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Book Reviews


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BOOK REVIEWS

Barnaby, Frank, ed. *Tactical Nuclear Weapons: European Perspectives*. London: Taylor and Francis, 1978. 371pp.

Van Cleave, William R. and Cohen, S.T. *Tactical Nuclear Weapons: An Examination of the Issues*. London: Macdonald and Jane's, 1978. 119pp.

The employment of tactical nuclear weapons has been a stepchild in Western military studies since the beginning of the sixties. In U.S. doctrine, a shift away from theoretical consideration of tactical nuclear warfare coincided with the enunciation of the strategy of flexible response and the decision to install a new locking system on American weapons in Europe. From the NATO perspective, both decisions undercut the belief in automatic recourse to nuclear weapons in European conflict. The topic of tactical nuclear weapons was revived forcefully in 1977 by the debate over DOD proposals to modernize American stocks. Controversy centered on what was popularly called the neutron bomb. *Tactical Nuclear Weapons: European Perspectives* represents the effort of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute to deal with many of the issues raised by the debate, as well as to present concerns that are more European than American in nature.

The value of the SIPRI volume lies in three areas. First, the book provides coverage of diverging opinions on a range of issues associated with the use of tactical nuclear weapons. For

example, one author may argue convincingly that the firebreak between nuclear and conventional weapons is inviolate (which is the real heart of the debate) and that improvements in tactical nuclear weapons will make it more likely that the firebreak will be crossed. Another counters, equally logically, that it is possible to separate strictly strategic and tactical nuclear forces and to do so without diminishing the value of either. A similar balance of opinions is also achieved on the issue of efforts to control or limit tactical nuclear weapons in Europe; alternative proposals are included with discussion of what levels of tactical nuclear disarmament are feasible.

The second value of the SIPRI book is that it clearly spells out the ambivalent attitude towards tactical nuclear weapons held by the European community and the dichotomy between American and European views. Essentially, the European position is a contradiction between the desire to use tactical nuclear weapons to preserve the American commitment (for those who accept them as part and parcel of deterrence) and the overwhelmingly negative reaction to the prospect of actual use of the weapons in European territory. The dilemma of the European position and the inevitable difference between American and European perspectives are inescapable facts if NATO is to produce a coherent doctrine of tactical nuclear warfare. That doctrine cannot be exclusively American if it is to be accepted and credible.

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Finally, the results of the SIPRI conference (of which this book resulted) lay to rest some of the conventional wisdom concerning tactical nuclear weapons that perhaps has been less wise than conventional. For example, the first chapter, setting out the history of tactical nuclear weapons, closely questions the assumption that Western analysts have operated with a correct assessment of the Soviet tactical nuclear threat. Given the almost total absence of hard data, the author notes that "the judgements of Western authors most often seem to be derived from a group of extremely limited and cryptic Soviet statements, from which many analysts seem to be able to obtain far more meaning and clarity than the original statements contain." As a result of this marginal information, categorical statements concerning what the Soviets have in their tactical nuclear stockpiles, where these weapons are, and for what purpose they are assigned, are not valid. Nor is the existence or nonexistence of a Soviet doctrine for the use of tactical nuclear weapons proven. Any attempt to encourage the formulation of a NATO position on tactical nuclear warfare must recognize this gap. Creating a doctrine to counter an ambiguous threat is difficult at best; it is nearly impossible if the ambiguity is not recognized.

A second example of laying conventional wisdom to rest concerns the performance of enhanced radiation weapons (or whatever name is chosen)—that is the falseness of the assumption that they are almost identical to conventional weapons. The designation "mini-nukes" or "clean" weapons is misleading. Initial collateral damage from low yield or enhanced radiation may be considerably less than that from conventional weapons or from larger yield fission weapons. The "advantage" of such weapons is that they achieve a high kill by initial radiation rather than by blast. However, in order to achieve this result the weapons actually cover pro-

portionately wider areas with delayed radiation effects than do conventional nuclear weapons. "Mini-nukes" is therefore a misnomer whose use could lead to incorrect judgments in the policy planning process. The dispelling of such common myths is a significant contribution of the SIPRI book.

The major challenge to the SIPRI book is likely to be a philosophical one in that the volume begins with the statement that tactical nuclear weapons should be eliminated. Such an opening could well put off the reader who recognizes the futility of bemoaning a technological development: the weapons exist, it remains to decide how to incorporate them or limit their use. Beyond this philosophical stumbling bloc, the reader should find considerable value in the detailed and readable history of tactical nuclear weapons provided by the book, and in its concluding presentation of opposing solutions.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons: an Examination of the Issues ranges less widely over the issues than does the SIPRI book. In fact, this book may be mistitled in that it is not truly an examination of the issues, but a presentation of one side of the case. The central theme is that the United States lacks a doctrine for the use of tactical nuclear weapons and needs to develop one. Much of the authors' argument is drawn from precisely the assumptions that are challenged by the SIPRI collection: the existence of a Soviet intention to use tactical nuclear weapons in Europe (based on Soviet citations that are apparently so limited that the authors are frequently forced to reuse them) and the relative "cleanness" of discriminate enhanced radiation weapons. The authors note that there are differences of opinion concerning these "facts" but are still willing to use them as the basis for later arguments. In this sense, the Van Cleave and Cohen book would serve better as a chapter in a larger collection than as a separate

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work. Structurally, the volume could fit as a chapter if the repetitions that characterizes each section were eliminated. Finally, in terms of content, there is a gap between the problem posed and the solutions offered. The authors focus on the lack of theory, but the concluding section on alternatives merely restates the need for a doctrine and shifts to consideration of some very specific non-doctrinal proposals, such as dispersal of forces and the introduction of VSTOL. These solutions do not parallel the theoretical questions presented throughout the book.

Neither the Van Cleave and Cohen book nor the SIPRI collection should be regarded as a final answer to where tactical nuclear weapons do or do not fit in modern arsenals. The merit of both is that they may stimulate other studies on the issues raised.

RENITA FRY

Baugh, Daniel A., ed. *Naval Administration 1715-1750*. London: Navy Records Society, vol. 120, 1977. 523pp.

Collinge, J.M., compiler. *Navy Board Officials 1660-1832 (Office Holders in Modern Britain, vol. 7)*. London: University of London, Institute of Historical Research, 1978. 152pp.

These two volumes are essential reference works for the student of English naval administration in the 17th and 18th centuries.

Professor Baugh's work is a selection of 437 documents that illustrate the most challenging administrative problems that faced the Royal Navy in a 37-year period of peace and war. The documents are carefully selected to stand by themselves as illustrations of a specific period and at the same time to complement works already in print. Most notably, this collection documents Professor Baugh's own well-known study of British Naval Administration in

the Age of Walpole (Princeton, 1965). There is much to be said for using the two volumes together. They are basically organized around the same categories, and the introductions to the different sections in the collection of documents provide some modification to his earlier judgments. In an additional short selection of material about Naval Stores and Timber, Baugh makes some important comments that modify or clarify several points in R.G. Albion's pioneer study, *Forests and Sea Power* (Harvard, 1926). Although there are a large number of documents on the subject of colonial naval stores, the documents printed here illustrate several points that have been previously overlooked. In particular, they complement the useful book by J.J. Malone, *Pine Trees and Politics: The Naval Stores and Forest Policy in Colonial New England 1691-1775* (University of Washington, 1964). Baugh's collection of documents makes a major contribution to our understanding of naval history and carries on the series of Navy Board papers that the Navy Records Society has published: *The Sergison Papers* for the period 1692-1702 and *Queen Anne's Navy* for the period 1702-14. Taking the three volumes together, one may see the manner in which the wartime procedures of 1692-1713 were consolidated and institutionalized by the middle of the 18th century.

Michael Collinge's work carries on the lists of Modern British Office Holders begun by J.C. Sainty. In 1975, Sainty published *Admiralty Officials 1660-1870*, a list of officials who served in the immediate office of the Lord High Admiral or Commissioners of the Admiralty. The men in that office were at the top of the navy's bureaucracy and were concerned with appointments, promotions, assignments and fleet operations under the direction of the cabinet. Collinge's work, like Baugh's, focuses on the administrative side that was dominated by the Navy Board, an

office that complemented the work of the Admiralty and dealt with naval pay and accounts, buildings, navy yards, repair and construction. Collinge has arranged his work into two major sections. The first lists each office under the Navy Board, and in an introductory paragraph discusses the development of each particular office and its area of responsibility, with an account of attempts to reform it, wages and salaries paid. Under each of these headings, a chronological listing is given with the dates of each official's service. The second major section of the book is an alphabetical listing of the officials who were employed at the Navy Board with their titles, dates of employment, and documentary source of that information. Through this structure, Collinge authoritatively covers the Navy Board's existence from its reconstitution under Charles II until its duties were merged with the Admiralty in 1832. Perhaps the most well-known individual in this list is Samuel Pepys, who was Clerk of the Acts at the Navy Board at the time he was writing his *Diary*.

Collinge has made a particularly valuable contribution and we hope that he will complete the job by giving us further volumes to clarify our understanding of naval affairs in this period. We still need to know more about the office of Treasurer of the Navy, resident officials at out-ports in Britain and abroad, The Victualling Board, The Transport Board, The Commissioners of Sick and Wounded Seamen, and The Prize Office.

Both these volumes make major contributions to naval history at a time when historians have only recently begun to turn from a narrative of battles to a systematic analysis of the bureaucracy and the quality of the administration that supported the fleet at sea.

J.B. HATTENDORF
Pembroke College
Oxford

Burns, James MacGregor. *Leadership*.
New York: Harper & Row, 1978.
530pp.

Writing the definitive book on *Leadership* is no mean feat. James MacGregor Burns has met the challenge with disarming energy and covers the waterfront in this doorstep pedagogical work that ranges from purely theoretical to practical in a balanced, thoughtful way. Whether one agrees with Burns' thesis or not, few could fault his carefully researched and documented attempt to develop a general theory of leadership. A political scientist by education and temperament, Burns chooses the behavioral approach to his analysis of leaders and politics of the world, past and present.

The study of behavior has revealed some commonality of needs among disparate peoples and cultures for countless years. Maslow articulated the universal nature of these needs in a popular and generally accepted foundation of motivation theory. In Burns' words, "Leadership over human beings is exercised when persons with certain motives and purposes mobilize, in competition or conflict with others, institutional, political, psychological, and other resources so as to arouse, engage, and satisfy the motives of followers." Such a definition springs from the study of new findings and concepts in psychology that Burns contends are the keys to understanding leadership. To support this proposition, several leaders (Gandhi, Lenin, and Hitler) are subjected to an extended psychobiographical autopsy that explores the roots of their leadership styles in an historically interesting yet not entirely convincing way.

Burns constructs two complementary concepts of leadership—transactional and transforming. The former connotes exchange of something valued. It can be "economic or political or psychological in nature." Good will, favors, bargaining chips, and quid pro quos support this

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style of mutual back patting. Such leadership lies at the heart of our democratic form of government and has a powerful influence despite its lack of moral conscience.

Raising "the level of human conduct and ethical aspiration of both leader and led" is the ultimate goal of transforming leadership. Gandhi is Burns' archetype for the leader with the vision, the presence, the imagination and the example to whom people of all walks of life eagerly respond. Mao is another; Woodrow Wilson and FDR don't make the cut.

When all the sententious fat is rendered from this idea of leadership's moral force and moral obligation, it makes good sense. George Washington's injunction seems to bear out the concept of transforming leadership: "It should be the highest ambition of every American to extend his views beyond himself, and to bear in mind that his conduct will not only affect himself, his country, and his immediate posterity; but that its influence may be coextensive with the world, and stamp political happiness or misery on ages yet unborn."

Leadership concludes with several chapters that tie the theoretical to the practical and that offer general prescriptive advice for practicing transforming leadership.

For all its strengths, there are some weaknesses in the book. Thomas Mann's edict, "In our time the destiny of man presents its meaning in political terms," aside, *Leadership* is poorly titled. Except for isolated instances, Burns supports his entire theoretical calculus with examples from political life—what about us in uniform? Burns claims that his theory is universal in application, that leadership for the politician, the teacher, the coach or the military man reduces to the same formula. If it's that simple, why is there such a strong and acknowledged need for leadership? Burns' examples of transforming leader-

ship are so sparse that even as a theoretical concept, its usefulness is limited. The gulf between the transactional and transforming leader is too great. There seems to be no middle ground. Few people in positions of leadership can remain in these transactional or transforming molds forever—their shadows are not as sharply contrasted as Burns would have us believe. The gray area in between, "contingency leadership" if you will, is where I believe most leaders spend most of their time, with frequent uneven migrations to both extremes. Warren Bennis describes this gray area in other terms: "The challenge is not for an omnipotent, omniscient 'man on a white horse'" but a fallible, somewhat idealistic individual who can reach the stirrups. That man is somewhere on the transactional side of Burns' transforming leader.

J.P. MORSE

Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Coleman, John S. Jr. *Bataan and Beyond*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1978. 210pp.

John Coleman's book affords an interesting view of the experiences Americans were forced to endure both as fighting men on Bataan and as prisoners of the Japanese. The book's main value, however, lies in its accurate depiction of the brutal physical and mental punishment inflicted upon Americans by their Japanese captors; punishment most civilized minds find difficult, if not possible, to comprehend.

Prior to the recapture of the Philippines, almost all American POWs were packed into the holds of "hell ships" and transported to prison camps in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, or Manchuria to perform slave labor. Many failed to survive the voyage but those who did found living conditions in their new camps as foul as those in the Philippines. In many they were worse.

The prisoners, to a man, suffered from malnutrition and various diseases

uncommon in the United States (scurvy, pellagra, beriberi, gynecomastia, avitaminosis, and others). Nevertheless, they were quickly forced to work like animals in unsafe mines, on docks, in railroad yards, factories, and shipyards. Harassed and degraded at every turn by brutal guards, they were always undernourished and inadequately clothed to stave off the cold of winter. They rested their emaciated bodies not on beds, but on rough boards—usually covered by a thin straw mat.

The grievously ill received little or no medical attention, and some were subjected to crude, often gruesome experimentation by Japanese doctors and medics. Brutal beatings for infractions of outrageous rules or trumped-up charges were the order-of-the-day. Men too sick to work were often beaten because they couldn't work. Sick men who tried to work rather than face ruthless guards in camp were beaten because they couldn't keep the pace.

It is little wonder then that of about 24,000 Americans of all services (mostly in their late teens or early twenties) captured in the Philippines, more than 13,000 died as Japanese prisoners. Of the roughly 11,000 Americans who survived to be repatriated, more than 5,000 have since died, most from the residual effects of prisoner of war experience.

There have been very few published accounts of Japanese work camps because those who survived them are, for one reason or another, incapable of writing about them or find such effort too depressing to recall. Coleman, however, paints a shocking picture of Yodogawa Bunshaw, one of many such work camps, where he was confined for 8 months. There is no exaggeration here and, difficult as it may be to believe, there were other work camps that were worse; few, if any were better.

Because Coleman is not a professional writer, it is unfortunate that the publisher did not see fit to edit his work. As a result, *Bataan and Beyond*

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lacking literary polish and style, often becomes tedious. Its main fault lies in the overabundance of Coleman's personal exploits that, at times, seem a little "tall" as stories go. Nevertheless, his account of conditions existing in Japanese POW camps is consistent with the facts, and should be of historic interest.

WALTER G. WINSLOW
Captain, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

Harrod, Frederick S. *Manning the New Navy: The Development of a Modern Naval Enlisted Force, 1899-1940*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978. 276pp.

To a Navy that alternately rejects and embraces a systems analyst's dehumanized methods, Harrod's work comes as an important example of how balanced, objective historical study can illuminate present naval problems by examining their past roots.

In his work, Harrod deals with a longstanding and complex problem of the Navy: the nature and maintenance of the enlisted force. He relies on an impressive range of sources to document his work, one of which is U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*. A perusal of its contents since its first publication in 1874 demonstrates that recruiting, training, preventing the desertion of and retaining high-quality enlisted men has long been a problem of the U.S. Navy. Harrod examines this dilemma in a crucial era—1899-1940. It was a period in which traditional seaboard sources no longer supplied the fleet with men who were familiar with the sea and when the Navy was embarking on both quantitative and qualitative material expansions.

In 171 pages of text, Harrod deals with "The Old Navy," the character and life of the men of the "New Navy," their recruitment, training, changing rate structure, recreation and welfare, naval justice and the officer-enlisted relationship. With a terse, almost anti-septic prose, he marshalls extensive and

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exhaustive research in a truly scholarly effort.

The problems of recruiting, promises of attractive duty and prospects for retention that plague today's Navy have their analogies in the period Harrod discusses. He analyzes these processes and offers insights into their importance. In an appendix of 13 tables, he delineates an interesting demographic picture of the enlisted force of the period. He also touches on the Navy's assessment of race relations and how racial policies were perceived and implemented in the fleet.

In its broadest sweep, Harrod's work has implications for naval leadership. Any man, officer or enlisted, who has served in the fleet can recall "white-hats" whom he admired, trusted and respected. He can also recall others who were less inspiring. Harrod speaks of both sorts.

A reading of *Manning the New Navy* will supply the officer and senior petty officer with a vantage point from which to view past personnel problems and from which to draw current inspiration for practical leadership.

LAWRENCE C. ALLIN
The University of Maine

Hutchinson, Martha C. *Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria, 1954-1962*. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1978. 178pp.

Among the more mundane results of the political terrorism problem has been the large number of popular and scholarly books published to meet the public's interest, as well as to fulfill certain imperatives of a free economic system. Anyone familiar with the literature dealing with terrorism could successfully predict the contents of a stereotypical book-length treatment of the problem. Included would be obligatory chapters treating the IRA, the

PLO, the Cypriot EOKA, the Tupamaros, and the concluding chapter would cite evidence indicating terrorist cooperation across national boundaries and across organizational lines. Naturally, the closing page or so would consist of a bit of prognostication on the prospect of nuclear terror. Several of the general works are quite competent, refreshingly provocative and informative—perhaps to the extent that they deviate from the stereotype—sadly many are not. Among the best might be cited J. Bowyer Bell's *A Time of Terror*, Anthony Burton's *Urban Terrorism*, Edward Hyams' *Terrorists and Terrorism*, and Paul Wilkinson's uniquely analytic *Political Terrorism*.

What is lacking at this point are systematic, in-depth treatments of specific terrorist campaigns. For it is only through the exhaustive (and unfortunately, exhausting) study of the many ways in which terrorism has manifested itself that the (dis)utilities and (dis)incentives for political terrorism can be comprehended. The surfeit of terrorism books does not include a great number of such extensive treatments. Not that it is hard to understand why, given the paucity of evidence, the clandestine nature of the terrorism enterprise, and the shortcomings of the researchers (e.g., linguistic). There are however a few notable works in the vanguard of this approach. Noteworthy works include Jillian Becker's study of the Baader-Meinhof Gang, *Hitler's Children*; Bell's study of Jewish terrorism in mandatory Palestine, *Terror Out of Zion*; and finally John Cooley's impressive and valuable study of the fedayeen (Palestinian terrorists), *Green March, Black September*.

Thus, it is with great anticipation that Martha C. Hutchinson's new book, *Revolutionary Terrorism* is received—a study of the use of terrorism by the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) during the Algerian war. It is odd that the FLN terror campaign, matched in its

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scope and effect probably only by the Irgun in the Holy Land, has not been subjected to more thorough treatment to date. Even in the general works, the space accorded the Algerian revolution is disproportionately small when compared to other terrorist campaigns. Two of the better recent books only cite the FLN on five out of nearly 700 pages; only Anthony Burton provides more than cursory treatment (about 10 pages). Thus, *Revolutionary Terrorism*, to the extent that it succeeds, is an especially welcomed addition to the literature.

Perhaps it is best to be explicit about what *Revolutionary Terrorism* is not. It is not a comprehensive chronicle or history of the events of the Algerian revolution. In fact, the reader unacquainted with those events would be well advised to first read Alistair Horne's superb history, *A Savage War of Peace, Algeria 1954-1962*, before starting *Revolutionary Terrorism*.

Hutchinson proceeds from a definition of revolutionary terrorism as a systematic and purposeful method for seizing political power through individual acts of extraordinary and symbolic violence, directed against victims or objects in such a way as to be psychologically effective, in order to change political behavior and attitudes. She ascribes the prevalence of revolutionary terrorism to its small costs as compared to its much larger benefits for the perpetrator (terrorism at its essence being an effective weapon of the weak).

Paradoxically, terrorism, which often appears irrational or unpredictable—an image that may contribute to its political effectiveness—is basically a rational revolutionary strategy, in the sense of being a reasonable political choice. Terrorism is a policy that entails foreseeable costs and benefits. The terrorism of the FLN was the result of deliberate decisions by the revolutionary

elite, not, in most cases, a pathological or irrational outburst. (p. 36)

(Perhaps 100,000 Muslim Algerians and 5,000 Frenchmen died at FLN hands. Whether this represents a "reasonable political choice" is at least problematic; it is certainly ghastly within any humanist philosophical framework.)

The fundamental aims of the FLN were to obtain the absolute independence of Algeria from France and for the FLN to be the sole representative of Algerian nationalism. In pursuit of these aims, the FLN sought to: (1) gain support of the "native" population; (2) isolate and weaken the French in Algeria; (3) influence the population of France; and (4) gain international support and assistance. In furtherance of these aims, terrorism was consciously chosen as an instrument of the Algerian revolution.

Hutchinson imposes a typology on FLN use of terror. While the typology is useful, the categories are not mutually exclusive, and one suspects that it might be the orderliness of the presentation, rather than the analytical neatness of the terrorists, that attenuates the chaos (and passion) of the revolution. In any event, there is something to be gained in contemplating the functions of FLN terrorism, even if the data is less than orderly; accordingly, a verbal sketch of parts of Hutchinson's typology follows: No doubt the most important function of terrorism in Algeria was creating an obedient and compliant population. "Anyone who was not actively pro-FLN risked being labeled a traitor . . ." Concomitant with the creation of a compliant populace was the use of endorsement terrorism largely directed against the colons, and intended to influence Algerian Arab attitudes toward the FLN. Endorsement terrorism included acts of vengeance, as well as acts carefully calculated to provoke repression by the French against the Muslim populace. For example, the terror-murders of

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71 Europeans, 31 French soldiers, and 21 Algerians in August 1955 led swiftly to an estimated 12,000 dead at French hands. There were two supreme ironies in the Algerian war. One was the degree to which the French acted as if they sought the alienation of the Arab people of Algeria, and the second was that in an anticolonial revolution against France, the preponderance of victims were not French, but Arab objects of both French and FLN violence.

A third function of terrorism was the *destruction* of the French regime through the truncation of intelligence links, the promotion of noncooperation, the discouragement of colon contacts with the Muslims, and the creation of an atmosphere of pervasive insecurity. In general, this facet of the FLN campaign did not succeed in affecting the resolve of the French colonialists (indeed it had an opposite effect), but it did isolate the two communities from each other, and it did render both more susceptible to extremist leadership. Hutchinson appears to be mistaken in her assessments of the damage done to the French intelligence system, which managed to sustain itself through a brutal policy of torture and intimidation that was especially effective in the Battle of Algiers.

Yet a fourth functional variant was *organizational* terrorism, intended to settle internal disputes, eliminate competitors, enforce discipline, and recruit members. Hutchinson holds that this use of terrorism "was probably less significant for the FLN, however, than any other form." In view of Alistair Horne's citation of French claims that 12,000 members of the FLN were killed in internal purges, as well as 4,300 Algerians killed in factional disputes in France, it is hard to understand the author's diminishment of this facet of FLN terrorism. Perhaps the only explanation for Hutchinson's interpretation is the fact that she might consider such terrorism as of the compliance

rather than the *organizational* variety, thus illustrating the ambiguity of her typology.

Hutchinson concludes her treatment with discussions of the French response to terrorism, and the FLN's attempts to internationalize the conflict. We know that the French combination of "unresponsiveness with impotence" led to political gains for an adversary that had been defeated militarily. In France, the pattern of FLN terrorism seemed constantly to remind the French public of their presence in Algeria and its costs, both in gold and flesh. In the end, of course, DeGaulle sacrificed the province to save the state. "It was not so much that the FLN 'won' but that the French 'lost' the war."

Revolutionary Terrorism is a step in the right direction—that is, toward the intensive study of specific groups and campaigns. The prose is not elegant; there is a bit too much equivocation; a lexicon might have been nice; and the lack of adequate development of several chapters is distressing (e.g., especially the chapter treating internationalization of the war). However, that being said, the reader interested in terrorism (or revolution or Middle Eastern studies) will find Professor Hutchinson's book a worthwhile afternoon's reading, which is more than can be said for many books in the terrorism family.

AUGUSTUS R. NORTON
Major, U.S. Army

Jones, David R., ed. *The Military-Naval Encyclopedia of Russia and the Soviet Union*, Volume I. Gulf Breeze, Fla.: Academic International Press, 1978. 247pp.

This is the first of a projected 50 volumes plus indexes and supplements. Entries run from a few lines to 15 or more pages and the longer signed entries have extensive bibliographic notes. Subject coverage, at least in this volume, appears comprehensive: there are

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aircraft, ship, and weapons systems designations and descriptions; battle, campaign, and unit histories; biographies; essays on diplomacy, doctrine, and geography; military terms and the many other categories necessary for thorough treatment of entries from "A" to "Ad."

This encyclopedia promises to become the leader in its field. Scholars, researchers, even those with casual questions will find it invaluable—if they are patient. The publication schedule calls for only 2-3 volumes annually and that translates to a 15-25 year wait for the entire series; and they will want to be associated with a subscribing library because at \$30.50 per volume, the total investment may be more substantial than most individuals will wish to undertake.

W.R. PETTYJOHN
Commander, U.S. Navy

King, Irving H. *George Washington's Coast Guard*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1978. 229pp.

Dr. King offers an interesting history of the Revenue Cutter Service, forerunner of today's Coast Guard, during the years 1789-1801. At first impression this book would seem to have a somewhat narrow appeal to American history buffs and coastguardsmen but after just a few pages the reader is quickly immersed in the problems of this young nation and the urgent needs for an agency to collect revenue during the Federalist Era.

The fascinating thing about this short book (only 170 pages of text) is that many of the problems and circumstances faced by our founding fathers are still with us today. There is a chapter on command selection for the first 10 cutters. President Washington and Secretary Hamilton sought information about candidates from many sources but kept close personal control over the final selection process.

Washington retained for himself the exclusive right to appoint these masters. Prior military experience, seamanship ability and even political influence played roles in the selection process.

The building of these first 10 ships, for which Hamilton desired to pay no more than \$1,000 apiece, was plagued by cost overruns and change orders. Finding builders who would construct "large" cutters for limited money was frustrating. In spite of this, Hamilton had the foresight to have the ships built in shipyards in various parts of the country to set up a shore establishment rather than have them all built in a single yard, and he had the prospective masters of the vessels supervise the construction. His objective was to "... build a ship not just to acquire a revenue cutter but to reap for the nation a harvest of military, economic and political benefits that would surely flow from the cutter establishment."

The domestic manufacture of sailcloth was fostered to decrease dependency on foreign imports and when, in December 1794, it was decided to import 20 anchors from Europe for use on six frigates Hamilton ordered the U.S. Minister to the Court of St. James to give a preference to American bottoms when he shipped the anchors.

Pay for the crews of the cutters was frequently a problem, and the fact that a master mariner could secure better compensation for sailing merchant ships than for sailing cutters made it difficult to attract officers for the service. This must sound familiar to the naval aviation and nuclear submarine communities.

In the desire for economy many of the cutters sailed shorthanded and in 1796 Hamilton's successor at Treasury, Oliver Wolcott, in a report on officers' pay to the House of Representatives, explained that the petitioners reported "... their compensation as being inadequate in consequence of the late increase of the prices of provisions,

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& . . . [cost] of liv[ing], and pray that they may be increased."

Concerning operation of the cutters, although their primary mission was revenue collection, they quickly were engaged in such additional duties as aiding distressed mariners, charting the harbors and coastal waters, maintaining aids to navigation and augmenting the new Navy during the Quasi-War with France. During that period, the cutters convoyed American merchant ships, helped keep open the sealanes of the North Atlantic and the Caribbean, captured 16 armed French vessels, participated in the capture of four others and recaptured 10 American vessels that had been seized by the French. One master even developed a method to distill fresh water from salt water aboard ship, no doubt the precursor of today's ship-board evaporators.

Coast Guard and Navy officers and those with a liking for American history should find this a fascinating book despite the narrow time period covered and the resemblance to a doctoral dissertation. The similarity of problems of the 1790s and the 1970s should give us cause to reflect on how far we really have come in the past 200 years.

J.W. DUENZL
Captain, U.S. Coast Guard

Lewy, Guenter. *America in Vietnam*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978. 576pp.

Shortly after the fall of Saigon, President Ford announced that there would be no official investigation of the causes of the American defeat in Southeast Asia. By and large, journalists and scholars have exhibited a similar disinterest. Vietnam is yesterday's newspaper that featured a confusing, emotional and tragic story we'd rather forget.

One, however, who chose to analyze rather than ignore the war is Dr. Guenter Lewy, Professor of Political Science

at the University of Massachusetts. A scholar who previously had been nominated for a National Book Award, Lewy devoted 5 years of research to his subject. The result is an excellent book organized around the examination of two issues: U.S. military strategy and tactics in Vietnam and the morality of the U.S. combat conduct.

Lewy's 200-page military history of the Vietnam war—the first half of the book—relies extensively upon thousands of official secret reports he demanded and received under the Freedom of Information Act. He explains succinctly the major phases of the war, criticizing as futile the basic U.S. military strategy of attrition. He attributes this strategy to organizational determinism: a military bureaucracy that persisted in "doing its thing" even when its own analyses (that Lewy quotes) damned the strategy. According to Lewy, it was this "special [military] knowledge that Westmoreland and most of his subordinates had [that] equipped them poorly to understand the political and social dynamics of the war."

Lewy does not suggest that it was communist rhetoric that triumphed over American bullets. The final defeat of South Vietnam was brought about by a strong, modern, conventional North Vietnamese army. Lewy's point is that the basic South Vietnamese weakness was a lack of leadership. U.S. military professionals, he writes, knew of and yet chose to ignore that fact, preferring to fight in place of the South Vietnamese. Lewy does not suggest, however, that defeat was inevitable. He explains, without excusing them, Thieu's 1975 decisions as heavily influenced by the sharp drop in American material support. He cites Nixon's 1973 secret written promise that the United States "will respond with full force should the [cease-fire] settlement be violated by North Vietnam." Lewy concludes that the fall of South Vietnam had many causes: the iron will and incredible

sacrifice of lives by the North Vietnamese politbureau; lack of South Vietnamese leadership and of a cohesive society; an inept U.S. military strategy; and American domestic divisiveness and incoherent war aims.

Lewy devotes the latter half of his book to the moral aspects of the U.S. military conduct of the war. He deals with terrorism, atrocities, prisoners, and aerial bombing. For each subject he systematically presents the case against the U.S. military and reviews the evidence. Many of the accusations were well-publicized, as were the accusers: David Dellinger, Richard Falk, Jane Fonda, Ramsey Clark, etc. Lewy concludes that "charges of officially condoned illegal and grossly immoral conduct are without substance." He states that the American military showed more concern for the safety and property of civilians during the Vietnam war than during World War II or the Korean war. The reader is left with the impression that truth about the American military conduct in Vietnam counted for less than political expediency and news sensationalism.

In sum, Professor Lewy has written a careful, documented, readable capsule military history of the U.S. military effort in Vietnam. It is an excellent professional work.

F.J. WEST
Naval War College

Murphy, Paul J., ed. *Naval Power in Soviet Policy*. Washington: U.S. Dept. of the Air Force, 1978. 341pp.

This is a balanced, scholarly, and current collection of essays for serious students of the Soviet Navy. The tired "Russians are coming in Tall Ships!" material standard in popularized writing for the past 15 years is absent. This is a lean, tough book written by professionals for other professionals who are not reluctant to let their minds probe ahead of any party line. Its solid con-

tent is comparable to that of the landmark McCwire series at a fraction of their price.

A concise opening chapter, cataloging Admiral Gorshkov's writing by subject, serves as a springboard for discussion of policy and Soviet naval employment. Included is William H. Thomson's essay on the long and continuing internal debate on the role of Russian navies in Russian policy concluding that Gorshkov faces internal Soviet opposition to his vision for the navy and that it is questionable to assume that all of his writings will be translated into naval reality. John J. "Buck" Herzog matches Soviet naval development with unfolding national purposes and makes the best case yet for the existence of an important Soviet pro-SSBN mission—a logical theory gaining belated acceptance in the United States. Concluding the policy/naval employment section, Alva M. Bowen's essay examines the Anglo-German and Soviet-American naval rivalries, and is a useful reminder of the continental origins of Soviet naval doctrine.

The second part of the book, "Naval War-Fighting: Capabilities and Missions," plows scant new ground but adds current and complete summaries of structure of the Soviet Navy and Soviet Naval Aviation by the editor to updates of the works of Michael McCwire and Robert W. Herrick. The chapter on Soviet Naval Aviation is a particularly useful and complete reference. Chapters by Claude R. Thorpe on the use of the Delphi Technique in determining Soviet naval mission priorities and by the team of Dimitry N. Ivanoff and Frank M. Murphy on the methodology of predicting Soviet naval technology are informative but concern analytic technique more than the Soviet Navy. Donald C. Daniel of the U.S. Navy Postgraduate School explores trends in major Soviet naval exercises in a piece worth remembering when OKEAN 80 begins its run on the world oceans.

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Rounding out the "War-Fighting" section is the most stimulating and entertaining essay in the book, "U.S. vs. Soviet Style Fleet Design," by Norman Friedman. He uses fresh and freewheeling historical analogy to look at the Soviet Navy from novel angles. By daring to be wrong, Mr. Friedman may be startlingly right over a wide range of topics. New thought about the Soviet Navy has always been scarce and is sometimes not officially welcomed.

Shifting the focus to peacetime issues are short sections on the Soviet view of naval arms limitation and Soviet forward naval deployment. Sophisticated analyses by Abram N. Shulsky, Albert E. Graham and a trio from the Center for Naval Analysis, Robert Weinland, Anne Kelly Calhoun, and Charles Peterson are equal to the complexities of the subject.

A nice bonus is the compact mass of reference material tabulated in the appendixes and interspersed in the text. A glossary of selected Soviet naval terms is unusual and illuminating. Much is suggested by subtle differences in our naval language.

Naval Power in Soviet Policy is recommended reading for military professionals. Mr. Murphy, assisted by his wife Margaret Murphy, should repeat this fine effort 2 or 3 years hence. The Air Force is commended for making so much information and expert opinion available in a compact, affordable book. Similar collections on Soviet ground and air forces are needed.

HAMLIN CALDWELL

Seton-Watson, Hugh. *The Imperialist Revolutionaries. Trends in World Communism in the 1960s and 1970s.* Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1978. 152pp.

Readers in the Kremlin, if there are any, will not like this book.

Hugh Seton-Watson, the dean of Western historians specializing in communist affairs, plays hard-ball:

One point on which Marxist-Leninists and old-style Russian imperialists could unite... was that what was good for the CPSU and the Soviet state was also good for its non-Russian citizens...

... the system of repression by the Committee of State Security (KGB) is immensely more ruthless and comprehensive than was any modern European colonial repression...

The language of Russian falsifiers of the histories of non-Russian peoples strikingly recalls the language of Victorian British or Wilhelmian German imperialism... for the Soviet Russian myth-makers are one more in the line of upstart imperialist elites glorifying their supremacy over lesser breeds...

Soviet propaganda has created a grotesque dreamworld of blissful brotherhood among socialist nations: judged by this standard, Soviet reality is shameful and oppressive...

The public posture of the rulers of the second super power was arrogant, boastful, and self-righteous.

Seton-Watson's purpose is to survey the activities of communism in the world in the 1960s and 1970s. Tasks of this magnitude usually are undertaken through collective action and the result is an uneven volume of essays by assorted authors. By contrast, *The Imperialist Revolutionaries* is an even, strong, brief work of scholarly interpretation that packs important political and strategic punch.

Starting on the basis that polycentrism is a fact (two centers of communist power: Moscow and Peking; an illusory third center, Havana, actually subservient to Moscow; and a possible fourth center, Hanoi), Seton-Watson proceeds to survey the globe. More comfortable with East European and

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Soviet internal developments, he nevertheless casts a critically interpretive eye on events in Western Europe, Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and the Asian southern and eastern rims. Conclusion:

The events of the last decade showed less progress for the communist cause in developing societies, and more progress in advanced industrial societies, than was to be expected in the early 1960s.

The basis for this judgment is not that of revolutionary takeovers. These occurred in five developing states: Cuba, South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Angola. Rather, the basis is that of growing Communist Party strength in Western Europe, "The Enigma of Eurocommunism," simultaneously with the lapse of noncommunist resolve into "short term hedonism and a collective guilt complex." Seton-Watson sees a failure of nerve in the West that bodes ill.

However, if the European communist parties succeed to power, he does not accept that they will be clients of Moscow:

... Italian or French Eurocommunists might conceivably welcome NATO as a defense against Soviet attack. It was, after all, true that the Chinese and Yugoslav governments had long reckoned with the possibility of armed resistance to Soviet forces; why should not West European communists do likewise?

Thus Seton-Watson sees Eurocommunism as, at best, a mixed blessing and, at worst, a curse, for the Kremlin. Eurocommunist issues impact on the Soviet succession. Brezhnev's heirs likely now are taking sides on how to treat its possibilities. If it succeeds, the impact in Eastern Europe and among the nationalities may result in upheaval difficult to control. If it fails, the peaceful road to socialism will be seen

to have dead-ended. The military road, with its deadly uncertainties, will remain.

For their part, the Eurocommunists face horrendous choices. To be too revolutionary is to drive the middle classes to the right. To be too conciliatory is to drive the workers and intelligentsia to the extreme left. If they successfully participate in coalitions, they risk feedback on the Eastern European communists. If they defend the Soviet record, they lose votes. If they succeed in reducing defense expenditures, they risk Soviet occupation. If they support defense expenditures, they are typed as American stooges.

To complicate their dilemma there is the Chinese aspect. Seton-Watson notes that Peking is recommending energetic defense measures and Atlantic unity, but the phenomenon is much more significant and deserves more emphasis. The Chinese Government is fully committed to the strategy of a second front against Moscow and is using all means available, ideologic, economic, psychological, to gain that end. Moreover, Peking's counter-Soviet efforts extend around the globe and encompass the spectrum from espionage and subversion, propaganda, psychological warfare, and diplomacy to proxy combat. This was apparent during the period covered, but is insufficiently highlighted.

One hundred and fifty-two pages of profound interpretation by a great historian, this book is one of true merit.

WILLIAM A. PLATTE
Captain, U.S. Navy

Suid, Lawrence H. *Guts & Glory*
... *Great American War Movies*.
Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley,
1978. 357pp.

There is only one problem with this book; it's mistitled. What if a seductive nude had been used as the cover for Gray's *Anatomy*? A potential reader who is attracted by the title and cover

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will probably not make it through the contents. A scholar seeking the wealth of information contained therein might never glance inside, assuming it to be simply another gossipy Hollywood exposé. This is a sincere piece of thorough, balanced research on the portrayal of the military by profit-oriented commercial films. Seventy-one movies are discussed—why they were made, how they were made, and how they were received—including the cooperation given or withheld by military public information offices. It has the quality of a doctoral dissertation, yet a broader appeal to a generation for whom John Wayne had far more influence on World War II than did Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

There are several interesting revelations in the book, providing perceptions not obvious to either a military man or to a moviegoer. In labeling several films as antiwar (or at least in stating that to be the intended statements of their makers) Suid leaves one with the implication that the majority are "pro war." Yet, he's not quite certain (nor am I) what a film advocating war would look like. Newsreels with martial music and a detached observer's view of guns, bombs, airplanes and ships may glorify war. But without fail the films he discusses get inside the airplanes and ships to show the men, then attempt to get inside the men for a personalized view of why they will kill and risk being killed—the personal, unit, corporate and national motivation for what normally would be an irrational act. Perhaps one of the best of this genre is *Twelve O'Clock High*, still used as a teaching vehicle at such diverse institutions as the Naval War College and Harvard.

The second interesting point comes from Suid's lucid exploration of the military bureaucracy's reaction to re-

quests for support of various films. A producer attempting to film scripts about the military obviously can do a more efficient job if he has access to military expertise, hardware, and real estate. Suid makes the point that, while fine films have been done without assistance, credibility among the large audience familiar with military hardware and techniques demands realistic simulation. Military policymakers are pictured as overly concerned not with the artistic quality of a film—more accurately of the script as they are consulted in advance of filming—but with possible derogatory effects on an audience's images of "the American fighting man." Films of posterboard people performing mundane tasks in a "military manner" would be supported more readily than would more penetrating studies of men suffering moral dilemmas and exhibiting physical weaknesses in the face of mortal conflict. Killing and being killed is a rather irrational way for an American to make a living. Acceptance of that fact might make us more ready to permit unretouched and even caricatured pictures to stand or fall on their own merit.

To me it seems vital that we explore as many of the facets of warfare as possible—so that commitments of force, if they must be made, will be undertaken with full knowledge of the possible consequences. The characters of Captain Queeg and Dr. Strangelove do not epitomize man at war—any more than do General Patton and John Wayne. Suid's book provides an authoritative view of Hollywood's contribution to this understanding. It is a readable and commendable research contribution.

D.G. CLARK
Commander, U.S. Navy

RECENT BOOKS

Selected Accessions of the Naval War College Library

Annotated by

Ann Hardy, with Kathleen Ashook
Doris Baginski and Mary Ann Varoutsos

Backer, John H. *The Decision to Divide Germany; American Foreign Policy in Transition*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1978. 212pp. \$9.95
The author challenges the views of both traditionalist and revisionist historians who contend that some grand strategy on the part of the Soviet Union or the United States was responsible for the partition of Germany along its present boundaries. Instead, Backer shows that the failure to unify the Eastern and Western zones of occupation resulted from a series of small, usually low-level, incremental decisions motivated by expediency rather than by long-range considerations.

Buccheim, Lothar-Günther. *U-Boat War*. New York: Knopf, 1978. n.p.
\$17.50

As a young artist assigned to report German war operations through "suitable" pictures, Buccheim joined a U-boat crew. To capture the realities of daily life in the inhumanly confined conditions of the boat he draws extensively from 5,000 personal photographs. The monotony of days of vigilance and testing contrasts with the feverish activity of attacks and the harrowing anxiety of defending against enemy action. Insufficient in numbers and antiquated in design, the German submarines were constantly sent out on hopeless missions, while the crews grew increasingly bitter at unfulfilled promises of improved boat replacements. Buccheim's opinion of Dönitz is uncomplimentary. German submarine warfare against the British Isles is classed as "the most frightful chapter in naval history . . . 27,941 German officers and enlisted men dead."

Evron, Yair. *The Role of Arms Control in the Middle East*. Adelphi Papers, no. 138. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1977. 43pp. \$1.50

The influence of the Arab-Israeli arms race on the strategic doctrines and peace negotiations of the countries involved are explored in this study of the past, present, and future of arms control measures in the Middle East.

Gaan, Margaret. *Last Moments of a World*. New York: Norton, 1978. 273pp.
\$9.95

A Eurasian woman who grew up in Shanghai during the turbulent years from 1920 to 1950 presents an intriguing blend of reminiscences that reveal her own personal growth and adventure, glimpses of middle-class Chinese family life, and constant awareness of the dramatic political events unfolding all the while—the Japanese invasion, World War II, civil war, and the Communist victory.

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Gervasi, Tom. *Arsenal of Democracy; American Weapons Available for Export*. New York: Grove Press, 1977. 240pp. \$14.95

Approximately 600 major American weapons and items of defense equipment that are currently being used by other countries, or are available for sale to them, are surveyed in this study of the role of the United States as a major arms supplier.

Gray, Colin S. *The Future of Land-Based Missile Forces*. Adelphi Papers, no. 140. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1977. 36pp. \$1.50

Because of the growing vulnerability of the ICBM, the future of land-based missile forces will be a major concern to military planners and analysts well into the 1980s. After exploring several alternative strategies, the author advances two claims: that unilateral abandonment of silo-housed missiles would seriously jeopardize the bargaining position of the United States in SALT III; and that the location of land-mobile ICBMs can be accurately verified to an acceptable degree.

Hirst, David. *The Gun and the Olive Branch; the Roots of Violence in the Middle East*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977. 367pp. \$12.95

Termed by some a conflict between right and right, violence between Arabs and Jews has erupted into four full-scale wars in the last 30 years. This historical survey, written from an admittedly anti-Zionist point of view, traces the acts of violence from the start of Jewish immigration to Palestine at the turn of the century to the present day, in light of the moral, political, and psychological climate in which they occurred.

Hough, Richard. *The Great Admirals*. New York: William Morris, 1977. 271pp. \$19.95

Maps, illustrations, and bits of contemporary songs and poetry enliven these tales of 21 admirals, whose adventures span the years from galleons to aircraft carriers.

Magnusson, Sigurdur A. *Northern Sphinx: Iceland and the Icelanders from the Settlement to the Present*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977. 261pp. \$12.00

Written by a native Icelander, this book offers an interesting survey of Icelandic history; the culture and artistry of the people are emphasized, and the contemporary aspects of the country are examined and discussed.

Martin, John B. *U.S. Policy in the Caribbean*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978. 420pp. \$19.00

Since the optimistic days when President Kennedy's Alliance for Progress attempted to nurture democracy and social reform in Latin America by means of development assistance, profound revolutionary changes have swept that area. This study examines those changes in the Caribbean, the effect they have already had on American foreign policy, and what effects should be expected in the future.

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Oxenfeldt, Alfred R., et al. *A Basic Approach to Executive Decision Making*. New York: AMACOM, 1978. 229pp. \$12.95

In this prescriptive rather than descriptive approach to decisionmaking the emphasis is on the mental activity in the process and on problem decisions over opportunity and planning decisions. Regarding the executive as a manager of decisionmaking and the decision as a production-line operation, the authors treat eight steps in a sound decision process, ranging from objectives to creativity.

Rubenstein, Murray and Goldman, Richard. *Shield of David; an Illustrated History of the Israeli Air Force*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1978. 223pp. \$12.50

Known as the *Chel Ha'Avir*, the Israeli Air Force was created shortly before the British withdrawal from Palestine in 1947. Having engaged in four wars and many skirmishes during the last 30 years, it is one of the most battle-tested air forces in the world. This colorful account of the men, the airplanes, and the missions they have flown is supplemented by a chronology, the flight log of one of Israel's first fighter pilots, and data on armament, aircraft, and camouflage.

Sadat, Anwar. *In Search of Identity; an Autobiography*. New York: Harper & Row, 1978. 360pp. \$15.00

Throughout this autobiography the Egyptian President features his own self-evaluation and philosophy, describing himself as guided by the principles of love, truth, idealism, and beauty. Yet he practiced deceit in his foreign relations maneuvering for Egyptian freedom, and while stating that his love for Nasser "never diminished," he is highly critical of the former President's nature and leadership. Sadat is outspoken in his disapproval of British colonialism, Soviet unreliability, Israel's totally self-serving conduct, and U.S. executive "deceptions" in support of Israel. Yet he also commends American efforts to achieve peace in the Middle East where his own peace initiative is an attempt to breach the immemorial psychological barrier between Israel and Egypt.

Security Issues Symposium, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 1975. *Strategies, Alliances, and Military Power; Changing Roles*. Leyden, Neth.: Sijthoff, 1977. 372pp. \$33.95

The research and analysis efforts of a group of officers and civilian professionals at the Army War College are represented in this collection of 16 essays on matters of national security. Among the topics discussed are the moral dimension of strategy; arms trade; U.S. foreign relations and commitments; foreign treaties and politics and their significance for the United States; American and NATO defense policies and strategies; the role of theater nuclear forces; and the civilian based defense concept and its relevance to U.S. security interests.

Stern, Laurence. *The Wrong Horse: the Politics of Intervention and the Failure of American Diplomacy*. New York: Times Books, 1977. 170pp. \$10.00

Using American involvement in the Cyprus crisis as a model for U.S. foreign policy as practiced under the leadership of Secretary of State Kissinger, this

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study presents an in-depth analysis of the role of the C.I.A., the military, and the diplomatic service in Greek and Cypriot internal affairs from 1960 to 1977. The main premise is that lately the United States has been following an outmoded cold war policy that has supported the forces of oppression and repression rather than the forces of reform and democracy throughout the world.

Udis, Bernard. *From Guns to Butter: Technology Organizations and Reduced Military Spending in Western Europe*. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1978. 368pp. \$16.50

Authoritative interviews provided the data on the experience of seven Western European industrialized countries in transferring resources from military to civilian markets, the major focus being on industry's adjustment to the changeover. Many of the policies and approaches adopted to effect the conversion are seen as applicable and practical for U.S. purposes.

Warner, Denis. *Certain Victory: How Hanoi Won the War*. Kansas City, Kans.: Sheed Andrews and McMeel, 1978. 295pp. \$9.95

The author, with long experience as a war correspondent and journalist covering the Far East and Southeast Asia, writes as a concerned Australian of the war in Indochina that was unremitting despite the Paris Peace settlement. The Cambodian-North Vietnamese struggle is the central focus of the book which draws heavily on North Vietnam's Gen. Van Tien Dung's detailed account of the final offensive against South Vietnam. Of particular interest is Mr. Warner's personal inside knowledge of many of the actors and of Asian political intrigues.

Winslow, Ron. *Hard Aground; the Story of the "Argo Merchant" Oil Spill*. New York: Norton, 1978. 286pp. \$10.95

To illustrate the growing need for improved antipollution operations and equipment, this account vividly re-creates the ineffective efforts of the Coast Guard's expert Atlantic Strike Team to prevent the largest coastal oil spill in U.S. history. Although minimal environmental damage resulted from the grounding of the *Argo Merchant*, continued importation of billions of gallons of oil on marginally operated tankers, in conjunction with inadequate cleanup capability, constitutes a serious threat to our ocean fisheries and coastal areas.

