

1978

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### Recommended Citation

Horward, Donald D. (1978) "British Seapower and its Influence Upon the Peninsular War (1808-1814)," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 31 : No. 1 , Article 8.  
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol31/iss1/8>

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*The Napoleonic Wars have provided generations of soldiers and sailors with lessons and case studies. The problems of an amphibious power were discussed in an earlier issue; a successful joint land-sea operation by that power is discussed here, an operation whose failure would have meant the loss of Wellington's army.*

## **BRITISH SEAPOWER AND ITS INFLUENCE UPON THE PENINSULAR WAR (1808—1814)**

by

Donald D. Horward

In the wars spawned by the French Revolution seapower played a significant role in the ultimate outcome. In addition to the actual sea war carried on between France and England and their allies, seapower became a crucial factor in mainland operations carried on by England. Admittedly, many joint operations undertaken by the Royal Navy and the British Army were unmitigated failures, such as the landings in Holland in 1799, at Aboukir in 1799, in Sweden in 1808, and more notably at the Scheldt in 1809. However, in the war which raged in the Iberian Peninsula from 1808 until 1814, British naval power was successfully used in coordination with a small English army in an effort to support the insurrection in Spain and Portugal.

The defeat of Napoleon and the collapse of the Empire have been

attributed to many factors: the invasion of Russia, the Continental System, nationalism, English control of the seas, the treatment of the Pope, etc., but less emphasis is usually placed on the Peninsular War which was, in fact, a prime cause in the destruction of the Napoleonic Empire. It was in Spain and Portugal that the bleached bones of 300,000 French soldiers and the reputations of several French marshals were left as a testimony to the ferocity of the struggle.

Napoleon's involvement in the Peninsular War was related directly to the Continental System, designed to destroy English maritime trade and undermine its position as the "paymaster of Europe." Two nations, Portugal and Sweden, refused to close their ports and cut economic ties with England. Sweden was of little consequence but Portugal,

defiant and proud, ultimately became the focal point of resistance to French domination in the Peninsula. Although Napoleon insisted that the ruler of Portugal close his ports to the British vessels and declare war on England, Prince Regent João attempted to placate the French Emperor by accepting all of his demands except declaring war on Portugal's longest and most steadfast ally.<sup>1</sup> As a result, France and Spain concluded the Treaty of Fontainebleau on 28 September 1807, providing for the joint invasion and partition of Portugal. Nine days earlier, however, a French army of 25,000 men under the command of Gen. Andoche Junot had crossed the Bidassoa River and entered Spain.<sup>2</sup> Aided by the Spanish authorities and supported by three Spanish armies, Junot raced through Spain driven by Napoleon's continued orders that he seize the Prince Regent, capture the Portuguese Fleet, and occupy Portugal.

The British representative in Lisbon, Viscount Percy Strangford, approached the Prince Regent about sending a fleet to aid in the evacuation of the Government to Brazil but he warned that no troops or supplies would be sent to defend Portugal.<sup>3</sup> Don João procrastinated until the night of 9-10 November when he and the Royal Council decided that the time of appeasement had come to an end: if French and Spanish forces crossed the frontier the Government and royal family would sail for Brazil. Orders were issued for the transfer of the state treasury, the archives, and the precious objects to the Portuguese Fleet in the Tagus.<sup>4</sup> The Prince Regent and members of the royal family embarked and at 0800 on 29 November 1807, the first calm day in over a week, 15 Portuguese ships of the line and some 20 transports set sail in brisk northeast winds to join Sir Sidney Smith's squadron waiting at the estuary of the Tagus to escort them to Brazil.<sup>5</sup> However, the wind abated and the

following morning Junot, at the head of 1500 emaciated and exhausted soldiers of his advance guard, entered Lisbon and marched directly down to the Tagus only to see the Portuguese Fleet still in sight but safely over the bar.<sup>6</sup> Simultaneously, Spanish armies occupied Entre Minho y Douro in the north and Algarve in the south without opposition, completing the conquest of Portugal.

As soon as the French occupied Lisbon and the major fortresses of Lisbon, Junot began to dismantle the Portuguese Military Establishment. The militia was abolished and the regular army disbanded, with the exception of 6,000 troops sent to France to serve with the *Grande Armée*. The Portuguese fortresses, magazines, and military installations were placed under French command, the citizens were disarmed, high-ranking military and civil officials were removed from office and sent to France, the Regency Council established by João was soon dissolved, Junot assumed absolute powers in the name of the Emperor, and the Portuguese military and administrative organizations ceased to exist.<sup>7</sup>

Within 6 months, however, this situation had changed drastically as a result of Napoleon's decision to replace the unreliable and incompetent Bourbons on the Spanish throne. Under the pretext of reinforcing Junot's forces in Portugal, Napoleon sent over 100,000 men to occupy strategic fortresses in the northern provinces of Spain. Carlos IV, King of Spain, and his son, the heir apparent Fernando VII, were lured across the French frontier to Bayonne where, through Napoleon's threats and their own jealousies, they renounced their throne in his favor. In response, the Spanish rose up in revolt in Madrid on 2 May, *Dos Mayo*, in defense of their country and their monarchy. Three weeks later insurrection erupted in Asturias and spread across Spain; provinces established revolutionary

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juntas and provincial armies to resist the French and restore the monarchy. The revolt soon affected Spanish troops occupying Porto in northern Portugal and they withdrew, encouraging the Portuguese to resist the French. The French were overthrown, a revolutionary junta was established, and Portuguese agents were sent to London to seek aid against their common enemy.<sup>8</sup>

Meanwhile, Junot appealed to the Portuguese to form an army for the defense of their coastline against the British<sup>9</sup> but they responded by proclaiming a revolt against French authority. In England the Foreign Secretary, George Canning, as well as the opposition led by Richard Sheridan, supported the proposal to send aid to the insurrectionaries in the Peninsula. Sir Arthur Wellesley, conqueror of India and Under Secretary for Ireland, was chosen by Viscount Castlereagh at the War Office to command an expeditionary force of 9,505 men destined for the Peninsula. The fleet sailed from Cork in mid-July 1808 and after preliminary landings at La Corunna and Porto, Wellesley anchored in Mondego Bay on 1 August and began to disembark his army. Five days later Gen. Brent Spencer landed some 5,000 reinforcements at the mouth of the Mondego.<sup>10</sup> After transportation had been secured and organized, the British Army, supported by a contingent of the recently organized Portuguese Army, marched along the coastal road toward Lisbon, taking care to retain contact with merchantmen which sailed along the coast carrying supplies and reinforcements.

Simultaneously, Junot labored frantically to concentrate his army before Lisbon. To gain time he posted a rear guard under General Henri Delaborde at Roliça but Wellesley outflanked and overwhelmed his position, forcing him back on Junot's main army with considerable loss. On 21 August the only

major encounter of the campaign took place on the rolling hills at Vimeiro where French forces were decisively defeated. With a demoralized army, isolated from other French units in Spain, and lacking the most basic resources, Junot agreed to the Convention of Sintra which ultimately resulted in the evacuation of the entire French Army and its baggage and equipment to France aboard 155 British merchantmen.<sup>11</sup>

The success of the British Army over Junot's forces were a result of both sea and landpower. With the active support of the British Navy, especially Adm. Charles Cotton's squadron blockading Lisbon harbor, and Wellesley's army marching from the north, Junot found his army caught in a pincer from which he was fortunate to escape. Napoleon, accurately grasping Junot's plight, observed "You have gained this convention [of Sintra] by your courage, not your dispositions; and it is with reason that the English complain that their generals signed it."<sup>12</sup>

In the meantime, a French army commanded by Gen. Pierre Dupont had been surrounded by Spanish forces and forced to surrender at Baylen in July 1808. The Spanish armies assumed the offensive and attacked the French armies on all fronts. The French were forced back in most areas and Joseph Bonaparte, the new King of Spain, evacuated Madrid and retired to the Ebro River to collect his disorganized forces. With the French position in Spain seriously jeopardized, Napoleon resolved to go to Spain himself to recoup French losses, end Spanish resistance in the Peninsula, and drive the remaining British troops at Lisbon into the sea. Accompanied by 100,000 men of the *Grande Armée*, Napoleon arrived in Spain at the end of October 1808. He concentrated almost 200,000 men behind the Ebro River and then in a series of lightning strokes which began on 29 October at Zornosa and ended on 2

December when he reached the gates of Madrid, he overthrew three Spanish armies. Napoleon had only "to plant [his] eagles on the forts of Lisbon" and "drive the English army from the Peninsula"<sup>13</sup> to end the Peninsular War.

As Napoleon had advanced on Madrid Sir John Moore who had replaced Wellesley in Lisbon resolved to move in support of the Spanish armies. With perhaps 15,000 men, Moore's army moved in two separate columns to Salamanca where he would be in a position to threaten Napoleon's flanks and communications. Meanwhile, during the first weeks of October, several contingents of troops landed under the command of Gen. David Baird at La Corunna. When these forces were concentrated at Salamanca by Moore on 11 December 1808, his force totaled 25,730 actives which was supplemented by 8,000 Spanish troops commanded by the Marquis de la Romana.<sup>14</sup> Moore had contemplated aiding the Spanish in the defense of Madrid but their armies collapsed, forcing him to give up the operation. However, when he learned of the position of an isolated French corps commanded by Marshal Nicolas Soult to the northeast on the Carrion River, he resolved to attack at once.<sup>15</sup> Intelligence of Moore's threatening position reached Napoleon on 20 December as Marshal François Lefebvre's advance guard reached Talavera en route to Lisbon. Napoleon immediately revised his plans in the hope of fulfilling his fondest dreams—capturing a British army. He wrote to King Joseph, "Put in your newspapers that 36,000 English are surrounded, that I am in their rear while Soult is in front of them."<sup>16</sup> The immense French Army, destined for the invasion of Portugal was thrust across the Guadarrama Pass to cut the British line of retreat. Spearheaded by Ney's cavalry, the 6th Corps and the Imperial Guard, followed by the infantry regiments of Generals Pierre Lapisse and Jean Dessolles, some 42,000 men,

dashed through the Guadarramas toward Valladolid where Moore had concentrated some 33,000 troops to attack Soult on the Carrion.<sup>17</sup> On 23 December, a day before the scheduled attack on Soult, Moore received information of Napoleon's approach. He immediately ordered a retreat toward La Corunna where he hoped the Royal Navy would be waiting.<sup>18</sup> The advance guard of Napoleon's army along with Soult's converging corps made contact with Moore's rear guard on the Esla River on 27 December,<sup>19</sup> and for the next 15 days a running battle ensued, interrupted by several desperate rear guard actions. Discipline began to disintegrate in the British Army and excesses were committed by stragglers as they fled to escape pursuing French cavalry. The wounded and baggage were abandoned, villages were looted and burned, magazines were destroyed, disabled wagons and dead horses clogged the road, thousands of stragglers, many drunk from wineries along the route, were captured or sabred; only the British rear guard prevented the retreat from turning into a rout.<sup>20</sup> The first columns of Moore's exhausted army reached La Corunna on 11 January but only 100 vessels were in the harbor, less than half those required to embark the army. Additional merchantmen had put to sea from Vigo but a strong easterly had delayed their arrival. With Soult and Ney closing in on La Corunna, Moore had no choice but to fight and await the arrival of the remaining vessels.<sup>21</sup>

The wounded, the baggage, and the nonessential equipment were embarked while Moore deployed his army in a last desperate effort to hold off the French. The transports continued to slip into the harbor of La Corunna and on 14 January, another 110 vessels had dropped anchor raising the number to perhaps 250.<sup>22</sup> Assured of adequate transportation for his army, Moore prepared for his last battle which took

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place on 16 January 1809 on the heights above La Corunna and in the suburbs around Elvina. In this bitterly fought struggle each army suffered approximately 900 casualties and among the dead was John Moore who fell in the midst of the fighting as dusk approached.<sup>23</sup> After darkness had settled over the battlefield, the British Army was quietly embarked and early the following morning as the fleet was slipping anchor and setting sail for England, Moore's aides wrapped him in his great coat and buried him in a bastion of the citadel amid the firing of the French artillery overlooking the harbor. Once at sea the fleet, caught up in a strong southwesterly gale, was driven to England in 4 or 5 days.

Arriving at Portsmouth and other coastal ports, all troops landed as they had embarked—in uniforms worn during the retreat, stained with blood, powder, and filth. The English public and, more particularly, the members of Parliament were shocked and appalled to see the remnants of Moore's once proud army, the largest sent to the continent since the campaigns of the Duke of Marlborough 100 years earlier, in an apparent state of disintegration. Casualties were alarmingly high, over 7,000 men, but surrender or annihilation had been averted by the timely arrival of the Royal Navy.<sup>24</sup> Nevertheless, it should be noted that Moore's disastrous defeat had, in retrospect, resulted in a remarkable achievement. Napoleon and his army had been diverted from their goal of occupying Lisbon, driving its British garrison into the sea, and, in effect, ending the Peninsular War. The Royal Navy's contributions in this operation were crucial. Not only had Moore's army been saved but by the evacuation of his army, the navy successfully demonstrated that although British armies might be defeated, they would live to fight another day if they only could reach the sea.

for Paris on 2 January, after realizing he could not overtake Moore, he issued orders for Soult to invade Portugal with the 2nd Corps. Soult, in concert with Marshal Claude Victor, marching from the east, was expected to advance on Lisbon and drive the British Army into the sea.<sup>25</sup> However, with an army too small to accomplish Napoleon's goals, Soult advanced to Porto, the second city of Portugal, where he halted to consolidate his position and awaited intelligence of Victor's movements.

The British Government, initially stunned and dismayed by the results of Moore's expedition, resolved to continue their support of the insurrectionaries in the Peninsula. British transports plied the Atlantic between English seaports and Lisbon bringing supplies and reinforcements to the small British Army still in the Capital. Wellesley, exonerated before a Board of Inquiry for his role in the Convention of Sintra, returned to Lisbon on 21 April 1809 to take command of this army, numbering 23,455 men.<sup>26</sup> Supported by a reorganized Portuguese Army, financed by British funds and commanded by Marshal William Carr Beresford, Wellesley advanced directly on Porto where he surprised Soult, and drove his army from Portugal, capturing baggage and inflicting over 5,000 casualties on the 2nd Corps.<sup>27</sup> Thus ended France's second attempt to subdue Portugal. In this instance Napoleon was primarily responsible for Soult's failure. Napoleon had experienced all the difficulties characteristic of the Peninsular War, especially the topographic, logistic, and strategic problems encountered in the pursuit of Moore in 1808; however, he assumed these conditions had ceased to exist when Soult invaded Portugal. Soult's campaign was doomed to failure from its inception for he had a deficient army, inadequate supplies and communications, and the impossible task of coordinating his operations with Victor while his antagonist, Wellesley, had the

Although Napoleon had turned back

advantage of an allied population and, thanks to the Royal Navy, reinforcements, supplies, and ready communications with England.

In the summer of 1808 Soult was again ordered to begin preparations to lead 60,000 men into Portugal but his forces were diverted in an attempt to cut off Wellesley who advanced into Spain to threaten King Joseph's capital.<sup>28</sup> He was forced to fight a bloody battle at Talavera, 70 miles from Madrid, on 27 July 1809 without the promised support of the Spanish Army. Learning of Soult's approach, he fell back into Portugal exasperated by the conduct of the Spanish, convinced that the safety of his forces in the Peninsula depended upon his ability to mobilize Portugal and carry on a war from there. No doubt his decision was predicated upon the realization that he would be near the sea and in a position to utilize the strengths of the British Navy.

In the meantime, the reorganization of the Portuguese Army continued under Beresford. Despite the logistics problems encountered in the campaign against Soult at Porto and during the summer of 1809, by January 1810 the Portuguese Army had reached a level of effectiveness which prompted Wellesley, now the Viscount Wellington, to write, "I have had opportunities of seeing fifteen regiments in the Portuguese service, and I have great pleasure in informing your Lordship that the progress of all these troops in discipline is considerable, [and] that some of the regiments are in very good order." English and Portuguese regiments were brigaded together under English command, the British Commissariat began to assume responsibility for the arrival and distribution of supplies and equipment, agreement was reached for the British Government to provide £980,000 during the year for maintenance of 30,000 Portuguese troops in the field, the Paymaster's Corps was decentralized to facilitate the rapid and

equitable distribution of pay to the soldiers, alternate means of transportation were secured, magazines were established in provincial depots, health services and hospitals were reorganized and, as Napoleon's plans for the third invasion of Portugal were coming to fruition, Wellington resolved to assume the responsibility for feeding the Portuguese troops.<sup>29</sup> Despite the enormous quantities of food and supplies that would have to be imported to feed an army totaling 60,000 to 70,000 men, Wellington was convinced that the British merchant fleet would not be wanting.

In addition to the newly organized, trained, equipped, and commanded Portuguese Army, Wellington developed elaborate plans to mobilize and defend the Kingdom against the anticipated French invasion. His most notable project, the Lines of Torres Vedras, was actually based on the plans of Portuguese Maj. Neves Costa who has been ignored by historians. Neves Costa carefully reconnoitered the terrain north of Lisbon and sent a detailed survey and map of his findings to Forjaz. This material was forwarded to Wellington who extrapolated upon the Portuguese engineer's plans.<sup>30</sup> With Neves Costa's plans in mind and probably in hand, Wellington and the commander of the Royal Engineers, Lt. Col. Richard Fletcher, surveyed the terrain across the peninsula on which Lisbon was situated. Following this reconnaissance, Wellington drew up his famous memorandum of 20 October 1809 describing the outline of what became one of the most important fortified lines ever constructed. Initially Wellington visualized two lines of defense with a number of forward positions to be established on prominent topographical features to control the approaches to the Allied positions; these outposts included 32 redoubts and a total of 143 pieces of artillery. The original line of fortifications, later to become the second line,

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was established with its right flank on the Tagus at Quintela and its left 22 miles westward at the estuary of the San Lourenço on the Atlantic. When this line was completed, 215 guns and 15,442 men defended its 69 redoubts. The next line, established around the fortress of São Julião near the mouth of the Tagus, was constructed to permit the embarkment of an army in event the British were forced to turn to the Royal Navy for evacuation; this position was defended by 94 guns in 13 redoubts manned by 5,350 men. In July 1810 Capt. John T. Jones, as an afterthought, transformed the outposts before the main line into another fortified line 29 miles long; when this was completed 319 pieces of artillery, housed in 69 redoubts, were served by 18,863 men. When the three lines were finally completed in 1812, they included 628 guns in 165 redoubts with a complement of 39,475 men.

These self-sufficient fortifications varied in size, shape, and strength to conform to the terrain but they all reflected a general format which included 5-foot parapets and banquettes, preceded by a ditch 15 feet wide and 10 feet deep, and palisades before them; these fieldworks were defended by garrisons varying from 50 to 500 men. In addition, several fortifications resembling fortlets were constructed at Torres Vedras, Monte Agraça, and Montechique; they included up to 50 guns and garrisons of several thousand soldiers. Besides these formidable positions, the topography in the vicinity of the lines was utilized to further enhance these defenses. The roads approaching the lines were cut and barricaded, valleys were blocked with abatis, trenches were dug, hills were escarped and rocky slopes were blasted into perpendicular precipices, trees obstructing lines of fire were felled, bridges were mined, and rivers were dammed and flooded. To facilitate the rapid movement of Allied troops and communications, lateral

roads were constructed and the Royal Navy established and manned a telegraph system along and between the lines. Navy gunboats were anchored in the Tagus at Alhandra to obstruct the advance of French forces near the riverbank and any attack upon either extreme of the lines would fall under the fire of these vessels.

As the French invasion became imminent, the Portuguese and English worked frantically to complete their preparations on the lines. Workers were conscripted from as far as 50 miles away and by 7 September 1810, 7,000 were working on the redoubts along with two militia regiments and numerous units of *ordenanza*, under both Portuguese and British engineers.<sup>31</sup> By the first week of October 20,000 Portuguese troops occupied the lines and soon thereafter the first contingents of Wellington's Anglo-Portuguese Army began to enter the lines. As the lines were self-sustaining, the army would act independently of the fortifications in order to move and counter any successful French penetration of the lines. Supplemented by 8,000 Spanish troops under the command of the Marquis de la Romana, the entire Allied force behind the lines reached a total of 87,000 by the end of October 1810.<sup>32</sup>

In addition to the construction of fortifications before Lisbon, Wellington and the Portuguese Government made detailed plans to mobilize the Kingdom. The major fortresses along the frontier were reinforced with additional men, supplies, and equipment and their fortifications were improved to withstand a major siege. Arrangements were concluded for the destruction of all the vital roads leading from Spain while the routes over which the Allied army was expected to advance were repaired and carefully fortified. Fortifications were raised at several defensible positions through which the French would presumably pass. Boats on the major rivers were registered and placed under the



jurisdiction of local officials and all the boat bridges up the Tagus for 150 miles were withdrawn. Orders were issued for the removal of "carts, mules, and other means of conveyance, and the provisions, of which the enemy might make use in the invasion of the country."<sup>33</sup> Arrangements were also completed for the withdrawal or destruction of any Allied magazines near the Spanish frontier. In actively combating the French, ancient Portuguese laws were invoked to call up the *ordenanza*, similar to the French *levée en masse*. Every able-bodied male from 16 to 60 was expected "to do the enemy all the mischief in their power . . . not by assembling in large bodies, but by impeding his communications, by firing upon him from the mountains and strong passes with which the whole country abounds, and by annoying his foraging and other parties that he may send out."<sup>34</sup> Militia units were posted at the various border fortresses and along the frontier with orders to cut the enemy supply lines, attack foragers, capture French scouts, and engage in other disruptive activities.

In the areas in which the French were expected to invade, orders were issued for the inhabitants to retire. The Portuguese Government published inflammatory proclamations against the French inciting the peasants to resist the enemy. This was hardly necessary since they had already experienced excesses committed by French foragers and stragglers. In fact, it was difficult to induce the foreign troops in the French Army to desert for fear that they would be seized by peasants and brutally murdered.<sup>35</sup> However, it was Wellington's Proclamation to the Portuguese People that set the stage for the "scorched earth" policy. He declared:

The time which has elapsed during which the enemy have remained upon the frontiers of Portugal, has fortunately afforded to the Portuguese nation experience of what

they are to expect from the French . . . The Portuguese now see that they have no remedy for the evil with which they are threatened but determined resistance. Resistance, and the determination to render the enemy's advance into their country as difficult as possible, by removing out of his way everything that is valuable or that can contribute to his subsistence, or frustrate his progress, are the only and certain remedies for the evils with which they are threatened. It is obvious that the people can save themselves only by resistance to the enemy, and their properties only by removing them.<sup>36</sup>

Indeed, Wellington was willing to use his authority "to force the weak and the indolent to make an exertion to save themselves from the danger which awaits them, and to save their country."<sup>37</sup> He announced that he would treat as traitors anyone who assisted the enemy in any way. With this drastic action Wellington, supported by a majority of the Regency Council, was preparing to transform Portugal into a hostile desert without supplies, resources, or manpower. To accentuate his determination he wrote to Gen. Stapleton Cotton, "Send round to the people that they must retire from the villages, and let the magistrates know that if any of them stay, or if any of the inhabitants have any communication with the enemy, they will be hanged."<sup>38</sup> After observing the impact of his proclamation upon the populace, he declared, "The people of Portugal are doing that which the Spaniards ought to have done. They are removing their women and properties out of the enemy's way, and taking arms in their own defense. The country is made a desert, and behind almost every stone wall the French will meet an enemy."<sup>39</sup>

As a result of Wellington's plans for the defense of Portugal, two major

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controversies developed that threatened the implementation of his entire strategy. As reinforcements and supplies continued to pour into Lisbon, Wellington became convinced he would be able to successfully defend Portugal against all but an overwhelming French army. As early as 18 January 1810 he wrote to Villiers, "If I can bring 30,000 effective British troops into the field, I will fight a good battle for . . . Portugal." He promised, "If the Portuguese do their duty, I shall have enough [troops] to maintain it; if they do not, nothing Great Britain can afford can save the country."<sup>40</sup> Wellington was convinced the French could not subdue Portugal with "an army of 70,000 or even 80,000 men" if they did not attack by February.<sup>41</sup> Aware that the Government and Lord Liverpool, Secretary of War and the Colonies, were preoccupied with the safety of the British Army, especially after Moore's disastrous campaign, he sent detailed letters to London describing the minute precautions taken to protect the evacuation of the army if necessary. Nevertheless, Liverpool was not satisfied. Hoping to ease Liverpool's anxiety, Wellington persuasively argued in a dispatch dated 1 March, "The British army ought to remain in the field in Portugal as long as may be practicable, and consistent with its safety. I consider it highly desirable that we should maintain ourselves in Portugal as long as possible." He concluded promising, "If you will let us have a large fleet of ships of war, and 45,000 disposable tons of transports, I shall try, and I think I shall bring them [Anglo-Portuguese Army] all off."<sup>42</sup> With the inclusion of the Royal Navy as an integral part of Wellington's plan, he apparently hoped to gain support from among the members of Parliament committed to the navy; yet, pressure continued to develop over the safety of the army. Liverpool continued to press his commander, "I should appraise you, however, that a very considerable degree

of alarm exists in this country respecting the safety of the British army in Portugal." He suggested it would be wise to abandon Portugal "a little too soon than, by remaining in Portugal a little too long, exposing it to those risks from which no military operation can be wholly exempt." At the same time he questioned Wellington's decision to evacuate the British Army at Lisbon rather than Peniche, 40 miles north of the capital, if such operations become necessary.<sup>43</sup> Despite this doubt and anxiety in London, Wellington was determined in his convictions. "I believe," he wrote to Forjaz, "that if we are able to maintain ourselves in Portugal the war will not end in the Peninsula." Alluding to the Lines of Torres Vedras, he concluded,

If the enemy is not able to force us, when we have retired to this position, he will be obliged to retreat . . . and he will be forced in any case to abandon all the Portuguese territory. If we are forced to abandon this position, we will always have the means to embark ourselves in the Tagus.<sup>44</sup>

Wellington could take such a remarkable position despite Napoleon's virtual domination of Western Europe because he knew that the Royal Navy stood ready to carry out whatever operations were necessary for the safety of his army.

Despite Wellington's determination to defend Portugal, it was obvious he might be forced to evacuate the Kingdom. Thus for 3 months arrangements were pushed forward for the possible embarkment of both the British and Portuguese armies as transports and men-of-war put into Lisbon harbor. In addition to defending his strategy, he also had to combat the statements and theories of the fallen hero-warrior, Sir John Moore, who expressed the view that Portugal was indefensible. Wellington acknowledged, "I have as much respect as any man can have for the

opinion and judgment of Sir John Moore . . . but he positively knew nothing of Portugal, and could know nothing of its existing state." Indeed, Wellington grasped the significance of Portugal's role in the Peninsular War as did few of his contemporaries, especially with the advantages guaranteed by the British navy. "As long as we shall remain in a state of activity in Portugal, the contest must continue in Spain," and he promised,

I shall delay the embarkation as long as it is in my power, and I shall do everything in my power to avert the necessity of embarking at all. If the enemy should invade this country with a force less than that which I should think so superior . . . I shall fight a battle to save the country . . . and if the results should not be successful . . . I shall still be able to retire and embark the army.<sup>45</sup>

While Wellington was willing to consider the evacuation of his army as a last resort, the anxious Government immediately implemented plans to fulfill his requests for an evacuation fleet. By February 23,440 tons of transports, in addition to 7,000 tons en route from London, were anchored in the Tagus off Lisbon. Instructions were issued immediately for the captains of ships in the vicinity to alter course for Lisbon. By 6 March transports totaling 19,000 tons had set sail from Cadiz, Malta, and Gibraltar while six men-of-war and a number of ordnance and animal vessels were preparing to set sail from England.<sup>46</sup>

The baggage of many regiments had already been loaded aboard transports in the Tagus in January and February as new reinforcements arrived from England; hence the transfer of equipment to the merchantmen in the harbor would not cause alarm among the inhabitants of the city. By the first week of May, each vessel had been numbered and assigned a specific regiment. Moreover,

berths and anchorages were established for every ship to prevent confusion during an evacuation. Water, biscuit, and essentials were supplied to every vessel and longboats were assigned to each for the transfer of troops from shore to ship in event the French reached Lisbon.<sup>47</sup>

In conjunction with Adm. George Berkeley, commanding the British Squadron in the Tagus, Wellington carefully coordinated plans for the withdrawal of the army, but he refused to alter his strategy despite Liverpool's continued appeals for caution and suggestion that the army be evacuated at Peniche. The exasperated Wellington wrote to Liverpool, "I am willing to be responsible for the evacuation of Portugal . . . Depend on it, whatever people may tell you."<sup>48</sup> In a letter to Berkeley a week later he struck back at his critics,

The Government are terribly afraid that I shall get them, and myself, in a scrape. But what can be expected from men who are beaten in the House of Commons three times a week? A great deal might be done now, if there existed in England less party, and more public sentiment, and if there was any Government.<sup>49</sup>

Correspondence from England continued to prod and caution Wellington about the evacuation of his army until the end of April when King George III's private secretary, Col. Herbert Taylor, wrote to Liverpool promising the King's support "unfettered by any particular instruction which might embarrass him [Wellington] in the execution of his general plan of operation."<sup>50</sup> So with the threat of French invasion mounting each day, the Government came to the realization that Wellington and his strategy would have to be supported, satisfied that in event of disaster, the Navy would be ready to evacuate his army.

The second major controversy centered around Wellington's plan to

implement the "scorched earth" policy and turn Portugal into a wasteland. It was obvious that mobilization would have grievous effects upon the population. Two members of the Regency Council, the Principal José António de Menezes e Sousa, supported by the Patriarch, António de Castro, attacked Wellington's drastic plans to mobilize the kingdom, claiming the enemy should be fought on the frontier rather than at the gates of Lisbon after Portugal had been devastated. As the third French invasion of Portugal became imminent, the political struggle raged within the Regency Government.<sup>51</sup> It seemed to many patriotic Portuguese as well as the French that the British were willing to sacrifice Portugal, its population and its resources while they had only to withdraw to Lisbon, embark aboard the waiting fleet, and sail home to the safety of England.

While the Portuguese and British labored to create an effective fighting force and mobilize the Kingdom, Napoleon was returning to France after his successful campaign against Austria in 1809. With only the struggle in the Peninsula interrupting the continental peace, Napoleon was determined to end this "bleeding sore" which dragged on without foreseeable end, sapping the strength of his empire. Portugal no longer affected his economic strategy against England, but it served as a defiant example of successful opposition, a base of operations for the every increasing British forces, and a direct menace to imperial control. As long as the English remained in Portugal, supported by the Lusitanians, they were a threat to isolated French units, as well as a source of moral, economic, and military strength to all those opposing French domination. Napoleon began making arrangements to go to the Peninsula himself in December 1809 but pressing domestic and foreign problems forced him to send his most illustrious marshal, André Masséna, the Duc de

Rivoli, Prince d'Essling, to replace him and command the Army of Portugal. Although promised limitless material and manpower, Masséna actually led an army of approximately 65,000 into Portugal with orders to crush Portuguese opposition and drive Wellington into the sea.<sup>52</sup>

Initially, French reaction to the allies' plan of devastation was one of shock and skepticism, but it changed to dismay, frustration, and disgust. Masséna was first made aware of these preparations when French patrols advanced into Portugal at the end of July 1810. They found the villages and towns abandoned by their inhabitants and all the supplies and useful resources destroyed or hidden. This problem was soon complicated by the adverse reaction manifested by the French troops who, angered by their reception, resorted to pillaging and burning.<sup>53</sup> Masséna was forced to order the execution of those responsible for the looting and he even held officers responsible for the excesses committed by their troops.<sup>54</sup> Aware of the implications of this "scorched earth" policy upon his army, Masséna complained bitterly to Marshal Alexandre Berthier,

The English . . . employ a means of defense that results in the greatest misfortune to the nation. They have ordered the inhabitants to leave their homes . . . They have furnished all kinds of arms to them, and they are enjoined under penalty of death to retire and leave nothing that would serve to provide subsistence for the French army.<sup>55</sup>

When the Portuguese border fortress of Almeida fell to Masséna's invading army on 28 August 1810, those opposed to Wellington's system of mobilization denounced him passionately. The land was stripped bare before the advancing army and large segments of the population fled into the forests or mountains. As the French pursued the

retreating Allied army, Wellington determined to take up a position on the Serra de Bussaco, north of Coimbra and the Mondego river valley, to contest the French advance. Here the Anglo-Portuguese Army of some 60,000 men was concentrated to defend the mountain against 65,000 Frenchmen. The French attacks were repulsed on 27 September but 2 days later Masséna's troops filed along Boialvo road to Sardão, outflanking Wellington's position. The Allies fell back to the Lines of Torres Vedras, preceded by the fleeing refugees and followed by the pursuing French advance guard. When they reached Sobral and Villafranca, the French, who had no accurate information on the lines, were stunned to see a string of fortified sites stretching the entire width of the peninsula—from the Tagus to the Atlantic. It soon became obvious that a successful attack without extensive reinforcements was impossible. The French had been completely deceived by the plan. As one of Masséna's staff recalled, "The cruel ravages carried out by the enemy reinforced our ignorance, for it seemed they would not have abused a country they wanted to save."<sup>56</sup>

Nevertheless Masséna was confident of final victory. Assuming the British withdrawal was only a matter of time, Masséna wrote to Berthier, "I hold myself in position hoping the Portuguese refugees at Lisbon will make some movement against the British since they are reduced to the most frightful misery."<sup>57</sup> A month later Napoleon himself declared in a conversation, "The English would not be able to use the population in a struggle with me . . . Yet, we hold them tightly blockaded without food with an army and an immense population."<sup>58</sup> Such reasoning was reassuring but it was sheer fantasy since it ignored the British Navy and its capabilities. On the contrary, arrangements had been completed to supply grain and wheat in both English and

Portuguese bottoms from America, Algeria, Morocco, as well as from Ireland, Holland, and Prussia.<sup>59</sup>

Meanwhile, Masséna, after a month before the lines, decided to withdraw his exposed Army corps to the city of Santarém on the banks of the Tagus, less than 30 miles from the lines where he could confidently wait for reinforcements and supplies. The army retired from the devastated country before the lines on 14 November without incident and 2 days later it was firmly entrenched in the villages surrounding Santarém. Once this movement had been completed, Gen. Maximilian Foy was sent to Paris to inform the Emperor of the operations to date and request additional resources to complete the conquest of Portugal. Napoleon, who followed Masséna's progress in the English newspapers, had received no concrete information from the army from 15 September, until 24 November when Foy arrived in Paris. When he learned of Masséna's plight he promised reinforcements and other necessary supplies as soon as possible. Through the cold damp months of November and December reconnaissance columns were sent out in all directions hoping to make contact with the anticipated reinforcements. However, it was not until 26 December that a division of Gen. Jean Drouet's Corps joined the Army of Portugal but it was hardly of the size Masséna had expected. Marshal Soult had also been ordered to move his 5th Corps in support of the army but Masséna cynically observed to his first *aide de camp*, Jean Pelet, "The 5th Corps will not come or Soult will accompany it, and he will use it for some other purpose."<sup>60</sup>

As the agonizing days of January passed and the French Army approached starvation, British transports continued to arrive in Lisbon harbor laden with supplies and reinforcements. The Allied army continued to grow in size, resources and confidence and

Wellington began to contemplate an offensive to drive the French out of Portugal. Meanwhile, Admiral Berkeley and his squadron were deeply involved in efforts to strengthen Wellington's position behind the lines. The vital islands of the Tagus above Lisbon, Lyceria and Alhandra, were placed under the protection of Berkeley's seamen while gunboats carefully observed the mouths of the rivers emptying into the Tagus.<sup>61</sup> Several seamen were sent ashore to aid the artillerymen in Gen. Rowland Hill's Division, and when Wellington wanted to try to ignite the French stores collected near Punhete for the construction of a boat bridge, he called upon Admiral Berkeley to send a vessel capable of launching Congreve rockets into the enemy camp.<sup>62</sup> Each week between 20 and 30 cattle ships were sent to Oporto, Vigo, and even La Corunna to transport cattle back to Lisbon for its immense population of refugees. Some vessels in Lisbon harbor were transformed into salt depots for the army while others served as prisons for French who had deserted or been taken prisoner.<sup>63</sup> Much of the correspondence between Wellington and Berkeley was concerned with the Tagus and the most feasible method of preventing a French crossing. Various schemes were developed but the French were thwarted in their decision to cross the river by General Foy who misrepresented Napoleon's orders. Accordingly, Masséna, rather than cross the Tagus into the fertile province of Alentejo, ordered the destruction of the 80 boats for the pontoon bridge and began formulating plans for the withdrawal of the army.<sup>64</sup>

Despite this cooperation between Wellington and Berkeley, several controversies arose which might have caused serious repercussions. "To add to the numerical strength of the army," Wellington requested a brigade of seamen and a battalion of marines to be sent ashore but Berkeley was forced to

refuse after referring the question to the Admiralty.<sup>65</sup> Wellington concurred with the decision concerning the seamen, "But," he wrote to Berkeley, "Major Williams' battalion of marines had better proceed to Loures and the other battalion do the duty of Lisbon and St. Julian."<sup>66</sup> They were sent temporarily. In a more serious incident the seamen manning the telegraph on the Lines of Torres Vedras were withdrawn in September because they did not receive special pay allowance. These duties were performed by Portuguese militiamen until December, certainly the most crucial period in the life of the lines, when Wellington made arrangements to increase their allowance.<sup>67</sup>

Through February and March of 1811 the British squadron remained in Lisbon harbor along with the vast evacuation fleet but on 20 March, Wellington issued the long awaited letter that proclaimed victory for his army and strategy. "I have this day," he wrote to Berkeley, "given directions that the baggage of each division of infantry, and of cavalry, respectively, may be removed into one transport, which ought to be sufficient to contain it." With the exception of "coppered transports" capable of carrying 3,000 infantry, transport vessels for 300 cavalry, and the hospital ships, he continued, "I beg you to send all the remainder to England as soon as it may be convenient with you."<sup>68</sup> As the vessels returned to England or other stations, their crews must have had the satisfaction of knowing that their efforts had contributed to a remarkable success for their arms and their country.

Meanwhile, the French soldiers of Masséna's army, despite their courage and sacrifices, had reached a point of acute deprivation. After 108 days before the lines without supplies or adequate reinforcements, Masséna had no choice but retreat or see his army starve. Exasperated and disgusted he wrote a 20-page report to Napoleon declaring,

"This is the decision I have taken because it is impossible to remain in a country six months, where we did not think it possible to exist for fifteen days." He concluded, "I cannot finish without begging Your Highness to observe that the army lacks artillery, horses, transportation, clothing, shoes, and reinforcements."<sup>69</sup> The Army of Portugal began its withdrawal from Santarém on 5 March 1811, pursued by Wellington's reinforced and well-equipped army. The retreat, punctuated by several brilliant rear guard actions by Marshal Michel Ney, did not end until Masséna's army was again on the Spanish frontier. Thus, the Third Invasion of Portugal, Napoleon's most ambitious, had come to a dismal end with casualties totaling over 25,000 men—primarily from deprivation or the ramifications of the Portuguese mobilization and the inability of Napoleon to supply the Army of Portugal. Conversely, Wellington's Anglo-Portuguese Army had proven to be a highly effective fighting force which ultimately would carry the war across the Pyrenees into France, and the British Navy had demonstrated its strength and versatility as a vital adjunct to the allied army in the final victory.

Although the Royal Navy's support of Wellington's army is probably the most conspicuous example of land-sea cooperation in the Peninsular War, at the great fortress-city of Cadiz seapower had considerable effect upon the ultimate success of its defense. In February 1810 the armies of King Joseph laid siege to Cadiz after conquering Andalusia and crushing the resistance in southern Spain. The city, situated on the Isla de Leon with an extremely formidable system of outlying fortifications and topographical barriers, was besieged by Marshal Victor. As the siege dragged on, he finally came to realize that the fortress could only be taken by sea and the French Navy was utterly incapable of mounting such an

operation. Meanwhile, the British sent in vast quantities of arms and supplies; they landed some 8,000 English and Portuguese soldiers to supplement the Spanish garrison of 20,000 men and a squadron of warships was anchored nearby to augment the fortress guns. The siege, interrupted periodically by French attacks and allied sorties saw the capture of Spanish forts on the peninsula facing Cadiz. Nevertheless, with the continual arrival of munitions and supplies, supported at various periods by Spanish armies maneuvering on the French flanks, the siege continued through 1811. In August 1812 Wellington advanced on Madrid forcing Soult to raise the siege of Cadiz and evacuate Andalusia. The successful defense of Cadiz was to a large degree guaranteed by the Royal Navy. Not only had British vessels fed and armed the garrison and citizens of Cadiz for over 30 months but they protected the fortress from French naval attack and used their guns to second the garrison artillery.

The Royal Navy was also engaged in numerous amphibious operations during the Peninsular War to support the Spanish armies and guerrillas. Some raiding parties harassed isolated French forces near the coast causing little damage while other operations played an integral part in land operations. British squadrons blockaded and often

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### BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



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bombarded French-occupied seaports along the Spanish seacoast and maintained a threatening presence, always ready to take advantage of any ill-timed French maneuvers. Nevertheless, the navy's major role was to serve as an appendage of Wellington's army, capable of supplying and reinforcing it as the need arose. When Wellington mounted his great offensive in 1813 to expel the French from the Peninsula, the navy's base of operation was easily transferred to Santander to support the

left wing of the army. Although Wellington was not always sympathetic with the many nautical problems faced by the navy in their joint operation, as exemplified by the siege of San Sebastian, he recognized the importance of uncontested control of the seas. Despite the difficulties inherent in joint land-sea operations, there can be no doubt that without the successful employment of British seapower, Wellington's army would not have survived and the Peninsula would have been lost to Napoleon.

## NOTES

1. *Correspondence de Napoléon I<sup>er</sup> publiée par ordre de l'Empereur Napoleon III* (Paris: Imprimerie impériale, 1858-1869), No. 12928, Napoleon to Talleyrand, 19 July 1807, v. XV, p. 541.

2. *Ibid.*, No. 13300, Convention Secrète, 27 October 1807, v. XVI, pp. 140-42.

3. Public Record Office, Foreign Office, MSS [Hereafter cited as P.R.O., F.O.] 63/55, Strangford to Canning, 21, 29 August 1807.

4. *Ibid.*, Strangford to Canning, 2, 5, 6, 10, 24, 29, 30 November 1807.

5. John W. Fortescue, *A History of the British Army* (London: Macmillan, 1910-30), v. VI, pp. 99-102; Charles Oman, *A History of the Peninsular War* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902-30), v. I, p. 30.

6. Paul Charles Thiébault, *Relation de l'expédition du Portugal, faite en 1807 et 1808, par le 1<sup>er</sup> corps d'observation de la Gironde, devenu Armée de Portugal* (Paris: Magimel, Anselin, et Pochard, 1817), pp. 69-70.

7. Correspondence: Armée de Portugal, MSS, Service Historique de l'armée, Vincennes, Carton C<sup>7</sup> 16, Decrets, 3, 4, 15, 22 December 1807, 15 January 1808; Junot to Clarke, 8, 11, 28 January, 22 March 1808.

8. Donald D. Horward, *The Battle of Bussaco: Masséna vs. Wellington* (Tallahassee, Fla.: Florida State University Press, 1965), p. 4.

9. Correspondence: Armée de Portugal, Junot to Kellermann, 9, 13 June 1808; Junot to Governor of Porto, 11 June 1808; "Decret à l'Armée de Portugal," 11 June 1808; "Decret" to the Inhabitants of the Kingdom of Portugal, 14 June 1808.

10. Arthur Wellesley, *The Dispatches of the Field Marshal, the Duke of Wellington K.G., During His Various Campaigns in India, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, the Low Countries, and France from 1799 to 1818*, ed. John Gurwood (London: John Murray, 1835-38), Returns of the Forces embarked under Sir Arthur Wellesley, 13 July 1808, v. IV, p. 27; Wellington to Cotton, 30 July 1808, v. IV, pp. 50-51; *A Copy of the Proceedings upon the Inquiry Relative to the Armistice and Convention, etc. made and concluded in Portugal, in August 1808, Between the Commanders of the British and French Armies* (London: n.n., 1809), Castlereagh to Wellesley, 30 June 1808, Wellesley to Castlereagh, 21, 26 July, 1 August 1808, pp. 131-32; 146-49.

11. *Inquiry, Report to His Majesty*, signed Dundas, Moira, Craig, Heathfield, Pembroke, G. Nugent, O. Nicolls, 22 December 1808, pp. 111-21; Wellesley to Burrard, 6 August 1808, Wellesley to Castlereagh, 16, 17 August 1808, Wellesley to Burrard, 21 August 1808, pp. 152-54, 155-56, 160-61, 165-66; Definitive Convention for the Evacuation of the Portuguese Army, signed 28 August 1808, pp. 170-73, 180-82, 245-48.

12. *Correspondence de Napoléon I<sup>er</sup>*, No. 14386, Napoleon to Junot, 19 October 1808, v. XVIII, pp. 2-4.

13. *Ibid.*, No. 14413, Discours, 25 October 1808, v. XVIII, pp. 24-25; No. 14537, Proclamation aux Espagnols, 7 December 1808, v. XVIII, pp. 120-21.

14. Oman, v. I, pp. 528.

15. James Moore, *A Narrative of the Campaign of the British Army in Spain Commanded by His Excellency Lieut. General Sir John Moore* (London: Joseph Johnston, 1809), pp. 123-25. See for text of original dispatch from Berthier to Soult, 10 December 1808.



16. *Correspondence de Napoléon I<sup>er</sup>*, No. 14620, Napoleon to Joseph Bonaparte, 27 December 1808, v. XVIII, pp. 184-85.
17. Henri Bonnal, *La vie militaire du maréchal Ney, duc d'Elchingen, prince de la Moskowa* (Paris: Chapelot, 1914), Napoleon to Ney, 19 December 1808, v. III, pp. 81-82. See also *Correspondence de Napoléon I<sup>er</sup>*, Nos. 14611, 14612, 14613, Napoleon to Berthier, 22 December 1808, v. XVIII, pp. 177-79.
18. Moore to La Romana, 23 December 1808, pp. 165-66.
19. Dominique Balagny, *Campagne d'Empereur Napoléon en Espagne 1808-1809* (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1902-06), Colonel-Major Guyot to Berthier, 29 December 1808, v. IV, pp. 155-56.
20. Robert Blakeney, *A Boy in the Peninsular War, The Service Adventures, and Experiences of Robert Blakeney* (London: John Murray, 1899), pp. 49-65; Balagny, Soult to Berthier, 5 January 1809, v. IV, pp. 307-10; Moore, pp. 192-93.
21. Fortescue, v. VI, p. 375.
22. Balagny, Soult to Berthier, 14, 17 January 1810, v. IV, pp. 325-28, 338-42, 476n; Fortescue, v. VI, p. 375.
23. Fortescue, v. VI, p. 388. See also Oman, v. I, pp. 593-95 for casualty list.
24. Balagny, Soult to Berthier, 17, 18 January 1809, v. IV, pp. 338-45, 280-89.
25. William F.P. Napier, *History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France from A.D. 1807 to 1814* (New York: W.J. Widdleton, 1864), Napoleon to Soult, 21 January 1809, v. II, pp. 12-13.
26. Robert Stewart, *Correspondence, Dispatches, and other Papers, of Viscount Castlereagh, Second Marquess of Londonderry*, ed. C.W. Vane (London: William Shoberl, 1851), Castlereagh to Wellesley, 2 April 1809, v. VII, pp. 46-47; *Wellington's Dispatches*, Wellesley to Frere, 24 April 1809, v. IV, pp. 266-68.
27. Oman, v. II, p. 361; Napier, v. II, p. 96, Napier declares that Soult reached Spain with 19,500; Louis Adolphe Theirs, *History of the Consulate and the Empire of France Under Napoleon* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1894), v. VI, p. 497, maintains that only 17,000 men escaped from Portugal with Soult.
28. *Correspondence de Napoléon I<sup>er</sup>*, No. 15340, Napoleon to Clarke, 12 June 1809, v. XIX, pp. 116-17; *Mémoires et Correspondence Politique et Militaire du Roi Joseph*, ed. A. Du Casse (Paris: Perrotin, 1854) Jourdan to Soult, 22 July 1809, v. VI, pp. 278-80, "Rapport sur le mouvement des 2<sup>e</sup>, 5<sup>e</sup>, 6<sup>e</sup> corps des bords du Duero et du royaume de Leon, sur le Tage," v. VI, pp. 323-35; *Correspondence de Napoléon I<sup>er</sup>*, No. 15621, Napoleon to Clarke, 7 August 1809, v. XIX, p. 369. Observing Soult's movements, Napoleon complained, "It is very unfortunate that Marshal Soult should have maneuvered so ill as not to have joined the king."
29. *Wellington's Dispatches*, Wellington to Liverpool, 4, 15 January 1810, v. V, pp. 411, 429-30; Arthur Wellesley, *Supplementary Dispatches, Correspondence, and Memoranda of Field Marshal Arthur Duke of Wellington*, K.G. ed. by his son, the Duke of Wellington, K.G. (London: John Murray, 1871), "Memoranda on British Aids to Portugal, 1809 to 1812," March 1813, v. VII, pp. 593-94; Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates* (London: Hansard, 1810), 1st Ser., v. XV, pp. 511-25; Samuel E. Vichness, "Marshal of Portugal: The Military Career of William Carr Beresford, 1785-1814," Ph.D. thesis, Florida State University, Tallahassee, 1976, pp. 300-25.
30. Christovam Ayres de Magalhães Sepúlveda, *História organica e politica do exército portuguez* (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1896-1932), v. XIII, pp. 3-14.
31. For details on the Lines of Torres Vedras see John T. Jones, *Memoranda relative to the lines thrown up to cover Lisbon in 1810* (London: n.n., 1829); Donald D. Horward, *The French Campaign in Portugal: An Account by Jean Jacques Pelet*, ed., trans., annot. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 222-78.
32. Oman, Appendices XIV, "Wellington's Army within the Lines of Torres Vedras, Morning state of November 1, 1810," v. III, pp. 554-58.
33. *Wellington's Dispatches*, Wellington to Beresford, 23 January 1810, v. V, pp. 436-37; Wellington to Bacellar, 26 January 1810, v. V, pp. 457-58; Wellington to Hill, 27 February 1810, v. V, pp. 528-29.
34. *Ibid.*, Wellington to Leite, 28 February 1810, v. V, pp. 529-30; Wellington to Bacellar, 1 March 1810, v. V, pp. 534-36; Wellington to Masséna, 9, 24 September 1810, v. VI, pp. 419-20, 464-65.
35. *Ibid.*, Wellington to Liverpool, 7 May, 2 June 1810, v. VI, pp. 78-80, 167-69; Wellington to Doyle, 3 May 1810, v. VI, pp. 87-88; Wellington to Stuart, 13 May 1810, v. VI, pp. 110-11.
36. *Ibid.*, "Proclamation to the People of Portugal," signed Wellington, 4 August 1810, v. VI, pp. 329-30.
37. *Ibid.*

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38. *Ibid.*, Wellington to Cotton, 4 August 1810, v. VI, p. 324.
39. *Ibid.*, Wellington to Henry Wellesley, 20 August 1810, v. VI, pp. 373-75.
40. *Wellington's Dispatches*, Wellington to Villiers, 14 January 1810, v. V, pp. 424-26.
41. *Ibid.*, Wellington to Liverpool, 14 November 1809, v. V, pp. 280-82.
42. *Ibid.*, Wellington to Liverpool, 1 March 1810, v. V, pp. 538-42. See also P.R.O., W.O. 6/50, Liverpool to Wellington, 3 January 1810.
43. *Supplementary Dispatches of Wellington*, Liverpool to Wellington, 13 March 1810, v. VI, pp. 493-94.
44. *Wellington's Dispatches*, Wellington to Forjaz, 8 March 1810, v. V, pp. 556-59.
45. *Ibid.*, Wellington to Liverpool, April 2, 1810, v. VI, pp. 5-10.
46. P.R.O., W.O. 6/50. Liverpool to Wellington, 6, 7 March 1810. Of the 49,000 tons designated to evacuate the allied army if necessary, 23,440 tons of transports were in Lisbon Harbor by the end of January, 7,000 tons had sailed from England in February, 6,340 tons had sailed from Malta in December, 6,000 tons were at sea from Cadiz and Gibraltar, 3,000 tons left England for Lisbon by way of Cadiz and 3,500 tons were preparing to sail directly from Portsmouth. Liverpool also pointed out that "the transports might be crowded with troops without endangering the safety of the vessels, or the health of the men . . . [since] Cadiz may be considered to give a safe asylum to the fleet, at very trifling distance from the point of embarkation." The men-of-war included the *Caesar* 80, *Kent* 74, *Norge* 74, *Dolphin* 44, *Ulysses* 44, and another vessel of 74 guns.
47. *Wellington's Dispatches*, Wellington to Berkely, 24 January 1810, v. V, pp. 442-43; Wellington to Stuart, 6 May 1810, v. VI, pp. 93-94.
48. *Ibid.*, Wellington to Liverpool, 2 April 1810, v. VI, pp. 5-10. Wellington insisted his point of debarkation would be St. Julian if he were forced from Portugal. "When we do go, I feel a little anxiety to go, like gentlemen, out of the hall door, particularly after the preparations which I have made to enable us to do so, and not out the back door, or by the area."
49. *Ibid.*, Wellington to Liverpool, 2 April 1810, v. VI, pp. 5-10; Wellington to Berkeley, 7 April 1810, v. VI, pp. 21-22. See also Wellington to Stuart, 21 April 1810, v. VI, pp. 51-53.
50. *Supplementary Dispatches of Wellington*, Taylor to Liverpool, 15 April 1810, v. VI, p. 515; Liverpool to Wellington, 25 April 1810, v. VI, p. 515.
51. *Wellington's Dispatches*, Wellington to Forjaz, 6 September 1810, v. VI, pp. 408-409, Wellington to Stuart, 11 September, 28 October 1810, v. VI, pp. 427-30, 556-59.
52. *Correspondence de Napoléon I<sup>er</sup>*, No. 16385, Imperial Decree, 17 April 1810, v. XX, p. 338; Horward, *Pelet*, p. 17, n. 16.
53. Archives de Masséna, MSS, Montbrun to Masséna, 31 July 1810, v. LV, p. 312; Masséna to Loison, 8 August 1810, v. LI, p. 29. This manuscript collection is in the possession of Victor André Masséna, the 7th Prince d'Essling.
54. Horward, *Pelet*, p. 110.
55. Archives de Masséna, Masséna to Berthier, 20 August 1810, v. LI, p. 65.
56. Horward, *Pelet*, p. 222.
57. Correspondence: Armée de Portugal, Masséna to Berthier, 29 October 1810, Carton C 7 10.
58. Maurice Girod de l'Ain, *Vie Militaire du General Foy* (Paris: E. Plon, Nourrit et Cie, 1900), pp. 107-113; Correspondence: Armée de Portugal, Foy to Masséna, 4 December 1810.
59. P.R.O., F.O. 342/11, Wellington to Stuart, 29 October 1810; F.O. 342/22, Wellington to Stuart, 3 November 1810; F.O. 342/23, Wellington to Stuart, 29 December 1810.
60. Donald D. Horward, "Masséna and Napoleon: Abandonment in Portugal," *Military Affairs*, October 1973, p. 66.
61. John T. Jones, *Journals of the Sieges carried on by the Army under the Duke of Wellington, in Spain, during the years 1811 to 1814; with notes and additions; also Memoranda Relative to the Lines Thrown up to Cover Lisbon in 1810*. 3rd ed. (London: Weale, 1846), Wellington to Berkeley, 16 October 1810, v. III, pp. 146-47.
62. *Ibid.*, Wellington to Berkeley, 3, 6 November 1810, pp. 163-64, 168-69; *Wellington's Dispatches*, Wellington to Berkeley, 1 November 1810, v. VI, p. 570.
63. *Wellington's Dispatches*, Wellington to Berkeley, 11, 16, 22, 29 January, 10, 23 February 1810, v. VII, pp. 127, 147, 170, 207, 250, 284.
64. *Ibid.*, Wellington to Berkeley, 9, 25 December 1810, 11, 12 January 1811, v. VII, pp. 38-39, 70-71, 127-28, 133-34.
65. *Ibid.*, Wellington to Berkeley, 10 November 1810, v. VI, pp. 601-03; 25, 27 December 1810, v. VII, pp. 70-71 and 77-78.
66. *Ibid.*, Wellington to Berkeley, 25, 27 December 1810, v. VI, pp. 77-78; 11 January 1811, v. VII, p. 127.

67. *Ibid.*, Wellington to Liverpool, 19 October 1810, Wellington to Berkeley, 24 December 1810, v. VI, pp. 525-26, v. VII, p. 68; Jones, *Sieges in the Peninsula*, Jones to Fletcher, 12 September 1810 and Fletcher to Jones, 7, 11 September, 5, 6 October 1810, pp. 232-36, 250-51.

68. *Ibid.*, Wellington to Berkeley, 20 March 1811, v. VII, p. 379.

69. Correspondence: Armée de Portugal C<sup>7</sup> 12, Masséna to Berthier, 6 March 1810.

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Research for this paper in Lisbon, London, and Paris was completed with funds provided by the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation of Lisbon, Portugal.

