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The Theme of the Naval War College's 1977 Current Strategy Forum was "U.S. Policies and Naval Forces in the Pacific, 1977-85." In this paper, adapted from an address he gave at that Forum, Professor Marshall discusses the strategic significance of the area, considers the triangular relationship of the United States, the Soviet Union, and China and the interests pairing them in cooperative or competitive combinations, and reminds us that planning for the future is chancv business.

THREE POWERS–TWO OCEANS

by

Charles Burton Marshall

The ocean areas of my topic engross about 70 percent of the globe's water surface and more than 95 percent of its islands, preponderantly in the Pacific, and are abutted on by 45 percent of the world's countries aggregating 75 percent of its population. Each of these two oceans in its own way arouses strategic imagination. In the large the Pacific is an open ocean, but its western edge consists of a 6,000-mile string of almost closed seas delineated by the East Asian coast and offshore islands. More warships lost or destroyed by the U.S. Navy lie in those waters than in all others. Considered as a discrete tactical episode, what is said to be the longest battle in U.S. military history, with the most U.S. ships and U.S. troops involved and the greatest number of casualties suffered, was fought there within living memory. The United States has sustained war across that ocean with mixed success through 15 of the past 36 years. In our experience, the Pacific stands as the most bitterly contested of oceans. By comparison, the Indian Ocean is virtually a closed sea. Constraining points, such as found among the local seas in the Western Pacific, are dominant features of the whole Indian Ocean. Strategically, the contiguous countries have not been an appreciable factor. Control has been a function for outsiders. There as nowhere else Britannia ruled the waves from the Napoleonic epoch until very recent years, making the Indian Ocean the strategically most stable of the oceans—a fact of great benefit for us, though not one borne in general awareness. With the British having abdicated that function, a critical question concerns what strategic order effected by what power, close by or remote, will succeed.

Strategic interplay between the two oceans is notable. Japan's approach to one of the three constricted channels

of entry, challenging British dominance in the Indian Ocean, prompted the U.S. embargoes which in turn precipitated Pearl Harbor. An unanticipated early show of military activity on our part in the Western Pacific—I refer to the Doolittle raid on Tokyo—frightened the Japanese into pulling back from an effort which, if persevered in, might well have overturned Britain's thin control of the Indian Ocean. Britain's accesses to supply sources especially in India and, even more importantly, the lend-lease channel through the Persian Gulf, critical in sustaining Soviet resistance to the Nazis, were not sundered. If one accepts J.F.C. Fuller's estimate, as I do, that fact was determinative of victory over the Axis in World War II.

Our strategic concern now in the Indian Ocean area rests almost exclusively on supply considerations. Mineral resources in Southern Africa are of indisputable importance. I shall merely mention gold. South Africa also appears well on the way to achieving second rank among uranium-producing countries. I specify uranium as only one in a long list of stringent and strategically critical materials concentrated in that region. Petroleum comes to mind even more dramatically. Two-thirds of the world's known petroleum resources are deposited along the northern reach of the Indian Ocean.

Power to interdict or to assure the flow of industrial energy over much of the globe hinges on strategic factors focused on the Indian Ocean area and various appurtenant constricted channels. Without that supply Japan, once our enemy, now a friend and a strategic client dependent on the Indian Ocean for 90 percent of its petroleum, would languish. Our European Allies with a counterpart dependency of 80 percent would be in similar predicament if cut off. The United States is proportionately less but still too much dependent on the same sources and would be domestically on very hard times if denied access. The U.S. world position would be drastically damaged. Whether active in war or latent in other times, power to intercept the flow of oil out of the Indian Ocean is an instrument of enormous strategic implications.

I turn now to the triangle featured in my topic. In the spring of 1951 U.S. forces, under symbolic U.N. sponsorship, were entangled in hostilities on an appendage of the Asian mainland. Communist China had interposed to salvage stalemate from debacle in a war improvidently promoted by the Soviet Union and was the main enemy in the field. The options for the United States lay among indefinite protraction of indecisive fighting, an infusion of increments to pursue victory at huge cost and risks in what General Bradley called "the wrong war in the wrong place against the wrong enemy," and a quest for a cease-fire. The last course was preferred.

An obstacle was lack of any channel for confidential communication with Communist China, even indirect. Several of the few governments in formal diplomatic relations with the United States and China were considered untrustworthy as channels. Two others declined to try a middleman role. The remaining one disclaimed having practical access to the other side. Measures to bridge the obstacle included a variety of expedients and improvisations, recounted in Dean Acheson's *Present at the Creation*. The one pertinent here—mentioned on page 532 of that book—was the dispatching of someone with official standing to Hong Kong to try from that vantage to convey surreptitiously to Peking some basic points about U.S. foreign policy attitudes in hope of stimulating motion toward a cease-fire and, with luck, of getting negotiating preliminaries underway.

McCarthyism was then active, and

the MacArthur uproar was at the forefront of attention. Because of those touchy circumstances, utmost secrecy was applied. Five or six persons, no more, in the executive branch were informed. Only oral instructions were given. The civil servant performing the mission spent 6 weeks on the scene in mostly tedious, occasionally adventurous, and, for him, highly educational endeavors but never learned the effects beyond an assurance that at least one of the various potential intermediaries found for him by the CIA did get through to authorities in Peking. The aspect in point here is the substance of the message forwarded in that makeshift way. I give it in drastic compression—and with full confidence, having been the one sent on the mission.

The first part was a review, from the U.S. standpoint, of the hiatus in relations with mainland China emphasizing the constraints on the popularly accountable U.S. Government imposed by traditional attachments to China among large segments of the public and by general chagrin over the accession there of a regime with an outlook and purposes antithetic to American attitudes and aims. I cited as offsetting facts the United States' avoidance of direct involvement in China's civil war, the early refusal to interpose to protect the Chinese Nationalists' offshore refuge on Taiwan, and the attempts to keep open the U.S. Embassy and consular offices on the mainland. In the U.S. view, I stressed, the Communist regime's harassments to force closure of those facilities reflected a psychic need for an external enemy—a role, in the logic of circumstances, befalling the United States.

The war in Korea had interposed as a painful fact replacing mere animosity with palpable hostility. The embittering effects were bound to last a long time. I stressed considerations extremely important for the Peking regime to understand. The U.S. Government perceived not China but the Soviet Union as the strategic adversary. The United States was intent to avoid war with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the issues between them were sharp and basic, and communications with the Soviet Union had become critically difficult and tenuous with Stalin's approach to senility and the reintensification of terror within the Soviet domain. The danger of slippage into unwanted active hostilities was therefore considerable. For all their then current enmities, the United States and China had one big thing in common: in their highest mutual interest, China must not become involved on the Soviet Union's side in a war against the United States. That consideration must temper their enmity.

Protracting the conflict in Korea could only prolong the danger of inducing general war. That war had reached a stage of diminishing returns for both sides. Therefore the immediate necessity was to wind down the fighting. Embittered but cognizant of the necessary limits to their mutual grudges, the United States and China would probably have to continue holding each other at arm's length in the sequel to hostilities. At some juncture ahead—I stressed this point—a substitute external enemy for Peking would probably materialize in the Soviet Union. That development would provide a logical occasion for moving toward overtly improved relations between the United States and China.

So much for that hush-hush mission. At worst it proved not a hindrance. Armistice overtures soon surfaced. A cease-fire materialized after 2 more difficult years. I elide the 15 ensuing years of mutual sulking and growling. The United States had contracted itself into the defense of the Nationalist regime's position on Taiwan. The United States was intent also to preserve China's

U.N. franchise for the Taiwan regime, mainly excluding the Communist regime. In pique for having been labeled as aggressor in Korea, China underwrote that exclusionary policy by a show of studied aloofness and for a while even trying with no success to found a rival and successor world organization.

What is pertinent is the eventual shift toward amelioration with the United States, reflecting developments between that most profuse and ethnocentric land and the Soviet Union. Tension between the two was latent from the moment of Communist accession in China. I recall vividly from my Hong Kong venture an intimation to me of the Chinese Communists' assumption of cultural superiority to the Soviet Union's. It came from Chang Kua-tao, in exile as an ousted member of the Peking Politburo: "China was an ancient civility when Russians were painting themselves blue and wearing animal skins." The Chinese eschewal of satellite status surfaced in the refusal to join the chorus echoing Khrushchev's posthumous denunciation of Stalin at the 20th Party Congress. The difference had to be accounted for on doctrinal grounds rather than publicly acknowledged as a clash of national interests and cultural outlooks. Two papacies now vied for the same church, as it were. China made known its aspirations to rival and even to supplant the Soviet Union at the Communist apex.

A quick succession of three events some 9 years ago sharpened Peking's anxieties: the Soviet-led suppression of Communist deviancy in Czechoslovakia, the pronouncement in Moscow of a so-called Brezhnev doctrine asserting the Soviet Union's historic prerogative to enforce doctrinal rectitude throughout the Communist realm, and a sudden tripling of Soviet troop strength bordering China. Pressed by such palpable security threats, China substituted initiative for indifference in certain aspects of external affairs. First, China hinted affirmative interest in a U.N. connection by thanking several governments for their perennial opposition to our exclusionary policy thereby assuring its early undoing. More important, in an age-old practice of playing off adversaries against each other, Peking sought an opening to the one country with material capabilities to provide a counterweight to the Soviet threat. China's ping-pong initiative, Dr. Kissinger's secretive calls, and Mr. Nixon's theatrical visit capped by a joint communique prefiguring progress to normal relations came in remarkably quick order.

The Soviet response to that sequence of gestures reflected anxiety lest the incipient connection should mature into something akin to an alliance. Ambition to garner bonus effects in the form of subsidized preferential access to inventiveness and productivity (catering to an American preconception linking commerce and peace) supplied an auxiliary stimulus to the cultivation of Mr. Nixon and Dr. Kissinger. The culmination was their joint journey to Moscow 5 years ago.

The mere fact of a much-trumpeted melioration in U.S.-Soviet relations was nothing new. Such junctures had recurred many times, beginning with the Roosevelt-Litvinov parley of 1933. Yet one palpable quality does distinguish the turn in 1972 from the ones before. The volume and variety of U.S.-Soviet agreements then and thenceforth produced—they touch on such diverse matters as cultural interchange, commercial accommodation, technological transference, collaboration in space exploits, political concord, human rights, and the strategic equation—are unprecedented for so brief a span in the history of diplomatic relations between these two governments and probably between any other governments. If futurity inheres in what documents

promise, then what has been accomplished is stupendous, and Mr. Nixon's hyperbolic claims concerning the transformation wrought were realistic.

The luster did not last. I shall not labor that observation with concrete details. I wish to focus rather on some illustrative conceptual differences bearing on the transactional relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. As a basic point, a contract is an expression of linked intentions which the respective parties can properly and reciprocally accept as reliable predictions of actions so that they may shape their own conduct accordingly. The key terms must convey the same senses to both sides. Otherwise a valid contractual relationship is lacking. Miscarriages of agreed arrangements ascribable to confusions of common terms are not extraordinary in human affairs. A dozen old stories about contracts aborted over discrepancies of meanings come to mind. A thirsty wayfarer ordered a screwdriver at a country inn and was handed a screwdriver. A bishop sent a bellman to fetch a pot of tea and a tart and was brought his tea and a tart. An astronaut on Mars tried to buy a six-pack and was handed a bra. Here I am concerned not with foulups due to simple split definitions. I refer to profound discongruities reflecting divergencies of value and purpose.

As a point of reference consider a mutual pledge entered into at Moscow in 1972 and elaborated during the Brezhnev visit to Washington a year later for exchanging information and collaborating on behalf of peace in crisis situations wherever occurring. The Soviet Union's subsequent actions have included secret provisioning of the Yom Kippur attacks on Israel, unilateral initiatives toward direct intervention after a shift in the tide of battle against its clients, abetting of the petroleum embargo by the Arab oil-producing states and utmost efforts, though in vain, to get the embargo prolonged; continued efforts to impede the United States' step-by-step efforts to abate the Arab-Israeli quarrel, prompting the North Vietnamese in overrunning South Vietnam in violation of the Paris accords signed by the Soviet Union as a guarantor, and unilateral intervention in the Angolan civil war in scornful repudiation of the U.S. Secretary of State's entreaties. As borne out by that record, the meaning of peace and of the promotion of peace diverges profoundly as between the United States' and the Soviet Union's operational codes. The discrepancy bears examination, for it presents a serious impediment to prospects for contracting about peace.

Soviet discourse is as wont as ours to celebrate peace as a policy goal. In a theoretic sense, also, Soviet concepts parallel those prevailing here in regarding peace as the norm and war, by corollary, as deviant. The rub is this. In the Marxist-Leninist dogma, the aberrations giving rise to war are seen as rooted in differences between classes defined in relation to varying functions in the processes of production. The causes of conflict are seen as knotted into the very fabric of societies at variance with the Soviet Union's postulates, practices, and scheme of authority. The achievement of peace as a pervasive human condition is for a remote tomorrow when Marxist-Leninist dogma will be no longer challenged. That consummation is supposedly predetermined by history's laws.

In keeping with the Marxist-Leninist dogma, the Soviet ruling group professes to regard itself as supreme guardian of the principles linked to that putative truth and as history's agent in promoting momentum to the predetermined goal. Until that consummation and subject to the requirement of not jeopardizing everything by direct imprudent involvement in war

the pursuit of peace entails prosecution of unremitting enmity toward every differentiated political entity and belief, not simply for the sake of Soviet interests and preferences as such but in service to the teleological ends supposedly inspiring Soviet interests and purposes. Peace in the Soviet lexicon stands for promotion of Communist aims in what is called "class struggle between systems." Whatever is contributory thereto is by definition peaceful. Because the United States is the mainstay of resistance to that postulated momentum of history, the Soviet version of service to peace calls for the isolation, neutralization, and ultimately the effective elimination of the United States as a counterfactor. Thus enmity is waged under the rubric of peace, employing every device of strategy short of explicit war.

The United States' approach to peace reflects a privileged historic past, remote from theaters of strategic competiton, with security a bestowed condition, peace demonstrably the inherent situation, and war therefore regarded as obviously abnormal. In that outlook, strategy encompasses concepts and practices applicable only in the breakdowns but otherwise to be banished from general concern. The thing to do in order to perpetuate peace is to forestall breakdowns—not by attention to strategic factors but by communicating, engaging in commerce, sharing benefits, and following agreed rational procedures.

In the 20th century's two world wars the U.S. formula for perpetuating peace thenceforth was the creation of an international organization—first the League of Nations and then the U.N.—to institutionalize a nonstrategic approach to peace in a world expected to be so abundant with friends as to obviate having to calculate how to deal with putative enemies. With the U.N. demonstrably incapacitated for its peacekeeping purpose by a rift over the conditions of peace between the main two members of the prevailing coalition supposed to serve as the nucleus for the undertaking, the United States in the containment policy ventured into a strategic approach to maintaining peace.

The provisionary character of that turn needs stress. No thread runs more consistently through the pattern of U.S. foreign policy covering three decades than the thought, the dream, of vindicating the goal of a nonstrategic basis for peace by dissuading the Soviet Union from its waywardness and thus converting it into a reliable collaborator for peace according to the U.S. perception. That prodigy is conceived as achievable by depriving the Soviet ruling group of opportunities for expansive successes, undermining thereby the group's confidence in the Marxist-Leninist image of the future, and at long last bringing the Soviet Union around to tractability and cooperation. President Truman put the expectation into his message enunciating the Truman Doctrine. Secretary Acheson repeated it in testifying for the North Atlantic Treaty. President Eisenhower paraphrased it in his first Presidential speech on foreign policy. Thenceforward into the present, spokesmen for five successive Administrations have articulated the same vision in diverse styles.

The Soviet dream anticipates a United States worn down to ineffectuality and acquiescence. The American dream envisions a Soviet Union rendered pliant and cooperative by a combination of frustration and wooing. Each dream foresees its version of peace triumphant and the old opponent rendered submissive. Those conflicting dreams—they could not both come true—underlay, if that is the right tense, the strenuous competition called the cold war. The same tension between incompatible concepts carries over into a muddle of meanings

between "peaceful coexistence" and "détente."

The former expression is the Soviet term-of-art for the Soviet version of a sequel to the cold war and for the processes promoting that outcome. Thus "the strategic purpose of peaceful coexistence"–I quote President Brezhnev–"is to assure favorable conditions for the world-wide victory of socialism." "Détente" is the favored word expressing the contrasting version of a sequel to the cold war treasured in policy on this side, with the Soviet Union cured of its presumption to be a universal cause and content at last to function simply as a state pressing its own interests as such. The Soviets now use both terms interchangeably, as if the practice of détente entailed acquiescence to Soviet rampancy and aggrandizement. The Soviet style–"peaceful coexistence"–is adopted in the pertinent official documents subscribed by the United States in Nixon's time and since, but the alleged accomplishments are represented to the public in terms of détente according to the U.S. perception. The confusion is exemplified when statesmen, according to their wont on both sides, speak of making détente irreversible as if the word had a settled and definitive meaning. It has no such meaning but two antithetic meanings–Soviet desistance and an end of resistance to Soviet persistence–so that irreversible détente in one sense means the confounding of détente in the other.

The mismatch has a counterpart in strategic concepts, a matter of palpable importance so that I wish to apply utmost care and precision in discussing it. Conducting policy in peacetime under the rigors of strategic competition entails constant attention to the contingencies of war. The irreducible principle is never to afford one's putative adversary a basis for feeling optimistic about the probable consequences of launching war or of pushing an issue to a point of inducing hostilities. There is more to the matter than that, however. In a situation charged with contention, and with one side optimistic in that sense and the other pessimistic and each side knowledgeable of the other's estimate the probability of war is not high. The constraints, however, are unequal. The side on the heavy end of advantage will be in position to come out ahead at the adversary's expense. In a contrasting controversy, with neither side feeling optimistic about a hypothetical outcome, the constraints tend toward equality, and danger of actual hostilities is low. A strategically and politically stable relationship obtains. Thirdly, for both sides in a contentious situation to feel optimistic in the relevant sense heightens the chances of slippage into war.

The assets which accrued to the United States and put it in the advantaged situation vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in the earlier stages of its first venture into conducting policy in peacetime under conditions of strategic competition included such nonmilitary matters as undamaged civil and institutional morale, a matchless capital plant left intact and even much expanded and improved by the experience of war, great industrial and agricultural productivity, and a uniquely stable currency. To these add strong military resources exemplified in having armed forces attuned to victory and unchallengeable preeminence in military aviation, in naval power generally over the globe, and in nuclear technology with its prodigious strategic potential. Some of those assets were destined to decline in a relative measure because of factors beyond this country's ordaining. The last one listed, preeminence in strategic nuclear power–the anchor of the strength conveyed by grant and pledge to countries far and wide, was abdicated voluntarily in a decision dating from roughly 10 years ago.

The idea behind relinquishing the strategic nuclear advantage, by tapering

off and letting the Soviet Union catch up, was to open a way to establishing an equilibrium of pessimism about the outcome of a putative war between the superpowers. Then each side would feel pressed to back away from war and be in no position to invoke the image of war as an instrument for having its way on issues in contention—a version, as it were, of a nonstrategic basis for peace. The Soviet Union's predisposition to settle for such a standoff and to abstain from striving to supplant the United States in the favored position was assumed without critical examination.

Eight years of exacting negotiations, productive of a succession of intricate agreements, the major one being the centerpiece for the Nixon-Kissinger pilgrimage to Moscow 5 years ago, have not vindicated that last assumption. Does the Soviet Union seek only to complement the U.S. design for nuclear parity and the annulment of nuclear competition as a component of international politics, or does it to the contrary aspire to establish nuclear strategic superiority, which would be susceptible of being brought to bear as an instrument for forwarding the Soviet version of peace as an indefeasible dynamic force propelling toward global triumph for the Soviet Union? As between parity and superiority as Soviet goals, the present U.S. negotiator, Mr. Paul Warnke, professes not to know. In epistemological precision, the verb is correct. One does not *know*. One can infer. Soviet discourse does not replicate U.S. phraseology for expressing a nuclear standoff. Soviet internal writings consistently support the larger estimate of Soviet ambitions. The verified scope of momentum of pertinent Soviet programs can scarcely be reconciled with any other assumption.

An analogy from sports seems appropriate not to prove but only to articulate an idea. Any organized sport is a mixture of ritual and contest. The formular aspects are those equalized by regulation. Contest occurs in the interstices. In football, for example, the size of the gridiron and the allowable number of players in action at any moment are among the matters regulated. Agreement on such dimensions does not write off every game of every season as a tie but only sets broad limits to the contest. Woe to the side which takes the field under a contrary illusion and even, in a fit of sportsmanlike innocence, concedes the other side a dozen or thirteen players to its own eleven or, in a misguided unilateral urge to economize, restricts its own participants to ten or nine. Whether quixotic or stinting, such concessions can only excite the other side's ambition to prevail.

To the disappointment of more committed and sanguine supporters, the negotiations about nuclear arms probably cannot succeed of themselves in prescribing and effectuating a standoff. At best the process may set outer limits without eliminating competition. The gross quantities agreed upon will not succor us but can only set boundaries on the endeavors with which this country must save itself.

Nuclear strategic superiority for the United States is probably irrecoverable. The important thing now is to avoid descent into nuclear strategic inferiority. That matter is to be determined by our own efforts, for the strategic arms talks of themselves are not going to rescue us from that predicament. With that in mind, I earnestly wish for an abatement of this government's anxiety to obtain agreement—the approach which casts our negotiators as the suppliants in bargaining with Moscow.

In Professor Richard Pipes' words, "There is something innately destabilizing in the very fact that we consider nuclear war unfeasible and suicidal for both, and our chief adversary views it as feasible and winnable for himself." As someone has said, the United States is

predisposed to maypole dancing, while the Soviet Union insists on tug-of-war. No third party watches the two superpower contenders in that disjoined match with more avid interest or ventures into the arena more opportunistically with its own version of what game to play than does China. I am loath to give judgments about the land. I have never been there. Those who, having been there, write give me little light. I have a hard enough time understanding the determinants of policy even in my own society. Those operative in China abound, for me, with impenetrable mysteries, but I can at least resist a temptation to believe China's leadership to be endowed with transcendant sapiency. "Do you know, my son, with how little wisdom the world is governed?" Count Oxenstierna inquired three and a half centuries ago. The query is at least equally applicable to China as here or anywhere else. Watching the two superpower societies at the apex, set aside by their exclusory capability to attack and even to destroy each other, China's hierarchs inveigh against the superpowers, both as oppressors and exploiters and profess to eschew superpower status. The show of renunciation probably exemplifies the sort of piety which leads men to denigrate what they most covet.

Conceptually, the dogmatic elements in China's image of the future are akin to the Soviet Union's. What is repellent is the idea of Moscow, rather than Peking, as the New Jerusalem. To elbow Moscow from that summit, the Chinese Communists presumably would do anything within limits of whatever power they may ever attain to. Moscow's awareness of that ambition on the Peking regime's part impels a counter-ambition either to mend fences with China by somehow wooing the regime to conform with Soviet ambitions or to reduce China and thereby to render it subservient or inconsequential to Soviet purposes. Awareness of those contingent intentions makes China's hierarchs fearful of some form of political penetration or of attack and partition from the Soviet Union.

Precaution against any such development is what impelled China to cultivate the United States—but not quite as an ally. China's political hierarchs are too ideologically possessed, basically too abhorrent of the United States, for that. Yet as of the time being they need the United States or at least the shadow of its power. China strategically is not enough to count as a determinative factor but enough to make some difference in the U.S.-Soviet equation. China, moreover, disposes more strategic potential if poised against the Soviet Union than if against the United States. So for a short run, however long it may prove in the test of events, it is prudent to have China as a strategic factor more or less on this side rather than unequivocally opposed. U.S. policy toward mainland China is premised on China's remaining antithetic to the Soviet Union. Making opportune use of the situation is wise, but, in view of China's inscrutability, it would be improvident to stake much moral or material capital on China's constancy.

I now turn to projections. I do so with diffidence. This is not the first time of my letting the Navy down as a seer. A dozen or so years ago a panel of actual and aspirant admirals asked me (I was a consultant on a study of the strategic future of these same waters) to provide a sneak preview covering the following 15 years. I pleaded incapacity. They expressed willingness to settle for probabilities. I expounded the ambiguity of the concept "probable"—citing, in the case of a horse rated as the most probable winner in a race at 5 to 1, the higher probability for a less-probable horse to beat out the most probable. Their expressions signified innocence about playing the ponies. How—this was the next question—can one plan ahead without foreseeing the

future? That question prompted me to a favorite discourse.

We must plan ahead not for a foreseeable future but for the unforeseeable future. Like navigating in heavy weather without a radar, we must look intently ahead because we cannot see ahead. We only discern various possibilities. We try to rate their varying potentials for coming true, for harm or benefit, and for being affected by our own choices. Then we see to the allocating of resources not to conform to prefigured probabilities but to try to affect probabilities and above all to ensure that those in authority later on shall not be deprived of choice, and therefore of freedom, in face of exigencies not now perceivable. Another observation: In such matters we are masters of our own courses but never of how others beyond our fiat may discern and respond to them, much as we may try to anticipate.

It is chancy business. The Japanese did make war in face of our embargo to dissuade their advance toward the Indian Ocean and did surprise our fleet at anchor in a bay and our planes in supine rows on the ground. Adversaries did construe an opportunity for conquest from the lack of guarantees and defenses for South Korea. The Chinese did interpose and find a gap in our lines approaching the Yalu. The other side did exploit our improvident assent to making the demarcation line first item in the Korea armistice talks, risklessly testing the U.S. will with 2 additional years of attrition. In Vietnam our enemies saw and exploited, to ultimate success, the contradiction inherent in our decision to contest for an area whence we longed for exit against forces intent to get in and stay. The thin-skinned *Pueblo* did get pounced on.

The point of that dismal list—I could expand it considerably—is simple. The other side's failure to match our anticipations can land us in perplexity which is what policy analysts classify as a worst-case outcome. Let no reader exemplify the practice, which persists in face of experience and logic, of ruling out worst-case outcomes as marginal and paranoid. "You cannot evaluate policy alternatives on the basis of extreme speculative consequences," the President's counselor on national security affairs, Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, recently retorted to a question about consequences of the phasing-out of ground forces from Korea. That counsel is wrong. Such consequences do occur. They must always be taken into account.

Every occurrence on my random list, moreover, had the Western Pacific as its locale. For us it has been a recalcitrant region, prone to confound our premises. I suspect the Indian Ocean of similar perverseness, up to now concealed from us by its century and a half of unmatched strategic stability, under British naval dominance. In both ocean areas, as over the great globe itself, the years just ahead should be expected to present a quickening rate, not a diminution, of challenges and crises.

The pervasive basic circumstance, manifesting itself in a miscellany of local and regional troubles, will be the continuing problem of Soviet purposes and power, dealing with which has been the central feature of U.S. policy in the past three decades. Dr. Brzezinski's recent words about the United States challenging the Soviet Union to co-operate with our aims or "run the risk of becoming historically irrelevant to the great issues of our time" are an exercise in romance. The real situation, rather, approaches fulfillment of Brezhnev's boast in 1970 of a time when "no question of importance in the world can be solved without our participation, without taking into account our economic and military might."

The Soviet Union is not going to convert to cooperativeness with our preferences and designs. The ruling dogma sets precisely the opposite course. The regime's grasp on power

over its own society depends on that dogma. The regime will not—it cannot—abandon the dogma. The regime will continue, as in the past, to wrestle with production problems and consumer demands, but its command system for allocating resources will not be deflected from emphasis on military programs. The sector of life where the regime feels, with reason, most confident about contesting its adversaries is the military. The Soviet Union will not reciprocate in our projects for a strategic standoff but will approach strategic negotiations as, to use the apt internal phrase, "a highly effective form of class antagonism." Some time soon new leadership must take over in the Soviet Union. There is no reason to expect the younger successors to be less boldly opportunistic than the present leadership. The opposite is more likely to be the case.

As for China, some measure of rapprochement with the Soviet Union—a highly consequential development for us—should not be ruled out of calculation. The Chinese will watch exactingly with what prudence and constancy the United States manages its affairs, especially in respect of countering Soviet power, and will determine their own courses accordingly. China will maintain its irredentist claim to Taiwan, as for reasons of pride it must. Paradoxically, by breaking with Taiwan (if that is in the cards, as I suspect it is) in order to open a way to full formalities with Peking, the United States may satisfy a point of pride at the price of damaging its own reputation for constancy. The result of our impulsion for formally improving relations with Peking may well be substantively to impair them.

As for the United States, I note on the present scene relevant to my topic a propensity to presume the conclusiveness of the U.S. say-so, as if linkages among external issues were ruled by our preferences rather than determined by the nature of things. Because our plans so ordain, the contemplated troop withdrawal from South Korea is supposed to bear no adverse consequences. My doubt duplicates my skepticism in 1951 over London's confided assurance against any change in strategic conditions to follow a projected British pullout east of Suez.

A companion tendency is to count on the continuity of any convenient circumstance merely for its convenience. A Japanese swing away from disarmed dependency on U.S. strategic protection to a choice between armed neutrality and an accommodation with the other side would indeed be upsetting. So docility is attributed to that historically mercurial nation. I should regard a rekindling of Japanese nationalism, bringing on a basic realignment, as a plausible response to the unilateralism practiced by the United States in the demarche with Peking, the Lockheed affair, and now the decision to remove ground forces from Korea, which bears so directly on Japan's security.

An excessive inclination to trust in pacts, to believe in the feasibility of any desideratum by documenting it in an agreement, is a further characteristic of U.S. policy. A recent illustration is the diplomatic initiative to demilitarize the whole Indian Ocean. How in a practical sense could that be done for an ocean area within the ambit of one side's airpower and not the other's? Candidly, I must question the reliability of any standoff arrangement over such strategic stakes with an ambitious rival practiced in subversion and in waging proxy wars. If we are to maintain our interests there, it must be by naval power on the scene.

Is U.S. policy in a phase of overhasty self-confidence? In asking, I have in mind the current approach to the Arab-Israeli confrontation, with its obvious potential for affecting matters in the Indian Ocean and far beyond. The urge now is to push toward a resolution this year for a set of contentions whose roots are traceable back to events

recounted in the 21st chapter of *Genesis*. Neither side in the chronic quarrel, so I venture, can afford to make the concessions required by the other for a genuine and definitive settlement. Those are issues to be nursed along, not to be heightened by exercising a zeal to get things dône wholesale and forthwith.

My last point of particular concern is about Southern Africa, an area of which I feel sufficiently knowledgeable that I wish I might have made it the subject of my whole discourse instead of having its complexities dismissed in a paragraph. There, in my view, policy is not reflecting patience, wisdom, and a grasp of realities commensurate with the magnitude of the stakes. It operates on a basis of clichés rather than of comprehension and presses for so-called settlements and solutions beyond practical reach.

I remember the late Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen's pessimistic estimate concerning the United States' want of realistic insight and of staying power to sustain strategic competition with a dogmatic, enduring, and resourceful adversary. His doubt is yet to be refuted. The new Administration is exceptionally verbal—meaning that it talks much. It has a bent for dubious aphorisms, a favorite one being (test it with a forest ranger in a season of drought) that "fire is better fought with water than with fire." Concerning the new outfit's substantive qualities, I do not as yet feel able to distinguish between transient and ingrained traits. I am open-minded. My hopes are ardent because the needs are so compelling.

The basic necessity is to maintain the strategic nuclear deterrent. To permit the deterrent to become deterred would disqualify us for every other sort of strategic competition. Maintaining the deterrent, however, is only a necessary, not a sufficient, consideration. There are myriad other vexing and expensive tasks, including the maintenance of conventional military strength at a cogent level, to be performed year by year in countering Soviet expansion while avoiding strategic and political isolation. Not to persevere in those tasks must land us in the situation—to paraphrase Machiavelli—of having lost no enemies and kept no friends.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

A graduate of the University of Texas, Charles Burton Marshall received his Ph.D. from Harvard University. After service in the Army in World War II, he served the government in several positions. He was Professor of International Politics at the School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, from 1965 to 1975. His books include *The Limits of Foreign Policy* (1954) and *The Exercise of Sovereignty* (1965).