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The Changing World of the American Military

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had Nelson and Howe, so that the juniors would know instinctively how they should act in battle. Perhaps still more surprising, British destroyers never engaged in rigorous tactical exercises before Jutland, and their captains entered battle without written orders outlining offensive destroyer doctrine. Nor were the British prepared to fight at night, given the poor quality of their searchlights and their inability after dark to recognize friend from foe. Even had he been alerted that the High Seas Fleet was breaking through the British line in a dash for home under cover of dark, Jellicoe would not have reopened battle. Instead, he would have retired eastward to a position from which he might intercept the Germans at dawn.

Material deficiencies also plagued the British at Jutland. It was powder explosions arising from inadequate anti-flash protection rather than insufficient armor that cost the Grand Fleet three battle cruisers. German ships were well built, but their ability to survive British fire is attributed by Marder to faulty armor piercing shells that exploded on impact rather than within the German ships, where they would cause the greatest damage. To its credit, the Royal Navy profited from the lessons of Jutland, quickly raising the Grand Fleet to a high level of efficiency.

Marder praises the High Seas Fleet for the quality of its ships, for the precision of its movements, and for the superiority of its gunnery in the early phases of battle. He rates Admiral Hipper, the German battle cruiser commander, the "outstanding sea officer of the war," but his estimate of Admiral Scheer, the Commander in Chief of the High Seas Fleet, is low as Scheer was repeatedly outmaneuvered by the British and as his prime objective, after learning that he confronted the entire Grand Fleet, was to flee for home. Although the Germans claimed victory on the basis of ships sunk, Jutland was surely a strategic victory for the

Grand Fleet, which retained control of the sea.

Marder's study of the battle and his superb explanation of the Grand Fleet's Battle Orders will delight every naval professional. It is safe to predict that no historian in our time will attempt a new study of Jutland, unless Professor Marder himself undertakes a third edition!

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Margiotta, Franklin D., ed. *The Changing World of the American Military*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978. 488pp.

This book of 25 essays by 34 contributors—academics, experienced defense bureaucrats and military officers—focuses on military professionalism, international and domestic influences, manpower issues, organization dynamics and change, the service academies, and the future.

It is based on working hypotheses regarding military professionalism propounded by Samuel Huntington in *The Soldier and the State* (1957) and Morris Janowitz in *The Professional Soldier* (1960). Huntington contributed a brief foreword and Janowitz the opening article. Only in a footnote at the end does one find Maj. Gen. Robert Ginsburgh's observation of Janowitz' work as a self-fulfilling prophecy, as one might argue with respect to Huntington. A number of the essays, notably those by Sam Sarkesian, B. Guy Peters and James Clofelter (coauthors), Charles Moskos, George Odiorne and James R. Golden, examine how military professionalism seems to have been eroded by various external pressures. Moskos, arguing a shift from "calling" to "occupation" and John Lovell, in his Athenian-Spartan model, make the most valiant tries at reconception, while veteran organizational theorists Odiorne's essay on the pitfalls of the

"activity trap" is the most diverting and clearly written piece.

Because of the fragmentation of the work, not all beads are on the string: some are strung that should not have been, or should be strung on another necklace—a normal problem with a book of essays. Having labored in that vineyard, this reviewer will not engage in easy criticism. Editor Margiotta has done a very craftsmanlike job. But because it represents a sympathetic, "insider" perspective the book, overall, lacks a certain edge. Conceptual and critical sallies are incremental, more like reconnaissance patrols than breakthroughs.

Interestingly, although there are no essays by academic or official historians, history is used by many authors not only to provide examples and embellish, but often to shore up main arguments, yet rarely with documentation. This is the case, for example, in the essay on military leadership by John Toomay, Richard Hartke, and Howard Elman, who suggest that Washington was an easy disciplinarian apparently in their ignorance of his monumental temper and heavyhanded use of field punishment when he first took command at Boston. On the other hand, the typing of Napoleon as authoritarian is well off heading. To learn that the need for military training in the 18th century was "nil" is amazing as that was an era when estimates of training for seasoned infantry ranged from 2 to 5 years. What, indeed, was von Steuben's function in the Continental Army? While Marx and Engels might agree with the suggestion that "before the age of technology the fighting man was motivated almost entirely by material considerations," such exceptions to this "law" as the Spartans, Crusaders, the Jesuit advisors to the Indians, various orders of warrior monks, the Arab armies of the 8th century, and the Janissaries come easily to mind.

In a similar vein, in an essay on "The Future Demands on the Military

Professional," Vice Adm. Gerald Miller suggests that the United States "has enjoyed relatively stable conditions of government and 200 years of proof that this system of government is sound." A hundred, perhaps. But did not our nation suffer the bloodiest Civil War of modern times? This is followed by an assertion that changes in society reflect upon the military in a "traditional and logical manner." Cases of the tail wagging the dog such as Cromwell's Ironsides, Napoleon, the Indian "mutiny," the Kronshadt sailors in the Russian Civil War, the Kiel Mutiny, Italian Fascism, the Spanish Nationalists, and the Japanese Army, 1923-41 come easily to mind. Did not Truman use the armed services as an example to the nation in ordering integration in 1947? At best, this is a chicken-egg argument. In Admiral Miller's argument that "Traditionally and logically, the operating forces have defined weapons requirements," what of Jefferson's gunboats; Congress blocking cavalry appropriations in the early 19th century; the Manhattan project; etc.? Several essays predicate a mystical past where civilians left the military in splendid isolation. How quickly the Truman Committee has been forgotten, not to mention the Covode Committee in the Civil War, the naval repair boondoggles of the 19th century, the Roosevelt-Root reforms, the War Industries Board. There is, also, frequent invocation of a world of almost monastic military professionalism before World War II. The aura of victory in World War II seems to have blinded many to careerism and bureaucratic maneuvering evident in diaries, memoirs, and biographies of that era, and in the official histories as well.

There is also frequent reference to civilianization as a recent phenomenon. Yet a century ago, General-in-Chief Sherman moved to St. Louis to escape the humiliation of being overridden by Robert Todd Lincoln, the Secretary of War, a battle that Sheridan also lost.

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To steer away from the uses and abuses of history, it should be noted that many essays herein focus on the effect of forces and trends in society upon recruiting, force maintenance, and training. Three measure academy cadet traits in respect to Janowitz' original data and hypotheses, looking at social class, political, and sex differential attitudes.

There is no point in commenting on what this book intentionally excluded: arms control; effects of technology on hardware; tactics, strategy, and doctrine; weapons systems; missions; minorities and women. As adaptation to change is a main theme, however, it is interesting to consider factors omitted or treated lightly. There is but passing reference to the possibility that the EM-NCO-officer rank system may stand as a barrier to recruitment and retention, or that the service academy 4-year degree-granting system may offer too high an entry threshold, in more than one sense, while ROTC may be too low. Margiotta in his summary and others, like Russell Hale and Leland Jordan, while analyzing new legal and budget constraints, recognize formal changes in the wiring diagram of power *vis à vis* Congress and the executive branch of government. Yet much external social change is left unmentioned, particularly in respect to very recent history, and there is very little suggestion of rewiring the board in the military system itself. No distinction is made between leadership and the exercise of formal authority. Margiotta comes closest to this issue in pointing out the extensive fragmentation of motive and function with the growth of the administrative tail, and suggests that a persistent negative self-role concept in the military, in spite of increasing public favor, needs to be examined more carefully. Indeed it does, and derivative hypotheses as well, that the shift from the rewarding, athletic camaraderie of "tribal" life at basic unit, ship, and aircraft crew levels to the

careerist, sedentary, cerebral, and competitive middle and upper layers is a vital part of that problem. And that the military, swimming against strong currents in the culture, to the point where the real upper classes are the most unrepresented element in the officer corps, tends to attract many who see themselves short of full status, in a kind of reverse image of the alienation of the left.

Margiotta also hypothesizes a declining likelihood of the use of military force by Western Powers, while Huntington suggests the same, but warns of overreaction should forces be employed. If true, such paramilitary activities as propaganda, intelligence analysis, and economic warfare are not receiving enough attention. Margiotta's prediction of "few Pearl Harbors" in the future is not wholly reassuring in the nuclear age when one might be more than enough. Thus, it seems strange that amid all the concern about civilian authority over the military in this book there is no weighing of the major driving force: the threat of nuclear war and the "red phone." Perhaps this omission is analogous to what Stouffer and his colleagues noted in World War II, that combat troops suppress fear of those weapons statistically most likely to kill or wound, and fixate instead on exotic oddities in the enemy arsenal.

Also interesting are Margiotta's comments on the very wide gap in differences between suborganization function, and between the various services, a point often brushed aside or overlooked. Yet, it might also be asked, have not such differences tended to blur out in the upper reaches of the defense bureaucracy? In all these cases, more research needs to be done, and this thought-provoking work has done a solid job of suggesting where wells are running dry and where new ones might be drilled. Perhaps landmark is too strong a word, but *The Changing World...* will be hard

for those interested in strategic studies to avoid.

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Scherer, John L., ed. *U.S.S.R. Facts and Figures Annual*. Gulf Breeze, Fla.: Academic International Press, 1979. v. 3. 308pp.

A review in these pages of the 1977 volume of this series commented on the accuracy and completeness of the information in that volume and noted that if "appropriate information can be presented in tabular or statistical format, it probably can be found in UFFA." Those comments remain valid.

This, the 1979 volume, continues to fulfill the promise of its editor to provide "recent, basic data in fifteen major areas of Soviet life." The organization of the series remains generally fixed; that is, there are chapters on Government, Party, Demography, Armed Forces, the Economy, Agriculture, etc., but information is not repeated from year to year. Rather, each volume of UFFA is planned as a continuation of earlier volumes. This will obviously keep the cost of each volume at a reasonable level but will require that its users have access to the entire series. In this regard it is suggested that the editor reprint the table of contents of preceding volumes in the current *Annual* or provide some other sort of index to material previously published. Scholars and reference librarians will appreciate the added convenience (as they must already appreciate the convenience of one excellent source for such a wide range of information).

Institutional libraries and individuals whose research requirements include broad Soviet data will come to depend on UFFA (and they may wish to enter a standing subscription with the publisher) but even the casual browser will benefit (list of new Soviet movies, information on crime and crime rates, instant

history in the year in review, major events from 1917 to the present, lists of artists and scientists, the complete constitution of the U.S.S.R., rental rates, the price of a television set, particle beam weapons assessment, biographic sketches, etc.). *U.S.S.R. Facts and Figures Annual* is the *World Almanac* of specifically Soviet information.

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Scott, Harriet Fast and Scott, William F. *The Armed Forces of the USSR*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979. 439pp.

In the delicate strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, the precise assessment of such quantitative power factors as orders of battle, force levels and technological developments represent only part of the matrix for determining the current posture of Soviet military power. Just as important, even if less tangible, are such qualitative areas as doctrine, strategy and organizational dynamics that add a meaningful thrust to the overall scope of the burgeoning Soviet military buildup as it has progressed over the past decade and a half. Despite the wealth of Soviet military source materials that has appeared during the post-1960 "Revolution in Military Affairs" period, there continues a distinct Western analytical tendency to "mirror image" or otherwise equate Soviet views on these qualitative factors with those more prevalent outside the U.S.S.R./Warsaw Pact region. In contrast, the work at hand allows the reader to view the Soviet Military Establishment as it perceives its own missions and roles in line with the above trio of qualitative factors and thereby helps clarify many of the misperceptions still apparent among the Western analytical community.

Both authors are highly qualified observers of the contemporary Soviet military scene. A former Air Force