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Making the MIRV A Study of Defense Decision-Making

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book he has drawn on the scholarly literature, his personal knowledge, and interviews with U.S. businessmen to produce a very readable volume.

An understanding of past U.S.-Soviet economic dealings provides a perspective on present trade. Generally the Soviet Union turns to non-Communist societies when it has economic problems which it cannot solve within its own system. Once the immediate problem has passed, the Soviet Union's purchases abroad can be cut back very suddenly. If the political climate chills, as it has between China and Russia, trade can virtually disappear.

What will the Russians buy? What do they have to sell? The answer to the first question is U.S. agricultural products and technology. The response to the second question is raw materials, including oil and natural gas.

Détente and Dollars contains some fascinating and instructive cases on doing business with the Soviets. Because they operate a state-controlled economy with very large purchases going through a single buyer, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the Soviets may be able to get U.S. goods at less than competitive prices by playing one U.S. firm off against another. Goldman provides some suggestions as to how the U.S. should structure its dealings with Soviet buyers to reduce this risk.

Trade with the Soviet Union offers opportunities to the U.S. economy and may also contribute to better political relationships. But it also faces the United States with some political risks and economic costs as U.S. food buyers discovered too well following the 1972 grain deal. In addition to suggesting how the United States might minimize some of these costs and risks, Goldman makes a good case for using expanded trade to obtain some political concessions on

the part of the Soviet Union. Economic deals with the Soviets involve more than simple commercial transactions.

JOHN A. WALGREEN
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Greenwood, Ted. *Making the MIRV: A Study of Defense Decision-Making*. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1975. 237pp.

The increasingly complex, often frustrating, relationship between bureaucracy and national security is no better illustrated than in this thorough, readable, reworded Ph.D. thesis of MIT Professor Ted Greenwood. It is a natural text for any management analyst, for any defense-oriented scholar and, for that matter, it could well be reference reading for students of decisionmaking at the Naval War College.

Greenwood in his six chapters analyzes carefully and perceptively the development in the 1960's to MIRV our major nuclear weapons system; i.e., to provide added punch to our atomic arsenal in the form of multiple targeted reentry vehicles. The result is a clear explicit case study of how vested interests, bureaucratic fears and advancing technology join in conflict, argue, resolve and eventually produce decisions and eventually doctrine and hardware in inventory. The heart of the book is Chapter 3: "Bureaucracy, Strategy and Politics." This is required reading because it comes to the heart of bureaucratic decisionmaking. How is it done? How do innovation and change triumph over the status quo? The decision to MIRV, and the change agent it represented, was not that traumatic a defense issue and thus in its way it more clearly illustrates the case.

For example, the Air Force initially had doubts about MIRVING since bomb size would be smaller and lighter. And why should this matter in an age of

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technical efficiency and miniaturization? Because, and nonquant managers please copy, Air Force leadership of that era had grown up on strategic bombing using larger and heavier bomb models. Here indeed is the heart of the resistance to change. Again, the push to MIRV in the Navy was so highly integrated and effectively managed as a special projects office within OPNAV, that it raised bureaucratic jealousies among the older line bureaus and offices. Of such mundane things are decisions made and progress triggered. Of such mundane things also is proper progress hindered. Greenwood's analysis is precise, very extensively and competently documented, largely nontechnical and, for this reader at least, a primer into the intriguing and vital world of defense decisions and how in fact they are negotiated.

ROBERT F. DELANEY
Naval War College

Heikal, Mohamed. *The Road to Ramadan*. New York: Quadrangle, 1975. 285pp.

Any official or semiofficial Arab version of the most recent Arab-Israeli war is interesting, not so much for its description of military tactics and strategy, as for what it reveals about Arab attitudes towards both Israel and the superpowers.

Mohamed Heikal, former Egyptian Minister of Information and confidant of Presidents Nasser and Sadat, describes the origins, conduct and results of the 1973 war. Failure to undo the defeat of 1967 by diplomatic means, growing pressure on the Egyptian economy due to the spiraling costs of military preparedness, popular pressure for action and fear that the great powers would settle the Middle East problem by themselves convinced Sadat to act.

Heikal's description of the war itself is not very interesting. Accurate in broad outline, it is replete with errors of

fact and detail. Many of his military conclusions, such as the claim that the war marked the end of tank-air dominance, need more study and refinement before they can be accepted even tentatively.

His discussion of the political results is, however, fascinating. He claims that the Arabs misused the oil weapon and argues that the United States profited most from the embargo and price increase. This is certainly not the conventional wisdom in America, and Heikal's argument is certainly worthy of close attention.

Finally, Heikal offers some disturbing thoughts for the future. If internal pressures played a significant role in convincing Sadat to resort to war in 1973, they may well play a similar role in the not too distant future. In fact, in his Foreword, Heikal explicitly states that, "Another war is inevitable." Anybody concerned about the prospects for a long-term peace in the Middle East would do well to read Heikal's book with great care.

STEVEN T. ROSS
Naval War College

Herwig, Holger H. *Politics of Frustration: The United States in German Naval Planning 1889-1941*. New York and Toronto: Little, Brown and Co., 1976. 323pp.

A scholarly study which addresses the question of naval attack on the United States by a continental power is of considerable importance to the American profession of arms.

Professor Herwig's book revolves around the examination of a central question: Was there continuity in German naval policy and planning against the United States from Bismarck to Hitler? In answer, Professor Herwig advances the theory that the German Navy and to a lesser extent, the German Army, were consistently interested in the United States as a possible enemy