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## Practise to Deceive

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can escape the Communist-inspired charges that any U.S. help in family planning is really an "imperialist plot" to keep nonwhites from outnumbering us. A foolish charge, but didn't Hitler get away with some of the stupidest bigotry of all time in the guise of a New Order among an uncomfortable number of people in the 1930s, and have not the rulers in the Kremlin sold anti-Yankee slogans over and over?

The book has minor flaws. It contains no index, which forces the reader to thumb through subheadings and the table of contents, guessing if a specific topic has been covered.

And the study does not take into account the powerful forces of political propaganda which America's adversaries and Americans who disagree with this "mission" will exploit should we try to carry out the Mumford plan of using the Department of Defense to develop and help implement true birth control among the nations of the world.

But Mumford analyzes the basic problems of global overpopulation clearly and succinctly, and he does so from the admirable perspective of an American who cares deeply for the welfare of his own country.

MARVIN ALISKY  
Arizona State University

Mure, David. *Practise to Deceive*. London: William Kimber, 1977. 264pp.

In 1963 a retired American Intelligence official calling himself "Christopher Felix" produced a stimulating survey of international espionage entitled *A Short Course in the Secret War*. Therein he asserted that "one of secret operations' most vital and complex activities" is deception. That is the subject of this book: Mure's memoir of his share in British intelligence's effort in the Middle East during World War Two to hoodwink the German High Command into believing that the Allied invasion of Europe, when it came, would

come through the Balkans and not through the Channel coast of France. As chairman of the deception team—dubbed the "31 Committee" (its fellow command, "Twenty Committee" or Double-Cross, operated out of London)—Major Mure figured in the scheme from its inception and was active in the supervision of turned agents in Egypt, Iraq, Persia, and especially the Lebanon.

The book is dedicated to the presiding genius of the idea overall, the late Brigadier Dudley Clarke ("Galveston"), a South African whom Mure calls "certainly the most unusual Intelligence officer of his time," "in essence, the supreme artist, absorbed in his own virtuosity." Starting from the sands of defeat in the Western Desert under General Wavell, Clarke stitched together "the first directorate of its kind in history which had no existence other than in the imagination of himself and his Commander-in-Chief." Clarke's deputy, Col. Noel Wyld, directed the deception aspects of "Plan Jael," one arm of the larger "Neptune" scheme on the Western Front.

If Mure's praise of his chief may seem extreme, he freely admits that Clarke's success would have been impossible without use of "Ultra," the intercepts into the German communication system that were perhaps the single most closely guarded secret of the war. For the Middle East theater Mure also concedes that Clarke's triumph would have been severely hampered had he not had control—and the author feels this controversial situation must be taken for granted—of "Cicero," the German double agent serving as valet to the British Ambassador in Ankara. Together "these tremendous duetists" achieved the nearly total deception of Abwehr agent controllers based in Athens, Sofia, and Istanbul.

It is the day-to-day story of how this was done with which Major Mure's book is concerned. He quotes verbatim from message after message from those days

## 126 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

of 30 years ago, admitting that he has had no access to pertinent documents since 1944 but assuring the reader that "I am lucky in having a photographic memory . . . ." He also admits that he is "by nature a congenital liar and romancer," only one among "quite a number of lunatics who had been, apparently through extra-sensory perception, selected by Galveston for the supporting roles . . . ."

He further admits, "I am not at all highly educated, and on this point the present reviewer can confirm that the author would have benefitted from a crash course in the principles of punctuation. Worse, he has been ill-served by his publishers. The book's index is skimpy; there is only one map, and that grossly inadequate; there are misspellings and textual omissions; and the so-called bibliography is sadly lacking completeness. Two titles clamoring for addition therein are Elyesa (not Eleazar) Bazna, *I Was Cicero* (1963) and Leonard O. Mosley's account of the Abwehr agent Johann Eppler, *The Cat and the Mice* (1959).

Nevertheless, this volume may be recommended to all those intrigued by the nuances of double-agentry and how it is "played." The book is a natural companion piece to Sir John Masterman's *The Double-Cross System* (1972).

CURTIS CARROLL DAVIS  
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Naval OR Study Group USNA. *Naval Operations Analysis*. 2nd ed. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1977. 372pp.

The growth of operations research and operations analyses has been phenomenal. Since the first edition of this book in 1968 the complexity of naval tactical and strategic problems has so continued to increase that an update of the earlier edition is most appropriate. This edition is written principally for naval officers or those with a day-to-day

interest in the relationship between new technology and such naval decisions as:

(a) On average, what is the best course of action if the enemy has the choices of A, B, C, etc.?

(b) What search pattern should be used for today's sea state in order to minimize the location time of a lost aircraft?

(c) When is it best to fire in salvos and when is it best to use a doctrine of shoot-look-shoot?

The introductory chapters are a good review of a logic process for problem formulation, development of alternatives and evaluation of possible solutions. The methodology is straightforward and easy to read. This formulation process can stimulate creative ideas and introduce objectivity.

The detection theory chapters expand upon detection concepts and problems associated with continuous looking and separate glimpses. The illustrations and problems at the end of each chapter, including the electronic warfare and radar detection sections, contain many additional combat examples of the uses and limits of these ideas. The electronic warfare/countermeasures (with cross-over or burnthrough) discussion of an attack aircraft against a SAM defense system on a major naval ship is an outstanding example of the principles of EW, deception, and mass attack.

Throughout the book analytical and mathematical concepts are skillfully used to assist in decisionmaking. The authors have used Bayes' Theorem in search and patrol situations, probability theory in Antiair Warfare and Mine Warfare situations, and PER (Program Evaluation and Review) techniques relating to deployment scheduling.

The latest edition does have some limitations. First, it could have more descriptive matter rather than such a high analytical content. To the naval officer who has been away from formulas and calculus for several years a greater use of graphic illustrations