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

PROFESSIONAL READING

Speaking at the dedication of International Plaza at the Naval War College on 13 July 1976 Adm. Arleigh Burke, USN (Ret.) commented upon reasons for the founding of the Naval Command College in 1956 when he was Chief of Naval Operations. In the intervening 20 years many of the hopes and aspirations of the founders have been realized in the exceptional, personal relationships established among the graduates of this highly successful international course. International Plaza is dedicated to the NCC graduates "who have served the cause of peace with distinction by their contribution to international friendship and cooperation."

REMARKS

by

Admiral Arleigh Burke, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

It is not very often that an old retired sailor has the opportunity to meet old friends, and so it is with special gratitude that I thank Admiral LeBourgeois for his kind invitation to me to attend this assembly of distinguished graduates of the Naval Command College. It is also a great honor for me to be among men who have contributed so much to the security of their own countries.

These are troublesome times in our rapidly changing world. There are many problems confronting all nations. The problems are not only huge, they cover the spectrum of all a nation's activities—both internally and internationally. They are economic, political and military problems and the actions taken in one discipline or in one geographic area affect the solutions of the problems in other disciplines and in other areas. Very few problems these days are self-contained. It is a confused world we live in—made more complex by rapid communications and new technical innovations, so it is sometimes necessary for a nation to take action without long deliberation. It is difficult to determine whether the information so quickly transmitted by many different methods is accurate or complete, let alone whether that information is deceptive or has been deliberately distorted. Truly the responsibilities resting on the shoulders of naval officers is great. Their actions and advice may have great influence on the futures of their countries—and of the world.

But nations have always had problems and, I suppose, each generation believes that its problems are more complex and difficult than those of any preceding generation—and they may be right. But decisions on what to do about these many problems still must be made by men.

Men have vastly different opinions on how to solve these issues. That is natural and good, for societies are

composed of many groups with different backgrounds, with different objectives and with different convictions as to what would be best for their society as a whole. Of course, there are always some men and some groups who work very hard to obtain advantages and benefits for themselves at the expense of the other groups by either demanding more from their society or producing less to support that society. There are always those who want to exercise control and to force their ideas on everybody else.

This is true within a nation as well as among nations. It is also true within a Navy. There are always strongly held but differing opinions as to what kind of Navy a country should have to best protect the interests of that country within the resources it can provide. Men have strong convictions about whether the resources available should go to big ships or little ships, about types of ships, weapons systems, and propulsion, to say nothing of the strategy and tactics that are best for the nation.

These strongly held, different convictions are not frivolous conclusions held by irresponsible men. Most of those men have spent years of devoted hard work in their service, and their views are not to be disregarded lightly. Yet decisions must be made, and the best decision is not necessarily a compromise decision. Usually the differing views are based on different ideas of what is expected to happen in the future and what happens in the future is again dependent on what many other men and other groups try to do, and what means they employ to do it. The future is not wholly imponderable, but neither is it predictable with any certainty.

On what basis should these and other decisions be made? There are two factors that must always be taken into account. The first is the capability of other nations to force their domination or undue influence on another nation. Present capabilities of all nations are generally evident. Possible future capabilities can be estimated by analysis of trends and research effort. It takes a long time, frequently many years, for any nation to develop significant increased capabilities.

The second factor is intent, which is not so easy to determine. Words in statements and proclamations may reveal intent, but they may be used equally well to deceive. Guesses can be made on what another nation's intent may be, but that exercise is prone to error. There is only one good indicator: what has been done in the past. The actions that a man has taken in the past bespeak what type of actions he will probably take in the future. But it is wise to remember: history is full of examples where intent was changed overnight. A man, or a nation, cannot rely on another's intent, unless he has proven trust and confidence in that man or nation.

As a man gains experience in the Navy, or in any other profession, he learns to rely on other men in whom he has trust and confidence. He learns from his association that certain men have integrity, a high sense of values. He knows that certain men are scrupulous, staunch and trustworthy. Therefore, they are reliable.

And when a man reaches the end of his active career in his service he finds—as many men before him have found also—that the greatest assets accrued from his lifetime work are his friends. Men who know all about him and still like him. Men whom he knows, and respects, and admires and, above all, men he can trust.

That is the genesis of the Naval Command College.

In 1955 when the heavy responsibilities of the Chief of Naval Operations became my duties I learned once again what I had already found: one man by himself cannot do much good. Harm he can do with ease—but good, not much. However, many men by working

together can do tremendous things. The hard work of my brother officers—my friends—proved this to be so. The advice and counsel of many foreign friends in other navies had its place in helping us solve some of our problems. The job was made possible by the staunch support of many men.

But I had found many of my foreign friends late in life and I regretted that I did not know them years before. Perhaps if we all had had more friends in other navies, events might have taken another turn. I wondered what could be done about that.

Would it really be beneficial to bring together mature, experienced officers from several navies for a period long enough for them to form real friendships with officers of other navies? Would that long period out of the most important part of their careers be helpful to them? Would such duty be beneficial to the nations who sent their best officers? Those questions began to shape themselves into an idea. If the general idea seemed worthwhile, what sort of an organization should be formed—how many people should be involved in any one year—what could be done to improve the officers' knowledge and skills?

In time such general matters were discussed with my friends in other navies, and the response was mainly favorable—provided the groups were not too big and consisted of well-qualified officers. The thought was that the officers should be assembled someplace where they were not subjected to other duties. An advanced school seemed to be indicated. We thought it was worth a try. If it didn't work out well, it could be disbanded easily enough.

So, it was determined that a special course would be set up in the Naval War College. Nations would select outstanding officers of the rank of Captain or Commander and hopefully, their wives would accompany them to Newport. Each class would number about 20 to 30 officers. The most important instruction would come from the attending officers themselves through their mutual exchange of views and ideas. The main objective was for the attending officers to know—really know—their brother officers of other navies and to develop trust and confidence in each other.

We knew that the impact on world affairs of such a College would not—could not—be significant. We did not expect great results. It would not solve any major problems.

All it could do, even over many years, would be to produce a group of conscientious officers who knew officers in other navies and who also were favorably known by those officers. Maybe such respected friends might be able to help each other when problems arose in the future. Maybe they could keep in touch with one another and exchange views in the future that would be helpful.

It's easy enough to figure out wonderful concepts of what should be done and even how it should be done, but concepts are only dreams. To turn a concept into reality requires work and initiative and understanding and solid convictions. If this concept was going to work, I had to find an exceptional officer to start it.

Captain Dick Colbert proved to be just the man who was needed. He was enthusiastic about the idea. He was a hard-working, conscientious and brilliant man, but those were not the only characteristics we needed. Dick was a quiet man. He had that rare quality of real humility, and so he would dedicate himself wholeheartedly to his task. He was warmhearted and understanding. He liked people. He listened. He was a skillful professional in all naval matters —he was the ideal man for this important responsibility. And so Dick Colbert left his indelible imprint on this Naval Command College. The warm friendly atmosphere established at the beginning persists to this day.

When Dick Colbert slipped his cable, we—each of us—lost a gallant and true friend.

You, the graduates of this College, were the ones who made this course worthwhile. The nations did send their very best officers. Over the years you have established the courses of action and the basic principles that have proved to have value to yourselves, to your successors, and to your countries. You worked, you taught your associates, you exchanged views, and, above all, you became friends with one another.

I am deeply grateful to you and to all graduates for what you did here, and for what you are doing now for the security of your own countries.

May you always enjoy your service in your Navy—and may you always have fair winds and a calm sea.

COMMUNICATIONS, SUBVERSION AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: THE VIEW FROM NATO

by

Robert F. Delaney

Strategic and military planners in this age of technical and social change and adaptation have generally overlooked one of the most effective new weapons systems available to the arsenal of modern man: The psychological factor in military security planning.

A fair amount of lip service has been paid to its existence within the NATO countries, but the reality seems to be that we in the West have consistently failed to understand the meaning, utility and influence of the communications revolution which underlies this new psychological phenomenon.

Let it be suggested at the outset that there are certain change agents which have lately entered the strategic and military planning cycle, and which deserve increased interest. They are:

- The arrival on the world scene of an instant, international communications grid;
- The unprecedented increase in the amount of information (in the Soviet concept "disinformation") available to mankind;
- The rising level of mass involvement in decisionmaking as a result of the growth of popular opinion as a form of political activity;
- The reevaluation of communications as a strategic and tactical tool in cover, deception and psychological operations; and finally,
- A slowly evolving appreciation of the communications revolution as a spur to innovative politico-military thinking.

The World Communications Grid. Basic to any understanding of the psychological factor in defense planning is a full acknowledgment of the import of communications at the level of politics, alliance military planning and, what is being increasingly labeled as public diplomacy, the impact of communications on international affairs.

There are two aspects to this technical development. First is its physical dimension and second is its psychological effect.

Physically, today's world is visited with an unbelievable assortment of communication resources—all susceptible, one way or another, to manipulation or approach.

For example, there are some 600

new book titles published daily; 100,000 magazines are printed regularly within the NATO area; in the United States alone there are 6,500 radio stations and 850 television stations. To strike a contrast more than 1,600 radio transmitters have appeared in Africa within 30 years. Today, there is television in over 112 countries. The number of radio receivers in Africa, Asia and Latin America (the developing, politically susceptible regions of the world) have increased 200 percent in 15 years. There are over one billion radio sets scattered about and by the close of next year there will be some 500 million television sets being dutifully watched. International broadcasting (short and medium waves) hovers about 25,000 hours per week. Information collected, stored and retrievable now roughly equals all the data collected in the previous 2,000 years.

But this is not all, for the world is now joined in a satellite communications network which by the year 2000 will provide domestic and international satellites with 1,000 circuits each, capable of real-time television, radio, telex, telephone and data-link interconnections.

The world, in the words of the distinguished Canadian communicator, Marshall MacLuhan is "tuned in and on." This revolution alone will make of our planet the house next door.

Psychologically, the impact this rampaging technology is having is just as astounding, and, indeed, often more perplexing to the politician, diplomatist and military planner. In the United States, for example, and increasingly in the Americas and Western Europe; yes, even Eastern Europe, the facts are exciting and, to a degree, depressing.

The average American youngster by the age of 7 has a television track record of 4,000 hours. By graduation time at the age of 17, the young adult might qualify for a 16,000-hour certificate. And this is an increasing, not a decreasing, world phenomenon.

The implications are immediately evident: The intrusion into the home of new voices, new persuasions, new values, new challenges. The realist would add, of course, the potential for propaganda and, in the Soviet "agitprop" sense of the term, subversion—a practice not overlooked in current Soviet operational thinking.

The Impact of Information. This physical and psychological structure with which we must now contend almost automatically sets the stage for the next level of development: The worldwide passage of news, information, data and propaganda and its impact on men, varying in political maturity from primitive to sophisticated and from left to right in the ideological spectrum.

Increasingly, the world, despite itself, views the medium as the message. The trick is to get your views, your approach, your story before a waiting public and a cultural, sociopsychological process thus begins ending with value changes, attitude formation, public opinion formation and finally political participation.

Illustrations abound on a scale from the innocent to the politically serious. The Mexico City Summer Olympic games of several years past permitted a proud, but relatively little-known nation to express to the world via satellite television its culture, its pride and its charm in an unforgettable panorama of song and sentiment that climaxed the games. Its counterpoint was the calculated televised terrorism of the Black Septemberists at the Munich Olympic games. The relationship between communications and terrorism urgently needs investigation. The West is technologically vulnerable to terror. Or one might point to the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, an event which found both sides expertly employing

tactical disinformation via radio and television precisely because of its sophisticated instant communications.

Central to any discussion of information flow is the increased role of the media. Print and electronic media, it must be emphasized, are here to stay, despite the occasionally expressed hope that through some exquisitely fashioned dream come true journalists will blow away. It will never happen. The issue is not their departure, but a heightened awareness as to how to cope with them.

Interestingly, if one examines the information techniques of the Communists—say in Hanoi or at the peace table in Paris during early negotiations of 1968-70—it is quite clearly seen how adept the opposition was in portraying through the Western media the strength of their cause, and how, correspondingly, the United States failed to grasp the tactical significance of the impact of the messages relayed to the peoples of the world by the Communists using Western-controlled media. It was, to say the least, a most cost-effective operation, and a classic representation of the modern potential for electronic subversion.

Mass Involvement and Public Opinion. There are two broad questions to be asked of today's open communications environment within democratic societies, such as represent the NATO community. One relates to the recognition of the potential propaganda or subversive element and the other concerns the rising impact of communications-formed public opinion involving political and defense-related decision-making.

The first question deals with the calculated misuse of national (and international) communications systems in the interest of distortion or of misleading images. The longstanding Soviet drive against domestic intellectual dissidence and the external revulsion it has caused, for example, is consciously being offset by heavy electronic dosages of Russian culture ranging from the Bolshoi to the travel and televising of the priceless collections of the Hermitage (non-Russian masterpieces for the most part, incidentally). This is a highly calculated form of peaceful coexistence. The contest is no longer tied to the crude Communist slogans of yesterday. Today, it is rather the creation of perceptions designed to offset tangentially or obliquely the equal and opposite reality of revelations unflattering to the Soviet posture and image. It is interesting to note that the People's Republic of China is similarly engaged in a long-range psychological rehabilitation of its historic cultural image.

This is cultural subversion—modern style, and it has as a prime objective the culturally minded NATO region. It lends weight to détente and fosters a sense of psychological letdown.

The second question treating public opinion deals directly with urgent domestic concerns of interest principally to Europe and North America. If the American psychological experience in Vietnam had any meaning at all, it is this: An entire society was triggered into a national debate by the new communications technology. A public referendum on Vietnam emerged as a result of television coverage of its first war. Emotion, sensationalism, psychological overkill, inadequate perception and incomplete reportage combined to create a society tuned in and often off. Each weekday evening in the United States 110 million people spend 24 minutes learning but briefly about the world. It is by definition of time and space a distortion. But it was and remains America's mass window on the world and lacking desire or means for a quick alternative, nightly news shows form the raw material of opinion, and, as has been seen, the basis for political pressure of all types.

This massive new participation is

capable of turning societies about. It accounts indiscriminately for anti-militarism, popular pressure for reduction in defense budgets, a reordering of priorities, consumerism, popular fads, and the like, including obviously many worthy causes.

Mass communications also account for psychological sins of omission: For example, what efforts are made by NATO or individually concerned groups to cultivate the media; what effective programs to explain NATO and the nature of the East-West situation are being developed; what problems are faced to bridge the generational or psychological gap? One could go on questioning almost endlessly.

It is, of course, much easier to ask the questions than to answer them. NATO today faces formidable problems in the area of public diplomacy, public opinion and communications. Yet, it is equally true that the institutions of NATO are severely circumscribed by the political realities of national interest and psychological constraint. Any effort to develop modern NATO communications policy and programming must be at all odds delicately drawn and culturally sensitive. Nonetheless, the difficulty and intensity of the communications problems do not mean they should be forever set apart for later more propitious discussion, as has been the suggestion to date.

Operational Aspects of Communications. Given the presence of a new technology and given the instantaneous quality of modern communications and its institutional channel—the media, consider briefly what all this means operationally. And in this context operations means the spectrum ranging from public information at one end of the continuum (as in the NATO Information Service) to deception and psychological operations at the military end.

Time was when public information was considered white, overt and almost educational in the goals it sought to attain within the civil community. As a matter of fact, organizationally, this is still the case in the U.S. Department of Defense. Operationally, this was essentially so in the makeup of U.S. forces in Vietnam. The demonstrated reality is something else, and, although the point made here is controversial, it would appear that the separation of public information from other communications activities has become hopelessly blurred. The reason is psychologically, if not politically, simple. World mass communications designed for instant relay rather than timeless introspection create instant opinions, pressures, reactions, emotions and targets. The input is heavily politicized and, with its near real-time quality, operational. Peoples and governments react as with Pavlov's dog.

Witness the impact of the POW issue in Vietnam on the American psyche.

Witness the impact of strategic bombing in Indochina.

Witness the unprecedented impact of Richard Nixon's televised visit to the People's Republic of China, and his later use of television in Egypt and Moscow.

Witness the impact of a televised Soviet-American space shot on the concept of détente.

To gauge the psychological change in communications impact in just one lifetime ask how and when similar incidents have influenced audiences in years past. The answer is none.

Today, electronic media warfare and psychological warfare blend into a form of total psychological operations corresponding to the blurring of the information spectrum. The environment for military appreciation of communications has changed basically. With a world tuned in, a world stage of millions of people exists to receive messages willingly or unwillingly, prepared or not.

Transnational communications

permitted Israel to lull Egypt asleep on the eve of the Six Day War only to find the Arabs reciprocating 6 years later.

Transnational communications allowed North Vietnam to build a strong "underdog" image which the United States never quite shook.

Transnational communications permitted pre-1968 Czechoslovakia to mount intriguing deception operations against the United States in Latin America and against the Federal German Republic within NATO's central front.

The transnational communications of tomorrow will permit world-encircling direct and instant origin to receiver televised programming on an unbelievable scale, linking friend with enemy, democrat with totalitarian, the mass with the elite in a vast arena of influence. In a world of energy crises, economic scarcity and reversed rich-poor resource roles this instant view of each other will become a vital political factor subject to the most intense pressures.

And what will be the impact on military affairs?

Communications and Military Thinking. The advent of a communications revolution has clearly worked an influence on current strategic doctrine and military planning. Note has been taken of the increasing convergence of public opinion, image, communications, the media and subversion, foreign policy, decisionmaking and the military. For the future, in an age of shifting economic influences and new power relations, communications will be more important than ever before.

Communications are causing and will continue to cause a revolution in strategic thinking. The technical influence of communications on military command and control is well recognized; the influence of communications on military thinking is less well appreciated. While it is certainly true that communications have fundamentally changed the methodology of tactical surprise, communications and the media have also reintroduced into warfare and its setting a modified form of Liddell Hart's "indirect approach." The British strategist argued that indirect strategies involving surprise, deception, and stratagems are historically the stuff of which victories are fashioned.

Without venturing into a further explanation of his concept, let it be observed that the communications age of which we are part has brought the military face to face in a new confrontation with an old strategic principle.

Today's planner is no longer singularly or solely striving for the massive Clausewitzian strike of annihilation on the battlefield. Rather he must contend with an array of frustrating and erosive elements, often nonmilitary, as General Giap time and again demonstrated. And, of these elements, the psychological impact of communications is clearly one of the important few—and the most indirect. In this sense Liddell Hart survives, and it is for us to learn the lesson.

Public opinion can arrest as well as encourage war.

Moral disintegration is demonstrably a function of modern communications.

The media, free and unfettered, must be understood as carriers of political weaponry.

A society's will to survive and prosper is no longer a private affair of those in power, but increasingly represents a complex transnational equation pictured in significant part on a television tube.

The psychological factor in national security has unconsciously attained a position in military planning, unknown 25 years ago, and failure to recognize this reality is at the risk of a common weakening of our defensive alliances.

The harsh fact remains that the NATO area as a developed industrial region, which connotes strength in most instances, is by virtue of its very evident

communications technology, vulnerable to psychological assault, to an erosion and intellectual disarming. It is to this deficiency that NATO must direct its attention and resources as well as to its conventional and nuclear defenses.

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

THE BAROMETER

(Col. T.N. Dupuy, USA (Ret.), Executive Director, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Dunn Loring, Va., comments on Herbert Rosinski's "From Scharnhorst to Schlieffen," Summer 1976.)

I have only just had a chance to read the posthumous article, "Scharnhorst to Schlieffen," by the late Herbert Rosinski. While there could be arguments with some of the Rosinski comments about Scharnhorst, Clausewitz, Schlieffen, and their 20th-century successors, one must admire and respect the thought processes which produced these comments. Few people understood German military history as he did.

Which is why I must quarrel with the editorial comment which suggests that Rosinski was saying that "German military thought . . . reached a dead end in the concepts of Count Alfred von Schlieffen." Rosinski says nothing of the sort, nor does he imply it. Merely read what he says about Schlieffen and his concepts in *The German Army* to get a measure of the respect Rosinski had for Schlieffen—which emerges in this article also. What Rosinski is criticizing in this article (and here I do not agree with him) was the sterility, rigidity, and tangential nature (with respect to the Scharnhorst-Clausewitz school of thought) of the ideas of Schlieffen's contemporaries and successors.

(Lt. Col. William Menton, USAR, comments on Vice Adm. Thomas R. Weschler, USN (Ret.), "Priorities and Emphases for Logistics, 1976-78," Summer 1976)

Vice Adm. Thomas R. Weschler's "Priorities and Emphases for Logistics, 1976-78" gave us an unusually comprehensive reminder of how intimately technology and national military action are integrated in our society.

Admiral Weschler sees our rapidly increasing capability for fast air and sealift, the growing technological sophistication of the world operational environment, and the economic pressures on our industrial base as imperatives for change in the national logistics process.

As we change our technology (I suggest that *all* Americans are not passive observers to national economic/technological developments), we change our operational world. And implicit in these changes are adjustments in the targeting of what Admiral Weschler calls the "thrust and zeal" of affected commanders.

Separate service, and professional specialty, parochialism has vastly reduced survival value now, because even the strongest "families" cannot produce "combat effectiveness under variable combat conditions" unless their logistics is integrated by means of a superior logistical intelligence and practice, which is viable within the real environment of national economics and international technology.

Perhaps great bureaucracies, even those we take old-fashioned pride in being members of, require tough-minded physicians and surgeons of the military mind, to confront that organ with its "perniciousness," its compulsion for "efficiency" and "inflated combat standards" at the same time, its pride in hindsight analysis, and its failure to take each fateful lesson to heart. If American defense leadership remains unconscious of the logistical limitations of its strategy, no one can say that Admiral Weschler didn't give those who needed it the word.

■

(Mr. John F. McGuire, Cheverly, Maryland, comments on LCDR William R. Hynes, USN, "The Role of the Kiev *in Soviet Naval Operations," Fall 1976.)*

In reading the Fall issue of the *Review*, I was impressed by LCDR Hynes' study. The article is of timely interest. In discussing the proposed role of the *Kiev*, it might be interesting to note current American thinking on the role of this class of warship. According to published accounts in *Aviation Week* the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Rumsfeld, has stated in a letter to the Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman, Mr. Stennis, that "advances in Soviet weapons accuracy make large-deck aircraft carriers more vulnerable than small vessels carrying vertical/short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) aircraft." Rumsfeld supposedly quoted a National Security Council study preliminary conclusion that the vulnerability of large-deck carriers will force the Pentagon to examine ways to get airpower at sea in varied platforms such as the proposed vertical support ship or strike cruiser. Obviously, this view will trigger long and detailed arguments. Hynes' conclusion that "her size would tend to argue against her effectiveness in a multi-mission combat role," may require reappraisal. The role of the *Kiev* and ships akin to her may be more extensive than that envisioned by LCDR Hynes.

The article closed with an appropriate reference to the fact that the final evidence will be missing until the *Kiev* makes her debut in the Mediterranean. That event occurred this summer when she sailed into the Mediterranean and continued on into the Atlantic, and finally to Murmansk. She was tailed by HMS *Torquay*, a Royal Navy frigate, during the trip. In evaluating the *Kiev*, one important point was a definite difference in her superstructure design. The expected truncated *Moskva* design had been replaced by a graceful superstructure, not too much unlike that expected on a cruiser. Armament consists of two twin-mount 76mm guns—one mounted fore and the other aft of the mast. SA-N-3 missile launchers were noted also mounted fore and aft. There was no indication of the SA-N-4 mentioned in the article. In addition to the expected Topsail and Headlight radars, the superstructure displayed two fire control radar antennas and, at the mast head, a spherical dome for flight control radar antenna. Additionally, she carries three special antennas (small and spherical, mounted one above the other), on the starboard side of the island, designed for ELINT collection. The (Freehand) YAK-36 V/STOL fighter was observed landing and taking off. Advanced versions of the Hormone helicopter, the Kamov KA-25K, were observed on the flight deck. The exact number of YAK-36's and KA-25K's on board is unknown.

One final comment on a point in the article. Capt. John E. Moore, R.N., in his book *The Soviet Navy Today*, provides an insight into the reason for the use of the classification "ASW Cruiser" for both *Kuril* and *Moskva* classes. He feels this is an attempt to circumvent the restrictions on Aircraft Carriers in the Montreux Convention, which regulates the use of the Turkish Straits.



PROFESSIONAL READING

BOOK REVIEWS

Aliano, Richard A. *American Defense Policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy: The Politics of Changing Military Requirements, 1957-1961.* Athens: Ohio University Press, 1975. 309pp.

The 1957-1961 period marked a "dramatic shift in American defense establishment policy which occurred during the transition years from the second Eisenhower [administration] to the Kennedy administration." This is the central theme of this book by Dr. Richard A. Aliano, an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the same institution—the City University of New York—where he earlier received his own undergraduate education and graduate training.

The substance of the "dramatic shift," writes Aliano, was a rejection of the Eisenhower emphasis on "sufficient" nuclear retaliation capabilities in favor of the Kennedy orientation toward "flexible response" with a greatly enhanced range of conventional forces backed up by "strategic superiority." The catalyst—but only the catalyst, not the cause—for this shift, he says, was the impact of Sputnik I on the thinking of many influential Americans. Accurately recognizing that foreign and defense policy emerge at the interface between domestic and international political factors, Aliano argues that a variety of internal domestic circumstances were far more significant than the external stimuli from the U.S.S.R. in explaining the shift in U.S. defense policy. Once the shift had taken place, he says, it set the stage for the interventionist behavior of the United States in the 1960's, particularly in Vietnam, in contrast to the far more cautious involvements of the 1950's. Aliano, explicitly trying to avoid a determinist label, says that the buildup of U.S. conventional capabilities did not compel Kennedy to use the newly available forces. But, he adds, the simple fact of the new forces was—at the very least—a basic precondition for the expanding U.S. involvements in the 1960's, and might well have contributed to a cast of mind that was predisposed in that direction in any case.

Stretching for explanations, Aliano comments on differences in the backgrounds and personalities of Eisenhower and his key staff people in contrast to the backgrounds and personalities of Kennedy and his circle of aides. The author puts his main emphasis, however, on "innovators"—that is, new kinds of senior officers emerging in key roles in and out of the Pentagon in the late 1950's. In this he largely follows the earlier reasoning of Janowitz and Huntington in describing the new management-oriented military men and their civilian friends in various influential institutions. He also attaches importance to interservice rivalries as a major contextual element in the unfolding story. Thus, once the pressure began to emerge from these professional military quarters for expanded capabilities particularly in conventional forces, Aliano says that prominent journalists and academic strategists played the role of "popularizers" in publicizing and

supporting the new military thinking. Granting considerable success to these popularizers, Aliano says they were followed by the "capitalizers"–primarily ambitious political leaders in Congress and in presidential circles who rode the wave of the new thinking for their own political purposes. Chief among these capitalizers, according to the author, were the Kennedy people.

In the end, Aliano gives much higher marks to Eisenhower than to Kennedy, suggesting that further research would reinforce Ike's presidential reputation. But he was not reluctant to assign some important shortcomings to Eisenhower –for example, an alleged failure to give an adequate hearing to his senior military officers, which in turn, says Aliano, drove many of these officers (such as Gavin and Taylor) into political activities (mainly with the Kennedy crowd) to seek desired redress.

This short summary of Aliano's main arguments does not do justice to the nuances and subtleties of his provocative exposition. His balanced scholarship carefully takes into account a wide array of congressional documents, executive reports, books, articles, and many respected secondary sources. The resulting book is evenly paced and well-written. Most people with a professional interest in recent U.S. military and political history would benefit from and enjoy reading Aliano, if for no other reason than as a stimulus in their own alternative analyses.

Nevertheless, notwithstanding this book's substantial virtues, it falls into the category of interpretative contemporary history, and as such it is not entirely persuasive at all points. Although Aliano states in his introductory chapter that his book would examine three major "propositions," this reviewer was left with the impression that the author's mind was pretty much made up before he looked at all of the evidence–and part of the problem, therefore, is that he did not actually look at all of the evidence. In too many sentences we are given precise numbers but the indicated footnotes do not provide supporting data or explanations. For example, on page 3 we are told that President Johnson in 1965 could call on "the nearly 100 percent increase in conventional war strength which had taken place" since 1961, but the footnote gives no suggestion as to just how the author calculated this asserted increase. Somewhat similarly, over on page 56, there is an assertion that the Army had the "primary" mission for "limited war" and the Air Force the "primary" mission for "general war," thus meaning that the Navy in its policy goals in the late 1950's was "infringing" on Army and Air Force responsibilities. But the footnote at that point does not support this claim. This reviewer doubts that an official document supporting this claim ever existed.

Finally, another major weakness in the book is that Aliano seems to have confined most of his research to the specific 1957-61 period under examination, with inadequate attention to major events both before and after the period that significantly relate to his overall themes. Geometrists may be able to define straight lines from any two points, but historians need more than two points because history seldom moves in a straight line. For example, if Aliano had consulted House Document No. 285, 89th Congress, 1st Session, entitled *United States Defense Policies in 1964,* he could have learned from Table 13 on page 101 and from other evidence to this publication and in the series of which this congressional document was an annual edition, that as of FY '64 the Kennedy administration was already planning reductions in the Army. In other words, President Kennedy required only about 2 years to discover the major long-run constraints in the American political system that work against the consistent maintenance of substantial conventional war forces.

This reviewer would therefore suggest that the "dramatic shift" which Aliano tried to picture was in actuality only a short-lived experiment, with the trends in the final months of the ill-fated Kennedy administration moving back toward something resembling the U.S. Defense posture in the Eisenhower years. The subsequent "buildup" in conventional forces was President Johnson's reversal of Kennedy's ultimate reversal, accomplished by LBJ mainly by drawing down capabilities in inventory in various places which were then redeployed to Vietnam, supported by massive reliance on conscription for manpower needs.

In conclusion and on balance, the strengths of this book easily outweigh its weaknesses. We greatly need a new generation of research scholars with a dedicated interest in studying the evolution of U.S. military policy, carefully utilizing documentary sources within the traditional perspectives of political science. In this respect Dr. Richard A. Aliano is a most welcome and talented newcomer from whom we can hopefully expect more and better efforts in the future.

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Cecil, Robert. *Hitler's Decision to Invade Russia, 1941*. London: Davis Poynter Ltd., 1975. 192pp.

In his study of Hitler's decision to invade Russia, Robert Cecil provides a neat, concise description of one of World War II's most crucial events. Although his book contains nothing that is startlingly new, Cecil has put together a well-written, well-organized summary of the best and most recent research.

Hitler's motives are clearly documented and the author notes that Hitler always intended to attack and destroy the Soviet Union. The leader of Germany was, of course, flexible as to matters of timing and detail, but he never lost sight of his basic objective. Hitler even rejected opportunities to expand German power in other areas in order to husband resources for his great eastern venture.

Hitler's willingness to open a second front was, according to Mr. Cecil, based upon a number of miscalculations. Nazi racial ideology led Hitler to underestimate the abilities of the Russian soldier and the strength of the Soviet regime. The determination to enslave the Russian people made it impossible for the Germans to appeal to anti-Stalinist elements within the Soviet Union and guaranteed that the war would be fought with the utmost savagery. Poor military intelligence led to poor estimates of the Russian order of battle, and past German victories convinced Hitler that victory was in any case inevitable.

In 1941 Russia posed no direct threat to Germany's vital interests. Stalin did not want to fight and went to great lengths to appease Germany. Many German officers and civilians were reluctant to fight the Soviets, but Hitler ruled Germany and his obsession ruled him. Thus, Hitler not only decided to have a war, but also decided that the war would be one of ideological extermination. Mr. Cecil has presented a fine summary of the origins of the conflict that ultimately brought Soviet power into the heart of Europe.

STEVEN T. ROSS
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Couhat, Jean Labayle, ed. *Combat Fleets of the World 1976/77: Their Ships, Aircraft, and Armament*. Translated by Comdr. James J. McDonald, U.S. Navy (Ret.). Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1976. 575pp.

Since 1905 the standard reference work in the English-speaking world on

ships and aircraft has been the familiar *Jane's Fighting Ships*. The French equivalent, *Les Flottes de Combat*, predates *Jane's*, having been published since 1897, and is now available for the first time in an English translation. Other compilations of world navies which appeared at about the same time are still being published. To a large degree all were undoubtedly influenced by Mahan and the emerging age of empire at the turn of the century when he did his major writing. It is inevitable that *Combat Fleets*, to be published biannually by the U.S. Naval Institute, invites close comparison with *Jane's*. But first a few words about *Combat Fleets*.

In general, *Combat Fleets* is well organized and has a concise, systematic breakdown which is superior to other compilations in this respect. Ships, aircraft and weapon displays are integrated in a single section with major equipment identified in the drawings. (*Jane's* does not do so.) The U.S. Navy merits 92 pages, the Soviet 72, France 53 and Britain 43; all navies are illustrated by lavish and uniformly excellent photos and sketches. While less is offered on details of modernization, naval plans and programs than might be desired, a more balanced presentation is achieved by more information on small navies and a more consistent manner of presentation.

A few other points are worthy of mention.

- The use of the European system of dates, day-month-year vice the American month-day-year, is sometimes confusing: 1/7/77 is not January 7 but 1 July. Metric dimensions common to the rest of the world are used throughout. Conversion tables are provided for easy reference by Americans, West Indians, Malawians and other societies which still cling to the English system.
- The use of "..." to indicate information unknown or not available is quite helpful.
- A few vessels sold or given to other countries do not always show the same characteristics after the transfer as their sister ships with the parent navy. Armaments may change but displacements ordinarily should not, even when an overstatement may have political significance.

For the Western reader the Soviet section is of primary interest and a few additional comments are appropriate. Most of the 116 navy descriptions are preceded by a foreword on general naval policy and a summary of overall capability. The Soviet section includes a number of pithy, epigrammatic statements by naval and defense leaders, and a discussion of each of the four Soviet fleets. While generally accurate, this section contains numerous small errors, important mainly because they should not have occurred.

The discussion of Soviet maritime areas omits Ulad as an ice-free port; at the end of this section (p. 375), the statement is made "the geographic characteristics of the Soviet maritime areas indicate why it is essential that the country have 4 fleets." There may be strategic reasons why the U.S.S.R. has ships in each of the four sea areas; it is not essential, however, that they have a fleet in each area merely because the areas are isolated each from the others. The U.S. Navy is essentially isolated between Atlantic and Pacific yet in most of her history as a world power, the United States did not find it strategically necessary to create a two-ocean navy.

The discussion of the Soviet Fleets (p. 375), contains several errors. The statement is made that the Northern Fleet and Baltic Fleet construction yards are used for maintenance as well as construction of atomic submarines. There is much doubt that building yards in both areas are used for maintenance as well. The statement is further made that control of the Baltic is "assured . . . by extending their naval bases

towards the West," which also is questionable. In the Pacific area, the discussion suggests that Vladivostock and Petropavlosk are congruent, whereas they are 1,400 miles apart. (This may be an error in translation.) A similar careless statement appears (p. 383) in the allegation that until recently the Soviet Union had little interest in antisubmarine warfare. They had little success, it is true, but it may be assuming too much to concede that this indicated a lack of interest.

The sections on the U.S. and Soviet navies are obviously the most important in any compilation today. These again suggest interesting comparisons of *Combat Fleets* with *Jane's*. *Combat Fleets* offers the finest drawings of Soviet ships yet to appear in a compilation, the first description of the Soviet SSN-15 missile, the first mention of the Super Delta class ballistic-missile submarines, new drawings and photos of the modified *Kashin*-class guided-missile cruiser, and the most detailed and accurate drawings to date of the *Kiev*. And *Kiev*, incidentally, is identified correctly as a through deck ASW cruiser, not an aircraft carrier or attack carrier as in many other U.S. publications.

Despite some minor errors, *Combat Fleets* overall is superior on the Soviet fleet. On the U.S. side, new photos of the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier *Nimitz* and the new icebreaker *Polar Star* appear in *Combat Fleets*. Nevertheless, the *Jane's* section on the U.S. fleet, painstakingly done by Norman Polmar, former Naval Institute editor, is probably superior to anything else in print today.

One obvious advantage of *Combat Fleets* over *Jane's* is physical size. The data on ships, aircraft and armaments of the 116 nations is compressed into a single, thick, 8- by 10½-inch volume of 575 pages. Comparable data appears in three volumes, *Jane's Fighting Ships*, *All the World's Aircraft* and *Jane's Weapons Systems*, totaling 2,389 pages. In addition, the specialist may wish to add *Jane's Surface Skimmers*, *Jane's Infantry Weapons* and *Jane's Ocean Technology* of 1,494 additional pages. Adding still more roughage to a very heavy diet is 316 pages of advertising. The sheer bulk of the three primary volumes is a consideration which may require a new bookshelf--perhaps one each year. At $72.50 per volume, the three *Jane's* primary volumes (or the five-volume set at $362.50) makes the cost comparison particularly significant. Additionally, the extensive advertising suggests one additional factor in evaluating the relative merits.

Editors, like other suppliers of services, can hardly free themselves of responsiveness to the interests of their constituencies. While almost impossible to verify empirically, one gets the feeling that *Jane's* tends toward the high side on choices concerning forces and equipment levels. There may be a reluctance to retire older vessels from naval lists; editorializing suggests a tendency to assume an aggressive intent in naval policies of opponents. While much of this may reflect merely a conservative philosophy—and *Jane's* is conservative—there is neither philosophizing nor pontificating nor, in fact, any advertising in *Combat Fleets*.

In sum, *Jane's* may remain the standard reference work on the library shelf, but it is a rare need even for the specialist which is not completely fulfilled by *Combat Fleets*. Offering far more for the money, the consumer advocate would clearly rate it a best buy.

PAUL A. SCHRATZ
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Dinerstein, Herbert S. *The Making of a Missile Crisis, October 1962*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976. 302pp.

The Cuban missile confrontation of 1962 bears the singular distinction of being the most extensively studied

political-military crisis of modern times. Given the vast amount of literature which has already been written on that crucial episode in Soviet-American relations, one would think that there would be remarkably little more to add in the absence of significant new documentary information. Professor Herbert Dinerstein of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, however, has shown that fresh perspectives applied to the existing data can still yield novel insights into the complex Soviet deliberations which led up to the crisis. In this major study which has been close to a decade in the making, Professor Dinerstein consciously detaches himself from the mainstream of conventional wisdom, implicitly rejects many of the prevalent hypotheses adducing the Soviet move to a simple desire on Khrushchev's part to upgrade the Soviet nuclear force posture "on the cheap," and presents an argument depicting the missile gambit as the organic culmination of a systematic Soviet foreign policy design against the United States and Latin America whose origins may be traced as far back as the overthrow of the Arbenz regime in Guatemala in 1954.

In a sense, Professor Dinerstein has written not one book but three. In addition to treating the missile crisis itself, he also dwells on the seemingly independent themes of Cuba's rise to socialism and the evolution of Soviet policy toward Latin America since the mid-1950's. Given his prefatory admission that the volume was originally conceived as an expanded version of an article he had previously written on Soviet policies in Latin America without specific reference to the missile episode, some readers may feel that the study meanders from topic to topic without any consistent unifying theme. Other readers interested in the missile confrontation primarily as a case event in strategic decisionmaking and crisis management may become impatient with the elaborate intellectual side arguments which precede consideration of the crisis itself (the study warms to its theme only after 150 pages of gradual analytical bricklaying) and may protest that the book is inappropriately titled. The book remains, however, a serious work of scholarship whose complex argument depends heavily on the methodical reconstruction of Moscow's precrisis dealings with Castro which Professor Dinerstein provides. Whatever one may conclude about the ultimate persuasiveness of that argument, the careful reader cannot help but be impressed by the thoroughness of the textual analysis upon which it is based. At a minimum, the book constitutes a classic case study in the Kremlinological art of developing broad-gauge hypotheses regarding Soviet policy calculations from deductive interpretation of Communist documentary materials.

Reduced to its essentials, the principal thesis of the book is that the deepening Soviet political involvement with the Cuban socialist movement and the concomitant growth of broader Soviet geopolitical interests in Latin America which began gathering momentum in the late 1950's provided not only a lucrative *opportunity* but also the primary *rationale* for the systematic buildup of Soviet-supplied weaponry in Cuba that eventually resulted in the missile showdown of October 1962. The story begins with the toppling of Arbenz' nascent leftist regime in Guatemala in 1954 by U.S.-supported indigenous proxies, an event which Professor Dinerstein claims had the long-run effect of assuring that the embryonic Cuban socialist movement would follow a virulently anti-American developmental path, thereby offering a ready-made hotbed of revolutionary potential for Soviet political exploitation. It goes on to depict Castro's rise to power, the gradual Soviet-Cuban embrace that followed, the abortive Bay of Pigs affair, and the subsequent

expressions of Soviet verbal commitment to the defense of Cuba as successive stages in a seamless web of events which, through a compound of opportunism and outright misperception, led the Soviets to believe (a) that they had finally achieved a solid toehold in Latin America, (b) that further U.S. meddling was in fact deterred by declaratory Soviet nuclear threats, (c) that placing offensive missiles in Cuba would be a natural way of lending definitive credibility to those threats, and (d) that the Kennedy administration--in view of its previous display of irresolute behavior during the Bay of Pigs operation --would actually let them get away with such a move.

Needless to say, given the persistent shortage of authoritative "inside" data on the private deliberations of Khrushchev and his advisors which preceded the Soviet deployment of missiles to Cuba, there is no way that this account can be regarded as the final word on the crisis, and one can reasonably raise questions about many of its key propositions and judgments. For one thing, despite his meticulous canvass of the pertinent Soviet open-source literature, Professor Dinerstein has obviously been able to explore only the tip of the iceberg. Forced by the constraints of Soviet secrecy to rely solely on those fragments of data (one hesitates to call them evidence) available in the Soviet press rather than on the hard documentary record one would ideally prefer for venturing high-confidence explanations, he has been left to build his case on material which heavily obscures the real intentions and calculations of the Soviet leadership and which may in fact have had only a tenuous relationship to the actual premises which privately informed the Soviet decision.

Moreover, Professor Dinerstein has tended to assume that the numerous public declarations he cites faithfully mirrored the underlying objectives of the Soviet elite; that the authors of those declarations were made privy to the momentous move that was afoot; that both Castro and the Soviet media were not only brought in on the intimate planning details of a highly clandestine operation involving core Soviet national security interests but were also allowed (indeed encouraged) to broadcast hints of the impending event in advance; and that the entire body of Cuban and Soviet declaratory rhetoric was supremely orchestrated from above to provide a foundation of legitimacy for the establishment of a Soviet nuclear presence in the backyard of the United States. These assumptions may not be patently unreasonable, but they are far from self-evident, and there is much in the record of past Soviet political practice to generate valid skepticism about their plausibility.

Finally, in his effort to portray Khrushchev's missile decision as the natural outgrowth of previous Soviet interests in establishing a political-military sphere of influence in Latin America, Professor Dinerstein may have assigned excessive weight to the goal of shoring up Castro's regime against further U.S. intervention in comparison with other, possibly more transcendent, objectives bearing little relationship to the immediate geographic setting of the crisis. It should not be forgotten that at the time Khrushchev was planning his grand design, Soviet strategic programs were moving at best at a desultory pace, Soviet strategic inferiority to the West had become a widely acknowledged fact, and U.S. defense spokesmen were openly discussing plans for a Minuteman and Polaris posture which threatened to leave the Soviets even more outdistanced in the strategic balance than ever before. Under these circumstances, which Professor Dinerstein only cursorily addresses, the Soviets were extraordinarily hard-pressed to project some appearance of initiative toward offsetting the impending expansion of U.S. forces, and their concern in this

regard almost surely overshadowed whatever collateral desire they may have had for staking out a position of tangible influence in hemispheric diplomacy. This is not to say that Professor Dinerstein is wrong in underscoring the Cuban political connection as an important factor in shaping the Soviet missile decision. It is, however, to suggest that his argument—impressive and elegant though it is—has not altogether convincingly repudiated the more traditional explanation of the decision as having been grounded, first and foremost, in the context of bilateral U.S.-Soviet strategic relations.

Obviously, no review of this brevity can do adequate justice to such a major work of scholarship as Professor Dinerstein has produced, and it must remain to the reader to provide the detailed assessment which lack of space has prevented here. It can be asserted, however, that *The Making of a Missile Crisis* will find a lasting place in the literature of the October 1962 crisis and will have to be carefully pondered by future commentators on that crucial event in the nuclear age. It illuminates in unprecedented detail the relationship between Moscow's Cuban policy and the ultimate Soviet missile decision, offers important new insights into the timing of the decision, and provides a fascinating speculative discussion of possible Soviet internal factional infighting over alternative strategies once the venture broke down into a confrontation of countervailing resolve. It also conforms scrupulously to accepted rules of evidence, displays proper modesty where ambiguity dictates circumspection, and shows seemly cautiousness in advancing its admittedly provocative hypotheses. As such, it deserves attention not only as an important reexamination of the missile crisis itself, but also as a model of sophisticated micropolitical analysis.

BENJAMIN S. LAMBETH
The Rand Corporation

Endicott, John E. *Japan's Nuclear Option*. New York: Praeger, 1975. 289pp.

After India had exploded a nuclear device and after a U.S. "leak" had made clear that Israel has nuclear devices, it should have been strange that Japan chose this spring to end its long holdout against ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Not so strange to Colonel Endicott of the Air Force Academy. His book predicts Japanese ratification by 1976 and discounts that Japan will be moved towards nuclear weapons because other middle powers are going nuclear.

Yet, Colonel Endicott can foresee circumstances in which Japan would go nuclear. The mid-1980's is postulated for time. There would be a breakdown or exhaustion of bilateral or multilateral mechanisms serious enough for the Japanese to believe that their national existence is at stake. Based on this the book sets forth several scenarios for development of weapons, delivery systems, targeting plans, etc. Colonel Endicott envisions the Japanese strategy to be a second strike capable of destroying enough Chinese or Soviet cities to make even the complete destruction of Japan (a fairly easy nuclear task) not worthwhile. Japan could assure this with 160 one-megaton warheads. Time to develop a nuclear device is given at somewhat over 9 months from decision date, but because of Japan's lack of enriched uranium resources (except under foreign controls) the time-consuming centrifuge system would have to be used. Colonel Endicott does not see the NPT as an obstacle because of the treaty's reliance upon Security Council sanctions which require unanimity. All of this is illustrated with an abundance of technical data that reflects impressive research.

If we accept this statement of Japan's technical capability, questions that arise are the prospects for a break-

down of the U.S. security guarantee to Japan and the role of Japanese public opinion on the nuclear question.

Strains in the U.S. alliance have been obvious since 1969. Most are economic, some psychological, none, thus far, strategic. Chinese development of an ICBM force capable of threatening U.S. cities would introduce the most obvious strategic strain—an Asian version of the Gaullist argument that the United States would not risk Washington for the sake of Paris. Colonel Endicott believes that one factor in Chinese delay in construction of an ICBM system is fear that it would trigger a Japanese decision to go nuclear. The existence of a Soviet ICBM capability against the United States (while not politically comparable to a Chinese one, perhaps) has not affected Japanese thinking about the alliance, although Japan's relations with the U.S.S.R. are not good and are not promising of early improvement. While Japan is acutely aware of the strains in the alliance (few of her making) she is trying to reduce these and has shown no inclination to seek alternatives. By 1985 China might be an alternative, particularly in an Asian regional system, but neither Japanese political nor economic systems, as now constituted, could be easily fitted to such an arrangement. More likely is continued Japanese caution, relying on the U.S. alliance while awaiting a political breakthrough (Sino-Soviet war, reconciliation of internal breakdowns) or a technological breakthrough (the laser ABM defense system, for example) which would obviate a nuclear decision.

The Japanese system of consensus building is so painstakingly slow that one wonders if Colonel Endicott does not underestimate the inertia of public opinion. For a successful 1985 decision to go nuclear, the government would have had to start to prepare public opinion yesterday. The author thinks he sees a gradual shift toward a less uncompromisingly negative attitude toward nuclear weapons brought about by fears of the Chinese. Yet, even at the peak of the Cultural Revolution when events in China dominated the front pages of Japanese newspapers one in three Japanese did not know China had a Communist government, but 80 percent knew China had exploded nuclear weapons. Like the hedgehog, the Japanese in nuclear matters may know only one thing, but they know it well.

That Japan has a nuclear option Colonel Endicott has clearly demonstrated and his own scenarios are technically and logically consistent with his assumptions. It does not denigrate this achievement to say that reality is probably something else.

J.K. HOLLOWAY, JR.
Naval War College

Goldman, Marshall I. *Détente and Dollars: Doing Business with the Soviets.* New York: Basic Books, 1975. 337pp.

Some of the major stories in the business press in recent years have been about spectacular trade agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union. From generally less than $100 million a year prior to 1971, U.S. exports to the Soviet Union jumped to over $1 billion in 1973. The easing of political tensions, détente, has been intimately connected with the burgeoning commercial relationships. Marshall Goldman in *Détente and Dollars* provides a lucid account of these developments. His analysis should be studied by national security policymakers as well as by corporate executives.

Goldman is an expert on the Soviet economy, serving as an Associate of Harvard University's Russian Research Center as well as Professor of Economics at Wellesley College. He has published several books and numerous articles on the Russian economy. In this

book he has drawn on the scholarly literature, his personal knowledge, and interviews with U.S. businessmen to produce a very readable volume.

An understanding of past U.S.-Soviet economic dealings provides a perspective on present trade. Generally the Soviet Union turns to non-Communist societies when it has economic problems which it cannot solve within its own system. Once the immediate problem has passed, the Soviet Union's purchases abroad can be cut back very suddenly. If the political climate chills, as it has between China and Russia, trade can virtually disappear.

What will the Russians buy? What do they have to sell? The answer to the first question is U.S. agricultural products and technology. The response to the second question is raw materials, including oil and natural gas.

Détente and Dollars contains some fascinating and instructive cases on doing business with the Soviets. Because they operate a state-controlled economy with very large purchases going through a single buyer, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the Soviets may be able to get U.S. goods at less than competitive prices by playing one U.S. firm off against another. Goldman provides some suggestions as to how the U.S. should structure its dealings with Soviet buyers to reduce this risk.

Trade with the Soviet Union offers opportunities to the U.S. economy and may also contribute to better political relationships. But it also faces the United States with some political risks and economic costs as U.S. food buyers discovered too well following the 1972 grain deal. In addition to suggesting how the United States might minimize some of these costs and risks, Goldman makes a good case for using expanded trade to obtain some political concessions on the part of the Soviet Union. Economic deals with the Soviets involve more than simple commercial transactions.

JOHN A. WALGREEN
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Greenwood, Ted. *Making the MIRV: A Study of Defense Decision-Making.* Cambridge: Ballinger, 1975. 237pp.

The increasingly complex, often frustrating, relationship between bureaucracy and national security is no better illustrated than in this thorough, readable, reworded Ph.D. thesis of MIT Professor Ted Greenwood. It is a natural text for any management analyst, for any defense-oriented scholar and, for that matter, it could well be reference reading for students of decisionmaking at the Naval War College.

Greenwood in his six chapters analyzes carefully and perceptively the development in the 1960's to MIRV our major nuclear weapons system; i.e., to provide added punch to our atomic arsenal in the form of multiple targeted reentry vehicles. The result is a clear explicit case study of how vested interests, bureaucratic fears and advancing technology join in conflict, argue, resolve and eventually produce decisions and eventually doctrine and hardware in inventory. The heart of the book is Chapter 3: "Bureaucracy, Strategy and Politics." This is required reading because it comes to the heart of bureaucratic decisionmaking. How is it done? How do innovation and change triumph over the status quo? The decision to MIRV, and the change agent it represented, was not that traumatic a defense issue and thus in its way it more clearly illustrates the case.

For example, the Air Force initially had doubts about MIRVING since bomb size would be smaller and lighter. And why should this matter in an age of

technical efficiency and miniaturization? Because, and nonquant managers please copy, Air Force leadership of that era had grown up on strategic bombing using larger and heavier bomb models. Here indeed is the heart of the resistance to change. Again, the push to MIRV in the Navy was so highly integrated and effectively managed as a special projects office within OPNAV, that it raised bureaucratic jealousies among the older line bureaus and offices. Of such mundane things are decisions made and progress triggered. Of such mundane things also is proper progress hindered. Greenwood's analysis is precise, very extensively and competently documented, largely nontechnical and, for this reader at least, a primer into the intriguing and vital world of defense decisions and how in fact they are negotiated.

ROBERT F. DELANEY
Naval War College

Heikal, Mohamed. *The Road to Ramadan*. New York: Quadrangle, 1975. 285pp.

Any official or semiofficial Arab version of the most recent Arab-Israeli war is interesting, not so much for its description of military tactics and strategy, as for what it reveals about Arab attitudes towards both Israel and the superpowers.

Mohamed Heikal, former Egyptian Minister of Information and confidant of Presidents Nasser and Sadat, describes the origins, conduct and results of the 1973 war. Failure to undo the defeat of 1967 by diplomatic means, growing pressure on the Egyptian economy due to the spiraling costs of military preparedness, popular pressure for action and fear that the great powers would settle the Middle East problem by themselves convinced Sadat to act.

Heikal's description of the war itself is not very interesting. Accurate in broad outline, it is replete with errors of fact and detail. Many of his military conclusions, such as the claim that the war marked the end of tank-air dominance, need more study and refinement before they can be accepted even tentatively.

His discussion of the political results is, however, fascinating. He claims that the Arabs misused the oil weapon and argues that the United States profited most from the embargo and price increase. This is certainly not the conventional wisdom in America, and Heikal's argument is certainly worthy of close attention.

Finally, Heikal offers some disturbing thoughts for the future. If internal pressures played a significant role in convincing Sadat to resort to war in 1973, they may well play a similar role in the not too distant future. In fact, in his Foreword, Heikal explicitly states that, "Another war is inevitable." Anybody concerned about the prospects for a long-term peace in the Middle East would do well to read Heikal's book with great care.

STEVEN T. ROSS
Naval War College

Herwig, Holger H. *Politics of Frustration: The United States in German Naval Planning 1889-1941*. New York and Toronto: Little, Brown and Co., 1976. 323pp.

A scholarly study which addresses the question of naval attack on the United States by a continental power is of considerable importance to the American profession of arms.

Professor Herwig's book revolves around the examination of a central question: Was there continuity in German naval policy and planning against the United States from Bismarck to Hitler? In answer, Professor Herwig advances the theory that the German Navy and to a lesser extent, the German Army, were consistently interested in the United States as a possible enemy

and that the degree of interest varied as a function of German national objectives, domestic policy and the evolving political constellations in Berlin.

The work is divided into three specific periods: The era of colonial rivalry, the First World War, and the National Socialist period. The eastern, land-oriented or "continental" mentality of the Army officers and Foreign Office militated toward concentration on the *Drang Nach Osten* in both World War I and World War II, whereas the Navy's objectives and methods were oriented toward Germany's evolution as a world power. Professor Herwig points out

> During the First World War this continental mentality and the interservice conflict it engendered came to light most vividly during the Holtzendorff-Ludendorff* feud over the future of the Black Sea region, when the navy bluntly declared that the fulcrum of the war was the Atlantic maritime arteries rather than the plains of Russia. And in 1940 the interservice differences were made manifest on the one hand by the Army's (and Hitler's) plans to invade Russia (Operation Barbarossa) and on the other by the navy's Mediterranean program which sought to establish Egypt, North Africa, Gibraltar, and the Atlantic islands as the pivot of German strategy.

The author's treatment of the development of German grand strategic aims in Africa is of particular value to the Naval War College audience, because of its extent which covers the period from 1880 through World War II. These aims would appear something of a blueprint for any continental power seeking world power status. Professor Herwig's incisive analysis successfully demonstrates the German Navy's continuing desire for sub-Saharan bases in Africa. He shows "it was to be Germany's dream for the next half century to create a so-called Central African colonial empire by connecting the triangle of German East Africa, German South-West Africa, and the Cameroons-Togoland with the territories of 'dying' empires: Portuguese Angola to the west, Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique) to the east, and the Belgian Congo in Central Africa." Herwig shows that this German and later Nazi imperial dream failed to come to fruition primarily because higher priorities were assigned other projects.

The workings of the irrational jealousies, rivalries and disappointments among naval and national leaders are detailed in a good, readable framework for the first time, and Professor Herwig constructs his historical arguments skillfully. Although much of the evidence in the World War I period has already been published in his first book, *The German Naval Officer Corps 1890-1918: A Social and Political History*, (Oxford, 1973), this new book does not suffer from the repetition. His research is sound and Professor Herwig casts new light on the role of Mahan's theories on German imperial thinking, the German side of the Manila incident between Admirals Dewey and Diederich, and the navy's political maneuvering vis-à-vis German invasion plans. Most importantly, he shows that the concept of a German invasion of the United States was not simply an incident of contingency planning: it represented a recurring theme within the German Naval High Command.

Occasionally, however, Professor Herwig's handling of political and grand strategic themes leads to his misinterpretation of the strictly naval aspects of the discussion. For example, he asserts that three battle squadrons of the High Sea

*Holtzendorff was Chief of the Admiralty Staff and Ludendorff Chief of the General Staff.

Fleet were decommissioned in 1917 as a result of a modification of the fleet's mission from being the primary German instrument of naval power to "guarding vital iron ore supplies from Sweden." Further, he uses this decommissioning as evidence to advance the idea that senior German flag officers feared for the future of balanced fleets. Then Professor Herwig connects the decommissioning of the battle squadrons to the complaint of some shore-bound German admirals that the war had become one of lieutenants and that those admirals believed all U-boats should be disposed of after the war to allow for a continued balanced fleet.

To interpret the decommissioning or the statements of the shore-bound admirals as evidence to support the contention that "clashes with American surface vessels on the Atlantic were highly unlikely" betrays a lack of understanding of the capabilities of the High Sea Fleet itself. In fact, closer scrutiny of the decommissioning orders reveals that the ships involved were not first-class battleships or even capital ships, as Herwig implies, but obsolete predreadnoughts without sufficient range to operate in the Atlantic. Also, the officers manning them were required elsewhere—most went to the High Sea Fleet. At least 25 dreadnoughts remained in service and the fleet was capable of commerce warfare, but the Kaiser forbade it. Further, the real commanders in the German fleet such as Franz Hipper saw naval warfare (as early as 1915) evolving in three dimensions—surface, subsurface and air. The admirals in command had certainly no need to worry about billets. Subconsciously, Herwig seems to advocate the position of the *Jeune Ecole*.

Misinterpretation of naval technical aspects has shown itself before. In his first book Herwig asserted the movement of the British Grand Fleet to Scapa Flow was to keep it from the Bolshevist influences present in large cities. In *Politics of Frustration* Herwig also perpetuates the canard that the High Sea Fleet sat at its anchorages in 1918, when in fact it was active in supporting Baltic operations of the German Army against Russia and participated in several sweeps of the German Bight in support of the U-boat war. In another section concerning U.S. naval strategy in World War I, he misclassifies predreadnoughts as capital ships in an attempt to show that the main concern of American postwar strategy was German strength rather than British and Japanese.

Despite this occasional faltering, however, the book is a worthwhile effort and it is among the very few scholarly works available in English on the German Navy. Its contributions include evidence which indicates Raeder and Doenitz' memoirs were coordinated by a team of German Admiralty Staff officers headed by Admiral Erich Forste to assure no divergent views on major developments and decisions would appear. Professor Herwig also casts substantive doubt on the research behind Colin Simpson's book *Lusitania* (1973), asserting "Simpson's claim to the war log of the submarine U-20 which torpedoed the *Lusitania*, is also fictitious, as the U-boat's log ends in January 1915—more than three months before the *Lusitania* was hit."

Compared to other specialist works, Herwig's *Politics of Frustration* is much superior to Carl-Axel Gemzell's *Organization Conflict and Innovation: A Study of German Naval Strategic Planning 1888-1940* (Lund, 1973), because it is a better organized study which does not try to apply sociological jargon to complex historical events. It is also worth mentioning that, as a rule, Herwig's work stands above advocacy history which is a serious problem in the literature of this period. Insofar as he allows himself a paragraph of judgment at the end of his work, Professor Herwig credits the present German government

with having learned from experience and with being our most reliable ally in Europe.

Although the book suffers from notes being placed at the end of the text, the quality of the select bibliography is high. In sum, Professor Herwig's new book sheds considerable light on important naval/political issues between the United States and Germany. It also illuminates the perceptions and thinking process of a continental power over three generations of conflict. A reading of *Politics of Frustration* can lead to greater understanding of the naval/political position of the United States today as this country continues to face hostile competition from a continental power.

TOBIAS R. PHILBIN III
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Kennedy, Paul M., *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*. New York: Scribner, 1976. 405pp.

Marder, Arthur J., *From the Dardanelles to Oran Studies of the Royal Navy in War and Peace 1915-1940*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1974. 301pp.

It has been at least a generation since the publication of a first-rate systematic study of seapower, as distinguished from naval or maritime history. Paul Kennedy has now provided us with one. It is a lucid, readable, fascinating and worthy sequel to Mahan's classic works. It takes up where Mahan left off. Writing nearly a century after Mahan, Kennedy uses the perspective gained in the latter part of the 20th century to place Mahan's insights and conclusions into an appropriate context. While Mahan primarily wrote about maritime and naval history and its effect ashore, Kennedy's scope is more broad. It encompasses naval and maritime matters to be sure, but it is also concerned with the vast and immensely complex course of British history to show that national power, wealth and influence may be gained by the proper utilization of seapower, which in its turn is a derivative of total national development. Mahan largely ignored this latter point.

If Kennedy has any one theme it is that seapower does not exist in a vacuum. It is not a mysterious, primordial force. Rather it is intimately related to other aspects of national life and development. The British were able to employ seapower successfully because of a particular combination of circumstances. When these circumstances no longer existed, the British experienced a dramatic, if not a precipitous, decline in national power, which explains in part their present serious economic problems.

Writing at the end of the 19th century, Mahan correctly noted that British strategic successes from 1660 to 1815 could be attributed primarily to two factors: a happy blend of "maritime" and "continental" strategies and the fact that Britain industrialized before France and Germany. As the 19th century progressed, other states, including both Japan and the United States, industrialized and the British lost the relative economic advantage they enjoyed initially. The result was the waning of *Pax Britannica*, which, according to Kennedy, started about the time Mahan wrote. While Britain was among the military victors in World Wars I and II, afterwards her position relative to other industrialized states, including her former enemies, declined. Despite the excellent performance of the Royal Navy in World War II and other advantages of seapower, the lesson to be learned from the British experience is that seapower is no substitute for necessary adjustments to changing circumstances.

Kennedy properly identifies three assumptions upon which Mahan based his major conclusions: The superiority of seapower; the importance of

commerce, colonies and shipping; and, the unimportance of industrial production as opposed to trade and shipping. He proceeds to challenge these assumptions and in doing so he places them in proper historical perspective. He shows they applied only to a particular set of circumstances.

Fortunately, Kennedy is a young historian of great promise, from whom much can be reasonably expected in the future. He has already written three other books, in addition to several articles. This book will certainly make his reputation, if it is not already established, as a competent historian as well as a good writer.

If Kennedy is young and still relatively unknown, Arthur Marder is a recognized naval historian *par excellence*. Where Kennedy concerns himself with the broad sweep of history, Marder has devoted his considerable talents to a definitive series of histories of the Royal Navy, commencing with his study of the Victorian navy and his monumental five volume, *From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow*. However, in this more modest endeavor he has collected—to the delight of his readers—four essays published elsewhere, in addition to a thorough and reflective examination of the tragedy at Mers-el-Kebir, which he bases on access to relevant official documents, as well as interviews and correspondence. In so doing, he sheds new light on this unfortunate event.

When France concluded an armistice with Hitler in June 1940, the British were gravely concerned that the French Fleet would fall into German hands. Marder provides a detailed and suspenseful account of the events leading up to the actual British bombardment of the French Fleet at Mers-el-Kebir on 3 July 1940. He shows how tragic this whole series of events was for the officers and men who had recently been allies, for the commanders who were obliged to follow the directives of their respective superiors in London and Vichy, and even for Churchill himself who did not shrink from the painful decision because he saw the survival of Britain was at stake. Marder concludes that the real tragedy was "a case of right against right, for which reason there can never be a conclusive answer . . .."

While Kennedy's scope is broad, Marder's is deeper and more narrow. Where Kennedy reviews the span of centuries, Marder limits himself to a quarter of a century. Yet Kennedy in his discussion of the relationship of seapower to national development and Marder in his five studies of the Royal Navy demonstrate what the keenest observers and writers have known intuitively: Strategy is indeed comprehensive. It cannot be isolated from the real world. To be understood, it must be seen in relation to the whole course of events, whatever they may be.

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Kohler, Phyllis Penn. *Custine's Eternal Russia*. Miami: Center for Advanced International Studies, 1975. 218pp.

It is a sobering, perhaps shocking, experience for the normal American with all of his faith in progress and change and in the improvement of human nature to read Custine's account of his journey through Russia in 1839. What the book documents, page after page, in chilling detail is how little a culture does change in spite of world wars, revolution, and starvation, the destruction of the church and the imposition of a new theory of government and of life.

Reading this remarkable book also illuminates the degree to which we can remain ignorant of the real springs of action of a people. Try as he might and as countless successors after him, Custine could not penetrate the mystery of why the Russians act as they do, what is the key that unlocks this extraordinary culture which is at the same time

capable of great flights of humanitarian love and descents into the most barbaric and insane cruelty; which talks of the highest ideals of human freedom and liberation and enslaves vast masses in the most tyrannical system the world has ever known; which espouses the cause of the most advanced scientific studies and tries to hide the results in the darkest of closets. It is likely that we know more about the smallest Indian tribe in the remotest part of America than we do about the springs of action of the Russian culture.

Custine's journey, in many respects, mirrored what has become the basic pattern for the emotional reactions of countless travelers to Russia right up to the present day. Nearly everyone goes to Moscow assuming that things cannot be as bad as they are described; that once the Russians learn how nice we are, they will stop being suspicious; and that, in any case, life is getting better with greater contact with the West. Even a superficial reading of Custine shows how trite that attitude is. From the very first pages to the last, one can excerpt long passages which modern travelers would think, if they did not know the origin, were written yesterday. For instance, in the Chapter "I Laugh Off the Warning of an Innkeeper," travelers who leave Russia are described as having a "gay, free, happy air," and those returning "have long, gloomy, tormented faces." Anyone who has traveled to Russia several times has noted the same thing. Speaking of a guided tour through Petersburg, we read with astonishment Custine's observation that a tour through the capital is unlike a tour through the capitals of the civilized world, because under the supervision of the guide, "everything is constrained in a state governed with a logic as tightly drawn as that directing Russian policy." As Custine explained it, "Everyone here, you see, thinks about what no one says." One could describe Intourist or its guides no better with "the astonishment, the terror, the defiance, the affected innocence, the feigned ignorance" which accompanies the answers to our questions.

What does one make of the fact that nearly a century and a half ago a traveler through Russia was followed, spied upon, controlled, his mail was censored or confiscated and his guide was part of the official police network? How does one deal with the facts that even then disasters were not reported, that people who were arrested simply disappeared and no one dared tell the truth? It is not enough to say that nothing has changed. The mind cannot accept so simplistic a statement. Certainly much has changed, but apparently not the way people feel or the way institutions function. Obviously, reading such a book is an intellectual challenge, especially for Americans who tend to think that people change when they find out a better way to do things. After reading Custine, one returns to the history books with the question, "What was life like in old Russia?" The answer is discouraging. As Custine observed, the Russian people must have been the most unhappy of any nation and many modern travelers come away with the same conclusion today. But more to the point, one must wonder what a revolution is for? Custine's descriptions make it clear that the old czarist institutions have been reestablished with new names.

Custine, who went to Russia to gather material to support arguments against republican governments, was so shocked that he was turned into a democrat. He also developed a fear for the future of Europe, for he discovered that the Russian Empire was a militarized society, dominated by the irrational emotions of respect for European science and contempt for its bumbling freedoms and materialistic ethos (which implies, among other things, a respect for individual wants.) His fear of the combination of oriental

despotism (it really has turned out not to be oriental at all but Western in origin where extreme idealism—whether religious or political—seems to breed unmitigated cruelty) with Western scientific knowledge has been realized in the Soviet Union.

A popular bit of wisdom, frequently repeated in America, is that one should learn the lessons of history. Reading Custine, one wonders if that is ever taken seriously, for how many thousands of times has his journey been repeated and will be repeated before its significance will replace the popular notions about that strange land? Perhaps it is not true that we learn from history; we can only learn by our mistakes or through experience. Certainly about the present, Custine could say, "I told you so!"

Phyllis Kohler's translation is extremely readable. We must all be grateful to her for making this important work available in English. The new edition (which does not appear to differ from the old one under the title, *Journey for Our Time*) is enriched with an introduction by Foy Kohler, formerly the U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union and now one of our oldest and most venerated Russian hands. His introduction emphasizes the importance of this book for those who are interested in strategic and military questions.

For an exciting intellectual experience, after reading Custine, one should reread Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*, which was written at about the same time by another extraordinary Frenchman who also was trying to find arguments against the democratic form of government. The two works by two such penetrating minds make convincing evidence that there are constants in human behavior that appear and reappear through all manner of circumstances. With Custine, one can contemplate the Russians and then through Tocqueville the Americans. Then one can contemplate the Americans trying to understand the Russians and in the end, you come up with a reaffirmation of the old French saying, "plus ca change, plus ca la meme chose"—the more things change, the more it is the same old thing.

ROBERT B. BATHURST
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U.S. Coast Guard Academy

Korb, Lawrence J. *The Joint Chiefs of Staff—The First Twenty-five Years.* Bloomington: University of Indiana Press. 210pp.

Mr. Korb's book—the first to attempt a history and a critique of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—their accomplishments and their failures—is, to this reviewer, bivalent. It is ambitious, instructive and frustrating, occasionally perceptive and knowledgeable, but also simplistic and superficial, and at times, woefully wrong.

The book's strengths are the author's clear descriptions of the organization and methodology of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their first quarter century and an examination of their professional background. Mr. Korb also contributes a good account, in a chapter entitled "The Battle of the Potomac" of some of the politics of the defense budget and he stresses the synonymous relationship between dollars and military policy. The book's weaknesses stem from the inadequacy of the author's sources, all of them, except for interviews, public, and some of them unreliable as a basis for history; from compression and abbreviation (which lead to sweeping generalizations and inadequate explanation), and to the author's attempts to play global Monday-morning quarterback.

What Mr. Korb has really attempted in the short space of 210 pages (including notes and index) is nothing less gargantuan than a kind of bird's eye survey of the nation's security policies in the last 25 years. The focus is the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but as the author

indicates time and again their influence upon policy cannot be considered in a vacuum. The Defense Department and its ever-growing civilian bureaucracy, the State Department, the President and the Bureau of the Budget, the Congress and the American electorate all have a part in the process. And the continuing changes—many of them profound—in men and organization, methodology and psychology—have had a major influence upon the product, the kind of defense the nation has supported. The author touches base on all these issues, but in a book of his length—compressed and often too tightly focused on the Joint Chiefs—it is impossible to do justice to the multiple factors that influence the defense budget.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff is organized in five chapters. The first deals with the JCS as it exists today, its organizational history and the mechanics of its operation. The second looks at the men behind the corporate image and the stiff formal photographs—as a group, as service representatives, as individuals and as composites. The Marine Corps Commandants are—surprisingly—omitted, presumably (but mistakenly) because the author accepts the letter of the law as his guide, that the Marines are represented only when "matters pertaining" to the Corps are discussed. This omission overlooks the contributions and the important influence of men like David Shoup and Wallace M. Greene, Jr. This chapter focuses on the professional background and career patterns of the JCS—a useful survey—but unfortunately makes no attempt to evaluate the far more important intangible of character or to assess the individual relationships of the chiefs to the President and the Secretary of Defense. The third chapter, dealing with "The Battle of the Potomac," traces, from the Truman administration through the first Nixon administration, the part the Joint Chiefs played in the formulation of the military budget and hence in military policymaking. Mr. Korb's (debatable) conclusion is that the Joint Chiefs, in their corporate role, "had virtually no impact upon determining the actual size of the military budget," but he adds a somewhat contradictory caveat that the *service* chiefs—the individual members of the Joint Chiefs—"have been free to *request* (italics mine) nearly anything they want . . . the preparation and submission of the monetary requests."

In his fourth chapter, Mr. Korb discusses the operational role of the JCS. He points out that the "Joint Chiefs have very little authority in the operational realm" and ". . . are excluded from the chain of command," but goes on to add, quite correctly, that the JCS "does play a role." Actually the issue of whether the JCS do or do not command is somewhat like flogging a dead horse. Orders to the unified commanders, though issued in the name of the Secretary of Defense, pass ordinarily through, or are seen by, the Joint Chiefs (or the Joint Staff). Though the Joint Chiefs are, legally, only advisors to the President (the Commander-in-Chief) and the Secretary of Defense they do pull the strings behind the scenes—sometimes through "eyes only" messages, sometimes by direct "suggestion" or command. In the Dominican crisis, for instance, the then Chairman of the JCS ordered the field commander to *move one tank one block.*

The author's final chapter summarizes—far too succinctly and with too many generalizations—his conclusions about the successes and failures of the JCS in their first quarter century. He correctly absolves the JCS of the "absurd" charges that they have either dominated American foreign policy or that they have been "weak, divided and never consulted"—a valid judgment that, however, qualifies or contradicts some of the author's statements in preceding chapters. He points out, cogently, that the "National Security Act and its amendments did not create a unified

military establishment, and the JCS is not the cause but the reflection of that diversity." (Mr. Korb might have added and emphasized throughout his book that this "diversity" is not necessarily bad; that, indeed, the greatest security danger, politically and strategically, the country could face would be a unified, overriding military "party line.") Though today's Chiefs (at the time of writing they were Brown, Holloway, Weyand and Jones) face "an unfavorable and sometimes hostile environment," he sees them as highly fitted to "provide the leadership necessary" to adjust to post-Vietnam realities.

This book is both disappointing and provocative—good enough to be much, much better, bad enough to elicit (from this reviewer, at least) some expletives of emphatic disagreement and mild irritation. The author is given to pejorative words and phrases—"the battlefield disasters" of Westmoreland; the "madness of MacArthur"; the "strategic absurdities" of the Eisenhower administration. Mr. Korb focuses much of his examination upon the influence of the JCS in the Korean and Vietnam wars, and he is led, to my mind, to distorted or incomplete and sometimes false conclusions by inadequate sources, too much compression and sweeping judgments. All of his notes, except for 14 interviews—9 of them with former Chiefs—refer to published sources. Yet some of the most important documentation has not yet appeared in public print, and sources such as *The Pentagon Papers* and Halberstam's *The Best and the Brightest*—to which Korb repeatedly refers for his documentation on Vietnam—are at best incomplete, at worst entirely unreliable. Such material as the late Admiral Radford's unpublished manuscripts, the oral history tapes of the Naval Institute, and Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp's account of "Rolling Thunder" and other bombing operations have no place in this book.

There is no mention of the famous (at the time) "Fortress America" speech by the late Senator Taft. General Omar Bradley, then Chairman of the JCS, undertook to answer the Senator publicly—instead of leaving this task, more properly, to the Secretary of Defense—and his action helped to lead to the so-called "politicalization" of the JCS, something that was probably inevitable, anyway, in the U.S. system of government. (In the United States, the JCS are called upon to defend the budget; in Britain, that responsibility rests upon the civilian ministers.)

In his treatment of Vietnam, in particular, and of Korea to a somewhat lesser extent, Mr. Korb seems to me to have been far "off-base" and unfair to both the JCS and to General Westmoreland. This reviewer shares the author's admiration for the late General Abrams, Westmoreland's successor in Vietnam and as Chief of Staff. I had known General Abrams ever since World War II, and I saw Westmoreland fairly frequently before, during (1965 and 1976) and after his command in Vietnam. Abrams, were he alive today, would be the first to point out that he built his temporary successes in Vietnam upon Westmoreland's hard-won, grinding achievements in what had become a war of attrition. It was under Westmoreland, not Abrams, that every major Vietcong sanctuary in South Vietnam was cleaned out; it was under Westmoreland that the indigenous Vietcong were virtually eliminated before, during and after the Tet offensive, and that the North Vietnamese regulars were severely mauled at Khesanh, in the Highlands and elsewhere. And the serious incidence of drugs, racial strife, "fragging" and mutiny—which almost tore our army apart and were the direct result of the antiwar attitudes of the home front—grew to gigantic proportions after Westmoreland's time in Vietnam. And, curiously, what might have been Abrams' greatest contribution, if the American people had not lost the will to

win—Vietnamization—is not really mentioned.

Similarly much of Mr. Korb's appraisal of the role and the attitude of the JCS during Vietnam seems to me to be singularly wrong. I saw most of the Chiefs many times privately before, and during Vietnam and I cannot reconcile the author's brief and generalized critique of their role with my own experiences. In early 1965 *before* the United States had committed any combat ground troops to Vietnam I wrote in *The New York Times* that about a million men (including the Navy and Air Force) and years of war would be required for victory. I did not take these figures out of the blue; General Harold K. Johnson and General "Wally" Greene used them repeatedly as estimates in conversations with me, and in at least one instance, in a speech to a private group. These and similar figures were transmitted to both McNamara and to President Johnson. Both were also advised, early on, to mobilize the reserves, to give precedence to "guns," rather than "guns and butter," to blockade and/or mine North Vietnamese ports and to bomb consistently and continuously and heavily all lines of communication into North Vietnam. The policy of gradualism was anathema to the Chiefs. Certainly, as Mr. Korb points out, the JCS, General Westmoreland and the military must share responsibility for the defeat in Vietnam. But not as much of the blame as Mr. Korb seems to award them. Every historical guideline I know of makes it quite clear that—contrary to Mr. Korb—the military *were* "singled out unjustly for the failures of our policy" (in both Korea and Vietnam).

The JCS and the armed services during both Korea and Vietnam were frustrated men; nearly all the men in uniform I knew recognized at the time the military stupidity of our policies. What then, should they have done? Mr. Korb says "in retrospect, it would have been better for the JCS, the military and the nation if the Joint Chiefs had refused to support Johnson's war policies and resigned en masse to show their displeasure."

I, too, have long felt that some of the members of the JCS might have—indeed, should have—resigned in protest. Some months ago one of the wartime members of the JCS challenged what he termed the "debatable benefits of such a course." In correspondence with this reviewer he stated that "in my own case nothing would have pleased Messrs. Johnson and McNamara more than to have had me step out of the ring," and he added that the public results of his resignation would have been a "flash-in-the-pan."

> Instead, I chose to stay in there fighting, where I felt I belonged, continually shoving the facts into Johnson's unwilling face and fighting McNamara at every turn in his many ill-conceived ideas, projects and actions which in a major way brought about our eventual failure in Southeast Asia.

This point of view deserves discussion. But far more debatable is Mr. Korb's offhand reference to "resignation en masse," an option which could well be construed as a concerted action against proper authority—a kind of high-level form of the low-level mutinous conduct so familiar to the Navy in the Zumwalt days. The habit of obedience and the absolute primacy of civilian authority in the American system are—and should be—deeply engrained in military men. This principle may clash in some key matters of policy with the old dictum—"to thine own self be true"—but the conflict should be resolved by personal conviction, not by mutual concert.

In any case these and many other issues touched upon in this book deserve detailed and careful consideration and discussion—not generalized conclusions, summarized in a paragraph.

This is the basic trouble with Mr. Korb's book—a volume which whets the appetite but does not satisfy. *The Joint Chiefs of Staff* represents a valiant but flawed attempt to examine and evaluate a quarter century of troubled "security," but the author has compressed far too much into too little on the basis of inadequate sources.

HANSON W. BALDWIN

Professor Korb replies:

It is quite an honor to have such a distinguished and long-time follower of military affairs as Hanson Baldwin take the time to review my book on the JCS. As is the case with Mr. Baldwin's own writings over the years, his comments on my work are generally perceptive and well phrased. However, in his review, Mr. Baldwin makes a number of statements about my study which are simply inaccurate and misleading primarily because they are based upon a misreading of the book. In this reply, I would like to attempt to set the record straight in eight specific areas.

First, Mr. Baldwin accuses me of not adequately dealing with this nation's security policies over the past 25 years. In the preface (p. xii), I specifically noted this was beyond the scope of my study. An adequate treatment of this subject would require many books.

Second, Mr. Baldwin criticizes me for not assessing the relationships of the Chiefs to the President and the Secretary of Defense in Chapter Two which deals with JCS backgrounds. An overview of these relationships is presented in Chapter One while Chapters Three and Four describe JCS interactions with the President and Secretary of Defense in great detail. Discussing them in a chapter on JCS backgrounds would have been not only redundant but illogical.

Third, Mr. Baldwin states that my conclusion that the JCS as a corporate body had virtually no impact on the size of, or the ceiling on, the defense budget is debatable, but he does not offer any evidence to counter the conclusion which is carefully documented in Chapter Three. He states further that the caveat about the service chiefs being able to request what they want within that ceiling is somewhat contradictory. It is not. Determining the size and distribution of the defense budget are separate evolutions and the role of the chiefs is different in each.

Fourth, Mr. Baldwin implies that I am ignorant of the fact that the JCS pull strings behind the scenes in the operational area. Nothing could be further from the truth. Specific examples of backstage maneuvers between the JCS and field commanders are given on page 154 (Taylor-Harkins) and page 167 (Wheeler-Westmoreland). Moreover, on page 12, there is an entire paragraph devoted to this facet of the policy process.

Fifth, Mr. Baldwin accuses me of being off base and unfair to General Westmoreland and the JCS in my discussions of their conduct during Vietnam. If my judgments about Westmoreland's strategy in Vietnam are harsh, I am in good company. In all my discussions with Westmoreland's contemporaries and superiors, I heard very few words of praise about his methods. Indeed many comments are unprintable. If General Westmoreland were as successful as Mr. Baldwin says he was, two questions arise. Why did President Johnson relieve him and why did he not achieve his goals?

Mr. Baldwin also argues that my appraisal of the role and attitudes of the JCS during the war in Vietnam is "singularly wrong." To substantiate this claim, he states that in early 1965, before the commitment of ground troops to Vietnam [sic], the JCS had advised their superiors that 1 million men and years of war would be required for victory in South Vietnam. The clear implication is that I did not mention

this fact in my book and that I have therefore not given credit to the prescience of the chiefs. Readers should note that on pages 164-65, I state that in June 1965 the JCS advised the President that it would take 750,000 to 1 million men and up to 30 years to insure the victory. How Mr. Baldwin missed this section I do not know.

Moreover, I criticized the JCS for giving implicit support to war policies, with which they disagreed, by staying on the job. Whether resigning en masse would have provoked a public discussion, I do not know. Certainly a group resignation had a greater chance of provoking such a debate than an individual resignation. What I do know, and Mr. Baldwin does not dispute, is that by staying on the Chiefs became associated with the policy and became involved in such unsavory byproducts of the war as protective reaction strikes, provocation strategies, secret bombings, and dual reporting systems.

Sixth, Mr. Baldwin takes me to task for omitting Senator Taft's famous Fortress America speech and General Bradley's subsequent rejoinder. (Actually, the famous speech was General Bradley's talk on 20 March 1952 before the Pasadena Chamber of Commerce in which he castigated the "Gibraltar theory" of defense advocated by "Hoover and Taft" as selfish and defensive.) Mr. Baldwin feels that this episode is important because it helped to lead to the so-called politicization of the JCS. I do not mention this episode specifically, but (on p. 17) I point out that one of the complaints about the JCS is that they have been politicized by the party in power and thus become partisan political spokesmen. Moreover, (on p. 103), I note that in 1952 many Republicans and conservative Democrats, including Taft, complained that the JCS had become too closely identified with the partisan policies of the Truman administration and demanded that President Eisenhower replace them en masse. In my view, these parts of the book cover the issues raised by the Taft-Bradley incident.

Seventh, Mr. Baldwin states that I did not mention Vietnamization. Not so again. This policy is discussed on page 169.

Eighth, Mr. Baldwin makes several references to the length of the book and the sources. He is apparently disturbed because the book is "only" 210 pages (approximately 80,000 words). In my view there is very little correlation between book length and quality. Maxwell Taylor's famous book *The Uncertain Triumph* was only 203 pages and 64,000 words, while David Halberstam's *The Best and the Brightest,* which Mr. Baldwin disparages, runs to 688 pages and 500,000 words! The length of my book would be considered a problem only if it left out significant and relevant areas, which mine does not.

Mr. Baldwin is also concerned about my use of public sources. However, his review does not make a convincing case as to where or how those sources are wrong or misleading. Mr. Baldwin makes his charge but does not give specifics. Moreover, he ignores the fact that my interviews are a check or temporizer on these public sources. To buttress my point about my use of public sources, I would like to quote from a letter I received from a man who served on the JCS during the Vietnam years in regard to my analysis of the relationship between the JCS and the Secretary of Defense:

> . . . I was greatly struck by the depth to which you had been able to penetrate in your research and writing, the sound observations and conclusions which you reached [without access to classified sources].

I have no doubt that when the archives are opened and the relevant material is declassified, I could write another and better book, but this is not likely to take place until the end of this century.

It seems to me that what really concerns Mr. Baldwin are any judgments that are critical of military officers and conservative military traditions. Based upon his long association and friendship with this nation's highest ranking officers, his feelings are understandable. I leave it to the readers to make the ultimate evaluation. One of my purposes in writing the book was to provoke precisely this sort of dialogue about one of the least understood structures in the American political system. I think I have succeeded.

Polmar, Norman. *Strategic Weapons: An Introduction.* New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1976. 161pp.

It is sometimes forgotten, even by the specialist, that the nuclear balance which describes the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union does not rest on amorphous concepts and doctrines, but on concrete weapon systems with specific characteristics and capabilities. If the academic, the military officer or the concerned citizen desires to delve further than the policy pronouncements of his leaders or the superficiality of the press, it is essential that the weapons which react to, justify, and even motivate policy must be understood. To ignore this fact is to ignore sound analysis in national security studies. Can one seriously examine for example—except in moral-philosophical terms—the Schlesinger retargeting doctrine enunciated in January 1974 without first exploring the weapon developments which were its impetuses? The answer, obviously, is NO!

At first glance Norman Polmar's volume, *Strategic Weapons,* provides a useful resource for the type of analysis cited above. As stated in the preface by Frank R. Barnett, the monograph "seeks to fill a longstanding need for an outline of the development of strategic weapons and a description of their basic characteristics." If the posited purpose is met, it follows that the book will be a useful addition to any reference library oriented to the subject, and a complementary piece to the more standard annual reference works (particularly, *The Military Balance* published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London).

The book does partially fulfill its stated promise and does provide a useful and convenient listing of the strategic weapons systems deployed over the past 3 decades; however, the work is seriously marred by far too many errors of interpretation and fact. Beyond use as a mere listing, the book must be read with considerable discrimination and care. Polmar's use of quoted material is all too often not referenced, thus preventing the reading of statements in context. Second, since the book is very uncritical in its acceptance of the U.S. position as the author understands it, the interested reader may utilize his time more fruitfully by reading the *Annual Defense Department Reports* which are readily available and have improved greatly in quality over the past several years. Third, information on the accuracy of weapons systems (specifically CEP's) is omitted. While precise missile accuracy data is classified, public sources do make such information derivable.

Despite the author's impressive qualifications, which include editing a section of *Jane's Fighting Ships* and lecturing at the Naval Academy, he makes several errors not expected of the specialist. For example he states (p. 8) that a 50-kiloton (K.T.) weapon could devastate an entire city, which is patently false unless one is talking about a small urban area. One simply must be more precise. Polmar resorts to the simplistic weapons effects statements which typify uninformed commentary. For example, he equates the effect of four 1.5-megaton (MT) weapons to 300 of the variety dropped

on Japan. A simple calculation informs us that the posited four weapons would only have one quarter the effect of the 300 weapons cited (the equation for destructive effect being: $NY^{2/3} = D$, where N = number of weapons, Y = yield and D = destructive effect).

Belying a complete misunderstanding of the retargeting policy announced in 1974, the author states that massive retaliation has failed to inhibit international and intrasocietal conflict and seems to imply (p. 9) that the new doctrine will somehow redress this impotency. If this implication is correct, the author is seriously in error. For not only does the history of the nuclear era prove the error of the imputation of such a utility for nuclear weapons, but not even the most liberal reading of recent official statements will divulge such an intent. Similarly, Polmar seems not to understand the strategic doctrines which have evolved since the opening of the atomic epoch. He states: "Traditionally, intercontinental missiles have been viewed primarily for attacking opposing strategic offensive forces in a doctrine known as 'counterforce'" (pp. 64-65). This is simply and obviously false. The basis for massive retaliation and assured destruction has traditionally been the promise of destruction of the opposing society, not its means of mass destruction. It was only for a brief period (2 years) in the Kennedy administration that the counterforce option prevailed. Even the spectacular developments late in the Soviet ICBM programs offer the promise, but not the capability of a counterforce strike.

Polmar discusses the Cuban missile crisis and seems to be rather muddled about the facts. He states, for example, that U.S. Jupiter missiles were apparently removed from Italy and Turkey as a part of the U.S.-Soviet accord ending the crisis. The evidence to the contrary is well known, voluminous and convincing. Notwithstanding the fact that missiles in Italy were never the subject of any Soviet demand, President Kennedy had previously ordered the removal of the missiles in Turkey in the summer of 1962. The fact that they were not removed may be explained by bureaucratic inertia or diplomatic considerations, but in no way was the removal of the missiles linked to settlement of the crisis.

In a short, 11-page chapter, Polmar discusses the weapons programs of other nuclear and near-nuclear countries. This chapter provides scant useful information and includes one error that typifies lay comment on the proliferation question. Polmar states that "... Israel can produce plutonium for nuclear weapons." Since the production of plutonium from irradiated reactor fuel requires chemical separation in reprocessing facilities, and since Israel is not known to have such facilities, Polmar's conclusion does not necessarily follow.* Such imprecision adds to the fog; it does not dissipate it.

The shortcomings cited above are not comprehensive but merely illustrative. Had Polmar restricted himself to the data of deployment, capability, and number deployed of each respective system he would have provided a useful addition to the literature without qualification; however, such is not the case. For the reader desiring elementary information regarding strategic weapons systems Polmar could be useful, but he should look elsewhere for careful interpretation.

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*For further clarification the reader may refer to the reviewer's article, "Nuclear Terrorism and the Middle East," *Military Review*, April 1976, pp. 3-11.

Pratt, Lawrence R. *East of Malta, West of Suez: Britain's Mediterranean Crisis 1936-1939.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975. 215pp.

Great Britain began rearming in 1935, against the threat of a resurgent Germany in Europe and the threat of an expansionist Japan in the Far East. Italy, like France and the United States, was explicitly excluded from the list of Great Britain's potential enemies when rearmament began. The 1935-1936 crisis over Italy's conquest of Ethiopia changed all that. Mussolini defied the League of Nations and challenged Great Britain's traditional predominance in the Mediterranean. In this 1936 war scare, a colonel in the Cabinet Office wrote at the time, "we were properly caught with our trousers down." Great Britain now also confronted a third potential enemy, Italy, capable of endangering the Empire's Mediterranean lines of communication from the home islands to the Middle East, India and the Pacific.

Professor Pratt's theme in this excellent and provocative new study is the consequences and implications of the 1935-1936 Mediterranean crisis for long-range British strategy and policy. Skillfully using recently opened British official records (especially from the Cabinet and Foreign Office papers), Pratt expands our knowledge of the origins of the Second World War beyond the "Germanocentric" interpretations that have for so long dominated the histories of this period. By focusing on the Mediterranean crossroads, east of Malta and west of Suez, Pratt reveals how the demands of imperial and home defense conflicted and interacted in Great Britain's ultimately unsuccessful effort to recover the secure position she seemed to have had in the 1920's.

By 1936 the tensions between Great Britain's commitments and her limited military capabilities were overwhelming. Faced with intractable strategic problems British ministers and defense planners began to suffer from what Pratt calls a siege mentality, and a pessimism bordering on defeatism. "It was no accident," he writes, "that those who were closest to the rearmament programme and privy to the secrets of the defense effort were among the most fervent advocates of those policies that history has lumped together under the opprobrium of 'appeasement'."

After some 15 years of disarmament and the neglect of defense requirements, Great Britain by the mid-1930's was underprepared and overcommitted. To escape from the Mediterranean vulnerability which the 1936 war scare had exposed, Great Britain could either strengthen her forces in that area, or she could attempt to placate Italy by diplomatic concessions. Hardly anyone found the prospect of appeasing Mussolini attractive. Yet the alternative—the strengthening of British forces in the Mediterranean and Middle East—would both divert resources urgently needed for the defense of Great Britain against Hitler's Germany, and dangerously reduce the Royal Navy's capacity (still calculated in numbers of available capital ships) to fulfill the British Government's repeated promises to protect Australia and New Zealand against Japan in the Pacific. By looking at Great Britain's strategic problem as a whole, Pratt makes the shifting and competing views of British policymakers understandable. Pratt leaves us in no doubt that Great Britain's diplomatic and strategic situation on the eve of the Second World War was vastly more complex and difficult than the traditional indictments of the "guilty men of Munich" have led us to believe. This book is no *apologia* for Neville Chamberlain or his Government, but it does reveal the severe constraints which limited the range of their choices. After 1936 the British Government pursued rearmament and appeasement policies simultaneously, not least because Great Britain simply lacked the resources and

military capacity successfully to fight Germany, Italy, and Japan all at once and alone. Not only was the Empire "disjointed, disconnected and highly vulnerable," the First Sea Lord, Admiral Chatfield, wrote in 1936, but it was open to debate whether it was in reality strategically defensible at all.

Lawrence R. Pratt is a professor of political science at the University of Alberta. He pays tribute to the influence on his work of Donald C. Watt, Professor of International History at the London School of Economics, and this book can profitably be read along with Watt's important recent book *Too Serious a Business: European Armed Forces and the Approach to the Second World War*. Professor Pratt's detailed study of the formation of British Mediterranean appeasement policy solidly supports Watt's thesis that the chiefs of staff of all the European great powers were reluctant to risk war right up to the outbreak of hostilities in September 1939.

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Winter, J.M., ed. *War and Economic Development: Essays in Memory of David Joslin*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975. 297pp.

This volume contains 11 papers and an introductory essay written in memory of the late British economic historian David M. Joslin by his students, colleagues and friends. Arranged in chronological order, the essays treat a broad range of topics relating to the impact of war on economic development in Europe. Not surprisingly, most of the papers, 8 of the 11, deal with Great Britain. Four of the papers focus wholly or in part on the First World War. Others consider such diverse subjects as the effects of war taxation on the English economy in the late 13th and early 14th centuries, and the economic costs of the Dutch Revolt in the late 16th and early 17th centuries.

In the opening essay, Edward Miller makes a persuasive case that heavy taxation in the period 1294-97 significantly reduced living standards of all ranks of English society. He further argues that war taxes in the subsequent 50 years altered the economic structure in a variety of ways, and had particularly adverse effects on agriculture. He argues that taxes led to declines in agricultural prices and eventually in reductions in the amount of land under cultivation. Other economic factors were also at work during the period, of course. The weakness in Miller's paper lies in his inability to assess the relative importance of various factors. General deflation, apparently accompanied by (and probably caused by) declines in the money supply occurred during the period, together with sharply rising labor costs after 1320. The existence of these factors leaves his case that taxation played a leading role in the decline of agriculture unconvincing.

Next, G.R. Elton traces the transition, in the early Tutor period, in the right of the English Crown to collect direct taxes from a right to do so only in time of war or impending war, to a right to do so on "whatever grounds of need could be put forward." He draws the conclusion that, "Down to 1529, [the historian] can treat all taxation (and its effects) as the product of war; thereafter he needs to distinguish. It then becomes desirable to follow up the collection of revenue by an investigation of expenditure, in order to ascertain whether the impact of government on the economy through direct taxation may be ascribed to actual war . . . " (p. 46). While the evidence marshaled concerning the change in the right to tax is impressive, the conclusion fails to account for the obvious fact that revenues are fungible. Investigation of expenditure is desirable in any case.

Third, Geoffrey Parker examines the economic consequences of the Dutch war of liberation—the so-called Eighty

Years War. He concludes that the conflict was very costly in terms of economic development to both the Netherlands and Spain. He refutes the case sometimes made that the northern Netherlands benefited economically from the war as a result of the growth in trade with the East and West Indies. Acknowledging that that trade sector grew, Parker goes on to show that it was a relatively unimportant part of the Dutch economy, and further asserts that "there is every reason to suppose that [the trade] would have been still greater if a permanent peace with Spain had been arranged." (p. 64)

Peter Mathias, in a fascinating paper, argues that advances made in British military medicine in the late 18th century were important influences on the greatly improved civilian health standard of the 19th century. The advances, mostly preventive, rather than curative in nature, were stimulated by the great premium placed on health by the military because of the need to keep forces at effective levels. They were made possible by the authoritarian nature of the military as an institution, together with the practitioners' belief in the scientific, experimental method.

In "War and Industrialisation," Phyllis Deane concludes that war in the years 1793-1815 did not seriously retard the pace of the British Industrial Revolution. Next, Simon Schama, in a long and rather turgid paper, discusses the politics of taxation in the Netherlands in the period 1795-1810. This is followed by perhaps the most interesting essay in the book, in which Clive Trebilcock shows that in the Boer War, which he calls the last laissez-faire war, critical shortages of war materials developed. In both the private and public sectors of the armaments industry, significant mistakes were made in the process of expansion to meet war demands. The lessons of the Boer War were apparently not assimilated and exactly the same problems arose in World War I, a little more than a decade later. The failures of the production and procurement systems in Great Britain in the First World War have often been noted. According to Trebilcock,

> It is not sufficient to say that in 1914 and 1915 a production and procurement system organised for the colonial scale was broken by a continental war. The truth is that it was almost broken by an earlier great war, a colonial great war, which advertised its extent by the economic strains it created. Not only that, but many of the weak points in the industrial and military apparatus—over-reliance on the private sector, "contractors promises" poor procurement methods, faulty fuse and shell production—were the *same* points at which weaknesses developed in 1914 and 1915. (p. 161)

Roy and Kay MacLeod provide a case study of the British optical industry in the First World War, in their description of a rather moribund industry which the war, with considerable government assistance, rapidly transformed. They conclude that, "The experience of the First World War showed that an economic and scientific alliance between government and industry was, whether immediately or in the long term, of vital interest to both." (p. 192) In an essay that is only tangentially related to economic development, D.C. Coleman discusses the shortage of cellulose acetate in Britain during World War I, and the reaction of the private sector to it. A private monopoly, encouraged by the government, arose, enriching selected individuals and creating a public outcry in an episode which came known to be the "Dope Scandal."

In the volume's shortest essay, Joe Lee points out clearly the failures of German agricultural policy both before and during the First World War, which arose from "a failure to understand the basic interrelationships operating in the

economy." (p. 229) The final essay, by José Harris, describes the history of the making of the Beveridge Report, which is often regarded as crucial in influencing the direction of post-World War II British social policy. The book closes with an excellent, well-organized bibliography of some 35 pages, compiled by Professor Winter and his associates.

An overall appraisal of the volume comes out mixed. Many of the individual essays are informative and thought-provoking. However, the reader is left wondering just what he has learned about the relationship between war and economic development. An overview of this complex relationship is sorely lacking, and there is too little attempt to put the essays into perspective with respect to the rest of the literature, or to draw this immensely diverse collection together. Professor Winter's introductory essay provides important insight into the literature, but no real overview of the problem. Winter does point out that the contributors take two approaches: Six (Miller, Elton, Schama, Trebilcock, Coleman, and Lee) take an "internal" approach, examining production, finance and other policies as they relate to an economy during a particular war; the remaining five take an "external" approach, examining the effects of war on long-run trends. While this distinction is a useful one for ordering one's thinking, it is not an adequate framework for drawing parallels between the essays or for assessing their contribution to knowledge about the relationship between war and economic development.

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REVIEW ARTICLE

Zumwalt and Westmoreland: Contrasting Views of Military Professionalism

During the first part of 1976, two recently retired uniformed heads of military services and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General William Westmoreland and Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, published their memoirs.* Westmoreland, whose Army career spanned 36 years, served as Army Chief of Staff from 1968 to 1972, while Zumwalt, whose Navy career lasted 32 years, served as Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) from 1970 to 1974. Although their tenure on the JCS and their military careers overlapped to a considerable extent, there are a great many differences in outlook between these two men. Comparing these differences can provide a useful contrast between the different models of professionalism to which American military officers subscribe, the different organizational norms by which military officers govern their conduct, and the differences between two individuals who more than any others dominated military history in the past decade. The differences between Westmoreland and Zumwalt, as manifested in their memoirs, fall into five broad categories.

First, Westmoreland and Zumwalt disagreed about the propriety of retired military officers writing books. In his preface, Westmoreland states that the military life is one of constraint in

*Westmoreland, William C. *A Soldier Reports* (New York: Doubleday, 1976), 446pp. Zumwalt, Elmo R., Jr. *On Watch: A Memoir* (New York: Quadrangle/New York Times Book Co., 1976), 568pp.

which the career soldier serves within carefully prescribed limits which should inhibit his freedom to speak out. Therefore, he asserts that generals who have hung up their uniforms should turn to the pen because that medium allows them the opportunity for the free expression which they have long denied themselves. Zumwalt, on the other hand, argues that high-ranking military officers should practice in retirement the same reticence they practiced on active duty. In the view of the former CNO, such a "rule of reticence" is both useful and honorable if civilian control of the military and the integrity of the national security decisionmaking process are to be preserved. The admiral justified his own departure from this norm on the basis of a compelling need to inform the American public about the "ignoble outlook and perversion of the policy processes" practiced by certain members of the Nixon administration.

Second, the tone of each book is completely different. Zumwalt is bitterly critical of those with whom he disagrees. Henry Kissinger and Alexander Haig are labeled as deceitful. The former CNO characterizes Senator John Stennis (D-Miss.), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, as lacking in the intellectual breadth to preside over the momentous national issues that are his responsibility. Zumwalt contends that Senator Stuart Symington's (D-Mo.) inability to grasp an issue never prevented him from discussing it at length. Admiral Rickover's Division of Nuclear Propulsion is referred to as a totalitarian ministate, and John Warner, Secretary of the Navy during the second half of Zumwalt's tenure, is described as bending with every political breeze that blew. Even Westmoreland comes in for some sharp criticism from Zumwalt.

If Westmoreland is bitter toward anyone, it does not come through in this book. He speaks fondly and with praise of his military and civilian superiors, colleagues, and subordinates. In those instances in which the General disagreed with the actions of others involved in the decisionmaking process or in which Westmoreland's relations with others became frayed, he simply states it as a fact and then moves on. At no time is he abrasive or even strongly critical. When his predecessor in Saigon, General Harkins, said in 1964 that Vietnam would be pacified in 6 months, Westmoreland says he might have been naively optimistic, but Harkins was also a fine officer and a gentleman and a popular commander, who possessed a positive, self-confident outlook. When Secretary McNamara proposed a de-escalation strategy in 1967, Westmoreland notes simply that the "cut and run people" had gotten to him.

Third, Westmoreland and Zumwalt have different views of military professionalism. Westmoreland has a very straightforward concept of the role of the military man in the policy process. He made his views known methodically through the proper channels and always worked through the chain of command. If his views were accepted, fine; if not, then like a good soldier he carried out the policies without a word of complaint. The organizational confusion that existed in Vietnam certainly provided Westmoreland ample opportunity to engage in bureaucratic maneuvering. As COMUSMACV he worked for everyone but also worked for no one. Theoretically, Westmoreland was subordinate to the American Ambassador to South Vietnam and to CINCPAC. Practically speaking, he could have bypassed the civilians in Saigon and the admirals in Honolulu and worked directly with the JCS or the White House. His public stature offered many opportunities for him to go outside the executive branch or entirely outside the government. Many Congressmen and Senators solicited his views, and in November 1967 Westmoreland even had the

unique opportunity to address a joint session of Congress on Vietnam. He was a frequent guest on television news shows. On only one occasion did Westmoreland even come close to bypassing the normal channels. When he learned that some members of Nixon's staff wanted to whitewash any possible negligence within the chain of command over the My Lai massacre, Westmoreland threatened, through a White House official, to exercise his prerogative as a member of the JCS to object personally to the President.

Zumwalt possesses a less narrow concept of military professionalism. In *On Watch,* he relates several instances in which he went outside of the prescribed chain of command in order to attempt to translate his ideas into policy. When the CNO disagreed with the Secretary of State's policy of not immediately resupplying Israel during the 1973 war, he informed the staunchly pro-Israel Senator Jackson that it was Kissinger and not the Pentagon who was delaying resupply and that it was the opinion of the Chiefs that the Israelis were going to lose if resupply did not begin at once. When Secretary Schlesinger refused to forward some of Zumwalt's views on SALT to President Nixon, the CNO composed a memorandum for the President, via the Secretary of Defense, but with an advance copy to the White House. When Zumwalt felt that the normal pace of bureaucracy would not allow him to make changes in the Navy's personnel policies quickly enough, he created several retention study groups which bypassed the normal chain of command and reported directly to him. Finally, when the policy processes in this country failed to yield the results he wanted, the CNO made use of his extensive contacts with allied naval leaders to put leverage on the American political system.

Fourth, each book has a different focus. Zumwalt's book concentrates almost entirely on his 4 turbulent years as CNO. Westmoreland's 4 years as Army Chief of Staff rate only 20 pages. Zumwalt's main purposes are to defend the style and substance of the Navy's policy process and to attack the style and substance of the national security policies in the 1970-74 period. He spends only a few paragraphs discussing the correctness of our policies in Southeast Asia and only five pages on his nearly 2 years as Commander Naval Forces Vietnam. Indeed the first 28 years of Zumwalt's naval service appear to be a brief prologue to 4 long years as CNO.

Westmoreland's primary purposes are to explain his actions in Vietnam and to decry the policy of gradual escalation which, in his view, enabled the North Vietnamese and Vietcong to adapt to each new step and to absorb the damage. Although he spent as much time in Washington as in Saigon, his tour as Army Chief of Staff appears to be only a brief footnote to his time as COMUSMACV.

Fifth, although each of these officers reached the pinnacle of his profession, each left it with varying degrees of satisfaction.

The Westmoreland who emerged from *A Soldier Reports* is at peace with himself. He feels no bitterness about Vietnam or his role in it. The general is content that he has done his duty. He is aware that for many he has become the goat symbol of a disastrous episode in American history. However, he is convinced that history will reflect more favorably upon the performance of the military than upon that of politicians and policymakers. Although many would argue that Westmoreland appears to have fallen victim to the naive optimism which he noted in General Paul Harkins, it does not seem to disturb him.

The Zumwalt who emerges from *On Watch* is quite different. The former CNO's memoirs make it abundantly clear that he is less than content with

his situation. There are at least three manifestations of Zumwalt's frustration.

First, it is clear that at 53 years of age, he was hardly ready for retirement. However, because of circumstances over which he had little control, the CNO had to terminate his military career at a comparatively young age. Legislation, which took effect 1 year before he became CNO, limited him to one 4-year term as head of the Navy. Moreover, since Admiral Moorer was the Chairman of the JCS during Zumwalt's tenure as CNO, it was virtually impossible for Zumwalt to succeed to the Chairmanship.* It is certainly exhilirating to be the youngest CNO, but quite another thing to be the youngest former CNO. In a very real sense, being CNO was the perfect job for Zumwalt. It was in this position that his hard-line views on the Soviet Union, his conviction that this country needs to place reliance on a maritime strategy, and his job of providing for a strong U.S. Navy to counter the Soviets all came together.

Second, although Zumwalt bemoaned the way in which he felt Henry Kissinger manipulated the national security bureaucracy for his own ends, the CNO must have recognized that Kissinger's tactics were almost a mirror image of the way in which he handled his own naval bureaucracy. To be defeated by one's own tactics is often the ultimate source of frustration.

Third, Zumwalt knew that in writing his memoirs he was violating the informal norms of his organization. In publishing his book, Westmoreland was following in the footsteps of such other contemporary Army Chiefs of Staff as Omar Bradley, Lawton Collins, Matthew Ridgway, and Maxwell Taylor. However, no post-World War II CNO has given a public account of his stewardship. Zumwalt's justification for revealing the deceitfulness of the Nixon-Kissinger-Haig triumvirate has a hollow ring for two reasons. First, only 25 percent of the book deals with these men. The book is primarily a justification of Zumwalt's personnel and hardware policies. Second, most other CNO's had to deal with situations and problems as difficult as those experienced by Zumwalt. Louis Denfeld, CNO from 1947 to 1949, could have written about how Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson's foolish economies precipitated a "Revolt of the Admirals," the resignation of the Secretary of the Navy, and his own dismissal for simply doing his job. Arleigh Burke, CNO from 1956 to 1961, could have related how the Eisenhower administration pressured him to support the ill-conceived strategy of massive retaliation and how he and the other members of the JCS were made scapegoats for the Bay of Pigs fiasco. George Anderson, CNO from 1961 to 1963, could make public a great deal of information about the difficulties he experienced during the TFX episode and Cuban missile crisis, and David McDonald, CNO from 1963 to 1967, could write volumes about serving under an authoritarian and arrogant Secretary of Defense and an embattled President in the midst of an unpopular war. Yet, none of these predecessors of Zumwalt found it useful and honorable to violate their organizational norms.

It is somewhat paradoxical that Zumwalt and not Westmoreland should leave office frustrated. Although Zumwalt stirred up a great deal of discontent within some portions of the Navy and made some mistakes during his tenure as CNO, most objective observers rate him

*The law does not require that the position of Chairman of the JCS be rotated among the services. However, except for Robert McNamara, all of the Secretaries of Defense have followed the practice. Moreover, since the Air Force had held the Chairmanship for only three years in the 1949-74 period, it would have been extremely difficult for Secretary of Defense Schlesinger to "pass over" General Brown at the expiration of Moorer's term.

as one of the most capable and effective CNO's in the postwar period. (In my own opinion Zumwalt ranks behind Arleigh Burke and just ahead of Forrest Sherman (1949-51).) During Zumwalt's time in office, he instituted many long overdue personnel reforms and laid the groundwork for a modern efficient naval fighting force to serve this nation into the 21st century. On the contrary, most objective observers, including many Army officials, rate Westmoreland an abject failure as an Army Chief of Staff. The former Vietnam commander could not seem to adjust to the realities of the post-Vietnam period. It was not until the late Creighton Abrams succeeded Westmoreland that the Army really began to cope with the demands of the seventies.

Although the differences between the two officers are numerous, Westmoreland and Zumwalt do have one thing in common. Both men have written excellent memoirs. *A Soldier Reports* and *On Watch* add to our knowledge of the events which shaped the course of history and provide the perspective of the individual who was involved in the decisionmaking processes related to those events.

Although much has been written about Vietnam, Westmoreland's book does contain much new information, especially in two areas: the coup plotting and counterplotting that took place in South Vietnam between the fall of Ngo Dinh Diem and the accession of Nguyen van Thieu; and the organizational and administrative chaos created by the failure of the Department of Defense to establish a unified command in Southeast Asia.

Similarly, Zumwalt provides a great deal of new data on the October 1973 war, the controversy over homeporting elements of the 6th Fleet in Greece, and the "blowoffs" on the *Constellation* and the *Kitty Hawk*.

Both authors also provide an insider's views and the perspective of a military officer on the policy process that saw the United States move from a major undertaking to stem the spread of communism in a remote area of the globe to détente with the two giants of the Communist world.

Taken together, these memoirs are a useful step in the process of analyzing an important period in our history. Complete understanding of this era must await the publication of the writings of other key figures of that era, e.g., Richard Nixon, Robert McNamara, Alexander Haig, and Henry Kissinger.

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RECENT BOOKS

Selected Accessions of the Naval War College Library

Annotated by

Ann Hardy, with Kathleen Ashook
Doris Baginski and Mary Ann Varoutsos

Agirre, Julen. *Operation Ogro: the Execution of Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco*. New York: Quadrangle, 1975. 196pp. $8.95

The nationalist trend opposing the Franco regime and favoring political change was expressed in the 1973 assassination of Admiral Carrero Blanco, Franco's strongest supporter, by four young Basque militants; this is their firsthand report of the planning and accomplishment of this meaningful act.