

1979

In Peace and War: Interpretations of American Naval History, 1775-1978

James A. Field Jr

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Recommended Citation

Field, James A. Jr (1979) "In Peace and War: Interpretations of American Naval History, 1775-1978," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 32 : No. 4 , Article 14.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol32/iss4/14>

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disobedience, terrorism, and even "peripheral strategy" such as that practiced by the United States and the United Kingdom during the "catch-up" years of 1942-1943 against the Germans. The point is that the physically weaker side needs *time* to succeed, so it must avoid the kind of decisive engagement that could put a quick end to the struggle. The underdog must initially seek a war of attrition, not of annihilation, and he must use this time not only gradually to build his own physical strength at the expense of his adversary's, but also to build political support and a sense of psychological superiority through the commission of acts of bravery, defiance, and sacrifice. Opportunities for small victories are sought and when such victories are achieved they represent success in a campaign of physical attrition. More important, they are prized for their cumulative symbolic and psychological effects, which add not only to the real strength of armed elements but to the political power of the movement being served. When the underdog's combined physical and moral strength reaches a point at which he can meet his adversary on physically equal (or better) terms, the moment for final decision has arrived. This is the moment for orthodox forces to come to the fore and, like the matador, complete the victory in a final orthodox campaign of annihilation.

Besides the translation, Brigadier General Griffith's book contains 31 pages of introduction and translator's notes. In these pages, he traces the development of Mao's thinking on revolutionary warfare and places Mao's version of guerrilla warfare in context with other prominent historical examples and writings on the subject. The author argues that our failings in Vietnam were a product of our failure to truly understand Mao's teachings and how aptly they were being applied by the North Vietnamese and Vietcong. He also outlines the challenge to the industrialized

West that lies ahead, pointing in particular to the discontent that is festering in many Third World countries, and to the fact that the West has become associated with maintenance of the sometimes oppressive status quo while the Soviet Union and its proxies have been posing as champions of liberating change. While the book makes clear the application of Mao's teachings to these circumstances, it does not try to tell us how to meet the challenge. For insights or prescriptions pertaining to our own strategy, the reader must look elsewhere.

Mao has said that political power grows out of the barrel of a gun. Standing alone, this oft-quoted passage is misleading. The total of Mao's writing makes clear his true belief that power grows out of the supportive sentiment of a land's inhabitants. Guerrilla warfare—part of the gun barrel, as it were—is but one among a number of complementary ways for an underdog to win that supportive sentiment.

ROBERT D. KING

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

Hagan, Kenneth J., ed. *In Peace and War: Interpretations of American Naval History, 1775-1978*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978. 368pp.

The seventeen chapters by seventeen authors that make up this book attempt, in the editor's words, "to assess the navy as an institutional expression of the American experience," and to avoid the "hagiographic and eulogistic tone" of the old school of naval history. So far, so good. Regarding further intentions, it may be observed that although the subtitle announces the contents as "Interpretations of American Naval History," the editor has made "no effort to impose interpretive themes upon the authors," and some of the essays are in fact almost purely expository. Nevertheless, the end product is a very welcome one.

The chapter on the Revolution will remind the reader of the early

emergence of naval problems, and of how a generally deteriorating situation and an acute shortage of powder brought the employment of both commissioned warships and privateers well before the Declaration of Independence. By 1776 the two strategies of commerce raiding and of command of the maritime theater had developed, the former in ocean attacks against British supply lines and the latter in the building effort on Lake Champlain. Both strategies were of great importance prior to the intervention of the French, but from 1779 American naval operations steadily declined.

The discussion of the years between the winning of independence and the outbreak of the War of 1812 is good on problems of maritime commerce, underestimates the significance of the Jeffersonian campaign against Tripoli, and makes no mention of the Louisiana problem or of the preparedness debates in Congress as the second war with Britain approached. The treatment of the War of 1812 deals briefly with unpreparedness, overemphasizes the influence of personal considerations on strategic planning, correctly praises the effectiveness of single-ship raiding tactics, and touches on the vital contributions of naval constructors to the struggle for the command of the Great Lakes.

Traditionally, and especially since the publication of the *Sprouts' Rise of American Naval Power*, the history of the nineteenth-century peacetime navy has been overlooked, or underplayed, or treated with exaggerated Mahanist disdain. In the present volume the editor, seeking a common interpretive thread to link the various essays, has noted with pleasure the diminished emphasis on the revelations of Mahan. This is generally true, although the Admiral still gets more index entries than anything except "blockade" and "Department of the Navy." Nevertheless, the two chapters on the years before the Civil War still

reflect a residual hankering for an offensive-minded force, a "fleet consciousness," and the ability to take on a powerful enemy; in somewhat the same tradition is their desire for premature conversion to steam and their overestimate of Jacksonian and congressional hostility to the naval establishment. By contrast, the essay on the years from 1865 to 1869, the longest and most interestingly interpretive of all these "interpretations," manages a gratifyingly successful explanation of the last years of the Old Navy in terms both of contemporary national policy and of the complexities of the industrial revolution at sea.

For the Civil and Spanish-American Wars, we have three essays. The discussion of the Union Navy provides a model short exposition of its success in improvisation, of the strategy of blockade supported by coastal lodgments, and of war on the inland waters. The analysis of southern efforts at sea emphasizes the extreme difficulty of the Confederate position, the competence and energy of Mallory and Bulloch, and the conceptual failures of Jefferson Davis in naval matters and associated high policy. For the 1890s and the War with Spain, a short chapter (with singularly unhelpful footnotes) touches on the new thoughts, the new ships, the new planning capabilities and the new worries, and on such postwar developments as the creation of the General Board.

The end of the century "transformation" of American foreign relations brought a new assumption of friendship with Britain and a new and insoluble strategic involvement in the Far East. Together with developments in Europe and Asia these changes provided a succession of identifiable potential enemies—Germany, Japan, the Axis, and the Soviet Union—more concrete than those offered by the old Anglophobia and old ideas of "Europe" as an abstract ideological foe. In these new circum-

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stances the difference between war and interwar periods diminishes; navies, when not fighting, are always preparing to fight; and this change, however distressing to philosophers, is helpful to sequential exposition. At last the attitudes, if not necessarily the detailed prescriptions, of the Mahanists, become useful. The reasonably continuous developments of the years from 1900 to 1978 are considered in eight essays that make up the second half of the book.

Four chapters cover the period before Pearl Harbor. On the problems of defending the strategically illogical new commitments, the discussion touches on the Rooseveltian accomplishment of a big (as opposed to a modernized) navy, the German threat in the Caribbean, developing tensions with ORANGE and the problems of Pacific base location, and difficulties in Central America and Mexico; the puzzle of who was minding the Caribbean during the cruise of the Great White Fleet remains. For the war years from 1914-19, which temporarily solved the problem of BLACK, interesting questions are raised regarding Wilson's conversion from near-pacificist to advocate of a super-navy as a negotiating chip to support his mediation efforts and subsequent large designs. In 1919, with the Canal now operational and ORANGE again the problem, the first transfer of important strength to the Pacific opened a new period that received formal structure in the Washington Treaties. The discussion of the Treaty Navy points out (despite certain technological and operational inaccuracies) the effect of the Washington limitations in transferring competition to areas not limited by agreement, and in emphasizing quality over quantity.

In terms of appropriations and deployment, at least, World War II had begun by 1939. New naval building was expedited, weight was shifted to the Atlantic, and efforts were focused on the neutrality patrol, Caribbean bases, and convoy. With the fall of France and

the promulgation of Plan D, the Pacific was further downgraded, and when 1941 brought intelligence of Japanese plans, the freeze of Japanese assets, and shooting war in the Atlantic, the two-ocean problem was unmanageable. Yet while Japan had both the initiative and preponderant strength, the second American navy, which would solve it all, was on the ways. The chapter on the post-Pearl Harbor period, while skimping technical and operational matters, provides a fine overview of strategy with appropriate attention to administrative and institutional problems. Admiral King and the Joint and Combined Chiefs get their due, as do problems of lend-lease shortages, jurisdiction over ASW aircraft, and intertheater competition. The long-term strategic consequences of Guadalcanal and North Africa are emphasized, as are the questions of Pacific route of advance and Pacific command relationships. But all these troubles were surmounted, or erased, in the moment of victory.

The years since 1945 are dealt with in three chapters. The first, running through 1953, concisely handles the evaporation (personnel divided by ten, combatant units by five) of the wartime navy; postwar deployments which, while still emphasizing "Europe first," also had to cope with the Chinese puzzle; the unification row; and new problems with jet aircraft, nuclear attack and propulsion, Soviet submarines, and personnel administration. With the Korean War and the energizing of the concepts of NSC 68, the reactivation of older ships and personnel and new construction programs bring the transition to the cold war years. These are marked by the revival of carrier forces, missile development, the SSBN, and new ASW procedures, and by crises in Vietnam, the Formosa Strait, and the Mediterranean. The Bay of Pigs farce is followed by the missile crisis triumph, which brings its own counter in a big Soviet building program.

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The final chapter on the years from 1962 to 1978 concerns itself with the "erosion" of American naval preeminence. The increasing Soviet presence in the eastern Mediterranean, the OKEAN exercises, the deleterious effects of Vietnam on new construction, and the Rickover problem are touched on. Here the kind of "tabular comparisons dear to the heart of nineteenth century navalists," noted in the chapter on the 1890s, recur in profusion. These tables of ship numbers, tonnage, and out-of-area operating days make no mention of possible contributions by NATO allies, thus leaving the impression (perhaps intended) that this is a two-party game.

Generally speaking, these essays support the editor's claim that the practice of naval history has advanced in recent years. Some traces of the earlier period remain, as in neglect of logistic matters and echoes of unthinking Mahanism; its consequences can be seen in the bibliographic comments, reflective of the old roundshot and cutlass approach of the Office of Naval History, that information on naval strategy between 1919 and 1945 is best sought in official Army publications. Small mention is made of shifting deployments, by squadron or area, before 1937. There is nothing on the Marine Corps' development of amphibious techniques. Technological matters are at times skimmed and at times skewed. But it would be hard for anyone not to profit from a reading of the book.

JAMES A. FIELD, JR.
Swarthmore College

Lefever, Ernest W. *Nuclear Arms in the Third World*. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1979. 154pp.

Despite the fact that this primer is current only through March 1978, it is a useful and informative compilation of the history of nuclear technology in the Third World, those countries' unique reasons for keeping open the nuclear

weapons option, and some sensible projections that describe the security implications of nuclear weapons development. The export of nuclear technology over the last 20 years has been a powerful diplomatic and economic tool; yet recently it has become increasingly difficult to use, requires constant honing, and its brittleness is much more pronounced. Many of the countries now have the capability to complete the fuel cycle and produce weapon grade nuclear material.

Lefever has chosen nine countries (India, Pakistan, Iran, Israel, Egypt, South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil and Argentina) whose technological base and security needs combine for a strong potential for nuclear arms production in the future. These factors are weighed against the cost of building a "military significant force"—defined as deliverable (by aircraft or missiles) nuclear weapons. The country by country case method provides a well-reasoned, comprehensible synopsis of complex wide-ranging foreign policy objectives, economic considerations, military capabilities and intentions, regional influence and stabilities, and perceptions of superpower guarantees. The current situation has evolved from the initial export of technologies and fuel from the United States solely for power generation to a closely controlled, regulatory exchange safeguarded by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the nonproliferation treaty. IAEA oversees civil uses of nuclear power and governs fuel production with a series of on-site inspections, tests and trilateral agreements between the agency, the supplier and recipient. The U.S.-Soviet backed treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons that obligates all signatories to refrain from facilitating the acquisition of nuclear explosives has lessened their appeal for some. However, both safeguard methods are voluntary and while the United States has brought pressure to bear on those countries not members of the Agency or parties to the treaty, "The nuclear genie has been