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Marine Policy for America: The United States at Sea

Harold J. Sutphen
U.S. Navy

Gerard J. Mangone

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Mangone, Gerard J. *Marine Policy for America: The United States at Sea*. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath & Co., 1977. 370pp.

Seldom has American maritime policy been cited as an example of clarity, consistency or comprehensiveness. Regrettably, it more often has been offered as an example of the opposite extreme. Thus, when Gerard J. Mangone set out to present "an overview of the development of American marine policy for national security, the merchant marine, fisheries, seabed minerals, and pollution of the ocean environment," he took on a chore of awesome magnitude. The product of his labor is *Marine Policy for America*, a book that stands as a unified study in a field that has long suffered from single-factor analysis and fragmented consideration.

The author, Director of the Center for the Study of Marine Policy at the University of Delaware, treats his topic from a historical point of view. The opening chapter sketches America's long involvement with maritime affairs. Classifying maritime policy into five components, Mangone presents a detailed historical account of each: Navy, security and national defense policies; transport, trade and merchant marine policies; fisheries policies (domestic as well as foreign); oceanic mineral and energy resource policies; and ocean pollution and environmental protection policies. In each area, he presents the record of U.S. policy with care and considerable detail. Each chapter concludes with a brief summary of the problems and issues of contemporary significance to that particular element of maritime policy. Mangone thus gives the reader not only a chronicle of how American policy developed but also an outline of the principal points of contention that need to be resolved if U.S. maritime policy is to be effective in the future.

Maritime Policy for America does not read with the ease or speed of a

novel, but that is not unusual for a text of its variety. At times the book tends to get bogged down in a swamp of exhaustive detail about legislation; in others, the use of overly precise statistics either distracts the reader or puts him to sleep. For one who wants to make an exacting analysis of policy development, however, this detailed data will provide a very useful starting point. The book is also flawed by occasional typographical errors which are, it seems, a characteristic of contemporary publishing and modern printing processes. Unfortunately, these rather minor but conspicuous errors—such as the misspelling of a former Secretary of the Navy's name (Mittendorf, even in the index)—tend to shake one's confidence in the accuracy of the masses of detail presented by the author.

Mangone's concluding chapter focuses on current American interests in the ocean. Among the issues he addresses are the necessity for a navy, the importance of seaborne trade, the complexities of effective fishery management, and the progress and pitfalls along the road to protection of the marine environment. He presents the arguments for and against the contending views in a straightforward, impartial manner, then leaves it to the reader's judgment to draw conclusions. The author deplores the extended, divided, and unmanageable bureaucracy that has made it difficult if not impossible to devise and execute a coherent system of maritime policies. On this issue he suggests that the solution is not a superagency for the oceans that has been proposed by some; he prefers instead an independent coordinating panel somewhat similar to the National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere, but with substantial powers to make choices and set priorities among competing oceanic programs. He also endorses a program of public education on the grounds that a populace well informed

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about the role played by the oceans in our national welfare will express its support for a sound ocean policy through an effective democratic system.

Marine Policy for America is a noteworthy contribution to the literature of maritime policy. It is unique in that it assembles in a single volume a wealth of information illuminating the broad scope of a most important national issue. Mangone does not offer a simple solution to the complex problem of creating an effective maritime policy for America, for there is no simple solution. He does, however, give the reader a most useful framework for understanding the nature of the problem and an abundant stock of data to use in drawing conclusions about the issues. The book should be of particular value to those who are prone to equate "maritime" matters with "merchant marine" or "naval" matters; Mangone clearly shows that our national maritime policy must concern itself with much more than ships.

HAROLD J. SUTPHEN
Commander, U.S. Navy

Melosi, Martin V. *The Shadow of Pearl Harbor*. College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1977. 183pp.

Almost before the smoke had cleared, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor had created a major political controversy that remained relatively dormant until the conclusion of hostilities in 1945. Since then it has blossomed and in all probability it will never be completely settled. At root it is a question of who was to blame: President Roosevelt along with some or all of the Army and Navy officials in Washington, or the unfortunate commanders in Hawaii?

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was thoroughly investigated in a series of eight separate inquiries and investigations between 1942 and 1946. The first was conducted by Supreme Court

Justice Owen J. Roberts to allay controversy. Unfortunately, the Roberts Report had precisely the opposite effect. It raised more questions than it settled, but the Roosevelt Administration successfully staved off a potentially meddlesome Congressional investigation during World War II. Both the Army and the Navy conducted their own formal inquiries during the war.

In tracing the course of the political controversy through its muted and not so subtle partisan maneuvers, Melosi has performed a useful service for students of the period by describing clearly and concisely the reasons and the justifications for the eight separate investigations. He shows how sincere bewilderment (over how the United States could have been so surprised by the Japanese attack) easily gave rise to partisan wrangling. Roosevelt and his supporters saw a Congressional investigation as a possible hindrance to the prosecution of the war, in addition to their normal and understandable view that it might threaten their political self-preservation.

Roosevelt's political opponents not only sought to develop an issue to use against the incumbent Democrats in the 1942 Congressional elections, but in the 1944 Presidential election they also sought to challenge his conduct of foreign policy and preparations for war. In addition, there were plenty of Roosevelt haters, isolationists and others, whose motives tended to be more malicious than those found in ordinary partisan politics. During the war both factions kept the pot simmering in one way or another. The culmination came in one of the great Congressional investigations in which a joint committee examined witnesses and received documents and exhibits over a period of several months. The record fills 39 published volumes.

The thrust of this short, well-written book is a description of the course of the political controversy rather than an analysis of the issues involved. To this extent it is an original contribution to