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Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State

Thomas E. Kelly III

Daniel Yergin

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Akabomo, but the worst error is in Appendix 14 where the column titles are reversed and thus the data in the columns do not apply to the titles. Moreover, this makes the footnote which states the *Minegumo* did not launch torpedoes at odds with the confused table. It can be inferred (and correctly) that she launched eight.

The bibliography is useful in giving Dutch sources but could include better secondary works in English. The index is rather too short to be comprehensive.

Despite the criticisms, if they are that, noted above, this is a valuable scholarly book and certainly deserves a place in any professional navyman's library. van Oosten has provided valuable Dutch Navy data for future naval historians.

PAUL S. DULL
University of Oregon

Yergin, Daniel. *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977. 526pp.

Napoleon once said that "History is agreed upon myth." Contrary to the publicity surrounding the publication of Daniel Yergin's *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State*, the cold war still resists the fashioning of any kind of consensus. Yergin, a Research Fellow at Harvard University's Center for International Affairs and a lecturer at the Harvard Business School, has written a facile, entertaining and well-written account of the early years of the cold war. As the "definitive account of the cold war" it raises more questions than it answers.

Yergin's thesis is that two views of the Soviet Union emerged at the end of World War II. One, called the Riga Axioms, was developed by those men who served at the Latvian listening post in the late 1920's and espoused an anti-Soviet view. The other, the Yalta

Axioms, urged conciliation with the Soviets and was represented by Franklin D. Roosevelt at Yalta. In the confrontation between the two sets of principles, the Riga Axioms triumphed. The winner then advocated establishing a strong military posture, second to none, in order to contain the Russian menace.

I have difficulty with Yergin's basic premise. To say the Riga school developed an anti-Soviet stance and converted the key decisionmakers to this viewpoint during 1945 and 1946 is to ignore reality for the sake of a model. The reality is that by the late 1920's, anti-Russian sentiment was already rampant in the United States. Arno Mayer's *Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking, 1918-1919*, Robert K. Murray's *Red Scare* and William Preston's *Aliens and Dissenters* describe the development of this phenomenon. A hatred of Soviet Russia was a legacy of World War I and the Red Scare. I emphasize this because Mr. Yergin intimates that George Kennan, Chip Bohlen, and Loy Henderson all arrived at Riga tabulae rasae and there developed an anti-Soviet position. These men and Harriman, Crew, Acheson, and Truman were products of their times and the climate of the times was decidedly anti-Russian.

The treatment of President Roosevelt and the Yalta Axioms, while perhaps more valid, does not adequately explain why FDR did not support the Riga Axioms. Was he merely trying to keep two disparate nations, whose only bond was a common enemy, together? Or was he, as Yergin would have us believe, deeply committed to a Wilsonian world view? The reader cannot be really sure.

Based on the evidence Yergin presents, it is difficult to accept the second part of his thesis. He believes diplomatic initiatives, which he has illustrated with studies of the personalities of the important policymakers, led to the formation of the national security state. He uses the traditional examples to explain why decisions were made to

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"rebuild the arsenal": the fall of Czechoslovakia, the March 1948 Clay telegram, and the Berlin Blockade. By relying so heavily on an analysis of top policymakers, he misses such military factors as the connection between defense budgets and strategy. A national security state could not have developed under President Truman's \$14.4 billion budget. In 1948 there were few atomic weapons in the stockpile and even fewer planes modified to deliver them.

Yergin's study of the personalities of the top decisionmakers is important, but in limiting his study he has ignored the role that the bureaucracy played in the formation of cold war policy. In this case the keys to the origins of a national security state exist in the study of policy development, as opposed to per-

sonalities, and in a study of U.S. reaction to the first atomic test of 1949.

There are a number of annoying little mistakes which appear: there is no Bohlen interview at the Truman Library, Clay spoke to Secretary Royall in 1948 not 1945 (p. 366), and Leon Keyserling's oral history transcript does not support the position which Yergin tries to make (p. 404).

In spite of my disagreement with Mr. Yergin's interpretation, this is an enjoyable book to read. The vignettes he has pulled together will make it a valuable aid to the teacher of American foreign policy. As the definitive history of the cold war, however, it is sadly lacking.

THOMAS E. KELLY III
U.S. Army Center of Military History

REVIEW ARTICLE

RECENT RESEARCH ON THE MILITARY IN SOCIETY

by

Ronald Cosper

A review of Nancy L. Goldman and David R. Segal, eds., *The Social Psychology of Military Service*; Sage Research Progress Series on War, Revolution, and Peacekeeping; Vol. VI (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1976); Jerome Johnston and Jerald G. Bachman, *Young Men and Military Service*; Vol. V, *Youth in Transition* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Institute of Social Research, 1972); and Jacques Van Doorn, *The Soldier and Social Change; Comparative Studies in the History and Sociology of the Military* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1975).

After a rather belated start, sociologists have turned their attention to the military as a social institution and since

World War II, social scientific studies on the armed forces have been appearing with increasing rapidity. It has been observed that sociologists tend to study institutions that are controversial or whose existence becomes threatened in some way. During World War II, sociological study of the armed forces appeared to result in part from the mobilization of large numbers of civilians into military service and the confrontation of lifestyles and social structures that this entailed. In broader terms, the current academic interest in the armed forces can be analyzed as being related to the "crisis of legitimacy," as Van Doorn calls it, that surrounds the military in the West. By "legitimacy" Van