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An understanding of the nature and structure of strategy and the fundamental concepts that govern its practical application is essential for those charged with critical political-military decisions. The original version of this primer was presented at the 1978 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association.

STRATEGY—THE THEORY AND APPLICATION

by

Henry E. Eccles

Introduction. Although this paper considers strategy in general terms, the emphasis of the analysis will be on military strategy. Furthermore, within this limitation the discussion will, for the most part, be from the perspective of high command. This is the highest level of civilian and military executive authority dealing with the use of military power and armed force throughout the range of human conflict. Nevertheless, because the term strategy frequently is used loosely, unless the context is clear, an appropriate modifier should be used to indicate the kind of strategy one is discussing.

Regardless of how many people and interests are involved in the decision process of "crisis management," the major decision to use overt military force in combat must be made by one man who somehow must make an intuitive synthesis of the factors involved with the advice of his chosen associates. This intuitive synthesis of command must assimilate but transcend the technological aspects of the problem.

The use of the phrase "intuitive synthesis" should perhaps be explained. It derives from Jerome Bruner's account of the nature of intuitive thinking: "... an implicit perception of the total problem... rests on familiarity with the domain of knowledge involved... a familiarity that gives intuition something to work with... makes it possible for the thinker to take short cuts."

The fundamentals of strategy and strategic theory are relatively few and simple.¹ The practical application of these fundamentals is infinitely varied and at times very subtle.

Mahan wrote: "War cannot be made a rule of thumb, and any attempt to make it so will result in grave disaster in proportion to the gravity with which the issues of war are ever clothed."²

While adherence to theory and sound principle will not guarantee success, ignorance or inadvertent violation of them will enhance the likelihood of failure. Thus the art of war must include an intuitive understanding of theory and principle as well as a feeling for the

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particular circumstances that will influence application.

Frequently we hear the statement that war is irrational. Opinions may differ about the truth and application of this statement but regardless of its truth or the frequency of wars, rational or irrational, certain points remain:

Survival of one's person, or the interests of the state under the conditions of irrationality imposed by war, will be enhanced by a rational appraisal of the situation one faces and of the personal or group objectives one should be trying to attain. Strategic thinking should be rational in order to cope with what may appear to be a wholly irrational situation. A word of caution: What is rational in one culture may appear to be wholly irrational to one of a different culture. This was repeatedly shown in the relationship of U.S. government officials with those of Vietnam. The Vietnam war illustrated both the violation of sound principles and the blind application of rule of thumb.

A word on my use of the terms *war* and *human conflict*: Although I will use the term *war* as a convenience, I doubt if ever again there will be a formally declared "war" between great powers. On the other hand, I believe that violent human conflict, perhaps on a very large scale, will continue and that it will be the task of military command to use military force effectively wherever and whenever it is called upon to do so by the political authority.

I know of no way to make a sharp, easy distinction between policy and strategy. They blend and overlap. Both provide guidance for plans and operations.³ Both arise out of the desire to achieve an effect related to or in support of an interest. In most instances each term should be so modified that its meaning is clear.

Policy, whether national, strategic, administrative or what have you, provides guidance under which officials work to attain an effect desired. Policy

by itself achieves nothing until it is carried out by specific plans and specific action.

Because of the close relationship of terms, some scholars prefer to confine the term *strategy* to military affairs. For an example of this close relation, consider World War II. When Japan attacked the United States in December 1941, the American policy of neutrality, which had been deteriorating steadily, especially since June 1940, was shattered and abandoned. Thereafter the United States made the decision to place primary emphasis on the war against Germany and to defeat Germany before defeating Japan. This was a major political-military policy decision that had a major effect on the Alliance's military strategy. The more that details are included in any discussion of policy and strategy, the more their specifics are intertwined.

Nature, Structure and Fundamental Relationships. Strategy can be understood only as it is related to the other fundamentals of the art of war—tactics, logistics, intelligence and communications. The following definitions of these terms are included to show the coherent relationship that exists, as viewed from the perspective of command.

STRATEGY is the comprehensive direction of power to control situations and areas to attain broad objectives.

TACTICS is the immediate employment of forces and weapons to attain strategic objectives.

LOGISTICS is the creation and sustained support of weapons and forces to be tactically employed to attain strategic objectives.

INTELLIGENCE sheds light on the situation.

COMMUNICATIONS transmits information and the decisions of command.

The decisions of command in all combat situations require a blend of strategic, tactical and logistical con-

siderations. Thus *Operations* are a blend of logistic and tactical actions to attain a strategic purpose. The logistic action must precede the tactical action.

Strategy deals primarily with objectives. That is, the effects desired. This is usually a hierarchy of primary and secondary, immediate and ultimate objectives. A strategic concept is a verbal statement of:

What to control,
 For what purpose,
 To what degree,
 When to initiate control,
 How long to control,
 In general, how to control,

and the practical application of such a strategic concept is in the form of specific tactical operations that must be preceded by logistic action.

Strategy is comprehensive—it aims at the whole field of action.

Strategy is the direction of power. It should not concern itself with operational details.

Strategy deals with all forms of power available to the command.

Strategy deals with situations and areas, i.e., people's attitudes and behavior; relative positions and lines of communication, chokepoints, material resources, combat bases, etc. Strategy and destruction are not synonymous. Strategy uses destruction only when there is no better means of control. Strategy includes control of both the application of power and the sources of power.

Because strategy is comprehensive, it looks at the whole field of action. But as resources are always limited, the strategist must identify those minimum key areas and situations in relation to time and distance and the availability of tactical and logistic resources. Consequently, if a man cannot make an intuitive evaluation of the relation of key objectives, tactical and logistic resources, and time and distance, he is not a strategist, he is merely a speculator.

This is a very difficult matter, and thus

is precisely why there are so few strategists in the world, including the military profession. In each case, regardless of the level of authority, the strategist should think and act in terms of the elements of power that are at his disposal—international, national, military, theater or task force. So, when considering international or grand strategy, national strategy, military strategy or maritime strategy, one should remember that he is dealing with three interwoven essentials: objectives, the effects desired; scheme, or plan; and the physical means, the economics and logistics. There should then be no great difficulty with the terminology of discussion and in grasping the structure of a practical strategic problem. The Arab-Israeli war of 1973 and the ramifications of the U.S. relationship with its NATO allies during that war illustrate these essentials very well.

Principles and Corollaries. The first principle of strategy is that political purpose must dominate strategy. The use of military force without a clear political purpose is ultimately futile and self-defeating.

Political purpose expressed through policy dominates strategy by the analysis of objectives. Objectives should not merely be stated, they must be analyzed, for national strategy is concerned with the achievement of a hierarchy of objectives that in turn derive from the political purpose of the state. Among these, the continuing existence of the state as a sovereign entity and the preservation of national values are paramount and enduring objectives. Thus, the ultimate source of strategy lies in the values of the people of a nation. In a free society a strategy that is contrary to the sense of values of the people cannot be expected to succeed. If these values are confused it is likely that the strategy will be confused.

In the hierarchy of objectives there are primary objectives and secondary

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objectives; there are immediate objectives and ultimate objectives. These should be clarified before the final decision to use military force is made; thereafter, they must be continuously reexamined.

Enemy reaction to the initiation of the use of force is unpredictable. It may be that this enemy reaction will change the relative importance of the various elements in the hierarchy of objectives so as to necessitate a change in the planned action. But always the overall effect desired is paramount.

It is the special function of high command to make certain that there is conceptual unity, that all agree upon that effect desired. This is particularly important in a free society in which public support is vital. For that reason the objectives must be stated clearly and simply. If the high command cannot express its major objectives in terms that the people of the nation can understand and support, this should be a warning that the use of force is unwise.

The objectives represent "the effect desired," what one is seeking to achieve by the use of military force. Herein lies one of the most difficult and dangerous aspects of war and strategy, particularly in a nation of free government and free institutions, where the support of people is essential for the successful conduct of prolonged large-scale combat. The strategy that is suitable for the authoritarian state that effectively controls the news and public opinion may be unsuitable for a state of free institutions that does not.

The ultimate purpose of the use of military force is to achieve a settlement, for wars are not conducted merely for the sake of fighting. And yet the processes of war create a momentum difficult to control. World War I is an illustration. The initial national objectives, "the effects desired," were never clearly analyzed, and became submerged in unparalleled mud and blood. The

ultimate consequences of this are still not fully realized.

Public discussions of strategy are often corrupted by loose emotional uses of the words "threat," "security" and "risk." In some instances the context is clear and there is no confusion. But in others these words may be invoked to sanctify an unworthy motive, to support a special interest, or merely to conceal sloppy thinking.

National security has both external and internal requirements. The external basically involve sovereignty, territorial integrity and economic sufficiency. Internal security involves the institution of government, of society and the economy. Naturally they are inter-related. They are not quantifiable. All are part of national power and, as such, their evaluation becomes part of the concept of strategy as control.

The evaluation of strategic risk is largely intuitive. There is no such thing as a no-risk strategy or national policy. As a corollary, a large undisciplined armed force with poor morale becomes a menace rather than a safeguard to the security of state.

Economics, Logistics and Strategy. Just as national economics is a vital factor in national strategy; so too military economics (i.e., logistics) is a vital factor in military strategy. The understanding of logistics and its relationship to economics is therefore essential to understanding strategy.

The economic factors in national strategy are interlocking and regenerative. As in other strategic matters, the fundamentals are few and can be stated simply. The practical application is complicated and in some instances controversial. These factors are the sources of food, energy and raw material and their political availability; the trade routes, land, sea and air; the standard of living of the people; monetary systems, exchange rates and inflation. The normal reaction of human

beings to the process of industrialization and economic competition influences both the social and political situation in such a way as to produce violence. One form is interstate, such as war; other forms may be called revolution and terrorism, which may be both interstate and intrastate. Thus worldwide economic stability is not a reasonable expectation; both policy and strategy must respond to inevitable fluctuations.

From the military point of view the economic factors exert their influence on both strategy and military operations through the working of the logistics process and the logistics systems of the armed forces. The overall relationship can be expressed simply: The logistics process is both the military element in the nation's economy and the economic element in its military operations. Economic strength limits the combat forces one can create. Logistics limits the combat forces one can employ. Logistics is a coherent process with its roots in the national economy and its payoff in the tactical operations of combat. This process has two overlapping phases: the creation of weapons and forces (the producer phase), and the sustained support of these weapons and forces (the consumer phase).

The chief direct influences of logistics on strategy can be seen in the composition, balance, and deployment of combat forces; the site selection and buildup of strategic overseas bases; and the scope and timing of strategic plans. The elements of time and timing are two of the most important factors in the strategic planning for and the conduct of war. What is a good action at one time may be impossible or even fatal at another time. Producer logistics dominates national strategic timing. Producer logistics combines with consumer logistics to dominate theater strategic timing. Consumer logistics dominates tactical timing.

This matter of time and timing is primarily a matter of intuitive pro-

fessional judgment. One major difference between economics and logistics is that in logistics, time becomes a life and death value quite different from the element of time in nonmilitary economic affairs.

Further Fundamentals. The old Naval War College Green Book, *Sound Military Decision*, said:

Policy insures that strategy and tactics pursue appropriate aims. It is the duty of tactics to insure results appropriate to the strategic aim. It is the duty of strategy to give tactics the power appropriate to the results demanded. It is the duty of strategy to insure that the tactical action be initiated under conditions favorable for the attainment of objectives.⁴

In discussing the overall problem of translating a strategic concept into practical action, *Sound Military Decision* continues with the admonition that any proposed course of action be examined for:

Suitability—will its attainment accomplish the effect desired?

Feasibility—can the action be accomplished by the means available? and

Acceptability—are the consequences of cost justified by the importance of the effect desired?

These factors are interdependent and their evaluation is a test of professional judgment. They are not strictly quantifiable, nor is strategy a zero sum game.

Strategy must always be authoritative. There should be no question that orders will be obeyed. This is particularly true in the operational phase. But there is also the further point that the ultimate utility of the force being used depends on the legitimacy of the authority using that force. This in turn is related to the earlier comments on the control of both the use of power and control of the sources of power.

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Carrying these fundamentals further, the actual *employment* of combat forces is a tactical action, regardless of their size or destructiveness, whereas the *effect* of such tactical employment is strategic. Therefore, to label a weapon as being tactical or strategic in accordance with its range or destructiveness tends to inhibit the understanding of strategy.

The semantic aspects of this facet of strategy have serious implications. With the development of expensive complex weapons systems, a particular system may gain some special bureaucratic, industrial and legislative "vested interest" which may produce what I call a "weapon strategy," that is, to shape a strategic plan so as to emphasize the use of a special weapons system rather than to use the systems that will attain the effect desired. The availability of a weapon system certainly will and should *influence* strategy, but not *determine* it. Weapons limit strategic capabilities, but they should not dictate the objectives or the strategy itself. This leads to another matter: What kinds of power and forces can be used to accomplish a political purpose? This inevitably brings us to nuclear weapons.

Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence. Nuclear weapons and deterrence have dominated the literature of strategy for the last 25 years. Even though much of the discussion has been imaginative, even brilliant, vast areas of conjecture and ignorance still remain. In the case of the actual use of nuclear weapons, large or small, short or long-range, clean or dirty, there is no way of controlling the subsequent course of events. Because I cannot see any useful political purpose that can be achieved by the use of any form or size of nuclear weapon, I am reluctant to use the term "nuclear strategy."

The use of the term *strategy* implies rationality. If one says (and some do) that a certain course of action makes no

sense but nevertheless, because of forces that we cannot control, we must take it, then we must not dignify such a plan or decision with the name *strategy*. It is a desperate haphazard improvisation, nothing more, and it should be so labeled.

Twenty-five years ago, Cdr. Ralph Williams summed up the inherent paradox of the matter in writing about atomic airpower: . . . "Ironically, atomic air power can be justified only for the sole purpose of insuring that it will never be used."⁵

This same basic idea was expressed by James E. King in 1957:

Moreover we must be prepared to fight limited actions ourselves otherwise we shall have made no advance beyond massive retaliation which tied our hands in conflicts involving less than our survival, and *we must be prepared to lose limited actions*. No limitation could survive our disposition to elevate every conflict in which our interests are affected to the level of total conflict with survival at stake.⁶

This topic is discussed by Bernard Brodie under the title "The True Nature of Strategy."⁷

President Johnson, writing about the critical last week of July 1965, when the decision to commit U.S. troops to large-scale land combat in Vietnam was officially made, said, "Above all I did not want to lead this nation and the world into a nuclear war or even the risk of such a war."⁸ Thereafter the effectiveness of the U.S. combat effort in Vietnam was reduced by the constraints imposed to avoid this risk. The war, after all, was lost and its loss was accepted. This basic principle holds, regardless of various opinions on the specific effect of these constraints, their wisdom, or the continuing arguments about the basic inevitability of the U.S. defeat in Vietnam.

This emphasizes a point whose implications have not been adequately

recognized in strategic literature. Nuclear missiles have raised the level of tactical defeat that is acceptable to attain a higher strategic objective. The acceptance of such tactical defeat has always been a recognized feature of war. Usually, it has been in the area of military grand tactics. Now, however, it has been raised to the level of national strategy and therefore has new and major implications for all levels of command. In particular it imposes special demands on the character and ability of commanders and on the morale and discipline of the Forces!

The slogan "There is no substitute for Victory" can be dangerously misleading in an age of nuclear missiles. Thus the continuing analysis of objectives must include the recognition of the point at which they have been satisfactorily achieved, or the point at which further pursuit is unjustified. Here the problem of command and personal leadership is to maintain morale, discipline and combat effectiveness in the face of unfavorable tactical situations and in the absences of "victory."

The actual use of nuclear weapons and the limitation and control of nuclear weapons must always be a matter of strategic risk whose evaluation eventually comes down to an intuitive personal judgment. This judgment may be that of a commander in chief accepting the consensus of "expert advisors," or rejecting it and deciding independently, or it may be that of the members of Congress debating a military budget. In the specific case of the strategic risk of the United States and its NATO allies versus the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact, does the total abolition or rejection of any use of nuclear weapons pose a greater risk to the security of the free nations than the continued deployment of thousands of large nuclear weapons? In my opinion, the potential ability of the NATO nations to develop, procure, deploy and employ modern conventional weapons is such that even a

continued buildup of Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces poses less risk than a continuation of nuclear weapon development and deployment. If the NATO nations and the United States do not have the discipline to compete with an economically inferior Soviet bloc, they do not have the discipline to stand up to the threat of the actual use of nuclear weapons.

This situation requires three types of discipline if military force is to be used successfully to achieve a political purpose: the discipline of intellectual rigor in military-political analysis and decision, particularly regarding objectives; political-social discipline in the people of the nation; and, most important unquestioned discipline and high morale in the armed forces. In other words, in the light of the brutal facts of modern conflict, successful military strategy requires a kind of national discipline that has long been anathema to some members of our society. Without the assurance of such morale, discipline and combat effectiveness in such unfavorable situations, it is absurd to think that military strategy can achieve any political purpose.

In summation, nuclear deterrence is a necessary but negative aspect of strategy. Its only purpose is to provide freedom of action to use the positive aspects of strategy. Because nuclear weapons cannot be uninvented, knowledge of nuclear weapons, their effects and their control is essential for the strategist. This leads to the paradoxical definition that nuclear strategy is the political maneuvering and the deployment of weapons whose purpose is to insure that nuclear weapons are never used.

Illustrations. The Napoleonic wars (1793 to 1815) vividly illustrate the continuing interrelationships between policy, strategy, economics, logistics and tactics. Geoffrey Marcus, in his magnificent book *The Age of Nelson*,⁹

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brings to his analysis of these matters the added dimension of the personal influence of a great commander, Lord St. Vincent, who through his special concern for logistics, morale, and discipline made strategic success possible.

In 1941 and 1942 the senseless brutality of the German SS troops in the Ukraine severely antagonized the people of that area. Although the people were opposed to the Soviet regime, in response they supported the Soviets and effectively conducted guerrilla warfare against the German forces.

In China in the 1930s and 1940s, the Nationalist troops, operating largely under generals who were ineffectively controlled by the central government, so abused the people that in many instances they welcomed the better disciplined Communist forces of Mao.

The philosophy and strategy of guerrilla warfare as expounded and successfully practiced by Mao Tse-tung is a splendid illustration of the concept of strategy as control¹⁰ in almost all aspects.

The Arab-Israeli war of 1973 illustrates many matters discussed herein. For instance: The commitment of reserve forces is a vital command decision. In October 1973, the Israelis contained the initially successful attack and then, by a well-timed counterattack, drove the Egyptian forces back across the Suez Canal, completely changing the strategic situations. This counterattack was made possible by the commitment of reserves at the right time. This action was made possible by a U.S. air resupply of tanks, missiles and electronic gear staged in the Azores, a staging, in turn, made possible by the U.S. political support of Portugal.

This case again illustrates the interrelationships among policy, strategy, logistics, tactics and timing. It also illustrates the strategic exploitation of a tactical success by the use of a sound and flexible logistic system.

The Anglo-French misadventure in

Suez in 1956 was a splendid illustration of the cumulative consequences of lack of a clear and suitable objective; lack of conceptual unity in the high command and among members of an alliance; a "strategy" contrary to the values of a large segment of the people, with a consequent loss of the sources of power; bad timing, and loss of time caused by an inadequate logistic system that allowed the other adverse factors to build up to a fatal degree.¹¹

Vietnam. Much still remains to be done to clarify and present the policy and strategy lessons of the Vietnam war. A few major points, however, relate directly to this paper.

The United States had no coherent strategy to support its national policy.

There was no conceptual unity in the chain of high command about the nature of the war and how it should be conducted. It was confused conceptually from the initial U.S. involvement in support of the French in 1946 to the final debacle in April 1975. Finally in 1974-1975 the U.S. Commander in Chief lost his authority and control over the sources and use of power.

The influence of cultural factors and consequent sense of values both in Vietnam and in the United States was not understood with the result that conflicts within South Vietnam and the determination of the North Vietnamese, and the nature and power of the dissent within the United States were misunderstood and underestimated.

The major strategic-operational errors were neglect of time and timing both in tactics and logistics; the policy of compromise and delay in the command decision process at the Presidential level, combined with overcentralization and overmanagement. This was illustrated by detailed control of bombing, delay in the mining of enemy harbors, delay in establishing logistic control in South Vietnam.

Instead of a coherent strategy, there

was a series of improvisations that became desperate as the popular support of U.S. policy and the operations in Vietnam eroded under the combined influence of mismanagement and misrepresentation by the top command and the skillful manipulation of U.S. and world public opinion by the opponents of U.S. policy. Needless to say, the My Lai massacre in Vietnam is a splendid example of how the uncontrolled use of power contributed to the loss of control of the sources of power.

The North Vietnamese had a clear objective from which they never deviated: the complete conquest of South Vietnam and consolidation of their control over all of Vietnam. They employed all the power at their disposal with skill, conceptual coherence, and ultimate cumulative success. They used terrorism and the assassination of thousands of key southern officials to break the control of the South Vietnamese Government. They used the calculated abuse and torture of American prisoners as a tool of conflict—or bargaining point, in the so-called peace negotiations.

They exploited the free institutions of the United States and the sense of values of the American people to create doubt in the minds of the American people about the reality of the threat to the national interests and security of the United States, and to create a strong opinion in the people of the United States that their national values were threatened more by the policies and actions of the U.S. Government than they were by the possible success of the Hanoi cause. It was a comprehensive, coherent and cumulative strategy based on concepts of control and national values. In this war it appears that cultural factors ultimately were dominant.

Summary and Conclusion. The translation of theory and principle into specific operational planning can be

done effectively only by those who have responsibility, authority and up-to-date technical and situational knowledge. Modern strategy requires an intuitive synthesis of policy, political purpose, values, military power and force, military readiness and effectiveness, economics, logistics and the process of negotiation.

The military application of strategic theory and principles are the responsibility of military high command. This command, whose apex is the President of the United States, is in fact a continuum of executive authority, part of which is exercised by civilians and part by professional military officers. Part of this command structure deals primarily with operational matters, and part with matters that are variously described as administration, logistics, or management. Regardless of what mixture of civilians and officers make up the command structure, or of who deals with operations and who with administration, all these functions and positions blend and overlap in a manner that defies precise analysis. It varies from situation to situation, and varies also in accordance with the personal preferences of the President and the senior men in this chain of command.

This essential and inevitable variability can be understood and its operation wisely controlled only by those who attain an intuitive grasp of the whole.

The most critical strategic decisions must always ultimately be made by one man who must evaluate the recommendations of his colleagues, make an authoritative intuitive synthesis and assume responsibility. This element of authority coupled with responsibility moves down the legal chain of command of the state, from the head of state or government through the commander in chief and the appointed commanders to the operating units. The commander at each level has the personal responsibility to establish

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conceptual unity among his subordinate commanders on his objectives, i.e., the effect desired. The binding force that holds this structure together is an intangible quality that I call the Integrity of Command, primarily a matter of personal character and competence, instilling loyalty up and practicing loyalty down.

National strategy has both positive aspects and negative aspects. The positive strategy uses all the elements of national power to achieve the national purpose. The policy of deterrence is a negative use of power that employs the threat of force to gain time and freedom of action to employ the positive elements of power.

I know of no evidence that the Soviet operational doctrine makes any distinction between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. Except in arms control discussions, they do not distinguish nuclear weapons for deterrence and nuclear weapons for defense. We know, however, that within the Soviet power hierarchy, there are differing views on national security policy. The government control of news and the news media tends to conceal these differences, giving the men in control more freedom of action than their counterparts in the free societies. Therefore, they can employ ambiguity and equivocation both in policy and posture so as to complicate the decision process of an adversary government.

In grand strategy or the strategy of an alliance, a variety of views must be accommodated and differing perceptions of equivocal situations are to be expected. In such situations, or in a clear confrontation the modern strategist, after analyzing the situation and his objectives, must ask himself: what kinds of power and force can be used to achieve my political purpose? What kinds of power and force cannot be so used? What changes in the situation can transform a particular kind of power and force from one category of usability to

the other? And before initiating the use of military force, he must know the state of operational readiness and combat readiness of the forces at his disposal.

This brings him inevitably to the matter of morale and discipline of the combat forces that then becomes the critical links in the whole conceptual chain of strategic thinking. The conduct of violent human conflict or war always will be a matter of great uncertainty. The directing authorities will make many mistakes. Very seldom will one or two such errors be decisive; instead the issue will usually be decided by the balance of errors between the contestants as this affects the balance of power brought to bear. In other words, strategy is cumulative, not a matter of a single decisive stroke. The alleged decisiveness of nuclear preemption itself has such contradictions that it is a denial of strategic thought.

I have sketched my concepts of the nature and structure of strategy and the fundamental relationships that govern the practical application of strategic concepts. We can expect an indefinite continuation both of human conflict and the attempts of government to control it through the processes of bureaucratic politics as influenced by powerful vested interests. As we con-

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Rear Admiral Henry Eccles, USNA '22, retired in 1952 from active duty but not from active service to the Navy and the Naval War College. Two pages of the Summer 1977 issue of the *Review* (an issue dedicated to him) were required to list his books and other writings. His latest book, *Military Power in a Free Society*, will be published by the Naval War College Press in summer 1979.

tend with the semantic distortion and plausible rationalizations inherent therein, I suggest we bear in mind that:

Policy must dominate Strategy.

Strategy must dominate Tactics.

Tactics influences Policy.

Tactics influences Strategy.

Logistics limits and influences both Tactics and Strategy and hence influences Policy.

The methods of planning and decision, the criteria of judgment and the casual ethics that are adequate for the relatively modest risks of most business and domestic political decisions are utterly inadequate for the critical political-military decision of today's harsh world of conflict. The risks are great. The stakes are high. The challenge is clear.^{1 2}

NOTES

1. My ideas on strategy are largely derived from the fundamental thought of Herbert Rosinski, as affected by my own experience in and study of Logistics. I believe that these ideas in no way contradict the ideas of such authorities as Clausewitz, Mahan, Liddell Hart, Michael Howard or Bernard Brodie - all men whose work I greatly admire.

2. A.T. Mahan, *Naval Administration and Warfare* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1918), p. 232.

3. B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy, the Indirect Approach* (New York: Praeger, 1954), chap. XIX, "The Theory of Strategy," pp. 333-336 are particularly important and illuminating. Also see Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1973), chap. 10, "Strategic Thinkers, Planners, Decision-Makers," p. 438.

4. U.S. Naval War College, *Sound Military Decision* (Newport, R.I.: 1942), pp. 9, 30, 34.

5. Ralph E. Williams, Jr., "The Great Debate," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, March 1954, p. 253.

6. James E. King, Jr., "Nuclear Plenty and Limited War," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1957, p. 256.

7. Brodie, pp. 458-459.

8. Lyndon B. Johnson, *The Vantage Point* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), p. 153.

9. G.J. Marcus, *The Age of Nelson* (New York: Viking Press, 1971).

10. Samuel B. Griffith II, *Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press Doubleday, 1978).

11. Henry E. Eccles, "Suez 1956, Some Military Lessons," *Naval War College Review*, March 1969, pp. 28-56.

12. Henry E. Eccles, *Military Concepts and Philosophy* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1965), p. 289.

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