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The Army-Navy Game

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economics, even psychology, should enter into the planning process, together with some assessment of the intentions as well as the capabilities of potential adversaries; the result was a very different view of the world indeed. It is sobering, nonetheless, to realize that the American military was one of the last elements in the American foreign policy/national security establishment to become aware of the threat Soviet power posed to stability in Europe, and of the stake the United States had in preserving that stability.

This is not, then, a book to bolster one's faith in the ability of planners to anticipate future contingencies. Precisely for this reason, though, it is one all planners should read, if for no other reason than to "raise consciousness" regarding those habits of intellect and bureaucracies which cause military organizations to tend to plan, as well as fight, the last war.

JOHN LEWIS GADDIS
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Smith, Myron J., Jr. *World War I in the Air: A Bibliography and Chronology*. Metuchen, N.J.: The Scarecrow Press, 1977. 271pp.

Smith's little book is a gem and will save librarians, students, and buffs from more unnecessary work than any book like it. That much said, reviewers of bibliographies must offer three paragraphs—one each of description, strengths, and weaknesses (the last often reflecting the views of the reviewer rather than the compiler!).

Description: Don't miss the foreword by Stephen W. Thomson (the first man in U.S. uniform to shoot down an enemy aeroplane) or the preface by Arch Whitehouse (gunner on the aeroplane that was Manfred von Richtofen's 42nd victim, who survived to become one of America's foremost aviation writers). Smith's introduction then sets down the ground rules of selection, the

single most important of which is that this is an English language bibliography. (No reference here to Fritz Baur's *Wir flieger!* or René Martel's *L'aviation française de bombardement*.) Once that point is clear, the searcher can revel in the 2,035 entries, especially those identifying hard to find scholarly papers, articles, government documents, and both M.A. and Ph.D. theses. Not included are fiction, book reviews, poetry, and general newspaper articles. Then come: a 43-page chronology of the major aviation events in World War I (How many readers of this journal know that the USN Office of Aeronautics was established 17 days before the Aviation Section of the USA Signal Corps?); a list of World War I aces from 11 nations; and a subject index. Hard work, well done.

Strengths: Articles from obscure sources, scholarly monographs not previously listed, and—for all the more important entries—concise descriptions of their contents and author's standpoint. The 2,000 plus entries represent a monument to interest, effort, and scholarship.

Weaknesses (none of which outweighs the pluses): Henry Farré becomes Ferré; G.E. Turnure becomes Turner, and Sholto Douglas becomes Douglas Sholte. A few odd omissions; e.g., Bradshaw's *Flying Memories*, Carisella's *Black Swallow of Death*, and Killen's *History of Marine Aviation, 1911-68*. But these, and at least one garbled title (item #1976), bear far less weight than the strengths mentioned above.

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Stratton, Roy. *The Army-Navy Game*. Falmouth, Mass.: Volta Company, 1977. 258pp.

This is a book about a unique World War II naval officer in whom I have

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more than passing interest. His name is Milton E. Miles and he is dead.

It so happens that I hold the Naval War College Chair in International Relations named in memory of this extraordinary diplomat-sailor-intelligence officer-guerrilla fighter, and thus it is not difficult to understand my professional interest.

"Mary" Miles, as he was so picturesquely called, was a dedicated, talented and controversial man whose trilogy of motivations was his family, the Navy, and China where he had served before the war.

As a naval officer he possessed a high sense of duty, and singleminded commitment. As a man he had rare cultural sensitivity; an ability to perceive and project; as a commander he was a charismatic leader.

When in 1942 FADM Ernest King sent Miles as a commander back to China he gave him simple but vital instructions: prepare the coast for our ships in 3 years and do as much damage to the Japanese as possible.

The Army-Navy Game begins at that point. It is the story of one man's unremitting efforts to comply with his orders despite the odds.

The odds were formidable. They ranged from OSS General Donovan who considered Miles an interloper in his clandestine field and General Marshall who could not gracefully accept an independent Navy command on the mainland to Gen. Albert Wedemeyer who believed devoutly in staffing, channels, and organization even if the war had to stop in the meantime. He proved a difficult, narrow, military bureaucrat.

"Mary" Miles ultimately had only one powerful Washington friend, but it proved sufficient. His name was Ernie King.

The stage was set for jealousy, for intrigue, for misunderstanding and for rivalries. And yes, to be sure, there was the war and the heroism of Miles' famous but little-known command,

Naval Group China, operating under a controversial but effective Sino-American Cooperative Organization (SACO) agreement.

The agreement put Miles under Chiang Kai-shek's command, subject to General Tai Li, Chiang's feared intelligence chief and indeed to act as Tai Li's chief of staff with the assimilated rank of Major General in the Chinese Army. An unheard of arrangement! Their joint mission: establish coast watcher and intelligence nets, set up weather stations for the benefit of U.S. Pacific air and naval forces, create guerrilla, terrorist and sabotage columns, mine Chinese rivers, harbors and ports. To do this Captain, Commodore, then Rear Admiral Miles over a 2½-year period was given 3,000 sailors, marines and coastguardsmen and 10,000 tons of supplies, fairly cost-effective by present DOD standards.

With these advisors (including one survivor presently on the War College faculty) and with full Chinese cooperation Miles established an operation that ran from Gobi Desert weathermen, to naval cavalry, to Yangtze riverine guerrillas and sappers. By war's end the guerrilla columns held considerable stretches of coast and three ports for the advancing U.S. Navy, were harassing the retreating Japanese, and were deeply involved in rescuing downed U.S. airmen and initiating fleet weather reporting.

To put it bluntly, the U.S. Army liked this not one whit. Land, as is well-known, belongs to the Army. What was this odd lot of sailors doing running about China without proper clearances, uniforms or staff manuals? To add to the bureaucratic maze, "Wild" Bill Donovan was wildly unhappy about Miles' single-minded devotion to the SACO agreement which largely left OSS out in the Burmese cold. Chiang quite simply did not trust OSS, thus he cooperated little with Donovan, causing Donovan to blame Miles and precipitate

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the establishment of a rival but unwanted U.S. intelligence network of old China hands considered by Chiang to be "colonialists." Donovan ultimately fired Miles as OSS Chief China, a collateral duty Miles had not wanted because it interfered with his priority relations with the Chinese. Thus was the war fought: a military divided against itself and a military fighting a common enemy. Classic in its way. Tragic in its implications. For it raises once again the question of whether we really learn the lessons of war.

Naval Group China was, to say the least, unique. It was offbeat, flexible, attuned to the Chinese, and committed to its tasks of providing intelligence to the fleet, and guerrilla support for future landings. It was organized to this end, period. This command, living behind enemy lines yet crisscrossing them daily, existed on intelligence, wit, and Sino-American cooperation. Their unorthodoxy kept them—and Miles—alive. Four attempts on Miles' life were made, including one a month after V-J day. Incidentally, one of history's fetching footnotes has Miles shortly after the surrender meeting a young naval lieutenant in Shanghai, the first fleet sailor to approach from seaward. The lieutenant's name: Elmo Zumwalt, C.O. of a prize vessel. Miles was a man with a price on his head, perhaps symbolic of his usefulness and effectiveness. No command of this nature from Jeb Stuart to John Vann in Vietnam could have survived if they lived by army theater field manuals. This, in essence, explains the basic dislike of conventional military managers toward unorthodox special operations, for such operators not only elude control but like Miles himself, they tend to fly "a what the hell" pennant which infuriates the rigorous, inflexible military bureaucrat. "Being alone, without the language, and two hundred miles behind enemy lines, does not appeal to a staff planner," remarked one of Miles' former junior officers recently.

The Army-Navy Game makes sad but fascinating reading. Unfortunately, Roy Stratton, Miles' supply officer, is no editor. The book is in desperate need of editing. If only his authoress wife, Monica Dickens, had read the "proofs" before they went back to the local job printer. The style is "early memo." The continuities are difficult to find and the paragraphing difficult to comprehend. The story survives despite the prose.

Nonetheless, Stratton has pursued his topic with spirit. His raw research is impressive, and though he is not scholarly trained, the book provides vignettes and insights missing from such better known works as Miles' own memoirs *A Different Kind of War*, Alfred Wedemeyer's *Wedemeyer Reports* and Barbara Tuchman's more recent *Stilwell and the American Experience in China*. It is, as a matter of scholarly interest, very curious that Wedemeyer, who organizationally and childishly plagued Miles, mentions the admiral only once and then to complain to the JCS about Miles not being under his command (which eventually came to be). Tuchman passes Miles off simply as a Navy weatherman, a sad postscript to the residual bitterness.

In looking through Miles' uncut manuscript and papers held at the War College it is evident why he was so cordially hated and feared. He ran a clandestine operation, outside army channels, tied too closely to the Nationalists, responsive only to a five-star admiral and effective in ways no formal bureaucracy (in his case the army) can ever be.

The result, as Bob Komer points out in his organizational critique of Vietnam (*Bureaucracy Does Its Thing*), is a determined hierarchial effort to reduce the irritant, as was tried in Vietnam with Ed Lansdale, the Special Forces, and off and on, with JUSPAO. So too with "Mary" Miles. He was a loner, a "rice paddy" sailor in an army theater. How to get him? That's easy, as any self-

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respecting bureaucrat will know. Misrepresent, hold meetings without him, allege mismanagement and inefficiency, and charge the entire business off to a waste of time.

The plain truth is that one cannot quantify guerrilla operations. One cannot, as was shown with body count, guarantee accuracy. One cannot swear as to the lives saved, terror instilled and morale disintegrated. "War in the Shadows," as Ardrey has pointed out, is exactly that. While every infantryman knows that ultimate truth, no theater commander can afford to accept it organizationally.

"Mary" Miles survived and went on to three stars. But to the bitter end, even to the indignity of invaliding this heroic fighter home on an Army Air Corps version of the Toonerville Trolley, the vendetta continued.

It was initially the same with Lawrence, Wingate, and even Gordon. When do you suppose we'll learn?

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Vali, Ferenc A. *Politics of the Indian Ocean Region: The Balance of Power*. New York: The Free Press, 1976. 243pp.

The rationale for writing this book is plausible. Previous studies on the Indian Ocean as a whole included works sponsored by "legislative bodies," and "scholarly institutions."^{*} Such collective efforts seldom result in coherent, balanced, and unified topics and themes. The author's "synoptic" approach means that the problems of the Indian Ocean "should be viewed both in the context of the global balance of power and in regard to more restricted local power relations" in a single and comprehensive volume.

^{*}The Naval War College Center for Advanced Research underwrote the foreign travel research costs for the book being reviewed.

Against the backdrop of an historical survey of power relationships in the Indian Ocean region as a whole, the study concentrates on the politics of five major subregions, including Australia and Southeast Asia; India and its neighbors; the Persian Gulf; the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea area; and the southwest which embraces South Africa and other states in the southern and eastern parts of Africa as well as the islands along their shores. The roles of the United States, the Soviet Union and China on the one hand, and residual influence of the former colonial powers on the other as well as the effects of the problems related to oil, navigation, and the law of the sea on the political issues of the region as a whole also are examined.

Analytically, the study suffers in several respects. Firstly, although it aspires to be a comparative examination of the attitudes and views of the regional powers, the chapters on regional states are primarily descriptive rather than analytical and comparative. Secondly, the discussion of the oil issues reveals a serious misconception of the regional and global meanings of the control of oil production and prices, and the use of oil embargo as a means of economic coercion. The oil problem is viewed primarily from the narrow perspective of the adverse affects of the oil price explosion. Witness: "The timing and suddenness of these monstrous price hikes was 'more than a crime, it was a mistake,' to use Talleyrand's words." From these and similar harsh judgments the oil-producing states emerge as irrational, greedy and irresponsible countries drunk with new power. The author's concern with historical reality, so prominent in other contexts, deserts him surprisingly in the discussion of oil problems. From its inception the oil industry in the Middle East was in fact made inseparable by historical reality from the politics of great powers and their major oil corpo-