

1977

Military Unionization: The Central Issues

Henry E. Eccles

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review>

Recommended Citation

Eccles, Henry E. (1977) "Military Unionization: The Central Issues," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 30 : No. 3 , Article 3.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol30/iss3/3>

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

18 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Much of the debate on unionization of the armed forces has ignored the central issue: How does a free society use military power and force in defense of its freedom and in support of its policies? Because military forces cannot by definition be democratic, Command has the increased responsibility to be concerned with and care for the welfare of people in uniform. Overcentralization and growing civilianization of the armed forces have eroded the responsibilities, prerogatives and integrity of Command, all of which is reflected in the pressure for unionization.

MILITARY UNIONIZATION: THE CENTRAL ISSUES

by

Henry F. Eccles

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

Introduction. The current open discussion of the unionization of U.S. military forces is but one aspect of the major cultural change that has taken place throughout the world, and particularly in the United States, as a consequence of technological and social revolutions of the past 40 years.

Therefore the merits and demerits of the various proposals should be considered as they are related to, and as they influence the other elements of this change—especially those matters that relate to national security.

Mahan had some useful advice for those who deal with complex questions: "The search for leading principles, always few, around which considerations of detail group themselves, will tend to reduce confusion of impression to simplicity and directness of thought, with consequent facility of comprehension."¹ In practical terms, this means we should clarify the central issues in the question of unionization and concentrate on them rather than get distracted *and misled* by the secondary or peripheral issues.

As noted by Kane, Reynolds, Thorgeson and Gordon in the U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, the interest in unionization stems from:

First, the career navyman's dissatisfaction with his lot, and more importantly, his perception of an inability to influence the collective destiny of which he is a part. Secondly, the union leaders have recognized this discontent and have come forward in an attempt to fill this need for representation. Lastly, staunch opposition has been raised against the military unionization movement by naval

and government leaders who fear that unionization will compromise military discipline and preparedness.²

The formation of military unions has therefore been seen as a means whereby both the status and the rights of military personnel can be protected or enhanced. This view has been encouraged because, stimulated by the tremendous direct personnel cost of the "New Volunteer Army" and the increasing costs of military pensions, various proposals to cut back on the rights and privileges of both active and retired personnel have been made in the Congress. While this plausible reason has attracted considerable support we should realize that it is dangerously misleading.

The overriding central issue is: How does a free society organize and use military power and force in defense of its freedom and in support of its policies? This central issue has two aspects:

In a free society, national security must be seen as: First, external security and freedom; that is, sovereignty or freedom from external domination. Second, internal security and freedom; that is, preservation of the institutions which support the rights and welfare of its citizens.

There are several fundamental principles involved in answering the question of external security:

- The use of military force without a clear political purpose is futile and ultimately self-defeating.

- An accurate appraisal of the readiness and effectiveness of one's forces is a vital element in any political decision to use military force.

- A military force with poor morale and discipline is a menace rather than a safeguard to the security of the state.

- The nature of the military force of any nation is primarily dependent on the role that nation expects to play in world affairs. The force suitable for a

passive role is entirely different from that suitable for an active role.

- The greatest disasters can take place when a nation pursues an active policy based on the assumption of control of a military force suitable for an active role only to find, *after the die is cast*, that the force is suitable only for a passive role.

Insofar as the military system is concerned, the most important part of internal freedom lies in the principle of civilian control of the military. This, of course, has many features, but in this context the essentials can be stated briefly.

The theory, doctrine and philosophy of civilian control of the military establish that:

- The decision to use overt military force is a political decision of the gravest importance. In a free society this decision should be made at the highest political level by civilians who can depend upon the loyalty, competence and combat effectiveness of a professional and nonpolitical military force.

- This professional military force must be prepared to *fight* effectively regardless of whether or not a state of war has been declared, and, subject to the limits of logistic capability, regardless of the geographic location of the combat.

The Problem of Limited War. Twenty years ago, James E. King, Jr., writing on "Nuclear Plenty and Limited War" in the January 1957 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, said in part:

The prospect is disturbing, particularly to those who have thought that we could depend upon our nuclear advantages. It was not in the cards that we should owe our security to divine favor. The future counsels prudence, but not faintheartedness. While using every opportunity to reduce international tensions and to extend the reign of order

20 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

among nations, we must work positively for the limitation of war. To this end we must exert ourselves to the utmost in the technological competition to prevent the balance of advantage from shifting to the other side, and we must make it quite clear that we are prepared to risk annihilation itself to prevent Communist conquests by default, either by threat of nuclear terror or by conventional arms under cover of the nuclear ban. We must, in short, guarantee that only effectively limited hostilities can be rationally undertaken.

Moreover, we must be prepared to fight limited actions, ourselves. Otherwise we shall have made no advance beyond "massive retaliation," which tied our hands in conflicts involving less than our survival. And we must be prepared to lose limited actions. No limitation could survive our disposition to elevate every conflict in which our interests are affected to the level of total conflict with survival at stake. Armed conflict can be limited only if aimed at limited objectives and fought with limited means. If we or our enemy relax the limits on either objectives or means, survival will be at stake, whether the issue is worth it or not. But saying that we must be prepared to lose does not mean that we shall lose, particularly in the long run. Our strengths are many, not least the fact that our revolution offers a better promise to mankind than the Communist alternative.

The key sentences here are:

And we must be prepared to lose limited actions. No limitation could survive our disposition to elevate every conflict in which our interests are affected to the level

of total conflict with survival at stake. Armed conflict can be limited only if aimed at limited objectives and fought with limited means.³

At that time, few politicians would dare publicly to endorse such a statement regardless of how they may have felt as to its correctness, for it challenges the whole complex of emotional romanticism which runs through most public pronouncements on defense policy. Furthermore, it has very dangerous implications should foreign countries believe that we will willingly lose limited conflicts. What is more likely to happen is that our political leaders will act in accordance with this horrid and realistic concept while they *talk and write* in the traditional romantic terms.

This has several important implications for high military command. First, the military command must expect that in time of emergency the *orders and directives* they receive will be quite different in many respects from the *official plans*. They may also differ radically from the specific courses of action which would logically be deduced from official policy. The freedom of action of field commanders may well be more sharply circumscribed and limited than ever before in U.S. history.

While all of this may be recognized by thoughtful commanders, there are further effects which may not be so obvious. This situation will make special demands upon the imagination, flexibility, resourcefulness and discipline, both intellectual and military, of the commander himself.

But, perhaps even more important than this will be the need for greater emphasis on the discipline and combat morale of the officers and men of the armed forces. In the past all commanders have recognized the need for sometimes accepting a "tactical defeat" in one area or time in order to achieve a "strategic victory" in another area or time. It has always been a severe test of

leadership and morale to maintain discipline after such a sacrifice. But even under the best of circumstances it has always been a difficult task to develop combat forces of high morale, discipline, and aggressive spirit. However, if we limit our objectives and weapons as suggested, we will be expanding the magnitude of the tactical defeat which we are willing to so accept far beyond that previously thought acceptable in the interests of the larger strategic aim.

It will be a much more difficult task to maintain combat élan, the aggressive spirit, under these conditions.

This situation poses the most difficult of all tasks for leadership. However, if the realities of modern conflict are to be met, our strategic leadership must have combat forces with this kind of "weapon morale" and professional pride. The inducements of an easy pleasant life and the hope of swift victory, i.e., "soda fountain morale," are not enough.

With the current standard of plush, soft living in the United States, it does not seem likely that the requisite pride and weapon morale can be built with very large forces. It seems particularly unlikely if we maintain large forces while at the same time we discard the time-tested morale factors. Every factor which tends to blur or diminish discipline, service pride and unit pride will bring us nearer to ultimate strategic defeat on a catastrophic scale.

The essentials of this article and of the foregoing comments which I wrote in May of 1957 were tragically confirmed by the subsequent events in Vietnam.

Military Motivation and Leadership.

There are certain fundamentals of leadership which have been recognized for many centuries, but nevertheless have been forgotten or obscured by the rush of technology and by factors associated with the large size and rapid turnover of

personnel in the armed forces since World War II.

Most of these fundamentals have been repeatedly expressed in service publications such as the U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, but because of these same factors they tend to be neglected.

The first basic principle is that discipline, morale, leadership and motivation are all so interwoven that no one can be understood without understanding the others. Nevertheless, for purposes of detailed discussion they *sometimes* should be treated separately.

The U.S. Armed Forces are created and operated in a special environment that imposes special obligations for performance and restriction on the freedom of action of officers in the exercise of leadership.

Associated with this is the fact that the armed forces and the national society interact. The armed forces inevitably reflect the habits and mores of the society and they are being used for two purposes: The *primary and statutory* one is to defend the society, and provide for the military security of the nation. The *secondary and nonstatutory* one is to perform certain social and economic functions for the society which have no direct relation to the military function. Pressures from a variety of vested interests has emphasized these secondary purposes at the expense of the primary purpose.

Questions of morale and discipline are the single most important factors in operational readiness and combat effectiveness, and as such they are intimately associated with the growth and effects of the logistic snowball. Thus, any study of these matters must involve the nature and importance of the distinction between "weapon morale" and "soda fountain morale."

There is a vital distinction between Command and Management and this has critical influence on the understanding of motivation, morale, and discipline in the armed forces.

22 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

The military is not and cannot be a "democratic" organization in the sense that the so-called "democratic process" is popularly perceived in the United States today.

Consequently, the concepts of justice, court procedures and the exercise of constitutional rights which are appropriate for application to the civilian society, cannot be strictly applied to the military system without substantially decreasing the effectiveness of the system and greatly increasing its cost.

Finally, and most important: The standards of ethics, of duty, of performance, and of justice, must be higher in the military system than they are in civilian life.

Cultural Change. We are living in the midst of a worldwide cultural change brought about largely by modern communications technology, which in one way or another is influencing the perceptions, the attitudes and the behavior of nearly all of mankind. It is a psychological phenomenon that is particularly evident in the young people who form the bulk of our armed forces, both officer and enlisted.

This is not the place to attempt a full examination of this cultural change, but unless its general nature and its implications are recognized, the United States can blunder into a major disaster, which will make Vietnam appear as a minor interlude. Among other things:

From the world view, there has been an increased perception of economic, political and social inequity, and a sharpening in the sense of ethnicity. This has brought about a spirit of nationalism in undeveloped countries and a spirit of separatism in some developed countries, together with a growth in both national and transnational terrorism.

From the standpoint of the external security of the state this has made the organization and employment of military power very complex and difficult

In particular, however, it has made the political control and the operational reliability of military power absolutely essential.

In the United States, several aspects of cultural change are evident in: a change in the perception of moral sanctions; a high degree of illiteracy among high school graduates; a widespread use of drugs; and a great increase in juvenile crime associated with a slowly growing recognition that our criminal justice system and our penal system both are obsolete and ineffective.

Largely as a consequence of the foregoing, there has been such a great increase in litigation throughout the United States that both the civil and criminal courts are overcrowded. *Newsweek* magazine describes the situation:

The deluge of lawsuits is swamping the courts. The number of civil suits filed in Federal courts has doubled since 1960 and increased by more than one-third since 1970. . . . The clog in state courts is even worse. . . . In Cook County (Chicago) a negligence case can take four years to get to trial.⁴

The legal rights of children and military personnel have barely been explored.⁵

Law as a growth industry is little short of spectacular: there are 425,000 attorneys in the U.S. today compared to 250,000 just twenty years ago.⁶

The U.S. has created the most sophisticated—and the fairest—legal process in the world. But the burdens have become intolerable.⁷

These factors combine to make special and still little understood problems for the internal security of the state.

From the standpoint of recruitment and training of young

people entering military service, several factors are significant:

The social perceptions of young people have been sharpened by racial trouble, the civil rights movement, and the organized dissent of the Vietnam era.

They tend to oppose regimentation and to be skeptical of all authority and systematic organization.

They wish to know the reasons for the orders and regulations which govern them and to participate in decisions.

Those of us who grew up in "The Old Navy" knew that the enlisted men were never fooled by incompetent officers. But the special critical sense of equity and justice shown by the best of today's youth demands high standards of competence, integrity and personal concern in the officers. The challenge is clear and fundamental. If not met, the loyalty and discipline needed for today's military force will not be attained.

The Matter of Command. With this general background it is well to realize that the general trend of events, Defense Department policies and attitudes have eroded the tradition and principles of military command authority and responsibility, with consequences which were specifically forecast in a series of articles published in the U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, 20 years ago.⁸

The general theme of these articles was that when, by a general increase in centralization of authority in the military system, the authority of commanding officers is gradually eroded, the sense of personal responsibility and the ability to use authority wisely is also eroded throughout the chain of command. This inevitably produces dissatisfaction, frustration and lower performance of duty throughout the enlisted ranks.

Thus any discussion of military unions should be based on the perceptions and concepts of command which

can be expected to prevail.

The chain of command, regardless of the manner in which executive authority is blended among military professionals and civilians, is responsible for maintaining the morale, discipline and effectiveness of the people in the armed forces. If these people have just cause for complaint, it means that this chain of command either has performed poorly or that it is faced with adverse circumstances beyond its power. In either case, unionization is not the solution to the problem of dissatisfaction among the military people, because among other things it would not increase the competence of command.

If sound principles of civilian control are to be followed, military influence on policy should be exercised by formal advice through the chain of command, not by a pressure group within the active military service which is not part of the chain of command.

If command is so indifferent to or ignorant of the welfare of their people that it responds only to organized pressure from below rather than to its own intuitive concepts of integrity, loyalty and competence, it proves its unfitness to employ their people in combat. That is: *Those exercising command cannot be trusted to use military power and force effectively to support and defend the security of the state.*

In addition to this conceptual matter, other factors influence the exercise of command.

As a consequence of rapidly changing technology, the military training programs have concentrated on technical training, technical experience and technical duty to the detriment of the development of leadership training and experience. In the Navy, this particular problem has been accentuated by the manner in which the Zumwalt personnel policies tended to bypass the chief petty officers of the Navy. As previously predicted, this diminished their prestige, authority and morale.

24 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Furthermore, the "Great Society Programs" have greatly increased the "social responsibilities" of military commanders and created many programs for them to supervise and to report upon, with a consequent huge burden of administration and paperwork which (a) distracts them from their direct military concerns, and (b) adds to the size and snowballing bureaucratic growth of civilian and military administrative personnel and facilities.

These and other factors have combined to create a civilianization of the armed forces wherein civilian management terminology and attitudes are emphasized. An adverse semantic reaction develops gradually but inexorably.

When the chain of command is discussed as "Top Management," "Middle Management," etc., and the enlisted personnel are regarded as "employees" or as a "labor force," the sense of the special requirements and special concern of command for the needs, the aspirations and the capabilities of the men, and the consequent sense of loyalty and responsibility up and down, which is the essence of military professionalism, are diminished.

This semantic reaction, wherein one's perceptions are greatly influenced by the language used, has been aggravated by the increased centralization of operational authority in Washington.

The net result tends to create an adversary situation between officers and men similar to that between employers and labor in industry.

To a significant degree, this evolution is a misapplication of the principle of civilian control of military affairs and of freedom in a free society. Instead of simply civilian control, there has been a trend towards civilianization; instead of disciplined liberty there has been a trend toward irresponsible libertarianism.

The Matter of Recourse. In the cur-

rent discussion as to the desirability of

establishing or legalizing the formation of labor unions in the armed forces of the United States, there has been little mention of the matter of recourse by the Government should a strike take place.

In the United States in recent years there have been many work stoppages, strikes or job actions by unionized Government or municipal employees in fields where the law specifically forbids strikes by such union members.

As in the labor disputes in private industry, the Government has legal recourse to the courts for action in such cases, and in fact the process of injunction frequently prevents or greatly shortens a strike or other job action. In some cases, union leaders have been imprisoned or otherwise punished by the courts for violation of such injunction or other judicial process. In some instances large fines have been imposed upon the treasuries of the offending unions.

In private industry, a civil suit with monetary damages being imposed, is one form of legal recourse available to an employer if a strike occurs in violation of a formal agreement.

The military situation is unique. THE GOVERNMENT HAS NO EFFECTIVE RECOURSE IN CASE OF STRIKE OR JOB ACTION BY A MILITARY UNION.

In time of crisis and even more in time of actual combat the two elements of TACTICAL TIMING and UNQUESTIONED RELIABILITY OF THE FORCES are each vital and vitally intertwined. No recourse, legal or otherwise, after a major defeat can in any way regain the lost ground (in its broadest sense), the lost time and the lost lives incurred by such defeat.

Fines or imprisonment after the event are useless. Recourse to punitive or compensatory damages after a tactical defeat in combat is meaningless and useless because of the fundamental fact that no one can make an appraisal of

the cost of such tactical defeat in monetary or other material measure.

Thus the issues posed by the advocacy of military unions transcend both in nature and magnitude the issues of industrial and routine Government unionization. The criteria of the latter are irrelevant to the former. As in some other political military matters, the advocates of measures which affect the combat effectiveness of military forces seldom relate such advocacy to the ultimate consequence of the alternative presented.

Just as strategy itself is cumulative, the various measures proposed for the socialization and democratization of the armed forces, *each of which has a plausible reason*, have a cumulative effect on combat effectiveness. The overall result can be that enormous sums be spent to achieve military impotence together with an unsupportable foreign policy. This indeed would be tempting fate.

Summary and Conclusion. National security has two parts: external security and internal security.

The military system has as its major task the support and protection of the external aspects of national security.

An unreliable, ineffective military system is more of a threat than a safeguard to the national security in both its external and its internal aspects.

Morale, discipline and combat effectiveness are all inextricably interwoven with the concept and the perspective of command and military professionalism, as exemplified by the distinctions between command and management.

In recent years there has been an erosion in this concept and perspective of command brought about by over-centralization and overcivilianization, and this to a large degree has created a loss of morale and a dissatisfaction that is expressed by the concept of a military union.

Regardless of any supposed legislative safeguards, a military union strong enough to influence the internal policy of the military would inevitably influence the employment of the military and so exercise an unconstitutional control of national policies.

At best, unionization would require a complete reexamination of our national policy and national strategy to rule out the concept of sustained, major overseas combat operations by ground forces.

At worst, it would mean that we would commit large scale forces to combat in support of policy only to find out too late that they lacked the discipline and morale to fight effectively against a strong enemy force.

This establishes the central issues in the controversy over unionization the other issues are trivial.

The proponents of unionization present a *plausible case*, and that is exactly what is wrong. Every major political military disaster has come about because people of good intent and supposed competence have had a plausible reason for doing the wrong thing. The Vietnam War is a striking example.

While strong opposition has been expressed by senior officers, legislators, and veterans' organizations, nevertheless, some serving officers have favored unionization as the best way to protect their interest. Others, while not favoring it, consider it to be inevitable, and therefore something which the military should accept, and therefore initiate. No one should expect the public to understand the nature of, and necessity for, military morale, discipline and military professionalism, *if the military professionals do not themselves understand them!*

Finally, it is quite possible that the great cultural change of the last 25 or so years has made it impossible to maintain a large military force with a capability to conduct sustained, large-scale overseas ground combat. In which case, the

26 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

only remedy is to reduce the size of the armed forces to the point where the morale, discipline and responsiveness to control are unquestioned and to modify the national policy and strategy to conform to this capability.

NOTES

1. Alfred T. Mahan, *Naval Strategy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1911), p. 118.
2. John E. Kane, Gregory C. Reynolds, Arne R. Thorgeson, and Jeff Gordon, "Is Military Unionization an Idea Whose Time Has Come?" U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, November 1976, p. 36.
3. James E. King, Jr., "Nuclear Plenty and Limited War," *Foreign Affairs*, pp. 255-256.
4. Jerrold K. Footlick, "Too Much Law?" *Newsweek*, 10 January 1977, p. 43.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 46.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 47.
8. Russell S. Crenshaw, Jr., "Why We are Losing Our Junior Officers," *USNIP*, February 1957, pp. 127-132; G.H. Gardner, Jr., "Grow the Green Grass Here," *USNIP*, February 1956, pp. 137-143; R.D. Heintz, Jr., "Special Trust and Confidence," *USNIP*, May 1956, pp. 463-473. Also subsequent Discussions, Comments and Notes on this article in August 1956 *USNIP*, pp. 875-879; Matt Hensley, "The Whipping Boy," *USNIP*, November 1956, pp. 1154-1159; Howard N. Kay, "Reenlistment: A Case History," *USNIP*, June 1956, pp. 602-609; Raymond A. Komorowski and John W. Weiser, "An Old Weapon for a New Problem," *USNIP*, May 1956, pp. 504-507; Joseph E. Ogleby, "Give Them a Goal, Not Gold Braid," *USNIP*, January 1957, pp. 9-15; William J. Stanley, "The Ship and the Shore," *USNIP*, January 1956, pp. 1-7.

WRITINGS OF REAR ADMIRAL HENRY E. ECCLES, USN (RET.)

Admiral Eccles is a prolific writer. The following are his published writings, and his unpublished writings which appear in the Naval War College Library Catalogue.

- "Allied Staffs." *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, August 1953, pp. 858-867.
- "Basic Elements of Naval Logistics." *Naval War College Information Service for Officers*, November 1949, pp. 21-34.
- "Command and Control: the Logistics Basis." *The Proceedings of the Military Operations Research Symposia*. Washington: 1962. v. 2, no. 2, pt. 1, Fall 1962, pp. 307-318.
- "Command Logistics." Unpublished Study. U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I.: 1956.
- "Crash Programs and the Logistic Snowball." *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, March 1961, pp. 68-75.
- "Cuba - October 1962; a Working Paper." Unpublished Paper, 1963.
- "European Logistics, 1956." Unpublished Paper.
- "Logistics and Strategy." *Naval War College Review*, January 1958, pp. 17-39.
- "Logistics and Strategy." *Naval War College Review*, March 1962, pp. 15-30.
- "The Logistics Aspects of Command Control Systems." *Naval Research Logistics Quarterly*, June 1962, pp. 97-105.
- "Logistics: *Conditio Sine Qua Non* for NATO Defense." *Naval Research Logistics Quarterly*, March 1961, pp. 111-116.
- Logistics in the National Defense*. Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole, 1959.
- "Logistics Philosophy." Unpublished Lecture. U.S. Air Force School of Logistics, n.p.: 1959.

- "Logistics Research Notes: a Problem for Logistics Research; and Notes on Logistic Consolidation in the United States Armed Forces." Unpublished Notes, 1954-1961. v.p.
- "Logistics—What Is it?" *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, June 1953, pp. 645-653.
Reprinted in *Naval Research Logistics Quarterly*, March 1954, pp. 5-15.
Logistik und Landesverteidigung. Neckargemund, Ger.: Kurt Vowinckel, 1963.
- Military Concepts and Philosophy*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1965.
- "Military-Political Notes, 1963-1965." Unpublished Papers, 1966. v.p. (loose-leaf)
- "Military Theory and Education; the Need for and Nature of." *Naval War College Review*, February 1969, pp. 70-79.
- "Military Unionization: The Central Issues." *Naval War College Review*, Summer 1977, pp. 18-27.
- "A Note on Management and Logistics." *Naval Research Logistics Quarterly*, March 1967, p. 131.
- "Notes on Logistic Aspects of Command." Unpublished Paper. U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I.: 1954. v.p.
- "Notes on Naval Contributions to Nuclear Survival and Recuperation, Working Paper." Unpublished Paper, 1963.
- Operational Naval Logistics*. Washington: Bureau of Naval Personnel, 1950.
- "Realities of Nuclear Command Control." Unpublished Paper, 1963.
- "The Rommel Papers—a Commentary." *Naval Research Logistics Quarterly*, June 1954, pp. 103-108.
- "The Russian Maritime Threat." *Naval War College Review*, June 1969, pp. 4-14.
- "Some Command Problems and Decisions." *Naval Research Logistics Quarterly*, March 1955, pp. 9-15.
- "Some Fundamentals of Modern War, an Introduction to Logistics Presentations." Unpublished Paper. U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I.: 1959.
- "Some Notes on Military Theory." *Naval Research Logistics Quarterly*, March 1968, pp. 121-122.
- "Strategic Principles and Imperatives of Sea Power." *Strategic Review*, Fall 1973, pp. 51-54.
- "Strategy: the Essence of Professionalism." *Naval War College Review*, December 1971, pp. 43-51.
- "The Study of Military Management." *Naval Research Logistics Quarterly*, December 1966, pp. 437-445.
- "Suez 1956—Some Military Lessons." *Naval War College Review*, March 1969, pp. 28-56.
- "The TFX F-111 Aircraft: a Perspective in Military Command and Defense Management." *Naval War College Review*, April 1971, pp. 66-87.
- "Theatre Logistic Planning." *Naval War College Information Service for Officers*, October 1950, pp. 1-21.
- "The Vietnam Hurricane." *Shipmate*, July-August 1973, pp. 23-26.