

1977

Executive Protection Manual

Robert F. Delaney

Ian Reber

Paul Shaw

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review>

Recommended Citation

Delaney, Robert F.; Reber, Ian; and Shaw, Paul (1977) "Executive Protection Manual," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 30 : No. 2 , Article 27.

Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol30/iss2/27>

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

126 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

January 1944, less than a month after a conference with Admiral King in which the latter had emphasized the Marianas as the key to Pacific strategy, Nimitz and all his staff joined in support of the MacArthur plan for a single-line advance by way of New Guinea and Mindanao. But this decision was shortly sunk without trace by an angry broadside from that fierce Mahanian who ruled the Navy from Washington.

Of the unofficial Nimitz, we learn that he had simple tastes, a due respect for the proprieties combined with total lack of arrogance, great devotion to his family, and a service loyalty that ran both up and down (the latter sufficiently demonstrated when he went over the side into the winter Atlantic to rescue a drowning sailor). He loved music, disliked women in the armed services, and felt uncomfortable with the expanded postwar bureaucratic Navy. In retirement his generosity showed in the care and support he provided to four refugee Hungarian children whose parents had been unable to get out, and his catholicity in acquaintances in an enduring friendship with a Chinese-American banker. But the inner man remains concealed: The single most revealing insight in the book is provided by a discouraged letter of March 1942, one of the very few that Mrs. Nimitz did not destroy. Nor do we see the individual through the eyes of others: His postwar relationship with Eisenhower is not touched on, and it remains unclear why Secretary Forrestal so strongly opposed his appointment as Chief of Naval Operations.

One may regret the inability of author and reader to penetrate the screen that Admiral Nimitz so successfully erected in defense of his privacy. Yet it may be that in seeing only the naval officer we see the essential truth. Throughout his active career and on through his retirement this very balanced steady man seems to have found all the satisfaction he needed in the

service of his country. One of his daughters once contemplated joining the Communist Party and another in due course became a nun. But the Admiral's tombstone, by his own specific choice, carries as its only symbol a circlet of five stars.

JAMES A. FIELD, JR.
Swarthmore College

Reber, Ian and Shaw, Paul. *Executive Protection Manual*. Schuller Park, Ill.: Motorola Teleprograms, 1976. 285pp.

In an age where warfare is often terror and terror becomes a form of warfare it was inevitable that worried but practical men would begin to grope with the problem. And so the management of terror has been reduced to a technical training manual. It is a fascinating exercise, recommended for anyone who wonders professionally what the hell he would do if attacked, ambushed or kidnapped on the way to work. The work is professional, concise, and like the terror area it describes (a growth industry), it comes in flexible, expandable looseleaf format. I doubt if a prudent senior government officer or corporate official will want to pass up this easily read and intriguing "how to avoid . . ." textbook.

Principally, the book is a primer on terrorism and terrorists. Who, how, when and why! But much more importantly the book describes in considerable detail the problems of how to avoid acts of terror, principally the ambush, the kidnap and the hostage situation.

The text is divided into 15 chapters detailing the techniques, psychology and case histories of recent acts of terror, including the kidnapping of the British Ambassador Geoffrey Jackson in Uruguay. Survival techniques, hostage psychology, negotiating concepts are all explored in-depth and fascinating detail.

An entire section of the text is spent

PROFESSIONAL READING 127

on crisis management as applied to terror, blackmail and kidnapping. The role of the family, the role of the agency or corporation, the need for contingency planning and for training are laid out thoroughly and in detail.

This is one manual which deserves to be read for its own sake.

ROBERT F. DELANEY
Naval War College

Stevenson, William. *A Man Called Intrepid*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976. 486pp.

This is an important book for a wide range of readers: World War II scholars and buffs, those interested in espionage and clandestine operations, constitutional lawyers, revisionist historians, moralists, and proponents and opponents of unconventional warfare, to name a few.

A Man Called Intrepid provides an enticing glimpse into the inner sancta of high-level policy formulation, international and domestic intrigue and gut-wrenching decisionmaking. The author has presented a collection of case studies in espionage and counter-espionage which defy the imagination. More accurately, they might be called short stories. Each of the six parts contains extremely interesting and thought-provoking accounts of clandestine operations during World War II which had some impact on the conduct or outcome of the war.

There is an interesting and important account of relations between Churchill and Roosevelt prior to our entry into the war. It raises serious questions about the role of a neutral nation, what the President can or should do to enhance national security while supporting one belligerent against another. Bureaucratic problems are also discussed including disputes between agencies of the United States and Great Britain, as well as those within the U.S. Government.

Stevenson notes that on several <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol30/iss2/27>

occasions the necessity to preserve the secrecy of allied intelligence sources (human and technical) resulted in foreseen and unfortunate friendly casualties: devastation of Coventry, death of the actor Leslie Howard, German rockets missing London but landing in other inhabited areas.

There are instances of extraordinary bravery such as the efforts to destroy the "heavy water" plant in Norway to prevent the Nazis from harnessing atomic energy. This example also brings into view some of the conflicts between those who favor unconventional operations and those who prefer "conventional" military methods. New light is shed on the disastrous raid on Dieppe and, perhaps, justifies the losses suffered there.

Intrepid is much more than a sequel to *Ultra Secret* and the exploitation of the Enigma code machine. It is an exciting, well-written, inside look at many facets of worldwide intelligence and counterintelligence operations prior to and during a great war and, as such, deserves our attention.

W.P.C. MORGENTHAUER
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

Taylor, Maxwell D. *Precarious Security*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1976. 143pp.

In his three earlier books Maxwell Taylor has consistently sounded one alarm or another, but in this new work, recently identified in the press as influencing President Carter, Taylor's bugle rings out in somewhat muted and subtly ominous—and yet ultimately optimistic—tones. In the period of 1976 and beyond, the author methodically catalogs the major international problems he perceives as critical to the security of the United States, including the relative decline in military strength of the United States and our allies versus the growing militarism of the Soviet Union, economic problems of the Western