

1979

Book Reviews


The U.S. Naval War College

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review>

Recommended Citation

War College, The U.S. Naval (1979) "Book Reviews," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 32 : No. 4 , Article 10.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol32/iss4/10>

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.



PROFESSIONAL READING

BOOK REVIEWS

Coletta, Paolo E. *Admiral Bradley A. Fiske and the American Navy*. Lawrence: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1979. 306pp.

Whenever thinking back over the long list of flag officers who have served America's Navy, most of us nonspecialists find our knowledge to be very sketchy. We recall a few from the early days of our country, one or two from the Civil War years, Dewey, Luce, and Mahan from the late 19th and early 20th century, several from World War II, and a few of recent years. We remember many details from some careers, highlights from others, perhaps a single incident from some, only the names of a large number, and not even that for a completely neglected group. Of the two latter categories we forget, or never knew, that the contributions of some of them far outweigh those of some whose names we have enshrined. Bradley Fiske was one of those.

Other than a surname on a list, my own awareness of Fiske long was limited to the vague impression that he fit in somewhere between the Spanish-American War and World War I. He was important because he invented the stadimeter by which the 300-yard standard distance between destroyers in column was measured. I learned his first name when serving in the staff of a squadron to which U.S.S. *Fiske* (DD-842) was assigned and learned that there had been an earlier *Fiske* sunk in the Atlantic in 1944. Some years later I commanded the second *Fiske* and taught by a then-budding but now

full-fledged naval historian *qua* naval officer serving in the ship, I learned enough of Fiske to begin to wonder how it was that he has remained so little regarded. He won no wars, but neither did Mahan nor Luce nor Rickover nor Zumwalt; yet his professional writings were as widely read, his technical achievements as applauded, and his organizational battles as controversial.

Fiske will never attain the institutional stature of Decatur or Dewey or Halsey but we no longer need wonder who he was or what he did. Paolo Coletta, a professor at the Naval Academy, has given us an excellent biography, soundly researched and interestingly written, of "a seagoing officer, . . . the greatest inventor of optical and electrical mechanisms ever to serve the navy, . . . [a] progressive who worked to reform naval organization and administration . . . [and] the father of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, of the Naval Research Program, and the National Security Council."

Fiske graduated from the Naval Academy in 1874 and joined the first of a series of ships. He had always been a tinkerer and his newly acquired engineering education gave him foundation for inventing items and developing ideas ranging, in those early years, from mechanical pencils to navigation methods. More often than not he found that his ideas had already been invented and patented or that they were rejected by the bureaus and organizations to whom he sent them, but his flashing

light signaling device was accepted and is still being used. He became interested in electricity and wrote a text on the subject. He designed electrical primers to fire the guns of the new ABC cruisers. His work and suggestions led to electricity going to sea, first for lighting and power for handling ammunition and laying and firing guns, then to mines, torpedoes, telegraphy, telephony, fire control systems and even to electrically driven submarines. Poor gunnery results led him to a consideration of range-finders. Combining the study of optics with his knowledge of electricity resulted in telescopic gunsights and electric range transmitters and indicators. (Some commanding officers resented these improvements inasmuch as increased emphasis on gunnery meant daily drill and that mussed up their decks and paintwork.) Fiske's work on wireless communication between ships worked but its range was too limited to be of any practical value. Practical difficulties also arose with his scheme to connect ships by wired telephone.

Fiske was in Manila Bay with Dewey in 1898 and saw many of his fire control and gunnery devices in action (and also his engine order telegraphs, revolution indicators, rudder angle indicators, and a host of other electrically and optically operated or aided apparatuses he had designed).

He continued with his technical work but had begun to concern himself with questions of administration, organization, and strategy. His gold medal essay for the Naval Institute in 1905 called for a navy general staff, an idea not original with him but for which he became a leading spokesman. Such a staff was essential to the reforms that he and a few like-minded officers saw as necessary to an efficient, effective, powerful navy. Some in the navy (and in the national press) applauded his efforts but Congress was not swayed.

Fiske's professional career was steadily advanced, despite his being

called a visionary, impracticable, crank, bookworm, and laboratory officer by some, and after commanding *Tennessee* and *South Dakota* he was assigned to duty with the General Board in 1910. When he took over as head of the war plans section, he was taken aback to find that there were no war plans nor did anyone have the knowledge or means to draft any. Because the Board lacked any statutory authority and was caught in the political crossfire between the Secretary of the Navy and the bureau chiefs, the Board was of little use in developing strategy or fostering reform and Fiske was happy to return to sea as a battleship division commander.

When he returned to Washington in 1913 it was as aide for inspections, one of the four naval aides to the Secretary of the Navy, which positions had been established to "coordinate" the bureaus and to serve as liaison between the Secretary and the General Board. Within a month he was named as Aide for Operations, the senior aide. Shortly thereafter the new Secretary, Josephus Daniels, assumed office and for the 2 years of Fiske's term he and Daniels were the other's Nemesis. Fiske bombarded Daniels with studies and memoranda on organization, administration, preparedness, strategy, and any other matter that caught his attention in order "to educate the Secretary." While he approved a few actions Daniels took, most he considered lunacy. Little wonder that within a half year, Daniels began to try to get Fiske out of operations. The Secretary was particularly opposed to Fiske's views on reorganizing the department, legalizing the aide system, creating a Council of National Defense, naval aviation, general naval preparedness and almost all other military aspects of the Navy. Approximately a fourth of Coletta's book is devoted to Fiske's tenure as Aide for Operations and of his continual squabbles with the Secretary. Although

116 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

he had to go behind the Secretary's back to do so, Fiske was finally successful in getting Congress to establish the position of Chief of Naval Operations.

Fiske was obviously in line to be the first CNO and he and others within and without the Navy expected him to be. Daniels confounded everyone. Not only was Fiske not named; Daniels could find no flag officer that suited him and plucked Captain William Benson, Commandant of the Philadelphia Navy Yard, for the position. Fiske retired after 46 years of active duty and spent 26 years in retirement working on his inventions and commenting and consulting on those areas in which he had always had an interest—administration, technology, aviation, and preparedness. His last article was written in 1942 on airpower. One of his last comments on strategic matters was recorded that year, just before he died at age 87. He was asked how long the war would last. His answer, "How the hell would I know?" may have been his first to contain no opinion.

Coletta's biography of Fiske brings the man out of shameful obscurity and adds much to our understanding of the technologic and institutional changes of the "new navy" and of the preparedness struggles that seem always to have afflicted the Navy. The book adds new and welcome pages to naval history and will appeal to a wide variety of interests.

W.R. PETTYJOHN
Commander, U.S. Navy

Godson, Roy and Haseler, Stephen. *'Eurocommunism': Implications for East and West*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978. 144pp.

The growth in electoral strength of European Communist Parties, particularly in Italy and in France, along with statements by their leaders repudiating Soviet dominance of the Communist movement, has given rise to numerous books and articles on the West

attempting to understand Eurocommunism, of which this study is one of the most recent examples. In this short work, Godson and Haseler set out to examine the strength of West European Communist Parties, their domestic programs, and their foreign policies with regard to NATO and the U.S.S.R.

Having examined the electoral strength of the European Communist Parties, the authors conclude that European communism is a minority phenomenon. Nevertheless, they also conclude that if these parties entered governments, the result would be highly damaging to the economy and the security of Western Europe as a whole. The authors appear to assume that if the Communists entered governments at all, they would be the major force in them. Yet, because communism is a minority phenomenon it is much more likely that Communist Parties (CPs) would not become the leaders of governing coalitions but would only control less important ministries. Godson and Haseler imply that once in power the CPs would remain there permanently; they thus overlook the possibility of CPs being thrown out of office at a subsequent election.

Regarding the foreign policies of the European CPs, the authors acknowledge that some party leaders have denounced the U.S.S.R. and have even been supportive of NATO. While they correctly state that some ambiguity exists regarding what they would actually do once in office, they believe that European CPs in power would serve to enhance the interests of the Soviet Union. They do not appear to share the belief of some that part of the growing appeal of Eurocommunism is its decreased dependence on Moscow: that any sudden turn to the U.S.S.R. once in the government would result in a loss of popularity.

While Communist participation in European governments would not be politically beneficial to American

PROFESSIONAL READING 117

interests, the conclusion that it would automatically be beneficial to the U.S.S.R. is not necessarily correct. The Soviet Union has shown a marked tendency to develop poor relations with Communist governments that come to power largely through their own efforts, as Soviet relations with Yugoslavia and China have shown. Eurocommunism is an extremely complex phenomenon, especially as its strength has been achieved through legal, democratic means. If the United States were simply to oppose it, these parties may well be driven closer to the U.S.S.R. Instead of a balance sheet attempting to show who will gain and lose from Eurocommunism based on speculation about the future behavior of European Communist Parties, an appraisal of the opportunities and the difficulties American foreign policy faces is necessary in order for the United States to understand and make sensible decisions about Eurocommunism.

MARK N. KATZ

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Griffith, Samuel B. II, trans. *Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare*. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1978. 101pp.

Mao Tse-tung invented nothing new in the art of war. He borrowed almost entirely from the thoughts of Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Lenin. His greatest contribution, no doubt, was to synthesize those thoughts to embody in himself the main ideas of those earlier thinkers. Two of his interpretations stand out above all others. The first of these is that "politics is war without bloodshed; war is politics with bloodshed." This aphorism improves considerably on Clausewitz' own expression of the main idea in his book, *On War*. The second key interpretation is broader in its roots and concerns the whole matter of strategy for the physically weaker, but potentially morally stronger side in a struggle for political power.

As translated by Griffith, this essay is an important part of the corpus of Mao Tse-tung's writings. It treats guerrilla warfare not as an isolated military option and technique, but as one aspect of a political struggle. As the essay makes clear, an understanding of the political context of guerrilla warfare is crucial to an understanding of the strategy and tactics of it.

Although guerrilla warfare has been glamorized greatly and assigned much importance in recent decades, Mao considers it to be an indecisive expedient stage in a continuum of violent political struggle. It is worthwhile, he says, only when and while your opponent's orthodox forces enjoy superiority over your own. Guerrilla warfare is a way of protracting the struggle, building toward stronger orthodox forces of your own, wearing down the opponent both physically and mentally, and helping to gain moral (in the sense of psychological) ascendancy. The ultimate end is to achieve physical as well as moral superiority, and at that point to administer final victory with orthodox forces using orthodox methods. In a sense, the way of a Maoist follows the program of a bullfight, and for much the same reason. The matador is physically inferior and would be quickly gored and trampled by a fresh bull. So the matador is preceded by the banderilleros and picadors, who keep their distance and avoid direct encounters while inflicting small but muscle-weakening wounds on the bull and exhausting him in futile charges. By the time the matador enters the ring for a direct encounter, the bull is at least slightly inferior both morally and physically, and the outcome is seldom unpredictable.

Essentially, guerrilla warfare is one of the several forms of indirect approach used with frequent success by the physically weaker side against the morally vulnerable side. In this respect, it belongs in the same classification with civil

118 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

disobedience, terrorism, and even "peripheral strategy" such as that practiced by the United States and the United Kingdom during the "catch-up" years of 1942-1943 against the Germans. The point is that the physically weaker side needs *time* to succeed, so it must avoid the kind of decisive engagement that could put a quick end to the struggle. The underdog must initially seek a war of attrition, not of annihilation, and he must use this time not only gradually to build his own physical strength at the expense of his adversary's, but also to build political support and a sense of psychological superiority through the commission of acts of bravery, defiance, and sacrifice. Opportunities for small victories are sought and when such victories are achieved they represent success in a campaign of physical attrition. More important, they are prized for their cumulative symbolic and psychological effects, which add not only to the real strength of armed elements but to the political power of the movement being served. When the underdog's combined physical and moral strength reaches a point at which he can meet his adversary on physically equal (or better) terms, the moment for final decision has arrived. This is the moment for orthodox forces to come to the fore and, like the matador, complete the victory in a final orthodox campaign of annihilation.

Besides the translation, Brigadier General Griffith's book contains 31 pages of introduction and translator's notes. In these pages, he traces the development of Mao's thinking on revolutionary warfare and places Mao's version of guerrilla warfare in context with other prominent historical examples and writings on the subject. The author argues that our failings in Vietnam were a product of our failure to truly understand Mao's teachings and how aptly they were being applied by the North Vietnamese and Vietcong. He also outlines the challenge to the industrialized

West that lies ahead, pointing in particular to the discontent that is festering in many Third World countries, and to the fact that the West has become associated with maintenance of the sometimes oppressive status quo while the Soviet Union and its proxies have been posing as champions of liberating change. While the book makes clear the application of Mao's teachings to these circumstances, it does not try to tell us how to meet the challenge. For insights or prescriptions pertaining to our own strategy, the reader must look elsewhere.

Mao has said that political power grows out of the barrel of a gun. Standing alone, this oft-quoted passage is misleading. The total of Mao's writing makes clear his true belief that power grows out of the supportive sentiment of a land's inhabitants. Guerrilla warfare—part of the gun barrel, as it were—is but one among a number of complementary ways for an underdog to win that supportive sentiment.

ROBERT D. KING

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

Hagan, Kenneth J., ed. *In Peace and War: Interpretations of American Naval History, 1775-1978*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978. 368pp.

The seventeen chapters by seventeen authors that make up this book attempt, in the editor's words, "to assess the navy as an institutional expression of the American experience," and to avoid the "hagiographic and eulogistic tone" of the old school of naval history. So far, so good. Regarding further intentions, it may be observed that although the subtitle announces the contents as "Interpretations of American Naval History," the editor has made "no effort to impose interpretive themes upon the authors," and some of the essays are in fact almost purely expository. Nevertheless, the end product is a very welcome one.

The chapter on the Revolution will remind the reader of the early

emergence of naval problems, and of how a generally deteriorating situation and an acute shortage of powder brought the employment of both commissioned warships and privateers well before the Declaration of Independence. By 1776 the two strategies of commerce raiding and of command of the maritime theater had developed, the former in ocean attacks against British supply lines and the latter in the building effort on Lake Champlain. Both strategies were of great importance prior to the intervention of the French, but from 1779 American naval operations steadily declined.

The discussion of the years between the winning of independence and the outbreak of the War of 1812 is good on problems of maritime commerce, underestimates the significance of the Jeffersonian campaign against Tripoli, and makes no mention of the Louisiana problem or of the preparedness debates in Congress as the second war with Britain approached. The treatment of the War of 1812 deals briefly with unpreparedness, overemphasizes the influence of personal considerations on strategic planning, correctly praises the effectiveness of single-ship raiding tactics, and touches on the vital contributions of naval constructors to the struggle for the command of the Great Lakes.

Traditionally, and especially since the publication of the *Sprouts' Rise of American Naval Power*, the history of the nineteenth-century peacetime navy has been overlooked, or underplayed, or treated with exaggerated Mahanist disdain. In the present volume the editor, seeking a common interpretive thread to link the various essays, has noted with pleasure the diminished emphasis on the revelations of Mahan. This is generally true, although the Admiral still gets more index entries than anything except "blockade" and "Department of the Navy." Nevertheless, the two chapters on the years before the Civil War still

reflect a residual hankering for an offensive-minded force, a "fleet consciousness," and the ability to take on a powerful enemy; in somewhat the same tradition is their desire for premature conversion to steam and their overestimate of Jacksonian and congressional hostility to the naval establishment. By contrast, the essay on the years from 1865 to 1869, the longest and most interestingly interpretive of all these "interpretations," manages a gratifyingly successful explanation of the last years of the Old Navy in terms both of contemporary national policy and of the complexities of the industrial revolution at sea.

For the Civil and Spanish-American Wars, we have three essays. The discussion of the Union Navy provides a model short exposition of its success in improvisation, of the strategy of blockade supported by coastal lodgments, and of war on the inland waters. The analysis of southern efforts at sea emphasizes the extreme difficulty of the Confederate position, the competence and energy of Mallory and Bulloch, and the conceptual failures of Jefferson Davis in naval matters and associated high policy. For the 1890s and the War with Spain, a short chapter (with singularly unhelpful footnotes) touches on the new thoughts, the new ships, the new planning capabilities and the new worries, and on such postwar developments as the creation of the General Board.

The end of the century "transformation" of American foreign relations brought a new assumption of friendship with Britain and a new and insoluble strategic involvement in the Far East. Together with developments in Europe and Asia these changes provided a succession of identifiable potential enemies—Germany, Japan, the Axis, and the Soviet Union—more concrete than those offered by the old Anglophobia and old ideas of "Europe" as an abstract ideological foe. In these new circum-

120 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

stances the difference between war and interwar periods diminishes; navies, when not fighting, are always preparing to fight; and this change, however distressing to philosophers, is helpful to sequential exposition. At last the attitudes, if not necessarily the detailed prescriptions, of the Mahanists, become useful. The reasonably continuous developments of the years from 1900 to 1978 are considered in eight essays that make up the second half of the book.

Four chapters cover the period before Pearl Harbor. On the problems of defending the strategically illogical new commitments, the discussion touches on the Rooseveltian accomplishment of a big (as opposed to a modernized) navy, the German threat in the Caribbean, developing tensions with ORANGE and the problems of Pacific base location, and difficulties in Central America and Mexico; the puzzle of who was minding the Caribbean during the cruise of the Great White Fleet remains. For the war years from 1914-19, which temporarily solved the problem of BLACK, interesting questions are raised regarding Wilson's conversion from near-pacificist to advocate of a super-navy as a negotiating chip to support his mediation efforts and subsequent large designs. In 1919, with the Canal now operational and ORANGE again the problem, the first transfer of important strength to the Pacific opened a new period that received formal structure in the Washington Treaties. The discussion of the Treaty Navy points out (despite certain technological and operational inaccuracies) the effect of the Washington limitations in transferring competition to areas not limited by agreement, and in emphasizing quality over quantity.

In terms of appropriations and deployment, at least, World War II had begun by 1939. New naval building was expedited, weight was shifted to the Atlantic, and efforts were focused on the neutrality patrol, Caribbean bases, and convoy. With the fall of France and

the promulgation of Plan D, the Pacific was further downgraded, and when 1941 brought intelligence of Japanese plans, the freeze of Japanese assets, and shooting war in the Atlantic, the two-ocean problem was unmanageable. Yet while Japan had both the initiative and preponderant strength, the second American navy, which would solve it all, was on the ways. The chapter on the post-Pearl Harbor period, while skimping technical and operational matters, provides a fine overview of strategy with appropriate attention to administrative and institutional problems. Admiral King and the Joint and Combined Chiefs get their due, as do problems of lend-lease shortages, jurisdiction over ASW aircraft, and intertheater competition. The long-term strategic consequences of Guadalcanal and North Africa are emphasized, as are the questions of Pacific route of advance and Pacific command relationships. But all these troubles were surmounted, or erased, in the moment of victory.

The years since 1945 are dealt with in three chapters. The first, running through 1953, concisely handles the evaporation (personnel divided by ten, combatant units by five) of the wartime navy; postwar deployments which, while still emphasizing "Europe first," also had to cope with the Chinese puzzle; the unification row; and new problems with jet aircraft, nuclear attack and propulsion, Soviet submarines, and personnel administration. With the Korean War and the energizing of the concepts of NSC 68, the reactivation of older ships and personnel and new construction programs bring the transition to the cold war years. These are marked by the revival of carrier forces, missile development, the SSBN, and new ASW procedures, and by crises in Vietnam, the Formosa Strait, and the Mediterranean. The Bay of Pigs farce is followed by the missile crisis triumph, which brings its own counter in a big Soviet building program.

PROFESSIONAL READING 121

The final chapter on the years from 1962 to 1978 concerns itself with the "erosion" of American naval preeminence. The increasing Soviet presence in the eastern Mediterranean, the OKEAN exercises, the deleterious effects of Vietnam on new construction, and the Rickover problem are touched on. Here the kind of "tabular comparisons dear to the heart of nineteenth century navalists," noted in the chapter on the 1890s, recur in profusion. These tables of ship numbers, tonnage, and out-of-area operating days make no mention of possible contributions by NATO allies, thus leaving the impression (perhaps intended) that this is a two-party game.

Generally speaking, these essays support the editor's claim that the practice of naval history has advanced in recent years. Some traces of the earlier period remain, as in neglect of logistic matters and echoes of unthinking Mahanism; its consequences can be seen in the bibliographic comments, reflective of the old roundshot and cutlass approach of the Office of Naval History, that information on naval strategy between 1919 and 1945 is best sought in official Army publications. Small mention is made of shifting deployments, by squadron or area, before 1937. There is nothing on the Marine Corps' development of amphibious techniques. Technological matters are at times skimmed and at times skewed. But it would be hard for anyone not to profit from a reading of the book.

JAMES A. FIELD, JR.
Swarthmore College

Lefever, Ernest W. *Nuclear Arms in the Third World*. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1979. 154pp.

Despite the fact that this primer is current only through March 1978, it is a useful and informative compilation of the history of nuclear technology in the Third World, those countries' unique reasons for keeping open the nuclear

weapons option, and some sensible projections that describe the security implications of nuclear weapons development. The export of nuclear technology over the last 20 years has been a powerful diplomatic and economic tool; yet recently it has become increasingly difficult to use, requires constant honing, and its brittleness is much more pronounced. Many of the countries now have the capability to complete the fuel cycle and produce weapon grade nuclear material.

Lefever has chosen nine countries (India, Pakistan, Iran, Israel, Egypt, South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil and Argentina) whose technological base and security needs combine for a strong potential for nuclear arms production in the future. These factors are weighed against the cost of building a "military significant force"—defined as deliverable (by aircraft or missiles) nuclear weapons. The country by country case method provides a well-reasoned, comprehensible synopsis of complex wide-ranging foreign policy objectives, economic considerations, military capabilities and intentions, regional influence and stabilities, and perceptions of superpower guarantees. The current situation has evolved from the initial export of technologies and fuel from the United States solely for power generation to a closely controlled, regulatory exchange safeguarded by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the nonproliferation treaty. IAEA oversees civil uses of nuclear power and governs fuel production with a series of on-site inspections, tests and trilateral agreements between the agency, the supplier and recipient. The U.S.-Soviet backed treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons that obligates all signatories to refrain from facilitating the acquisition of nuclear explosives has lessened their appeal for some. However, both safeguard methods are voluntary and while the United States has brought pressure to bear on those countries not members of the Agency or parties to the treaty, "The nuclear genie has been

122 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

released and the spread of nuclear technology and fuels is irreversible."

In the concluding chapters, Lefever reviews policy options and offers three approaches to support a position of deterring nuclear arms acquisition in the Third World: increased U.S. security assistance or nuclear guarantees, promotion and strengthening of international agreements, and legislated sanctions on the export of technology, nuclear fuels and control of waste storage. These alternatives are not mutually exclusive; it is probable that the United States' stance will remain a combination of all three. However, Lefever concludes that "the provision of security assistance or support—by a nuclear guarantee, defense pact, or military assistance, and in appropriate circumstances the presence of U.S. combat troops—is the most effective way to encourage nuclear abstinence."

Well-organized and documented (although with largely dated material), *Nuclear Arms in the Third World* is a good starting place for studying the dilemmas facing the United States in its Third World nuclear policy. However, the study is narrow in scope and relies on a depressingly conventional wisdom. While I find the choice of countries and likelihood of developing nuclear arms sound, there are other places in the world to consider, e.g., Cuba, Central America, Vietnam. Additionally, the threat of nuclear terrorism makes Lefever's "militarily significant" qualification a moot point. On either side of the balance sheet, nuclear weapons can become significant domestic and international liabilities for the nations of the Third World. United States policy must delicately balance friendship and cooperation against control and technological sanctions in order to keep nuclear weapons development a dilemma, not a reality.

J.P. MORSE

Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Levitan, Sar A. and Alderman, Karen Cleary. *Warriors at Work*. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1977. 216pp.

Warriors at Work is a description and evaluation of manpower policies and practices of the U.S. Armed Forces, with particular attention to changes in these practices that have been made or may have to be made as a result of the all volunteer force (AVF). The book is carefully researched and well written. It is the most recent of several monographs by Levitan evaluating various Federal government programs.

The authors present factual evidence and summarize issues regarding recruiting, compensation, training, unionization, and numerous other matters. Their intent, they state in the Preface, "is to provide a framework for informed decision-making." Specific judgments and recommendations of the issues are allegedly avoided, although in fact strong and controversial opinions slip in here and there throughout the book. For example, regarding unionism: "Clearly the Defense Department and some of its staunchest friends in Congress are overreacting to the presumed dangers of unionism." Regarding selection standards in recruiting: "The case for requiring high school credentials is far from clear." Regarding women's role: "Discrimination against women has been relaxed, but acceptance smacks of tokenism, rather than a serious effort to attract women to the armed forces." One should not conclude from these examples that Alderman and Levitan believe DOD policy to be consistently misguided, however. For example, contrary to the views of many economists, they are not at all convinced of the wisdom of replacing the present pay structure with a salary system.

The book has five chapters. In Chapter 1, size, grade structure, turnover of the forces, retention and promotion patterns, recruiting problems and selection standards are described. The authors note the shrinking manpower

pool and discuss studies of the relationship of national unemployment rates to enlistments. They conclude that in peacetime, concerns over possible manpower shortfalls are insufficient reason for abandoning the AVF. They argue that adjustments to the AVF to date have been in effect for too short a period for adequate testing and more policy alternatives are available in the longer term.

In Chapter 2, the complexities of military compensation are described, including RMC, supplementary benefits, retirement, survivors benefits, and even the potential for postservice second careers. The retirement system is, in the authors' opinion, the element most in need of reform. Indeed, they see the present system as threatening the long-term validity of the AVF. Otherwise, they conclude that "[T]he overview of current compensation suggests that military personnel are neither grossly underpaid, as was true in the past, nor are they overpaid."

Training and education from basic training to the National Defense University are described in Chapter 3, along with GI bill benefits, tuition assistance programs, and other voluntary education plans. The transferability of military training and experience to the civilian sector is extensively treated. The authors assert that the effect of the AVF on transferability is not yet known. However, they expect some long-run changes in training investment, as would be predicted by economic theory—specifically that the military will try to hire those already trained, will try harder to retain those in whom it has invested significantly, and that it will narrow the focus of training to reduce the spillover to the private sector.

A variety of personnel issues and practices is discussed in Chapter 4, including: military justice, particularly the "bad papers" issue; possible unionization; racial balance; the current and

potential role of women; alcoholism and drug abuse. Although they are somewhat critical of DOD policy in all of these areas, the authors praise the record on equal opportunity as "clearly superior to that of most other major American institutions."

In the final chapter, the authors attempt an overall assessment of the military as an employer. Noting that "the military remains in many essential ways different from civilian employers," they argue that it is simplistic to believe that changing personnel practices to match private sector norms necessarily represents progress. Strategic considerations remain paramount. Still, the authors do not appear to believe that adjustments made necessary by the AVF are such that the effectiveness of the force is curtailed.

The book is chock-full of facts. We learn, for example, that military hospitals had 26,000 beds (as of 1976) down by 50 percent from 1968; that universal compensation for Revolutionary War widows was not granted until 1836 when the widows were made eligible for the general service pensions their husbands would have received; that three-fifths of Army-trained teamsters who might have taken related jobs on leaving the service were unable to find jobs. Extensive references are made to the military manpower literature. Three of the chapters have in excess of 100 footnotes.

In spite of the mass of factual and statistical detail, *Warriors at Work* is an interesting volume. The authors are facile writers and a dry sense of humor pervades the book. The authors assure us, for example, that "the nineteenth century gastronomical fare offered to enlisted personnel left much to be desired." In discussing civilian counterparts to military occupations, they note that, "[A]side from very limited, highly cyclical and apparently quite risky markets for mercenaries, there are no civilian counterparts for ground combat occupations."

124 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Warriors at Work is a very useful book, providing an excellent overview of military manpower issues and policies plus a comprehensive introduction to the literature on the subject. It is useful even to the specialist. Professional military officers will be familiar with much that Levitan and Alderman present, and will find opinions to disagree with, but few will fail to learn something from the volume. It is recommended reading.

J. ERIC FREDLAND
U.S. Naval Academy

Martin, John Bartlow. *Adlai Stevenson and the World: The Life of Adlai E. Stevenson*, Vol. II. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1977, 863pp.

In the second volume of this mammoth biography, John Bartlow Martin, noted journalist, editor, and former U.S. Ambassador to the Dominican Republic, chronicles Stevenson's activities and utterances from the Presidential campaign of 1952 to mid-1965, when Stevenson died. As a two-time Presidential contender, and then Ambassador to the United Nations for Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, Stevenson enunciated ideas of enduring significance to national politics and international affairs. Although he was somewhat less than successful in his attempts to exert great influence on U.S. policy, several of his largest concerns, perhaps ironically, have steadily gained prominence in U.S. foreign affairs since his death.

Throughout his years as a national political figure Stevenson worried and spoke about the problem of controlling nuclear weapons. He was among the early advocates of test bans, arms control, and even disarmament. Indeed, according to several of his close friends, Stevenson suffered in his last years from nightmares, dreams of the world blowing up, of the extinction of humanity, the end of life on earth.

Stevenson's concern about nuclear weapons led him to a parallel interest in

negotiation with the Soviet leadership. In the middle 1950s he established personal relationships with Khrushchev and other top leaders and he believed, partly on the basis of his brief contacts with these individuals, that the Soviet leadership shared both a concern over the consequences of nuclear armaments and a willingness to deal constructively, through negotiation, with the United States. "The real question," Stevenson said in a 1960 campaign speech,

is not who can stand up or talk back to the Russians. That's too easy. The real question is who can sit down with them at the bargaining table and negotiate with them from a position of strength and confidence. The real question is not who is tough and who is soft. The real question is who is wise and who is foolish, who likes to play with words and who likes to get things done.

On China policy, one of the most sensitive issues of the 1950s, Stevenson took a position remarkably similar to that on which the United States finally "normalized" relations with mainland China in 1978-1979. He argued that the U.S. policy of isolating mainland China forced China to rely on the Soviet Union in international affairs. The United States, he believed, ought to seek independence for Formosa and a pledge from the mainland not to use force to determine Formosa's future. And he anticipated, though he did not actually advocate, the admission of mainland China to the United Nations.

In the United Nations from 1961 to 1965 Stevenson stressed what he considered the two transcendent world problems: nuclear proliferation and the disparity in the living standards of rich and poor nations. He did his utmost to make the United Nations significant in U.S. foreign policy, though he largely failed to impress the circle of advisors and operators closer to the Kennedy and Johnson White Houses. Late in his

PROFESSIONAL READING 125

life he foresaw the need to shift conceptually from a foreign policy based on containment and limited war to a policy reflecting the developing diversity of world affairs amid the dissolution of the early cold war's strict polarization--limited peace, as he liked to describe it.

Several points emerge from this lengthy narrative to form a basis for assessing Stevenson's influence on his times. As a candidate in the 1950s, albeit a losing one, Stevenson kept alive a healthy Democratic Party organization. His personal leadership, so Martin suggests, brought large numbers of capable young people into party political activity, which made possible the successful campaigns of Kennedy and Johnson in the next decade. Further, in 1956 Stevenson set out ideas basic to the New Frontier and Great Society programs and it is easy to see still today, in Carter administration programs and policies, a rather large debt to the body of thought produced in the course of the 1956 Stevenson campaign. Finally, Martin argues that as Ambassador to the United Nations Stevenson gave that organization a standing with the American people that it did not enjoy before his tenure and has not since.

In all, Martin's two-volume study of Stevenson meets the severest test of biography: to illuminate the times, the character, and the concerns of the chosen subject. It is difficult to tell in this case whether Martin's success comes in spite of the masses of quotation and detail encumbering the narrative or because of them. Yet the book is unquestionably valuable. It contributes substantially to the history of the 1952, 1956, and 1960 Presidential campaigns. It augments in several important respects the accounts now available of foreign policy in the Kennedy Presidency. And, despite the need for a brief, more analytic treatment of Stevenson's public life, Martin's biography constitutes an essential source for people interested in the intellectual and

political antecedents of contemporary American party politics and foreign affairs.

THOMAS H. ETZOLD
Naval War College

Novik, Nimrod. *On the Shores of Bab Al-Mandab: Soviet Diplomacy and Regional Dynamics* (FPRI Monograph No. 26). Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1979. 83pp.

Until recent years, the Strait of Bab al-Mandab received little international attention except for cursory recognition as a strategic chokepoint along the Mediterranean-Indian Ocean sealanes. Since 1968, when Great Britain terminated its traditional "protecting power" status east of Suez, the U.S.S.R. has sought to extend its influence in the Strait area. In this comprehensive monograph, Professor Novik traces the Soviet ascendancy with attention to its effect on regional interactions and, conversely, the effects of the area's complex relationships on Soviet patterns of behavior towards Third World countries.

Holding that the U.S.S.R. has maintained longstanding interests in the Strait within its overall ambition to secure dominance in the Middle East, Novik's introductory chapter provides solid background for more recent events in the African Horn and Southwestern Arabia. He contends that while Soviet activities in Somalia, Ethiopia and the two Yemen republics might serve its strategic defensive aims by denying U.S. Navy SLBM presence in northern Indian Ocean waters, this factor is more than offset by its aggressive quest for power and influence among these Third World states. He particularly asserts that the rapid switch in Soviet allegiances during the 1976-1977 Somali-Ethiopian conflict is typical of the intensive, but deliberate, "no holds barred" brand of Third World power politics in which the U.S.S.R. is currently engaged.

126 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

In separate chapters, Novik assesses Soviet involvement in the currently volatile PDRY-YAR and Somali-Ethiopian relationships. His treatment of recent trends and events on both sides of Bab al-Mandab are an especially valuable feature. On the two Yemens, his analysis serves as helpful background for assessing the February-March 1979 border clash between the pro-Soviet PDRY and the Western/Saudi-backed YAR. Likewise, Novik's coverage of the Somali-Ethiopian conflict in the Ogaden includes solid analysis of both internal and external factors that led to the sudden Soviet turnabout in its superpower patron role. If somewhat critical in his judgments regarding Western inaction in the face of these Soviet initiatives, Novik concludes that it is essential for the United States to reexamine its regional interests before developing a clear-cut responsive policy.

This analysis should prove useful in interpreting recent events along the Strait and also the current nature of Soviet involvement. Its skillful integration of Soviet and Arab source materials are particularly helpful in gaining sophisticated comprehension of the area's complex internal, regional and superpower politics.

These features especially recommend the work as one from which specialist and general reader alike may reach informed opinions.

JOSEPH E. THACH, JR.
Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense
for Public Affairs

The Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, ed. *Royal United Services Institute and Brassey's Defence Yearbook 1978/1979*. London: Brassey's, 1978. 365pp.

At its price of \$49.50 when procured through Crane, Russak, its U.S. distributor, this book would be the last on my list for addition to a personal library. It does not fulfill its stated purpose. It is

dated where it claims to be current, hence not authoritative. Data readily available in 1978 were not included. It is also contemporary where it might be timeless. It is poorly composed and edited. It is general where it should be specific and detailed in offering simplistic trivia. It reflects an "England first" viewpoint, perhaps understandable, but that becomes distracting to an objective reader. Its jacket price of £15, compared to its cost in \$U.S., reflects more strength to the pound than one would find elsewhere.

Brassey's is divided into three parts. Part I "Strategic Review" is the best—a series of 12 articles on the United Kingdom, U.N. and NATO military matters suitable to a quality British periodical, but they are not matched by the remainder of the book.

Part II is entitled either "Weapons Systems" or "Weapons Technology," depending where in the text one chooses to seek its title. It is inconsistent in quality with internal disagreements among paragraphs and between text and tables. It is obvious that this part, especially the section on naval weapons, has not been updated for several years. Available data in the tables is missing; that provided is sometimes incorrect. The writing style is less able than that of Part I.

Part III is an Anglophile's view of important "Defence Literature of the Year" and a "Chronology of Events June 1977-May 1978." Neither seems complete nor are the criteria for inclusion apparent.

There are many credible reference works on defense matters available on both sides of the Atlantic. There are also acknowledged forums that publish contemporary essays quarterly or monthly. This contribution of Brassey's seems to enter both arenas tentatively and sorely unarmed in light of the competition—89 years of experience notwithstanding.

D.G. CLARK
Commander, U.S. Navy 13

Spielmann, Karl F. *Analyzing Soviet Strategic Arms Decisions*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978. 184pp.

Few political-military topics are as important, yet poorly understood, as Soviet strategic arms behavior. A pioneering work that sought to demonstrate what could and could not be said about the Soviet arms decisionmaking process was the 1972 study by Mathew Gallagher and Karl Spielmann, *Soviet Decision-Making for Defense* (New York: Praeger). Among the more important conclusions of that study: Western misjudgments about Soviet military policy were less because of the absence of adequate information than the mistaken first assumption that Soviet and American decisionmaking practices and decisionmaker motivations were analogous.

The present study is, in a number of respects, an extension of the earlier Gallagher/Spielmann inquiry. It also provides a critique of prevailing paradigms of Soviet decisionmaking behavior and, like the 1972 work, calls for a broad, multiple analysis approach in conducting future case studies on Soviet defense policy. The principal novelty of the new Spielmann volume is the articulation of an alternative model for analyzing Soviet decisionmaking and the application of a "multiple approach analysis" to Soviet deployment decisions regarding the first Soviet ICBM.

The book is an outgrowth of a study undertaken as part of a project commissioned by the Historian, Office of the Secretary of Defense, on the history of U.S.-Soviet strategic arms competition. It consists of four short sections that deal, respectively, with a depiction of three approaches to the study of Soviet strategic arms decisionmaking, an examination of their general applicability to Soviet defense decisionmaking, a discussion of their relevance for assessing the action-reaction phenomenon in Soviet arms decisions, and a demonstration of their specific applicability in the

analysis of the decisions regarding the first Soviet ICBM, the SS-6.

Two of the three approaches discussed by Spielmann are familiar ones: the "rational strategic actor" approach, which emphasizes a centralized, cost-benefit mode of decisionmaking, and the "pluralistic" approach, which combines the nonrational actor assumptions of Graham Allison's organizational process and bureaucratic politics models. Spielmann's discussion of the limitations of these two approaches is perceptive, if not particularly original. More intriguing is his argument about the need for a third: the "national leadership decisionmaking" approach, to bridge the gap between the pluralistic and rational strategic actor perspectives. The rationale for a third approach is to account for those decisionmaking situations in which a decisional outcome primarily reflects the personal preferences of the leadership, rather than either pluralistic pressures or strictly rational strategic calculations. As an example, Spielmann cites the hypothetical case of the Politburo leader who is in a position to act as the "quintessential rational strategic actor" on a particular strategic weapon system decision, but might allow his decision to be influenced by his personal preference for a specific service (based upon his earlier career affiliation) and other preferences he might have as a national leader (e.g., the implications for a pet agricultural program of a large production run on a new weapon system).

Although useful in directing attention to a number of questions about leadership perspectives and preferences that otherwise might be ignored, Spielmann's approach suffers from severe underspecification. It is defined principally in terms of what Allison's other models are not, and would appear not to satisfy Spielmann's own explicit criterion for a useful model—that it "provide a fair amount of guidance as to when and where it is most and least

128 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

likely to apply." Even after a demonstration of the "national leadership" approach as part of a three-pronged "multiple approach analysis" of the Soviet SS-6 program, one is impressed by Spielmann's virtuosity but somewhat at a loss about how to apply the approach oneself.

One of the telling points repeatedly made by Spielmann is the difficulty, given present research methods and materials, of reaching firm conclusions about Soviet strategic intentions. His emphasis on the need to pay greater attention to the personal preferences and perspectives of Soviet leaders might well be extended to call for much more systematic research on what the Soviets themselves have to say about strategic arms and military policy. In the absence of such data on Soviet perceptions, even the best of models will be of limited assistance in interpreting Soviet strategic arms behavior.

WILLIAM C. POTTER
Tulane University

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. *Outer Space: Battlefield of the Future?* London: Taylor and Francis, 1978. 202pp.

Despite its catchpenny title there is little in this book on the lines of Major General Keegan's revelations on the great battle to be joined in space. It is a sober, perhaps too sober, attempt to describe what artificial earth satellites are capable of and how they are being used, in particular by the military.

At one level this book is very good indeed; a straight readthrough, ignoring the mathematics and the copious tables, but paying attention to the excellent, if occasionally rather small, diagrams will give the layman a useful basic background on satellites. It begins with a simple but clear explanation of orbital dynamics so that one can quickly grasp the capabilities and limitations of satellites, and for example realize that it is

impossible for the Big Eye in the Sky to be omnipresent. The book goes on to describe the construction and use of reconnaissance/photographic, communications, navigation, meteorological and geodetic satellites. This is mostly factual and descriptive and contains much familiar material reprinted from the SIPRI yearbook, although there is some speculation both scientific and operational. Each section contains a description of appropriate nations' progress in the field and concludes with a table listing all satellites of each type launched as of the date of printing. The last two chapters are on hunter/killer satellites, FOBS and on general conclusions, and naturally contain much more speculation.

But rereading the book, one gets an uneven impression. Who is the mathematics aimed at? Some of it is derived from first principles, which anyone with reasonable numeracy can follow, but some equations are presented fully formed and some of these not in the way normally used by other workers in the field. One or two, I fear, are unsound and contain confusing misprints. On the operational side, too, faults can be found. For example, while it is agreed that three position lines are required for an acceptable navigation fix, the text gives the impression that a *Transit* fix depends on "sights" of three satellites simultaneously, whereas the *Transit* system works by the receiver computer integrating the relative position of one satellite during its 10 to 15 minute passage over the navigator's horizon. Further, the disadvantages of the *Transit* system are not brought out, e.g., the occasional gaps of 12 hours and the frequent gaps of 6 hours in coverage. Similarly when dealing with communications satellites, the problems arising from eclipsing, the power limitations on bandwidth for mobile earth terminals and the limited launch windows available are not developed. My U.S. Naval War College colleagues of 1974-76 also

PROFESSIONAL READING 129

will miss any reference to the vast expense of satellite launches to the secondary powers.

It is realized that SIPRI sees itself, and undoubtedly performs a useful function, as Cassandra telling of the dangers to peace of unbridled military expansion, but this can be overdone. While the use of satellites as "national means of verification" of the SALT treaties is recognized, nothing is said in this book of the improved command, control and communications offered by satellites. This improvement can give greater confidence to the leaders of both sides that their adversaries are in full control of their forces, thus reducing the possibilities of a war by accident. The warning note in this book is too constant and in the end, irritating. Sometimes the alleged conspiratorial acts of the military are introduced totally unnecessarily, as when it is stated that in 1964 "secrecy descended over the navigation satellite programme and the designation TRANSIT ceased to be used." This is nonsense. For at least the past decade manufacturers have been marketing *Transit* receiver systems openly, and by early 1977, 80 percent of the 1900 sets sold were being used by civilians in merchant ships, oil surveys and even transatlantic racing yachts. Unclassified references to *Transit* are easy to find and Strensell's article "TRANSIT, the Navy Navigation Satellite System" in the spring 1971 edition of *Navigation* is typical. This type of error is crying "Wolf!" and in the end one could be excused for losing confidence in other parts of the book.

However to return to its strengths, there is an excellent description of how the Russians elegantly solve the problem of Satellite Communications at high latitudes. This problem is also faced by most Western users who prefer for other reasons to use geostationary equatorial satellites, but is more pressing for the Russians because of their geography. The Russian *Molniya* system consists of

a series of satellites launched into high-inclination, highly elliptic orbits with apogees over the northern hemisphere. The satellites thus spend about 11 hours of their 12-hour orbits in view from the U.S.S.R., orbital dynamics forcing them to spend only a short period at high velocity over the southern hemisphere. Another interesting description and set of diagrams shows how U.S. and Russian reconnaissance satellites were maneuvered to pay special attention to the Eastern Mediterranean in July 1974 at the time of the Cyprus Army coup and the subsequent Turkish invasion.

So SIPRI has produced a useful book of interest to all concerned in the technological fundamentals of military science, but leaves one looking for a better, more balanced text, that would deal with all uses of satellites, civil and military. Such a book would allow the reader to draw his own conclusions on the contributions of space technology to peace and war.

M.G.M.W. ELLIS
Commander, Royal Navy

Tran Van Don. *Our Endless War: Inside Vietnam*. San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1978. 274pp.

Many Americans consider the Vietnam war to have been a tragedy in our national history that gave rise to many problems that are still with us today. However, the dimensions of that tragedy appear much greater when looked at from a Vietnamese perspective. *Our Endless War* is the account of the Vietnam conflict as seen by a former high-ranking South Vietnamese official intimately involved in it from the end of World War II until the fall of Saigon in 1975.

Tran Van Don largely attributes the victory of the Communists to two factors. First, the corrupt and repressive nature of the successive Saigon Governments prevented them from being able to organize effective domestic

130 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

opposition against the Communists. Second, the United States refused to learn from the South Vietnamese experience of fighting along with the French against the Communists for many years; after the United States spent a long time committing exactly the same mistakes the French had, it became demoralized to the point of wanting solely to extricate itself from the war.

Although the account of the war may be incorrect in some of its details and even self-serving with regard to the author's own role, this book has two important lessons for American foreign policy. First, the defeat of Communist insurgency cannot be accomplished through military means alone. An acceptable political alternative to the adversary's must also be provided. If it was worthwhile for the United States to fight in Vietnam, it would have also been worthwhile both to insist upon and help organize political reform in Saigon. In addition, while beleaguered Third World Governments may have much to learn from the United States about ending insurgencies, the United States has much to learn from them regarding the local history and political context in which these conflicts take place. In sum, while General Don's account of the errors committed in Vietnam may be painful for some, the conclusions he draws from them may lead the United States to avoid such errors in the future.

MARK N. KATZ
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Webster's American Military Biographies. Springfield, Mass.: Merriam, 1978. 548pp.

Biographical dictionaries abound, but until now none has been devoted to American military figures. The void is now to a large degree filled by a work with several merits.

The editor must be congratulated

broad definition to the term "military" and thereby to include not only the traditional officer corps but also Indians, writers, explorers, inventors, and even spies, cartoonists, and astronauts among the 1,033 entries. All eras and branches of the armed forces are covered and it is pleasant to find such individuals as Bill Mauldin, Jean Laffite, John Philip Sousa, and Sergeant York included. Many of the subjects are still living, thus giving this work much wider coverage than such guides as the *Dictionary of American Biography* that are limited to the deceased.

Selection aside, the entries are on the whole well written, pithy summaries of their subjects' entire careers, not simply their years of military service. The brevity of the entries—they average 500 words each—precludes sophisticated analysis. Perhaps more judicious allocation of space might have allowed further development of some individuals. Edmund Ruffin, for example, whose only claim to military fame was his firing of the first shot at Fort Sumter, is accorded equal coverage with Benjamin Franklin Isherwood, James Forrestal, Francis Marion, and others.

Several appendixes add greatly to the utility of this work. Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Defense, chief officers of all four services, and Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are chronologically listed as are all wars, and within wars, almost all battles, their dates, and the American commanding officers and their major subordinates. Tables of army, theater, corps, squadron, fleet, and air force commanders and their dates of office are also helpful.

Minor criticisms aside, the work's broad coverage, especially of individuals still alive, and its modest price (\$12.95) make it a most attractive addition to the library of anyone interested in American military and naval history.

JAMES C. BRADFORD
U.S. Naval Academy

PROFESSIONAL READING 131

Werking, Richard Hume. *The Master Architects: Building the United States Foreign Service 1890-1913*. Lexington, Ky.: The University Press of Kentucky, 1977. 250pp.

This fine study of the reform and reorganization of American consular and diplomatic services between 1890 and 1913 should be of interest to military men for two reasons. First, it focuses on the vital connection between American foreign trade and government support of that trade. This concern, prominent in the expansionist-imperialist years at the turn of the century, is if anything more important than ever in view of the unfavorable trade and payments balances of the 1970s. Second, it illuminates aspects of administrative and organizational history also germane to the study of other American institutions, including those of the military.

Werking describes the beginnings of serious effort in the Department of State, the consular service, and the Department of Commerce and Labor to extend American business abroad. He concludes, in fact, that "the pre-World War I foreign service was first and foremost an instrument for the nation's commercial expansion. It not only held open the door to equal opportunity for American exports (ensuring *protection* for American trade), but it increasingly attempted to shove American businessmen through the open door (*promoting* foreign trade)."

Werking's conclusion that the foreign service led rather than followed the commercial community into overseas

trade expansion forms the basis for his contributions to administrative history. First, the book elaborates important but often neglected considerations of how organizations and institutions affect their environments in addition to the more customary analysis of how environments may shape organizations. Second, the volume illuminates the relationship between circumstances, organizational needs, and personal ambitions in the cases of a handful of the individuals most important to the reform and reorganization of the foreign and commercial services. This is a difficult task, exceptionally well handled here so as to avoid the usual tendencies either to criticize ambition too harshly or to ignore the human element in institutional development.

In these times of post-Vietnam, post-Great Society disillusion, a certain estrangement has developed between government and the public. This considerably enhances the value of sound studies, such as this one, of the interplay between individuals and agencies private and public. Such studies may ultimately help in rebuilding the cooperative relation between private and public institutions so essential to the American political system, and in this endeavor, one must add, both the members and the students of American military institutions have a large responsibility.

THOMAS H. ETZOLD
Naval War College