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The Shadow of Pearl Harbor

B. M. Simpson III

Martin V. Melosi

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about the role played by the oceans in our national welfare will express its support for a sound ocean policy through an effective democratic system.

Marine Policy for America is a noteworthy contribution to the literature of maritime policy. It is unique in that it assembles in a single volume a wealth of information illuminating the broad scope of a most important national issue. Mangone does not offer a simple solution to the complex problem of creating an effective maritime policy for America, for there is no simple solution. He does, however, give the reader a most useful framework for understanding the nature of the problem and an abundant stock of data to use in drawing conclusions about the issues. The book should be of particular value to those who are prone to equate "maritime" matters with "merchant marine" or "naval" matters; Mangone clearly shows that our national maritime policy must concern itself with much more than ships.

HAROLD J. SUTPHEN
Commander, U.S. Navy

Melosi, Martin V. *The Shadow of Pearl Harbor*. College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1977. 183pp.

Almost before the smoke had cleared, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor had created a major political controversy that remained relatively dormant until the conclusion of hostilities in 1945. Since then it has blossomed and in all probability it will never be completely settled. At root it is a question of who was to blame: President Roosevelt along with some or all of the Army and Navy officials in Washington, or the unfortunate commanders in Hawaii?

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was thoroughly investigated in a series of eight separate inquiries and investigations between 1942 and 1946. The first was conducted by Supreme Court

Justice Owen J. Roberts to allay controversy. Unfortunately, the Roberts Report had precisely the opposite effect. It raised more questions than it settled, but the Roosevelt Administration successfully staved off a potentially meddlesome Congressional investigation during World War II. Both the Army and the Navy conducted their own formal inquiries during the war.

In tracing the course of the political controversy through its muted and not so subtle partisan maneuvers, Melosi has performed a useful service for students of the period by describing clearly and concisely the reasons and the justifications for the eight separate investigations. He shows how sincere bewilderment (over how the United States could have been so surprised by the Japanese attack) easily gave rise to partisan wrangling. Roosevelt and his supporters saw a Congressional investigation as a possible hindrance to the prosecution of the war, in addition to their normal and understandable view that it might threaten their political self-preservation.

Roosevelt's political opponents not only sought to develop an issue to use against the incumbent Democrats in the 1942 Congressional elections, but in the 1944 Presidential election they also sought to challenge his conduct of foreign policy and preparations for war. In addition, there were plenty of Roosevelt haters, isolationists and others, whose motives tended to be more malicious than those found in ordinary partisan politics. During the war both factions kept the pot simmering in one way or another. The culmination came in one of the great Congressional investigations in which a joint committee examined witnesses and received documents and exhibits over a period of several months. The record fills 39 published volumes.

The thrust of this short, well-written book is a description of the course of the political controversy rather than an analysis of the issues involved. To this extent it is an original contribution to

the rather extensive Pearl Harbor literature. It clearly shows how and why the controversy became polarized between those who blamed officials in Washington and those who blamed the officers in the field.

In describing the controversy, Melosi raises several issues by implication. It would be unfair to criticize him for not having written another kind of book; but it would also be unfair to prospective readers to fail to point out that Melosi by describing the polarization of views in the political controversy has only scratched the surface of the issues he has raised. He properly describes the shock resulting from the attack and the public indignation that the United States could be surprised. Something must have gone wrong, many people said. Was it incompetence on the part of the field commanders and in Washington? Or, did Roosevelt seek to maneuver the Japanese into attacking first? The question remains, the controversy continues, and probably will forever.

Another aspect has been inadequately examined in the literature to date. Whatever the faults and discrepancies of the command structure in Hawaii and the means and methods of communication between Washington and the field, they were essentially those of a peacetime military establishment. True, the Atlantic Fleet had been at war for all practical purposes for several months; true, both Adm. Harold R. Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations, and Gen. George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, had bent every effort towards preparing the Navy and the Army for war; true, in late 1941 war with Japan was seen as inevitable—but the fact remained that a peacetime mind-set prevailed in Hawaii and in the Philippines. (General MacArthur had several hours warning but his B-17s were still on the ground, wingtip to wingtip, when the Japanese attacked his forces.) Even though Stark had sent a war-warning message, the Pacific Fleet still

saw war as only hypothetical, regardless of its likelihood. This may partly explain the complacency in the field and the failure to implement the sound and workable defense plans for Hawaii that had been prepared several months earlier, both of which were unknown in Washington. Incidentally, the Hawaiian defense plans were so good on paper that CNO used them as examples to be followed by other commands.

Pearl Harbor remains a matter of controversy but not so much because of doubt about the facts. Probably all the important evidence is in. It is controversial because more work remains to be done in analyzing and interpreting the data. The polarization resulting from the political controversy, which Melosi describes so well in its partisan context, is an insufficient explanation of why America was surprised. More complete and satisfactory analyses await the pens of other scholars.

B.M. SIMPSON III

Mumford, Stephen D. *Population Growth Control: The Next Move is America's*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1977. 167pp.

As illegal Mexican immigrants, feeling the consequences of Mexico's high birth and unemployment rates, continue to pour into the United States, most Americans are becoming aware of the population explosion in developing nations. Naval officers and others may likely find themselves on duty in any number of nations where the birth rate is soaring as the death rate is plunging, thanks to control of yesteryear's worst communicable diseases but without parallel birth control.

Since the 1960s social scientists have been reporting on the problems resulting from population pressures in most nations of the world and on occasion, physical scientists also write about the problem.

Now Stephen D. Mumford, with a doctorate in public health, offers a slim,