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Bataan and Beyond

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style of mutual back patting. Such leadership lies at the heart of our democratic form of government and has a powerful influence despite its lack of moral conscience.

Raising "the level of human conduct and ethical aspiration of both leader and led" is the ultimate goal of transforming leadership. Gandhi is Burns' archetype for the leader with the vision, the presence, the imagination and the example to whom people of all walks of life eagerly respond. Mao is another; Woodrow Wilson and FDR don't make the cut.

When all the sententious fat is rendered from this idea of leadership's moral force and moral obligation, it makes good sense. George Washington's injunction seems to bear out the concept of transforming leadership: "It should be the highest ambition of every American to extend his views beyond himself, and to bear in mind that his conduct will not only affect himself, his country, and his immediate posterity; but that its influence may be coextensive with the world, and stamp political happiness or misery on ages yet unborn."

Leadership concludes with several chapters that tie the theoretical to the practical and that offer general prescriptive advice for practicing transforming leadership.

For all its strengths, there are some weaknesses in the book. Thomas Mann's edict, "In our time the destiny of man presents its meaning in political terms," aside, *Leadership* is poorly titled. Except for isolated instances, Burns supports his entire theoretical calculus with examples from political life—what about us in uniform? Burns claims that his theory is universal in application, that leadership for the politician, the teacher, the coach or the military man reduces to the same formula. If it's that simple, why is there such a strong and acknowledged need for leadership? Burns' examples of transforming leader-

ship are so sparse that even as a theoretical concept, its usefulness is limited. The gulf between the transactional and transforming leader is too great. There seems to be no middle ground. Few people in positions of leadership can remain in these transactional or transforming molds forever—their shadows are not as sharply contrasted as Burns would have us believe. The gray area in between, "contingency leadership" if you will, is where I believe most leaders spend most of their time, with frequent uneven migrations to both extremes. Warren Bennis describes this gray area in other terms: "The challenge is not for an omnipotent, omniscient 'man on a white horse'" but a fallible, somewhat idealistic individual who can reach the stirrups. That man is somewhere on the transactional side of Burns' transforming leader.

J.P. MORSE

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Coleman, John S. Jr. *Bataan and Beyond*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1978. 210pp.

John Coleman's book affords an interesting view of the experiences Americans were forced to endure both as fighting men on Bataan and as prisoners of the Japanese. The book's main value, however, lies in its accurate depiction of the brutal physical and mental punishment inflicted upon Americans by their Japanese captors; punishment most civilized minds find difficult, if not possible, to comprehend.

Prior to the recapture of the Philippines, almost all American POWs were packed into the holds of "hell ships" and transported to prison camps in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, or Manchuria to perform slave labor. Many failed to survive the voyage but those who did found living conditions in their new camps as foul as those in the Philippines. In many they were worse.

The prisoners, to a man, suffered from malnutrition and various diseases

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uncommon in the United States (scurvy, pellagra, beriberi, gynecomastia, avitaminosis, and others). Nevertheless, they were quickly forced to work like animals in unsafe mines, on docks, in railroad yards, factories, and shipyards. Harassed and degraded at every turn by brutal guards, they were always undernourished and inadequately clothed to stave off the cold of winter. They rested their emaciated bodies not on beds, but on rough boards—usually covered by a thin straw mat.

The grievously ill received little or no medical attention, and some were subjected to crude, often gruesome experimentation by Japanese doctors and medics. Brutal beatings for infractions of outrageous rules or trumped-up charges were the order-of-the-day. Men too sick to work were often beaten because they couldn't work. Sick men who tried to work rather than face ruthless guards in camp were beaten because they couldn't keep the pace.

It is little wonder then that of about 24,000 Americans of all services (mostly in their late teens or early twenties) captured in the Philippines, more than 13,000 died as Japanese prisoners. Of the roughly 11,000 Americans who survived to be repatriated, more than 5,000 have since died, most from the residual effects of prisoner of war experience.

There have been very few published accounts of Japanese work camps because those who survived them are, for one reason or another, incapable of writing about them or find such effort too depressing to recall. Coleman, however, paints a shocking picture of Yodogawa Bunshaw, one of many such work camps, where he was confined for 8 months. There is no exaggeration here and, difficult as it may be to believe, there were other work camps that were worse; few, if any were better.

Because Coleman is not a professional writer, it is unfortunate that the publisher did not see fit to edit his work. As a result, *Bataan and Beyond*

lacking literary polish and style, often becomes tedious. Its main fault lies in the overabundance of Coleman's personal exploits that, at times, seem a little "tall" as stories go. Nevertheless, his account of conditions existing in Japanese POW camps is consistent with the facts, and should be of historic interest.

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Harrod, Frederick S. *Manning the New Navy: The Development of a Modern Naval Enlisted Force, 1899-1940*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978. 276pp.

To a Navy that alternately rejects and embraces a systems analyst's dehumanized methods, Harrod's work comes as an important example of how balanced, objective historical study can illuminate present naval problems by examining their past roots.

In his work, Harrod deals with a longstanding and complex problem of the Navy: the nature and maintenance of the enlisted force. He relies on an impressive range of sources to document his work, one of which is U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*. A perusal of its contents since its first publication in 1874 demonstrates that recruiting, training, preventing the desertion of and retaining high-quality enlisted men has long been a problem of the U.S. Navy. Harrod examines this dilemma in a crucial era—1899-1940. It was a period in which traditional seaboard sources no longer supplied the fleet with men who were familiar with the sea and when the Navy was embarking on both quantitative and qualitative material expansions.

In 171 pages of text, Harrod deals with "The Old Navy," the character and life of the men of the "New Navy," their recruitment, training, changing rate structure, recreation and welfare, naval justice and the officer-enlisted relationship. With a terse, almost anti-septic prose, he marshalls extensive and