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
FOREWORD

The *Naval War College Review* was established in 1948 by the Chief of Naval Personnel in order that officers of the Navy and Marine Corps might receive some of the educational benefits available to the resident students at the Naval War College. The forthright and candid views of the authors are presented for the professional education of the readers. Articles published are related to the academic and professional activities of the Naval War College. They are drawn from a wide variety of sources in order to inform, to stimulate and challenge the readers, and to serve as a catalyst for new ideas. Articles are selected primarily on the basis of their intellectual and literary merits, usefulness and interest to servicewide readership and timeliness. Reproduction of articles in the *Review* requires the specific approval of the Editor, *Naval War College Review* and the respective author. Reproduction of articles published in the *Review* is subject to the Copyright Act of 1976 and treaties of the United States, to the extent that they are applicable. Caution should be exercised in the case of those articles protected by copyright, as may be indicated by a copyright notice at the beginning of such articles. *Review* content is open to citation and other reference, in accordance with accepted academic research methods. The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Navy Department or the Naval War College.

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Cover: Home From a Cruise. Oil Painting by Norman Rockwell.

TAKING STOCK

Press reaction to Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's Harvard address last spring was extraordinary. Editorial comment was voluminous, frequently registered surprise at what one would assume were his well-known viewpoints, and seemed to avoid his major thrusts. In particular, most writers missed or ignored his principal premise, one common to almost all the Solzhenitsyn titles which have lined American library shelves for the past fifteen years, and one with which I agree. While not wanting to use the *Naval War College Review* as a forum for debating whether Solzhenitsyn is on target or not, I believe his concept of the insidiousness of creeping legalism is relevant to our fighting forces and bears investigation. The mutation of ethics in a legalistic society is a very thought provoking subject and it strikes me as odd that the editorial writers of this country bypassed it. For me, the problem boils down to displacement of personal responsibility by law in what has become an essentially litigious society, where moral goodness is defined as conformity to specified rules of conduct and where personal virtue or righteousness is considered synonymous with a mechanical disposition to submit consistently to those rules.

The flagrant, excessive use of laws, courts, regulations and the growing penchant for directing society's course by a myriad of rules has largely and sadly depreciated the burden of moral responsibility. No longer are individuals expected to make determinations of right or wrong. Now they can justify nearly every action by some rule, some technicality, either written or conceived for the appeals process. The product of this "letter of the law" society is measured on the legal versus illegal scale with the good versus bad scale only rarely being applied, more often than not as a matter of convenience. Society as a whole has adopted the judicial process as its moral yardstick and forfeited common sense and personal responsibility. Legal is not necessarily synonymous with good.

This situation exists to a great extent in the U.S. military profession in which too many officers are armed only with technical knowledge and a legalistic, by-the-numbers approach; this type of person proceeds through his careeer tripping over minutiae and substituting checkoff lists for common sense. Too many have become relativists without any defined moral orientation. Too many are content to align their value systems with fads and buzzwords, and mindlessly try to obey what amounts to a hodgepodge mixture of inconsistent slogans. Error avoidance and careerism are seen to take the place of positive achievement within our ranks.

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What is to be done? If one looks at the West's cultural heritage, particularly at its roots in the classical writings, there seem to be several important guideposts designed to discourage what Solzhenitsyn calls a "letter of the law" mentality that "paralyzes men's noblest impulses." Aristotle frequently distinguished between the ethics of character and the ethics of acts by suggesting that society's main objective is to instill virtue in its citizenry, and that specific laws are a secondary concern. In fact, most philosophers of the classical Greek rationalistic tradition treated dispositions of character as primary and specific rules of conduct as secondary and derivative. We must realize that laws merely delineate a floor in our behavior, a minimum acceptable level of ethical standards, and that moral standards can and should be set on a higher plane. In the Naval Service we have no place for amoral gnomes lost in narrow orbits; we need to keep our gaze fixed on the high minded principles standing above the law: Duty, Honor, Country.

A meaning to life can only be gained through an intuitive sense of good and bad and their attendant comparatives (worse, worst, better, best). It does not obtain directly from systems of laws emanating either from the legislative or the judiciary sides, and can be positively strangled by the real culprit in our national . investment in moral bankruptcy—the delegation of lawmaking powers to the administrative bodies who work far from the "canons of ethics and decency." Such social regulation is the disease that Solzhenitsyn diagnoses as totally lacking an ethical base.

It is certainly convenient to adopt the mores of the bureaucracy and not take on the unpleasant and tedious task of formulating one's own. However, if anything has power to sustain an individual in peace or war, regardless of occupation, it is one's conviction and commitment to defined standards of right and wrong. Today's ranks are filled with officers who have been weaned on slogans and fads of the sort preached in the better business schools of the country. That is to say that rational managerial concepts will cure all evils. The flaws of this viewpoint are brightly illuminated when it is applied to fighting forces—that's one of the things Vietnam proved. The loss of that war demonstrated that we cannot adopt the methodology of business without adopting its language, its style, its tactics, and above all, its ethics. We must regain our bearings.

It is time to put the legal machinery in its proper place: to aid the people in maintaining order and seeking truth. However, regardless of the fairness of our judicial system it must not be allowed to take the place of moral obligation to ourselves, to our Service, to our country. Each man must bring himself to some stage of ethical resolution. I hope this message will travel far beyond the walls of Mahan Hall where I will be expounding it this year.

The purpose of education is not to teach people what they do not know, but to teach them to behave as they do not behave.

John Ruskin

J.B. STOCKDALE
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College

Historical evidence suggests that the basic policies of the full term of a President can be deduced from an examination and analysis of his initial budget. The arms control philosophy of the present administration is examined here.

THE ARMS CONTROL IMPLICATIONS

OF THE CARTER DEFENSE BUDGET

by

Lawrence J. Korb

Introduction. The Carter administration has been in office for a little less than two years. During that time, it has had opportunity to modify the FY 1978 Department of Defense (DOD) budget prepared and initially presented to the Congress by the outgoing Ford administration and to produce a defense budget entirely its own, the FY 1979 defense budget.

Before undertaking this budget analysis, three interrelated questions must be addressed: What are the objectives of arms control? What is the relationship of the U.S. defense budget to these objectives? Can meaningful statements about an administration's arms control philosophy be made on the basis of just "1 and ½" budgets?

To answer the first question, most analysts agree that arms control has three "normally accepted" objectives.[1] They are: to reduce the likelihood of war, to reduce the scope of violence if war occurs, and to reduce the cost of preparing for war. While these three objectives are often seen as compatible and reinforcing, it is important to note that this is not always the case. As several analysts have noted, the best way to reduce the likelihood of war or to increase the possibilities for successful future arms control negotiations may be to increase the defense budget in the present.[2]

The answer to the second question is that the size and distribution of the defense budget and the objectives of arms control are inextricably intertwined because in defense, dollars in effect determine policy. This situation prevails within our political system for three reasons. First, plans remain irrelevant and operations impossible until the forces and weapons to support them have been purchased. For example, planning to defend the flanks of NATO is of little use unless sufficient power

projection forces[3] are procured. Conversely, forces and weapons that have been procured and are on hand often determine the course of action that policymakers undertake. For example, many have argued that one of the reasons that the United States intervened militarily in Southeast Asia in the mid-1960s was that the Army had developed forces for that type of war in the early 1960s. Similarly, one of the reasons the United States undertook a massive air bombing campaign against North Vietnam was that the Air Force and Navy had on hand large numbers of sophisticated fighter and attack aircraft.

Second, decisions reflected in a particular defense budget have long-term consequences. A naval surface combatant ship funded in the FY 1979 budget will not become operational until sometime in the mid-1980s and will remain in the inventory until about 2015. Some B-52 aircraft still in an operational status were initially funded more than 25 years ago and will last at least another 10 years.

Third, the size and composition of the defense budget send signals to our allies and adversaries about our intentions.[4] On the one hand, projected increases in either the defense total or in specific areas are often viewed as signs of a nation's resolve and can be used to enhance deterrence or as bargaining chips in arms control negotiations. On the other hand, these same increases can lead to a demand for concomitant increases by a potential adversary.

If the opinion of President Carter about his FY 1979 budget is accurate[5] and if the history of post-World War II administrations is any guide, the answer to the third question is yes. Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Nixon and Ford all established the basic policies of their entire Administrations in their initial budgets. In his FY 1955 budget, Eisenhower laid the foundation for the policy of massive retaliation and a period of level defense budgets. Eight years later,

in the FY 1963 budget, Kennedy established the groundwork for the strategy of flexible response, a policy of being prepared to fight 2½ wars simultaneously, and an era of increased spending for defense. The FY 1971 budget of the Nixon administration shifted DOD toward a 1½ war strategy, a period of shrinking defense budgets, and a change in the military balance.[6] In his first defense budget, FY 1976, President Ford reversed the downward trend in defense spending and laid the foundation for a period of real growth in the defense budget and reversal of the deterioration in the military balance. Figure 1 displays the budget patterns of these Administrations.

The Cost of Defense. One of the most controversial issues of the first part of the Carter Presidency has been his real impact on the level of defense spending. Throughout his first year in office, the new President has been attacked simultaneously for both increasing and decreasing the size of the defense budget.[7]

There are two reasons for the confusion. One is the President himself. Mr. Carter wishes to reconcile his campaign pledges to his party and to the electorate to reduce defense spending by $5 to $7 billion below current levels with his postelection promises to our NATO allies and the national security bureaucracy to increase defense spending by 3 percent a year in real terms. The second reason is the various ways in which the size of the defense budget can be expressed.

Mr. Carter claims that he has fulfilled both of his apparently contradictory promises, and, in a certain restricted sense, he has. As shown in Table 1, his budget request for DOD for FY 1979 is $8.4 billion less in TOA and $5.6 smaller in outlays than Ford had projected for FY 1979. Moreover, Carter's request for FY 1979 is $9.4 billion more in TOA and $9.9 billion higher in

**Fig. 1—Defense Budget Authority FY 1955-78
(in billions of FY 1978 dollars)**

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), *National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 1978,* p. 138.

TABLE 1—DEFENSE BUDGET TOTALS FOR FY 1978 AND 1979

Budget Category			Change		
		1978	1979	Amt.	%
TOA (Current Dollars)					
	Ford	122.2	134.4	12.2	9.9
	Carter	119.4	126.0	6.6	5.5
	Congress	116.6	121.0*	4.4	3.8
TOA (Constant FY 1979 Dollars)					
	Ford	129.5	134.4	4.9	3.8
	Carter	126.5	126.0	-0.5	-0.4
	Congress	123.7	121.0*	-2.7	-2.2
OUTLAYS (Current Dollars)					
	Ford	109.5	120.8	11.3	10.3
	Carter	109.1	115.2	6.1	5.6
	Congress	105.3	110.6*	5.3	5.0
OUTLAYS (Constant FY 1979 Dollars)					
	Ford	116.0	120.8	4.8	4.1
	Carter	115.5	115.2	-0.3	-0.1
	Congress	111.5	110.6*	-0.9	-0.8

*Assumes a 4% Congressional reduction.

Sources: Donald Rumsfeld, Annual Defense Department Report FY 1978, 17 January 1977, p. 8 and Harold Brown, Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1979, p. 12.

outlays than the amounts actually provided to DOD for FY 1978. This represents a real increase over the level of FY 1978 of only $2.3 billion or 1.9 percent in TOA but $3.7 billion or 3.3 percent in outlays.

However, there is an inconsistency in the argument; that is, he has mixed apples and oranges, and a rubber yardstick is used to prove a point. In reality the Administration has neither cut the budget $5 to $7 billion below the current level nor increased defense spending by 3 percent in real terms. Analysis of Table 1 will demonstrate why. The FY 1978 budget did end up $5.6 billion below that of Ford in TOA and $4.2 billion less in outlays, but that

was the result of action by the Congress, not the President. The President cut TOA by $2.8 billion and outlays by only $0.5 billion. Moreover, when the House Budget Committee adopted a target for the FY 1978 defense budget of $116 billion in TOA and $109 billion in outlays, both President Carter and Secretary of Defense Brown lobbied hard to increase the target.[8]

It is true that Carter's FY 1979 request is substantially below that which President Ford had projected for FY 1979. However, in 1976 candidate Carter had pledged to cut defense spending by $5 to $7 billion below its present level, not some future higher level. Moreover, in 1976 when Carter

made his statement, Ford was projecting that defense authority for FY 1978 would be $121 billion and that for FY 1979 it would be $130 billion.[9]

Similarly, the President's FY 1979 budget request most probably will not result in a 3 percent real increase in defense spending over the levels of FY 1978 because it is subject to being reduced by Congress. In constant dollars, the TOA and outlay requests for FY 1979 are less than requested a year ago, and if Congress makes a cut as small as 4 percent, the Legislature will actually appropriate less than it did a year ago. The only way that a 3 percent increase in the defense budget can be achieved is for the Congress not to make any reductions in the budget. Because Congress has cut the budget by an average of $5.5 billion annually over the past 5 years, this is a highly unlikely prospect.[10]

However, it is true that President Carter has reduced defense spending below the level that would have prevailed had Ford remained in office. Thus, he has achieved one of the principal objectives of an arms control policy, namely reducing the cost of preparing for war. This point can be demonstrated by examining the data displayed in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 compares the Ford and Carter projections for FY 1977 through FY 1983 for TOA and outlays in both current and constant dollars. As indicated in that table, President Carter's defense program will save the taxpayers a total of about $40 billion in the FY 1978-83 period and will result in an annual increase in defense spending of approximately one percent less than the Ford program.

Table 3 compares the Ford and Carter programs in terms of the demands that defense places on the economy. The Carter program will consume about one-half percent less of GNP and about 3½ percent less of the Federal budget. Moreover, the Carter administration will be the first adminis-

tration since the Korean war to allow defense spending to fall below 5 percent of GNP[11] and to allot less than one quarter of its federal budget to DOD.

However, the confusion and disillusionment created by the President's conflicting pre and postelection pledges may well offset any gains achieved by his decreasing of defense expenditures. When our NATO allies realize that the President's FY 1979 budget request will not result in a 3 percent real increase in defense spending, they may not be willing to do their part in redressing the imbalance in central Europe where the Warsaw Pact currently outnumbers NATO in manpower, tanks and aircraft. Moreover, when the Soviet leaders recognize that this Administration, unlike its predecessor, is not willing to match the size of their defense budget, which has been rising by 3 to 4 percent per year in real terms since 1962, they may perceive this as a weakening of our resolve.

On the other hand, when the President's supporters become aware that he has not fulfilled his promise to cut the budget by $5 to $7 billion,[12] they will most likely demand further reductions in the FY 1979 budget even if these are not warranted by the international situation.

Distribution. While the size of the defense budget is important, it is not an end in itself. The objectives of arms control can also be weakened or strengthened by the programs on which the funds are spent.

The funds in the defense budget are spent primarily on two kinds of forces: strategic and general purpose or conventional. The final part of this discussion will analyze the arms control implications of the Carter programs in each of these areas.

Strategic Forces. Since taking office, President Carter has reduced proposed expenditures for the strategic program

TABLE 2—THE DEFENSE BUDGET FY 1977-82 IN CURRENT AND CONSTANT DOLLARS
(In Billions of Dollars)

| | | | | Fiscal Year | | | | Total | Average Annual Increase FY 77-82 | |
Budget Category	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	FY 77-83	Amt.	%
TOA (Current Dollars)										
Ford	110.2	122.2	134.4	144.8	155.7	166.8	180.1	904.0	11.7	10.5
Carter	110.2	116.6	126.0	137.7	148.6	160.5	172.7	861.6	10.4	9.4
Difference Amt.	-----	6.6	8.4	7.6	7.1	6.3	7.4	42.4		
%	-----	5.4	6.3	5.2	6.6	3.8	4.1	4.7		
TOA (Constant FY 1979 Dollars)										
Ford	122.6	129.5	134.4	136.6	139.3	141.9	146.3	828.0	3.9	3.2
Carter	122.6	123.7	126.0	129.4	133.0	136.6	140.3	789.0	2.9	2.4
Difference Amt.								39.0		
%								4.7		
OUTLAYS (Constant FY 1979 Dollars)										
Ford	98.3	109.5	120.8	133.3	145.2	156.0	166.7	831.5	11.4	11.5
Carter	98.3	105.3	115.2	125.8	136.5	147.9	159.5	790.2	10.2	10.3
Difference Amt.	-----	4.2	5.6	7.5	8.7	8.1	7.2	41.3		
%	----	3.8	4.6	5.6	5.9	5.1	4.3	4.9		
OUTLAYS (Constant FY 1979 Dollars)										
Ford	111.3	116.0	120.8	125.7	129.9	132.7	135.1	760.2	3.9	3.5
Carter	111.3	111.5	115.2	118.7	122.2	125.9	129.6	723.1	3.1	2.7
Difference Amt.								37.1		
%								4.8		

Sources: Donald Rumsfeld, *Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1977,* 17 January 1977, p. 8 and Harold Brown, *Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1979,* p. 12.

TABLE 3—DEFENSE AND THE ECONOMY, FY 1978-83

	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	Average
Outlays as a % of GNP							
Ford	5.4	5.3	5.3	5.4	5.3	5.4	5.4
Carter	5.2	5.1	5.0	4.9	4.9	4.8	5.0
Outlays as a % of Federal Budget							
Ford	25.0	26.0	26.9	27.6	28.0	28.5	27.0
Carter	22.8	23.0	23.1	23.7	24.5	24.5	23.6

Sources: The Budget for Fiscal Year 1978, pp. 24, 51, and 53 and The Budget for Fiscal Year 1979, pp. 33, 43 and 44.

by nearly 20 percent. Ford had envisioned spending $23.5 billion on strategic forces for FY 1978 and 1979; President Carter proposes to spend only $19.1 billion. Carter has achieved this reduction primarily by refusing to allow the B-1 bomber to move into full production[13] and slowing down the M-X missile program by 3 years, that is, delaying its initial operating capability from 1983 to 1986.[14] As indicated in Table 4, the decision to cancel B-1 saved $4.5 billion and the M-X slowdown an additional $1.5 billion. The President also saved $28 million by not improving the guidance system on Minuteman Il missiles. These savings are to be offset by the additional $211 million to accelerate the cruise missile which will substitute for the B-1. Reductions in the strategic area would have been even greater if the Trident submarine program were not experiencing such large cost overruns. As shown in Table 4, Trident funding for FY 1979 had to be increased by $450 million. This will pay for the cost growth on the first Trident submarine. The additional funding will not accelerate the program nor provide any extra submarines.

Cancelling the B-1 and slowing down M-X development will no doubt save money in the short run. However, these decisions could cost more in the long run and may even hinder the prospects for meaningful strategic arms control agreements with the Soviet Union.

When he unexpectedly cancelled the B-1 on 30 June 1977, President Carter cited the cruise missile and the improved B-52 as early substitutes and the cruise missile carrier (CMC) and another manned penetrating bomber as future options.[15] An FY 1978 supplement, presented in July 1977, and the FY 1979 budget contain funding for developing both the cruise missile carrier and another manned penetrating bomber. If this Administration, or a successor, find it necessary to implement both of these alternatives, the proposed savings from the B-1 may prove to be ephemeral.

This point can be demonstrated by examining Table 5. That table shows that it would have cost $18 billion more to build 240 B-1 aircraft. These airplanes could have carried 5,760 cruise missiles and would have had a 0.7 probability of penetrating Soviet airspace to deliver a like number of gravity bombs. For approximately the same amount of money, the Pentagon could purchase 100 cruise missile carriers and

TABLE 4—MAJOR PROCUREMENT PROGRAMS FY 1978-79
(In Millions of Current Dollars)

Program	1978 Ford	1978 Carter	1979 Ford	1979 Carter	Total Ford	Total Carter	Difference Ford-Carter Amt.	Difference Ford-Carter %
Strategic Forces								
MINUTEMAN Improvements	338	333	146	123	484	456	28	5.8
M-X	294	134	1533	158	1827	292	1536	84.0
TRIDENT*	3626	3435	2339	2789	5965	6224	-259	-4.3
B-1	2162	443	2915	106	5077	549	4528	89.2
Cruise Missile*	358	382	229	416	587	798	-211	-35.9

*Carter increases.

Source: Department of Defense, *Program Acquisition Costs by Weapon System,* FY 1978 and FY 1979.

TABLE 5—CHARACTERISTICS OF MANNED BOMBERS

Type	Number	Cost[a]	Unit Cost[b]	Cruise Missile Capability	Internal Nuclear Payload	Penetrating Capability (Probability)
Cruise Missile Carrier	100	10.4	104	60	0	0.0
B-1	240	18.0	75	24	24	0.7
FB-111 H	165	7.0	42	12	4	0.6

[a]In billions of current dollars. Does not include cost of arming the aircraft.

[b]In millions of current dollars.

Sources: Ronald Tammen, "The Bomber Debate, Is There a B-2 in Our Future?" *Arms Control Today,* November 1977, pp. 1-4; "U.S. Détente Policy and the B-1 Bomber Controversy," *Congressional Digest,* December 1976.

165 stretched FB-111H bombers.[16] This mixed force would be somewhat less capable than a B-1 force. It could carry 38 percent more cruise missiles but could deliver 83 percent fewer bombs on target and would have a 15 percent lower probability of penetrating Soviet airspace.

Even if the Carter administration never feels the necessity of exercising the option of building the mixed force of cruise missile carriers and penetrating bombers, the B-1 cancellation could have three other undesirable side effects. First, it could weaken the case against the M-X. Our land-based ICBM force is becoming increasingly vulnerable. Most analysts agree that by the mid-1980s 90 percent of the Minuteman force could not survive a Soviet first strike.[17] At that same time the ability of the remaining B-52s to penetrate Soviet airspace also will decline.[18] It is difficult to conceive of an American President allowing two legs of the triad to be placed in jeopardy simultaneously.

Probably the only way to increase the survivability of the ICBM force is to build a mobile missile like the M-X.

The M-X is both an expensive and impressive weapon.[19] Three hundred of these missiles will cost about $40 billion, twice the price of the B-1 program. Each missile will contain 15 independently targeted warheads, each of which has a yield of 200 kilotons and a CEP of 300 feet. This will give the M-X 3 times the explosive power and twice the accuracy of the Minuteman III missile. To ensure survivability, an M-X will be placed in a 10 to 20-mile long trench system, and it will move at random intervals inside the trench. Such a powerful missile system could be viewed by the Soviets as a first-strike weapon and its mobility would make verification almost impossible. Indeed, it was for these reasons that President Carter has slowed down the program.

Second, this Administration's emphasis on the cruise missile will probably lead to a corresponding emphasis on the weapon by the Soviet Union. In the past, the U.S.S.R. has shown a great propensity to deploy weapons previously deployed by the United States and an unwillingness to negotiate until they have matched us. The Soviets already have the most sophisticated air defense system in the world—6,500 surveillance radars, 2,600 interceptors, and 10,000 surface-to-air missile launchers. To deal with our cruise missile they need only to increase the system's depth and density with such systems as the SA-10.[20] But to counter a Soviet deployment of cruise missiles, the United States would have to bear the enormous expense of building an air defense system from scratch[21] or live with the imbalance.

Third, unilaterally cancelling the B-1 and slowing down the M-X may make it more difficult to achieve a SALT II agreement. The Carter administration has been trying for many months to win concessions from the Soviets that will make a SALT agreement palatable to certain segments of the Senate. The B-1 and M-X may have proved to be the bargaining chips necessary to obtain such Soviet concessions.

Conventional Forces. President Carter has made less than a 5 percent reduction in funds allocated for general purpose forces. However, he has altered significantly the priorities for which those forces are configured. In its FY 1978 and FY 1979 budget decisions, the Administration has placed emphasis on increasing the capability of our conventional forces to fight a short intensive war in central Europe. Programs that contribute to that mission have been given priority while those not related to that function have been slashed. Essentially this has meant increasing funds available to the Army and Air Force and reducing the Navy budget.

This point can be illuminated by comparing the general purpose forces procurement programs of the Army and Air Force with those of the Navy. Table 6 outlines Army procurement programs by major category for the FY 1975-83 period. As indicated in that table, the Carter program increased Army procurement by $1.5 billion or nearly 30 percent in FY 1979 alone, and by FY 1983 it intends to be spending more than twice as much as in FY 1978. Moreover, the Administration is making major increases in every category of Army procurement. None of the major categories is increasing at a rate of less than 39 percent a year, and two areas are increasing by more than 50 percent annually. In FY 1979 the Army will buy 223 helicopters, 10,260 missiles, 1,907 tanks and 7,500 other weapons.

Table 7 compares the shipbuilding budgets of the Carter and Ford administrations for the FY 1978-82 period. As that table shows, President Carter has made an overall reduction of 41 percent in the program proposed a year ago. The

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TABLE 6—ARMY PROCUREMENT, FY 1975-83
(In Millions of Dollars)

Category	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1983	Total Change 75-83 Amt.	%	Average Change 75-83 Amt.	%
Aircraft	247	331	534	657	1017	1400	1153	466.8	144	58.4
Missile	392	415	473	536	773	1600	1208	308.1	151	38.5
Weapons & Tracked Combat Vehicles	415	679	1089	1421	1636	1750	1335	321.6	167	40.2
Ammunition	647	682	897	1171	1420	3250	2603	402.3	325	50.3
Other	655	895	1383	1400	1789	3000	2345	358.0	293	44.8
Total	2356	3002	4376	5185	6635	11000	8644	366.8	1082	45.9

Source: The Budget for Appropriate Years.

TABLE 7—SHIPBUILDING AUTHORITY FOR THE NAVY, FY 1978-83
(In Billions of Current Dollars)

	Fiscal Year						
	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1978-83
Ford	6.5	8.5	9.9	10.7	13.1	15.0	63.7
Carter	5.8	4.7	7.4	8.6	9.6	10.7	46.8
Difference							
Amt.	0.7	3.8	3.5	2.1	3.5	4.3	16.9
%	10.8	44.7	25.3	19.6	26.7	28.7	26.5

Source: Estimated from *The FY 1979 Budget,* p. 328 and letter from the Secretary of Defense to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, 23 March 1978.

President has cut the Navy shipbuilding budget for FY 1979 almost in half.

The effect of these cutbacks is depicted in Table 8. As a result of the Carter modifications, the Navy will be able to purchase only 74 ships in the FY 1978-82 period, 83 fewer than the number proposed by President Ford. This will mean that the Navy will have only 440 ships in 1990 and by the year 2000 could drop to 400 ships. This figure is 200 fewer ships than a May 1976 National Security Council study had recommended.[22] The effect of the Carter reduction falls most heavily on those ships normally employed in a power projection role, that is, carriers (CVV), major escorts (CSGN and DDG-47), amphibious ships (LSD-41), and mine countermeasures ships (MCM).

Table 9 compares the procurement programs for Navy and Air Force fighter and attack aircraft for the FY 1976-79 period. As indicated in that table, during the FY 1976-79 period, the Air Force received more than twice as much funding for tactical aircraft as the Navy, and was able to procure about 3 times as many aircraft.[23] This program will enable the Air Force to expand to 26 fully equipped tactical air wings, with 2,500 combat aircraft, by the mid-1980s. The Navy on the other hand is losing 3 of its 15 carrier air wings and will suffer a 30 percent decline in the number of aircraft over the next 5 years. It needs to procure 180 airplanes just to keep its tactical aircraft inventory level. In FY 1979 alone, it will suffer a shortfall of 121 airplanes or 67 percent.

TABLE 8—SHIPBUILDING PROGRAMS, FY 1978-82

	Ford	Carter	Difference Amt.	Ford-Carter %
Ship Type				
SSBN	8	7	1	12.5
SSN	8	5	3	37.5
CVV	2	1	1	50.0
CSGN	2	---	2	200.0
DDG-47	10	6	4	40.0
FFG-7	56	32	24	42.9
FFG-X	2	0	2	100.0
LSD-41	6	1	5	83.3
MCM	19	3	16	84.2
AO	14	1	13	92.9
OTHER	30	18	12	40.0
Total	157	74	83	52.9
COST	48.7	30.3	18.4	37.8
Active Ships in October 1978	456	456	-----	------
Active Ships in 1990	550	440	110	20.0
Active Ships in 2000[a]	600	400	200	33.3

[a]Assumes same shipbuilding rates continued through 1980s.

Sources: FY 1978 Defense Report, p. 190; *FY 1979 Budget,* p. 328; *The FY 1979 Defense Report,* pp. 167-185.

Strengthening our forces on the central front in Europe at the expense of our non-NATO forces makes three obvious contributions toward achieving arms control objectives. First, it allows DOD to increase its capability of meeting the primary threat to the security of the Western World without increasing the defense burden. Second, strengthening the ability of our conventional forces to fight a war in Europe makes it less likely that the United States and its NATO allies will have to resort to nuclear weapons to repel a Warsaw Pact blitzkrieg. Third, the emphasis on NATO will help to redress the conventional imbalance in central Europe where the Warsaw Pact currently outnumbers NATO forces by approximately 2 to 1 in ground troops, 3 to 1 in tanks, and 1½ to 1 in tactical aircraft.[24] By FY 1983, the Carter program will give DOD the ability to double the number of ground troops and tactical aircraft in central Europe within 7 days. Such a balance on the central European front will make an attack in that region by the Warsaw Pact less likely.

However, this NATO first strategy could also have three undesirable side effects on arms control. First, the policy weakens U.S. capabilities on the northern (Norwegian Sea) and southern (Mediterranean) flanks of NATO and in the Pacific. These weaknesses may tempt the Soviets to think that they can

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TABLE 9—NAVY AND AIR FORCE PROCUREMENT RATES AND COSTS, FY 1976-79

| Navy Designation | Name | 1975 | Number Procured | | | | Total FY 1976-79 | | |
			1976	1977	1978	1979	Number	Funding[a]	Unit Cost[a]
A-4M	Skyhawk	---	3	21	---	18	42	236	5.6
A-6E	Intruder	---	11	6	12	12	41	659	16.1
A-7E	Corsair II	---	36	30	12	----	78	589	7.6
F-14A	Tomcat	---	45	36	44	24	149	3040	20.4
F-18	Hornet	---	----	----	----	5	5	1992	94.7[b]
Totals		---	95	93	68	59	315	6516	20.6
Air Force									
A-10	Attack	---	---	73	100	144	162	479	6.1
F-15	Eagle	---	132	108	96	78	414	6486	15.7
F-16	Air Combat	---	---	----	105	145	250	4076	16.3
Totals		---	205	208	345	385	1143	13462	11.8

[a]In millions of current dollars.
[b]Unit cost calculated from FY 1979 production costs only.

Source: Program Acquisition Costs by Weapon System, FY 1978 and FY 1979.

attack the flanks with impunity or that they can fight a one-front war. Such an idea could make it easier for the Soviets to start a war. Moreover, our allies on the flanks and in the Pacific may come to doubt our intentions.[25] This could lead to such destabilizing actions as a weakening of the NATO alliance, a desire on the part of the Japanese to rearm, or even a Sino-Soviet rapprochement.

Second, the NATO emphasis decreases the flexibility of U.S. Forces to be used outside of central Europe. Since the end of World War II, the American people have been unwilling to pay for the forces needed to carry out our national security objectives and to keep our military commitments. Traditionally, DOD has dealt with the situation by relying upon flexible forces, that is, forces usable in more than one place and for more than one purpose. Without this flexibility our ability to deter violence in many areas of the globe may be diminished.

Third, the U.S. buildup in central Europe may undermine the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR)

negotiations. It will be difficult to convince the Soviets to reduce their forces in central Europe at the same time that we are increasing ours.[26]

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Lawrence Korb is Professor of Management, Naval War College and an Adjunct Scholar of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. He has been a consultant to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, and the Office of Education and has served on the faculties of the University of Dayton and the U.S. Coast Guard Academy. Professor Korb spent four years on active duty as a Naval Flight Officer and currently holds the rank of Commander in the Naval Reserve. He specializes in National Security Organization, Process, and Policy and is the author, co-author, and editor of numerous articles, monographs, and books on these subjects. His most recent publication is *The FY 1978-83 Defense Program: Issues and Trends.*

Conclusion. While the arms control philosophy of the Administration is clear despite the fact that it has only worked on 1½ budgets, the implications of that philosophy are still somewhat uncertain.

On the positive side, President Carter certainly has reduced the burden of defense on the American public, both in absolute and relative terms. His focus on the central front in Europe has made both a conventional and nuclear confrontation in that area less likely, while his slowdown of the M-X has increased the possibilities of a SALT II agreement.

However, these same decisions could have unsalutory side effects on arms control. Contradictory statements about the level of defense spending could confuse both our allies and adversaries. Cancellation of the B-1 may make deployment of the M-X missile more likely, and could initiate a cruise missile arms race. Likewise, unilateral reductions in strategic forces may weaken our position at the SALT talks. Finally, emphasis on the central front, at the expense of flexible forces, may unhinge deterrence in certain areas and could cause some of our allies to question our capabilities and intentions.

NOTES

1. For example see Jane Sharp, "Taking the Initiative: Proposals for United States Action at the UN Special Session on Disarmament," *International Studies Association*, February 1978, p. 12.

2. For example see Joseph Pechman, ed., *Setting National Priorities, the 1978 Budget* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1977), p. 141.

3. Both flanks have seacoasts that lend themselves to amphibious operations and sea-based airpower.

4. For example see Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "The Defense Budget's Message to the World," *Washington Post*, 29 December 1977, p. 19.

5. In his budget message, the President called his FY 1979 budget the most important of his administration. *The Budget of the United States Government, FY 1979* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1978), p. 141.

6. This occurred because the Soviets simultaneously embarked on a larger than anticipated military buildup. The size of their defense budget surpassed ours in FY 1969.

7. Speaker of the House, Thomas O'Neil (D-Mass.) said there is too much money in the budget for defense in the FY 1979 budget. Senator George McGovern (D-S.D.) called the size of the FY 1979 budget unbelievable. Senator Gary Hart (D-Colo.) called the budget a serious disappointment. Senator John Tower (R-Tex.) criticized it as being too low and Senator Dewey Bartlett (R-Okla.) argued that the FY 1979 budget is dangerously inadequate.

8. James Rowe, "House Votes Compromise Budget Target," *Washington Post*, 6 May 1977, p. A9.

9. Lawrence Korb, *The Price of Preparedness: The FY 1978-82 Defense Program* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1977), p. 7.

10. During the spring of 1978 there were indications that Congress may alter its attitude toward defense spending. The first concurrent resolution added $0.3 billion to Carter's TOA request and cut the outlay figure by $2.1 billion.

11. The last time that this occurred was in FY 1950, when defense consumed 4.5 percent of the GNP.

12. On 31 January 1978 Representative Parren Mitchell (D-Md.), Chairman of the House Budget Committee's Human Resources Task Force, charged that President Carter reneged on his campaign promise to trim defense spending by $5 to $7 billion.

13. The President halted B-1 production at four prototype aircraft. He plans to spend $106 million in FY 1979 and another $400 million in subsequent years to complete research and development on the system.

14. The President has not allowed the program to move into full-scale development. President Ford wanted to complete development in 1977.

15. Statement by President Carter, released at his news conference, 30 June 1977.

16. The FB-111H is a stretched version of the FB-111A medium bomber, with which it shares a 43 percent common structure. It is 12 feet longer, has a more restricted wing arc, uses

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B-1 engines and electronics, and carries a modified tail section. Secretary of Defense Brown called preliminary development of this airplane a prudent step.

17. Harold Brown, *Department of Defense Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1978*, 2 February 1978, p. 63 and Clarence Robinson, "Carter Warns on Soviet Nuclear Advantage," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 7 November 1977, p. 21. For a more optimistic view see Congressional Budget Office, *Counterforce Issues for the U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1978), p. 30. CBO projects that 42 percent of the launchers would survive.

18. Senator John Culver (D-Iowa), "The Future of the Strategic Bomber," *AEI Defense Review*, February 1978, p. 3.

19. For information on the M-X see Alton Slay, "M-X—A New Dimension of Strategic Deterrence," *Air Force Magazine*, September 1976, pp. 44-49 and Representative Thomas Downey (D-N.Y.), "How to Avoid Monad—and Disaster," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1976, pp. 172-201.

20. John McLucas, "The Case for a Modern Strategic Bomber," *AEI Defense Review*, February 1978, p. 19. For a contrary view see Robert Metzgel, "Cruise Missiles: Different Missions, Different Arms Control Impacts," *Arms Control Today*, January 1978, p. 1.

21. The strategic defenses of the United States consist of 57 surveillance radars and 330 interceptors.

22. John Finney, "Administration is Proposing $7.5 Billion for Long-Term Shipbuilding Program," *The New York Times*, 5 May 1976, p. 1. The study was made public by Representative Les Aspin (D-Wis.) on 6 March 1977.

23. Unit costs of Navy aircraft are higher because production runs are smaller and because aircraft must be more sophisticated to use a sea-based platform.

24. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1977-78* (London: 1977), pp. 102-107.

25. Concern for this situation led Secretary Brown to assure our Pacific allies publicly in a speech to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council on 20 February 1978. The speech was summarized in Bernard Weinraub, "Brown Says U.S. Will Strengthen Its Forces in Asia," *The New York Times*, 21 February 1978, p. 7.

26. The current U.S. proposal seeks a 62,000-man Soviet reduction to be offset by a 29,000-man U.S. cutback.

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Recently ratified Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 reflect the experiences of the last three decades. Among subjects covered are means and methods of warfare, legality of weapons, protection of medical transportation, and internal warfare.

THE 1977 PROTOCOLS TO

THE GENEVA CONVENTION OF 1949

by

Major W. Hays Parks, U.S. Marine Corps

On 12 December 1977 a decade of international negotiation was culminated when the Government of Switzerland opened for signature the Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. The United States was one of 46 nations participating in the signing ceremony in Bern.[1]

Modern law regulating the conduct of armed conflict—commonly referred to as the "law of war"—dates from the mid-19th century. Commencing with the Geneva Convention of 1864 for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field and the U.S. Lieber Code of 1865, "Instructions for Government of Armies of the United States in the Field," the law of war is intended to:

Protect both combatants and noncombatants from unnecessary suffering;

Safeguard certain fundamental rights of civilians, prisoners of war, and wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of armed forces; and thereby to

Facilitate the restoration of peace.

Before the Geneva Convention of 1864, agreements providing protection to noncombatants were sporadic, limited to a particular conflict and the parties concerned, and based upon strict reciprocity. Agreements commencing with the 1864 Geneva Convention, negotiated in the aftermath of war rather than the heat of battle, seek universal agreement, application at all times and under all circumstances, and rely upon their consistency with the principles of war, tactical considerations, and leadership principles rather than reciprocity exclusively for their success.

Law of war conventions of this century reflect the evolutionary development of warfare as well as the slow but steady definition of the rights of individuals not engaged in battle. The principal treaty of the 14 Hague Conventions of 1907, Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,[2] is in large measure a

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codification of those principles governing the conduct of warfare that had evolved through the customary practice of states to that time. An acknowledgment of the premise that the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring one another is not unlimited, it is primarily a statement of the obligations of the combatants toward each other.

In contrast, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the Protection of War Victims[3] serve to delineate minimum standards of protection and respect to be afforded persons placed *hors de combat* or taking no direct part in hostilities. This protection covers members of the armed forces no longer capable of carrying on the battle because of wounds, sickness, shipwreck, capture or surrender, and civilians who have no direct influence on the war-making potential of the enemy.

As often is said of tactics, law of war conventions stem from and reflect the conflict or conflicts most recently concluded. The Hague Conventions of 1907 address problems which arose during the Franco-Prussian and Russo-Japanese wars, while the Geneva Protocol of 1925 banning the use of poisonous gas[4] and the two Geneva Conventions of 1929[5] evolved as a direct result of the experience of the belligerents in World War I. Similarly, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 are based upon abuses committed by the Axis Powers during World War II and other law of war issues surrounding a European-style international conflict between conventional forces in occupied territory. Only Article 3, common to all four of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, anticipated the then-developing problem of wars of a noninternational character fought by or against unconventional forces. The resultant problem may be illustrated by the incident at My Lai where U.S. Army Forces on 16 March 1968 assembled and executed several hundred unarmed, unresisting men, women, and children. Despite the heinousness of the offense

there was no violation of the Geneva Conventions inasmuch as the victims were citizens of the host country and U.S. Forces were present as an ally rather than as an occupying power. This experience and others in the more than 100 conflicts since the promulgation of the 1949 Conventions—the civil wars in the Dominican Republic, Nigeria, the Congo, and Angola, the Bangladesh war for independence, the British counterinsurgency campaign in Malaya, the chronic violence in Cyprus, the Arab-Israeli conflicts and their attendant guerrilla operations, to name a few—suggests that existing law is not fully attuned to the conflicts of the 1960s and the 1970s.

Moreover, as with all law, the law of war was in need of an overhaul to catch up with technological advances. Serious questions were being raised with regard to the lawfulness of a number of weapons. Medical evacuation by helicopter, developed by the United States in Korea and refined in Vietnam, went beyond the aerial evacuation methods contemplated in the 1949 Geneva Convention for the Wounded and Sick. New means for the protection of hospital ships were available and international acceptance was necessary in the over-the-horizon naval warfare of today. Finally, no specific agreement had been reached governing bombardment from the air as Hague Convention XIV of 1907 prohibited the "discharge of projectiles and explosives from balloons. . . ."[6]

While moves to update the law of war can be traced back as far as 1956, when the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) unsuccessfully proposed its Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War, it was not until 1968 that there was any impetus behind the move. In that year the United Nations-sponsored Tehran Conference on Human Rights adopted a resolution requesting the General

Assembly to invite the Secretary-General to examine the "need for additional humanitarian international conventions or of possible revision of existing conventions" to "ensure the better protection of civilians, [and] prisoners [of war] ... in all armed conflicts and the prohibition and limitation of the use of certain methods and means of warfare."[7] General Assembly Resolution No. 2444, approved on 16 December 1968, made such a request.

This action by the General Assembly served to encourage a number of nations to direct their attention to ICRC initiatives to update the law of war. The ICRC is the traditional guardian of the humanitarian law of war, is possessed of a professional staff highly knowledgeable of the law of war and, above all else, is both neutral and apolitical. As a result, the ICRC sponsored conferences of government experts in 1971 and 1972 to discuss the draft Protocols that it had prepared. Forty-one nations sent delegations in 1971, 77 in 1972, with the United States playing a very active role at each session. In 1974, Switzerland, the depositary of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, convened the first of what would be four annual sessions of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts to consider the draft Protocols. The fourth session, which concluded on 10 June 1977, produced the Protocols signed by the United States on 12 December 1977.

The Protocols reflect the experience of the last three decades, Protocol I serving to further the definition of the law of war as it relates to conflicts of an international character, Protocol II offering clarification and elaboration of the protection afforded noncombatants and the duties of combatants in internal or civil wars. They are intended to supplement rather than replace existing codifications of the law. Among the more significant measures there are

considerations of means and methods of warfare, legality of weapons, protection of medical transportation, and internal warfare.

Means and Methods of Warfare. Traditionally the legality of the means and methods of warfare have been measured by a balancing of *military necessity* and *unnecessary suffering.* The former is defined as permitting "a belligerent to apply only that degree and kind of regulated force, not otherwise prohibited by the law of war, required for the partial or complete submission of the enemy with the least possible expenditure of time, life, and physical resources."[8] Article 35 of Protocol I reaffirms the longstanding principles of *unnecessary suffering* by declaring:

(1) In any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited.

(2) It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.

The classic example of the balancing of these two considerations is that of an infantry unit delayed in its attack by a lone sniper hiding at the edge of a village. While incidental injuries are an unfortunate but not prohibited aspect of war, the calling in of an artillery barrage to take out this lone sniper potentially would cause greater damage to the village and its inhabitants than is warranted. Herein lies a third factor in the means and methods equation, that of *proportionality.* In weighing incidental injury to civilians, the degree of such injury must not be disproportionate to the military advantage to be gained.

During the Vietnam war, for example, the North Vietnamese installed

substantial concentrations of anti-aircraft guns and missiles on the earth-ware dikes and dams surrounding Haiphong and Hanoi. *Military necessity* warranted airstrikes against these positions. However, attack of the positions with conventional ordnance would destroy not only the enemy positions but the dams as well. This would result in massive flooding and in the probable deaths of several hundred thousand civilians, a cost U.S. authorities concluded was disproportionate to the military advantage to be gained. When the mission finally was approved by President Nixon, it was executed with a clear proviso that only antipersonnel bombs, capable of neutralization of the positions without substantial damage to the dikes, would be used.

While examples of this balancing of *military necessity, unnecessary suffering,* and *proportionality* are common-place in U.S. practice, the concept of *proportionality,* though part of customary international law, has not found its way into previous codifications of the law of war. This legislative lag has existed since 1911 when Italy conducted the first bombardment by aircraft (in the Libyan War against Turkey). As with other successful weapons, once the military efficiency of the airplane was realized, suggestions for the regulation of its use failed because of inadequate sponsorship. Thus attempts to codify the *proportionality* concept in the "Rules of Air Warfare" drafted by the Commission of Jurists meeting at The Hague in 1922-23 flew in the face of airpower arguments that "terror" bombing of the civilian population would destroy the morale of the enemy and hasten the end of any war. Although this theory was contradicted by the experience of both sides during World War II, legislation regulating aerial bombardment and codifying the rule of *proportionality* was not immediately forthcoming, prompting one

expert to offer the following observation regarding the state of the law:[9]

Here are two villages in an occupied country. Detachments of the enemy are going through them. Unidentified inhabitants shoot down some fifteen soldiers. A rapid police inquiry naturally produces nothing. To identify the assailants would require long interrogations and probably torture, since it is a matter of extracting information from patriots, conscious of serving a sacred cause. Moreover, other columns are arriving and there can be no question of conducting enquiries for weeks. The [division] commander will simply consider that "the enemy" is present in these two villages. He has a few planes at his disposal; he causes one of the villages to be bombed flat and several hundred people are killed. In the case of the other, he orders ... the execution of twenty-five people.

Faced with these two series of homicides, what will be the attitude of justice? There is no room for hypotheses: the law is perfectly clear. The pilots who wiped out the village, and their officers, will be charged with no crime. On the other hand, the soldiers, members of the firing squad and officers who took no part in the execution ... of the twenty-five inhabitants of the second village, will be found guilty of homicide.

From this state of the law there can be drawn only one precious, but amoral, axiom: Never carry out executions or destructions with the care of a craftsman. But long live wholesale massacre!

Article 57 of Protocol I not only corrects this paradox by codifying the rule of *proportionality*, but also provides the military commander with uniformly recognized guidance with respect to his responsibility to the civilian population in executing attacks against military objectives. Simultaneously, Protocol I charges the military commander under attack with the duty to avoid civilian casualties by prohibiting "the movement of the civilian population or individual civilians in order to attempt to shield military objectives from attack" (Article 51(7)) or the improper use of the red cross (Articles 28(1) and 38(1)). In requiring that a commander "do everything feasible" to identify a target as a military objective, Article 57 coincides with the rules of engagement used by U.S. forces in Vietnam,[10] traditional target intelligence requirements, principles of war such as economy of force, and practical political considerations arising from excessive collateral injury to civilians or civilian objects. While objective criteria are provided, the decision of the commander ultimately is based upon subjective factors, i.e., the best information available to him at the moment of decision.[11]

Weapons. Weapons also are judged by considerations of *military necessity* and *unnecessary suffering,* the latter phrase in the classic sense concerning itself with such weapons as barbed spears or dumdum bullets that "uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or renders their death inevitable."[12] The rationale for this rule is twofold: (a) weapons which cause unnecessary suffering cause needless injury to the individual long after the conclusion of hostilities, as evidenced by the effects of poisonous gas in World War I; and (b) militarily, wounding generally is more effective than killing, diverting men from the battlefield to evacuate and care for their wounded.

While the concept may be simple, further definition is elusive. Concerted efforts at definition have been made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the ICRC during this decade without success. Considerations have hinged upon whether a weapon causes unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury, whether the weapon is indiscriminate in effect, or whether the weapon kills through treachery. Studies to date have concentrated on napalm and other incendiary weapons, small caliber projectiles, and mines and boobytraps in an effort to identify "illegal" weapons. Those studies have found, however, that few weapons are illegal per se, and that questions of illegality are more inclined to arise in a particular use of a weapon than design intent. Moreover, there is considerable difference between an arbitrary declaration by a social scientist or movie actress that a weapon is "illegal," "immoral," or causes unnecessary suffering, the establishment of empirically proved criteria by which to measure a weapon, and scientific support for an allegation against a particular weapon. Most certainly, efficiency in its task is not tantamount to illegality. To the contrary, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 banning poisonous gas was adopted in large measure because of the military inefficiency of gas.

Three conferences of government weapons experts sponsored by the ICRC in conjunction with the 1974, 1975, and 1976 sessions of the Diplomatic Conference generally were little more than battles of rhetoric between the "haves" and the "have nots," with at least one developing nation changing its position over the course of the sessions once it had acquired its own arsenal of the weapons it previously had condemned. Other ironies surrounded the negotiations. Sweden was in the forefront of the battle to condemn napalm while simultaneously being a world leader in its manufacture and export.

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On more than one occasion the intensity of its delegation's objections to a particular weapon was directly proportional to the capabilities of its arms industry to develop and market its version of that weapon. The Soviet Union, long a supporter of the arguments of the underdeveloped nations and liberation movements, found its position as an arms developer outweighed the "humanitarian" arguments of those states opposing certain weapons, ultimately siding with the United States in asserting that the Diplomatic Conference was not the proper forum for consideration of the weapons issue.

Failing to achieve any new definition, Protocol I (Article 36) limits itself to the requirement that new weapons be reviewed to ensure their legality, a requirement the United States placed into effect by DOD Directive 5500.15 on 16 October 1974. However, Resolution 22 of the Diplomatic Conference recommends the convening of a conference in 1979 to endeavor to reach agreement regarding the issues raised by the previous conferences of government experts.

Protection of Medical Transportation. In 1910 two young Army doctors at Fort Barrancas, Florida, built and flew an aircraft with a view to using it to evacuate the wounded and sick from the battlefield. Although their experiment ended with the crash of their aerial ambulance on its maiden flight, the concept remained, with Marine 1st Lt. Christian F. Schilt performing one of the first aerial combat evacuations during the campaign against Nicaraguan bandit Augusto Sandino in January 1928. Briefly technology and the law were almost parallel in their development. In 1923, at the XIth International Red Cross Conference, the French delegation placed on the agenda for the XIIth Conference (in 1927) a proposal to grant protection to medical aircraft. This proposal eventually became Article 18 of the 1929 Geneva Convention for the Wounded and Sick and provided protected status to aircraft dedicated exclusively to medical evacuation, painted white with red crosses,[13] and (absent special and express permission to the contrary) operating solely to the rear of medical clearing stations.

Although aerial evacuation became an essential means of medical transportation during World War II, it was limited primarily to theater evacuation rather than evacuation from the combat zone. Attempts to update the law at Geneva in 1949 were influenced by the experience of World War II and the fact that (unlike wheeled ambulances and hospital ships) seldom were aircraft dedicated to exclusive medical use. Moreover, government experts argued that Article 18 of the 1929 Convention had found only limited application during World War II, technical progress in fighter aircraft and antiaircraft having rendered unrealistic any justification for the development and widescale use of protected medical aircraft. It was anticipated that future conflicts would continue the practice of theater aerial evacuation with fighter escort. As a result, Article 36 of the 1949 Geneva Convention for the Wounded and Sick provided protected status to medical aircraft solely when "flying at heights, times, and on routes specifically agreed upon between the belligerents concerned."

In 1942 a civilian physician in Virginia wrote to the War Department suggesting the feasibility of using helicopters for frontline medical evacuation. Development of the concept lagged, however, and frontline medical evacuation received little consideration by the 1949 Diplomatic Conference. The outbreak of the Korean war the following year quickly changed regard for helicopter evacuation. As early as 17 August 1950, Marine HO3S-1 helicopters of VMO-6 operating within the Pusan   perimeter   were   evacuating

wounded from the 5th Marines' regimental aid station to the Army's 8076th Surgical Hospital at Miryang, 20 miles away. Helicopters evacuated more than 8,000 wounded in the first 16 months of the war alone. By the end of the war, as little as 43 minutes elapsed between the time a Marine was wounded and the time he was placed on board a hospital ship by helicopter, 30 minutes where delivery was to a land-based hospital.[14] Helicopter evacuation became the rule rather than the exception in Vietnam, where experience taught that flights by medical aircraft within the combat zone were both a reality and a necessity.[15]

Recognizing this technological advancement and change in manner of operation, Protocol I significantly extends the areas in which medical aircraft may operate and be entitled to protection. Although guarantees of protection remain tied to communication to and acceptance of flight plans by the enemy, Protocol 1 recognizes the myriad situations in which medical evacuation by helicopter may occur by affording protection for flights over areas not controlled by an adverse party (communication not required but recommended, particularly when within range of enemy surface-to-air weapons systems), areas controlled by an adverse party (prior agreement required), and within that area identified in Protocol I as the "contact zone."[16] Medical aircraft operating in the contact zone without prior agreement do so at their own risk, but are entitled to respect after they have been recognized as medical aircraft. For military security reasons, medical aircraft continue to be prohibited from carrying out search and rescue missions over enemy-controlled areas or in the contact zone.

Substantial progress was made toward resolving the perpetual problem of identification of medical aircraft and hospital ships. Historically, attacks on each of these craft have occurred more as the result of failure of identification than through intentional acts of wrongdoing.[17] The meter-and-a-half horizontal green hull band prescribed for hospital ships by Hague Convention X of 1907[18] was deleted from the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention for the Wounded and Sick after U.S. Navy tests determined that the band hindered rather than facilitated visual identification of those ships. Although other tests confirmed wartime experience that reliance upon visual identification exclusively was inadequate, efforts at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference to adopt modern means of communication and detection for identification of medical aircraft and hospital ships were unsuccessful.

In 1973 the ICRC convened a meeting of experts from 11 nations and 4 specialized international organizations to consider signaling and identification systems for medical transports. A system of distinctive visual and nonvisual signals to supplement the emblem of the red cross was recommended and ultimately incoporated into Annex I to Protocol I for unilateral adoption by a party to a conflict if desired. These systems include: (a) use of a flashing blue light by medical aircraft; (b) a distinctive radio signal for medical units and transports; and (c) a designated Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) mode and code for medical aircraft. Further, the flashing blue light and SSR may be adopted for use by other forms of medical transportation upon special agreement between the parties to a conflict. Although technically feasible, efforts to establish a recognized underwater acoustic transmitter system as a means for identification of hospital ships by submerged submarines was placed in abeyance pending further study.[19]

Noninternational Wars. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 took a major step forward in adopting the article 3 common to all four conventions that in

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theory binds all parties to an internal conflict to certain minimum standards of conduct. The concept was and is not without difficulties in interpretation and implementation. A sovereign state, if a party to the conventions, is bound by the provisions of the article: its guerrilla opponent is not. The absence of reciprocity destroys what traditionally has been one of the more important forces for compliance with the laws of war. A government, fighting for its life against externally supported domestic foes committing acts of terrorism, is unlikely to take kindly the suggestion that these acts be responded to with humanity. Moreover, despite a provision to the contrary in common article 3, pronouncement by a government that it will apply the standards of conduct declared in common article 3 to a conflict has certain legal and political implications. Politically, it raises the dignity of an opponent from that of a mob of bandits to one of a legitimately recognized guerrilla force fighting for "national liberation" or "self-determination," inviting additional outside support in what otherwise would be purely a domestic affair. Legally, what ordinarily would be murder may become lawful killing by a "combatant" in wartime. For these reasons the Symbionese Liberation Army and the besieged Indians at Wounded Knee were quick to declare their intention to abide by the Geneva Conventions in their respective "wars" with the United States, while U.S. authorities were just as anxious to conclude that the level of conflict necessary for such recognition was not met.

Whatever the objections to common article 3, two decades of national liberation wars established that it did not go far enough in providing protection to the victims of noninternational conflicts. Protocol II is intended to offer additional delineation of this protection. The drafting and approval of its provisions were accomplished in an atmosphere frequently charged with emotion and political rhetoric, brought about in part by the participation for the first time of a number of national liberation movements. Nonetheless, Protocol II—18 substantive articles as compared to the 91 of Protocol I—states in greater detail than common article 3 both the minimum protection to be afforded the victims of noninternational conflicts and the responsibilities of the parties to a conflict. It specifically does not apply to riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence, and other acts of a similar nature. Otherwise it does not attempt to establish a "threshold of violence" at which time Protocol II comes into effect, for that question only can be answered through analysis of a particular situation in light of myriad legal, historical, sociological, and political factors. Rather it is an attempt to minimize violence in noninternational conflicts and to limit suffering by those not taking a direct part in the conflict. However, the history and nature of insurgent tactics suggests that Protocol II will face a plethora of difficulties in practical implementation.

Other Provisions. Other articles specify new areas of express protection. Article 56 of Protocol I and 15 of Protocol II, for example, prohibit making works or installations containing dangerous forces (such as dams or nuclear electrical generating stations) the object of attack, except where that facility offers regular, significant, and direct support of military operations and if such attack is the only feasible way that support may be terminated effectively. In order to facilitate the identification of such works or installations, Article 56(7) establishes a special sign—three bright orange circles placed on the same axis—to mark these facilities. Article 44 serves to neutralize those reservations by the Soviet Union and other Communist states to Article 85 of the 1949 Geneva Convention for

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Prisoners of War that have been used to deny prisoner-of-war status to captured combatants on the allegation that they have participated in aggressive war or committed war crimes (the argument of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam against U.S. prisoners of war during the Vietnam war). Paragraph 2 of Article 44 guarantees a combatant prisoner-of-war status notwithstanding his conduct (alleged or actual) prior to capture. Articles 32 through 34 recognize a new human right, the right of families to know the fate of their relatives, by setting forth a requirement for belligerents to search and account for the missing in action, and for the decent disposition and eventual repatriation of the remains of the dead.

Conclusion. The Protocols to the Geneva Conventions are the product of lengthy negotiation and a great deal of compromise between delegations representing diverse political views and geographic areas. They are evolutionary rather than revolutionary, constituting a codification of customary international law rather than embarking upon substantial change of that law. They are not without fault. In addition to some attempts at politicization of the law of war, there were the perennial efforts by moralists and idealists who, realizing the futility of any attempt to outlaw war, endeavored to interject language into the Protocols that could be interpreted as making the law governing combat operations so restrictive as to make the waging of war impossible. But the pages of history are strewn with moralistic documents which failed in their usefulness because they attempted to establish an unattainable standard of conduct.[20] In this regard the law of war is no different from domestic and other international legislation in achieving respect only to the extent it reflects the customary practice of those it seeks to govern.[21] Changes in limitations on the governing of military forces in combat

can be particularly critical, for any change likely to be perceived as a threat to the survival of an individual, unit, or nation, or contrary to the Principles of War, tactical considerations, or reasonable means for the commander's accomplishment of his mission is likely to be honored more in its breach than in its adherence.

To avoid the imposition of unrealistic restraints upon its armed forces, the Protocols were the subject of detailed review by the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff prior to their signature by the United States. A more detailed review is underway within the services, DOD, and other agencies of the U.S. Government to insure that U.S. interpretations of the Protocols are attuned to the realities and conditions of combat prior to submission of the Protocols by the President to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. The United States and its NATO allies are conducting a separate review of the Protocols to insure their common understanding of the Protocols' effect. If approved by the Senate, the Protocols will go into effect for the United States 6 months after deposit of its instrument of ratification with the Government of Switzerland, adding further definition to the law of war.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

A judge advocate, Major Hays Parks has served in a variety of command and staff assignments since his commissioning in 1963. He was senior U.S. representative to the 32-nation Seminar on the Dissemination of the Geneva Conventions in Warsaw in 1977. He serves in the International Law Division of the Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy where he is responsible for law of war matters.

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NOTES

1. Participating in the signing ceremony on 12 December 1977 were Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Ivory Coast, Denmark, Egypt, El Salvador, Ecuador, Finland, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iran, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Jordan, Luxembourg, Morocco, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Philippines (Protocol I only), Portugal, East Germany, Byelorussian SSR, Ukrainian SSR, U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, Holy See, Senegal, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Tunisia, Vietnam (Protocol I only), Yugoslavia, and the United States.

2. U.S. Laws, Statutes, etc., "Convention on War on Land," *United States Statutes at Large* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1907), v. 36, pt. 2, p. 2277.

3. U.S. Treaties, etc., "Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field," *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements,* TIAS 3362 (Washington: U.S. Dept. of State, 1949), v. 6, pt. 3, pp. 3115-3216; U.S. Treaties, etc., "Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea," *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements,* TIAS 3363 (Washington: U.S. Dept. of State, 1949), v. 6, pt. 3, pp. 3217-3315; U.S. Treaties, etc., "Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War," *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements,* TIAS 3364 (Washington: U.S. Dept. of State, 1949), pp. 3316-3515; U.S. Treaties, etc., "Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War," *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements,* TIAS 3365 (Washington: U.S. Dept. of State, 1949), pp. 3516-3695.

4. U.S. Treaties, etc., "Geneva Protocol Prohibiting the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare," *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements,* TIAS 8061 (Washington: U.S. Dept. of State, 1975), v. 26, pt. 1, pp. 571-582.

5. U.S. Laws, Statutes, etc., "Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Wounded and Sick of Armies in the Field," *United States Statutes at Large* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1932), v. 47, pt. 2, p. 2074; U.S. Laws, Statutes, etc., "Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War," *United States Statutes at Large* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1932), v. 47, pt. 2, p. 2021.

6. U.S. Laws, Statutes, etc., "Hague Declaration Prohibiting the Discharge of Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons," *United States Statutes at Large* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1910), v. 36, pt. 2, p. 2439.

7. Resolution XXIII, Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 32/41, p. 18 (1968).

8. U.S. Office of Naval Operations, *The Law of Naval Warfare* (Washington: 1955), para. 220b.

9. Pierre Boissier, *L'Epee et la Balance* (Geneva: Editions Labor et Fides, 1953), pp. 55-56. Prior to Protocol 1, only air forces were without specific regulation. Naval and land forces are limited in their operations on land by Hague Convention (IX) Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War, *United States Statutes at Large* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1932), v. 36, pt. 2, p. 2351 and Hague Convention IV.

10. Paragraph 6a of MACV Directive 525-13 (May 1971), as reprinted in *Congressional Record,* 6 June 1975, pp. S9897-9898 provided:

All possible means will be employed to limit the risk to the lives and property of friendly forces and civilians. In this respect, a target must be clearly identified as hostile prior to making a decision to place fire on it.

11. In the plenary sessions the United States offered the following understanding to Article 57:

Commanders and others responsible for planning, deciding upon or executing attacks necessarily have to reach decisions on the basis of their assessment of the information from all sources which is available to them at the relevant time.

This statement reflects customary international law. In 1948 charges against former German Gen. Lothar Rendulic alleging he had carried out wanton destruction in the Norwegian province of Finmark were dismissed by a Nuremburg tribunal, which declared that ". . . the conditions, as they appeared to the defendant at the time were sufficient upon which he could honestly conclude that urgent military necessity warranted the decision made (that is, . . . as a precautionary measure against an attack by superior [Russian] forces)." *U.S. v. List, et al.,* XI *Trial of War Criminals* 1113, pp. 1295-1297.

12. The Declaration of St. Petersburg, 1868, as found in Department of the Army Pamphlet 27-161-2, *International Law,* 1962, p. 227.

13. Or the red crescent or red lion and sun, the authorized distinctive signs of the medical services of the armed forces of some Moslem states (e.g., Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Syria, and Turkey)

and Iran, respectively. Israel uses a red shield of David, which has not gained international recognition.

14. In contrast, during the 1945 battle for Iwo Jima, Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal offered this praise of medical evacuation efforts: "I went aboard the [hospital ship] *Samaritan* [AH-10], where Navy surgeons and corpsmen were already dealing with the casualties from the day and the night before." Clifford P. Morehouse, *The Iwo Jima Campaign* (Washington: U.S. Marine Corps, Historical Division, 1946), p. 139.

15. The Army and Marine Corps estimate that virtually 100 percent of U.S. battlefield casualties in Vietnam requiring medical evacuation were removed from the battlefield by helicopter; 15 percent of battlefield casualties in Korea were removed by helicopter. The Army carried out 950,000 helicopter evacuations in Vietnam. During the Vietnam war, 1 percent of the personnel evacuated to hospitals died of wounds, as compared with 2.5 percent in Korea and 4.5 percent in World War II. While these advances are tied to improved medical facilities, they also relate to the increased use of the helicopter for battlefield evacuation.

16. Article 26(2) defines "contact zone" as "any area on land where the forward elements of opposing forces are in contact with each other, especially where they are exposed to direct fire from the ground."

17. J.C. Mossop, "Hospital Ships in the Second World War," *British Year Book of International Law*, v. 24, 1947, p. 402; and *Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross on Its Activities During the Second World War* (Geneva: ICRC, 1948), v. I, p. 213.

18. U.S. Laws, Statutes, etc., "Hague Convention (X) for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention," *United States Statutes at Large* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1910), v. 36, pt. 2, p. 2371.

19. Distinctive signals and communications necessary for the improved identification of medical transportation require implementation through the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the International Civil Aviation Organization, and to some extent, the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. This subject is on the agenda for the ITU 1979 World Administrative Radio Conference.

20. See, e.g., Article 22 to the Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armaments, otherwise known as the London Treaty of 1930, which attempted to prohibit submarine warfare by placing unreasonable restrictions upon submarine operations. Although reaffirmed by a 1936 *Proces-Verbal* acceded to or signed by Great Britain, the United States, Germany, and Japan, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in its proceedings against Grand Adm. Karl Doenitz, former Fuehrer der Unterseeboote, found that those limitations had not been followed by any of those parties during World War II.

21. Although degree of adherence is not the sole criteria for determining a law's effectiveness, the reader may consider the response of U.S. citizens to the 18th Amendment (prohibiting liquor) and the 55-mph speed limit as examples of legislating conduct beyond the perceived point of necessity or reality.

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"[There] has been a tendency on the part of some staff people to use systems analysis as a cover for what is really subjective judgment . . .. I am determined not to let what is essentially a helpful tool, and systems analysis can be a helpful tool, become the overriding force in driving decisions, particularly in the dark."—The Honorable W. Graham Claytor, Jr., Secretary of the Navy, Keynote Address of the Naval War College Current Strategy Forum, 27 March 1978. What is this helpful tool? What may we ask of it? What must we not ask of it?

DEFENSE SYSTEMS ANALYSIS ... ONE MORE TIME

by

George F. Brown, Jr.

Imperfect Roots. The roots of defense systems analysis can be found in a wide variety of attempts to apply quantitative economic theory to operational problems confronting business enterprises. While generalization is made difficult by the wide variety of business problems for which quantitative economic theory has proved applicable, five characteristics of private enterprise can be identified that facilitated the rapid success of quantitative approaches to management.

First, virtually all business investment decisions can be evaluated in terms of a single-dimensioned measure—dollar profitability. Both revenues and costs can be expressed in this unit, and thus, while difficulties in analysis might arise, the potential always exists to reduce the debate among alternative choices to the measure of profitability.

The second key characteristic is a corollary of the first: because of the existence of the profit measure, a general consensus regarding preferences is built into business problems. Greater profits are preferred to lesser profits, and alternatives can be readily ranked along this scale.

Third, the systems being analyzed can be reasonably defined and boundaries can be drawn enabling discrete problems to emerge. One product can be analyzed separately from another unless there are interrelationships within the demand or production functions. One plant's operations can be separated effectively from another plant's operations. Even in the cases in which interrelationships exist, these are relatively transparent enabling the analyst to correctly define the system for study.

Fourth, while uncertainty is present in most business decisions, the areas of uncertainty typically can be defined and permit the application of standard methods of analysis. Ranges of

consumer demand or of raw materials cost, for example, can be expressed using probability theory and analyzed accordingly.

Finally, the data necessary for the analysis of business decisions are usually readily obtained. In many cases, historical data can be studied to provide forecasts of future characteristics. Even in those cases in which little historical data is available, analysts of business decisions have been able to draw upon such techniques as market surveys to build a data base.

While this short synthesis does injustice to the complexities of a subset of analyses of business decisions, (e.g., those falling into the realm of long-range corporate strategy), these five characteristics are present in the majority of the problems which have been chosen for analysis. As a result, the application of tools of analysis to business decisions has expanded rapidly. A survey of most present textbooks in the quantitative management field will reveal a state-of-the-art that has reached near cookbook character for many recurring management decisions.

As a result of the successes in business, a natural extension to the problems of defense decisionmaking was suggested. Attempts at this extension began in earnest in the early 1960s. At one level, these attempts met with successes similar to those experienced in business. These efforts, however, were mostly ones in which direct analogies could be drawn between defense operations and business counterparts— scheduling industrial activities, planning inventories and maintenance strategies, etc.

The more important problems facing defense planners, however, are those relating to force structure choices. Here, the application of analysis required facing problems totally different from that experienced by the early practitioners of quantitative management disciplines. The differences are strongly

highlighted by a comparison with the five characteristics of private enterprise from which defense systems analysis evolved.

First, unlike the relatively clean measure of dollar profitability, defense systems analysts are faced with problems in which the two sides of the equation—costs and effectiveness—are fundamentally incommensurate. While costs of alternatives frequently have a dollar component, effectiveness is almost never measured in monetary terms. Rather, effectiveness of alternatives must be related, directly or through proxies, to the provision of national security and the achievement of national objectives. Further complicating this problem is that for most force planning problems, the relevant measures of effectiveness (and sometimes also of cost) are multiple in nature. Rarely can a force alternative be evaluated using a single dimension of effectiveness. Thus defense systems analysts must begin an evaluation of force choices by confronting three difficult problems: attempting to define effectiveness measures that adequately reflect force contributions to national security and objectives, attempting to define effectiveness measures which adequately reflect the multiple dimensions of potential force contributions, and recognizing the fundamental inability to combine cost and effectiveness measures into a single index of interest. Nowhere are these problems more clearly apparent than in attempts to analyze military force alternatives.

As a result of these difficulties, defense systems analysis is rendered unable to lead to unarguable preferences among alternatives, a situation again distinct from the profitability ranking scheme available to business analysts. The classic question of "How much is enough?" suggested by the inability to combine cost and effectiveness cannot be answered by analysis. Only experience, subjective judgment, and the

other factors that enter into the political decisionmaking process can be called upon to weigh, for example, the dollar worth of an improvement in force effectiveness. As a result, final choices regarding forces are removed from the realm of formal systems analysis.

Even the classic ploys of formulating systems analysis problems in such frameworks as "maximize effectiveness for a fixed cost" or "minimize the cost of attaining a given effectiveness" are typically doomed to the same fate. First, the "fixed costs" and "given effectiveness" within such frameworks are themselves arbitrary; one must always debate whether these levels were chosen correctly. Further, the presence of multiple effectivness measures for most force planning problems again leads to situations in which only judgment can lead to final choices. Much like trade-offs between cost and effectiveness, the trade-offs across dimensions of effectiveness cannot be synthesized into a single measure like profitability.

Third, the problem of defining appropriate systems for analysis introduces complexities in force planning beyond those in most other problems. In a very real sense, force units cannot be easily segregated into discrete categories for analytical purposes; rather, most force alternatives must be viewed within the total structure. Furthermore, even when systems can be defined with reasonable boundaries, the problem of multiple relevant systems emerges. The varying employment alternatives and potential conflict scenarios within which forces might be allocated make any single system chosen (and any single effectiveness measure) suspect. Finally, relevant systems definitions frequently require the incorporation of national and international political considerations along with strictly military ones. As a result, the systems relevant for evaluating force choices grow to immense proportions in many instances.

Fourth, uncertainty, rather than being merely one facet of the problem, is perhaps the central facet in force planning. Who will be the enemy in the future conflict? What will be his objectives? Where and when will the conflict take place? What type of conflict will it be? What capabilities will the enemy have? How will various force options affect his decisions? How will other nations react? The list of such uncertainties can be expanded far beyond the questions suggested above, and these types of uncertainties must be central in any analysis of force choices. Furthermore, attempts at addressing these questions are far more complex than, for example, specifying potential levels of consumer demand. It is difficult merely to list the potential range of possibilities, let alone attach concrete probabilities to each.

Finally, the hard data frequently available for business analyses is often absent for defense systems analysis. For some inputs to analysis, such as those relating to the interests and intentions of potential adversaries, only subjective informed judgment is available. In other instances, such as the outcome of a conflict, no real data can ever be available until the conflict takes place. Thus the data base available to the defense systems analyst is built to a significant extent on subjective judgment, past experience, proxy attempts at modeling conflicts, and similar foundations.

In summary, none of the five ingredients that contributed to the success of other analyses are fully present in force planning. Realistically, defense systems analysis, particularly when applied to force planning decisions, must be viewed as a discipline that draws only a modest amount of support from its roots.

Two Key Contributions. Allowing that systems analysis will never lead to force planning cookbooks similar to those that have evolved for some other

business and defense decisions, the contributions of the discipline to force planners can be reduced to two dimensions.

First, the economic foundations of defense systems analysis have forced a recognition that cost is an essential consideration in force choices. Every force choice under consideration has a relevant cost component. At the highest level, spending on defense implies lesser resources available to the private sector of society or to other government programs. Advocates of defense spending must therefore argue that the benefits so obtained outweigh those foregone. More pragmatically, this factor leads to the conclusion that defense budgets will always be "tight"; there will never be funds available for all programs of potential interest. Once budgets are set, force choices must still be considered in terms of their cost. The selection of one option implies that others are foregone; this fact applies throughout force planning decisions. Spending on one weapons system will be at the expense of another; spending on readiness will be at the expense of modernization; allocating resources to one command will be at the expense of some alternative command; deploying forces in one area will make them less available in another.

One consequence of the inevitability of cost considerations is that defense program advocates are forever destined to operate in an adversary relationship. At the highest level, the requirement exists to demonstrate the desirability of defense spending over other ways of spending (or not spending) federal government funds. At the service level, program advocates must make arguments showing the relative merits of their programs over those of the other services. Within each service, the same requirement exists: successful programs will be those which can be argued to be superior to their competitors.

It is as a result of this forced competition that defense systems analysis makes its second contribution to force planning. It provides a framework within which rational debate can occur, one which forces program advocates to state their cases in a form which other decisionmakers can review and evaluate. While debate regarding force options is nothing new to military planning, the attempt to impose a structure of logical analysis onto the debate is a significant change within the past two decades.

The Debate. Defense systems analysis, perhaps to a greater extent than any other discipline, has been scrutinized, criticized, and attacked by force planners in a wide variety of forums. Initially, perhaps, such actions might be viewed as the natural consequence of unfulfilled expectations; the tools which proved such a success in earlier applications found force planning a task not so readily confronted. No profit measure was present; instead, defense systems analysts were forced to try to develop effectiveness measures capturing the contributions of alternative forces. Preferences and choices were in no way removed from the judgmental and political realms by the presence of systems analysis. Attempts to draw boundaries around force planning problems proved difficult at best. Fundamental uncertainties found their way to the head of each force issue. Judgment, guesstimates, and proxy data proved essential as inputs to defense systems analyses. Numbers, the ultimate instruments of precision in other sciences, became merely the best way of communicating such judgments and estimates. All of these realizations had to be a disappointment to analysts who were able to progress rapidly towards cookbooks for solving other problems. These facts simultaneously proved—to both the analysts and the users of analysis—that the ground upon which force analyses were built was shaky at best.

But all of this is--or certainly should be--well recognized by professional analysts and the decisionmakers alike who draw upon analysis. The early disappointments of the transition to force planning are now history, and the viewpoint that systems analysis can only hope to make a contribution to debate is well established.

As a result, military decisionmakers are left with only one realistic viewpoint regarding the discipline. This view accepts defense systems analysis, and attempts to use its principles as a foundation for developing and defending positions in the inevitable debate over force choices. The alternative of rejecting systems analysis reduces to the rejection of the process of effective argument. Those who argue that the framework of systems analysis leads the debate away from the important issues underlying force planning decisions are left with a position somewhat similar to arguing that the use of accounting methodologies leads to embezzlement; the truth is merely that embezzlement went undetected before books were kept. The framework of defense systems analysis consists only of identifying the measures of cost and effectiveness relevant to the choice among alternatives in view of the underlying objectives and interests, constructing models of the relevant problems requiring decisions, assembling the information prerequisite to the analysis, and evaluating the performance of the various alternatives under consideration as an input to the final decisionmaking process. Expanded discussions of this framework emphasize the need for careful sensitivity and contingency testing throughout this process. Systems analysis allows--and even invites--debate over the correct ways to measure force effectiveness, the use of subjective and experience-based inputs to the analysis, arguments over the likely future environment, and so forth. Thus in any particular application criticisms along

such lines represent a tacit acceptance of the science. While the potential for inept and incomplete use of the framework of defense systems analysis certainly exists as strongly as in any other discipline, the framework itself represents only the formalization of sound intuitive structures of reasoning. In fact, viewing defense systems analysis as it actually is--and not as analysts (incorrectly) envisioned it to be in the early 1960s--leaves little room for argument over the merits of the discipline. As long as the need for effective argument exists in a cost-constrained environment, the contribution of defense systems analysis in providing a framework for argument and debate will persist.

Even allowing for the fact that time will allow the current view of the most modest contributions of defense systems analysis to replace the overly optimistic predictions of the early practitioners, however, criticism of defense systems analysis will continue. Unlike most other disciplines, defense systems analysis is blessed with at least three schools of critics likely to remain permanently within the Defense Establishment.

First are those unwilling to expose and defend force alternatives in the rigorous manner required by the discipline. Specifying the dimensions of effectiveness relevant to force choices, attempting to measure the contributions of alternative force structures along these dimensions, announcing judgments regarding the critical uncertainties, placing bets on their likelihoods, and similar activities such as are required within the framework of defense systems analysis are difficult and sometimes unpleasant tasks. There will always exist a cadre of planners who wish to avoid laying out their cases in a manner so readily scrutinized.

Secondly, the continuing flow of analysts and decisionmakers whose education was obtained in business

schools and in business into defense planning implies that the disconnect between business and defense systems analysis will continue to be a problem. Both the mistakes and the disappointments suggested earlier are likely to be repeated continually by those familiar with business analysis but not with the additional complexities of force planning.

Finally, the adversary nature within which cost-constrained defense planners operate guarantees that there will always be losers among the competitors. Human nature being what it is, there will be those who find it easier to denigrate the process of argument than to admit their inability to construct a compelling argument.

Using Defense Systems Analysis. The previous comments suggest a view that defense systems analysis, for better or worse, is likely to remain a fixture of force planning. Several key lessons have emerged regarding the effective use of this tool.

The most important of these lessons are suggested by the framework of defense systems analysis itself and by the characteristics of force planning described earlier. First, analysts (and critics of the analyses of others) should key on the measures of effectiveness and cost used to support choices among alternative forces. Unlike the clean profit measure, the choice of measures for defense analysis is pure art. Questioning whether the measures chosen truly reflect the underlying objectives for which forces are bought and whether the measures adequately reflect all of the multiple dimensions of contributions must be standard practice within force planning. Few arguments are more compelling than ones which demonstrate that key dimensions of a problem have been ignored in an analysis.

Secondly, the same critical review should be placed on comparisons between cost and effectiveness or among various dimensions of effectiveness; as a general rule, such comparisons are outside the realm of formal analysis as they essentially involve debate over the nature of national interests and objectives. Careful attempts to define the relation of force effectiveness to national interests are therefore an essential part of the adversary relationship.

Third, users of analyses should examine carefully the system defined for analysis. The appropriateness of its boundaries (are essential considerations excluded?) and the existence of alternative relevant systems (are there alternative missions of relevance or alternative scenarios of interest?) must be examined. Such questions are central in force planning as most force elements are truly multimission in nature.

Fourth, defense systems analysis must address specifically the key uncertainties. Have important potential conflict scenarios been ignored? Can debate be raised regarding assumptions relating to these uncertainties? Are new viewpoints required relating to the capabilities and intentions of potential adversaries? Uncertainty, fundamental to force planning, must be fully debated among analysts, critics, and decisionmakers. In fact, it is largely the role of the experienced operator to provide the basis for analytical assumptions regarding these critical uncertainties.

In this regard, one further caveat is appropriate. The presence of significant uncertainties in the future should not be used as a means of avoiding arguing within the framework of defense systems analysis. The old comparison between the worth of a bird in the hand and those in the bush provides useful guidance here. In the cost-constrained defense competition, there will always be a bird in hand to compete against those potentially in some future bush. The tendency will likely persist among defense decisionmakers to choose a force alternative that confronts some

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clear and present danger (or, at another level, a government program that confronts some clear social problem) over an alternative that might prove useful against some as yet undetermined future threat. At minimum, force planners concerned about future uncertainties should strive to define the likely shapes of future bushes, the likely number of them that might appear, and the probable bird count therein. To do less is to invite openly the categorization of such arguments as vague and ineffective.

Finally, recognizing the general lack of hard data with which defense systems analysis must operate, it is necessary to scrutinize the inputs carefully. While judgmental inputs per se should not be attacked (as in most cases the critic can do no better than to supply his own judgmental inputs), the necessity exists to solicit as fully as possible the information necessary to provide the best possible judgment. While even the best of all possible systems analyses will never allow the decisionmaker to "know" he has reached the correct answer, effective and careful debate over these inputs can lead in this direction.

The above guidance can be seen to relate directly back to the contributions attributed to defense systems analysis. It suggests nothing more than the need for a careful debate among force alternatives in a cost-constrained environment. Defense systems analysis provides the framework within which this debate can occur. It is more art than science; it draws upon and invites judgment and opinion rather than replacing it; it provides a format within which arguments can be developed and dissected. To expect defense systems analysis to be anything more than this has been proven pointless; to deny the contributions which it can make is to deny the realities it reflects.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Professor George Brown has been a member of the Management Department, Naval War College since 1973. He received his Ph.D. in Economics from Carnegie-Mellon University and has written widely on operations research, financial and quantitative analysis, statistics, and management matters. Prior to joining the faculty, he was a Study Director at the Center for Naval Analysis.

Ψ

The ambivalence of the relationship between Russia and the West creates difficult problems and some observers treat the ambivalence and the problems as new phenomena. There is an apparent, if irregular, cycle of Russian receptivity to and isolation from Western ideas and technology that began half a millennium ago. Today's problems are no less difficult but they aren't new.

DÉTENTE THEN AND NOW

by

Steven Ross

Russia has always fascinated and frightened the West. Americans today are puzzled by the meaning of the term détente and apprehensive about what the policy of détente implies about Russia's relations with the West.

Détente has been called everything from an effort to transform the Soviet Union into a *status quo* power by involving Moscow in a web of treaties and understandings, to attempts to add a modicum of order and restraint to a basically anarchic threat situation, to a move by Washington to accommodate itself to being the world's number two power.[1] Russian motives are subject to an equally wide variety of interpretations. Some believe that the Soviet Union is basically a cautious, prudent power interested in reducing the risks of nuclear war and accepting the existence of a permanent rivalry with the West that does not preclude areas of cooperation. Others argue that Moscow is using détente as a tactic designed to obtain Western technology and lull the West

into a state of complacency before resuming an aggressive posture.[2] The word détente has in fact caused such problems in the public mind that during the 1976 election campaign one Presidential candidate dropped the term from his rhetoric, substituting instead the rather inelegant phrase "peace through strength."

Inability to comprehend the meaning of Russian policy is not, however, new. Nor is it a response to the 1917 revolution or the cold war. A mixture of fear, admiration, loathing and hope has been a part of the Western view of Russia ever since the 16th century. Russian attitudes towards the West have been equally ambivalent. Russian rulers have frequently borrowed technology from the West. Periodically, they have also adopted elements of Western culture. On other occasions, they have tried to isolate Russia from the influence of Western culture. Russian popular response to Westernization of any sort has varied from friendly to

hostile, and Western reactions to the cycles of openness and isolation have been marked by a wide variety of conflicting opinions.

Russian Rulers and the West. Kievian Russia enjoyed extensive economic and political contact with Western Europe, whose monarchs looked upon Kiev as a full-fledged European state. Mongol conquest in the 13th century isolated Russia from the outside world for more than two centuries. After casting off the Tartar yoke, the rulers of Moscow gradually built a web of relationships with Europe. Muscovite tsars sought alliances with the Poles against the Mongols and turned to the Swedes, Danes, Dutch, and English to check the Poles. By the early 17th century, Russia, though not yet a European power, was an important player in Eastern Europe's political system.

In order to compete effectively with European rivals, Russian rulers began to adopt European technology. In the 1470s, Ivan III employed Italian craftsmen to build the Kremlin's fortifications. Italians also designed many of Moscow's churches, took over the coinage of money, and introduced vodka and venereal disease to Russia.[3] In 1550, Ivan IV established a Musketeer Corps, armed and organized on Western lines, and recruited foreign officers to train it. He also hired German and Italian experts to cast cannon for his forces.[4]

During the late 16th and first half of the 17th century, Russia waged a long bitter conflict with Poland. To counter initial Polish military superiority, Moscow again turned to the West. Dutch and Swedish officers helped organize and train Russian regiments, and Western mercenaries served in the ranks. By the 1660s, the Russian Army was about one fourth foreign. Dutch experts in 1632 built a modern arms factory at Tula and in 1647 supplied the Russians with their first official drillbook.[5]

Until the end of the 17th century, borrowing from the West had been sporadic and *ad hoc*. Peter the Great, however, placed the Westernization of Russia's military and administrative system at the forefront of state policy. As a youth, Peter spent much time with the foreign community of Moscow, raised two Western style regiments from among his own courtiers and generally concluded that Westernization was the key to transforming Russia into a major European power.[6]

As tsar, one of Peter's first acts was to visit Western Europe, where in the course of his travels, he engaged hundreds of artisans and craftsmen to bring their skills to Russia. Peter also abolished the mixture of old and new regiments and created a standing army based on conscription and equipped with Western weapons. Hundreds of Westerners trained the Russian forces, and the proportion of Western mercenaries in the officer corps grew to about a third. By 1725, Russia had a European-style army numbering 210,000 regulars backed by 100,000 irregular troops. Russia also possessed a modern navy of 24,000 men.[7]

Peter also modernized Russia's administrative system. He directed a German advisor to study the Swedish Government's structure and copied it by organizing government departments into nine administrative colleges capped by a Governing Senate. Hired Germans and Swedish war prisoners provided most of the original personnel.[8] Peter introduced Western dress and manners at court, sent hundreds of young men to study abroad, and established technical schools at home. He also built a new city—St. Petersburg—on the Neva estuary. The tsar then transferred his capitol from Moscow to his new Western style window on the West, an action symbolizing the state's new orientation.[9]

Peter borrowed from the West in order to strengthen the Russian state, especially its military power. He was not

interested in Europe's culture or ideals and was even reputed to have told a confidant, "We need Europe for a few decades and then we must turn our back on it."[10] Nevertheless, he did Europeanize his armed forces, civil service, and upper nobility and raised Russia into the ranks of the great powers.

His successors were not active reformers, but they perpetuated most of his innovations. An aristocratic faction attempted to move the seat of government back to Moscow but was finally defeated. St. Petersburg remained the capitol; foreign specialists continued to serve the government, and Russia participated actively in Europe's power politics. European culture began to influence the Russian upper classes. Tsarina Anna's regime was permeated with German styles and manners while French language and literature predominated during Elizabeth's reign. Moreover, a series of marriage alliances between members of the Romanov dynasty and numerous European royal families made the rulers of Russia progressively more European, at least biologically.

Catherine the Great, a German princess, came to power in 1762 via a *coup d'etat* against her husband and made a concerted effort to present herself to the rest of Europe as a leader of the Enlightenment. She carried on an extensive correspondence with many of France's leading philosophers and won lavish praise from them. Voltaire, for example, described her as "an Empress who does good from Kamchatka to Africa."[11] He even justified Russian aggression against Poland and the Ottoman Empire as triumphs of reason over priestcraft and superstition and expressed the hope that the Russian flag would one day fly over Constantinople.[12] Catherine encouraged the expansion of the publishing industry which turned out translations of the works of the philosophes, and in 1767, the Empress summoned a Legislative

Commission to reform and codify Russia's laws in the best manner of enlightened despotism.

Catherine, of course, never contemplated a reduction of her aristocratic powers nor did she seek to improve the lot of the serfs, and in 1785 actually increased aristocratic control over the peasantry.[13] Catherine may have indeed believed in many of the advanced notions of her day, but she never allowed philosophers to influence her foreign or domestic policy.

The French Revolution frightened the tsarina, and she quickly dropped all pretense of being a liberal reformer. Catherine banned the works of Voltaire and other philosophes, forbade Russian reformers to publish their views, and exiled Radishchev, a perceptive social critic, who had described the evils of serfdom, to Siberia. Masons and religious dissenters often found themselves charged with heresy or treason.[14] After 1789, Catherine discovered that Western thought was no longer helpful or amusing, and she turned against it.

Paul I continued the policy of isolating Russia from subversive ideas. He instituted strict censorship and even excluded French music and clothing from his realm.[15] He continued to use foreign technology and employ Westerners in his army and civil service but rejected the French ideals of liberty and social change.

Alexander I, a mystic with a strong streak of Machiavellianism, flirted with Western thought and simultaneously became a champion of reaction. He fought Napoleon in the name of liberty while seizing territory from neighboring states, and he even tried to place one of his satellite allies on the French throne.[16] At his court, he allowed liberals to work on constitutional projects but also expanded the power of the secret police, purged professors, burned books, and outlawed all Masonic and other secret societies.[17] For all his dabbling with constitutions and mystic

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religious cults, Alexander never allowed Western thought to influence state policy.

Nicholas put an end to the ambiguities of the previous regime and instituted a reign of harsh reaction. Like other tsars, Nicholas was willing to import Western technology and was responsible for building Russia's first railways. He also fostered technical education and began to introduce modern, Western-designed weapons into his army. On the other hand, censorship, secret police, and persecution of religious and national minorities characterized Nicholas' domestic policy, and the official slogan, "Autocracy, Orthodoxy, and Nationality," summarized the basic outlook of the government.[18] Nicholas was the apogee of autocracy and at home and abroad he was the leader of the forces of reaction.

The Crimean War revealed the inadequacy of the Russian state and its inability to cope with the technical superiority of the West. Consequently, Alexander II ushered in another period of rapid modernization based on Western models. Serfs were freed, intellectual repression slightly curtailed, and foreign entrepreneurs encouraged to invest in Russian railroad construction and industrial development.[19] Reforms created demands for further change, and in the second half of his reign, the tsar reimposed restrictive measures against subversive ideas.[20]

Alexander II's assassination and the accession of Alexander III opened another cycle of repression. Orthodoxy, Autocracy and Russification became the government's guiding slogans. Officials frankly stated that Western notions such as freedom of speech and representative government were evil myths and that mystery and authority formed the proper philosophic foundations of the Russian state.[21]

Official obscurantism notwithstanding, the tsar was quite willing to turn to the West for diplomatic and financial assistance. Alexander concluded an alliance with the French Republic in the 1890s thereby linking Europe's most reactionary and radical regimes. Alexander also encouraged foreign capital, and the French invested heavily in the Russian economy. French engineering firms built much of Russia's expanding rail net, and French investors bought billions of francs worth of government bonds. By 1914, the French held ten billion francs in government paper plus two billion in shares of private firms. The rapid growth of Russian heavy industry in the late 19th and early 20th century owed much to Western investment.[22]

Nicholas II, the last Romanov tsar, continued the familiar policy of seeking the benefits of Western technology without suffering any of its consequences. Although he had to make concessions to growing demands for internal reform, he remained a convinced autocrat and resisted those demands as best he could. He never came to terms with the need for change and presided ineffectually as Russia staggered from war to revolution to the extinction of the dynasty.

The Romanov heraldic eagle had two heads; one looking West, the other East. It symbolized one aspect of the regime— a willingness to use Western technology and culture combined with a desire to maintain the traditional Russian political and social system. Some tsars had a sincere admiration for Western life, but no Romanov ruler ever seriously considered allowing Western culture to undermine the foundations of the Russian state.

In this respect, the Bolshevik regime was little different from its predecessors. Lenin and his followers believed in a Western ideology and during the first months of the revolution assumed that events in Russia were the start of a global movement. The failure of Communist revolutions in the West, civil war, and foreign intervention quickly

dashed the messianic hopes of the Bolsheviks. Moreover, the Soviets soon found themselves almost completely cut off from normal contacts with the rest of the world. The transfer of the capitol back to Moscow, though done for practical military and political reasons, was symptomatic of Soviet Russia's isolation.

After winning the Civil War, the Bolsheviks turned their attentions to the problems of economic recovery and national security. In dealing with both issues, Lenin showed himself quite willing to avail himself of Western resources. From 1921 to 1923, the American Relief Administration, led by Herbert Hoover, helped alleviate a disastrous famine in southeastern Russia.[23] The Soviets also tried to attract Western money and competence and concluded a number of agreements with German firms. Moreover, in 1922, the Soviet Union and Germany signed the Rapallo Treaty which included provisions for extensive German assistance to the Red Army.[24] In cultural affairs, Lenin allowed much freedom of expression in artistic forms. The content of a play, film, or novel was, of course, subject to control, but the method of presentation of acceptable themes was left to individuals, many of whom used the most advanced Western forms and techniques.

Stalin sought absolute control over all aspects of Russian life while simultaneously transforming the Soviet Union into an industrial giant. To achieve these goals, Stalin used the tsarist policy of domestic repression coupled with borrowing Western technology. He made the Soviet state the focal point of the Communist movement, proclaiming the doctrine of Socialism in One Country and reducing the Comintern to an apparatus of the state. He made himself the focal point of the state by systematically eliminating all real or potential rivals. He even reduced the artistic, scientific, and

intellectual communities to a state of silence or sycophancy. As in the days of Nicholas I and Alexander III, censorship, secret police terror, and rigorous control of intellectual pursuits became standard governmental procedures.

Having insulated Russia against the possible influx of subversive ideas from the West, Stalin had no compunction about turning to his ideological foes for technical assistance. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, over 20,000 foreign experts worked in the Soviet Union. American engineers helped build the Dnieprostroy hydroelectric generator and the steel mill at Magnitogorsk. The Ford and Austin Companies built the large automobile factory at Nizhni Novgorod, and Americans designed and directed the construction of the giant Stalingrad tractor factory.[25] In 1930, the Soviets published a book in the United States emphasizing the commercial opportunities available in Russia and inviting large-scale American investment.[26] During World War II, Stalin received over $10 billion worth of military equipment and raw materials. Lend-lease shipments included over 427,000 trucks, 12,000 planes, 9,500 tanks, four and a half million tons of food, a million tons of steel, 22 million rounds of ammunition, and two million tires.[27] Wartime contacts, however, did nothing to reduce Stalin's self-imposed isolation from the West and after 1945 Russia remained a closed society, impervious to outside influences.

Since Stalin's death, Soviet leaders have permitted renewed, if limited, cultural contacts with the West. The United States and the Soviet Union signed a cultural exchange agreement in 1958 and since then there have been mutual visits of scholars, dance troupes, students, chess players, and athletic teams. The flow of Western tourists to the U.S.S.R. has also grown rapidly in the last two decades. More recently, the Soviets have resumed the policy of seeking Western goods and services and

Russians now purchase Western grain and encourage American and European firms to build plants in the U.S.S.R.

Ironically, increased Soviet economic and cultural contact with the West has produced a renewed tightening of internal constraints. After 1953, there were appearances of a thaw in Russian cultural life. Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin at the Twentieth Party Congress seemed to imply a forthcoming relaxation of cultural controls. There was in fact the appearance of innovative work in the arts, music and literature, but as contacts with the West expanded, the government moved to silence critics, dissidents, and those who wished to experiment with new, unapproved forms. Thus, as in the past, increased contact with the outside world seems to have led the regime to impose strict domestic controls to avoid contamination from foreign cultures.

The Popular Reaction to the West. During the cycles of receptivity to and isolation from Western ideas and technology, the Russians have been ambivalent about their relationship with the West. Some have regarded contact with the West as a necessity for reasons of state. Others have greeted Western ideas as a positive progressive factor in Russian development while others have regarded all things Western, material and spiritual alike, as fundamentally dangerous to the unique nature of Russian life.

During the 16th century, the Russian people looked at outside innovations with suspicion and hostility. In 1565, for example, a mob destroyed and burned Russia's first printing press.[28] In the early decades of the 17th century, the Russian people reacted violently to Polish interference in their affairs. Polish political intervention did not at first produce a massive hostile reaction, but when it became obvious that the Poles intended to bring their religion and culture to Muscovy, the Russians felt that their traditional way of life was

in danger. A popular uprising, led by a Romanov patriarch and a Moscow merchant, drove the Poles from Russia and placed the Romanov dynasty on the throne.

In the 1650s, the Patriarch Nikon introduced a number of changes into the ritual of the Orthodox Church. These reforms were based on a careful study of Byzantine texts, but many people regarded any change of traditional forms as dangerous and heretical. Fundamentalist Old Believers branded Nikon as the Antichrist and resisted the reforms with armed force, self-immolation and even self-castration.[29]

During the late 17th and 18th centuries, the court and aristocracy became more and more Westernized, and the lot of the serfs became more burdensome. There were frequent peasant disturbances, and some of them became serious uprisings. Many of the larger rebellions were led by individuals claiming to be a "true tsar." The pretenders promised to destroy the political and administrative system of Westernizing heretics and return to the former Russian way of life which presumably included the abolition of serfdom.[30] Thus, peasant unrest rejected change and innovation, seeking instead a return to a traditional golden age.

Russian thought is, of course, tremendously rich and varied, but one persistent issue is a dispute concerning the nature and destiny of Russia and its vocation in the world. Two broad schools have emerged, one accepting the reforms of Peter the Great and asserting that the future of Russia depended upon continuing along the Western path; the other believing in a unique culture springing out of ancient Muscovite social and religious traditions and rejecting Europeanization.

The Western-Slavophile debate took concrete form during the reigns of Alexander I and Nicholas I. Speransky and La Harpe advocated continued liberalization of Russian society and

government. They represented the West-ernizers at court. At the same time, Nicholas Karamzin, a widely traveled aristocrat and court historian, argued that foreign innovation was the source of Russia's difficulties. Russia, he said, should remain true to her traditions of Orthodoxy and Autocracy. Michael Zagoskin, one of the most widely read writers of his day, asserted that Moscow rather than St. Petersburg represented the true essence of Russia, and Michael Magnitsky called upon Russia to sepa-rate herself entirely from European in-fluences.[31] In 1836, Peter Chaadaev, an aristocrat who had traveled widely in Western Europe as a soldier and later as a member of the tsar's entourage, pub-lished eight philosophical letters about Russian historical development that defined the terms of the debate over Russia's destiny. He claimed that Rus-sia's past was essentially Asiatic and passive. Russia had no genuine culture, only pale distorted imitations of other civilizations. The very absence of a vigorous Russian culture, however, held great promise for the future. Chaadaev believed that by adopting the best aspects of European culture Russia could lead the way to a spiritual Chris-tianity that would save both Russia and the West.[32] Despite his pro-Western proclivities, Chaadaev clarified the point that both Slavophiles and Westerners saw Russia's past as unique and her ultimate destiny as having universal messianic implications.

The Slavophile-Western debate con-tinued throughout the 19th century. The Pan-Slav movement of the 1870s preached an aggressive nationalism. Cen-tered in Moscow, Pan-Slav activists pro-claimed the existence of a violent, ir-reconcilable conflict between the Slavic world and the West.[33] Dostoyevsky, though not a chauvinist, sought the means of salvation through the unique characteristics of "the Russian soil, the Russian Saviour and the Russian God."[34] Constantine Leont'ev, for aesthetic reasons, denounced bourgeois culture and called for a return to Byzan-tine rules and discipline. In contrast to reactionary aesthetics, Tolstoy, drawing on the traditions of Russian religious life and a belief in the unique charac-teristics of the peasants, became a Christian anarchist seeking to lead the peasantry along the path of moral per-fection.[35]

Among the Westernizers, Turgenev denounced serfdom and advocated gradual liberalizing reforms of the Rus-sian political system. Restive students in the 1860s accepted Turgenev's label, Nihilist. The Nihilists rejected Russia's past and present and advocated a new social order based on science and rea-son. The Cadet Party of the early 20th century embodied the hopes of the Russian middle class for orderly prog-ress towards a constitutional, parlia-mentary regime.

Even revolutionary groups fell into a Slavophile and Western school. The Decembrist revolt of 1825 was the first revolutionary effort that did not seek a return to the past but rather looked to the future and saw violence as a vehicle of progress. Most of the Decembrists were aristocratic Guards officers who wanted to impose a Western style con-stitution on Russia. One faction, how-ever, desired a social revolution as well. This small group saw in the peasantry and their traditions the basis of a more just social order derived from Russian rather than European sources.[36]

In the following decades, such revo-lutionaries as Herzen, Belinski, and Chernyshevski called for the violent overthrow of the autocracy and the substitution of a democratic system.[37] Jacobinism was in theory to lead to democracy which in turn would pro-duce social as well as political change. Herzen, after 1848, became dis-illusioned with middle-class democracy, and from his place of exile in London, he concluded that the Russian peasant commune was inherently democratic

and socialist. The peasantry with its unique Russian characteristics could, therefore, be the pioneer of social revolution.[38]

The 1870s witnessed the Populist (Narodnik) Movement wherein thousands of students went out to the country in an effort to convert the peasants to agrarian socialism. The peasants simply could not understand the students and either ignored them or turned them over to the authorities. Survivors of the Narodnik movement then formed a secret society, Land and Liberty, dedicated to preparing a mass peasant uprising. Land and Liberty soon split into two factions. Black Partition favored propaganda efforts among the peasants to prepare them for the coming upheaval while the People's Will stood for terrorism directed against the forces of autocracy.[39]

The People's Will had a brief but sensational career culminating in the assassination of Alexander II in 1881. The police then destroyed the group, but survivors formed new populist groups. The 1890s saw the foundation of the People's Right, the Northern Union, the Socialist Agrarian League, and the Union of Socialist Revolutionaries. In 1902, representatives from populist groups inside Russia met in Switzerland with populist exiles and formed a single group, the Socialist Revolutionary Party. Like its predecessors, the Socialist Revolutionaries looked to the peasantry as the key to unleashing revolution. By 1917, the Socialist Revolutionary Party was the largest in Russia and in elections held at the end of the year outpolled the Bolsheviks 21 million to 9 million.[40]

The Marxist Social Democrats evolved from the Populist Movement. Several members of the Black Partition went into exile in the 1880s and in 1883 created the first Marxist faction. Other Marxist groups developed in urban Russia, and in 1898, a number of small cliques merged to form the Russian Social Democratic Party.[41] Russian Marxists, like their colleagues elsewhere, adhered to the theories of dialectical materialism. Despite conflicts within their ranks, the Russian Social Democrats assumed that their country was evolving along the same lines as the rest of the Western world and that events in Russia would unfold much as they were destined to do in England, Germany, and America.

The Bolshevik triumph seemed to mark another victory for the Westernizers. Russia was, after 1917, led by men who adhered to a Western philosophy and believed that Russia was to lead the forces of revolution to the ultimate Marxist victory. Stalin's rise to power marked a decided shift of emphasis towards Russian particularism. While never abandoning Marxist universalism, Stalin emphasized Russian problems and Russian solutions. Even in cultural affairs, Soviet intellectuals began to focus their attentions on the glories of the Russian past, even turning Ivan the Terrible into a hero.

Since 1953, opposition writers have emerged, but even they fall into a Slavophile and Western camp. Pasternak tried to find religious significance in the revolution and implied that the revolution may well be a stage in the emergence of a new culture springing from the Russian soul. Solzhenitsyn has called upon Russia to abandon Western ideas and technology and return to a religious, agrarian way of life. By way of contrast, Sakharov and Medvedev advocate Western style civil liberties in the Soviet Union and hope to push Russia towards a Western style democratic system. Thus, the debate on the nature of Russia and its relationship to the West is not over. The Russians have been and still are hesitant and ambivalent about the effect of contact with Western culture.

The Western Reaction. Western observers have been equally hesitant and

ambivalent about contacts with Russia. Westerners have been unable to decide whether Russia was a European or an Asian state. Nor have they established a consensus concerning the motives that lay behind Russia's reactions to and dealings with the West.

The earliest visitors to Muscovy all agreed that Russia was very different from Europe. The Russian climate, religion, social mores and political system appeared exotic, strange, and unique.[42] Some travelers felt that the Muscovite regime was an oriental tyranny,[43] but such views did not prevent visitors from journeying to Russia to trade with or serve the tsars in the hope of financial reward. Nor did Western powers see any dangers in concluding diplomatic and military agreements with the Russians.

The notion that Russia presented a threat to the peace and security of Europe developed during the era of Peter the Great. His policy of Westernization coupled with his successful conflict with Sweden convinced some that Peter was pursuing sinister ambitions. A number of commentators, of course, argued that all Peter wanted was to transform Russia into a European power.[44] Those threatened by Russian advances, however, painted a bleak picture of Russian goals and intentions. In 1707, the British Ambassador to Prussia informed London that he agreed with Berlin's view that to help the Russians modernize their armed forces would pose a danger to all of Europe.[45]

A number of Peter's enemies, meanwhile, began to circulate a rumor, backed by forged documents, that the tsar had a concrete, systematic plan for conquest. Émigrés fleeing Russian expansion often took service with Western governments and carried stories of a Russian conspiracy with them. After Peter's death, émigrés and other anti-Russian elements transformed the tsar's plot into a Testament in which Peter laid out for his successors a detailed plan for the conquest of the West.[46]

There were several versions, all forged, of Peter's will. One Testament had 14 points; among the more important propositions was the statement that as Russia's basic goal was constant aggrandizement, Russian rulers should maintain the state on a permanent war footing. Future tsars should bring foreign specialists to Russia and develop commercial ties with the West in order to strengthen the Russian economy. Tsars should also use ideology to lay claim to universal sovereignty thereby strengthening the policy of territorial expansion. By the use of clever diplomacy, Russia should keep the rest of Europe divided and when everything was ready launch a final assault on the weakened West beginning with naval offensives in the Baltic and Black Seas.[47]

During the rest of the 18th century, copies of the Testament appeared first in France and then in other courts. Powers at odds with Russia often used the will to justify their hostility. Others with more balanced views were also suspicious of Russia, arguing that despite a veneer of Western civilization, Russia remained an Asiatic despotism.[48]

On the other hand, 18th-century Russia had its defenders. An English visitor stated that Peter sought only internal progress, and later another Englishman wrote that Catherine governed with rectitude and enlightenment.[49] The French philosophes regarded Catherine as a paragon of enlightened virtue, and even the Americans became pro-Russian when Catherine turned down a British request to hire Russians to fight in the Revolutionary War. Early in the 19th century, Madame de Stael was among those who believed that Alexander I desired only to brighten and ameliorate the lot of his people.[50]

Suspicion of Russia also persisted. In the late 1830s the Marquis de Custine visited Russia and wrote a book that

painted a dark picture of the Romanov regime. Custine claimed that Russia was an Asiatic power, a nation of regimented Tartars, bent on conquest.[51] Siberia, he noted, "begins at the Vistula."[52] Custine went on to say that Russia used Western technology to strengthen the regime but ignored Western culture and remained an Asiatic tyranny.[53]

The Marquis also raised the issue of Russian intentions. He pointed out that the Romanovs had a universalistic ideology, the doctrine of the Third Rome that in effect claimed that the tsar was the proper head of all Christendom. Optimists in the West tended to emphasize Russia's internal problems and believed that ideology was used primarily for internal consumption. It was a technique of domestic politics designed to maintain order and discipline at home.[54] Pessimists, including Custine himself, assumed that the Russians meant what they said. The tsars wanted "to rule the world by conquest; they mean to seize by armed force the countries accessible to them and thence oppress the rest of the world by terror."[55] The Russian state was to Custine a barbaric thing barely disguised under a revolting magnificence, ruled with Asiatic ferocity and dedicated to perpetual conquest. Europe, the Marquis warned, had to be continually on guard against a constant threat.[56]

Lord Palmerston also claimed that Russian policy was to push forward as far and as fast as possible, stopping only when others offered resistance. The tsars would then halt, try to lull their foes into a complacent state and resume their aggression.[57]

Karl Marx agreed with those who believed that Russia was permanently at war with the West. As a correspondent for the *New York Tribune* in the 1850s, Marx informed his American readers that Russia was a semi-Asiatic nation that was, ever since the days of the Kievian rulers, perpetually at war with

the rest of Europe. Russian ideology, he claimed, called for a war to the knife against Western civilization. Russia, therefore, posed a vast, constant menace that could be countered only by constant vigilance.[58]

Twentieth century observers of the Russian scene have been and still are equally divided in their views of the nature and motives of the Russian state. The advent of Bolshevism served only to deepen the confusion. Many, of course, accepted the premise that Lenin and his followers were leading a worldwide revolutionary conspiracy, seeking nothing less than the destruction of Western civilization. Others, however, felt that Soviet Russia could be tamed by normalizing diplomatic and commercial relations with Moscow. Thus, Red scares alternated with periods of normal relations during the interwar period.

Within the non-Communist intellectual community, many turned to Russia out of despair of Western values. The bourgeois world had failed to solve its political and economic problems, and people saw in the Soviet experiment the road to salvation. Some joined the Communist Party. Others sympathized with the Soviet Union and consciously overlooked its shortcomings. The depression, the rise of fascism and the growing prospects of another major war convinced countless individuals that Stalinist Russia despite its faults, which were, perhaps, temporary growing pains, was the West's best hope.

Many, of course, became disillusioned. Some joined with Trotsky and his followers in denouncing the Moscow regime as betrayers of the revolution and the hopes of mankind. Others took up new political fads. Still others rejoined the bourgeois camp to seek their fortunes as repentant sinners and professional anti-Communists. Many simply returned to their former beliefs and interests. Thus, opinions on Soviet Russia ranged from the view that the Bolsheviks were the culmination of

Western ideals to the notion that Stalin had completely perverted them.

World War II, not surprisingly, witnessed the growth of friendly feelings in the Allied camp towards the Soviet Union, but after 1945, suspicions again emerged. On 22 February 1946, George Kennan, the Chargé in Moscow, sent his famous "long telegram" to Washington. In it, he said that Stalin believed that in the long run there could be "no permanent peaceful coexistence."[59] Moreover, the Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs was based on a traditional Russian sense of inferiority to the West. Russian rulers have always feared direct contact with the West because it would tend to reveal their shortcomings to their own subjects. Russians, therefore, learned to seek security by waging a long, patient, deadly struggle for the destruction of their rivals. Marxist dogma has simply bolstered traditional Russian fears and hostilities, and the Western powers could expect in the years to come constant Soviet efforts to undermine them.[60]

Kennan reiterated his position in another telegram sent on 20 March. He asserted that the Soviets believed that the outside world was menacing, that suspicion was inherent in the Soviet system and that the West could do nothing to mitigate Soviet suspicions. The United States could disarm completely and turn the government over to American Communists, and Moscow would still suspect a trap.[61]

Kennan's efforts were merely the tip of the iceberg. The advent of the cold war witnessed a revival of hostile interpretations of Soviet motives and intentions that at times reached the point of hysteria. Soviet military might coupled with efforts at internal subversion was widely regarded as placing the West in a situation of imminent mortal peril. The works of Marx and Custine were reissued with prefaces that assured the public that nothing had changed in Russian designs against Western civilization.

In the years after Stalin's death, more benign views of Soviet policy resurfaced. Some argued that American and Russian societies were in fact becoming more alike and that this convergence would encourage both peaceful coexistence and a more stable world order. A number of historians blamed the United States for the coming of the cold war and claimed that Stalin was actually a prudent cautious leader concerned with Russian state security, not world revolution. One revisionist historian stated flatly that a totalitarian domestic system did not necessarily produce an aggressive foreign policy.[62] Today, the debate over Russian intentions still persists. Some believe that Russia is a prudent power willing to coexist with the West while others adhere to the view of Russia as unrelentingly hostile.

There is, of course, a tendency among intellectuals, especially those professionally interested in current events, to regard the immediate as permanent and the temporary as universal. They tend to regard any shift of Soviet or American policy as a strategic change of direction rather than a tactical adjustment. The current debate over the meanings and implications of détente bears these characteristics. People on all sides of the issue speak and write as if this were the first time the problem has come to the West's attention and as if

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BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Professor Ross is a member of the Strategy Department, Naval War College. He received his Ph.D. in History from Princeton University and has taught at the Universities of Nebraska and Texas. In addition to military history, his special interests, on which he has written extensively, are Napoleon and the French Revolution,

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any conclusion will decide the fate of the world for decades to come. Thus, it may be of some cold comfort to realize that the whole range of problems associated with relations between Russia and the West has existed for centuries. Russia has been an enigma to the West ever since the 16th century, and our predecessors were as far from reaching firm conclusions as we are today.

NOTES

1. For differing views on détente see G. Warren Nutter, *Kissinger's Grand Design* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975); Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., *On Watch* (New York: Quadrangel/New York Times Books, 1976); John G. Stoessinger, *Henry Kissinger: The Anguish of Power* (New York: Norton, 1976).

2. See for example H. Sonnenfeldt, "Russia, America and Détente," in *Foreign Affairs*, January 1978, pp. 275-294; J.D. Baker, Jr., "Détente: Myth and Reality," in *Military Review*, December 1977, pp. 41-50.

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55. *Ibid.*, p. 229.

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———— Ψ ————

Misunderstanding and misapplication of some enduring arms race metaphors obscure distinctions that should be made and can lead to conclusions not supported by logic.

MYOPIC VISIONS OF THE ARMS RACE:

THE IMMORTALITY OF METAPHORS

by

Major Augustus R. Norton, U.S. Army

The metaphor is a tool for extending the resources of language and describing highly complex phenomena in a shorthand that captures contextual richness in economical language. In the field of national security studies, the metaphor has been particularly attractive given the highly complex character of strategic questions (and frequently the political utility of simplifying arguments for the lay audience); thus such well-known metaphors as "nuclear thresholds,"[1] "plate glass windows," and "tripwires." More venerable metaphors have survived their prenuclear origins to enter the nuclear strategy lexicon; the "arms race" is prototypical.

Arms Race Theory. If we attempt to conceive of the competition that characterized the relationship between the United States and the U.S.S.R. as an arms race, and if we do so without benefit of the thousands of pages of analysis, polemic and diatribe that fill the literature, we would probably begin with the image of two athletes, each racing to cross the finish line first (assuming naturally that they both aspire to victory) and whether the finish line was 100 yards away from the starting blocks or at marathon distance, we would not know. We would—justifiably—expect there to be a finish line and fairly intense activity to reach it but our analysis would fall palpably short of portraying just what it is that the "arms race" metaphor means.

As is well known, the "arms race" has been loaded with further definitions as the nuclear age has progressed. Often the metaphor is merely being used as a rather pejorative comment on the nuclear balance: a usage of very little analytical use.

An insubstantial, though firmly held, notion that somehow arms races are *bad* is not the intellectual baggage that is likely to prove useful for any analysis concerned more to understand behavior than it is to condemn villainy.[2]

The essence of the metaphor, in its more precise form, is well captured by Samuel Huntington in a classic essay in which he defines an "arms race" as: "A progressive, competitive peacetime increase in armaments by two states or coalition of states resulting from conflicting purposes or mutual fears."[3] As Huntington holds that "every peacetime increase in arms is not necessarily the result of an arms race,"[4] it is clear that the familiar action-reaction cycle is essential to the definition.

Combine this cycle with the claim that "[t]he armed forces inevitably overstate the military capabilities of the opponent"[5] and one has the crux of the "arms race" metaphor. Thus, George Rathjens observed, "... the action-reaction phenomenon, with reaction often premature and/or exaggerated, has clearly been a major stimulant of the strategic arms race."[6]

Typically, the cycle has been portrayed as mostly one-way in that the United States is asserted to be the leading actor in the dyad. For example, G.B. Kistiakowsky recently asserted:

In this history of the nuclear arms race, the United States has been first with most of the technological innovations and new weapon systems, except for some systems of defense, to which the Soviet Union has traditionally dedicated a far greater portion of its military effort. . . .

The American innovations . . . were all followed a few years later by the Soviet versions.[7]

In a similar vein, Herbert York remarks: "Our unilateral decisions have set the rate and scale for most of the individual steps in the strategic arms race."[8]

Such remarkably ethnocentric views must be questioned, not only because of the *post hoc ergo propter hoc* implications, but because they imply that the Soviets would not have pursued development of a given system were it not for the U.S. example. If this is not the intent of such assertions, then we can only conclude that something besides the U.S. example is driving Soviet strategic programs.

Science—indeed even the science of and for war--is not the unique purview of the United States.

Vast and fairly constant investment in research and development ensures the routinization of military invention, the guarantee that the flow of "product improvements" is unlikely to cease or even to diminish very markedly. Necessarily, an arms race between Great Industrial-Scientific Powers must portray bilateral momenta of the processes and products of technological innovation.[9]

The long research and development leadtimes that are characteristic of most—if not all—innovative weapon systems are simply ignored by "arms race" theorists.[10] The one-way causal relationship is presumed to be accurate. To reiterate, the technological lead of the United States is accorded great significance as an impetus to Soviet action. What is so often forgotten is that while the Soviet Union may be lagging behind the United States, lagging is not at all the same as following. Indeed, one could make a case that the pace of technological innovation could be slowed considerably if the two members of the dyad waited to be stimulated by their opposite number instead of proceeding rather independently.[11] G. Allison and F. Morris address this matter succinctly:

Because of such factors as the lengthy period involved in

acquisition, uncertainty about the opponent's research, and the consequent necessity for anticipating it, decisions about weapons research, development, and procurement cannot be based on evidence about the opponent's actual weapons programs. Rarely can such evidence be decisive.[12]

Validity of Theory. As Albert Wohlstetter has decisively demonstrated, many of the central tenets of the "arms race" theory are categorically false, at least for the decade of the 1960s.[13] Rather than systematically overestimating the rate of growth of Soviet strategic forces in the 1960s, the evidence instead betrays systematic underestimates. The exaggerated threats which ostensibly drive the "arms race" were not to be found in the Defense Secretaries' formal statements for the period from 1962 to 1969.

The explanation for this gross deviation from a central "arms race" maxim is complex. No doubt misconceptions about Soviet objectives played a part; specifically the tendency to project the assured destruction doctrine to Soviet strategists proved especially misleading. There seems to be little justification, beyond wishful thinking, to claim that "assured destruction . . . has acquired respectability" in the U.S.S.R.[14] As one authoritative monograph states:

> There is no indication of a Soviet willingness to subscribe to the Western concept of "mutual assured destruction," which is said to be inherently unstable in view of the possibility of new breakthroughs in weapons technology as well as for political reasons.[15]

In addition, bureaucratic politics played its part in the underestimates,[16] but central to any explanation may be the collective guilt complex resulting from "missile gap" overestimates. However, even the "missile gap," which is often cited as typifying the over-

estimation syndrome, is a less than sturdy buttress for the "arms race" theory. As Wohlstetter explains, the gap was actually an ICBM gap, rather than a general missile gap, for "our underestimate of the number of IR and MRBM launchers that the Russians would deploy by 1963 roughly offset our overestimate of the number of ICBM launchers they would deploy."[17] The United States simply botched Soviet priorities; yet another instance when our ethnocentric slip showed. It was not the case that the United States was reacting to a "nonexistent threat" as Harvey Brooks would claim,[18] but to a threat we did not understand.

Perhaps what has been most interesting about the Wohlstetter findings are the reactions of those committed to the "arms race" as a paradigm guiding research and analysis. As Thomas Kuhn says, "only those who have taken courage from observing that their own field (or school) has paradigms are likely to feel that something is sacrificed by the change to a more useful paradigm."[19] It is in this respect that we find evidence for Colin Gray's assertion that in the "arms race" theory "evidence was hurriedly, though disingenuously, tailored to fit certain propositions concerning arms race dynamics which accorded with the predilections of the analysts and policymakers."[20]

Thus, in the face of evidence that the strategic budget has been spiraling downward, not upward, Paul Warnke states: "The 'race' analogy is not destroyed by the fact that the 'runners' may move at times at different speeds."[21] [But, in different directions.]

Michael Nacht's response was much more sophisticated. Nacht asserted that contrary to Wohlstetter's claims, the estimates for the 1960s reveal a pattern of underestimation, "but not without a pronounced learning effect and not to the degree that Wohlstetter implies."[22] The differing interpretations on the data

turn on the choice of the factor to be explained. For Nacht the appropriate measure is the cumulative total, whereas Wohlstetter stresses the increment of change. The effect of the former approach is to "swamp unpredicted new starts in the steadily increasing total of launchers known to be started or completed."[23] Using Nacht's technique, one could repeat the predictive error annually and *appear* to be improving in prediction performance. Such numbers games obfuscate rather than enlighten. Despite such disclaimers as Nacht's, it is hard to avoid John Holst's observation that, "[t]he record, however, does not substantiate the basic premises of this [arms race] model."[24]

Where Theory Leads. It is reasonable to ask whether concern with the bloody details of the "arms race" theory might not be just so much nitpicking. May we not ignore the distracting evidence and simply look to the reality of the arms race? What sorts of statements are being made when it is declared that the mad momentum of the arms race must be stopped, or that the arms race is irrational or destabilizing?

If there is any logical meaning to the notion that the arms race must be stopped (or alternately that the momentum be halted), then it must be conceivable to speak of U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations in the context of a "nonrace." Clearly, a "nonrace" is conceivable, but not in a world of ideological opposites or even states with contending interests. Proceeding from the position that a disarmed world is a chimerical objective, it is not inappropriate to state that arms are only surrogates for the factors which render the adjective "chimerical" appropriate. Thus, the arms race is no more than a mere—albeit hackneyed— synonym for "normal Great Power behavior somewhat accentuated."[25]

Much of the commentary on strategic questions considers further arms acquisitions as destabilizing measures,

i.e., as factors which make nuclear war more likely. In this vein, George Rathjens alleges that " . . . it seems likely that another upward spiral in the arms race would simply make a nuclear exchange more probable, more damaging or both."[26] This is clearly not necessarily true. Innovations are not necessarily malevolent, nor are they necessarily beneficent. A number of innovations has greatly reduced the vulnerability of U.S. and U.S.S.R. strategic forces (e.g., the SLBM, silo-hardening, solid-fuel propulsion systems, etc.) and hence the risk of war. This is well borne out by Arthur Steiner:

> Today's strategic forces can survive an attack; they do not need to be launched upon receipt of an ambiguous warning. (To a surprising extent, the forces of the 1950's, at least the U.S. forces, lacked the survivability which would have ensured their ability to wait for certain evidence of a large-scale attack before beginning their deadly mission.) This greatly improved state of affairs has been brought about by that very technological arms race that . . . [Rathjens fears].[27]

Unfortunately, many authorities in their haste to reduce arms expenditures assume a certain automaticity of deterrence that simply isn't there. Ergo, McGeorge Bundy concludes that "there is no level of superiority which will make a strategic first strike between the two great states anything but an act of utter folly."[28] This species of reasoning, this urge to "cap the volcano," brings us to proposals which would resurrect "the delicate balance of terror" which we left behind in the 1950s. G. Kistiakowsky, following the "automaticity" line, argues that we would in all likelihood have warning of a Soviet attack; Muscovites would trek to the countryside armed with shovels, "space sensors" would alert us to the Soviet launch and the American President

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would have the happy prospect of launching on warning.[29] We should be protected from such deliverance from the "arms race."

Conclusions. While it makes good sense not to sanction every "improvement" in the strategic force structure that the "hawks" might propose, it is also the beginning of wisdom in such matters not to reject every innovation because it will "fuel the arms race." Applying such strictures first requires that we have a clear understanding of the nature of the competition that describes the U.S.-U.S.S.R. strategic relationship. Clearly distinguishing between qualitative and quantitative "arms races" could well be a good beginning.

Every arms race is initially quantitative, momentum shifts in time to step-level increases in performance, i.e., qualitative versus quantitative improvements. Samuel Huntington argues that in a quantitative race one state will tend to develop a definite superiority in the long run, a superiority that will be very difficult for the trailing state to overcome (save by a qualitative improvement). On the other hand, a qualitative race is likely to take place in the context of a number of distinct races.

While a quantitative race tends to produce inequality between the two competing powers, a qualitative race tends toward equality irrespective of what may be the ratio-goals of the two rival states.

Each new weapon instead of increasing the distance between the two states reduces it. The more rapid the rate of innovation the more pronounced is the tendency toward equality.[30]

Making the distinction, and recognizing the futility of damming the technological tide, could lead to an understanding that sometimes one must move to stay in place; that the critical matters will be understanding how opposing weapons interact, and deciding between —as opposed to making a cursory condemnation of—contending technologies. This is not to conclude that the United States "must overcome every Soviet lead despite its lack of military meaning." Such a stance is indeed illogical.[31] However, some "leads" do matter and will have both military meaning and political significance even if we act as if it does not matter.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

A graduate of the University of Miami and a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Chicago, Major Augustus R. Norton was formerly Adjunct Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Illinois, Chicago Circle Campus. His book, *International Terrorism*, will be published next year by the Westview Press. He is now studying Arabic at the Defense Language Institute, Monterey, California.

NOTES

An earlier, slightly altered version of this paper was presented at the 1978 Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association.

1. See Augustus R. Norton, "NATO and Metaphors: The Nuclear Threshold," *Naval War College Review*, Fall 1977, pp. 60-75.

2. Colin S. Gray, *The Soviet-American Arms Race* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath, Saxon House Study, 1976), p. 1.

3. Samuel Huntington, "Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results," in *Public Policy, 1968*, ed. by Carl J. Friedrich and Seymour E. Harris (Cambridge, Mass.: Graduate School of Public Administration, Harvard University, 1968), p. 41.

4. *Ibid.*

5. *Ibid.,* p. 54.

6. George Rathjens, "The Dynamics of the Arms Race," *Scientific American,* April 1969, reprinted in *Arms Control* (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1949 through 1966, 1968 through 1973), p. 181.

7. G.B. Kistiakowsky, "The Arms Race: Is Paranoia Necessary for Security?" *The New York Times Magazine,* 27 November 1977, pp. 54, 76.

8. Herbert F. York, *Race to Oblivion: A Participant's View of the Arms Race* (New York: A Clarion book published by Simon and Schuster, 1970), p. 230.

9. Gray, p. 43. See also page 39: "The principal stimulus to innovation comes, in this view, not from *evidence* of military developments abroad, but rather from the inquisitiveness and creative genius to be found within the respective research and development communities."

10. *Ibid.,* p. 37. Colin Gray observes: "By the time a new defense technology attracts public attention as being of some arms race significance, at which time the non-official arms control community may join battle with the research and development community and with the prospective military organization, *that technology will probably have close to a decade of research and development history behind it."* [Emphasis added.]

11. Graham T. Allison and Frederic A. Morris, "Armaments and Arms Control: Exploring the Determinants of Military Weapons," *Daedalus,* Summer 1975, p. 118. The following interpretation can be very compelling: " . . . the action-reaction hypothesis, which emphasizes tightly coupled, specific, offsetting reactions to particular weapons, seems less important, even logically, than a loosely coupled, general competition in which each nation pursues broad strategic objectives that may be readjusted periodically in light of forces that the other assembles."

12. *Ibid.*

13. Albert Wohlstetter's work on the subject "The Legends of the Arms Race," may be found in the following sources: "Part I: The Driving Engine," and "Part II: The Uncontrolled Upward Spiral," *Strategic Review,* Fall 1974 and Winter 1975 respectively. "Part I" appears in a slightly abridged version in *Foreign Policy,* Summer 1974, and "Part II" appears in *Foreign Policy,* Fall 1974. An article, "Racing Forward? or Ambling Back?" incorporating many of Wohlstetter's replies to his critics, appears in *Survey,* Summer/Autumn 1976, pp. 163-217.

14. John Newhouse, *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1973), pp. 58-59.

15. Foy Kohler, et al., *The Role of Nuclear Forces in Current Soviet Strategy* (Miami: Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1974), p. 14.

16. For the bureaucratic perspective, see Allison and Morris.

17. Wohlstetter, *Survey,* p. 170.

18. Harvey Brooks, "The Military Innovation System and the Qualitative Arms Race," *Daedalus,* Summer 1975, p. 76.

19. Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,* 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962, 1970), p. 179.

20. Colin Gray, "Across the Nuclear Divide-Strategic Studies, Past and Present," *International Security,* Summer 1977, p. 41.

21. Paul C. Warnke, "Apes on a Treadmill," *Foreign Policy,* Spring 1975, p. 12.

22. Michael L. Nacht, "The Delicate Balance of Error," *Foreign Policy,* Summer 1975, p. 166.

23. Albert Wohlstetter, "How to Confuse Ourselves," *Foreign Policy,* Fall 1975, p. 180.

24. Johan Jorgen Holst, "What is Really Going On?" *Foreign Policy,* Summer 1975, p. 157.

25. Gray, *Arms Race,* p. 182.

26. Rathjens, p. 177.

27. Arthur Steiner, "The Enormity of the Arms Race," review of *Armaments and Disarmament in the Nuclear Age,* by SIPRI, in *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* October 1977, p. 64.

28. McGeorge Bundy, "To Cap the Volcano," *Foreign Affairs,* October 1969, excerpted in Morton A. Kaplan, ed., *Great Issues of International Politics,* 2nd ed. (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1974), p. 491.

29. Kistiakowsky, p. 82.

30. Huntington, p. 72.

31. Warnke, p. 15.

Ψ

The Napoleonic Wars have provided generations of soldiers and sailors with lessons and case studies. The problems of an amphibious power were discussed in an earlier issue; a successful joint land-sea operation by that power is discussed here, an operation whose failure would have meant the loss of Wellington's army.

BRITISH SEAPOWER AND ITS INFLUENCE

UPON THE PENINSULAR WAR (1808—1814)

by

Donald D. Horward

In the wars spawned by the French Revolution seapower played a significant role in the ultimate outcome. In addition to the actual sea war carried on between France and England and their allies, seapower became a crucial factor in mainland operations carried on by England. Admittedly, many joint operations undertaken by the Royal Navy and the British Army were unmitigated failures, such as the landings in Holland in 1799, at Abourkir in 1799, in Sweden in 1808, and more notably at the Scheldt in 1809. However, in the war which raged in the Iberian Peninsula from 1808 until 1814, British naval power was successfully used in coordination with a small English army in an effort to support the insurrection in Spain and Portugal.

The defeat of Napoleon and the collapse of the Empire have been attributed to many factors: the invasion of Russia, the Continental System, nationalism, English control of the seas, the treatment of the Pope, etc., but less emphasis is usually placed on the Peninsular War which was, in fact, a prime cause in the destruction of the Napoleonic Empire. It was in Spain and Portugal that the bleached bones of 300,000 French soldiers and the reputations of several French marshals were left as a testimony to the ferocity of the struggle.

Napoleon's involvement in the Peninsular War was related directly to the Continental System, designed to destroy English maritime trade and undermine its position as the "paymaster of Europe." Two nations, Portugal and Sweden, refused to close their ports and cut economic ties with England. Sweden was of little consequence but Portugal,

defiant and proud, ultimately became the focal point of resistance to French domination in the Peninsula. Although Napoleon insisted that the ruler of Portugal close his ports to the British vessels and declare war on England, Prince Regent João attempted to placate the French Emperor by accepting all of his demands except declaring war on Portugal's longest and most steadfast ally.[1] As a result, France and Spain concluded the Treaty of Fontainebleau on 28 September 1807, providing for the joint invasion and partition of Portugal. Nine days earlier, however, a French army of 25,000 men under the command of Gen. Andoche Junot had crossed the Bidassoa River and entered Spain.[2] Aided by the Spanish authorities and supported by three Spanish armies, Junot raced through Spain driven by Napoleon's continued orders that he seize the Prince Regent, capture the Portuguese Fleet, and occupy Portugal.

The British representative in Lisbon, Viscount Percy Strangford, approached the Prince Regent about sending a fleet to aid in the evacuation of the Government to Brazil but he warned that no troops or supplies would be sent to defend Portugal.[3] Don João procrastinated until the night of 9-10 November when he and the Royal Council decided that the time of appeasement had come to an end: if French and Spanish forces crossed the frontier the Government and royal family would sail for Brazil. Orders were issued for the transfer of the state treasury, the archives, and the precious objects to the Portuguese Fleet in the Tagus.[4] The Prince Regent and members of the royal family embarked and at 0800 on 29 November 1807, the first calm day in over a week, 15 Portuguese ships of the line and some 20 transports set sail in brisk northeast winds to join Sir Sidney Smith's squadron waiting at the estuary of the Tagus to escort them to Brazil.[5] However, the wind abated and the

following morning Junot, at the head of 1500 emaciated and exhausted soldiers of his advance guard, entered Lisbon and marched directly down to the Tagus only to see the Portuguese Fleet still in sight but safely over the bar.[6] Simultaneously, Spanish armies occupied Entre Minho y Douro in the north and Algarve in the south without opposition, completing the conquest of Portugal.

As soon as the French occupied Lisbon and the major fortresses of Lisbon, Junot began to dismantle the Portuguese Military Establishment. The militia was abolished and the regular army disbanded, with the exception of 6,000 troops sent to France to serve with the *Grande Armée*. The Portuguese fortresses, magazines, and military installations were placed under French command, the citizens were disarmed, high-ranking military and civil officials were removed from office and sent to France, the Regency Council established by João was soon dissolved, Junot assumed absolute powers in the name of the Emperor, and the Portuguese military and administrative organizations ceased to exist.[7]

Within 6 months, however, this situation had changed drastically as a result of Napoleon's decision to replace the unreliable and incompetent Bourbons on the Spanish throne. Under the pretext of reinforcing Junot's forces in Portugal, Napoleon sent over 100,000 men to occupy strategic fortresses in the northern provinces of Spain. Carlos IV, King of Spain, and his son, the heir apparent Fernando VII, were lured across the French frontier to Bayonne where, through Napoleon's threats and their own jealousies, they renounced their throne in his favor. In response, the Spanish rose up in revolt in Madrid on 2 May, *Dos Mayo*, in defense of their country and their monarchy. Three weeks later insurrection erupted in Asturias and spread across Spain; provinces established revolutionary

juntas and provincial armies to resist the French and restore the monarchy. The revolt soon affected Spanish troops occupying Porto in northern Portugal and they withdrew, encouraging the Portuguese to resist the French. The French were overthrown, a revolutionary junta was established, and Portuguese agents were sent to London to seek aid against their common enemy.[8]

Meanwhile, Junot appealed to the Portuguese to form an army for the defense of their coastline against the British[9] but they responded by proclaiming a revolt against French authority. In England the Foreign Secretary, George Canning, as well as the opposition led by Richard Sheridan, supported the proposal to send aid to the insurrectionaries in the Peninsula. Sir Arthur Wellesley, conqueror of India and Under Secretary for Ireland, was chosen by Viscount Castlereagh at the War Office to command an expeditionary force of 9,505 men destined for the Peninsula. The fleet sailed from Cork in mid-July 1808 and after preliminary landings at La Corunna and Porto, Wellesley anchored in Mondego Bay on 1 August and began to disembark his army. Five days later Gen. Brent Spencer landed some 5,000 reinforcements at the mouth of the Mondego.[10] After transportation had been secured and organized, the British Army, supported by a contingent of the recently organized Portuguese Army, marched along the coastal road toward Lisbon, taking care to retain contact with merchantmen which sailed along the coast carrying supplies and reinforcements.

Simultaneously, Junot labored frantically to concentrate his army before Lisbon. To gain time he posted a rear guard under General Henri Delaborde at Roliça but Wellesley outflanked and overwhelmed his position, forcing him back on Junot's main army with considerable loss. On 21 August the only

major encounter of the campaign took place on the rolling hills at Vimeiro where French forces were decisively defeated. With a demoralized army, isolated from other French units in Spain, and lacking the most basic resources, Junot agreed to the Convention of Sintra which ultimately resulted in the evacuation of the entire French Army and its baggage and equipment to France aboard 155 British merchantmen.[11]

The success of the British Army over Junot's forces were a result of both sea and landpower. With the active support of the British Navy, especially Adm. Charles Cotton's squadron blockading Lisbon harbor, and Wellesley's army marching from the north, Junot found his army caught in a pincer from which he was fortunate to escape. Napoleon, accurately grasping Junot's plight, observed "You have gained this convention [of Sintra] by your courage, not your dispositions; and it is with reason that the English complain that their generals signed it."[12]

In the meantime, a French army commanded by Gen. Pierre Dupont had been surrounded by Spanish forces and forced to surrender at Baylen in July 1808. The Spanish armies assumed the offensive and attacked the French armies on all fronts. The French were forced back in most areas and Joseph Bonaparte, the new King of Spain, evacuated Madrid and retired to the Ebro River to collect his disorganized forces. With the French position in Spain seriously jeopardized, Napoleon resolved to go to Spain himself to recoup French losses, end Spanish resistance in the Peninsula, and drive the remaining British troops at Lisbon into the sea. Accompanied by 100,000 men of the *Grande Armée*, Napoleon arrived in Spain at the end of October 1808. He concentrated almost 200,000 men behind the Ebro River and then in a series of lightning strokes which began on 29 October at Zornosa and ended on 2

December when he reached the gates of Madrid, he overthrew three Spanish armies. Napoleon had only "to plant [his] eagles on the forts of Lisbon" and "drive the English army from the Peninsula"[13] to end the Peninsular War.

As Napoleon had advanced on Madrid Sir John Moore who had replaced Wellesley in Lisbon resolved to move in support of the Spanish armies. With perhaps 15,000 men, Moore's army moved in two separate columns to Salamanca where he would be in a position to threaten Napoleon's flanks and communications. Meanwhile, during the first weeks of October, several contingents of troops landed under the command of Gen. David Baird at La Corunna. When these forces were concentrated at Salamanca by Moore on 11 December 1808, his force totaled 25,730 actives which was supplemented by 8,000 Spanish troops commanded by the Marquis de la Romana.[14] Moore had contemplated aiding the Spanish in the defense of Madrid but their armies collapsed, forcing him to give up the operation. However, when he learned of the position of an isolated French corps commanded by Marshal Nicolas Soult to the northeast on the Carrion River, he resolved to attack at once.[15] Intelligence of Moore's threatening position reached Napoleon on 20 December as Marshal François Lefebvre's advance guard reached Talavera en route to Lisbon. Napoleon immediately revised his plans in the hope of fulfilling his fondest dreams—capturing a British army. He wrote to King Joseph, "Put in your newspapers that 36,000 English are surrounded, that I am in their rear while Soult is in front of them."[16] The immense French Army, destined for the invasion of Portugal was thrust across the Guadarrama Pass to cut the British line of retreat. Spearheaded by Ney's cavalry, the 6th Corps and the Imperial Guard, followed by the infantry regiments of Generals Pierre Lapisse and Jean Dessolles, some 42,000 men,

dashed through the Guadarramas toward Valladolid where Moore had concentrated some 33,000 troops to attack Soult on the Carrion.[17] On 23 December, a day before the scheduled attack on Soult, Moore received information of Napoleon's approach. He immediately ordered a retreat toward La Corunna where he hoped the Royal Navy would be waiting.[18] The advance guard of Napoleon's army along with Soult's converging corps made contact with Moore's rear guard on the Esla River on 27 December,[19] and for the next 15 days a running battle ensued, interrupted by several desperate rear guard actions. Discipline began to disintegrate in the British Army and excesses were committed by stragglers as they fled to escape pursuing French cavalry. The wounded and baggage were abandoned, villages were looted and burned, magazines were destroyed, disabled wagons and dead horses clogged the road, thousands of stragglers, many drunk from wineries along the route, were captured or sabred; only the British rear guard prevented the retreat from turning into a rout.[20] The first columns of Moore's exhausted army reached La Corunna on 11 January but only 100 vessels were in the harbor, less than half those required to embark the army. Additional merchantmen had put to sea from Vigo but a strong easterly had delayed their arrival. With Soult and Ney closing in on La Corunna, Moore had no choice but to fight and await the arrival of the remaining vessels.[21]

The wounded, the baggage, and the nonessential equipment were embarked while Moore deployed his army in a last desperate effort to hold off the French. The transports continued to slip into the harbor of La Corunna and on 14 January, another 110 vessels had dropped anchor raising the number to perhaps 250.[22] Assured of adequate transportation for his army, Moore prepared for his last battle which took

place on 16 January 1809 on the heights above La Corunna and in the suburbs around Elvina. In this bitterly fought struggle each army suffered approximately 900 casualites and among the dead was John Moore who fell in the midst of the fighting as dusk approached.[23] After darkness had settled over the battlefield, the British Army was quietly embarked and early the following morning as the fleet was slipping anchor and setting sail for England, Moore's aides wrapped him in his great coat and buried him in a bastion of the citadel amid the firing of the French artillery overlooking the harbor. Once at sea the fleet, caught up in a strong southwesterly gale, was driven to England in 4 or 5 days.

Arriving at Portsmouth and other coastal ports, all troops landed as they had embarked—in uniforms worn during the retreat, stained with blood, powder, and filth. The English public and, more particularly, the members of Parliament were shocked and appalled to see the remnants of Moore's once proud army, the largest sent to the continent since the campaigns of the Duke of Marlborough 100 years earlier, in an apparent state of disintegration. Casualties were alarmingly high, over 7,000 men, but surrender or annihilation had been averted by the timely arrival of the Royal Navy.[24] Nevertheless, it should be noted that Moore's disastrous defeat had, in retrospect, resulted in a remarkable achievement. Napoleon and his army had been diverted from their goal of occupying Lisbon, driving its British garrison into the sea, and, in effect, ending the Peninsular War. The Royal Navy's contributions in this operation were crucial. Not only had Moore's army been saved but by the evacuation of his army, the navy successfully demonstrated that although British armies might be defeated, they would live to fight another day if they only could reach the sea.

Although Napoleon had turned back for Paris on 2 January, after realizing he could not overtake Moore, he issued orders for Soult to invade Portugal with the 2nd Corps. Soult, in concert with Marshal Claude Victor, marching from the east, was expected to advance on Lisbon and drive the British Army into the sea.[25] However, with an army too small to accomplish Napoleon's goals, Soult advanced to Porto, the second city of Portugal, where he halted to consolidate his position and awaited intelligence of Victor's movements.

The British Government, initially stunned and dismayed by the results of Moore's expedition, resolved to continue their support of the insurrectionaries in the Peninsula. British transports plied the Atlantic between English seaports and Lisbon bringing supplies and reinforcements to the small British Army still in the Capital. Wellesley, exonerated before a Board of Inquiry for his role in the Convention of Sintra, returned to Lisbon on 21 April 1809 to take command of this army, numbering 23,455 men.[26] Supported by a reorganized Portuguese Army, financed by British funds and commanded by Marshal William Carr Beresford, Wellesley advanced directly on Porto where he surprised Soult, and drove his army from Portugal, capturing baggage and inflicting over 5,000 casualties on the 2nd Corps.[27] Thus ended France's second attempt to subdue Portugal. In this instance Napoleon was primarily responsible for Soult's failure. Napoleon had experienced all the difficulties characteristic of the Peninsular War, especially the topographic, logistic, and strategic problems encountered in the pursuit of Moore in 1808; however, he assumed these conditions had ceased to exist when Soult invaded Portugal. Soult's campaign was doomed to failure from its inception for he had a deficient army, inadequate supplies and communications, and the impossible task of coordinating his operations with Victor while his antagonist, Wellesley, had the

advantage of an allied population and, thanks to the Royal Navy, reinforcements, supplies, and ready communications with England.

In the summer of 1808 Soult was again ordered to begin preparations to lead 60,000 men into Portugal but his forces were diverted in an attempt to cut off Wellesley who advanced into Spain to threaten King Joseph's capital.[28] He was forced to fight a bloody battle at Talavera, 70 miles from Madrid, on 27 July 1809 without the promised support of the Spanish Army. Learning of Soult's approach, he fell back into Portugal exasperated by the conduct of the Spanish, convinced that the safety of his forces in the Peninsula depended upon his ability to mobilize Portugal and carry on a war from there. No doubt his decision was predicated upon the realization that he would be near the sea and in a position to utilize the strengths of the British Navy.

In the meantime, the reorganization of the Portuguese Army continued under Beresford. Despite the logistics problems encountered in the campaign against Soult at Porto and during the summer of 1809, by January 1810 the Portuguese Army had reached a level of effectiveness which prompted Wellesley, now the Viscount Wellington, to write, "I have had opportunities of seeing fifteen regiments in the Portuguese service, and I have great pleasure in informing your Lordship that the progress of all these troops in discipline is considerable, [and] that some of the regiments are in very good order." English and Portuguese regiments were brigaded together under English command, the British Commissariat began to assume responsibility for the arrival and distribution of supplies and equipment, agreement was reached for the British Government to provide £980,000 during the year for maintenance of 30,000 Portuguese troops in the field, the Paymaster's Corps was decentralized to facilitate the rapid and

equitable distribution of pay to the soldiers, alternate means of transportation were secured, magazines were established in provincial depots, health services and hospitals were reorganized and, as Napoleon's plans for the third invasion of Portugal were coming to fruition, Wellington resolved to assume the responsibility for feeding the Portuguese troops.[29] Despite the enormous quantities of food and supplies that would have to be imported to feed an army totaling 60,000 to 70,000 men, Wellington was convinced that the British merchant fleet would not be wanting.

In addition to the newly organized, trained, equipped, and commanded Portuguese Army, Wellington developed elaborate plans to mobilize and defend the Kingdom against the anticipated French invasion. His most notable project, the Lines of Torres Vedras, was actually based on the plans of Portuguese Maj. Neves Costa who has been ignored by historians. Neves Costa carefully reconnoitered the terrain north of Lisbon and sent a detailed survey and map of his findings to Forjaz. This material was forwarded to Wellington who extrapolated upon the Portuguese engineer's plans.[30] With Neves Costa's plans in mind and probably in hand, Wellington and the commander of the Royal Engineers, Lt. Col. Richard Fletcher, surveyed the terrain across the peninsula on which Lisbon was situated. Following this reconnaissance, Wellington drew up his famous memorandum of 20 October 1809 describing the outline of what became one of the most important fortified lines ever constructed. Initially Wellington visualized two lines of defense with a number of forward positions to be established on prominent topographical features to control the approaches to the Allied positions; these outposts included 32 redoubts and a total of 143 pieces of artillery. The original line of fortifications, later to become the second line,

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was established with its right flank on the Tagus at Quintela and its left 22 miles weatward at the estuary of the San Lourenço on the Atlantic. When this line was completed, 215 guns and 15,442 men defended its 69 redoubts. The next line, established around the fortress of São Julião near the mouth of the Tagus, was constructed to permit the embarkment of an army in event the British were forced to turn to the Royal Navy for evacuation; this position was defended by 94 guns in 13 redoubts manned by 5,350 men. In July 1810 Capt. John T. Jones, as an afterthought, transformed the outposts before the main line into another fortified line 29 miles long; when this was completed 319 pieces of artillery, housed in 69 redoubts, were served by 18,863 men. When the three lines were finally completed in 1812, they included 628 guns in 165 redoubts with a complement of 39,475 men.

These self-sufficient fortifications varied in size, shape, and strength to conform to the terrain but they all reflected a general format which included 5-foot parapets and banquettes, preceded by a ditch 15 feet wide and 10 feet deep, and palisades before them; these fieldworks were defended by garrisons varying from 50 to 500 men. In addition, several fortifications resembling fortlets were constructed at Torres Vedras, Monte Agraça, and Montechique; they included up to 50 guns and garrisons of several thousand soldiers. Besides these formidable positions, the topography in the vicinity of the lines was utilized to further enhance these defenses. The roads approaching the lines were cut and barricaded, valleys were blocked with abatis, trenches were dug, hills were escarped and rocky slopes were blasted into perpendicular precipices, trees obstructing lines of fire were felled, bridges were mined, and rivers were dammed and flooded. To facilitate the rapid movement of Allied troops and communications, lateral

roads were constructed and the Royal Navy established and manned a telegraph system along and between the lines. Navy gunboats were anchored in the Tagus at Alhandra to obstruct the advance of French forces near the riverbank and any attack upon either extreme of the lines would fall under the fire of these vessels.

As the French invasion became imminent, the Portuguese and English worked frantically to complete their preparations on the lines. Workers were conscripted from as far as 50 miles away and by 7 September 1810, 7,000 were working on the redoubts along with two militia regiments and numerous units of ordenanza, under both Portuguese and British engineers.[31] By the first week of October 20,000 Portuguese troops occupied the lines and soon thereafter the first contingents of Wellington's Anglo-Portuguese Army began to enter the lines. As the lines were self-sustaining, the army would act independently of the fortifications in order to move and counter any successful French penetration of the lines. Supplemented by 8,000 Spanish troops under the command of the Marquis de la Romana, the entire Allied force behind the lines reached a total of 87,000 by the end of October 1810.[32]

In addition to the construction of fortifications before Lisbon, Wellington and the Portuguese Government made detailed plans to mobilize the Kingdom. The major fortresses along the frontier were reinforced with additional men, supplies, and equipment and their fortifications were improved to withstand a major siege. Arrangements were concluded for the destruction of all the vital roads leading from Spain while the routes over which the Allied army was expected to advance were repaired and carefully fortified. Fortifications were raised at several defensible positions through which the French would presumably pass. Boats on the major rivers were registered and placed under the

jurisdiction of local officials and all the boat bridges up the Tagus for 150 miles were withdrawn. Orders were issued for the removal of "carts, mules, and other means of conveyance, and the provisions, of which the enemy might make use in the invasion of the country."[33] Arrangements were also completed for the withdrawal or destruction of any Allied magazines near the Spanish frontier. In actively combating the French, ancient Portuguese laws were invoked to call up the ordenanza, similar to the French levée en masse. Every able-bodied male from 16 to 60 was expected "to do the enemy all the mischief in their power . . . not by assembling in large bodies, but by impeding his communications, by firing upon him from the mountains and strong passes with which the whole country abounds, and by annoying his foraging and other parties that he may send out."[34] Militia units were posted at the various border fortresses and along the frontier with orders to cut the enemy supply lines, attack foragers, capture French scouts, and engage in other disruptive activities.

In the areas in which the French were expected to invade, orders were issued for the inhabitants to retire. The Portuguese Government published inflammatory proclamations against the French inciting the peasants to resist the enemy. This was hardly necessary since they had already experienced excesses committed by French foragers and stragglers. In fact, it was difficult to induce the foreign troops in the French Army to desert for fear that they would be seized by peasants and brutally murdered.[35] However, it was Wellington's Proclamation to the Portuguese People that set the stage for the "scorched earth" policy. He declared:

The time which has elapsed during which the enemy have remained upon the frontiers of Portugal, has fortunately afforded to the Portuguese nation experience of what

they are to expect from the French . . . .. The Portuguese now see that they have no remedy for the evil with which they are threatened but determined resistance. Resistance, and the determination to render the enemy's advance into their country as difficult as possible, by removing out of his way everything that is valuable or that can contribute to his subsistence, or frustrate his progress, are the only and certain remedies for the evils with which they are threatened. It is obvious that the people can save themselves only by resistance to the enemy, and their properties only by removing them.[36]

Indeed, Wellington was willing to use his authority "to force the weak and the indolent to make an exertion to save themselves from the danger which awaits them, and to save their country."[37] He announced that he would treat as traitors anyone who assisted the enemy in any way. With this drastic action Wellington, supported by a majority of the Regency Council, was preparing to transform Portugal into a hostile desert without supplies, resources, or manpower. To accentuate his determination he wrote to Gen. Stapleton Cotton, "Send round to the people that they must retire from the villages, and let the magistrates know that if any of them stay, or if any of the inhabitants have any communication with the enemy, they will be hanged."[38] After observing the impact of his proclamation upon the populace, he declared, "The people of Portugal are doing that which the Spaniards ought to have done. They are removing their women and properties out of the enemy's way, and taking arms in their own defense. The country is made a desert, and behind almost every stone wall the French will meet an enemy."[39]

As a result of Wellington's plans for the defense of Portugal, two major

controversies developed that threatened the implementation of his entire strategy. As reinforcements and supplies continued to pour into Lisbon, Wellington became convinced he would be able to successfully defend Portugal against all but an overwhelming French army. As early as 18 January 1810 he wrote to Villiers, "If I can bring 30,000 effective British troops into the field, I will fight a good battle for . . . Portugal." He promised, "If the Portuguese do their duty, I shall have enough [troops] to maintain it; if they do not, nothing Great Britain can afford can save the country."[40] Wellington was convinced the French could not subdue Portugal with "an army of 70,000 or even 80,000 men" if they did not attack by February.[41] Aware that the Government and Lord Liverpool, Secretary of War and the Colonies, were preoccupied with the safety of the British Army, especially after Moore's disastrous campaign, he sent detailed letters to London describing the minute precautions taken to protect the evacuation of the army if necessary. Nevertheless, Liverpool was not satisfied. Hoping to ease Liverpool's anxiety, Wellington persuasively argued in a dispatch dated 1 March, "The British army ought to remain in the field in Portugal as long as may be practicable, and consistent with its safety. I consider it highly desirable that we should maintain ourselves in Portugal as long as possible." He concluded promising, "If you will let us have a large fleet of ships of war, and 45,000 disposable tons of transports, I shall try, and I think I shall bring them [Anglo-Portuguese Army] all off."[42] With the inclusion of the Royal Navy as an integral part of Wellington's plan, he apparently hoped to gain support from among the members of Parliament committed to the navy; yet, pressure continued to develop over the safety of the army. Liverpool continued to press his commander, "I should appraise you, however, that a very considerable degree

of alarm exists in this country respecting the safety of the British army in Portugal." He suggested it would be wise to abandon Portugal "a little too soon than, by remaining in Portugal a little too long, exposing it to those risks from which no military operation can be wholly exempt." At the same time he questioned Wellington's decision to evacuate the British Army at Lisbon rather than Peniche, 40 miles north of the capital, if such operations become necessary.[43] Despite this doubt and anxiety in London, Wellington was determined in his convictions. "I believe," he wrote to Forjaz, "that if we are able to maintain ourselves in Portugal the war will not end in the Peninsula." Alluding to the Lines of Torres Vedras, he concluded,

> If the enemy is not able to force us, when we have retired to this position, he will be obliged to retreat . . . and he will be forced in any case to abandon all the Portuguese territory. If we are forced to abandon this position, we will always have the means to embark ourselves in the Tagus.[44]

Wellington could take such a remarkable position despite Napoleon's virtual domination of Western Europe because he knew that the Royal Navy stood ready to carry out whatever operations were necessary for the safety of his army.

Despite Wellington's determination to defend Portugal, it was obvious he might be forced to evacuate the Kingdom. Thus for 3 months arrangements were pushed forward for the possible embarkment of both the British and Portuguese armies as transports and men-of-war put into Lisbon harbor. In addition to defending his strategy, he also had to combat the statements and theories of the fallen hero-warrior, Sir John Moore, who expressed the view that Portugal was indefensible. Wellington acknowledged, "I have as much respect as any man can have for the

opinion and judgment of Sir John Moore ... but he positively knew nothing of Portugal, and could know nothing of its existing state." Indeed, Wellington grasped the significance of Portugal's role in the Peninsular War as did few of his contemporaries, especially with the advantages guaranteed by the British navy. "As long as we shall remain in a state of activity in Portugal, the contest must continue in Spain," and he promised,

> I shall delay the embarkation as long as it is in my power, and I shall do everything in my power to avert the necessity of embarking at all. If the enemy should invade this country with a force less than that which I should think so superior ... I shall fight a battle to save the country ... and if the results should not be successful ... I shall still be able to retire and embark the army.[45]

While Wellington was willing to consider the evacuation of his army as a last resort, the anxious Government immediately implemented plans to fulfill his requests for an evacuation fleet. By February 23,440 tons of transports, in addition to 7,000 tons en route from London, were anchored in the Tagus off Lisbon. Instructions were issued immediately for the captains of ships in the vicinity to alter course for Lisbon. By 6 March transports totaling 19,000 tons had set sail from Cadiz, Malta, and Gibraltar while six men-of-war and a number of ordnance and animal vessels were preparing to set sail from England.[46]

The baggage of many regiments had already been loaded aboard transports in the Tagus in January and February as new reinforcements arrived from England; hence the transfer of equipment to the merchantmen in the harbor would not cause alarm among the inhabitants of the city. By the first week of May, each vessel had been numbered and assigned a specific regiment. Moreover,

berths and anchorages were established for every ship to prevent confusion during an evacuation. Water, biscuit, and essentials were supplied to every vessel and longboats were assigned to each for the transfer of troops from shore to ship in event the French reached Lisbon.[47]

In conjunction with Adm. George Berkeley, commanding the British Squadron in the Tagus, Wellington carefully coordinated plans for the withdrawal of the army, but he refused to alter his strategy despite Liverpool's continued appeals for caution and suggestion that the army be evacuated at Peniche. The exasperated Wellington wrote to Liverpool, "I am willing to be responsible for the evacuation of Portugal .... Depend on it, whatever people may tell you."[48] In a letter to Berkeley a week later he struck back at his critics,

> The Government are terribly afraid that I shall get them, and myself, in a scrape. But what can be expected from men who are beaten in the House of Commons three times a week? A great deal might be done now, if there existed in England less party, and more public sentiment, and if there was any Government.[49]

Correspondence from England continued to prod and caution Wellington about the evacuation of his army until the end of April when King George III's private secretary, Col. Herbert Taylor, wrote to Liverpool promising the King's support "unfettered by any particular instruction which might embarrass him [Wellington] in the execution of his general plan of operation."[50] So with the threat of French invasion mounting each day, the Government came to the realization that Wellington and his strategy would have to be supported, satisfied that in event of disaster, the Navy would be ready to evacuate his army.

The second major controversy centered around Wellington's plan to

implement the "scorched earth" policy and turn Portugal into a wasteland. It was obvious that mobilization would have grievous effects upon the population. Two members of the Regency Council, the Principal José António de Menenzes e Sousa, supported by the Patriarch, António de Castro, attacked Wellington's drastic plans to mobilize the kingdom, claiming the enemy should be fought on the frontier rather than at the gates of Lisbon after Portugal had been devastated. As the third French invasion of Portugal became imminent, the political struggle raged within the Regency Government.[51] It seemed to many patriotic Portuguese as well as the French that the British were willing to sacrifice Portugal, its population and its resources while they had only to withdraw to Lisbon, embark aboard the waiting fleet, and sail home to the safety of England.

While the Portuguese and British labored to create an effective fighting force and mobilize the Kingdom, Napoleon was returning to France after his successful campaign against Austria in 1809. With only the struggle in the Peninsula interrupting the continental peace, Napoleon was determined to end this "bleeding sore" which dragged on without foreseeable end, sapping the strength of his empire. Portugal no longer affected his economic strategy against England, but it served as a defiant example of successful opposition, a base of operations for the every increasing British forces, and a direct menace to imperial control. As long as the English remained in Portugal, supported by the Lusitanians, they were a threat to isolated French units, as well as a source of moral, economic, and military strength to all those opposing French domination. Napoleon began making arrangements to go to the Peninsula himself in December 1809 but pressing domestic and foreign problems forced him to send his most illustrious marshal, André Massena, the Duc de

Rivoli, Prince d'Essling, to replace him and command the Army of Portugal. Although promised limitless material and manpower, Massena actually led an army of approximately 65,000 into Portugal with orders to crush Portuguese opposition and drive Wellington into the sea.[52]

Initially, French reaction to the allies' plan of devastation was one of shock and skepticism, but it changed to dismay, frustration, and disgust. Massena was first made aware of these preparations when French patrols advanced into Portugal at the end of July 1810. They found the villages and towns abandoned by their inhabitants and all the supplies and useful resources destroyed or hidden. This problem was soon complicated by the adverse reaction manifested by the French troops who, angered by their reception, resorted to pillaging and burning.[53] Massena was forced to order the execution of those responsible for the looting and he even held officers responsible for the excesses committed by their troops.[54] Aware of the implications of this "scorched earth" policy upon his army, Massena complained bitterly to Marshal Alexandre Berthier,

> The English ... employ a means of defense that results in the greatest misfortune to the nation. They have ordered the inhabitants to leave their homes .... They have furnished all kinds of arms to them, and they are enjoined under penalty of death to retire and leave nothing that would serve to provide subsistence for the French army.[55]

When the Portuguese border fortress of Almeida fell to Massena's invading army on 28 August 1810, those opposed to Wellington's system of mobilization denounced him passionately. The land was stripped bare before the advancing army and large segments of the population fled into the forests or mountains. As the French pursued the

retreating Allied army, Wellington determined to take up a position on the Serra de Bussaco, north of Coimbra and the Mondego river valley, to contest the French advance. Here the Anglo-Portuguese Army of some 60,000 men was concentrated to defend the mountain against 65,000 Frenchmen. The French attacks were repulsed on 27 September but 2 days later Masséna's troops filed along Boialvo road to Sardão, outflanking Wellington's position. The Allies fell back to the Lines of Torres Vedras, preceded by the fleeing refugees and followed by the pursuing French advance guard. When they reached Sobral and Villafranca, the French, who had no accurate information on the lines, were stunned to see a string of fortified sites stretching the entire width of the peninsula--from the Tagus to the Atlantic. It soon became obvious that a successful attack without extensive reinforcements was impossible. The French had been completely deceived by the plan. As one of Masséna's staff recalled, "The cruel ravages carried out by the enemy reinforced our ignorance, for it seemed they would not have abused a country they wanted to save."[56]

Nevertheless Masséna was confident of final victory. Assuming the British withdrawal was only a matter of time, Masséna wrote to Berthier, "I hold myself in position hoping the Portuguese refugees at Lisbon will make some movement against the British since they are reduced to the most frightful misery."[57] A month later Napoleon himself declared in a conversation, "The English would not be able to use the population in a struggle with me . . .. Yet, we hold them tightly blockaded without food with an army and an immense population."[58] Such reasoning was reassuring but it was sheer fantasy since it ignored the British Navy and its capabilities. On the contrary, arrangements had been completed to supply grain and wheat in both English and Portuguese bottoms from America, Algeria, Morocco, as well as from Ireland, Holland, and Prussia.[59]

Meanwhile, Masséna, after a month before the lines, decided to withdraw his exposed Army corps to the city of Santarém on the banks of the Tagus, less than 30 miles from the lines where he could confidently wait for reinforcements and supplies. The army retired from the devastated country before the lines on 14 November without incident and 2 days later it was firmly entrenched in the villages surrounding Santarém. Once this movement had been completed, Gen. Maximilian Foy was sent to Paris to inform the Emperor of the operations to date and request additional resources to complete the conquest of Portugal. Napoleon, who followed Masséna's progress in the English newspapers, had received no concrete information from the army from 15 September, until 24 November when Foy arrived in Paris. When he learned of Masséna's plight he promised reinforcements and other necessary supplies as soon as possible. Through the cold damp months of November and December reconnaissance columns were sent out in all directions hoping to make contact with the anticipated reinforcements. However, it was not until 26 December that a division of Gen. Jean Drouet's Corps joined the Army of Portugal but it was hardly of the size Masséna had expected. Marshal Soult had also been ordered to move his 5th Corps in support of the army but Masséna cynically observed to his first *aide de camp*, Jean Pelet, "The 5th Corps will not come or Soult will accompany it, and he will use it for some other purpose."[60]

As the agonizing days of January passed and the French Army approached starvation, British transports continued to arrive in Lisbon harbor laden with supplies and reinforcements. The Allied army continued to grow in size, resources and confidence and

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Wellington began to contemplate an offensive to drive the French out of Portugal. Meanwhile, Admiral Berkeley and his squadron were deeply involved in efforts to strengthen Wellington's position behind the lines. The vital islands of the Tagus above Lisbon, Lyceria and Alhandra, were placed under the protection of Berkeley's seamen while gunboats carefully observed the mouths of the rivers emptying into the Tagus.[61] Several seamen were sent ashore to aid the artillerymen in Gen. Rowland Hill's Division, and when Wellington wanted to try to ignite the French stores collected near Punhete for the construction of a boat bridge, he called upon Admiral Berkeley to send a vessel capable of launching Congreve rockets into the enemy camp.[62] Each week between 20 and 30 cattle ships were sent to Oporto, Vigo, and even La Corunna to transport cattle back to Lisbon for its immense population of refugees. Some vessels in Lisbon harbor were transformed into salt depots for the army while others served as prisons for French who had deserted or been taken prisoner.[63] Much of the correspondence between Wellington and Berkeley was concerned with the Tagus and the most feasible method of preventing a French crossing. Various schemes were developed but the French were thwarted in their decision to cross the river by General Foy who misrepresented Napoleon's orders. Accordingly, Masséna, rather than cross the Tagus into the fertile province of Alentejo, ordered the destruction of the 80 boats for the pontoon bridge and began formulating plans for the withdrawal of the army.[64]

Despite this cooperation between Wellington and Berkeley, several controversies arose which might have caused serious repercussions. "To add to the numerical strength of the army," Wellington requested a brigade of seamen and a battalion of marines to be sent ashore but Berkeley was forced to refuse after referring the question to the Admiralty.[65] Wellington concurred with the decision concerning the seamen, "But," he wrote to Berkeley, "Major Williams' battalion of marines had better proceed to Loures and the other battalion do the duty of Lisbon and St. Julian."[66] They were sent temporarily. In a more serious incident the seamen manning the telegraph on the Lines of Torres Vedras were withdrawn in September because they did not receive special pay allowance. These duties were performed by Portuguese militiamen until December, certainly the most crucial period in the life of the lines, when Wellington made arrangements to increase their allowance.[67]

Through February and March of 1811 the British squadron remained in Lisbon harbor along with the vast evacuation fleet but on 20 March, Wellington issued the long awaited letter that proclaimed victory for his army and strategy. "I have this day," he wrote to Berkeley, "given directions that the baggage of each division of infantry, and of cavalry, respectively, may be removed into one transport, which ought to be sufficient to contain it." With the exception of "coppered transports" capable of carrying 3,000 infantry, transport vessels for 300 cavalry, and the hospital ships, he continued, "I beg you to send all the remainder to England as soon as it may be convenient with you."[68] As the vessels returned to England or other stations, their crews must have had the satisfaction of knowing that their efforts had contributed to a remarkable success for their arms and their country.

Meanwhile, the French soldiers of Masséna's army, despite their courage and sacrifices, had reached a point of acute deprivation. After 108 days before the lines without supplies or adequate reinforcements, Masséna had no choice but retreat or see his army starve. Exasperated and disgusted he wrote a 20-page report to Napoleon declaring,

"This is the decision I have taken because it is impossible to remain in a country six months, where we did not think it possible to exist for fifteen days." He concluded, "I cannot finish without begging Your Highness to observe that the army lacks artillery, horses, transportation, clothing, shoes, and reinforcements."[69] The Army of Portugal began its withdrawal from Santarém on 5 March 1811, pursued by Wellington's reinforced and well-equipped army. The retreat, punctuated by several brilliant rear guard actions by Marshal Michel Ney, did not end until Masséna's army was again on the Spanish frontier. Thus, the Third Invasion of Portugal, Napoleon's most ambitious, had come to a dismal end with casualties totaling over 25,000 men— primarily from deprivation or the ramifications of the Portuguese mobilization and the inability of Napoleon to supply the Army of Portugal. Conversely, Wellington's Anglo-Portuguese Army had proven to be a highly effective fighting force which ultimately would carry the war across the Pyrenees into France, and the British Navy had demonstrated its strength and versatility as a vital adjunct to the allied army in the final victory.

Although the Royal Navy's support of Wellington's army is probably the most conspicuous example of land-sea cooperation in the Peninsular War, at the great fortress-city of Cadiz seapower had considerable effect upon the ultimate success of its defense. In February 1810 the armies of King Joseph laid siege to Cadiz after conquering Andalucia and crushing the resistance in southern Spain. The city, situated on the Isla de Leon with an extremely formidable system of outlying fortifications and topographical barriers, was besieged by Marshal Victor. As the siege dragged on, he finally came to realize that the fortress could only be taken by sea and the French Navy was utterly incapable of mounting such an operation. Meanwhile, the British sent in vast quantities of arms and supplies; they landed some 8,000 English and Portuguese soldiers to supplement the Spanish garrison of 20,000 men and a squadron of warships was anchored nearby to augment the fortress guns. The siege, interrupted periodically by French attacks and allied sorties saw the capture of Spanish forts on the peninsula facing Cadiz. Nevertheless, with the continual arrival of munitions and supplies, supported at various periods by Spanish armies maneuvering on the French flanks, the siege continued through 1811. In August 1812 Wellington advanced on Madrid forcing Soult to raise the siege of Cadiz and evacuate Andalucia. The successful defense of Cadiz was to a large degree guaranteed by the Royal Navy. Not only had British vessels fed and armed the garrison and citizens of Cadiz for over 30 months but they protected the fortress from French naval attack and used their guns to second the garrison artillery.

The Royal Navy was also engaged in numerous amphibious operations during the Peninsular War to support the Spanish armies and guerrillas. Some raiding parties harassed isolated French forces near the coast causing little damage while other operations played an integral part in land operations. British squadrons blockaded and often

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bombarded French-occupied seaports along the Spanish seacoast and maintained a threatening presence, always ready to take advantage of any ill-timed French maneuvers. Nevertheless, the navy's major role was to serve as an appendage of Wellington's army, capable of supplying and reinforcing it as the need arose. When Wellington mounted his great offensive in 1813 to expel the French from the Peninsula, the navy's base of operation was easily transferred to Santander to support the left wing of the army. Although Wellington was not always sympathetic with the many nautical problems faced by the navy in their joint operation, as exemplified by the siege of San Sebastian, he recognized the importance of uncontested control of the seas. Despite the difficulties inherent in joint land-sea operations, there can be no doubt that without the successful employment of British seapower, Wellington's army would not have survived and the Peninsula would have been lost to Napoleon.

NOTES

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2. *Ibid.*, No. 13300, Convention Secrète, 27 October 1807, v. XVI, pp. 140-42.

3. Public Record Office, Foreign Office, MSS [Hereafter cited as P.R.O., F.O.] 63/55, Strangford to Canning, 21, 29 August 1807.

4. *Ibid.*, Strangford to Canning, 2, 5, 6, 10, 24, 29, 30 November 1807.

5. John W. Fortescue, *A History of the British Army* (London: Macmillan, 1910-30), v. VI, pp. 99-102; Charles Oman, *A History of the Peninsular War* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902-30), v. I, p. 30.

6. Paul Charles Thiébault, *Relation de l'expédition du Portugal, faite en 1807 et 1808, par le Ier corps d'observation de la Gironde, devenu Armee de Portugal* (Paris: Magimel, Anselin, et Pochard, 1817), pp. 69-70.

7. Correspondence: Armée de Portugal, MSS, Service Historique de l'armée, Vincennes, Carton C 7 16, Decrets, 3, 4, 15, 22 December 1807, 15 January 1808; Junot to Clarke, 8, 11, 28 January, 22 March 1808.

8. Donald D. Horward, *The Battle of Bussaco: Masséna vs. Wellington* (Tallahassee, Fla.: Florida State University Press, 1965), p. 4.

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10. Arthur Wellesley, *The Dispatches of the Field Marshal, the Duke of Wellington K.G., During His Various Campaigns in India, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, the Low Countries, and France from 1799 to 1818*, ed. John Gurwood (London: John Murray, 1835-38), Returns of the Forces embarked under Sir Arthur Wellesley, 13 July 1808, v. IV, p. 27; Wellington to Cotton, 30 July 1808, v. IV, pp. 50-51; *A Copy of the Proceedings upon the Inquiry Relative to the Armistice and Convention, etc. made and concluded in Portugal, in August 1808, Between the Commanders of the British and French Armies* (London: n.n., 1809), Castlereagh to Wellesley, 30 June 1808, Wellesley to Castereagh, 21, 26 July, 1 August 1808, pp. 131-32; 146-49.

11. *Inquiry*, Report to His Majesty, signed Dundas, Moira, Craig, Heathfield, Pembroke, G. Nugent, 01. Nicolls, 22 December 1808, pp. 111-21; Wellesley to Burrard, 6 August 1808, Wellesley to Castlercagh, 16, 17 August 1808, Wellesley to Burrard, 21 August 1808, pp. 152-54, 155-56, 160-61, 165-66; Definitive Convention for the Evacuation of the Portuguese Army, signed 28 August 1808, pp. 170-73, 180-82, 245-48.

12. *Correspondence de Napoléon Ier*, No. 14386, Napoleon to Junot, 19 October 1808, v. XVIII, pp. 2-4.

13. *Ibid.*, No. 14413, Discours, 25 October 1808, v. XVIII, pp. 24-25; No. 14537, Proclamation aux Espagnols, 7 December 1808, v. XVIII, pp. 120-21.

14. Oman, v. I, p. 528.

15. James Moore, *A Narrative of the Campaign of the British Army in Spain Commanded by His Excellency Lieut. General Sir John Moore* (London: Joseph Johnston, 1809), pp. 123-25. See for text of original dispatch from Berthier to Soult, 10 December 1808.

16. *Correspondence de Napoléon Ier*, No. 14620, Napoleon to Joseph Bonaparte, 27 December 1808, v. XVIII, pp. 184-85.

17. Henri Bonnal, *La vie militarie du maréchal Ney, duc d'Elchingen, prince de la Moskowa* (Paris: Chapelot, 1914), Napoleon to Ney, 19 December 1808, v. III, pp. 81-82. See also *Correspondence de Napoléon Ier*, Nos. 14611, 14612, 14613, Napoleon to Berthier, 22 December 1808, v. XVIII, pp. 177-79.

18. Moore to La Romana, 23 December 1808, pp. 165-66.

19. Dominique Balagny, *Campagne d l'Empereur Napoléon en Espagne 1808-1809* (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1902-06), Colonel-Major Guyot to Berthier, 29 December 1808, v. IV, pp. 155-56.

20. Robert Blakeney, *A Boy in the Peninsular War, The Service Adventures, and Experiences of Robert Blakeney* (London: John Murray, 1899), pp. 49-65; Balagny, Soult to Berthier, 5 January 1809, v. IV, pp. 307-10; Moore, pp. 192-93.

21. Fortescue, v. VI, p. 375.

22. Balagny, Soult to Berthier, 14, 17 January 1810, v. IV, pp. 325-28, 338-42, 476n; Fortescue, v. VI, p. 375.

23. Fortescue, v. VI, p. 388. See also Oman, v. I, pp. 593-95 for casualty list.

24. Balagny, Soult to Berthier, 17, 18 January 1809, v. IV, pp. 338-45, 280-89.

25. William F.P. Napier, *History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France from A.D. 1807 to 1814* (New York: W.J. Widdleton, 1864), Napoleon to Soult, 21 January 1809, v. II, pp. 12-13.

26. Robert Stewart, *Correspondence, Dispatches, and other Papers, of Viscount Castlereagh, Second Marquess of Londonderry*, ed. C.W. Vane (London: William Shoberl, 1851), Castlereagh to Wellesley, 2 April 1809, v. VII, pp. 46-47; *Wellington's Dispatches*, Wellesley to Frere, 24 April 1809, v. IV, pp. 266-68.

27. Oman, v. II, p. 361; Napier, v. II, p. 96, Napier declares that Soult reached Spain with 19,500; Louis Adolphe Theirs, *History of the Consulate and the Empire of France Under Napoleon* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1894), v. VI, p. 497, maintains that only 17,000 men escaped from Portugal with Soult.

28. *Correspondence de Napoléon Ier*, No. 15340, Napoleon to Clarke, 12 June 1809, v. XIX, pp. 116-17; *Mémoires et Correspondence Politique et Militaire du Roi Joseph*, ed. A. Du Casse (Paris: Perrotin, 1854) Jourdan to Soult, 22 July 1809, v. VI, pp. 278-80, "Rapport sur le mouvement des 2e, 5e, 6e corps des bords du Duero et du royaume de Leon, sur le Tage," v. VI, pp. 323-35; *Correspondence de Napoléon Ier*, No. 15621, Napoleon to Clarke, 7 August 1809, v. XIX, p. 369. Observing Soult's movements, Napoleon complained, "It is very unfortunate that Marshal Soult should have maneuvered so ill as not to have joined the king."

29. *Wellington's Dispatches*, Wellington to Liverpool, 4, 15 January 1810, v. V, pp. 411, 429-30; Arthur Wellesley, *Supplementary Dispatches, Correspondence, and Memoranda of Field Marshal Arthur Duke of Wellington, K.G.* ed. by his son, the Duke of Wellington, K.G. (London: John Murray, 1871), "Memoranda on British Aids to Portugal, 1809 to 1812," March 1813, v. VII, pp. 593-94; Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (London: Hansard, 1810), 1st Ser., v. XV, pp. 511-25; Samuel E. Vichness, "Marshal of Portugal: The Military Career of William Carr Beresford, 1785-1814," Ph.D. thesis, Florida State University, Tallahassee, 1976, pp. 300-25.

30. Christovam Ayres de Magalhães Sepúlveda, *História organica e política do exército portuguez* (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1896-1932), v. XIII, pp. 3-14.

31. For details on the Lines of Torres Vedras see John T. Jones, *Memoranda relative to the lines thrown up to cover Lisbon in 1810* (London: n.n., 1829); Donald D. Horward, *The French Campaign in Portugal: An Account by Jean Jacques Pelet*, ed., trans., annot. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 222-78.

32. Oman, Appendices XIV, "Wellington's Army within the Lines of Torres Vedras, Morning state of November 1, 1810," v. III, pp. 554-58.

33. *Wellington's Dispatches*, Wellington to Beresford, 23 January 1810, v. V, pp. 436-37; Wellington to Bacellar, 26 January 1810, v. V, pp. 457-58; Wellington to Hill, 27 February 1810, v. V, pp. 528-29.

34. *Ibid.*, Wellington to Leite, 28 February 1810, v. V, pp. 529-30; Wellington to Bacellar, 1 March 1810, v. V, pp. 534-36; Wellington to Masséna, 9, 24 September 1810, v. VI, pp. 419-20, 464-65.

35. *Ibid.*, Wellington to Liverpool, 7 May, 2 June 1810, v. VI, pp. 78-80, 167-69; Wellington to Doyle, 3 May 1810, v. VI, pp. 87-88; Wellington to Stuart, 13 May 1810, v. VI, pp. 110-11.

36. *Ibid.*, "Proclamation to the People of Portugal," signed Wellington, 4 August 1810, v. VI, pp. 329-30.

37. *Ibid.*

38. *Ibid.*, Wellington to Cotton, 4 August 1810, v. VI, p. 324.

39. *Ibid.*, Wellington to Henry Wellesley, 20 August 1810, v. VI, pp. 373-75.

40. *Wellington's Dispatches,* Wellington to Villiers, 14 January 1810, v. V, pp. 424-26.

41. *Ibid.*, Wellington to Liverpool, 14 November 1809, v. V, pp. 280-82.

42. *Ibid.*, Wellington to Liverpool, 1 March 1810, v. V, pp. 538-42. See also P.R.O., W.O. 6/50, Liverpool to Wellington, 3 January 1810.

43. *Supplementary Dispatches of Wellington,* Liverpool to Wellington, 13 March 1810, v. VI, pp. 493-94.

44. *Wellington's Dispatches,* Wellington to Forjaz, 8 March 1810, v. V, pp. 556-59.

45. *Ibid.*, Wellington to Liverpool, April 2, 1810, v. VI, pp. 5-10.

46. P.R.O., W.O. 6/50. Liverpool to Wellington, 6, 7 March 1810. Of the 49,000 tons designated to evacuate the allied army if necessary, 23,440 tons of transports were in Lisbon Harbor by the end of January, 7,000 tons had sailed from England in February, 6,340 tons had sailed from Malta in December, 6,000 tons were at sea from Cadiz and Gibralter, 3,000 tons left England for Lisbon by way of Cadiz and 3,500 tons were preparing to sail directly from Portsmouth. Liverpool also pointed out that "the transports might be crowded with troops without endangering the safety of the vessels, or the health of the men . . . [since] Cadiz may be considered to give a safe asylum to the fleet, at very trifling distance from the point of embarkation." The men-of-war included the *Caesar* 80, *Kent* 74, *Norge* 74, *Dolphin* 44, *Ulysses* 44, and another vessel of 74 guns.

47. *Wellington's Dispatches,* Wellington to Berkely, 24 January 1810, v. V, pp. 442-43; Wellington to Stuart, 6 May 1810, v. VI, pp. 93-94.

48. *Ibid.*, Wellington to Liverpool, 2 April 1810, v. VI, pp. 5-10. Wellington insisted his point of debarkation would be St. Julian if he were forced from Portugal. "When we do go, I feel a little anxiety to go, like gentlemen, out of the hall door, particularly after the preparations which I have made to enable us to do so, and not out the back door, or by the area."

49. *Ibid.*, Wellington to Liverpool, 2 April 1810, v. VI, pp. 5-10; Wellington to Berkeley, 7 April 1810, v. VI, pp. 21-22. See also Wellington to Stuart, 21 April 1810, v. VI, pp. 51-53.

50. *Supplementary Dispatches of Wellington,* Taylor to Liverpool, 15 April 1810, v. VI, p. 515; Liverpool to Wellington, 25 April 1810, v. VI, p. 515.

51. *Wellington's Dispatches,* Wellington to Forjaz, 6 September 1810, v. VI, pp. 408-409, Wellington to Stuart, 11 September, 28 October 1810, v. VI, pp. 427-30, 556-59.

52. *Correspondence de Napoléon Ier*, No. 16385, Imperial Decree, 17 April 1810, v. XX, p. 338; Horward, *Pelet,* p. 17, n. 16.

53. Archives de Masséna, MSS, Montbrun to Masséna, 31 July 1810, v. LV, p. 312; Masséna to Loison, 8 August 1810, v. LI, p. 29. This manuscript collection is in the possession of Victor André Masséna, the 7th Prince d'Essling.

54. Horward, *Pelet,* p. 110.

55. Archives de Masséna, Masséna to Berthier, 20 August 1810, v. LI, p. 65.

56. Horward, *Pelet,* p. 222.

57. Correspondence: Armée de Portugal, Masséna to Berthier, 29 October 1810, Carton C ^{7} 10.

58. Maurice Girod de l'Ain, *Vie Militaire du General Foy* (Paris: E. Plon, Nourrit et Cie, 1900), pp. 107-113; Correspondence: Armée de Portugal, Foy to Masséna, 4 December 1810.

59. P.R.O., F.O. 342/11, Wellington to Stuart, 29 October 1810; F.O. 342/22, Wellington to Stuart, 3 November 1810; F.O. 342/23, Wellington to Stuart, 29 December 1810.

60. Donald D. Horward, "Masséna and Napoleon: Abandonment in Portugal," *Military Affairs,* October 1973, p. 66.

61. John T. Jones, *Journals of the Sieges carried on by the Army under the Duke of Wellington, in Spain, during the years 1811 to 1814; with notes and additions; also Memoranda Relative to the Lines Thrown up to Cover Lisbon in 1810.* 3rd ed. (London: Weale, 1846), Wellington to Berkeley, 16 October 1810, v. III, pp. 146-47.

62. *Ibid.*, Wellington to Berkeley, 3, 6 November 1810, pp. 163-64, 168-69; *Wellington's Dispatches,* Wellington to Berkeley, 1 November 1810, v. VI, p. 570.

63. *Wellington's Dispatches,* Wellington to Berkeley, 11, 16, 22, 29 January, 10, 23 February 1810, v. VII, pp. 127, 147, 170, 207, 250, 284.

64. *Ibid.*, Wellington to Berkeley, 9, 25 December 1810, 11, 12 January 1811, v. VII, pp. 38-39, 70-71, 127-28, 133-34.

65. *Ibid.*, Wellington to Berkeley, 10 November 1810, v. VI, pp. 601-03; 25, 27 December 1810, v. VII, pp. 70-71 and 77-78.

66. *Ibid.*, Wellington to Berkeley, 25, 27 December 1810, v. VI, pp. 77-78; 11 January 1811, v. VII, p. 127.

67. *Ibid.*, Wellington to Liverpool, 19 October 1810, Wellington to Berkeley, 24 December 1810, v. VI, pp. 525-26, v. VII, p. 68; Jones, *Sieges in the Peninsula,* Jones to Fletcher, 12 September 1810 and Fletcher to Jones, 7, 11 September, 5, 6 October 1810, pp. 232-36, 250-51.

68. *Ibid.*, Wellington to Berkeley, 20 March 1811, v. VII, p. 379.

69. Correspondence: Armée de Portugal C 7 12, Masséna to Berthier, 6 March 1810.

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
SET AND DRIFT

CONTAINMENT, STRATEGIC VALUE, WORLD IMAGE— DIFFERING VIEWS OF NATIONAL SECURITY

by

Thomas I. Dickson*

When we winnow the never-ending arguments over national security for their essences, three basic competing views remain on the threshing floor. They can be labeled "containment," "strategic value," and "world image." Explicitly, but more often implicitly, one of these three world outlooks lies behind most arguments of those who enter the great debates on security. The immediate issue may be whether the defense budget is too big, too small or just right; whether we should build the B-1 bomber, the Trident submarine or some other piece of military hardware; or whether we should leave troops in Korea or reduce our contingents in Europe. The questions may be technical in form but varying opinions still tend to derive from differing perceptions of men, nations, and the world system that grow out of stressing one or another of the three persuasions.

The matter probed here is not which view is right, if indeed one is, but whether the inherent nature of each places it in opposition to each of the others. The acrimony in national security debates—those over Vietnam and the ABM, for example—indicates that compromise or amalgamation of contrasting positions is difficult. There appear to be fundamental underlying incompatibilities. To begin the inquiry, each concept is stripped to its bare essentials; it is set up, in effect, as an "ideal" model. There is no implication that any one person or group of persons holds precisely to the form in which these ideas are summarized here.

Containment. The doctrine of containment finds its theoretical underpinning in the appeasement theory of war, which sometimes is shorthanded as the Munich syndrome.[1] The basic notion is that if greed is allowed to sit down at one place at the table, it will end up trying to eat the entire board. In the particularly American application the culprit is likely to be a totalitarian dictator. However, the doctrine can accommodate some more broadly

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defined villain, e.g., communism or the Russians. Being overlayed with democratic and moralistic patina, containment has come to be tied to dividing the world between good guys and bad guys, a fact that tends to obscure the essential mechanism of the theory.

Crucial to the understanding of containment is that it is concerned with assumptions about a process. This process is one whereby a nation will move, if not halted at the outset, from one adventure to another in a manner ultimately to yield the kind of confrontation that breeds war. The precise issues or territories involved in each instance do not lie at the heart of the philosophical justification for the doctrine of containment. Rather a notion that might be termed the growth of psychologic excitation does. The country that wins limited objectives through limited applications or threats of force, or even through several means short of threats of force, particularly if "territorial" gains are involved, will continue to the point where the once yielding or complacent or frightened potential opposition will say nevermore. But the strength of that cry will not be understood by the "aggressor" in the light of recent history, and conditions for major war are reached. Containment subsumes the supposition that a little war now can prevent a big war later. National interest lies in halting the progression, nipping it in the bud, so that the "critical mass" is not reached.

Strategic Value. Strategic value theory is quite different, even though proponents of "containment" often argue using strategic value premises. Strategic value regards national interests to be protected as definable and identifiable "things." They can be known and they are at the core of policy formulation. These interests are imbedded in economic and military requirements, in cultural ties, or in historic relationships. Nobody supposes that their identification is easy, and they might not have precise boundaries, but it is these "things" that must be protected.

To provide an example, most proponents of strategic value theory would accept that Western Europe is vital to the survival of the United States and the American way of life and, for that reason, must be defended. In American thinking, probably the ultimate reduction of strategic value theory is found in the so-called "Fortress America" concept. It has the added advantages of ruling out having to go to war for foreigners, who probably are not very virtuous anyway, and of representing the simplest application of the moral principle that war is justified only in self-defense.

Inherent in strategic value thinking is that there are things that need *not* be protected. Not that their "loss" would be good, but only that they can and should be sacrificed because they are not so important as to justify the cost and effort of protecting them. South Vietnam is an apt example of something that, in the minds of many Americans, did not merit defending. The *place* was not, in and of itself, important, or at least not very important, to the United States.

World Image. Obviously, the United States pursuing containment of strategic value policies projects a world image. But the proponents of the world image thesis believe it is the wrong image and that it is counterproductive. Militarism is what they see as the U.S. stance. This generates antagonism and anti-U.S. feelings and actions abroad. Whether it be "revisionist" versions of the cold war or the strained relations of the United States with the Third World, we are tending to create our own enemies. The answer then, lies in ways to make friends, not enemies.

The means may be various, but those that seem to attract attention are those

that serve as an example for the rest of the world in dealing with the problems of modernization—pollution and urban blight, for instance--and working to obliterate poverty, suffering and racism at home and abroad. World image advocates rely on humanist principles and apply their moral values directly to the wellbeing of individuals.

Can the Views be Reconciled? At one level the answer to the question has to be "Yes." There is no law that requires foreign policy to conform rigidly to the canons of formal logic. Adding apples and oranges is common political practice. It is evident that there have been elements of all three world outlooks in U.S. approaches since World War II. But pursuing part of all three has led to some inconsistencies, as was pointed out by domestic and foreign critics alike when the United States gave Europe formal priority in foreign policy because of its strategic value and then drew on the resources earmarked to defend Europe in order to wage a war in Southeast Asia in the name of containment.

Even if these concepts can be combined politically, conflicts that exist among their basic principles cannot simply be glossed over while we assemble any combination of them we want and call the resulting melange U.S. national security policy. Conflicting fundamental premises seem certain to emerge even if they fail of explicit recognition in the course of argumentation. To the extent that containment, strategic value, and national image are so different that they do not allow of accommodation, the possibility of solutions short of one side or another "winning" is restricted. And, to the extent they are so different that they do not allow of accommodation, "compromise" solutions are likely to contain basic inconsistencies that adversely influence implementation of the decisions reached. If indeed, each outlook is

basically incompatible with each of the others, then the duel of monologues that has characterized disagreements over national security is little likely soon to be substituted for by a true dialogue.

To start with, can containment and strategic value be joined? In one sense, strategic value includes an aspect of containment in that it draws boundaries that the "aggressor" may not transgress without fear of reprisal, assuming he understands and accepts the limitations placed on him. But basically it is different in that it is concerned with the identification of more or less "concrete" national interests that must be defended, while containment is concerned with halting a process associated with another state's propensity to national aggrandizement. For containment the process must be short-circuited, the assumption being that the "aggressor" will not be able to perceive clearly the restrictions placed by the identification of items of strategic value or, if he does perceive them, he cannot abide by them. For this reason the two concepts cannot logically be joined but must be in conflict with one another.

To the extent that containment and strategic value stress the presence and use of military force to abort the process of aggrandizement or protect high value items, they both are in conflict with national image. To gain peace by eschewing force as an instrument of national policy lies at the heart of national image theorizing even though few proponents of the idea have been willing to espouse unilateral general disarmament. Military force itself tends to be at the root of the international relations problem in the eyes of the advocates of national image.

Thus it can be concluded that each of these three basic theories of national security is at base in conflict with each of the others, even though few persons seek to apply any one of them to the exclusion of the other two. We also may

surmise that the attempt to use a little bit of each in the creation and justification of a U.S. national security policy for today's world guarantees the continuance of a form of debate that cannot lead to a consensus. Such consensus on national security remains unreachable so long as different national leaders hold in differing degrees to basic premises that defy being melded.

NOTE

1. The terms "appeasement theory of war" and "strategic value theory" as used in this essay are taken from James Payne, *The American Threat* (Chicago: Markham, 1970).

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WASHINGTON ALUMNI MEETING

Approximately 75 Naval War College alumni stationed in the Washington area met for lunch at the Arlington Hall Officers' Club on 30 June and heard Vice Admiral Stockdale, president of the college, tell of programs initiated in Newport this past year.

The meeting was conceived and arranged by Army Col. Paul Hurley, College of Naval Warfare 1976, with the assistance of Dean of Students Capt. Dave Denton. Some informal photographs taken at the meeting are included here. Another luncheon is planned to be held at Fort Myer in October in an attempt to keep graduates informed of college events and to elicit their comments regarding the college's curriculum.

Admiral Stockdale, stressing the desire of the college to "keep in touch with our graduates," discussed curriculum revisions, an expanded electives program for the Class of 1979, and the recent establishment of the Cooperative Masters Degree Program with the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School.

Graduates in Washington and in other areas of high alumni concentration who are interested in alumni meetings should call the new Dean of Students, Captain Al Kruger, at 401-841-3262 (AVN 948-3262).

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Mr. Frederic D. Hosford, Central Intelligence Agency
Commander Joseph S. Hurlburt, U.S. Navy
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Colonel Arthur M. Bergman, U.S. Marine Corps

William Snowden Sims Award

Commander Robert E. Curtis, U.S. Navy

Admiral Richard G. Colbert Memorial Prize Essay

Captain William F. Fahey, U.S. Navy

### J. William Middendorf II Award for Advanced Research

Lieutenant Colonel Gerald P. Schurtz, U.S. Army
Lieutenant Colonel Frederick J. McConville, U.S. Army
Major Henry J. Lowe, U.S. Army
Major James J. Steele, U.S. Army

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THE BAROMETER

(Dr. John Tashjean comments on a "Review" article question regarding the mission of Task Force 74 in the Indian Ocean in 1971.)

"What was TF 74 going to do if India did choose to continue the war, and why operate in the Bay of Bengal rather than the Arabian Sea if the deterrence mission was in the West rather than in the East?" This excellent question about the role of Task Force 74 in the Indo-Pakistani War of December 1971 was asked by Lieutenant Commander McGruther in this *Review* 4 years ago.[1] So far, it appears, no answer has emerged in the literature.

We may therefore take note of a possible answer that, however plausible, is so tentative as to constitute only an hypothesis worth further examination. For convenience I call this hypothesis "the Palit solution."[2]

The Palit solution of McGruther's problem is simple: neither Pakistan nor the United States expected India to engage in blitzkrieg in East Pakistan. So TF 74 was dispatched to the Bay of Bengal, only to find a *fait accompli*. The Indian dash to Dacca in a dozen days effectively preempted a naval presence mission.

These bare bones of the Palit solution must be fleshed out by one important allegation of Palit's: the deployment of East Pakistani ground forces, stretched out in hedgehogs all along their border, played perfectly into the hands of LTG J.S. Aurora of the Indian Army, the author of its blitzkrieg plan.

Readers of Manstein's *Lost Victories* will recall the clear parallel of Polish deployment in 1939.

How naval presence and attempted blitzkrieg might have interacted had the East Pakistani posture been different; how events might have unfolded had escalation been permitted to TF 74—these questions are well beyond the scope of this brief note. Palit, relying on National Security Council records published in this country, asserts that the declaratory mission of TF 74, namely evacuation, was a cover for a presence mission. The complexities and opportunities of evacuation, from Saigon to Zaire, are also beyond our scope. *Decent Interval* has not, it seems, deterred the Europeans.

As though this were not complex enough, there is also a puzzle within the puzzle. By the fall of 1971 informed American circles knew that there were Indian "hawks" advocating a quick war.[3] Even so it would appear that the contingency of an Indian blitzkrieg was not taken seriously, or at least not with respect to East Pakistan alone. The rapid military clinching of a protracted regional disaffiliation defines, as we see in retrospect, the blitzkrieg that gave birth to Bangladesh. "The inclusion of the less-developed world in the strategic picture entailed . . . the extension of the list of actors to the sub-national level, for the unitary nation is a peculiarly modern European phenomenon."[4]

Given a two-tier system of national powers outclassing states of third and fourth military rank, blitzkrieg solutions

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must be assumed to be of interest to second and third rank powers seeking a decisive regional rearrangement prior to superpower intervention. General Palit is explicit about the calculations of world politics that went into the making of Mrs. Gandhi's command decision. And students of personality theory interested in Indo-European names will be aware that Mrs. Gandhi is named after Indra, the god of war.[5]

NOTES

1. Kenneth R. McGruther, "The Role of Perception in Naval Diplomacy," *Naval War College Review*, September-October 1974, pp. 3-20.

2. After Major-General D.K. Palit, *The Lightning Campaign: the Indo-Pakistan War 1971* (New Delhi: Thomson Press India Ltd., 1972).

3. "... As the flood of East Pakistani refugees into West Bengal continues, further destabilizing the Indian economy and the politics and society of West Bengal, the Indian hawks' argument—that a quick war will cost less than the indefinite political and economic burden of the refugees and the guerrilla war—becomes to them more telling. As of this writing (late October 1971) it appears that Mrs. Gandhi has chosen to escalate covert military aid to the Bangla Desh guerrillas rather than give in to the hawks' pressure to attack Pakistan, thus avoiding worsening India's international position and especially antagonizing Moscow, while putting the onus on Pakistan to attack India. Even so, one wonders how long she will be able to hold out against war. Border tension is reportedly rising." William E. Griffith, *The Great Globe Transformed III, The Indo-Pakistani Crisis* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Center for International Studies, 28 October 1971), C/71-17, pp. 6f.

4. J.E. Tashjean, "Modern Forms of Conflict," *Journal of the RUSI*, December 1977, p. 21.

5. Frank D. Balog, "An Assessment of the Relevance of the Comparative Mythology of Georges Dumézil for Political Thought," *Revue européenne des sciences sociales* (Geneva), v. XII, no. 33 (1974), p. 198.

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
PROFESSIONAL READING

REVIEW ARTICLES

The Pearl Harbor Attack:

Admiral Yamamoto's Fundamental Concept

with reference to Paul S. Dull's

A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941-1945)

by

Professor Jun Tsunoda, Kokushikan University, Tokyo

and

Admiral Kazutomi Uchida, JMSDF (Ret.)

*A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941-1945)** is the first precise and faithful English language reconstruction of official Japanese accounts of World War II in the Pacific. Students of history and Japanese Navy survivors of that war will certainly be unanimous in appreciating the fidelity of the account, an account from which they can discuss and organize the war's strategic, tactical, as well as logistics lessons. Readers may see in the battles the influence of Mahan whose theories the Japanese Navy had evidently treasured, but they will also observe a strong recurrence of and reference to the doctrines of Sun Tzu that were popular with and ingrained into the structure and thinking of the Japanese Navy.

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*Paul S. Dull, *A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941-1945)* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1978), 402pp.

Prompted by a reading of this book and because it may be of some interest to the readers of the book (and this journal), we should like to take this opportunity to introduce some of Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto's fundamental concepts in the strategic decisions leading to the air attack on Pearl Harbor.

On 7 January 1941, Admiral Yamamoto left with Vice Adm. Teikichi Hori, a Naval Academy classmate, an envelope containing memos of his proposals to Adm. Koshirō Oikawa, the Navy Minister.* Attached to the envelope was a request that the envelope be kept sealed until the situation necessitated that it be opened. It was locked in the safe of the Vice Minister of the Navy, Vice Admiral Sawamoto.

On 18 May 1943, one month after Admiral Yamamoto's death in Bougainville Island, Admiral Hori opened the

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*Originals held by War History Division, Defense College, Japanese Defense Agency.

envelope. He, however, sealed and locked it again in the safe and, except for opening it at one time to show it to Adm. Mineichi Koga, the successor of Admiral Yamamoto, Commander in Chief Combined Fleet, it was not opened again until 9 November 1949 when he finally released the memos to the public.

The reasons for his prudence, he wrote, were as follows:

1. During the war, curiosity concerning who might be given credit—or blame—for the Pearl Harbor assault grew strong. Admiral Hori, on behalf of Admiral Yamamoto, wanted to avoid involvement in the controversy. Furthermore, he thought it important to avoid fostering the opinion that Admiral Yamamoto had held a plan contrary to the navy's traditional ambush tactics in the West Pacific theater. He worried that that might confuse the Japanese Navy's military concepts.

2. After the end of the war, it was feared that the memos might be used to paint Admiral Yamamoto as a leading jingoist and to blame him for the surprise attack. Admiral Hori therefore thought it necessary to defer their release until public acceptability appeared more probable.

3. Various war reports and magazines began to be published as the social situation stabilized and Admiral Hori recognized that it would not be long before the documents of Admiral Yamamoto would be required as part of the historical record. To provide for this requirement he made copies of Yamamoto's memos in 1949. He did not neglect, however, to put his comments on them in order to discharge his obligation to a classmate who had entrusted him with those memoranda.*

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*Admiral Hori's comments are preserved with the Yamamoto Memos in the War History Division, Defense College, Japanese Defense Agency.

The Outline of Yamamoto's Memos. Admiral Yamamoto's proposals to Admiral Oikawa are composed of five paragraphs whose essential points are summarized as follows:

1. Preparation of equipment.

The Combined Fleet has already submitted its list of required weapons and ammunition but in the event of emergency it will certainly need more, particularly aircraft, as well as manpower to handle them. Emphasis should therefore be placed on the mass management of those weapon systems.

2. Training.

Training of the fleet to date in most cases has been directed toward the tactical concept of waiting for and fighting the enemy in the West Pacific. Each component force should solve the problems of its individual mission under this basic strategy. It would not be useless, of course, to exercise in order to improve their tactical and joint operational capabilities.

Practically, however, it is not considered that decisive combined-force battles against the U.S. or U.K. Fleets will always take place, nor that the classic series of approach, deployment, gunfire and torpedo attack and then a rush by the total force will always be possible. Admiral Yamamoto believes instead that he must concentrate on separate smaller unit tactics that have been neglected in the past.

In this program, the skill level of each ship and aircraft must be fully inspected and encouraged. In 1940, the English and Italian Fleets met and fought each other for 25 minutes in the Mediterranean with no loss to either side. It was not because of their lack of fighting spirit and technical skill however, and these are elements that Japan should never underestimate.

3. Fundamental courses of action.

In the past the Japanese Navy never has won war games that required her to adopt wait-and-react tactics in the Western Pacific. The navy must avoid such an operation in an actual war.

The proper question is how to attack and thoroughly destroy the main body of the enemy fleet in the first moments of the war—annihilating the enemy's military and national morale and thus preventing it from recovering from its vital damage. With this success and a subsequent defensive posture in the Far East, Japan might be able to obtain her goals and secure the peace in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

4. Operation plan.

The Russo-Japanese War has given the Japanese Navy some good lessons on the necessity of the successful first blow. Studies have suggested that (a) the quick assault to the Russian main body by Japan was quite effective and influential to the ultimate victory; (b) night operation of the torpedo squadron, on the other hand, was not satisfactory; (c) the blockade of harbors was deficient in its planning as well as in its execution. Learning from these lessons, operations plans must be so formulated that Japan can ensure an ultimate victory by making a daring attack on the first day of war.

Under this principle, (a) operations should include an assault on Pearl Harbor first of all by the air forces, and then blockade it by submarines, (b) forces allocated for this mission should be the 1st and 2nd Air Squadrons (at least the 2nd Squadron), one torpedo squadron, one submarine squadron and several oilers; and, (c) if the enemy leaves Hawaii earlier in order to conduct a concentrated first attack on the Japanese Fleet, only then should we wait and fight them in the Western Pacific.

Following the early assault principle, enemy air forces located in the Philippines and Singapore must be caught and destroyed in concert with the above operations directed against the fleet.

If the Hawaii assault ends in large success, antagonistic forces in the West Pacific will also quickly lose their morale and durability to cope with us. Should Japan hesitate to attack Pearl Harbor, worrying about possible heavy damage to her own forces, and continue crouching in the Far East, the enemy would proceed to Japan to bomb and burn down the cities, which inevitably will cause the Japanese Navy to draw back its forces or prevent them from advancing to the South Pacific to secure oil. In this situation, we see very little hope to win the game.

5. Personnel.

Admiral Yamamoto has earnestly requested that he be the Commander in Chief of the assault forces and that the Combined Fleet be commanded by another admiral. [He in fact recommended Adm. Mitsumasa Yonai, who was the Minister of the Navy under whom Yamamoto served as Vice Minister.]

Comments by Admiral Hori. Admiral Hori's annotation on the Yamamoto memos emphasized the following points:

1. Admiral Yamamoto's views on the situation and on his responsibility: He did not want to take drastic measures against the United States. He strongly opposed the Tripartite Treaty and war against the United Kingdom and the United States. He eagerly wished for a peaceful solution to the questions between those countries and Japan.

He held a firm belief, on the other hand, that because he was the Commander in Chief Combined Fleet, he must wholeheartedly devote himself for

the sake of his nation in an emergency even if personally he did not want to fight.

2. Operational concept. He kept in his mind a different concept of strategy from that which had been esteemed to be authoritative for the past. In fact, the traditional scenario of the navy had been (a) the occupation of the Philippines; (b) to meet and fight an attrition war along the Mariana Islands against the U.S. Fleet which would be heading west for the rescue of the Philippines; (c) to concentrate Japan's Fleet for a decisive fleet war against the enemy, and annihilate them.

The lessons of the Jutland Sea battle in 1916 seemed to underlie this concept. Every naval exercise had been arranged under this hypothesis.

He believed, however, that a strategy of this sort, when accepted as a fundamental concept, is apt to become much too formal and structured for practical use. Ascribing only one course of action to a foe is in no doubt dangerous. In order to be able to wipe out enemy forces on the scene, strategic and tactical flexibility is paramount. In exercises, furthermore, inspection of all details, including the shooting techniques of the crew members, should be greatly encouraged. Training must be realistic, not make-believe.

Admiral Yamamoto, in fear of chronic dogmatism in the Navy, tried to weed it out. When he was appointed Vice Minister of the Navy in 1936, he, with the close cooperation of Vice Admiral Koga, Vice Chief of Navy General Staff, endeavored to breathe fresh air into the offices and in fact did motivate some conceptual improvement.

Their efforts continued after the two admirals transferred to the First and Second Fleets in 1939, and the situation had changed a great deal by the middle of 1940. Still, Admiral Yamamoto appears to have felt there was much room for fresh thought. As an example

of the need, at some prewar game study an officer made a comment that the U.S. Fleet might not always proceed to the Philippines for its rescue but might make a surprise thrust directly to the Japanese archipelago; that Japan should not adhere too rigidly to the campaign for the occupation of the Philippines. An instructing officer representing the General Staff Office insisted that the occupation of the Philippines was the settled program which had been developed with the cooperation of the army and that it was beyond criticism. He added that the purpose of the exercise was to unify the concept of naval operations.

3. Fundamental strategy against the United States. The Japanese people forgot to pay serious attention to the grave meaning of "staking her national destiny." We should not have staked our national destiny on such ideals as "New Order of the Orient" or "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." Such slogans must not be used except in case of legal self-defense. [sic!]

The war against the United States was such a decisive one that Japan was really required to stake her destiny. It would not have been difficult, however, for those who had studied world history from the viewpoint of national power, to predict the consequence of the war. There were incomparable differences between the two countries with respect to the national resources, economic power, industrial capabilities, etc. In particular, U.S. air power was overwhelmingly greater in quantity, quality, and destructive capability when compared with that of Japan.

Admiral Yamamoto had well known the difficulty of war against the United States. What he really meant when he proposed the air raid on Pearl Harbor was that if Japan conceived the war to be unavoidable, the Navy must attack Hawaii; if that attack was impossible, the war must be given up. Sneaking deception was no part of the basis of his

military plan. His assault plan reads, "We will make a storming assault (or a surprising attack) against the enemy in the moonlight or dawn." It meant that he had planned a storming assault but if he were lucky enough, he would also have the advantage of surprise. This was why he sincerely wanted to command the expeditionary forces to accomplish his aim by himself.

The Navy General Staff Office did not initially agree with the Pearl Harbor attack plan because of its risky feasibility. Adm. Osami Nagano, the Chief of the Naval General Staff did, however, eventually approve it and allocated six aircraft carriers for the operation. But the Navy Minister did not accept Admiral Yamamoto's request to be the Commander in Chief of the attack forces, and Vice Adm. Chuichi Nagumo commanded them.

The key problem for the Japanese Navy to solve was how to take a gigantic task force, in secret, to far away Pearl Harbor. It was not an easy task, even for a skilled navy, but Admirals Yamamoto and Nagumo did it well.

The air assault on Pearl Harbor concentrated on ships and aircraft and only incidentally damaged such facilities as repair shops, dockyards, oil tanks, etc., a fact with which Admiral Yamamoto utterly was dissatisfied. Those surviving facilities greatly contributed to the quick recovery from the damage.

There will be another charge, Admiral Hori remarks, that if Admiral Yamamoto opposed the war against the United States and the United Kingdom, he should have rejected any directives, even the Emperor's order, to open fire.

Frankly, however, military forces exist in order to discharge their duty when directed. Military men, particularly Japanese, must not resign for personal reasons once they have received the supreme order. Such is their identity. Admiral Yamamoto in fact left a *waka* which says, "Though I face hundreds of thousands of adversaries, I will resolutely go to battle, taking an oath of allegiance to our Emperor." Another says, "What does the world think? I do not care nor for my life for I am the sword of my Emperor."

Admiral Hori added, in closing his comments, that he did not wish to exaggerate nor distort the partial facts in pleading Admiral Yamamoto's "case." He earnestly wished instead that the readers of Admiral Yamamoto's memos would be able to understand better what those memos were intended to explain.

It is interesting that a rumor of the Pearl Harbor attack was given to the U.S. Ambassador by a Peruvian diplomat shortly after Admiral Yamamoto briefed his plan to Admiral Oikawa. On 27 January 1941 the Ambassador reported to the Secretary of State:

> My Peruvian colleague told a member of my staff that he had heard from many sources including a Japanese source that the Japanese military forces planned, in the event of trouble with the U.S., to attempt a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor using all of their military facilities.*

He added that although the project seemed fantastic the fact that he had heard it from many sources prompted him to pass on the information.

It is further quite interesting that although the rumor was rather popular, it *was* considered fantastic by people at that time. It certainly was a blind spot although the attack idea was not really new among the naval officers.

While Admiral Yamamoto was the force behind the preparation of the assault plan, the concept did not originate with him. The same tactics are discussed in a 1936 draft paper by an instructor at the Japanese Naval War

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*Foreign Relations of the U.S., 1941, Vol. 4, "The Far East," p. 17.

College.* In addition to that, on 7 February 1932, U.S. Admiral Yarnell conducted an exercise attack on Pearl Harbor, 30 minutes before sunrise, by 152 aircraft launched from U.S.S. *Saratoga* and *Lexington*. That exercise attack ended up in a great success for the "attackers."**

Not everyone agrees with Admiral Hori that Yamamoto's plan was best in the given circumstance. Some argue that the method and location of the attack gave the U.S. Government a rallying point around which public opinion, heretofore fragmented, could be unified. The critics also maintain that Admiral Yamamoto's plan centered on the decisive fleet battle, a concept whose possible adverse results were quite contrary to affording the protracted war.

These last opinions have, of course, logical inconsistencies. First, Admiral Yamamoto's view was that in order to obtain oil Japan had no choice but to go to the Netherlands East Indies. To do so

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*Original held by War History Division, Defense College, Japanese Defense Agency.

**Noboru Kojima, *8th December 1941* (Tokyo: Shinchō-sha, 1962).

they must, first of all, clear both sides of the route to the south, which meant the occupation of the Philippines as well as of Singapore. As this course of action and the resulting war declarations against the United States and the United Kingdom were unavoidable, their public opinion toward Japan could no longer be considered vital to Japan. Second, the attack on Pearl Harbor was not an example of a decisive fleet battle but rather was a graduated measure based on the doctrine of offensive tactics in a defensive strategy in an effort to permit the endurance of a protracted war.

How a war is fought will, in the end, rest upon the leader's perspective and personality. The Pearl Harbor assault could never be guaranteed as the only or best solution of Japan's then contemporary grand strategy. The wait-and-react strategy in the Far East theater which had long been cherished by the Navy might have been more trustworthy, had solution of its defects been accomplished.

What is most important is not to force the matter into a single answer. An inquiring attitude is most requisite in order to reap a rich and substantial harvest of the study of the Pearl Harbor assault.

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY

Faulty Rationale for Current Practice

by

Alex A. Vardamis

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army

Few works have so conspicuously influenced American nuclear planning as Henry Kissinger's *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*. Published in 1957, it was the book of the hour with Congress, the State Department, the Pentagon and President Eisenhower himself. Written for the Council on Foreign Relations, it appeared at the perfect moment to gain acceptance, for it synthesized ideas that were already current in Washington, but which had not yet been articulated within such a persuasive intellectual and historical framework.

Although the book deals with many facets of policy, its most controversial chapter, the one that received the greatest attention from the Eisenhower administration, argues that limited nuclear war, particularly in Western Europe, should be a strategic option for the United States. This was not a new idea, but it arrived at a convenient time for opponents of Dulles' strategy of massive retaliation; attempting to convince the Administration of the need for U.S. limited-war forces, they seized on the work to support their arguments. As pointed out in a *New York Times* article of 11 August 1957, officials at the highest governmental levels were interested in the concept of limited nuclear war and that the lead in the debate had been taken by "scholar Kissinger" and his new book.[1] *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, which was on the best-seller list for 14 weeks, rapidly became the single most authoritative document on limited nuclear war. Perhaps more significantly, it ultimately vaulted Henry Kissinger on his way to un- paralleled levels of power and prestige in U.S. foreign affairs.

Not everyone was convinced by Kissinger's conclusions, and many found his notion that nuclear war could be controlled to be extremely dangerous. Dean Acheson was appalled by the book. He wrote: "Quite apart from its military impracticability, our allies would see at once that the proposed strategy would consign them to a fate more devastating than would compliance with the demands of the Soviet Union."[2] Paul Nitze criticized Dr. Kissinger's futuristic vision of a "little nuclear war." More was required, he felt, than a "Rube Goldberg chart of arbitrary limitations, weightless weapons, flying platforms with no fuel requirements, and tactics based on no targets for attack and no logistic or communication vulnerabilities to defend."[3] James King, writing in the *New Republic*, found Kissinger's conclusions to be based upon a

> uniquely fragile argument . . . and upon an imaginative picture of nuclear ground tactics that seems . . . to leave out some essential facts. The picture is supposed to show that tactical nuclear combat need not prove intolerably destructive of the combatants. This picture needs the closest examination.

And although King praised Kissinger's "brilliantly developed theory of limited war," he declared that the book contained "many inadequacies." "Surely," he wrote, "Kissinger is not asking the German people to believe they would be

spared destruction in limited war . . . ."[4]

But most reviews were favorable. August Heckscher, in *Saturday Review,* wrote that

the book has already become something of a classic in the field . . . . Here is the great subject of war and peace set forth in the round, with its interrelated factors kept steadily in perspective, with its feasible choices patiently and imaginatively explored. Apart from the great service it has undoubtedly rendered at the official level, the book has served the vital purpose of restoring to laymen the possibility of thinking meaningfully about the things upon which life and civilization depend.[5]

Hans Morgenthau found the book answered "the questions everybody is asking: how can a nation defend its interests in the atomic age without destroying itself and civilization in the process?"[6] *Newsweek* declared the work to be "must reading for United States government officials."[7] Perhaps the most effusive and simplistic praise came from *Time:* "In the Pentagon, the State Department, the White House, top United States policymakers are earnestly debating a new book, a brilliant, independent analysis of the nation's post war diplomatic and military struggle with communism." Kissinger "gets and deserves high marks from . . . top policymakers and military men." With a flourish of admiration, *Time's* reviewer concluded:

It takes a firm hand and steady nerves to face a small-war challenge, to resist the outcries against atomic weapons, and to confront the enemy with the choice of backing down or risking all-out war . . . . At a time when public apathy, disarmament talk and budget mindedness are being felt in the scales of U.S. policy . . . Kissinger has brought fresh ideas to weigh.[8]

Such enthusiasm over the prospect of any war, let alone a nuclear one, seems dangerously naive, in view of our experiences of the past two decades. Since Vietnam the desirability of U.S. involvement in limited conventional warfare has been seriously questioned. Of course, limited *nuclear* war was never tested in Vietnam. Possibly some may argue that had U.S. forces been armed with small-yield nuclear weapons, the outcome would have been more favorable to the United States. In any event, the thousands of American tactical nuclear weapons in Europe indicate that the United States remains committed to the concept of limited nuclear warfare. Yet a widespread suspicion exists that densely populated Europe is the least appropriate arena for even a limited nuclear exchange. The debate is far from over. In fact, it is perhaps approaching a new period of prominence. European reluctance to accept deployment of the neutron bomb illustrates the growing concern in NATO over the dangers of a nuclear confrontation with the Warsaw Pact. Civilian strategists and military planners are once again questioning the purpose of the American tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, alleged to be so essential to Western Defense. Insofar as *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, which articulated the rationale for stationing nuclear weapons in Europe, stands largely unamended after 20 years, it now seems necessary to reexamine its conclusions. A retrospective book review can perhaps shed new light on one of the most far-reaching military debates of the 1950s; it might also suggest that revision in our nuclear arsenal in NATO is in order. It is time to reexamine whether Kissinger is the drummer to whom we should have marched.

Kissinger perceived, in 1957, that the United States was in a life-or-death struggle with the Soviet Union. The contest was ideological, political, economic, and military; the enemy was

monolithic, unscrupulous, and totally dedicated to the overthrow of the Western world. And the West was losing the battle. The irony of our retreat was that we possessed a weapon Promethean in magnitude but found ourselves unable to use it because no single Soviet provocation seemed to warrant such a drastic response as thermonuclear war. Our strategic nuclear arsenal, wedded to the doctrine of massive retaliation, was so terrifying, so threatening to the existence of life on earth, that we were paralyzed into inaction. From time to time we made bullying threats of massive destruction which clearly bore little relationship to the minor skirmishes all over the globe by which the Soviets were seen to be nibbling us to death. Incrementally, through internal subversion and limited war, in small struggles that never seemed sufficiently grave to risk all-out war, the Soviets were relentlessly pursuing their goal.

Kissinger, writing to effect new policy, explained that there should be a choice between thermonuclear war and surrender, a middle ground which offered new alternatives. "No more urgent task confronts American policy than to bring our power into balance," he wrote.[9] His solution was to make the power fit the situation; to scale our nuclear response to the level of aggression; to "create alternatives less cataclysmic than a thermonuclear war."[10] If the Soviets pursued limited war, we should have the capability to counter with limited nuclear war. Kissinger explained that because of America's economic, technological, moral, and psychological strengths, we held a clear advantage over the Soviet Union in a limited nuclear confrontation. He was writing, of course, when Soviet intercontinental capability was negligible, and when Soviet tactical nuclear weapons were practically nonexistent, a sharp contrast to the situation today.

Clearly, the service best suited to implement limited nuclear war was the

Army. Far too much reliance had been placed on SAC. What was needed, Kissinger decided, were small, mobile, self-contained nuclear ground units, employing tactics based on speed, surprise, and the overwhelming firepower of nuclear weapons. Such units would neutralize the superiority in manpower of the Soviet Union. This part of the argument was especially appealing to a budget-conscious Administration, eager to reduce the costs of maintaining large conventional ground forces in Europe. It was politically convenient to learn that the United States could maintain its defense commitments, at the same time realizing large savings in dollars and manpower, by substituting small "atomic units" for conventional ground troops.

Another attractive aspect of Kissinger's book, for those disturbed by the influence of the Strategic Air Command on national policy, was his rationale for returning the vast nuclear power of the United States to political control. Too long, Kissinger argued, nuclear policy had been dominated by Air Force generals. His goal was to bring that power under the control of diplomats and to relate it to specific diplomatic objectives. What was needed, he wrote, was a "strategic doctrine which gives our diplomacy the greatest freedom of action."[11] The measured, deliberate and limited application of nuclear weapons, always as an extension of politics, underlies his theory of limited war. Kissinger believed, however, that politicians should not shrink from the prospect of using nuclear weapons, for they represented the ultimate extension of national power. Each "small" mushroom cloud could become the equivalent of a diplomatic exchange which would serve to inform an opponent that we had great power, that we were willing to use it, and that there was more where that came from. But the decision to use such weapons had to reside in the hands of the political

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leadership. Nuclear weapons were much too powerful, to paraphrase Clemenceau, to be entrusted to the military.

Since the end of World War II, the U.S. Military Establishment, for a variety of reasons, had played an ever-decreasing role in the formulation of strategic concepts. A large and growing number of civilian strategic theorists, frequently university-based, had taken the initiative in establishing the directions for U.S. military doctrine. The military professional had played, at best, a secondary, consultative role. That Kissinger, a university professor in 1957, prescribed a theoretical framework for limited nuclear war, was not unusual. It was remarkable, though, that an academic with extremely limited military and scientific background presumed to deal with specific tactical, technological, and operational questions. With considerable arrogance, Kissinger explained why he felt it was necessary to instruct military professionals in their own specialty. American generals were locked into a World War II mentality. They erroneously believed that the next war would begin with a surprise attack on the continental United States. Their principal characteristics, he concluded, were a reliance on tradition and a lack of versatility and imagination. They seemed unable to recognize that nuclear weapons had revolutionized warfare and that total victory, in a military sense, was no longer possible. The military had to learn to settle for limited objectives and to scale its response to an appropriate level of destructiveness. In the nuclear age, battles would approach "the stylized contests of the feudal period which served as much as a test of will as a trial of strength." If the U.S. Army could learn to follow Kissinger's guidelines, the advantage in a limited nuclear war would fall preponderantly to the United States. But if the military failed to heed his advice, such a war could end in disaster:

... Unless they [nuclear weapons] are coupled with sophisticated delivery means, highly complex communications systems and appropriate tactics, it will be difficult to utilize them effectively. Unless the whole military establishment is geared to nuclear tactics, nuclear war becomes a highly dangerous adventure.[12]

In *Necessity for Choice* (1961) Kissinger seemed to abandon his strategy of limited nuclear war, primarily because the Army was unable to implement a tactical doctrine based on his earlier guidelines. He had also come to believe that we were probably incapable of keeping a nuclear war limited for very long. But he returned to his original opinion in 1962. In an article in *Foreign Affairs*, "The Unsolved Problems of European Defense," he again argued that tactical nuclear weapons could be used most effectively on the NATO battlefield. Although the services were still remiss in failing to implement his model, Kissinger remained convinced that his concept of limited nuclear war remained sound. Because nuclear weapons were crucial to a defense of Western Europe, the Army's inability to grasp the new and daring form of warfare had to be overcome.

Kissinger proposed to replace the military "Maginot Line mentality" with what frequently seems a Star Wars fantasy. His strategy of limited nuclear war was based on a technology of science fiction that, 20 years later, still seems unrealizable. By focusing on Kissinger's advice, comparing his vision of 1957 with the reality of 1978, we can begin to understand why there is a growing uneasiness in NATO over the entire prospect of fighting a limited nuclear war in Europe. Kissinger's instructions on nuclear tactics and organization, his assessment of military technology, and his evaluation of American character superiority on the nuclear battlefield, seem, in retrospect, not only

superficial and occasionally absurd, but also, when we realize that we are reading a prime example of the rationale that underlies our current Army nuclear force in NATO, deeply unsettling.

Nuclear Unit Organization. Kissinger began his instructions with an organizational scheme for nuclear units:

> The tactics for limited nuclear war should be based on small, highly mobile, self-contained units, relying largely on air transport, even within the combat zone. The units should be small, because with nuclear weapons firepower does not depend on numbers and because a reduction in the size of the target will place an upper limit on the power of the weapons it is profitable to employ against it. The units must be mobile, because when anything that can be detected can be destroyed, the ability to hide by constantly shifting position is an essential defense. The units should be self-contained, because the cumbersome supply system of World War II is far too vulnerable to interdiction.[13]

There is little similarity between Kissinger's organizational theory and present-day fact. NATO ground-delivery nuclear forces are relatively large, somewhat cumbersome, and dependent on considerable external support. Why is this the case? Is the military petulantly dragging its feet? Or is there a solid reality that stands in the way of Kissinger's prescription?

Part of the answer lies in the physical characteristics of U.S. Army tactical nuclear weapons. They consist primarily of nuclear projectiles designed to be fired at ranges of a few miles from 155-millimeter or 8-inch howitzers; warheads launched at medium ranges (less than 100 miles) by rocket or missile: the Honest John, the Sergeant, and their newest replacement, the Lance; the rela-

tively immobile Nike Hercules, a nuclear air defense system; the complex Pershing, which fires larger yield warheads (up to a few hundred kilotons) several hundred miles; and finally, atomic demolitions which can be thought of as nuclear landmines. Most of these weapons are physically unwieldy; some of them, such as the 8-inch howitzer nuclear projectile, require complicated assembly; many of them are large, particularly the Honest John, Sergeant, and Nike Hercules. And when the warhead is relatively simple and small, such as the 155-millimeter nuclear projectile, it is fired from a delivery system of World War II vintage. Atomic demolitions, which are physically emplaced at the desired point of detonation, could be moved around by small, mobile units. But they, like all nuclear weapons, require protection by an extensive array of security forces.

All U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe are currently stored in highly protected storage sites far distant, in most cases, from their actual field deployment area. Nuclear storage sites are easily identifiable, for they are ringed with double fences, brightly illuminated at night, and bristling with security guards. In peacetime, nuclear weapons are rarely removed from their secure bunkers. When they are, it is in small numbers for maintenance purposes, or for evacuation prior to shipment back to the United States. Weapons are not moved for exercise purposes. Should actual field deployment of nuclear weapons to wartime field storage sites be ordered in a period of increased mobilization, they would be, for the most part, transported on large motor convoys, accompanied by heavily armed security troops and by vehicle-mounted communication systems. On the road, these convoys would be easily identifiable, slow-moving, and vulnerable to air or ground attacks. When they reached their field storage sites, in some forest, along a wood line, or in a deserted farm complex, a tem-

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porary depot consisting of perhaps several dozen nuclear warheads would have to be established. The security problems would be immense. These temporary sites would be tempting targets for espionage, sabotage, or small, local ground attacks.

Extending beyond the immediate vicinity of the nuclear delivery unit and its storage site is a complex and far-reaching communication system extending back to additional security forces, to operational headquarters, and eventually, to the President of the United States, who, under existing law, alone has the authority to order the release of nuclear weapons. At each field storage site, therefore, an elaborate communication center would have to be established linking that location with the nuclear release chain. By simply combining the security forces, the radios, the nuclear weapons, the delivery vehicles, and the support troops, one begins to appreciate the difficulties of moving nuclear weapons around the tactical battlefield.

Tactics and Technology. Kissinger seemed to rely upon technological breakthroughs that would improve the mobility of nuclear units. But he was not writing for the distant future, but for the here and now. NATO forces have had to make do with currently available equipment and not with esoteric science-fiction possibilities. Kissinger theorized:

These tactics will require a radical break with our traditional notions of warfare and military organizations. The army has already made a start by reorganizing some of its divisions each into five self-contained combat teams. It stresses the development of troop-carrying helicopters, and even the individual soldier in some units has been given a rudimentary ability to transport himself through the air by means of the "flying platform."[14]

The Pentomic Division Kissinger referred to simply did not work. Separated into five combat teams, the organization was too large and unwieldy to be controlled by a single division headquarters. And the combat teams were too small to sustain independent operations without extensive logistical support. Although the Pentomic Division looked good on paper, it rapidly became apparent in practice that nuclear operations demanded centralized control. Five combat teams overtaxed the command and control capability of a single division headquarters. The Pentomic Division was disbanded and the Army returned to the traditional three-brigade division.

Kissinger apparently visualized soldiers flying off on individual platforms, with nuclear weapons tucked in their rucksacks. Without intending to ridicule his concept of flying platforms, it might be instructive to take it one step further, to imagine that a technological breakthrough made flying platforms available for the nuclear battlefield and to visualize what such a nuclear force would be like. First of all, rudimentary nuclear security, command and control requirements would prohibit any lone individual from possessing a nuclear weapon. He would have to be joined by a second soldier on a flying platform to satisfy the "two-man" rule. What would be on adjoining platforms? A heavily armed infantry platoon to provide security; a radio to provide a secure link to the nuclear release net; another radio for the unit's operational net; metal containers carrying release codes; explosives to destroy the weapon should capture be imminent; rolls of concertina to ring the perimeter as soon as the weapon-carrying platform landed. In the near vicinity would be a security company with machineguns, grenades, and automatic rifles to reinforce the accompanying security platoon in case of attack.

Unlikely as such a picture of flying platforms may be, it does point out a fundamental problem concerning nuclear delivery units. They have to be so large to satisfy command, control, custody, and security requirements that they are easy to detect, slow-moving and vulnerable.

Or did Kissinger mean that the lone soldier, skimming the treetops with his atomic arsenal in his weapons pouch, should be permitted to wage nuclear war independently? Certainly it seems politically and psychologically infeasible that the U.S. Government, or any nation, would permit one individual, whether an 18-year old private, a veteran sergeant, or an aging general, to assume the responsibility for nuclear warfare. Kissinger's admiration for the proverbial initiative of the individual GI in World War II was apparently boundless. Of course, it might be argued that the individual's nuclear ammunition would be of such low yield that there would be no danger of a berserk "flier" doing irreparable damge. The argument comes full circle. Why, then, make the weapon nuclear?

But beyond the question of trust, there is the problem of this lone soldier falling into enemy hands. Again the experience in Vietnam illustrates the vulnerability of slow-moving, low-flying craft. If a helicopter was an easy target, how much more so would a flying GI?

Kissinger, dissatisfied with the internal combustion engine, urged that science develop an alternative form of locomotion:

> Since the mobile units will not be able to rely on a logistic system of the traditional type, they should be able to carry all their supplies and maintain their own equipment. A great deal of thought will have to be given to measures for reducing the bulkiness of equipment, particularly to developing a substitute for the internal combustion engine whose demands for fuel and maintenance severely limit the range and staying power of mobile units.[15]

It need hardly be explained that should deployment to wartime field locations be ordered, thousands of nuclear warheads in NATO would be transported on vehicles powered by internal combustion engines. As of now, there are no nuclear- or solar-powered trucks available. Some warheads could be transported by helicopter, particularly those assigned to U.S. delivery units. But our NATO allies, by-and-large, are confined to truck transport. One suspects, though, that in many ways a truck convoy is perhaps no more vulnerable, in a sophisticated air defense environment, than a helicopter convoy.

As for "reducing the bulkiness of equipment," much has been done. But the logistic burdens which impede mobility have not been eliminated. One item which might be illustrative of these problems is concertina wire. When nuclear weapons are deployed outside their permanent storage depots, a defensive perimeter must be established. Concertina wire affords at least some security against infiltrators. But given an area large enough to contain several warheads, it readily becomes apparent that a self-sufficient unit must possess rolls on rolls of concertina, and trucks to transport it all. Frequently, during NATO exercises, nuclear units merely ring their simulated storage sites with white ribbon to lend some sense of reality to the proceedings. Either they lack the concertina, or the transport trucks. The difficulty of moving concertina is merely symptomatic of the logistic problems of nuclear units. In order to be self-contained they are no longer small nor mobile.

As has been stated, a nuclear unit on the move must, of necessity, include a large number of trucks, jeeps, communication vans and other vehicles. It is inevitably vulnerable to air attack. Nor

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does this vulnerability end when it reaches its field location. Careful sound and light discipline and scrupulous adherence to camouflage techniques by well-trained units, traveling only at night, can make it difficult for enemy aircraft to detect nuclear ground units. But not impossible. Survival of Army nuclear delivery units would be in jeopardy without friendly air cover. Kissinger dismissed such mundane concerns:

> The concept that air supremacy is the pre-requisite of victory and that it is achieved by bombing enemy airfields will soon be outstripped by technological developments . . . . It will then be meaningless to speak of air supremacy, in the traditional sense . . . . Even before the advent of missiles and vertical take-off aircraft, the concept of complete air supremacy will have become inconsistent with a policy of limited war.[16]

Because missiles would be "dispersed and concealed," because vertical takeoff aircraft "need no airfield" which the enemy could crater, and because deep penetration of enemy airspace might unleash a thermonuclear response, Kissinger declared air supremacy to be irrelevant in limited nuclear war. When one realistically assesses the rewards the enemy would reap by destroying nuclear delivery units and their weapons before such units are brought into firing positions, a different view of air supremacy emerges. As unlikely as a Soviet attack on Western Europe now appears, such aggression probably would be preceded by preemptive strikes, through a variety of offensive means, against all NATO nuclear sites. Enemy use of missiles and assault aircraft cannot be cavalierly discounted. Even more than in a conventional war, air supremacy, backed by a strong local air defense system, is a prerequisite to success.

As for vertical takeoff aircraft, they have not fulfilled their promise, partially because their range is extremely limited. The vast majority of NATO's tactical aircraft is very much dependent on the survivability of airfields.

Kissinger foresaw nuclear warfare obviating the need for communication centers. He explained that communication systems are vital in conventional war, because of "the large numbers of troops involved" and the "relatively small destructiveness of individual weapons." But in a limited nuclear war armies would be "mobile and self-contained" and "because command would be decentralized" the "elimination of communications centers may lose its former significance."[17]

It is difficult to understand this reasoning. In a nuclear war, communication centers must serve as connecting links with the entire release chain which stretches back to the White House. The transmission of all traffic concerning nuclear warfare flows from the continental United States to high-level military command centers, down to implementing nuclear delivery units. One could hardly imagine a more centralized, rigid structure of command and control than that demanded by nuclear warfare. Theoretically, all higher headquarters from, say, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe to battalion could be destroyed, and still the President of the United States could relay his release authority for nuclear weapons to an individual firing battery, telling them through coded message to launch a nuclear weapon, to recall it, or to destroy it in place. But the ability of the President to do this on a broad front, with major communication centers out of action, in the confusion and uncertainties of a rapidly deteriorating situation, and under the present state of communications technology, is highly doubtful. Destruction of communication centers in conventional war was serious, but not necessarily disastrous. Conventional units can continue to fight

autonomously for long periods of time, relying on local initiative and leadership. In nuclear war, on the other hand, destruction of a major communication center probably would disrupt operations for days, and could result in a paralysis of NATO forces over a large segment of the European front. Because nuclear weapons can and should be employed only with Presidential authority, a nuclear delivery unit severed from its communications links would be reduced to fighting for its own existence, unable to use the nuclear weapons in its arsenal. Or did Kissinger mean to suggest that small units retain, through a decentralized system of codes, for example, an independent capability to wage nuclear war? Nuclear proliferation, extended to hundreds of small artillery units represents a staggeringly daring concept.

Everything said thus far should indicate that security of nuclear weapons is a vital national consideration. Strict safeguards have been instituted to insure that they are protected against accident, capture, and unauthorized use. The plethora of checks, protective devices, release codes, permissive action links, self-destruct mechanisms, and the like, are not simply a reflection of the military's high standards of security and custody; they are, in large measure, the outgrowth of the immense and proper concern of the U.S. Government, over the past two decades, that nuclear weapons remain under Presidential control. Instructions are specific:

Under existing law, the President alone has the basic authority to order use of nuclear weapons . . . . Further, while NATO operational plans contemplate the assignment of U.S. theater nuclear forces to the Supreme Allied Commander [currently General Alexander Haig] in time of war, the President would retain his constitutional responsibility to control these forces and could order or

forbid the use of U.S. nuclear weapons . . . even after assignment of these forces to SACEUR.[18]

We recognize in peacetime that if checks were lax, security forces slight, and electronic and mechanical locking devices nonexistent, the dangers of unauthorized use or capture by terrorists would become unacceptable. Strict controls are no less essential in war, to insure that local forces cannot independently precipitate and wage a nuclear war. As now constituted, in numerous battlefield situations, the last vestige of American custody over a nuclear weapon would be two lonely GIs at a launcher or howitzer firing position. The codes, checks and controls keep them honest. They also protect from an ally who may have independent conceptions of what warrants the introduction of nuclear war.

The immense superstructure necessary to insure that nuclear weapons never escape political control apparently was not considered by Kissinger. How else could he have proposed the following?

Since mobile nuclear units will often be operating deep within enemy territory, they will also have to acquire an understanding of political relationships, particularly of methods of organizing and supporting partisan activities. In short, the units for nuclear war should be conceived to approximate a naval vessel as a self-contained tactical formation, but also to act as a political and military spearhead for disorganizing the enemy rear.[19]

Can we seriously envision nuclear units cast adrift "deep within enemy territory," carrying along their nuclear warheads while simultaneously organizing partisans or debating Lenin and Marx with rear-echelon Soviet troops? We might also recall that, earlier, Kissinger excluded air supremacy partially because deep aerial penetration would risk

the outbreak of thermonuclear war. Surely it is a contradiction to ignore the same risks associated with similar penetrations by "mobile nuclear units." But leaving such objections aside, one sees these Special Forces patrols with orders to destroy specific targets and disrupt the enemy rear. Such patrols would necessarily have to possess the authority to use the weapons at will. Certainly, any government, short of an absolute military dictatorship, would hesitate to transfer such power over war and peace into military hands. The last vestige of political control vanishes in Kissinger's unusual scenario.

Kissinger believed that limited nuclear war would render conventional weapons redundant. Attempting to carry along conventional weapons would, he instructed, not only slow down nuclear units, it would also create a logistic chain inviting nuclear attack by the enemy:

> It is clear that units of this type [nuclear units] cannot both remain mobile and capable of fighting conventional war. Without nuclear weapons they would not have the firepower to defend themselves, and the amount of ammunition required for conventional weapons would present almost insuperable problems for mobile warfare.[20]

We now know that a nuclear delivery unit would be virtually defenseless without substantial conventionally armed security forces to protect it. Because of collateral damage, for example, one can rarely employ a nuclear weapon in a localized attack against a delivery unit without destroying oneself in the process.

Kissinger was interested in demonstrating that dual-purpose forces (equipped for both conventional and nuclear war) would be inappropriate on the nuclear battlefield. They would be "highly vulnerable to the sudden introduction of nuclear weapons by the enemy." Would nuclear units be less vulnerable? Moreover, it is curious that he ignores the corollary to his suppositions, namely that a "pure" nuclear unit would also be easy prey to a conventional attack.

With the state of technology of 1957, Kissinger's concepts rested on a clearly unscientific and visionary foundation. Has the situation changed? Have there been recent developments in tactical nuclear weapons which might now justify Kissinger's earlier optimistic assessment of the value of nuclear weapons on the tactical battlefield? The neutron bomb comes to mind. But although it represents a smaller, "cleaner," more benign explosive than the current crop of U.S. fission weapons in NATO, it is still a nuclear weapon. It would be no more mobile than any other tactical nuclear weapon and it would be subject to the same control, security, and custodial requirements. No new delivery system has been developed for the neutron warhead. This new bomb merely represents more of the same.

One of the central issues relating to the neutron bomb is whether it would lower the nuclear threshold and make nuclear war more likely. It is argued that because it is smaller and more precise, the neutron bomb seems less objectionable, and blurs the distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons.

Not so, argue its proponents, who also tend to believe in the credibility of limited nuclear war in Europe. They argue that there is a clear distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons; that the President, should he ever be forced to decide whether to use nuclear weapons in defense of NATO, would be making a decision of such immense consequence that he hardly would be influenced by whether the first U.S. nuclear weapon initiating the war was of a neutron or a fission variety.

One suspects that Kissinger welcomed lowering the nuclear threshold. An examination of his theory reveals that, from his point of view, nuclear weapons should be made smaller and more precise because that would signal our adversaries that we would be quite prepared to "go nuclear" in a limited war:

> The decision to resist aggression by nuclear war requires a diplomacy which seeks to break down the atmosphere of special horror which now surrounds the use of nuclear weapons, an atmosphere which has been created in part by skillful Soviet "ban-the-bomb" propaganda. It should . . . put great emphasis on measures to mitigate their effect. The focus of disarmament negotiations, for example, should be shifted from eliminating the use of nuclear weapons to reducing the impact of their employment.[21]

Throughout *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, Kissinger emphasized that the United States should strenuously resist Soviet propaganda which attempts to portray any form of nuclear war as an "unparalleled catastrophe." Once the United States is resolved "to face the prospects and opportunities of limited nuclear war," he wrote, and learns to employ proper tactics, "nuclear war need not be as destructive as it appears."[22] He challenged scientists to develop "weapons of an intermediary degree of destructiveness . . . discriminating enough to permit the establishment of a significant margin of superiority."[23] The neutron bomb would appear to be a response to his challenge. Whether, though, it represents an advantage over a Soviet force fully prepared to respond with their own tactical nuclear weapons, the majority of which exceed twenty kilotons, and none less than five kilotons, remains highly debatable.

Soviet Capabilities and the American Character. Besides specifying the tactical, organizational, and technological superiority the West would enjoy on the nuclear battlefield, Kissinger also explained how the American character would succeed over the Soviet:

> . . . the introduction of nuclear weapons on the battlefield will shake the very basis of Soviet tactical doctrine. No longer will the Soviet bloc be able to rely on massed manpower as in World War II and in Korea. In a limited nuclear war . . . everything depends on leadership of a high order, personal initiative and mechanical aptitude, qualities more prevalent in our society than in the regimented system of the USSR. To be sure, the Soviet forces can train and equip for nuclear war. But self-reliance, spontaneity and initiative cannot be acquired by training; they grow naturally out of social institutions or they do not come into being. And a society like that of the Soviet Union, in which everything is done according to plan and by government, will have extraordinary difficulty inculcating these qualities.[24]

Soviet tactical doctrine remains an area of speculation for the West. We do know, however, that the individual soldier in the Red Army is well-trained and thoroughly equipped to fight in a nuclear environment. The Soviets possess about 1,500 ground-launched tactical nuclear weapon delivery systems, deployed and targeted against Europe. Soviet tactical nuclear weapons, by-and-large mated to surface-to-surface rockets and missiles such as the "Frog" and "Scud," with ranges of 40 and 170 miles, respectively, may lack the discrimination and refinement of U.S. weapons. But they are sufficiently awesome to give us pause.[25]

We should not overlook the fact that the battlefield of limited nuclear war

would be Western Europe, where the Soviets might be less concerned than NATO over collateral damage to neighboring civilian centers. If the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons into NATO has "shaken" Soviet doctrine, it has been to push it even further in the direction of a massive, armored "Blitzkrieg," attempting to overwhelm NATO with a surprise attack, coincidental with preemptive strikes against nuclear weapons units and storage sites.

It is always dangerous to prejudge a nation's character. Rather than assume an enemy to be inferior, the military and Kissinger should expect the best from them. Underestimation of American fighting ability by Hitler, or of Vietcong initiative by U.S. military and civil experts are but two examples of this attitude. One would be a fool to surmise that there is anything inherently defective in the Soviet mentality which prevents them from incorporating dispersion and mobility in their plan of attack.

How valuable, moreover, are the American qualities of initiative and mechanical aptitude in the highly structured, centralized operations of nuclear war? Without sounding too heretical, one might even take the opposite view and argue that because the U.S. Government is complex and diffuse, subject to lengthy consultation with NATO allies on nuclear questions, an authoritarian regime, such as the Soviet Union would have the initial edge. And perhaps troops who are dumbly obedient may function no worse in the holocaust of nuclear war than self-reliant, spontaneous Westerners. In past conventional wars, where autonomy of operations on a local level was possible, initiative and ingenuity could carry the day. The Sergeant [Alvin] Yorks of our society were often superior to a regimented enemy. But to put Sergeant York in a nuclear delivery unit might be an absolute danger. And, hang security keys around his neck, restrict his actions

and those of his commanders with volumes of nuclear rules and regulations, and he then becomes a small link in a long chain that extends to powers he only remotely fathoms but who control his every move. If there are American character advantages, they are probably of greatest value in a conventional war, where small units can operate independently under decentralized control.

If, as has been suggested, our current nuclear posture in NATO is based on faulty rationale, can and should anything be done to streamline our nuclear forces? Unless some of the technological developments in mobility foreseen by Kissinger come to pass, one would have to remain pessimistic. Perhaps the cruise missile, developed for tactical use, would represent increased speed of reaction and enhanced mobility. But if the cruise missile is nuclear tipped, it would be under the same superstructure of control that, although politically necessary, makes flexibility of reaction in a fluid situation difficult, if not impossible. The encumbrance of any variety of nuclear weapons deprives military commanders of the possibility of initiative, the advantages of surprise, and the capacity for rapid response to the unexpected. Central is the reality that, because they were married, early on, to revolutionary developments in long-range bombers, intercontinental missiles and submarine-launched missiles, strategic nuclear weapons may well have radically altered strategic warfare. There is not a comparable, totally new delivery system available for ground troops; on the tactical battlefield there has been no fundamental breakthrough. Tactical nuclear weapons are merely a more destructive form of artillery. They require not less, but substantially more in support facilities and personnel. This is hardly a new discovery. General Ridgway, writing in the mid-1950s, maintained that larger armies would be called for in a nuclear war, because nuclear

weapons were complex, caused greater casualties, and demanded far greater dispersion, thus increasing the size of the combat zone.[26] His conclusions were, obviously, completely counter to Kissinger's. The composition of our nuclear forces in NATO testifies to the adoption of Ridgway's assessment.

Forecast. Is it possible to fight successfully a limited nuclear war in Europe? Has the military done everything it can to assure success? NATO has tried to incorporate thousands of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons into its defensive doctrine. American and allied forces have devoted their best efforts to guard the weapons, scattered in dozens of storage sites all over Western Europe; to maintain them; to keep communications systems on the air and delivery vehicles operational; to safeguard the release codes, nuclear arming devices, and permissive action links; to train personnel in the complex administrative and technical procedures of a limited nuclear war; to keep the transport ready to roll, the warheads ready to shoot, and the troops ready to fight. If the U.S. military has failed in any aspect of training, it has been in being too scrupulous in the technical aspects of assembling nuclear warheads. Nuclear delivery units in Europe spend several months each year either preparing for or undergoing technical proficiency inspections conducted under sterile and unrealistic laboratory conditions. These inspections are not only grueling and time-consuming, but also bear little relevance to actual field operations to be expected on the battlefield.

Aside from this perhaps obsessive concern with technical proficiency, an outgrowth of the Atomic Energy Commission's (ERDA and NRC as of 1974) high standards, the army has been hamstrung because the weapons are unwieldy; there are too many of them; they require immense efforts to secure

and transport; command, control, and communications requirements, compounded in the multilanguage environment of NATO, are extremely complex and sophisticated; authority to deploy and fire them is necessarily centralized at the highest levels; and all aspects of nuclear release are highly uncertain and time-consuming.

We are, of course, in a defensive posture in Europe. It is difficult to conceive of NATO on the offensive, operating deep within Warsaw Pact territory. Yet, Kissinger told us that dependence on a concept of defense is a formula for disaster. France collapsed in World War II because it "believed in no strategy save the defense." Kissinger criticized a "Maginot line mentality" which seeks safety in "absolute numbers of bombs," or even in "superior destructiveness." He warned us that we should forego a "strategy . . . based on resisting overt attack," that is, "a military onslaught against Western Europe."[27] It is perhaps too much to expect that Kissinger should have recognized that our reliance on tactical nuclear weapons in NATO reflects precisely his worst fears. What do these several thousand weapons represent other than a "Maginot Line mentality," through "superior destructiveness," and "absolute numbers of bombs," designed to halt an "overt attack" on Western Europe? Kissinger's facts have come to resemble the lamppost the drunk leans upon. They are used more for support than for illumination.

The concept of limited nuclear war conceivably has placed NATO at a disadvantage. Our allies are forced into wishfully believing that nuclear weapons will stop a Soviet attack on the border, thus making possible the defense of every last foot of NATO territory from Soviet occupation. NATO's reliance on a nuclear Maginot Line is, perhaps, inevitable, given political and economic realities. It was facile for Kissinger to postulate nuclear "shoot and scoot"

tactics, to advocate that we ignore defending territory, to prescribe that nuclear units operate deep in enemy territory, and to declare that "the use of nuclear weapons simply as a form of artillery, the attempt to maintain a stabilized front, and similar tactics derived from the experience of World War II would be both ineffective and extremely costly."[28] But would frontier nations like Germany derive any benefit at all from his strategy? Or was Kissinger simply designating West Germany as a kind of battlefield playground on which Soviet and American armies could amuse themselves? Is there any alternative, given the defensive posture of NATO, the physical nature of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, and the restrictions imposed in their use? The form of limited nuclear war Kissinger advocated would not only demand radically new weapons and delivery systems, it would also represent a circumvention of the nuclear chain of command and a surrender of political control over nuclear weapons, with all of the potentially hazardous implications for all-out nuclear war such surrender implies.

For the present, we must not expect that nuclear weapons would be of great military utility on a battlefield demanding rapidity of decision and mobility of execution. Our army nuclear units are neither small, highly mobile, nor self-contained. Nor can they be. The nuclear command and control system trails across continents and over oceans into the Oval Office in Washington, with scores of approval and disapproval terminals reaching into practically every capitol of Western Europe.

NATO is, in a sense, a prisoner of the concept of limited nuclear war. European politicians are seriously reconsidering the wisdom of this concept. The apparent rejection of the neutron bomb, the latest development in tactical nuclear weapons, is but an example of this attitude. A wide-ranging debate in Europe has not only intensified distrust over whether the United States would release nuclear weapons in time to stop a Soviet attack on NATO's borders, but also on the military utility of these weapons.

It is high time that the United States, also, carefully review the rationale for limited nuclear war in Europe. When the concept was enunciated, we possessed a perhaps unjustified confidence in our superiority in nuclear technology. We were less than cautious in adapting this technology for the tactical battlefield. Such unbounded optimism is no longer possible, particularly when one compares the rationale of the 1950s with present-day reality. Kissinger's *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* remains "must reading," precisely because of its misprescriptions.

NOTES

1. "U.S. Considering Small War Theory," *The New York Times*, 11 August 1957, p. 1.

2. Dean Acheson, "NATO and Nuclear Weapons," *New Republic*, 30 December 1957, pp. 14-16.

3. Paul H. Nitze, "Limited Wars or Massive Retaliation?" *The Reporter*, 5 September 1957, pp. 40-42.

4. James E. King, Jr., "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (Part I)," *New Republic*, 1 July 1957, pp. 18-21; (Part II), *New Republic*, 15 July 1957, pp. 16-18.

5. August Heckscher, "A Doctrine for New Weaponry," *Saturday Review of Literature*, 8 February 1958, pp. 17, 32-34.

6. Hans Morgenthau, "Atomic Force and Foreign Policy," *Commentary*, June 1957, pp. 501-505.

7. "Scholarly Firecracker," *Newsweek*, 13 January 1958, pp. 17-18.

8. "A New Study in the Anatomy of U.S. Doctrine," *Time*, 26 August 1957, p. 14.

9. Henry A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, published for the Council on Foreign Relations (New York: Harper Brothers, 1957), p. 7.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 197.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 180.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 181.

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 181-182.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 183-184.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 183.

18. U.S. Congress, Committee on International Relations, *Authroity to Order the Use of Nuclear Weapons* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975), p. 1.

19. Kissinger, p. 182.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 182.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 190.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 183.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 194.

24. *Ibid.*, pp. 195-196.

25. Information on Soviet and American tactical delivery systems can be obtained from a variety of sources. The data on the "Frog" and "Scud" comes from R.T. Pretty, ed., *Jane's Weapons Systems*, 8th ed. (New York: Franklin Watts, 1977), pp. 410 and 50, respectively.

26. Matthew B. Ridgway, *Soldier* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1956), pp. 296-97.

27. Kissinger, p. 60 and p. 29.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 397.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Cave Brown, Anthony. *Dropshot, The American Plan for World War III Against Russia in 1957.* New York: Dial Press, 1978. 330pp.

The promulgation of Executive Order 11652 in 1972 and the passage of the Freedom of Information Act in 1975 have resulted in the release of a great number of formerly classified documents to historians and political scientists. For the first time, the basic national security documents of the United States in the atomic age have become available to the public. During the past 2 years in particular, the strategic concepts and plans for war with the Soviet Union prepared between 1945 and 1951 have been opened for scrutiny at the Modern Military Records Branch of the National Archives.

It was inevitable that many writers would want to explore such a windfall. One such is Anthony Cave Brown, the author of the best seller, *Bodyguard of Lies.* A journalist, Cave Brown has a certain amount of experience in editing

secret documents, with *The Secret War Report of the O.S.S.* (New York: Berkley, 1976) and *The Secret History of the Atomic Bomb* (New York: Dial Press, 1977) to his credit. Both of these books were advertised and sold on their sensational aspects, however, rather than as contributions to history.

His most recent publication, *Dropshot, The American Plan for World War III Against Russia in 1957*, appears to be an outright exploitation of a newly declassified national security document, which, because of its subject matter and language, promises to have considerable public appeal. Cave Brown has reproduced a massive document nearly intact, and has written a 29-page prologue which purports to outline its historical context and which stresses the frightening prospect of the war which might have been.

There is no question that the contingency war plans prepared by the U.S. Military Establishment in the postwar years are sobering and even terrifying

documents. Despite the popular belief that the United States was in a position of unassailable strength because of its atomic arsenal in the late 1940s, military planners perceived the nation to be in a position of unparalleled vulnerability, unprepared to defend its interests abroad, or, over the long term, its own territory against Soviet attacks. This sense of vulnerability and the belief that desperate measures might be necessary to offset it is apparent in *Dropshot*.

Dropshot, or more accurately, JCS 1920/5, "Report . . . to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Outline Plan for Use in the Event of War in 1957, (short title: *Dropshot*)" was a study completed by an ad hoc committee of the JCS in December 1949 to serve as background for preparation of a Joint Outline Long Range War Plan. It was itself not a JCS-approved war plan, contrary to Cave Brown's assertions, but was a requirements study that explained the long-term implications for war planning of the fiscal and defense policies that emerged between 1947 and 1949. In a sense, *Dropshot* might be considered the ultimate expression of that era's strategic thinking, as represented by documents now gradually coming to light as a result of the declassification process.

Unfortunately, Cave Brown knows little about strategic thinking and military planning in the postwar era. As a result, he misrepresents the role and significance of *Dropshot*. His facile introduction to the document is not only sprinkled with factual errors, but also presents an argument which is fundamentally flawed. Although he correctly identifies the sense of vulnerability which lay at the heart of military planning in the late 1940s, he fails to comprehend why or how that feeling emerged. He presents it rather as a relatively timeless phenomenon, and implies that it was much more permanent than it in fact turned out to be.

The sense that the United States could not carry out its military obligations, particularly the defense of Western Europe, despite its growing atomic arsenal, was consistently reaffirmed in the war plans prepared from 1946 to 1949. Although a variety of factors combined to create this sense of American inferiority, it was the budgetary ceilings which President Harry Truman imposed on military spending beginning in fiscal year 1949 that were the final blow. Military planners reluctantly concluded that most of Western Europe would be lost in event of Soviet attack and that the only hope of controlling possible Soviet aggression lay in rapid expansion of the then minimal American atomic capability.

Dropshot, completed nearly 2 years after strategic planners had reached this grim conclusion, contained no revelations in this regard. It instead attempted to explore what might occur if the current budget limitations were maintained until 1957. This was the first attempt to undertake such long-term forecasting and, as such, casts an interesting light on the thinking of U.S. strategists. *Dropshot's* conclusions, however, became irrelevant a few months after the study was prepared. In April 1950, NSC-68, "U.S. Objectives and Programs for National Security," the so-called blueprint for U.S. rearmament, was completed. Two months later the Korean war began. In the ensuing crisis, the budget ceiling was lifted and the military services entered a new era of strategic planning. *Dropshot* thus marked the end of a process of military planning, not the beginning of an era of atomic terror. As proof of this, the JCS removed *Dropshot* from planning consideration in February 1951.

Given these facts it is difficult to explain why Cave Brown chose *Dropshot* as a vehicle for presenting the unfolding of strategic planning of the

early atomic era. The initial JCS-approved emergency war plans such as *Halfmoon* and *Offtackle* would have clearly been more appropriate, as they show a growing sense of awareness concerning the Soviet conventional threat. Cave Brown's assertion that *Dropshot* was the main military planning production of the time is completely unsupported. It was never approved as a war plan, and there is no evidence, contrary to the editor's claim, in the JCS files or in President Truman's personal papers that he was ever advised of its existence.

But *Dropshot* had several characteristics which may have appealed to Cave Brown. The early emergency and mid-range war plans are buried deep within the geographical and central decimal files of the JCS and are relatively short. To reconstruct the context in which they were written would have taken a great deal of research time and competence in the strategic planning field. In contrast, *Dropshot*, an ad hoc special committee report, was book length—800 typescript pages—and was separated from these files in a "bulky package."

It should be noted that Cave Brown does include some interesting material in his introductory essay. His description of the Joint Intelligence Committee studies of the Soviet Union's capabilities to make war in 1948-1949, and of the Weapon Systems Evaluation Group's analysis of the effectiveness of possible strategic air operations against the Soviet Union in 1950 are particularly noteworthy. So too is his use of the conclusions of NSC 20/4 "U.S. Objectives with Respect to the U.S.S.R. to Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security," that he mistakenly identifies as NSC 40. Unfortunately, he is so eager to associate all these studies with *Dropshot*, perhaps to magnify its importance, that his descriptions of their development and use cannot be trusted. Compounding this problem is

his failure to cite sources for his many quotations in the introduction.

There are other ways in which Cave Brown twisted this document to suit his purposes. He takes the original introduction to *Dropshot* and hides it in the book's final appendix, after deleting certain key portions that would place *Dropshot* in its proper context. Also among the appendixes he introduces a 1957 unofficial British intelligence estimate without relating it to the 1949 official long-range estimates of the plan. Finally, he presents a fictional scenario for the opening of war in 1957 as the "editor's epilogue." This is clearly an attempt to strip *Dropshot* of its historical import and highlight its sensational aspects.

One hopes that responsible historians will be able to correct the errors which Cave Brown promulgates, and to disseminate a more accurate portrait of this period. Unfortunately, as eminent British historian Michael Howard commented on *Bodyguard of Lies:* "Perhaps the damage done by books such as this ... can never be completely undone. Mud is easy to throw and some of it always sticks." Furthermore, this kind of abuse of historical documents is likely to become increasingly common. Papers with the intriguing stamp "Top Secret" are being declassified in growing numbers. Unknowing or unscrupulous editors will continue to use these public papers and in the process may peddle a great deal of misinformation to unwary readers.

In the case of *Dropshot*, there is a particular reason to regret that Cave Brown did not take the opportunity to raise serious questions to which his material is so well suited. The question of what effect spending limitations may have on military planning and strategic philosophy is important today. An understanding of how President Truman's laudable attempts to control military spending led to an

unbalanced reliance on atomic weapons and a strategy of defense based on desperation would be helpful to us in thinking through present defense choices.

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Churba, Joseph. *The Politics of Defeat: America's Decline in the Middle East.* New York: Cyrco Press, 1977. 224pp.

No area of the world is as potentially explosive and dangerous to world peace as is the Middle East. American policy in this area during the past decades has not ranked among our finer achievements. Sound critical scholarship is necessary; viable alternative, imperative. Unfortunately, a high portion of that which professes to be scholarship is polemic; and that, which calls itself analysis is little more than tract. *The Politics of Defeat* is a classic example of this debasement.

On the surface, Joseph Churba has impressive credentials: Ph.D. in International Relations and Middle East Studies from Columbia University, graduate of the National War College, instructor at the Air University, Air Force Middle East intelligence analyst, and prolific author. But this book is not the work of a scholar or even an objective observer. It is a shallow, emotional polemic, a personal critique of American policy based upon spurious factual information and specious logic. Source material is limited, biased, and poorly employed. Throughout the book, personal opinion is professed as substantiated fact.

Churba is a committed Zionist. The book must be read with this in mind for it underlies and colors every word of his argument. He forthrightly states his purpose in the opening lines of the preface: "to demonstrate that the validity of Israel is crucial to the United States and that the United States must therefore categorically commit itself to the defense and preservation of that nation."

Few would challenge the United States historic and moral commitment to Israel; or that this commitment is realistic and in the interest of the United States. But our commitment must be kept in perspective and in a constant process of assessment. Every Israeli national interest and aspiration is not consistent with American interest as Churba would have us believe. The United States has legitimate interests in the Arab world as well. The fact of oil cannot be dismissed as easily as Churba attempts. Difficult as the task is, American policy must be one of firm commitment to the integrity of Israel yet a middle ground between Arab and Israeli aspirations.

This Churba cannot accept. He discounts any advantages of closer U.S.-Arab relations. He dismisses the Arab world as pliant surrogates of the Soviet Union. In fact, the author cloaks his Zionism in a convenient anti-Communist framework. No question exists that Soviet penetration of the Middle East has been detrimental to genuine U.S. interests there. But Churba creates a picture of American policymakers' indifference to this Soviet activity, an acceptance of a policy of "inexorable defeatism." He exaggerates Soviet success and explains away apparent rebuffs as mere facade.

Churba dispenses with the Palestinians and "the Palestinian problem" in the same manner. He proclaims that really there are no such people as the Palestinians. They are nothing more than Hashemite Jordanians attempting to carve out another illegitimate Arab state in the area, an enclave which by definition would be a Soviet base for subversion, "a Cuba for the Middle East." Palestine, he declares, is merely part of "the grand Soviet design ... being actively sketched at the present time."

The author asserts that Israel is the only force standing in the way of Soviet domination of the Middle East; yet her position, her vital role, is not appreciated by the United States. Churba demands that the United States tie itself completely to Israel who is fighting our fight for us. She is "a priceless strategic stronghold, a reliable anti-Communist bastion, an essential contingency base and a crucial link in the NATO defense posture." At any cost, Israel is a "national security bargain for America."

Why does the United States not fully appreciate the Israeli effort and her dilemma, Churba asks. Why has our policy been so muddled? The author claims that State Department, the Pentagon, and the Intelligence community are Arab oriented and anti-Israeli. He offers nothing more than his own word to substantiate these neo-McCarthyite charges. He even claims that he was dismissed as a Pentagon analyst for challenging rampant anti-Israeli bias.

The book is a compendium of assertions proclaimed as fact. One final example must suffice. Rejecting any legitimate Palestinian grievance, Churba avers that the peoples of the area have never suffered any form of injustice by Israel. Any problems are entirely their own making: "The fact that some Arabs may have suffered during the period of reestablishment of Jewish sovereignty over a part of Palestine is the direct result of a stubborn refusal to reconcile themselves to its existence."

Though myopic, Churba's book is not worthless. It affords a good example of the Zionist perspective. It is interesting reading, vibrant and committed. More importantly, it raises questions worthy of serious debate and more sophisticated analysis than the author offers.

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Collins, John M. and Cordesman, Anthony H., *Imbalance of Power, Shifting U.S.-Soviet Military Strength*. San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1978. 316pp.

Collins, John M. *American and Soviet Military Trends--Since the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Washington: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1978. 496pp.

The Spring 1977 issue of this publication reviewed *United States/Soviet Military Balance: A Frame of Reference for Congress*, commending the pamphlet "for its breadth, its detail, and its brevity." Its author, John M. Collins, a Senior Specialist in National Defense at the Congressional Research Service (CRS), has now followed that 1976 effort with two more extensive studies. Only brevity has suffered. His format has evolved from handbook, to almanac, to single-volume encyclopedia. However, his style has remained that of a dispassionate observer providing facts and asking questions of his readership—the Defense and Congressional decision-makers in Washington, it is hoped. Through page after page of tables, graphs, histograms and charts, complemented perfectly by concise explanatory prose and notes, he portrays the results of years of implicit policy decisions made by explicit budgetary incisions.

Imbalance of Power contains data through 1976 and provides "Net Assessment Appraisals" in each section by Anthony H. Cordesman, former assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Defense Intelligence Board. Of the two books, it can be read the most easily and leaves the survivor with some sense of understanding. *Trends* has picked up 1977 data, lacks the "assessment" sections, and adds substantial portions covering U.S. and Soviet defense organizations and functions, along with annexes

stating roles and missions per Title 10 U.S. Code, SALT, Warsaw and NATO Treaties and Protocols and a most valuable index for reference work.

Senator Howard Baker introduces *Imbalance* as providing "a unique service in making available to the public the information necessary for an informed and open debate on the defense needs of this nation and its allies." Congressman John Breckenridge introduces *Trends* thus: "To permit the adverse trends of the past ten to fifteen years to continue would be tantamount to a conscious decision by the American people to allow their national independence and free institutions increasingly to be hostage to decisions made in Moscow by Soviet Communist Party leaders."

There are more similarities between these two books than one would expect, even considering the common authorship and subject matter. Paragraphs, sections and figures appear in both; yet neither acknowledges the other. In some cases, minor cosmetic editing has been done while the preponderance of the words, the paragraphing and even the titles are the same. Copyrights aside, perhaps the tale should be "told twice," once for reading and once for reference.

The curriculum at the Naval War College is built around an ideal model: that military force serves national security as the result of a linear genesis in which policy begets strategy, begets budget, begets force level, begets tactics to meet a threat. Hence forces on scene are assumed to reflect some explicit national policy and strategy. We attribute such characteristics to other nations. If the *Trends* and *Imbalance* portrayed in these two books are actually a reflection of this nation's will and its perception of the world situation, then, perhaps, the Solzhenitsyn assessment at Harvard has more substance than it has been given by its sanguine detractors. If, rather, the situation is the result of a series of ad hoc budget

changes on the margin that have reduced strength and set policy by making many strategies infeasible, then these books cannot but assist in, at best, turning the situation around and, at least, in showing the public and Congressional and Executive Branch decisionmakers the cumulative results of isolated actions.

Imbalance of Power is recommended reading as the best unclassified net assessment available. *Trends* is a splendid reference text that capably and creditably meets its author's stated "fourfold purpose; to

—Furnish fact,

—Outline opinions,

—Sharpen issues, and

—Stimulate debate."

Collins, with the help of CRS, has done his homework and compiled an enormous amount of data that can serve the decisionmaker very well. Furthermore, he has Socratically posed sufficient policy and strategy questions that decisionmakers can now focus on policy as an input to, rather than as a by-product of, their work.

D.G. CLARK
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Couhat, Jean Labayle, ed. *Combat Fleets of the World 1978/1979: Their Ships, Aircraft, and Armament.* Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1978. 652pp.

The English language edition of *Flottes de Combat*, at roughly half the price of its obvious competitor from across the channel, is a bargain. This is the second edition published here and is larger (by 77 pages) and classier than the first. The Naval Institute has a winner which should find its way to many wardrooms in many navies.

Several years ago as a young lieutenant junior grade I had the unique opportunity to live and work for 3 months aboard a French destroyer, *Du Chayla* (D 630). She was visiting the

United States for TARTAR SQT. Every preconception I had held about the French Navy was destroyed by that experience. My lasting impressions of that short time are of an extremely professional, smoothly functioning team aboard an impeccable—literally spotless in all spaces—and efficiently laid out ship that reflected an inventive yet very pragmatic and efficient approach to naval architecture. (The fact that the helm was located half a level down and forward of the conning station, putting the backsides of the helmsman and lee helmsman at the same level as the foot of the OOD, made an impression on one used to conning from the leaky open bridge of a *Forrest Sherman* class.) These men were true professionals. Billet for billet, the officers had several times the experience that would be found on a U.S. Navy guided missile destroyer. Division officers and department heads were veterans of Vietnam and Algeria. They had lost two wars, and DeGaulle was pulling out of NATO. These facts were, perhaps, part of the reason that they were so modest and subtle in their relationships with the Italian and U.S. naval officers and men with whom they dealt daily. They were also cautious sailors, not at all the dashing romantics one might have expected by combining French and sailor stereotypes. When I was permitted to conn for a landing, the captain didn't care for my destroyer-type approach at all. He preferred to stop parallel, 25 feet out, and work the ship in with a wire to the forward capstan and one to the fantail winch.

This professional thoroughness, caution, and a subtle pride restrained by modesty is reflected precisely in *Combat Fleets*. Perhaps the fact that France has been a battleground for foreign powers so many times throughout history has contributed to this tendency toward understatement. There are no sermonizing editorials in· this book as one finds in *Jane's*, just a ·thorough

description of all one might want to know about all the world's navies. Even the tumultuous U.S. Navy ship procurement process is treated gently, with only cautious mention of the various players in our budget process pushing and pulling, cutting and adding, as the politics of the time seem to require.

It is noteworthy that the sections on France, Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. are each headed by a trenchant quotation:

France:

The Strategic nuclear strength . . . the completion of this force . . . is without question a great scientific and technical exploit.

Valery Giscard d'Estaing

Great Britain:

We can no longer afford to patrol the World's sea lanes.

Roy Mason, Ministry of Defense

U.S.S.R.:

Henceforth, the flag of the Soviet Navy will float proudly on all the oceans of the world. Sooner or later the United States will have to understand that it is no longer master of the sea.

Admiral Sergei Gorshkov Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy

No such statement of pride or apology, bravado or policy is stated for the U.S. Navy. Rather, the U.S.A. section leads off with a table showing the FY 1978-82 Five-Year Shipbuilding Plan showing 138 ships to be authorized--a sad relic of more optimistic days before the number of planned units was cut in half in order to fund what some consider to be a modern day Maginot Line on· the Central Front. Where is the spokesman who can .authoritatively

rebut the contention of Admiral Gorshkov?

Although this 1978/1979 edition is an obvious improvement over that of 1976/1977, it could stand a few changes for the sake of balance and readability.

—*Kiev* gets more coverage, 6 pages including a cover photo, than do many of the world's navies—perhaps a little overdone.

—It would help if the names of countries which title each section were at the outer margin for rapid access, rather than consistently to the right.

—Classes of ships within navies would be easier to find if class titles were in bold print rather than light italics.

—·The seemingly random placement of photos within ship descriptions is distracting, especially when one must search for the remainder of a table or sentence.

—Someone should have checked out the cross-referencing. When it is stated that a certain system, ship or weapon is similar to or adapted from that of another navy, it would be convenient if the pertinent information were provided in the other navy's listing.

—For those of us who are recalcitrant in accepting metric measurements, it would be helpful if dimensions were expressed parenthetically in feet and inches as is done in *Jane's*.

—Active ships should be differentiated, by notation or typeface, from those in mothballs or reserve.

These minor points aside, *Combat Fleets* is a superb reference text with fine line drawings and action photographs which provide a living dimension to the factual data. Lists of aircraft, weapons and systems are provided for completeness. The Naval Institute is to be complimented for bringing it to the United States and making it available at a price low enough for single ownership while *Jane's* must be purchased corporately or on the installment plan.

D.G. CLARK
Commander, U.S. Navy

Graubohm, Herbert. *Die Ausbildung in der deutschen Marine von ihrer Gruendung bis zum Jahre 1914 (Training in the German Navy from Its Foundation to the Year 1914).* Dusseldorf: Droste Publication, 1977. 444pp.

Herbert Graubohm, naval officer and doctor of pedagogy makes a successful attempt to describe the training system of the Imperial German Navy as it developed from its very beginning in 1850 until 1914. He reveals the extent to which the system was based upon the educational concepts and intentions of the 19th century—how military education and training agreed with the public school system and the contemporary pedagogic endeavors. The aspirations of the 1848 National Assembly of Frankfurt to establish a parliament-governed German national state included the establishment of a navy as well. The Prussian monarchy was deeply affected domestically by the events of 1848 and, as far as foreign affairs were concerned, the blockade of German ports dramatically underlined the role of seapower. From the comparably modest Prussian formula of "recognition of the nation at sea" resulted the claim to an equal part in world policy which led finally to the demand of Emperor Wilhelm and Admiral Tirpitz for extended power by naval armament. In some detail the philosophy of the pedagogic century and its greatest protagonists (Herbart, Humboldt, and Schleiermacher) are brought to the attention of the reader. Once more we are made aware of the prevailing harmony of state, society, and people (including the enlightened and educational minded officers around the great reformer Scharnhorst) of the reform age. It is one of the inevitable consequences of the revolution of 1848 that the efforts to educate "scientifically" noncommissioned officers and enlisted men became a matter of vehement criticism. The magic power of the educated classes over the non-

educated was meant to ensure obedience in all situations and simultaneously excluded any competition between superiors and subordinates. Consequently, a maximum of general and special branch education was introduced for officers in order to guarantee the dominance of the superiors. Chapter IV is an excellent source of information for professionals who are interested in schools of the navy and the various ways of thinking during the time from 1850 to 1914. Although the author obviously tried to write a comprehensive book in order to share with a broad public his remarkable research efforts and experience in the interrelation between the different social fields— military and pedagogy—sometimes the tendency to overemphasize the scientific aspects reduces the pure reading delight. For historians, however, and those interested in 19th-century social and pedagogic matters in Germany, the book is an excellent work of reference.

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Haselkorn, Avigdor. *The Evolution of Soviet Security Strategy, 1965-1975.* New York: Crane, Russak, 1978. 135pp.

If you would like to read a detailed account of modern Soviet expansionism based on meticulous research in a broad range of source material, Avigdor Haselkorn's *The Evolution of Soviet Security Strategy, 1965-1975,* may be the book. What most observers have gathered on an impressionistic basis has been presented in definitive text and tables in concise (135 pages), readable form. With impressions and suspicions substantiated by Haselkorn's data, we can conclude that Ulam's recognized work on Soviet international relations, *Expansion and Coexistence** should perhaps

now be titled as *EXPANSION and Coexistence* in a new edition. When Chinese polemicists refer to the "New Czars" and the "Social imperialists," they in fact can be well supported with the evidence compiled by Haselkorn.

Western scholars and policymakers long have recognized the Soviet "quest for security." Stalin's maneuvering to outwit a German-Japanese two-front attack in the late 1930s, his attempts to develop buffer states or areas in the East before the war, and his success in arranging buffer states in the West after the war are generally known. Our problem has been, as Helmut Sonnenfeldt has so ably put it,* that Moscow's quest for security inexorably has led to the insecurity of all its neighbors. The United States, pursuing its own "forward strategy," "containment," and "collective security" since the late 1940s, has sought to assist those neighbors while enhancing its own security. Haselkorn highlights the changing world situation in the 1965-75 period: Washington's defensive efforts, successful for several decades, were rapidly eroded. With increased military capabilities, especially in the Red Navy and in maritime and air logistics, Moscow in the 1970s can leapfrog into areas further and further from its own borders. The United States is forced into ever wider-ranging containment efforts, while Moscow probably takes some comfort in being able to defend against the normally postulated (in Soviet circles) U.S.-NATO attack further from the homeland. According to Haselkorn, the Soviet "Blue Belt of Defense" has proceeded from concept to capability, boding ever more serious problems for Western military planners.

The author is careful to note that Soviet security strategy is not focused exclusively on the United States and NATO, but takes China into con-

*Adam B. Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1967.* New York: Praeger, 1968.

*In a lecture at the Naval War College, 29 March 1978.

sideration in a major way. Although Brezhnev's Asian Collective Security System has never been fulfilled in a single regional treaty organization pointed against China, Haselkorn deduces that Moscow nevertheless has constructed a makeshift alliance through a series of bilateral treaties of Friendship and Cooperation with nations around the Asian periphery. One is reminded of a much earlier Soviet assertion that if China did not return to the fold, the Soviet Union would know how to handle the situation.

Having developed his case, Haselkorn calls for U.S. actions to counteract Soviet momentum. It is almost an anguished call for an "American policeman" to wake up and return to his world patrol: "How many doors is the hotel burglar planning to break into, as opposed to where he has already tested the handles?" But what should America do to thwart Soviet ambitions? This is the disappointment in the book. There are no prescriptions. Having suggested that all our previous policies and strategies are outmoded, the author suggests no replacements. Each reader, I suppose, could develop his own new strategy—perhaps some readers will. Perhaps Haselkorn will draft his own recommendations in a sequel. He argues for global rather than regionalized strategic planning, a valid position, but one difficult to carry from concept to implementation because of area idiosyncracies.

Haselkorn's thesis is that the Kremlin indeed has orchestrated a global strategy and is implementing it successfully despite occasional setbacks. If they can do it, we must be able to, also. This is where many readers of the book will part company with the author. Even the introduction by Leo Cherne notes gently that the book is "overschematized." It is possible that Kremlin planners will be flattered at being credited with a grand design envisaging a

great Socialist (Communist) world system, with regional subsystems and intra- and intersubsystem strategic mutual support. Certainly they have had their problems. Certainly they have been reactive to outside events. But perhaps, through perserverance, they have developed a master strategy. We cannot be sure the Haselkorn design attributed to Communist éminences grise is in fact an official Soviet plan. If we could, our own counterplanning would be easier.

However, to deny the formal Soviet strategic orchestration postulated by Haselkorn is not to deny that Moscow has evidenced a strong consistency of purpose, achieved a formidable military buildup, and often shown deftness in policy and strategy coordination. In fact, these characteristics were visible well before the 1965-75 period. Discrete analytic periods in international affairs always carry the cognitive danger of not recognizing the influence of precursors or past experience. This is a weakness in Haselkorn's presentation.

He picks 1965 because that was the first full year of the Brezhnev government, and credits the new group with initiating the strategy and the military buildup to implement it. This does not give adequate weight to several factors:

(1) It is known that the Soviet Military Establishment in part was responsible for Khrushchev's ouster; Khrushchev had been hard on it. It is likely that Brezhnev and Kosygin had certain understandings with the military as to their future relationships, favorable to the latter's plans and programs. It is almost certain that the new party leadership was cautious about crossing military concerns. In short, the military was more likely to have its own way.[*]

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[*] Roman Kolkowicz, "Interest Groups in Soviet Politics: The Case of the Military," in Lenard J. Cohen and Jane P. Shapiro, *Communist Systems in Comparative Perspectives* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press, 1974), pp. 317-34.

(2) There was a military buildup in progress prior to 1965. For instance, the major Soviet Navy ship construction program is known to have been given great impetus immediately following the Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962. However, it is possible to track its genesis into the late 1950s. A similar time progression can be drawn for Soviet missile forces.

(3) On the political side, much emphasis is placed on the spate of Soviet bilateral treaties of friendship and cooperation signed during the 10-year period. In perspective, this may not be too significant. The Soviet Government always has tended to operate abroad under treaty aegis. In the 1920s, the Lenin-Stalin regime negotiated a phenomenal number of treaties, agreements, and understandings. Diplomatic effort is a Soviet penchant; written agreements a standard *modus operandi*. To imply a sinister design to recent activity, without saying it is standard procedure and reminiscent of the 1920s, may be to stretch the point.

Given these caveats, however, Haselkorn's book is nonetheless recommended for politicomilitary planners. His diligent research effort and consequent strategic conceptualization provide food for thought.

WILLIAM A. PLATTE
Captain, U.S. Navy

Hooper, Edwin Bickford, et al. *The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict: Vol. I, the Setting of the Stage to 1959.* Washington: U.S. Dept. of the Navy, Naval History Division, 1976. 419pp.

Prepared by the Navy History Division, this is "the first of a planned series on the United States Navy and the Vietnam conflict." When completed, that series should be of great value to students both of naval history and of the wars in Vietnam. If that objective is to be fully achieved, however, subsequent volumes (number and nature as yet unspecified) must be better defined and prepared than is this one.

This first volume is designed to give a general survey of developments in Vietnam prior to active American involvement (whenever one wants to date that), and to provide background for the rest of the series. While the book is unquestionably useful and will be a valuable resource for later historians, as a self-standing historical work, it suffers in a number of respects.

Vice Admiral Hooper, former Director of Naval History, explains in his Preface that "the volume is the product of a team effort within the Naval History Division." Unfortunately the book shows it. Many of us have reservations about the abilities of committees to do much of anything, much less such a difficult, and indeed idiosyncratic, task as writing history. In this case the product might have been more satisfactory had the responsibility for authorship been assigned to a single individual, as has been the case with the best of the various military history series. Indeed, Admiral Hooper's own book about logistics in Vietnam (*Mobility, Support, Endurance: A Story of Naval Operational Logistics in the Vietnam War 1965-1968*, Washington: U.S. Dept. of the Navy, Naval History Division, 1977) is a far more successful historical work even though it treats a subject with much less general appeal.

The problem of multiple authorship is compounded by the stated objective of providing simultaneous treatment of three interrelated but nonetheless distinct threads. While the quality varies considerably among the three threads, none is very well done and the cutting back and forth succeeds primarily in confusing the reader.

As one thread the book treats the historical background and context of developments in Vietnam as a whole. While certainly of relevance to an understanding of the specific involvement of

the U.S. Navy in the French Indochina War and its aftermath, the treatment is of necessity summary, and often sketchy. It relies overwhelmingly on "standard" secondary sources and provides little new information or insight. Brevity leads to inevitable distortions which, while certainly not intentional, are fundamentally misleading. These parts of the book may have some value for someone with no knowledge of Vietnamese history at all, but such a reader might be better advised to start with a more comprehensive historical work. For the reader with some background, the presentation here is often irritating and frustrating. If the authors deemed general background essential, they would have presented it better in a single chapter or an appendix. This was the approach adopted, with great success, in the first volume of the Marine Corps history of its involvement in Vietnam (Captain Robert H. Whitlow, USMCR, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Advisory & Combat Assistance Era, 1954-1964*, Washington: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, History and Museums Division, 1977).

Similar comments apply to the second thread, the evolution of U.S. defense policy and organization and, within that, of the Navy itself during the period between the beginning of World War II and 1959. This subject, too, is treated far better in other works. Description of the changing organization of the Navy, of the evolving role of the Chief of Naval Operations, of the impact of debates over weapons systems (much treatment of aircraft carriers, surprisingly little of the Polaris program and nuclear power), may be of interest in other contexts, but the scattered and simplified analysis found here gives little and detracts much. It too often seems remote from the main subject. Again, single chapter or appendix treatment might have been preferable.

The third thread is what the book should have been all about: naval

operations in Vietnam. Here the essentials are covered, with much hitherto unavailable specific information from official naval sources, but the depth of presentation and analysis is uneven. The focus is on operational, rather than on tactical, activities. On the whole, the Marine Corps history mentioned earlier does a better job of providing the kind of detail most readers will expect from an official history.

There is illuminating treatment of the Navy's role in the minesweeping of Haiphong Harbor in 1945, of naval deployments in the Indochina theater during the early months of 1954, and of the assistance provided in the early development of the Vietnamese Navy. In these and other areas there has been effective use of otherwise unavailable or overlooked sources, notably official naval records and little touched primary collections such as the Gallagher Papers found in the Army's Center for Military History.

The treatment of other topics is less satisfactory. While the development of the French riverine forces ("Dinassauts") is correctly noted as significant, the specifics are largely ignored. Particularly in light of the subsequent importance of river warfare in Vietnam, the reader would benefit from more intensive analysis of things such as the kinds of craft found suitable (or not), the specifics of armament and protection, logistics and tactics, successes and failures. Similarly, the otherwise good coverage of the evacuation from the North in 1954 (the "Passage to Freedom") provides less detail than many readers will find satisfactory.

There are a number of small but irritating errors which should not appear in a book prepared with so much effort. At one point, Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson is referred to as "Secretary of State." The authors state that the Final Declaration of the 1954 Geneva Conference was "approved in a voice vote by all participants except the

United States," a statement which is simply inaccurate as a reading of the records of the meeting makes clear. The Tenth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Worker's Party (the Communist Party of North Vietnam) is described as "the Tenth Congress."

Historiographic deficiencies also mar the overall quality. The extensive footnotes provide guidance to the wider materials on which the study is based, but a number of major sources cited with some frequency is not found in the Bibliography; one is the Commander in Chief, French Forces, Indochina, *Lessons of the War in Indochina*. Because the normal convention of providing a full citation the first time a source is referenced in each chapter is not followed, the reader is driven to distraction trying to find the identity of the work, which is normally cited only in the short form as *Lessons of the War in Indochina*. The only full citation is "buried" in a footnote on page 96. And, given the book's general survey and introductory nature as the first in a series, a more comprehensive bibliography would have been of considerable value.

There is certainly general misunderstanding of the extent to which naval activities were crucial to military operations in and around Indochina during the period treated in this volume and later as well. The fact that the enemy had little naval capacity leads many to ignore the vital role of seapower (and river power) for France, South Vietnam, and the United States. Unfortunately this book does not do enough to remedy that deficiency, if for no other reason than that it does not maintain a consistent central focus on the issue. Subsequent volumes, and the series as a whole, will be successful to the extent they rectify the problem of fragmented focus and fall into the tradition more of Samuel Eliot Morison than of a committee report.

ALLAN W. CAMERON
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

Kinnard, Douglas. *President Eisenhower and Strategy Management: A Study in Defense Politics.* Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1977. 169pp.

This brief monograph examines President Dwight D. Eisenhower's role in the formulation and implementation of U.S. strategic policy. The author refutes the claim that the President was an indecisive, politically naive figurehead, dominated by strong personalities within his Administration and insulated from political reality by an excessively formal staff system. Kinnard maintains that Eisenhower undertook the management of America's defense program with a confidence born of a lifetime of professional military experience, and that he provided strong, effective leadership, personally articulating the strategic policy of his Presidency and skillfully defending it throughout his tenure.

The program Eisenhower initiated came to be known as the New Look—a long-term strategic plan designed to support existing containment policy through a careful balancing of military necessity and economic capability. Predicated on a concern for a healthy economy and balanced budget, this program sought to achieve "more bang for the buck" by major reallocation of resources among military components. Greater emphasis was placed on the deterrent and destructive power of nuclear weapons, i.e., massive retaliation; missile delivery systems and air defenses were upgraded; conventional forces were reduced; and allies, supplemented by U.S. logistic, air and naval support, were given primary responsibility for local defense. The new strategic goal, reflecting Eisenhower's disbelief in the possibility of a conventional war with the Soviet Union, was military sufficiency and economic stability over a prolonged period.

Not only was the President architect of this strategic program but, according to Kinnard, he developed effective bureaucratic techniques to manage and defend it. He revitalized the National

Security Council system: a new planning staff provided long-range strategic guidance as well as continuous policy planning; an operations coordinating board implemented and supervised agreed defense programs. He utilized the Council as a device to discuss issues, elicit support and attain consensus, but reserved to himself final decisionmaking authority, a function exercised through informal meetings with advisers in the Oval Office, not through the bureaucratic mechanisms of the NSC. The President also enlisted the cooperation of potentially recalcitrant military leaders. He selected service chiefs amenable to his program, carefully indoctrinated them in their responsibilities and loyalties, and secured Joint Chiefs' endorsement of his overall program while tolerating service competition for individual shares of the defense budget. In this manner he avoided major military defections until late in his Administration.

Kinnard also lays to rest any question of Eisenhower's primacy on defense matters within his own Cabinet. Dulles, lacking any expertise on strategic issues, never challenged the President. Defense Secretaries Wilson and McElroy, similarly inexperienced in military affairs, contributed little to discussions of fundamental strategic doctrine; they were functionalists, used by Eisenhower to manage the Pentagon and keep a tight rein on defense budgets. Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey certainly reinforced the President's fiscal conservatism, but beyond that influenced the Administration's defense program primarily as advocate and publicist. Even Adm. Arthur Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, was an enthusiastic convert to Eisenhower's defense policies rather than a source of independent strategic advice.

The author further claims that Eisenhower effectively defended his strategic program against major challenges. The first of these came from world events which seemed to invalidate the premises of the New Look: increasing Communist belligerency and military expenditures, a "bomber gap" in the early 1950s, Sputnik and a "missile gap" toward the end of the decade, and crises around the periphery of the Communist world, Berlin, Hungary, Lebanon, Suez, Vietnam and the Offshore Islands. And the Administration program came under increasing attack by defense intellectuals challenging the basic assumptions of massive retaliation, military leaders demanding improved limited war capabilities, and politicians seeking viable election issues. However, the President, capitalizing on his general popularity and unassailable military reputation, firmly maintained a solid, unified Administration position on defense policy. He carefully controlled the defense budget process and successfully advocated his strategic policy before Congress and the public until his final days, yielding only gradually to demands for increased military spending and altered strategic priorities.

Professor Kinnard has made an impressive case for Eisenhower's ability and primacy in matters of defense management, and he has done so with clarity and economy. However, is such a case necessary? Despite the author's and publisher's construction of a strawman of presidential ineptitude, analysts of bureaucratic politics and historians of the Eisenhower era have for over a decade clearly indicated the President's dominance in defense matters, many describing him as "his own Secretary of Defense." Even the more current and animated debate on the importance of his role in foreign policy determination has largely been resolved in the President's favor. So, while the author has certainly expanded our knowledge of Eisenhower's managerial techniques, this work does not provide the major reinterpretation that it claims.

Furthermore, this analysis seems to equate success in Eisenhower's defense program solely with political and managerial performance. Yet can an evaluation of the President's strategic policy exclude

considerations of substance and result? Although the author has deliberately confined his study to the area of bureaucratic policy, it is difficult to share his enthusiasm for Eisenhower's program without further discussion of its security implications. Was the New Look the optimum strategy for America in the 1950s? Did reliance on massive retaliation, subordination of limited war capabilities, modification of force structures and roles serve the interests of the nation? Did determination of strategy by budget rather than by threat, concentration on balanced budgets, establishment of fiscal ceilings as the initial step in defense calculations enhance the nation's security? Did politicizing the Joint Chiefs and formalizing the NSC staff system to suppress dissent contribute to a sounder estimate of defense policy? These are questions which bear on the "success" of President Eisenhower's management of strategy. For no matter how effective the President was in formulating and implementing a strategic program, his reputation in defense management must ultimately rest on the success of that program in protecting national interests. It is hoped that Professor Kinnard, having so ably described the mechanics of Eisenhower's defense policy management, will in the future address his talents to evaluating the worth of that effort.

RICHARD MEGARGEE
Naval War College

Korb, Lawrence J. *The FY 1979-1983 Defense Program: Issues and Trends.* Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978. 45pp., and Joseph A. Pechman, ed. *Setting National Priorities: the 1979 Budget.* Washington: Brookings Institution, 1978. 318pp.

"How much is enough?" is the question that Robert S. McNamara asked when he was making decisions on defense spending. The two studies reviewed here examine the answer that the Carter Administration has given to this vital question as shown in the size and composition of the FY 1979 defense budget. Lawrence J. Korb is Professor of Management at the Naval War College and the author of several studies of the defense budget and Pentagon decisionmaking. The Brookings Institution volume contains two chapters (61 pages) on the defense budget, authored principally by Herschel Kanter and Charles A. Sorrels, members of the Brookings defense analysis staff that has produced much-discussed studies of U.S. defense policy. These two analyses would be excellent companions to the FY 1979 posture statement of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown. The Brookings volume comes from a noted liberal research institute, while Korb's monograph is published by a prominent center for conservative thought.

This review will contrast the major arguments in the Korb and Brookings analyses of the defense budget and then, more briefly, mention other parts of the FY 1979 federal budget that are treated by Brookings. Both Korb and Brookings provide fine overviews of defense spending, examining it in several dimensions. Although President Carter continues the trend that started in 1975 of increasing defense spending in dollars of constant purchasing power, in FY 1979 outlays for national defense will represent only 5.1 percent of gross national product (GNP), the lowest share of GNP going to defense since before the Korean war.

Korb provides more detail and explanation of the different ways of measuring defense spending and the various categories into which overall defense spending can be divided than is available in the Brookings study, although both works make extensive use of statistical tables. Korb's comparison of the Carter defense program for FY 1979 and projected out into the 1980s shows lower levels of defense spending

and a slower growth rate in overall defense spending than projected by the last budget of President Ford. Carter is doing what he promised during his Presidential election campaign. Korb notes, however, that the $5 to $7 billion of defense spending that candidate Carter argued could be cut without impairing national security may already have been eliminated by the Ford administration and Congress in the FY 1977 budget. Korb generally sees the spending reductions made by Carter relative to the FY 1979-1983 figures projected in the Ford budgets as creating problems for the U.S. defense program in its efforts to compensate for the vast increase in Soviet defense spending since the 1960s.

The Brookings study does not compare the Carter and Ford defense programs in detail, but does show that the Carter budget projections through FY 1983 will fall $24 billion short of what it estimates will be necessary to fund all of the programs currently in the "Five Year Defense Program" (FYDP). This inconsistency illustrates one of the problems with the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) used by the Department of Defense. While decisions are ideally made on a long-term programming basis, they must be squeezed into annual budget ceilings. However, the Congress may reverse its usual behavior and add funds to the Carter defense budget instead of cutting that budget. Signs of Congressional concern for the adequacy of the defense budget are the additions of $3 billion to the Administration budget by the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. On the other hand, in May 1978, both the House and Senate rejected amendments to increase their respective Budget Committee's recommended defense spending ceiling because of concerns about the size of the federal budget deficit.

Defense policy issues that are addressed by both Korb and Brookings are

(1) the Carter Administration's emphasis on the NATO central front, (2) the Navy shipbuilding program, and (3) the strategic nuclear forces. Korb's monograph provides a very useful placement of defense policy in the context of the National Security Council (NSC) guidance. He does an excellent job in a few pages of showing how an administration's first defense budget usually establishes the national defense priorities for that administration. (Although Carter presented the FY 1978 budget to Congress, the FY 1979 budget is really the first one produced entirely by the Carter Administration.)

The major concern of the Carter Administration is the ability of U.S. general purpose forces to fight a short, intense war on the NATO central front. Real spending is to increase for such forces by at least 3 percent per annum even if other parts of the U.S. defense program must have a slower rate of real growth or even cuts. The United States has also obtained a commitment from other NATO nations to try to increase their defense spending in real terms. Brookings supports this NATO emphasis and even suggests that U.S. antitank weapons in this area could be increased further by cutting funds from reserve component forces that they see having little utility in this NATO scenario. Korb is more cautious; he argues that although it is necessary to improve NATO central front capability this effort should be part of a balanced strengthening of the U.S. defense posture. Korb warns, "Since history teaches us that we rarely fight the wars for which we plan, this lack of flexibility could be serious."

One of the areas that the Carter Administration has cut sharply in order to hold down overall defense spending while giving extra support to the NATO central front has been the Navy shipbuilding program. On this issue the views of Korb and Brookings are very different. Korb sees the Carter cuts of

$18 billion and 83 ships by 1982 as compared to the Ford shipbuilding program as moving the Navy's primary mission to sea control at the expense of power projection though nothing is said of such a change in mission in Secretary Brown's FY 1979 posture statement. Korb believes that the loss of projection power will require the United States to abandon defense of NATO's northern and southern flanks and cause a loss of defense capability in the Pacific and other parts of the world.

The Brookings analysis, however, questions whether the United States should continue the orientation toward a carrier task force-dominated Navy. Brookings views the carrier and its escorts as being very expensive and not contributing much to the ability to fight the NATO war. Land-based tactical air forces are proposed as a less vulnerable substitute for sea-based tactical airpower to defend NATO's flanks. Although Brookings argues for shifting naval resources from carriers to attack submarines, it does not believe that the United States is likely to move in this direction. Consequently, Brookings anticipates Congressional action to increase the Carter shipbuilding budget, and the Armed Services Committees have done just as Brookings predicted.

A third major difference between the Ford and Carter defense programs is in strategic nuclear forces. The Carter budget projections amount to about 20 percent less than those of Ford over FY 1978-1983. In FY 1978 Carter decided to halt production of the B-1 strategic bomber and to slow down the M-X ICBM. To Korb these decisions mean that the U.S. strategic triad of bombers, ICBMs, and SLBMs will be in trouble by the mid-1980s, given the growth of Soviet strategic systems. The United States needs new strategic systems if it is to maintain the "essential equivalence" with the Soviet Union that has been part of U.S. defense goals. Although the Carter Administration has favored the cruise missile over the B-1 penetrating bomber, Korb makes a forceful argument for reversing the B-1 production decision.

In its extensive discussion of the strategic balance, Brookings seems to be more optimistic than Korb. It sees the Minuteman ICBMs as less vulnerable to a successful Soviet attack than the numbers and characteristics of the Soviet ICBM force might suggest, possibilities for extending the operational life of Poseidon fleet ballistic missile submarines, and the U.S. force of penetrating bombers and cruise missiles being effective into the mid-1980s even without the B-1. However, Brookings observes that it will be necessary to make a decision relatively soon on the M-X and Trident II SLBM if one or both are to be available by the end of the 1980s. High cost will probably preclude going with both systems. The United States may be forced to choose between the relative invulnerability of nuclear deterrent in the SLBM and the advantage of protective redundancy by maintaining a triad of strategic nuclear systems. Unfortunately, Brookings does not see a SALT-II treaty as solving the triad problem or giving much relief in the defense budget, even if such a treaty can be concluded and ratified by the Senate, as now seems doubtful.

The Brookings volume also looks at the butter as well as the guns in the FY 1979 budget. Chapter-long treatments are given to domestic expenditure programs in agriculture, education, urban policy, employment and income security as well as to tax policy. It will be difficult for Carter to attain his goals of reducing federal spending to 21 percent of GNP, eliminating the budget deficit, and cutting unemployment to less than 5 percent. The economic and social environment will put the federal budget under strong pressures, not a good climate for higher defense spending.

The Brookings book and the Korb monograph provide a high level of

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information and analysis presented in readable prose. This reviewer hopes that military professionals will read both works to see the arguments that can be made for different defense budgets and why it is so hard to answer that simple question, "How much is enough?"

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JOHN A. WALGREN
Wheaton College

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Lefever, Ernest W. ed. *Morality and Foreign Policy.* Washington: Georgetown University Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1977. 76pp.

Few speeches made today could bear the detailed scrutiny that President Carter's Notre Dame commencement speech is subjected to in this first edition of a monograph series of Georgetown University's Ethics and Public Policy Center. The editor, Ernest Lefever, offered Carter's first comprehensive expression of the future course of U.S. foreign policy to 15 "observers" of American politics for their comment, and 9 of the responses are included in this small reader. Three other pieces on the broad subject of ethics and foreign policy add to the concise commentary of the body in a somewhat tangential sense. Although among the essayists one finds such respected and familiar names as Robert L. Bartley, C.B. Marshall, Daniel P. Moynihan, and Eugene Rostow, I found none of the essays particularly remarkable in either analytical value or perspective.

Some took Carter to task for the time and place of his sententious pronouncements; others argue that his prescription for a "foreign policy that is democratic, that is based on fundamental values, and that uses power and influence which we have for humane purposes" is nothing new in American politics; some question his assessment of a unifying threat of conflict with the Soviet Union which "has become less intensive even though the competition has become more extensive"; some do not agree that "we can no longer separate the traditional issues of war and peace from the new global questions of justice, equity, and human rights"; others feel that his "five cardinal premises" are limited and narrow in their scope and that they promote a selective morality, a double standard; finally, some conclude that our national ethnocentrism questions the universal application of human rights abroad.

Yet the strength of this symposium lies not in the breadth of criticism or support. Beneath the semantics, the nitpicks of historical analysis, and the dilemma between human rights and *realpolitik*, most of these commentators share some common concerns: that morality or ethics should be an important consideration in the formulation of our foreign policy; that it must be balanced with security interests and cannot be the sole policy determinant; that Mr. Carter's speech will not become the oft-quoted Gettysburg Address of 1977.

Despite the diversity of view, the interest of these writers in morality is instructive and useful: each seemed to be consistent in the view that there is such a thing as national will or ethical foundation which can be articulated; the debate was generated by the President's conception of its method of translation or strength of application. The essays provide a balanced view of Carter's stance, and curiously, a guarded consensus which was totally unexpected. Henry Kissinger's "Morality and Power" sums up that consensus view: "morality without security is ineffectual; security without morality is empty. To establish the relationship and proportion between these goals is perhaps the most profound challenge before our government and our nation."

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J.P. MORSE
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy

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Mangone, Gerard J. *Marine Policy for America: The United States at Sea.* Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath & Co., 1977. 370pp.

Seldom has American maritime policy been cited as an example of clarity, consistency or comprehensiveness. Regrettably, it more often has been offered as an example of the opposite extreme. Thus, when Gerard J. Mangone set out to present "an overview of the development of American marine policy for national security, the merchant marine, fisheries, seabed minerals, and pollution of the ocean environment," he took on a chore of awesome magnitude. The product of his labor is *Marine Policy for America,* a book that stands as a unified study in a field that has long suffered from single-factor analysis and fragmented consideration.

The author, Director of the Center for the Study of Marine Policy at the University of Delaware, treats his topic from a historical point of view. The opening chapter sketches America's long involvement with maritime affairs. Classifying maritime policy into five components, Mangone presents a detailed historical account of each: Navy, security and national defense policies; transport, trade and merchant marine policies; fisheries policies (domestic as well as foreign); oceanic mineral and energy resource policies; and ocean pollution and environmental protection policies. In each area, he presents the record of U.S. policy with care and considerable detail. Each chapter concludes with a brief summary of the problems and issues of contemporary significance to that particular element of maritime policy. Mangone thus gives the reader not only a chronicle of how American policy developed but also an outline of the principal points of contention that need to be resolved if U.S. maritime policy is to be effective in the future.

Maritime Policy for America does not read with the ease or speed of a novel, but that is not unusual for a text of its variety. At times the book tends to get bogged down in a swamp of exhaustive detail about legislation; in others, the use of overly precise statistics either distracts the reader or puts him to sleep. For one who wants to make an exacting analysis of policy development, however, this detailed data will provide a very useful starting point. The book is also flawed by occasional typographical errors which are, it seems, a characteristic of contemporary publishing and modern printing processes. Unfortunately, these rather minor but conspicuous errors—such as the misspelling of a former Secretary of the Navy's name (Mittendorf, even in the index)—tend to shake one's confidence in the accuracy of the masses of detail presented by the author.

Mangone's concluding chapter focuses on current American interests in the ocean. Among the issues he addresses are the necessity for a navy, the importance of seaborne trade, the complexities of effective fishery management, and the progress and pitfalls along the road to protection of the marine environment. He presents the arguments for and against the contending views in a straightforward, impartial manner, then leaves it to the reader's judgment to draw conclusions. The author deplores the extended, divided, and unmanageable bureaucracy that has made it difficult if not impossible to devise and execute a coherent system of maritime policies. On this issue he suggests that the solution is not a superagency for the oceans that has been proposed by some; he prefers instead an independent coordinating panel somewhat similar to the National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere, but with substantial powers to make choices and set priorities among competing oceanic programs. He also endorses a program of public education on the grounds that a populace well informed

about the role played by the oceans in our national welfare will express its support for a sound ocean policy through an effective democratic system.

Marine Policy for America is a note-worthy contribution to the literature of maritime policy. It is unique in that it assembles in a single volume a wealth of information illuminating the broad scope of a most important national issue. Mangone does not offer a simple solution to the complex problem of creating an effective maritime policy for America, for there is no simple solution. He does, however, give the reader a most useful framework for understanding the nature of the problem and an abundant stock of data to use in drawing conclusions about the issues. The book should be of particular value to those who are prone to equate "maritime" matters with "merchant marine" or "naval" matters; Mangone clearly shows that our national maritime policy must concern itself with much more than ships.

HAROLD J. SUTPHEN
Commander, U.S. Navy

Melosi, Martin V. *The Shadow of Pearl Harbor.* College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1977. 183pp.

Almost before the smoke had cleared, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor had created a major political controversy that remained relatively dormant until the conclusion of hostilities in 1945. Since then it has blossomed and in all probability it will never be completely settled. At root it is a question of who was to blame: President Roosevelt along with some or all of the Army and Navy officials in Washington, or the unfortunate commanders in Hawaii?

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was thoroughly investigated in a series of eight separate inquiries and investigations between 1942 and 1946. The first was conducted by Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts to allay controversy. Unfortunately, the Roberts Report had precisely the opposite effect. It raised more questions than it settled, but the Roosevelt Administration successfully staved off a potentially meddlesome Congressional investigation during World War II. Both the Army and the Navy conducted their own formal inquiries during the war.

In tracing the course of the political controversy through its muted and not so subtle partisan maneuvers, Melosi has performed a useful service for students of the period by describing clearly and concisely the reasons and the justifications for the eight separate investigations. He shows how sincere bewilderment (over how the United States could have been so surprised by the Japanese attack) easily gave rise to partisan wrangling. Roosevelt and his supporters saw a Congressional investigation as a possible hindrance to the prosecution of the war, in addition to their normal and understandable view that it might threaten their political self-preservation.

Roosevelt's political opponents not only sought to develop an issue to use against the incumbent Democrats in the 1942 Congressional elections, but in the 1944 Presidential election they also sought to challenge his conduct of foreign policy and preparations for war. In addition, there were plenty of Roosevelt haters, isolationists and others, whose motives tended to be more malicious than those found in ordinary partisan politics. During the war both factions kept the pot simmering in one way or another. The culmination came in one of the great Congressional investigations in which a joint committee examined witnesses and received documents and exhibits over a period of several months. The record fills 39 published volumes.

The thrust of this short, well-written book is a description of the course of the political controversy rather than an analysis of the issues involved. To this extent it is an original contribution to

the rather extensive Pearl Harbor literature. It clearly shows how and why the controversy became polarized between those who blamed officials in Washington and those who blamed the officers in the field.

In describing the controversy, Melosi raises several issues by implication. It would be unfair to criticize him for not having written another kind of book; but it would also be unfair to prospective readers to fail to point out that Melosi by describing the polarization of views in the political controversy has only scratched the surface of the issues he has raised. He properly describes the shock resulting from the attack and the public indignation that the United States could be surprised. Something must have gone wrong, many people said. Was it incompetence on the part of the field commanders and in Washington? Or, did Roosevelt seek to maneuver the Japanese into attacking first? The question remains, the controversy continues, and probably will forever.

Another aspect has been inadequately examined in the literature to date. Whatever the faults and discrepancies of the command structure in Hawaii and the means and methods of communication between Washington and the field, they were essentially those of a peacetime military establishment. True, the Atlantic Fleet had been at war for all practical purposes for several months; true, both Adm. Harold R. Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations, and Gen. George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, had bent every effort towards preparing the Navy and the Army for war; true, in late 1941 war with Japan was seen as inevitable—but the fact remained that a peacetime mind-set prevailed in Hawaii and in the Philippines. (General MacArthur had several hours warning but his B-17s were still on the ground, wingtip to wingtip, when the Japanese attacked his forces.) Even though Stark had sent a war-warning message, the Pacific Fleet still

saw war as only hypothetical, regardless of its likelihood. This may partly explain the complacency in the field and the failure to implement the sound and workable defense plans for Hawaii that had been prepared several months earlier, both of which were unknown in Washington. Incidentally, the Hawaiian defense plans were so good on paper that CNO used them as examples to be followed by other commands.

Pearl Harbor remains a matter of controversy but not so much because of doubt about the facts. Probably all the important evidence is in. It is controversial because more work remains to be done in analyzing and interpreting the data. The polarization resulting from the political controversy, which Melosi describes so well in its partisan context, is an insufficient explanation of why America was surprised. More complete and satisfactory analyses await the pens of other scholars.

B.M. SIMPSON III

Mumford, Stephen D. *Population Growth Control: The Next Move is America's.* New York: Philosophical Library, 1977. 167pp.

As illegal Mexican immigrants, feeling the consequences of Mexico's high birth and unemployment rates, continue to pour into the United States, most Americans are becoming aware of the population explosion in developing nations. Naval officers and others may likely find themselves on duty in any number of nations where the birth rate is soaring as the death rate is plunging, thanks to control of yesteryear's worst communicable diseases but without parallel birth control.

Since the 1960s social scientists have been reporting on the problems resulting from population pressures in most nations of the world and on occasion, physical scientists also write about the problem.

Now Stephen D. Mumford, with a doctorate in public health, offers a slim

volume with considerable specific information and some clear conclusions. With a refreshing lack of stilted social science jargon, he presents in readable, concise prose a lot of material in a relatively few pages. That feat alone contrasts with many other books and articles in which scholars use so much behavioral terminology that they befog the points they are trying to make.

Mumford's own field work centered in Korea, and to a lesser extent Taiwan, Japan, the Philippines, and Thailand. His observations match those that some of us have experienced for years in Latin America or African nations. Recent desperate action by India and Pakistan in unsuccessfully making sterilization compulsory underscored the fact that nations suffering the worst from the baby boom do not have the technological tools to implement a population policy which can significantly reduce birth rates. Mumford believes that the security of the United States itself will be threatened by the alarming world population growth. That point alone justifies a reading of this study by any career officer determined to defend the survival of our country.

At the beginning of the Christian era world population totaled 250 million, approximately the same as that of the Soviet Union in 1974. From the time of the Roman Empire to the beginning of the industrial revolution, world population increased from one-quarter of a billion to 1 billion. By 1950, it had climbed to 2.5 billion. It took more than 100 years to add that second billion to the total. But in a mere 15 years, between 1960 and 1975, humankind added our fourth billion and a fifth billion people will be added to this overcrowded planet in only 10 years.

Americans, smug because our own family pattern now consists of two or fewer children for young couples, should reconsider. The industrial nations of Europe and Japan depend on food imports already. U.S. wheat must help feed the Soviet Union and India. The poorer nations produce additional citizens faster than they produce food or additional jobs. Given the soaring birth rates in most nations, the majority of the world's countries, which are poor, will get poorer.

The industrial system which supports the economy of the United States depends on raw materials from the poorer, developing nations. The rising price of our imported oil in recent years should remind us of our vulnerability. Mumford stresses that when the overcrowded poor nations begin strangling on their own excessive populations, America's supply lines of vital raw materials will become endangered just as much as if hostile foreign missiles or ships were pointed at our merchant fleets. He fits together in logical sequence trends on food production, the needs of nations, and the sheer numbers which beset us already.

Mumford insists that our national security *requires* that the United States solve the world's population problem. He then looks at our State Department and all other entities of U.S. Government and concludes that only the Department of Defense has the capability to develop the paraphernalia and to help less-developed nations implement effective birth control programs.

His requirements are very specific and he believes the task should have first claim on all DOD resources. Physical and human research problems could be formidable. In most peasant societies, the social psychology of villagers holds fast to bringing as many children into the world as possible. In the days before longevity zoomed upward and infant mortality downward, such an attitude fit a majority of the inhabitants of this perplexed planet. All the basic physical conditions have changed but not the inbred attitudes of most people. Mumford has no suggested solution to this human engineering problem nor does he tell us how the United States

can escape the Communist-inspired charges that any U.S. help in family planning is really an "imperialist plot" to keep nonwhites from outnumbering us. A foolish charge, but didn't Hitler get away with some of the stupidest bigotry of all time in the guise of a New Order among an uncomfortable number of people in the 1930s, and have not the rulers in the Kremlin sold anti-Yankee slogans over and over?

The book has minor flaws. It contains no index, which forces the reader to thumb through subheadings and the table of contents, guessing if a specific topic has been covered.

And the study does not take into account the powerful forces of political propaganda which America's adversaries and Americans who disagree with this "mission" will exploit should we try to carry out the Mumford plan of using the Department of Defense to develop and help implement true birth control among the nations of the world.

But Mumford analyzes the basic problems of global overpopulation clearly and succinctly, and he does so from the admirable perspective of an American who cares deeply for the welfare of his own country.

MARVIN ALISKY
Arizona State University

Mure, David. *Practise to Deceive.* London: William Kimber, 1977. 264pp.

In 1963 a retired American Intelligence official calling himself "Christopher Felix" produced a stimulating survey of international espionage entitled *A Short Course in the Secret War.* Therein he asserted that "one of secret operations' most vital and complex activities" is deception. That is the subject of this book: Mure's memoir of his share in British intelligence's effort in the Middle East during World War Two to hoodwink the German High Command into believing that the Allied invasion of Europe, when it came, would

come through the Balkans and not through the Channel coast of France. As chairman of the deception team—dubbed the "31 Committee" (its fellow command, "Twenty Committee" or Double-Cross, operated out of London) —Major Mure figured in the scheme from its inception and was active in the supervision of turned agents in Egypt, Iraq, Persia, and especially the Lebanon.

The book is dedicated to the presiding genius of the idea overall, the late Brigadier Dudley Clarke ("Galveston"), a South African whom Mure calls "certainly the most unusual Intelligence officer of his time," "in essence, the supreme artist, absorbed in his own virtuosity." Starting from the sands of defeat in the Western Desert under General Wavell, Clarke stitched together "the first directorate of its kind in history which had no existence other than in the imagination of himself and his Commander-in-Chief." Clarke's deputy, Col. Noel Wyld, directed the deception aspects of "Plan Jael," one arm of the larger "Neptune" scheme on the Western Front.

If Mure's praise of his chief may seem extreme, he freely admits that Clarke's success would have been impossible without use of "Ultra," the intercepts into the German communication system that were perhaps the single most closely guarded secret of the war. For the Middle East theater Mure also concedes that Clarke's triumph would have been severely hampered had he not had control—and the author feels this controversial situation must be taken for granted—of "Cicero," the German double agent serving as valet to the British Ambassador in Ankara. Together "these tremendous duetists" achieved the nearly total deception of Abwehr agent controllers based in Athens, Sofia, and Istanbul.

It is the day-to-day story of how this was done with which Major Mure's book is concerned. He quotes verbatim from message after message from those days

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of 30 years ago, admitting that he has had no access to pertinent documents since 1944 but assuring the reader that "I am lucky in having a photographic memory . . . ." He also admits that he is "by nature a congenital liar and romancer," only one among "quite a number of lunatics who had been, apparently through extra-sensory perception, selected by Galveston for the supporting roles . . . ."

He further admits, "I am not at all highly educated, and on this point the present reviewer can confirm that the author would have benefitted from a crash course in the principles of punctuation. Worse, he has been ill-served by his publishers. The book's index is skimpy; there is only one map, and that grossly inadequate; there are misspellings and textual omissions; and the so-called bibliography is sadly lacking completeness. Two titles clamoring for addition therein are Elyesa (not Eleazar) Bazna, *I Was Cicero* (1963) and Leonard O. Mosley's account of the Abwehr agent Johann Eppler, *The Cat and the Mice* (1959).

Nevertheless, this volume may be recommended to all those intrigued by the nuances of double-agentry and how it is "played." The book is a natural companion piece to Sir John Masterman's *The Double-Cross System* (1972).

CURTIS CARROLL DAVIS
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army Reserve (Ret.)

Naval OR Study Group USNA. *Naval Operations Analysis*. 2nd ed. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1977. 372pp.

The growth of operations research and operations analyses has been phenomenal. Since the first edition of this book in 1968 the complexity of naval tactical and strategic problems has so continued to increase that an update of the earlier edition is most appropriate. This edition is written principally for naval officers or those with a day-to-day

interest in the relationship between new technology and such naval decisions as:

(a) On average, what is the best course of action if the enemy has the choices of A, B, C, etc.?

(b) What search pattern should be used for today's sea state in order to minimize the location time of a lost aircraft?

(c) When is it best to fire in salvos and when is it best to use a doctrine of shoot-look-shoot?

The introductory chapters are a good review of a logic process for problem formulation, development of alternatives and evaluation of possible solutions. The methodology is straightforward and easy to read. This formulation process can stimulate creative ideas and introduce objectivity.

The detection theory chapters expand upon detection concepts and problems associated with continuous looking and separate glimpses. The illustrations and problems at the end of each chapter, including the electronic warfare and radar detection sections, contain many additional combat examples of the uses and limits of these ideas. The electronic warfare/countermeasures (with crossover or burnthrough) discussion of an attack aircraft against a SAM defense system on a major naval ship is an outstanding example of the principles of EW, deception, and mass attack.

Throughout the book analytical and mathematical concepts are skillfully used to assist in decisionmaking. The authors have used Bayes' Theorem in search and patrol situations, probability theory in Antiair Warfare and Mine Warfare situations, and PER (Program Evaluation and Review) techniques relating to deployment scheduling.

The latest edition does have some limitations. First, it could have more descriptive matter rather than such a high analytical content. To the naval officer who has been away from formulas and calculus for several years a greater use of graphic illustrations

would be helpful. Second, in view of the high-low mix issues in the Navy today, Lanchester's combat "laws" on possible tradeoffs between mass and technology or firepower should at least be carried in an appendix. (For naval officers who desire to refresh themselves on Lanchester ideas Peter W. Zehna, ed., *Selected Methods and Models in Military Operations Research* (Monterey, Calif.: Naval Postgraduate School, 1971) and Chantee Lewis, "A Method for Conceptualizing Combat Theory," *Naval War College Review*, Fall 1975, pp. 45-56 are suggested.) Third, the end of the book section on systems effectiveness and reliability is limited and does not reflect such techniques as fault-free analysis or the post-World War II work of Barlow, Prosehan or Jorgenson on military reliability issues. The reader should be aware of these limitations.

All in all, the Operations Research faculty of the U.S. Naval Academy has given us an excellent book, useful as a text at the undergraduate level or by naval officers wishing to update themselves on recent quantitative applications relating to tactical and strategic decisionmaking.

The shortcomings mentioned are more than compensated for by the strengths of this book, a broad and imaginative attempt to show the role of a logic process to increase objectivity in military decisions.

CHANTEE LEWIS
Naval War College

Pensel, Helmut. *A History of War at Sea*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1977. 176pp.

The 1975 German edition of this book was titled *Von Salamis bis Okinawa* but this edition is more up to date with the addition of a new chapter, "The Nuclear Age," which covers Suez, Cuba, Vietnam, the Indo-Pakistan War, and the Yom Kippur War. The author intended to "provide an easily accessible chronicle of all significant armed conflicts at sea from the time of the Persian Wars to the present day . . . favoring the history of no one nation above the other." He succeeded.

The book does not pretend to be detailed history but is more a chronology of naval battles. The accompanying maps (there are well over 200) do not permit recreating actual ship or fleet movements but they do serve to fix an engagement in place and time. The first dated entry is 1210 BC: Battle off Cyprus (the first recorded sea battle) in which the Hittites defeated the Cypriot fleet. The last entry is for May 1975: the recovery of *Mayaguez* and her crew. The intervening 3000 years are covered in 150 pages with no lacunae evident.

A History of War at Sea is not only a useful research aid but is good recreational reading. The latter, however, will accent an unusual character of the book; the entries are written entirely in the present tense and the language cadence is evocative of a Lowell Thomas newsreel narration:

The combined squadrons approach the Korean Coast. Togo, well-informed of the Russian strength and movements, awaits them in the Korea Straits, off Tsushima Island.

Beatty overhauls the Germans, and outflanks them on an easterly course, but the weather closes in and prevents continuous action.

A bomb and torpedo attack wave takes off from *Hiryu* for *Yorktown*, which is hit by 3 bombs and 2 torpedoes and loses way, apparently doomed.

There are several appendixes including the oldest surviving naval order of battle (that of the *Iliad*), tonnage and ship numbers tables, lists of ships sunk by various weapons, etc. Of more interest, if not of practical value, are the tables which rank great naval battles.

Pensel assigns points to four factors: numbers involved, strategic significance, political significance, and tactical execution. By this scheme history's greatest naval battle (many will agree) was that of Leyte Gulf in 1944. World War II has four other battles in the top 35, eight in that list have B.C. dates, and Trafalgar and The Armada are sixth and twelfth, respectively.

This atlas and chronology will be of value and interest to both the serious researcher and the casual reader.

W.R. PETTYJOHN
Commander, U.S. Navy

Price, Alfred. *Instruments of Darkness*. London: Macdonald and Jane's, 1977. 284pp.

"It seems that every time we go to war we have to re-invent the wheel." Alfred Price ascribes this statement about Electronic Warfare to a USAF officer and uses it as one of the chapter headings of his book. Besides revealing the short corporate memory of the armed services, aggravated by the rigid compartmentalization of experience gained in previous electronic engagements, this quotation also illustrates the cyclic nature of the campaign in the electromagnetic theater of operations of a modern war.

Although subtitled "The History of Electronic Warfare," this book is largely concerned with just one part of it, the long campaign between the Royal Air Force and the Luftwaffe over northern Europe between 1939 and 1945. Nevertheless, many key battles of this campaign turned on the use of electronics.

Using clear, jargon-free language, Price explains and illustrates the principles of electronic warfare and their links with intelligence and general tactics. He also points up another important facet of modern war, the organization and application of scientific effort. The undoubted scientific skills of the Germans had produced electronic systems superior to those of the British and the Americans by 1939, yet by May 1943 Goering was forced to say "I did hope that even if we were behind we could at least be in the same race."

The centerpiece of the book is the story of the introduction of "window" (the strips of metal foil now known as "chaff" used to confuse radar). The idea of window was thought of in Britain and Germany almost simultaneously but what the decisionmakers did about it reveals much about the direction of scientific effort in both countries and also of how scientific developments must always be closely related to operational developments in the frontline — particularly in the dynamic area of electronic warfare.

The tale also goes through one of those mazes so familiar to students of the subject. Each side thought that if it used a technique first, that technique would be adopted quickly by the other side who would then gain more from it. This cannot be true for both sides, yet both persuaded themselves that it was. Goering ordered the destruction of his force's initial trials report and stringent measures to prevent any leakage of information—all experiments, even those aimed at developing a countermeasure, had to cease.

In Britain, window was found to be highly effective against the radar used by night fighters. RAF Fighter Command immediately asked that Bomber Command not use window until an antidote had been developed. After 4 months, the requisite new procedures and tactics had been developed, and Fighter Command dropped their objections, but then Bomber Command demurred. Their spokesman, Air Marshal Saundby said: "There are only so many tricks that my force can use against the enemy, and once these are exhausted there is nothing." He therefore wanted to use each new trick until it was played out, and as two other forms of jamming ("mandrel" and

"tinsel") had just been introduced, he wished to let these run before using window. Thus the use of window was postponed for another 6 months.

Saundby's thoughts were a mirror of those of General Milch, Luftwaffe Director of Air Equipment, who about the same period said "There is only one worry for us, that the enemy will again catch us on the hop with some radar trickery and we will have to start trotting after him again."

Mandrel, which put noise jamming into the Freya early warning radar, and tinsel, which jammed the ground-control radio frequencies, went into service with immediate success. Soon however, the German radar operators got used to mandrel and found how to get round it. They detuned their sets and spread their frequencies and the fighters learned how to home onto jamming. Within 3 months, mandrel had all but lost its effect. Tinsel continued in use until the end of the war, although the Germans were forced to use higher power transmitters and introduce new frequencies. The experience of these two devices shows that Electronic Warfare is a fast-moving campaign where victories are relative, not absolute. Enemy measures, defensive or offensive, can be hampered but never definitely negated. Given time, the adversary will produce antidotes or new equipments immune to the jamming in use.

During all this period the Wurzberg ground control radar, the backbone of German Air Defense system, remained unjammed and General Kammhuber, its commander, developed the tactic of co-ordinating radar, searchlights, flak and night fighters to a high pitch of success. Some of his pilots felt that the system was too rigid and sought to find free-ranging tactics more suited to their personalities. Maj. Hajo Herrman led this group and was allowed limited experiments with day-fighters, using the illumination given by searchlights and the flares used by the British bombers. Nicknamed

"Wild Boar," these tactics were not encouraged as they raised problems of coordination with the flak gunners.

Eventually permission was given for the RAF to use window, and all was set for massive attacks on Hamburg beginning on 24 July 1943. Seven hundred and forty-six bombers attacked that night and the effect of the first use of window was devastating. It appeared as if over 10,000 aircraft were attacking the city. Searchlights, fighters and flak were directed onto false targets and confusion reigned on the German side. Only 11 British aircraft were lost instead of the expected 50. The second night, however, Major Hermann was allowed to use his "Wild Boar" tactics and in the light of fires caused by the bombing started to score successes. By the time the attack was shifted to Berlin, in August, Wild Boar was in full effect, and British loss rates had risen to almost the same level as prewindow days. The 6 months virtual immunity originally hoped for was reduced to a few weeks by the Luftwaffe's swift introduction of tactics only lightly dependent on electronics.

Those responsible for organizing and operating Electronic Warfare equipments and for coordinating E.W. with general tactics will find this book both interesting and useful. They will find that many of their bright ideas have been thought of before, albeit in different parts of the electromagnetic spectrum, perhaps, and under very different conditions. With Instruments of Darkness as a guide, the painful reinvention of the electronic warfare wheel may be shortcircuited.

M.G.M.W. ELLIS
Commander, Royal Navy

Reynolds, Clark G. The Fast Carriers: The Forging of an Air Navy. 2d ed. Huntington, N.Y.: Robert E. Krieger, 1978. 502pp.

This second edition of The Fast Carriers, first published by McGraw-Hill in

1968, poses several philosophical questions on the study of naval history. Samuel Eliot Morison once said the purpose of history is to find out what happened, and why. Most historians would agree. But discerning the truth is particularly difficult in studying the history of war, as Liddell Hart so eloquently addressed in his short treatise, *Why Don't We Learn From History?* Liddell Hart's thesis was that too often flag and general officers have altered the records of their participation in war so that historians might later be persuaded to judge them favorably. Consequently naval and military historians should approach their tasks with caution, skepticism, and humility, for what seems true today may be proven false tomorrow. To emphasize his point, Liddell Hart quoted the American historian, Henry Adams, who replied to a questioning letter: "I have written too much history to believe in it. So if anyone wants to differ from me, I am prepared to agree with him." Liddell Hart then added his own postscript: "The study of *war* history is especially apt to dispel any illusions—about the reliability of men's testimony and their accuracy in general, even apart from the shaping of facts to suit the purposes of propaganda."

When Dr. Reynolds first published *The Fast Carriers* 10 years ago, he had taken on one of the most emotional subjects of the Second World War. Airpower, whether naval or military, too often fails to be treated calmly or objectively. It arouses passions either for or against and as a new and untested form of warfare struggling for status during the Second World War, it was subject both to extravagant claims and to violent denunciations. The wartime efforts of Army Air Force extremists to unify all of the nation's air forces into one service exacerbated suspicions and hostilities even more. Given these controversies, a balanced, impartial, unbiased study of the role of naval airpower was needed and would have been welcomed.

Unfortunately, neither edition of *The Fast Carriers* entirely meets these criteria. Instead, both editions too often uncritically reflect the views of proponents who asserted that naval airpower alone could defeat Japan, that naval aviators were best qualified to direct the war against Japan, and that an antiaviation conspiracy (presumably battleship officers) thwarted their enlightened concepts of modern naval warfare. The source material often was selectively chosen to support these theses, with unduly heavy reliance on uncorroborated entries in the self-serving diaries of John H. Towers and Frederick C. Sherman.

Reynolds' views have not changed with time in this second edition. In an unusual preface to this edition, the author quotes favorable extracts from reviews of the first edition. "The Fast Carriers," the author concludes, "has, thus far at least, stood the test of time and historical evaluation, hence there is no reason for the original text to be altered in any significant way. The writer is therefore pleased to introduce to a new generation of readers a revised edition which is different only in corrected minor errors, an updated bibliography, and the inclusion of some previously unavailable but important documentary materials . . . ." The author does acknowledge that in recent years at least two historical writers have disagreed with certain aspects of his book, but they are dismissed as having chosen "to ignore the challenges made about their subjects in *The Fast Carriers.*"

How, then, has *The Fast Carriers* stood the test of time? Certainly it retains its proaviation bias and fails to recognize that defeating Japan required the combined seapower resources of the United States: airpower; amphibious forces; submarines; mobile logistical support; and civilian industrial capacity.

No one component of seapower alone could have defeated Japan, but the carrier advocates continued to insist that if given a free hand the fast carriers could have destroyed the Imperial Navy and thus rendered Japan helpless, quickly ending the war. Yet these same advocates failed to recognize that a decisive sea battle was possible only if both fleets were willing to fight. But the Japanese were not inclined to risk their fleet unless they had a chance of winning and therefore could not be expected to cooperate—and after the Battle of Midway the Imperial Navy fought only when an amphibious assault had begun. In these cases the American naval commander was faced with two incompatible missions, covering the invasion or leaving the troops in order to seek a remote sea battle. Spruance at Saipan and Halsey at Leyte will forever manifest this classic dilemma.

Towers is the protagonist of *The Fast Carriers* and rightly so as he was the principal American naval airpower advocate of the war. The author asserts that King so disliked Towers that he banished Towers from Washington to Pearl Harbor and then denied Towers a command at sea. This view is based upon Towers' mistaken perception rather than reality. Towers was so accustomed to his role of martyr that he had become almost paranoid by the Second World War. He and King had been friends before the war; indeed, when King had been Chief of the Bureau of Naval Aeronautics in the early 1930s, he had saved Towers' career when the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery had wanted to retire Towers owing to defective vision. King had prevailed upon Leahy, then Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, to retain Towers on active duty because of his importance to naval aviation. One evening in the late 1930s, however, Towers insulted King in a drunken argument and from then on Towers felt that King held a grudge that forevermore had hurt Towers' career. Towers did not realize that King was accustomed to such insults and promptly forgot them. Indeed, the only people King could not forgive were lazy, careless, or stupid. Towers was none of these.

In reality, King was acutely aware of the dissatisfaction of the aviators early in the war, and it was he who initiated the controversial Yarnell survey described in Chapter Two. King sent Towers to Pearl Harbor because King recognized that Nimitz was ignorant about airpower and might unintentionally misuse the Pacific Fleet's carriers. Given Towers' seniority and dominant personality, King could rely upon him to see that the carriers were properly employed. Certainly Towers wanted to go to sea—every respectable flag officer disliked being ashore—but King insisted that personal desires had to be set aside for the good of the service. Towers was needed ashore at Pearl Harbor. There were plenty of other aviators who could command the carriers at sea, but only Towers had the authority and prestige to protect the best interests of naval aviation within CINCPAC headquarters. And Towers did this so vigorously that Nimitz came to dislike him intensely. When King recommended that Towers go to sea in early 1945, Nimitz adamantly refused to agree.

Despite the author's assertion that nothing new has been found over the past 10 years that would affect his text, there has been a number of new facts that could have been incorporated into the second edition. The case of Miles Browning is an example. The author continues to state that Browning was a tactical genius at Midway, and time and again cites Browning as the epitome of an aviator chief of staff for a surface flag officer. Browning's role at Midway has, in fact, been discredited in recent years. Even Morison has admitted that Browning had been more a burden than an asset to Spruance. Browning's ineptness had become so notorious by 1943

that King demanded that Nimitz replace him without delay as Halsey's chief of staff.

On the contrary, then, new sources and new interpretations have appeared in the past decade which could have been incorporated into this second edition. It is regrettable that the text does not reflect them. Nevertheless, *The Fast Carriers* is valuable, not as a balanced history of naval aviation, but rather as a mirror of the views of naval aviators seeking recognition for their service. Its summary of technical developments is also valuable. No other book has done as well in describing the emergence of the carrier as a principal tactical weapon of the Navy in the Second World War. Thus by its uniqueness, despite its flaws, *The Fast Carriers* remains as an important book on the history of naval warfare.

THOMAS BUELL
Commander, U.S. Navy

Rohwer, Jürgen. *The Critical Convoy Battles of March, 1943.* Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1977. 356pp.

The Atlantic Ocean frequently has been the scene of great battles. Perhaps the most intense of these conflicts was during what Winston Churchill called the 20th century's "forty years war." The outcome of both the First and Second World Wars depended to a significant degree on the results of submarine against convoy in the Atlantic.

Jürgen Rohwer, noted German naval historian and editor of *Marine Rundschau*, has exhaustively researched a brief but crucial period in this theater. The Battle of the Atlantic—Germany's attempt in World War II to intervene decisively in the seaborne flow of material from the United States to England—reached a point of crisis during the winter of 1942-1943. During the last quarter of 1942, for the first time since the beginning of the war, Allied production of merchant shipping

exceeded losses (both to weather and Axis activities). In May 1943 Churchill surveyed the Atlantic situation, as well as that in North Africa, Russia, and the Pacific, and declared the "end of the beginning" of winning the war. The intervening period—January through April 1943—was of decisive importance.

"Few outside the two Navies and merchant marine," wrote Samuel Eliot Morison,

realized how serious the situation had become in March 1943. The U-boats ... sank 108 ships that month, totaling 627,000 tons, and lost only 15 of their number. So many Allied escort vessels were under repair that the group organization was disintegrating. So many U-boats were at sea ... that evasive routing was futile .... No enemy ever came so near to disrupting Atlantic communications as [Germany] did that month.

It is precisely that month, March 1943, that Rohwer addresses in his book. In particular, he describes the events surrounding the transits of the convoys designated SC. 122, HX. 229, and HX. 229A.

The author has intensively researched both Allied and German sources to produce a greatly detailed narrative. So great is the detail, in fact, that *Critical Convoy Battles* is a book for the specialist. It is itself a valuable historical source document. Included in the 200 pages of text and the 153 pages of appendixes and bibliography is a wealth of information about the participants—the men as well as the ships—from both sides in the Battle of the Atlantic. The book also contains many detailed diagrams and tables. The photographs are so numerous and excellent that they alone justify the book's purchase.

The convoys discussed were attacked almost continuously during their transit. Although the Germans regarded this battle, occurring primarily from 16-19 March, as a victory—no U-boats were

lost to surface escorts (two were sunk by patrol aircraft) and approximately 20 merchantmen were sunk—it was really an Allied win. Not only did the bulk of the convoys reach their destination but March was to mark the high point of the German U-boat successes. In fact, during the period 28 April-6 May 1943 convoy "ONS-5," composed of 42 ships, transited the North Atlantic with a loss of "only" 13 ships although it was opposed by up to 51 U-boats. In addition, seven of the submarines were sunk, five by the convoy's escorts and two by aircraft. On 24 May 1943 Germany withdrew its submarines from the area. In Rohwer's words, "the Battle of the Atlantic had been decided."

The author discusses more than just this brief period and provides valuable information about the operating methods of Allied and German commanders as they contested the convoys' passages. The heart of the German campaign was communication. The effectiveness of the "wolf pack"—the tactic of coordinated attacks on a convoy by several submarines—depended on frequent use of radio communications. This provided the Allies with a valuable source of intelligence about the U-boats' locations and intentions. Rohwer emphasizes that the Germans were surprisingly slow to appreciate how much information they were giving away to the Allied "HF-DF" or direction-finding effort. Indeed, the author concludes that this was the decisive factor in the Allied victory in the Atlantic, with radar a distant second.

Also of great importance to this victory was the increasing number and range of patrol aircraft. As the primary U-boat tactic was to attack on the surface, aircraft visual and radar surveillance capabilities were excellent detection means, well outranging the surface escorts' radar and sonar resources.

What is striking about the Battle of the Atlantic is the heroism and resourcefulness of the men who fought it. The winter of 1942-1943 was one of the harshest on record and the warships involved, both submarines and escorts, were relatively small, with the latter averaging only 1,000 tons. The author states that he did not intend to produce a book about the "human" story of the battle but rather to investigate "the interplay of forces on both sides in the sphere of operational command with its many technical aspects." He has accomplished this purpose admirably, but also has produced a record of determined and courageous actions by seamen of many nations.

BERNARD D. COLE
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Smyth, Henry DeWolf. *Atomic Energy for Military Purposes: The Official Report of the Development of the Atomic Bomb under the Auspices of the United States Government, 1940-1945.* New York: Da Capo Press, 1976. 264pp. Lens, Sidney. *The Day Before Doomsday: An Anatomy of the Nuclear Arms Race.* Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1977. 274pp. Cave Brown, Anthony, and MacDonald, Charles B., eds. *The Secret History of the Atomic Bomb.* New York: Dial Press, 1977. 582pp.

The books under review here address three aspects of the same conviction: that the advent of atomic and nuclear weapons has constituted an essential break with the past, and a principal problem for the present and future. The Smyth report, a physicist's description of the bomb's genesis, rested on the premise that good national policy in the new technological era would depend on wide public and professional understanding of the problems and capabilities inherent in atomic power. Sidney Lens' book elaborates the author's conviction that exploitation of nuclear technology has threatened the human species, jeopardized democratic and liberal political institutions, and

made war obsolete. The book of documents edited by Brown and MacDonald shows that the nuclear age imperils not only people and political institutions but scholarly standards.

Henry Smyth's report on atomic energy for military purposes was written at the request—or order—of Gen. Leslie R. Groves, who headed the wartime Manhattan Project for the development of an atomic bomb. Completed before the atomic bomb was even tested, it was always intended to be made public—in the case of failure perhaps as an explanation of how huge problems had required huge expenditures even while defying solution, in success as a restrained celebration of triumph in the emerging collaboration of government and science. Originally published late in 1945 (first by the Pentagon and then by Princeton University Press), the report summarized the theoretical problem the atomic scientists had faced at the outset of their wartime crash program, the administrative history of the project's several phases, and the main lines of research on principal alternative solutions to the difficulties of atomic weapons development.

The report undoubtedly was a landmark in public knowledge of the new technology. In the introduction to their book, discussed below, Brown and MacDonald also argue that the report was one ingredient vital to the success of Russian catchup atomic development from 1945 to 1949, serving as a sort of handbook of problems and solutions outside the classified fields of bomb engineering. Parenthetically, in this age of Freedom of Information laws and voluminous declassification requests, it is interesting to see the curt and confident manner in which Gen. Groves anticipated the possibility that the Smyth report might stimulate rather than satisfy curiosity. The volume appeared with his personal introduction containing this paragraph:

All pertinent scientific information which can be released to the public at this time without violating the needs of national security is contained in this volume. No requests for additional information should be made to private persons or organizations associated directly or indirectly with the project. Persons disclosing or securing additional information by any means whatsoever without authorization are subject to severe penalties under the Espionage Act.

That, one might suspect, is enough to induce attacks of nostalgia in hundreds, perhaps thousands, of government officials of the 1970s.

In his ominously titled book, Lens presents familiar arguments against reliance on nuclear weapons or technology. Nuclear weapons, he asserts, have made war obsolete because they have removed war's decisiveness as between major nuclear adversaries, and war that cannot bring decision—victory—to one side or the other is purposeless. Nuclear weapons have made it impossible to defend national boundaries. Nuclear wastes are perennially poisonous and probably unmanageable. These things mean that the world faces an immediate choice: either it must accept the fact that nuclear weapons, nuclear wastes, and nuclear proliferation require complete and effective international control leading to their elimination, or (alternative a) somebody will blow humanity to hell; (alternative b) to keep the lid on it will be necessary to erect extremely stable political institutions, which will be possible only at the expense of personal and political liberties.

It will be obvious that the argument of this volume is exaggerated, the viewpoint extreme and pessimistic. Yet it is worthwhile reading, especially for people who do not as a matter of course follow the arms race and associated issues. Lens presents his views, and a lot

of information on recent and current policy, with logic, flair, and literacy. He has a good eye for the absurdities and infelicities of official justifications for policies that do not stand close scrutiny. And he points clearly to the most worrisome aspect of present developments in this area. In the "first nuclear age," as he calls it, only the United States and the Soviet Union were seriously engaged in quasi-nuclear antagonism. But as of the early 1970s, a "second nuclear age" has opened, in which the number of nuclear weapons and nuclear capable states is increasing rapidly. Clearly, the nuclear threat to world security is not going to become easier to manage in the near future.

In The Secret History of the Atomic Bomb, Cave Brown and MacDonald have unfortunately given in to the temptation to publish a "non-book." They have published almost 600 pages of selections from the 35-volume official history of the Manhattan Engineering District. More than one-fifth of their book is an incomplete version of the Smyth report discussed above. Cave Brown's introduction to the volume is inappropriately titled, unfocused, and erroneous. The documents are presented without explanations of significance, selection criteria, annotation, or indications of abridgment. There is no index. In many instances the editors chose to publish the summary chapters of long sections in the official histories, so that the coverage of topics is extensive in breadth, abbreviated in depth. In sum, Cave Brown and MacDonald have succeeded in being the first to "edit" and "publish" this material, and perhaps that is distinction enough.

It remains an open question just what difference the bomb has made to politics, civilization, humankind. This riddle needs to be asked and answers attempted, whether doomsday is near or far, even though any clear solution seems likely to be elusive for some time to come.

THOMAS H. ETZOLD
Naval War College

Snyder, Glenn H., and Diesing, Paul. *Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977. 578pp.

In this lengthy book Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing have made a carefully argued and clearly written contribution to the growing contemporary literature on the anatomy of crises. As they acknowledge in the preface, the Naval War College Center for Advanced Research was able to provide the support needed for completion of the work.

The book, while clear and well-organized, is not easy to read because the material itself is very complex. There are only seven chapters, some of them 100 pages long. Sequentially, these chapters cover, after a short introduction, formal models of bargaining, crisis bargaining strategies and tactics, information processing, decisionmaking, crises and international systems, and—finally· summary and synthesis. Interspersed are 61 "figures" and 15 tables.

It is too difficult to attempt to summarize the argument in the limited space of a review. The progression of the book can, however, be indicated. Chapter II shows that bargaining models vary greatly in their "usefulness for understanding crisis bargaining." The most useful model they found to be the 2×2 game (and its 3×3 extension), at least with certain adaptations to "incorporate various cognitive processes—search, information processing, building up and revising subjective estimates of the bargaining situation, constructing and revising strategies." Accordingly, after a less formal analysis of the bargaining process in crises (Chapter III), Chapters IV and V analyze that reformulated model. Chapter VI examines the effects caused by variations in the nature of the international system (i.e., variations in number of actors, etc.). Chapter VII is a summary and synthesis.

The book, because it has two authors, adopts a special device to clarify divergences in their views. Each author wrote several of the chapters and then amended them to take account of his colleague's critique. Where important differences persisted, footnotes expound the point. See p. 407 for an illustration, author Snyder dissenting. (I agree strongly with Snyder.)

What the book attempts to do it does well, and the material is certainly important. But what it does not do is important, too. As it looks at crises as categories occurring in a system, it suffers (as does Schelling's work, which they frequently cite) from being essentially devoid of cultural context. Their approach is perfectly valid and has value; I only point out that generalizing about actors, structures, and systems can usefully be taken only so far. Then its results have to be cross-tabulated against a look at the specific cultural context in which diverse actors approach decisionmaking. It is not only important to look at crises comparing changes in the system but at crises comparing who was involved (and considering the stage of their always changing self-views of their proper role in world affairs). Snyder and Diesing do not, of course, attempt this second task.

FREDERICK H. HARTMANN
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Steinberg, Eleanor B., and Yager, Joseph A., with Brannon, Gerard M. *New Means of Financing International Needs.* Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1978. 256pp.

The United Nations is already experiencing what seems to be a chronic shortage of funds for maintenance of peacekeeping forces and for assistance to developing nations. In coming years there is likely to be a growing shortage of funds to pay for such new international services as controls over pollution of the environment. The answer to the dilemma of growing demand for international services, and a relatively fixed supply of financial means, is sought by Eleanor B. Steinberg and Joseph A. Yager in new means of finance, and not in economies in services.

The authors believe that the existing means of raising money for international purposes—voluntary contributions by national governments to the United Nations and its associated agencies, or funds borrowed in capital markets by the World Bank and other international financial institutions—will not be adequate in future. Accordingly they study other possible sources of finance, including taxes on international trade, on oil, on raw materials, on international investment income and, most interestingly, on pollution of the marine environment. They also explore the possibility of raising funds from the proceeds of exploiting resources in or under international waters, in particular manganese nodules on the ocean bed. No possibility is excluded simply because its adoption seems unlikely for the time being, but clearly, unless nation states are to abandon both part of their sovereign rights and their propensity to disagree with each other, the scope for international taxation is limited, perhaps more limited than the authors appear to realize. Again, there are serious fiscal problems when taxes are collected in different currencies, some of them inconvertible, and some with highly variable exchange rates. Certainly the political and economic complexities of international taxation made this reader wonder whether the existing system of voluntary contributions and of borrowing by international agencies is not the best possible solution in an imperfect world.

Be that as it may, nautical interest will center on the authors' ideas for taxes on polluters of the marine environment. Such taxation would raise revenue only incidentally, the main purpose being to give polluters an

economic incentive to reduce pollution, particularly from oil spillage. The case of *Torrey Canyon* is noted, when a tanker flying a flag of convenience ran aground in the English Channel outside British territorial water in 1967, causing what was then the most costly oilspill on record. The owners of the tanker who were inadequately insured refused to acknowledge responsibility. The only readily available assets of the company were two other tankers, one of which was seized by British naval forces, and released only in exchange for a bond of security from the company. Such incidents raise problems in international law, and the United Nations, lacking a navy, would not seem to be well placed to police the ocean unless member states agree to their vessels being policed by each other's navies. Steinberg and Yager attempt to bypass this problem by what seem at first sight to be practicable fiscal expedients, but even collection of taxes on polluters would depend on cooperation by national port authorities, and past experience of the attitude of flag-of-convenience nations makes one wonder whether the authors might not have been more pessimistic on this score.

Nevertheless, the tone of the book is one of caution and careful appraisal. The general reader is likely to find the "if-pigs-had-wings" approach tiresome, however logical, but doubtless this product of the Brookings Institution has provided food for thought in the finance offices of the United Nations.

DR. G.C. PEDEN
University of Bristol

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RECENT BOOKS

Selected Accessions of the Naval War College Library

Annotated by

Ann Hardy, with Kathleen Ashook
Doris Baginski and Mary Ann Varoutsos

Bagley, Worth H. *Sea Power and Western Security: the Next Decade.* Adelphi Papers, no. 139. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1977. 40pp. $1.50
After comparing the relative strengths of the armed forces of the United States and the Soviet Union, Admiral Bagley argues that the balance of power is gradually shifting towards the East, thus undermining the military stability of the world. He analyzes the implications of this premise and proposes several measures Western seapower can employ to arrest such a trend.

Bayliss, Gwyn M. *Bibliographic Guide to the Two World Wars.* New York: Bowker, 1977. 578pp. $30.00
The volumes listed in this guide to bibliographies and reference works on World War I and World War II are arranged by category, with a brief annotation. Included are materials published through 1976, which are indexed by author, title, subject, and country or region.

Bell, Coral. *The Diplomacy of Détente.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977. 278pp. $12.50

Détente is approached from the triangular perspective of Soviet-American-Chinese relations. Policies of previous administrations which influenced the evolution of détente are examined, but the focus is on the Kissinger years from 1969 to 1977.

Borowiec, Andrew. *Yugoslavia after Tito.* New York: Praeger, 1977. 122pp. $15.00

Based on approximately 70 interviews with experts on Yugoslavian government, this brief study addresses some of the major problems to be faced by Tito's successors: the lack of strong national leaders; the fragility of Yugoslavia's economic system; the vulnerability of its federal government to regional forces; and the Soviet pressure which probably will be brought to bear upon Yugoslavia's independence.

Burrell, R. Michael and Kelidar, Abbas R. *Egypt: the Dilemmas of a Nation, 1970-1977.* Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1977. 78pp. $3.00

The authors outline the problems confronting Egypt and analyze the confluence of domestic and international factors which helped to shape the country's present situation.

Chafe, William H. *Women and Equality: Changing Patterns in American Culture.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1977. 207pp. $8.95

A comparison of the women's movement with the experiences of blacks in America is the major point of this history of U.S. feminism in the 19th and 20th centuries. It explores the operation of social control in American society and what the process of social change has entailed in the past and may entail in the future.

Durch, William J. *The Cuban Military in Africa and the Middle East: from Algeria to Angola.* Professional Paper No. 201. Arlington, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 1977. 67pp. (AD AO45 675) $5.25; microfiche $3.00*

This paper traces Cuban military involvement in Africa and the Middle East from 1961 to the present in light of Cuban-Soviet relations. It concludes that Cuba's military intervention in Angola was neither a radical departure in Cuba's foreign policy nor a response to a Soviet dictum, but part of a series of similar ongoing military missions.

*For sale by the National Technical Information Service, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Va. 22151.

Eichelberger, Clark M. *Organizing for Peace; a Personal History of the Founding of the United Nations.* New York: Harper & Row, 1977. 317pp. $12.50

These reminiscences of an American internationalist who was an active official in support of the League of Nations, and later a participant in the creation of the United Nations, are presented chronologically, following the evolution in American foreign policy from 1920 to the present.

Friendly, Alfred. *Beaufort of the Admiralty*. New York: Random House, 1977. 361pp. $15.00

The subject of this biography is Sir Francis Beaufort, British naval officer and maritime surveyor and cartographer who served as Hydrographer of the Admiralty from 1829 to 1854. During his tenure, the Hydrographic Office became world renowned for the outstanding accuracy and completeness of its work.

Harrison, Selig F. *China, Oil, and Asia: Conflict Ahead?* New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. 317pp. $10.95

Harrison examines in text and maps China's oil production prospects, stressing its offshore resources and offering some perhaps excessive estimates on its future potential. He foresees that China's oil will be an important factor in Asian politics, influencing neighboring countries and the international law of the sea question. The author recommends that the U.S. Government and American oil companies avoid involvement in disputes over oil boundaries and issues in the East Asian area. Based largely on interviews with geologists, government officials, and oil company executives, the book contains no bibliography.

Hazleton, Lesley. *Israeli Women; the Reality behind the Myth*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1977. 235pp. $8.95

The purpose of this exploration into some of the paradoxes and contradictions evident in the legal and social status of Israeli women is to encourage them to develop a heightened awareness of their role and social position. The myths and ideologies which perpetuate the existing societal perceptions of womanhood are emphasized.

Herr, Michael. *Dispatches*. New York: Knopf, 1977. 260pp. $8.95

The war correspondent author of these frank and moving reports empathizes with the enlisted Marines as they endured the psychic and physical agonies of the Vietnam conflict. Barracks humor in the unbowdlerized conversations of the grunts balances with Herr's emotion and his literacy flair to portray the rock-and-roll generation as it lived in closest intimacy with death and disillusion.

Lord, Walter. *Lonely Vigil; Coastwatchers of the Solomons*. New York: Viking Press, 1977. 322pp. $12.50

The author of such bestsellers as *A Night to Remember* and *Day of Infamy* here recounts the vital services rendered by the Islands Coastwatching Service in the Solomon Islands during World War II, observing and teleradio reporting Japanese naval and air actions and rescuing Allied service casualty cases—among them John F. Kennedy. The Coastwatchers, their daily relationships and experiences, and their invaluable contribution to the Allied victory in the Pacific are vividly presented in this well-illustrated volume.

Montagu, Ewen. *Beyond Top Secret Ultra*. New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1978. 192pp. $7.95

The author of *The Man Who Never Was*, the true story of an exciting wartime deception, tells further of his experiences during World War II as an officer deeply involved in British naval intelligence and its network of double agents.

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Morison, Samuel Eliot. *Sailor Historian; the Best of Samuel Eliot Morison.*
Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977. 431pp. $15.00
An interesting cross section of Admiral Morison's writings is contained in
these selections which range from brief reminiscences to excerpts from his
monumental work, *The History of United States Naval Operations in World
War II.* Long distinguished as a scholar on both sides of the Atlantic, Morison
was also a great lover of the sea who enjoyed sailing in the paths of the
ancient explorers and visiting the sites of the naval battles he so enthusiasti-
cally described.

Morris, Eric. *The Russian Navy: Myth and Reality.* New York: Stein and Day,
1977. 150pp. $9.95
A concise, readable analysis of the growth, role, and current status of the
Soviet Navy, this volume treats its history, its policies, the motivation and
course of its development, its strategy, its composition and deployment, and
the purposes it serves. The author's position is that the dramatic expansion of
the Red Fleet has been in reaction to the challenge of U.S./Western seapower.

Smedley, Agnes. *Portraits of Chinese Women in Revolution.* Old Westbury,
N.Y.: Feminist Press, 1976. 203pp. paper $3.95
From 1928 to 1941, Agnes Smedley, an activist and a feminist, lived and
worked in revolutionary China. These stories and sketches selected from a
variety of her writings document the struggle for the liberation of Chinese
women within the context of the revolution as a whole.

Snepp, Frank. *Decent Interval; an Insider's Account of Saigon's Indecent End
Told by the CIA's Chief Strategy Analyst in Vietnam.* New York: Random
House, 1977. 590pp. $14.95
A controversial exposé that bitterly censures U.S. judgment and action during
the 1975 evacuation of Saigon has been written by a former CIA analyst who
is highly critical of officials of the U.S. State Department and CIA and their
lack of candid intercommunication in the crisis. He expresses deep concern
over destruction of U.S. records and abandonment of many Vietnamese who
had been employed as U.S. agents, accusing American personnel of irrespon-
sible and heartless behavior.

Steele, Jonathan. *Inside East Germany; the State That Came In from the
Cold.* New York: Urizen Books, 1977. 256pp. $12.95
In an era when European communism is the focus of considerable interest,
this history of the German Democratic Republic provides one example of
Communist adjustment to the Western political system. The author contends
that East Germany is not a replica of the U.S.S.R., but a uniquely German
state which resembles the old Germany even more closely than its counter-
part in the West.

Tucker, Robert W. *The Inequality of Nations.* New York: Basic Books, 1977.
214pp. $10.95
In this very significant and trenchant book, the author examines the present
accommodationist socialistic trend in support of the equality of all nations—
rich, poor, and economically emerging. He finds that "equality" to the Third
World means greater national power, greater concessions by the capitalist

West, and a nuclear capability—in short, greater wealth and power for themselves, not a new democratic egalitarianism. Such an international system is seen as effecting no real change in the inherently unequal order, only a new hierarchy exerting much less control and posing much greater danger to national security.

U.S. Congressional Budget Office. *Assessing the NATO/Warsaw Pact Military Balance.* Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977. 63pp. $2.40

Based on the premise that the major determinant of the defense budget is how the United States plans to meet its commitments to NATO, this paper is the first in a CBO series intended objectively to describe and analyze the ramifications of that commitment.

Van Tien Dung. *Our Great Spring Victory.* New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977. 275pp. $15.00

The last days of the Vietnam war from the perspective of Gen. Van Tien Dung, chief of staff of the North Vietnamese Army and commander of the final military campaign.

Watson, Jac D. *The Defense of Offshore Structures.* Memorandum 1415-75. Arlington, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 1976. 32pp. No charge

A corollary of the growing U.S. dependence on the development and processing of ocean resources is the requirement to protect the vital and vulnerable offshore structures against the covert or terrorist attack entailing hostages, sabotage, and environmental damage. The probabilities and problems facing the Navy in affording this protection are here explored and analyzed: prevention, reaction, and damage control are discussed, and some conclusions are presented.

Yanarella, Ernest J. *The Missile Defense Crisis.* Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1977. 236pp. $17.25

This historical study of the development of the antiballistic missile system (ABM), and the ensuing public controversy which continued from the McNamara years until SALT I, encompasses extensive analysis of the ideological roots and external factors that influence the decisionmaking processes in American defense research.

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