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The United States emerged from World War II as a revolutionary power: we held that security, democracy and economic and social progress were everywhere or nowhere. Professor Kolodziej argues that these ideas represented a break with our traditional, historic concepts and that the limits of this revolution have now been reached at home and abroad.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: REVOLUTIONARY POLICY IN A CONSERVATIVE GUISE

by

Edward Kolodziej

We find it hard to understand sometimes why the United States and the American people are so misunderstood and maligned abroad. We find it hard to explain our rejection by large segments of the Third World. We find it hard to appreciate differences with our allies. We even find it hard, perhaps, to grasp why our adversaries are so steadfast and resourceful—and often so successful. Certainly much can be explained away by looking at the beam in the eye of others, that is, by looking at what they say and do. But much can also be learned by looking at ourselves as others see us, to see ourselves through our effect on other states and peoples when we exercise our enormous power.

I would like to advance two closely tied arguments: First, that the United States emerged from World War II as a revolutionary, not a conservative or status quo, power as it has so often been portrayed and, second, that the limits of

that revolution have now been reached at home and abroad. Until recently, there was wide consensus, growing out of World War II and the experience of the postwar period on the principles that should guide the projection of American power and purpose and the role that the United States should play in building a new world order. That is no longer the case. We need to look at the principal reasons for the present disarray which grows, paradoxically, out of the very consensus on power and purpose we so widely held not so long ago—certainly within the conscious memory and personal experience of Americans today.

I use the word revolutionary in two senses. There is the obvious meaning, familiar to us all, that after World War II the United States abandoned its traditional diplomatic principles and practices. This view often, and mistakenly, identifies American policy with

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isolationism and nonintervention and contrasts these characteristics with a policy of internationalism and intervention. These distinctions will be clarified below.

A larger meaning that can be attached to the word revolutionary, and the one which will occupy the second half of this discussion, refers to the impact of American power on other states and peoples, or more generally, to the impact of American power and purpose on the international system and the role of the United States within it.

In this latter sense, revolutionary refers to the efforts of American leaders, supported by a majority of Americans, to use the instruments of power and persuasion at their disposal to shape a world congenial to American security interests, political values, and economic and social well-being. Since World War II the United States has sought to define the global security relations that should prevail between governments and states and between them and their populations. It has sought to define the quality of political relations between foreign peoples and their governments, largely in terms of American conceptions of governmental practice. It has sought finally to define the rate, forms, and direction of economic development and social progress of other peoples, again largely in the coinage of American perspectives and interests that carried the familiar stamp of American experience.

Let me turn initially, and briefly, to the traditional principles and practices underlying American foreign policy before the revolutionary break with them during and after World War II.

Three principles defined American diplomacy. These were the principles of the *divisibility* of security, the *divisibility* of political regimes, and the *divisibility* of economic wealth and social progress between peoples and states.

These principles reflected a shrewd assessment of the interests and

objectives of the American political community and the capacity of the nation to advance its interests and objectives within a global political system in which the fledgling nation was more the stake or prize sought by other states and governments than a respected participant in an international system, responsive to its influence or persuasion.

The divisibility of security stated that the security of the United States did not depend on the security of other states and peoples. Also, the United States had no obligation to assume their security interests. This principle was not widely accepted, much less permitted expression, in the 18th century. French aid to the colonies was premised on retaining them as useful tools in France's struggles with the other European powers. I emphasize the word tools since the possibility of fashioning a unified state from a ragtag collection of disparate, geographically separated colonies appeared doubtful even to those committed to the enterprise. The formal enunciation of the divisibility thesis in Washington's Neutrality Proclamation in 1793 signaled the repudiation of the Treaty of 1778 with France, and henceforward all entangling alliances. It also asserted a conception of world politics and a role for the United States within it different from that normally practiced in the balance of power politics of 18th-century Europe. Rejected was the notion that American security was necessarily a function of European power politics. This principle of the divisibility of security assumed that American power was too weak to affect the outcome of Europe's struggles. The new nation also risked too much in involving itself in those conflicts: the loss of blood, treasure, and territory, or, worse, domestic division and dissolution.

The external and internal security of the United States required, moreover, the elimination of foreign influence of its western borders. Hence there were

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early moves against Britain and Spain to limit their sway and rights on the American continent. The Louisiana Purchase largely rid French influence from the New World. The Monroe Doctrine subsequently made virtue of necessity. Unable to intervene effectively in Europe's affairs, the United States announced it would not do so. In return, it notified the European powers that the New World was no longer open to colonization or intervention. Geographic separation, the balance of power in Europe, and the British Navy made the thesis that American security was divisible from that of European other states, appear plausible.

Insulation from Europe's politics and wars did not mean *isolation* from international relations. The West was our international relations. There is a tendency to believe, suggesting perhaps the lingering force of the notion of Manifest Destiny, that the West was *always* American. The history of the West and its conquest could have been different. Not until the 1840's, after the Mexican and Oregon crises, did we finally eliminate foreign presence, if not influence, from what are presently the geographic boundaries of the United States. If you include Hawaii, then you would have to push the date of the achievement of American territorial integrity to the 1890's. If you include the Pearl Harbor attack as a benchmark, you have a sense that the provisional realization of American territorial security has come within our own lifetimes and experience. A host of Indian tribes, Mexicans, Canadians, and sundry Central and Latin American peoples—Cubans, Nicaraguans, Panamanians, Colombians—were at the center of our international relations. And they still cannot be entirely ignored. Witness negotiations over the Panama Canal and proposals of statehood for Puerto Rico.

Isolation from European security and diplomacy freed our resources and foreign policy for Western expansion

and for our repeated intervention into the affairs of those alien people who adjoined our borders or who, sad for them, lay astride our continental advance.

There was also wide acceptance by political leaders and by a majority of Americans on a second divisibility principle, viz, the divisibility of democratic regimes. Democracy at home did not necessarily depend on its success abroad. We might have rejected this principle. The French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars were premised on an obverse principle. Repeated overtures for support of liberal causes, beginning with American refusal to assist the French Revolutionists against monarchical rule, were ignored throughout the 19th century. Offered, instead, was a beneficent and benign example. Secretary of State William Seward summarized the American position in a letter to France and other European states in which he declined to lend American support for their condemnation of Russian tyranny in Poland. Contrast his reply with those we have recently witnessed in the presidential debates: "In view of the location of this republic, the characters, habits, and sentiments of its constituent parts, and especially its complex yet unique and very popular Constitution, the American people must be content to recommend the case of human progress by the wisdom with which they should exercise the powers of self-government, forbearing at all times, and in every way, from foreign alliances, intervention, and interference."¹

Self-determination, national independence, and democratic institutions, however desirable they were for other peoples, did not generate a corresponding political or moral responsibility on the part of Americans to assure these goals for others. Indeed, intervention in the affairs of other states in Europe hampered the ability of Americans to secure these blessings for themselves.

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Americans also widely accepted a third principle, viz, the divisibility of economic wealth and social progress of peoples and nations. American leaders applied the divisibility doctrine in economic and social affairs in two ways. Political and military relations were sharply distinguished from the commercial relations of states. These were to be free and open, affording equal access of all states to each other's markets. Unencumbered economic exchange was expected to benefit all parties on the condition that they were kept separate from diplomatic and strategic considerations.

The divisibility of economic relations was also applied in another, more general sense. Not only was American economic exchange to be considered separate from diplomatic and strategic ties with other states or peoples, but American economic development was considered separate from the material growth of other nations. American wealth and social progress did not depend on the simultaneous progress of other nations. Nor were Americans obliged, beyond humanitarian impulse, to assist their development. Enlarged trade, while obviously beneficial to all, was only one panel of a larger triptych of economic and social development in the United States that included Western expansion (based initially on agriculture), expanded commerce, and industrialization. American military and diplomatic isolation, on the one hand, and economic internationalism, on the other, were conditions of economic and social advancement of the American nation.

The genius of the divisibility formulae was their salutary effect on domestic politics. Application of these interwoven military, political and economic principles promised to minimize domestic conflict in an already divided nation. The possibility of foreign intervention and its adverse impact on domestic unity were a real problem at the

inception of the Republic. This is suggested by the intrigues of Citizen Genet and Aaron Burr, the struggles between Hamilton and Jefferson to define American foreign policy, British maneuvering in the West, specifically in Texas and Oregon, and the efforts of the Lincoln administration to prevent European recognition of the Confederacy. Washington said it all in his Farewell Address. Marked out clearly is his concern with domestic faction and the tendency of segments of American life, divided by race, class, status, and section, to split over foreign policy and to the temptation of alliance with foreign powers for their particular advantage. These centrifugal tendencies were uppermost in Washington's mind when he observed in a seldom quoted segment of his Farewell Address:

The inhabitants of our Western country . . . have been witnesses to the formation of two treaties—that with Great Britain and with Spain—which secure to them everything they could desire in respect to our foreign relations toward confirming their prosperity. Will it not be their wisdom to rely for the preservation of these advantages on the union by which they were procured? Will they not henceforth be deaf to those advisors, if such there are, who would sever them from their brethren and connect them with aliens.²

Thus the principles of the divisibility in the security, political, and economic affairs of states was applied by successive administrations to assure American security, democratic values and institutions, and economic and social welfare. These principles grew out of necessity and responded to American weakness, not strength.

The divisibility thesis died hard. Forces were at work, especially throughout the second half of the 19th century and first part of the 20th century to

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undermine it. First was the rise of the United States as a global power. The conquest of the West, the creation of a liberal empire, and the defeat of the Spanish in 1898 signalled American ascendancy in North America and its rapidly rising arbitrating role in world affairs. As World War I demonstrated, American power could henceforward determine the outcome of Europe's struggles.

Second was the decline in power of the liberal democracies, specifically Britain and France, and the corresponding rise of authoritarian, expansionist states—Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union. American physical security appeared threatened and its institutions under stress, at the same time, paradoxically, that its real and potential power appeared to be expanding.

The growth of collectivist movements, like the Bolshevik Revolution, and the worldwide economic dislocation of the Great Depression threatened liberal economies, like that of the United States. The Open Door economic policies of the United States, premised on the free flow of goods, services, capital, and even labor across state lines, could not be automatically counted upon to stay open.

The erosion of these favorable conditions in the 20th century prompted a revision of the traditional doctrines of divisibility. This revision assumed revolutionary proportions after World War II: First in terms of America's traditional approach to foreign policy and, second, in the impact that application of this revolutionary revision of principles and practices of American diplomacy had on the behavior of other peoples and states and on the structure and process of contemporary international relations.

American decisionmakers, reflecting thinking that can be traced at least to Woodrow Wilson, and, perhaps, even earlier to Theodore Roosevelt, stood

traditional principles and practices on their heads.

For divisibility in security, the U.S. policy was predicated on the notion of indivisibility, viz, that security was everywhere or nowhere. For the divisibility of democratic institutions, U.S. policy substituted another principle of indivisibility, viz, that democracy had to be everywhere or nowhere. For the divisibility of economic development and social progress, Washington decisionmakers based American policies increasingly on yet a third principle of indivisibility, viz, that economic and social progress were everywhere or nowhere. The achievement of American security, democratic values and institutions, and economic and social development were seen to depend on their realizations abroad. Joined in marriage was national self-interest with universal mission within a global strategy that enveloped increasingly all spheres of American life and the lives of other peoples. This marriage encompassed a national ambition, matched but not exceeded by prevailing imperial and expansionist states to define the relations of states, the relations of governments and their peoples, and the terms of economic and social progress within and across state boundaries.

History is misread, however, if it is assumed that these principles were embraced all at once. Also unfounded is the thesis pressed by revisionist historians that they derive from conspiratorial plan. They crystallized slowly, hesitantly, in no necessary logical or sequential order. The timing of their emergence must be measured by a political, not a celestial, clock and must be seen to proceed more as the product of the disordered, unpredictable occurrence of crises than as the outcome of a structured debate over ideas or ideology.

This halting, haphazard process of exterior challenge and response, of decision and action, from the Roosevelt

through the Johnson administrations, had implications which were truly revolutionary for Americans and others.

The Roosevelt administration assumed that, after World War II, the United States and Soviet Union would join with France, Britain, and China as guarantors of a global security system working within the framework of the United Nations. The defeated powers would be permitted to join the international community after their leadership was purged and democratic institutions were firmly in place. As they were gradually nursed to political health, they were expected to contribute to the reconstruction and growth of a global liberal economic order. Reparations would be set at levels consistent with the ability of the defeated nations to pay them. Protective trade policies and competitive monetary devaluations, viewed as principal sources of global economic depression of the prewar era, were to be avoided by basing international recovery on free trade, expended private investment, and improved control of international monetary transactions. The U.S. role would be crucial, but not necessarily dominant, once economic recovery in war-torn countries had been completed.

The assumptions on which postwar security, political, and economic planning proceeded proved unrealistic. The United States and the Soviet Union could not agree on Germany's reparations or political rehabilitation, on ways to assure democratic institutions in Eastern Europe, or on the terms of what was later to be called peaceful co-existence between Capitalist and Communist states, including social and economic exchanges between states and peoples across national boundaries.

Two crises—the British evacuation from Greece in early 1947 and the larger economic breakdown in Western Europe—prompted the Truman administration to revise and extend the indivisibility thesis reflected in the policies of

the Roosevelt administration. On the one hand, the Greek-Turkish crisis led to the break with the Soviet Union. Moscow was identified as the principal threat to global security. Suspended for the indefinite future was the prospect that the Soviet Government could be brought into a global security framework, resting on Big Five cooperation. The United States, leading the so-called free nations of the world, would form the nucleus of a world security system that would both contain what was perceived as expanding Soviet power and would redefine the structure of global security. The United Nations was implicitly downgraded as the proper vehicle of this new security system. The split between the United States and the Soviet Union, between the Western and Communist states, generally, made the United Nations more a battleground or stake than a participant or independent actor in defining international security.

The Truman Doctrine, announced in justification of the Administration's call for \$400 million in aid to Greece and Turkey, accepted the indivisibility of national and international security and of democratic regimes around the world. The responsibility for global order and for the extension of democratic values and institutions was placed squarely on the shoulders of the United States:

One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion . . . We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free people to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples,

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by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States.³

Threats to American and international security were equated. These arose both from the expansion of totalitarian regimes, like the Soviet Union, and from the attack on democratic institutions from within by "aggressive movements that seek to impose totalitarian regimes."

Security and democratic institutions had to be everywhere or they could not be maintained anywhere.

The Greek-Turkish crisis occurred in tandem with an even graver socio-economic crisis in Western Europe. The West European states failed to recover economically after World War II, as expected, and were increasingly vulnerable to internal subversion and external political and military pressure. This crisis elicited what might be termed the Marshall Doctrine, the socioeconomic complement to the Truman Doctrine. In calling for a massive aid program to help Europe's recovery, Secretary of State George Marshall argued that economic deprivation and social dislocation abroad could not be insulated from their adverse effects at home:

It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to assist the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist.⁴

The outlines of the indivisibility thesis were now sketched. Security, popular government, and economic well-being had to be achieved everywhere or they

could survive nowhere. American national and international systemic interests were one. The governing responsibilities of the federal government were globalized.

The indivisibility thesis advanced by the Truman and Marshall Doctrines was selectively applied at first. Despite the military presence of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and the large voting bloc strength of Communist support in Western Europe, especially France and Italy, containment essentially remained a socioeconomic response to the perceived Soviet threat. Greek-Turkish aid was modest when compared to later security programs or the \$17 billion spent on European economic recovery. The Atlantic Alliance signed in 1949 was a guarantee pact, resting on the American nuclear monopoly. It was not designed to assault the Soviet Union frontally. Eastern Europe was conceded in fact, if not in rhetoric, to the Soviet Union. Its freedom from Soviet control was foreseen to be the eventual result of the gradual mellowing assisted by a patient containment policy, of the Soviet Union's dictatorial rule over its people and its Western Empire. Defense expenditures slipped sharply after World War II. The Soviet military threat was not considered significant enough to warrant a full-scale remobilization, even after the Berlin Blockade and the fall of Czechoslovakia in 1948. A ceiling of approximately \$15 billion was placed on defense spending to maintain a balanced budget. Deficit financing was equated with economic collapse. American nuclear striking power, not ground troops stationed in Europe, was to establish a security framework within which European reconstruction could proceed. Europe's recovery was essential to its reassumption of the important role that it had previously played in the world economy based on liberal, capitalist principles. Meanwhile, American influence and presence receded in Asia with the fall of Nationalist China, the

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assignment of responsibility for South-east Asia to France and South Asia to Britain, and the announced self-limitation of the United States for the defense of South Korea.

A new crisis, the Korean War, militarized containment. The Soviet threat was now seen as a military threat, aimed principally at Europe. The Atlantic Alliance became NATO, with a unified command structure under American leadership. Over conservative protest at home, President Truman sent troops to Europe on his own authority. The military assistance program was augmented, and preparations for Germany's re-militarization were commenced. American military-political commitments were increased in Asia, reversing the trend of the immediate postwar period. The U.S. intervention in the Korean Civil War was occasioned by renewed American intervention in the Chinese civil war with the dispatch of the Seventh Fleet to protect Formosa. South Korea joined Japan as protectorates of the United States.

Intervention into the domestic politics of other states centered principally on Europe, not Asia. The reinterpretation of the Soviet threat to West Europe as a military threat refocused American interest in a united Europe. Its integration was seen not only as a means of solving traditional national rivalries but as a mechanism to fight more effectively the cold war.

The European Defense Community Treaty became the centerpiece of American diplomatic efforts in the early 1950's. European union (under American protection) would also furnish the instrument to legitimize and to control effectively German rearmament. The importance of EDC to American cold war strategy was suggested in Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' threat of an "agonizing reappraisal" of the American security commitment to Europe if the treaty failed. For many Frenchmen, including Gaullists and Communists, the issue was more than a dispute over cold

war strategies. The European Defense Community posed a profound intervention into the domestic politics of France and a challenge to its national independence and military security. In less than two centuries since its independence, the tables were now turned between American and European states. Now Europe, not America, was the stake of global politics; now Washington, not France, sought to organize the economic, political, and security structure of its client as a tool in its struggle with its adversaries.

Meanwhile, the Eisenhower administration expanded American political-military commitments around the globe. The Truman administration had signed the Rio Treaty, the Atlantic Alliance, the ANZUS Pact, and a bilateral security accord with the Philippines. The Eisenhower administration added military agreements with Korea and Nationalist China and organized SEATO. It was also the driving force in the formation of the Baghdad (later the CENTO) Pact as a link in a worldwide security chain around the Soviet Union. The passage of the Formosa Resolution in 1955 and the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957 for the Middle East unilaterally extended American assistance to these areas. This augmentation of American security obligations (tied to large military and economic aid programs) was designed to build a barrier to overt military aggression on the Korean model.

The Third World was largely left out of the consideration of the Truman administration, notwithstanding the announced sweep of the Truman and Marshall Doctrines. The Suez crisis and subsequent internal flareups in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon in the middle 1950's dramatized a seeming gap in American cold war strategy. The developing balance of terror between the United States and the Soviet Union nullified much of the relevance of the massive retaliation strategy as a check to

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Communist advances in the Third World. It dictated that the "power of the United States and its allies to control events within the non-Communist portions of the world would . . . have to be based on more than the existing global distribution of military power."⁵ Washington's alignment with Egypt and the Soviet Union against its allies and clients (Britain, France, and Israel) was advised by the changing structure of American strategic concerns with the perceived importance of the Third World in global politics. The pactomania of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations principally addressed the problem of external security. It did not touch the socio-economic substrata of national life. An expansion of American political-military engagements around the world did not respond to the emerging Third World need for national independence, socio-economic development (partly through outside assistance) and nonalignment in the Soviet-American confrontation.

The Eisenhower administration recoiled from a full acceptance of its own evolving conception of the new power requirements of the global struggle with the Soviet Union. It was also reluctant to widen the conflict to include a greater range of military confrontations with Soviet and other Communist forces than at the nuclear level. Massive retaliation remained the prevailing doctrine although it was inconsistent with the structure of American commitments. Ceilings were still kept on defense spending. Defense spending averaged below \$40 billion each year. Air and seapower, based on tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, was stressed at the expense of ground forces. Military disengagement in Asia proceeded in counterpoint to political engagement. Conservative economic doctrine, that the American economy could not support a greater global effort, dominated administration thinking.

international politics at the close of the Eisenhower administration provoked a wide-ranging debate, about the future course of American foreign policy and the role of the United States. The issues were fourfold: (1) The balance of terror and, after Sputnik in November 1957, the perceived ascendancy of the Soviet Union in the cold war; (2) enlarging concern for the stabilization of the arms race and military conflict; (3) the rise of an economically strong and politically restive Western Europe; and (4) the national assertiveness of Third World states progressively resistant to Soviet-American blandishments and threats. These foreign policy problems developed within the context of the most serious economic recession in the United States of the postwar period. Economic worries were added to those of fear and moral depression in the aftermath of Sputnik that the quality of American life was diminishing and that the American people lacked the pluck and genius to meet these varied challenges.

Dispute centered on the Eisenhower administration's stewardship of American foreign policy. Critics rejected the limits that it placed on the American role in global affairs and on the means and strategies that should be employed in conducting a globalized cold war. The debate that raged from 1958 through the election campaign of 1960 set the stage for the most extensive expansion of American power. It also fully absorbed the cold war into the domestic politics of the nation. Hard-line critics of the Eisenhower administration advised a wider spectrum of national military capabilities, tighter security alliance coordination with allies and clients, and military assistance, including arms and advisors, to establish a single, interwoven global security network resistant to external Communist aggression and internal subversion. Soft-line critics emphasized economic and technical support for political elements

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within countries seeking to encourage modernization and democratic institutions. Both hard and soft-liners were convinced that foreign policy success hinged on the stimulation of the lagging American economy and on addressing social ills in American society, such as jobs, civil rights, urban blight, voting inequities, medical insurance, and income redistribution.

Domestic reform was called into the service of foreign policy. Through circular logic, economic growth and social change were promoted to assure international conditions whose preservation and extension were considered prerequisites of progressive movement at home. Foreign and domestic problems had to be attacked as a whole since they were seen to be inseparably linked. The United States was said to have the means for achieving these ambitious goals if it drew on the human and material resources at the disposal of the American people. The Eisenhower administration's shortcomings in foreign policy were measured by its failure to pursue domestic social and economic policies to exploit these resources.

A strong Presidency was also advanced as the institutional means to mobilize the American people whose skill and resources were enlisted in the world struggle. An ascendant Presidency, resting on a strengthened plebiscitary principle, was conceived as more suited to the needs of American society than one constrained by Congress under the separation of powers. The President's constituency extended beyond the geographic limits of the United States and included all those peoples and interests over which American power had influence and obligations. The President was agent of the American people whose society and government were at the hub of an emerging world order of their own creation.

The Kennedy administration fused hard and soft-line critics into an uneasy coalition which carried him to a slim

electoral victory in 1960. Kennedy proposed to respond to the domestic needs of the American people and simultaneously resolve the principal structural problems of international politics that posed a challenge to continued American leadership in the world. Kennedy's campaign speeches are instructive. They marked a complete break with the divisibility thesis:

We will no longer be secure unless we have confidence that we represent the way of the future, that we are constructing here in the United States the kind of society which gives [people abroad] hope that they can follow our example. When we drift, when we lie at anchor, when we are uncertain, when we have long debates about what our national purpose is, then we give an image of uncertainty . . . We have to demonstrate our conviction that not only will our children be free, but so will the children of men around the world.⁶

The array of foreign and military strategic initiatives taken by the Kennedy administration, heralded as a Grand Design, spoke to each level of international challenge facing the United States. At a security level, Washington embraced a flexible response strategy built on the development of strategic, conventional, and antiguerrilla forces capable of resisting overt or covert aggression around the globe. To meet what was perceived as a growing Soviet military threat, the Kennedy leadership announced its intention to seek a position of overwhelming strategic superiority. The European states were assigned the job of building up their conventional forces. European concern about American nuclear protection, on the one hand, and the possibilities of entanglement in the U.S. conflicts in the Third World, on the other, were muted in the call for an Atlantic Community in which the United States and a united

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Europe were to be equal partners. The issues of European control over American nuclear weapons or over Washington's Third World adventures would be moot since European-American political perspectives and interests would presumably converge. The Bahamas accord between the United States and Britain in 1962 placed the British nuclear deterrent under closer American supervision. The offer to France to join the arrangement, which opened the divisive campaign to create an Atlantic multilateral force, foresaw the extension of American technology to France (and Western Europe) in exchange for greater coordination and control of European nuclear weapons and their development within an Atlantic framework under American direction.

The two industrialized blocs of Europe and the United States, linked by common security, institutional, and economic ties, were expected to be a powerful magnet for the East European peoples and to be a liberalizing pressure upon the Soviet Union. The Atlantic Community, resting on the two pillars of the United States and Europe, would also provide the political, economic, and strategic bases for a North-South relation favorable to the West. It would serve as an added buttress for anticipated Western domination in the East-West struggle. The Third World would be called into play to address the balance of the old world in favor of a brave new world under American leadership.

The Third World was not neglected. The Alliance of Progress, designed initially for Latin America, was modeled for world export. Like West Europe, the emerging states were expected to pattern their economic development on the American example. The soft-line elements of the Kennedy coalition argued for larger American economic and political intervention into the Third World to align the United States with nationalist and socially progressive

elements around the world. Economic development, social and political equality, and democratic institutions were viewed as indispensable instruments for the integration of the underdeveloped states within a free and liberal Western community under American aegis. In the absence of American stimulated reform, Communist forces would have, as General George Marshall had intimated over a decade earlier, a favorable terrain on which to increase their power. Features of domestic political life that had hitherto escaped cold war attention—the tax structure of a country, its economic planning, voting procedures—came within the American purview. Where economic assistance and moral exhortation for reform proved unavailing, American arms would be available to protect and to establish democratic regimes, like the Congo, which were being besieged by the right or the left, preferably but not exclusively under collective security auspices. The armed services were advised to give more attention to fighting guerrilla wars, to increase airlift capacity as a means of streamlining and improving the U.S. ability to intervene militarily abroad, and to encourage a greater civic role for American and allied troops.

The Kennedy Grand Design and the policies which it initiated marked the zenith of the indivisibility doctrine in operation. American moral worth was to be validated on a world stage. American national action had merit only if it were universal. It was not entirely coincidental that Kennedy repeatedly invoked Thomas Paine's injunction that America acted on behalf of mankind: "The cause of America is the cause of mankind." The American role in world politics was total. It envisioned the eventual domestication of international politics and the internationalization of domestic politics. Security, democracy, and socioeconomic welfare were to be achieved everywhere or they could exist

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nowhere. America would assume the challenge of its revolutionary past and project it forward in a revolutionary transformation of the international order cast in its own image.

Conclusions. The demise of the indivisibility doctrine was simultaneous with its fullest rhetorical statement under the Kennedy administration. Increasing American offensive nuclear arms failed to tip the balance of terror in America's favor. These efforts were perceived as destabilizing and mutually disadvantageous to both superpowers unless placed under agreed controls. Shortly after the announcement of a nuclear counterforce strategy, it was abandoned as unfeasible. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara conceded before Congress that a nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union would result in over 100 million American deaths. There was no alternative to arms control understandings with the Soviet Union since American security was not solely within the capacity of the United States to determine or control. It was a function of Soviet capabilities, intentions, and behavior over which the United States had some, but hardly a controlling, influence.

For their part, America's allies, especially the European states and Japan, resisted the roles assigned to them and the military-political-economic guidelines they were supposed to follow. Flexible response was judged too costly and politically unpalatable. Despite continued European misgivings about the U.S. nuclear deterrent, there appeared no workable alternative to dependency on the American guarantee. The multilateral nuclear force was viewed after 3 years of intense American diplomacy, much of it aimed at isolating Gaullist France within Europe, more as an obstacle than as a vehicle of U.S.-European cooperation. De Gaulle's veto of Britain's request for

membership in the EEC, his rebuff of the MLF, his decision to withdraw France from NATO, and his sustained criticism of American imperial drives in Europe and the Third World diminished the attractiveness of European unity in American policy circles and, by that token, its prospects. A Europe of Gaullist-minded states was neither a pliable instrument in the service of American global designs nor necessarily compatible with narrower American self-interests. The French nuclear program deepened the problem of proliferation. Its charges of American economic dominance centered its attack on the dollar standard, its protectionist orientation within the EEC, and its insistence on a common agricultural policy, which restricted access of American farm products to European markets, suggested that European unity under such terms was potentially a competitor, not a partner, for markets and political influence around the world.

American setbacks in the Third World were no less pronounced. The Congo episode coincided with a trend in Third World sentiment adverse to the United States. The United Nations was increasingly less susceptible to American bidding. The Cuban revolution under Fidel Castro survived American efforts to destroy it despite the aborted invasion of 1961 and the missile crisis of 1962. The Alliance for Progress raised Latin American suspicions about its disruptive effects, and foundered for lack of congressional support. Except for heavily assisted client states in Asia and Africa, and even among them, the United States found few friends or ready invitations of the American example.

Vietnam drew the sharpest and most painful limits for the applicability of the indivisibility thesis. A military solution proved elusive in a war of national liberation; Communist forces proved more disciplined and devoted to their cause than the troops of America's

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client regime in Saigon; democratic institutions and socioeconomic reforms that were promised never materialized. The cost was enormous—\$25.5 billion economic and military aid to Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam—and over 50,000 American lives lost in a doubtful struggle. Having tied itself to corrupt and authoritarian regimes, the entire rationale for American intervention appeared undermined.

The gravest blow to the indivisibility doctrine, however, was at home. Kennedy-Johnson efforts *To Move a Nation*, as one official of the Kennedy administration wrote, backfired.⁷ Their efforts to increase American power, commitments, and responsibilities abroad and to reform American life met with increasing opposition as the costs in blood and treasure of these efforts became clearer. Domestic division, exemplified in clashes between the races, between generations, and between social and economic groups, was one of the fruits of expansion. Governmental authority, based on such dubious results, was inevitably challenged. Set in motion was a new crisis, as much domestic as foreign, that questioned the viability of American institutions, the success of its socioeconomic achievements, and the basis of its security arrangements resting alternately on nuclear holocaust or unlimited intervention in civil strifes and wars of national liberation around the world.

Thus, what one might call the Second American Revolution is over. The need for a new rationale to direct American power abroad and to relate it to American values and institutions at home is evident. But necessity is not necessarily the mother of invention. The Nixon administration promised to develop such an innovative conceptual and institutional framework to fit the times.

Whatever its partial successes—Communist China's reintroduction into the international community and the SALT accords come quickly to mind—its violation of domestic political norms and its dissemblings over Vietnam deepened the crisis facing the American nation and its people. The job of defining a new conceptual and normative base for American foreign policy, one workable abroad and acceptable at home, remains.

President Kennedy, quoting Edmund Burke, was right when he said, "We sit on a conspicuous [stage], what we do here, what we fail to do, affects the course of freedom around the world."⁸ The United States may, indeed, sit upon a global stage, but there is neither a completed script at hand, nor a role assigned nor ascribed. If the Presidential election of 1976 offers any indication, Americans also appear unsure, as never before, about who should be the director of the stage production. It may be unsettling but no less true to conclude that, for the while, the United States, buffeted at home and abroad, is like an actor in search of a play.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



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NOTES

1. Quoted in Norman A. Graebner, *Ideas and Diplomacy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 310.
2. *Messages and Papers of the President*, ed., Richard D. Richardson, I, p. 217.
3. Quoted in Graebner, p. 731.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 733.
5. Seyom Brown, *The Faces of Power* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 125.
6. U.S. Senate, Committee on Commerce, *The Speeches of Senator John F. Kennedy: Presidential Campaign of 1960* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1960), p. 777.
7. Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967).
8. *Speeches of Senator John F. Kennedy*, p. 339.

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