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Preparing for the Next War: American Plans for Postwar Defense, 1941-45

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promises a chronology of Lyndon Johnson's agony in stepping down because of Vietnam. He provides that amply. It is simply not a satisfying tale. It is an authentic tragedy, and Schandler is not Shakespeare.

JOHN B. BONDS
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Sherry, Michael S. *Preparing for the Next War: American Plans for Postwar Defense, 1941-45.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977. 260pp.

It is supposed to be characteristic of soldiers to prepare for the next war by refighting the last one, but the process has rarely been demonstrated as clearly as in this first comprehensive history of postwar planning by the American military during World War II. Indeed Michael Sherry maintains that in at least one area—the Army's campaign for Universal Military Training—preparations were being made for World War III on the basis of lessons learned in World War I.

Sherry's book also treats such topics as postwar force structures, unification of the armed services, the relationship between scientists and the military, perceptions of the Soviet threat, and the strategic implications of the atomic bomb. He is not always successful in weaving these diverse subjects into an integrated narrative, but his account makes up in scope and analytical insight what it lacks in continuity.

Sherry's main thesis is that the emergence of a cold war consensus in the United States cannot be understood solely as either the product of Soviet aggressiveness or the requirements of capitalism. It stemmed as well, he argues, from the development of a firm conviction within both the American military and the civilian policymaking elite that technology alone had rendered the United States vulnerable to postwar aggression, even before it had become clear from what source such aggression might come. "Before the cold war developed," he writes, "there had arisen a cold war mentality, an anxiety about the nation's security and an insistence on mobilizing full resources to protect it."

This is a significant and, on the whole, credible interpretation. It does not depend upon time-worn but unverifiable assertions that both capitalism and military organizations require identifiable enemies in order to survive. It recognizes the importance of the revolution in military thinking generated by the simultaneous utilization during World War II of strategic weapons and long-range delivery systems—a revolution whose implications for the future security of the United States concerned the generals and admirals of that war more than is often realized. Sherry's account also provides the best explanation yet for one of the most puzzling aspects of postwar military planning: the fact that despite this concern over American vulnerability expressions of alarm over the long-range objectives of the Soviet Union were virtually nonexistent until almost the end of the war.

Sherry makes it clear that this particular blindspot grew out of the Pentagon's tendency to plan on the basis of adversary capabilities rather than intentions, and from a narrowly military perception of American postwar interests. Because the Soviet Union had developed neither a strategic air force nor a blue-water navy, it did not fit the new technological criteria of danger planners had established. Obviously the Russians would have a powerful ground army after the war, but from the "purely military" point of view this force posed no threat because it could not attack the United States. Nor was it all that clear, from the same limited perspective, that the United States would have a vital interest in maintaining the postwar balance of power in Europe. Not until 1945 did it become evident that considerations of politics, economics, even psychology, should enter into the planning process, together with some assessment of the intentions as well as the capabilities of potential adversaries; the result was a very different view of the world indeed. It is sobering, nonetheless, to realize that the American military was one of the last elements in the American foreign policy/national security establishment to become aware of the threat Soviet power posed to stability in Europe, and of the stake the United States had in preserving that stability.

This is not, then, a book to bolster one's faith in the ability of planners to anticipate future contingencies. Precisely for this reason, though, it is one all planners should read, if for no other reason than to "raise consciousness" regarding those habits of intellect and bureaucracies which cause military organizations to tend to plan, as well as fight, the last war.

JOHN LEWIS GADDIS
Naval War College

Smith, Myron J., Jr. *World War I in the Air: A Bibliography and Chronology.* Metuchen, N.J.: The Scarecrow Press, 1977. 271pp.

Smith's little book is a gem and will save librarians, students, and buffs from more unnecessary work than any book like it. That much said, reviewers of bibliographies must offer three paragraphs--one each of description, strengths, and weaknesses (the last often reflecting the views of the reviewer rather than the compiler!).

Description: Don't miss the foreword by Stephen W. Thomspon (the first man in U.S. uniform to shoot down an enemy aeroplane) or the preface by Arch Whitehouse (gunner on the aeroplane that was Manfred von Richtofen's 42nd victim, who survived to become one of America's foremost aviation writers). Smith's introduction then sets down the ground rules of selection, the single most important of which is that this is an English language bibliography. (No reference here to Fritz Baur's *Wir flieger!* or René Martel's *L'aviation francaise de bombardement.*) Once that point is clear, the searcher can revel in the 2,035 entries, especially those identifying hard to find scholarly papers, articles, government documents, and both M.A. and Ph.D. theses. Not included are fiction, book reviews, poetry, and general newspaper articles. Then come: a 43-page chronology of the major aviation events in World War I (How many readers of this journal know that the USN Office of Aeronautics was established 17 days before the Aviation Section of the USA Signal Corps?); a list of World War I aces from 11 nations; and a subject index. Hard work, well done.

Strengths: Articles from obscure sources, scholarly monographs not previously listed, and–for all the more important entries–concise descriptions of their contents and author's standpoint. The 2,000 plus entries represent a monument to interest, effort, and scholarship.

Weaknesses (none of which outweighs the pluses): Henry Farré becomes Ferré; G.E. Turnure becomes Turner, and Sholto Douglas becomes Douglas Sholte. A few odd omissions; e.g., Bradshaw's *Flying Memories,* Carisella's *Black Swallow of Death,* and Killen's *History of Marine Aviation, 1911-68.* But these, and at least one garbled title (item #1976), bear far less weight than the strengths mentioned above.

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U.S. Air Force Academy

Stratton, Roy. *The Army-Navy Game.* Falmouth, Mass.: Volta Company, 1977. 258pp.

This is a book about a unique World War II naval officer in whom I have