

1977

A Man Called Intrepid

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on crisis management as applied to terror, blackmail and kidnapping. The role of the family, the role of the agency or corporation, the need for contingency planning and for training are laid out thoroughly and in detail.

This is one manual which deserves to be read for its own sake.

ROBERT F. DELANEY
Naval War College

Stevenson, William. *A Man Called Intrepid*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976. 486pp.

This is an important book for a wide range of readers: World War II scholars and buffs, those interested in espionage and clandestine operations, constitutional lawyers, revisionist historians, moralists, and proponents and opponents of unconventional warfare, to name a few.

A Man Called Intrepid provides an enticing glimpse into the inner sancta of high-level policy formulation, international and domestic intrigue and gut-wrenching decisionmaking. The author has presented a collection of case studies in espionage and counter-espionage which defy the imagination. More accurately, they might be called short stories. Each of the six parts contains extremely interesting and thought-provoking accounts of clandestine operations during World War II which had some impact on the conduct or outcome of the war.

There is an interesting and important account of relations between Churchill and Roosevelt prior to our entry into the war. It raises serious questions about the role of a neutral nation, what the President can or should do to enhance national security while supporting one belligerent against another. Bureaucratic problems are also discussed including disputes between agencies of the United States and Great Britain, as well as those within the U.S. Government.

Stevenson notes that on several

occasions the necessity to preserve the secrecy of allied intelligence sources (human and technical) resulted in foreseen and unfortunate friendly casualties: devastation of Coventry, death of the actor Leslie Howard, German rockets missing London but landing in other inhabited areas.

There are instances of extraordinary bravery such as the efforts to destroy the "heavy water" plant in Norway to prevent the Nazis from harnessing atomic energy. This example also brings into view some of the conflicts between those who favor unconventional operations and those who prefer "conventional" military methods. New light is shed on the disastrous raid on Dieppe and, perhaps, justifies the losses suffered there.

Intrepid is much more than a sequel to *Ultra Secret* and the exploitation of the Enigma code machine. It is an exciting, well-written, inside look at many facets of worldwide intelligence and counterintelligence operations prior to and during a great war and, as such, deserves our attention.

W.P.C. MORGENTHAUER
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

Taylor, Maxwell D. *Precarious Security*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1976. 143pp.

In his three earlier books Maxwell Taylor has consistently sounded one alarm or another, but in this new work, recently identified in the press as influencing President Carter, Taylor's bugle rings out in somewhat muted and subtly ominous—and yet ultimately optimistic—tones. In the period of 1976 and beyond, the author methodically catalogs the major international problems he perceives as critical to the security of the United States, including the relative decline in military strength of the United States and our allies versus the growing militarism of the Soviet Union, economic problems of the Western