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Precarious Security

Herman J. Long Jr.
U.S. Navy

Maxwell D. Taylor

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on crisis management as applied to terror, blackmail and kidnapping. The role of the family, the role of the agency or corporation, the need for contingency planning and for training are laid out thoroughly and in detail.

This is one manual which deserves to be read for its own sake.

ROBERT F. DELANEY
Naval War College

Stevenson, William. *A Man Called Intrepid*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976. 486pp.

This is an important book for a wide range of readers: World War II scholars and buffs, those interested in espionage and clandestine operations, constitutional lawyers, revisionist historians, moralists, and proponents and opponents of unconventional warfare, to name a few.

A Man Called Intrepid provides an enticing glimpse into the inner sancta of high-level policy formulation, international and domestic intrigue and gut-wrenching decisionmaking. The author has presented a collection of case studies in espionage and counter-espionage which defy the imagination. More accurately, they might be called short stories. Each of the six parts contains extremely interesting and thought-provoking accounts of clandestine operations during World War II which had some impact on the conduct or outcome of the war.

There is an interesting and important account of relations between Churchill and Roosevelt prior to our entry into the war. It raises serious questions about the role of a neutral nation, what the President can or should do to enhance national security while supporting one belligerent against another. Bureaucratic problems are also discussed including disputes between agencies of the United States and Great Britain, as well as those within the U.S. Government.

Stevenson notes that on several
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occasions the necessity to preserve the secrecy of allied intelligence sources (human and technical) resulted in foreseen and unfortunate friendly casualties: devastation of Coventry, death of the actor Leslie Howard, German rockets missing London but landing in other inhabited areas.

There are instances of extraordinary bravery such as the efforts to destroy the "heavy water" plant in Norway to prevent the Nazis from harnessing atomic energy. This example also brings into view some of the conflicts between those who favor unconventional operations and those who prefer "conventional" military methods. New light is shed on the disastrous raid on Dieppe and, perhaps, justifies the losses suffered there.

Intrepid is much more than a sequel to *Ultra Secret* and the exploitation of the Enigma code machine. It is an exciting, well-written, inside look at many facets of worldwide intelligence and counterintelligence operations prior to and during a great war and, as such, deserves our attention.

W.P.C. MORGENTHAUER
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

Taylor, Maxwell D. *Precarious Security*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1976. 143pp.

In his three earlier books Maxwell Taylor has consistently sounded one alarm or another, but in this new work, recently identified in the press as influencing President Carter, Taylor's bugle rings out in somewhat muted and subtly ominous—and yet ultimately optimistic—tones. In the period of 1976 and beyond, the author methodically catalogs the major international problems he perceives as critical to the security of the United States, including the relative decline in military strength of the United States and our allies versus the growing militarism of the Soviet Union, economic problems of the Western

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world related to energy shortages, disruption of the status quo power relationships in the Mideast, and growing discontent in the world's have-not nations. He adds to these woes with his impressions of domestic problems of disunity at home, decreasing national confidence in political leaders, and loss of the national will as evidenced by the "self-destructive and decadent traits." Taylor assumes his "self-appointed task . . . to outline a national security policy that will identify the sources of power available to provide such security, and propose ways for maximizing the effectiveness of this power and for minimizing the waste inherent in present procedures."

Taylor then proceeds through nine substantive but easily read chapters to outline his conceptions of the future, which, coming from a former Army Chief of Staff, an ex-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a past and possibly future Presidential advisor, should be considered seriously by any alert and astute student of international affairs. Taylor sees the Soviets losing little in various politically required international concessions and simply waiting instead for the "Marxist day of judgement when the walls of capitalism will come tumbling down." Instead of the inevitable nuclear conflict or stalemate of yesteryear, therefore, Taylor now foresees only limited conflicts involving proxies for the superpowers, but he theorizes that military intervention by both these powers might occur to prevent further nuclear proliferation of workable weapons, particularly in India, Iran, Libya, Brazil and Venezuela.

He calls for a total reexamination of all existing alliances which he perceives as outdated and partially indefensible in today's environment. Additional antithetical discussions involve Israel's chances of survival with and without U.S. support, using food production as a national weapon, the likelihood of the

the Warsaw Pact nations pouncing on the prostrated superpowers following a nuclear exchange, and the unconstitutionality of the new War Powers Act, which Taylor thinks should be challenged immediately in the courts since it is far too constraining on future presidents.

A particularly interesting new concept for Taylor is his enlarged horizon of "total national security" and the "valuables" it must protect—including now the quality of life and the national economy, as well as the time-honored ideas of national essence and alliances. This approach allows the author to ask for financial sacrifices by the populace, and to state that the "test of a bona-fide national interest is the willingness of a country to expend resources for its attainment," a not-too-well veiled warning that we may have to pay for our future security in the coin of reduced excesses and fewer creature comforts.

Maxwell Taylor followers will be interested, too, in his postscript explanation and interpretation of the "debacle in Vietnam," especially his analysis of the four contributory U.S. mistakes. His projections for overall defense manning, conversely, will surprise no one given his own predilections and the aforementioned perceptions. Unpredictable, though, is Taylor's call for greatly increased economy in defense to reverse the DoD image as a wasteful spend-thrift, by subsequent reductions in land-based missiles, large aircraft carriers, strategic bombers, and foreign-based Army divisions—particularly in NATO.

On the civil, domestic scene, Taylor strongly advocates a total reexamination and reorganization of the Federal government machinery, and the creation of an all-encompassing new National Policy Council modeled on the NSC to absorb the NSC, but embracing the "total security" picture he portrays to establish clear and consistent policy and to avoid wasting resources. Harkening back to one of his Johnson-era recommen-

dations, he again suggests the President must increase his use of communications and the media to form favorable public opinion, and that the President is otherwise at a severe disadvantage in the opinion arena. Taylor suggests 1 to 2 hours of Presidential television press coverage weekly to allow "recurrent public questioning" of national policy, and implies that this step will improve the national consciousness.

In summary, Taylor predicts that the American people will pay the price necessary to achieve their "total security" once they are enlightened. His book could add to that enlightenment.

HERMAN J. LONG, JR.
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Vernon, Raymond, ed. *The Oil Crisis*. New York: Norton, 1976. 301pp.

The events following the outbreak of war between Israel and the Arab states in October 1973 had traumatic impacts on the world's economic and political systems that are still being felt. The "oil crisis" is the term commonly used to describe the embargoes and production cutbacks by the Arab oil producers and the fourfold increase in crude oil prices by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The oil crisis strained the NATO alliance and was a major factor in the double-digit inflations and severe recessions that wracked the industrial nations' economies in 1974 and 1975.

Raymond Vernon has edited and contributed to a collection of essays by a multidisciplinary group of international scholars whose efforts were sponsored jointly by the Center for International Affairs of Harvard University and by *Daedalus*, the journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. This volume will aid readers to understand the nature of the oil crisis and help them to put it in perspective. Although most of the essays are related to others in the work, many of them could be read independently.

Raymond Vernon opens the book with an interpretative essay which focuses on what was learned about the oil crisis by the interaction of these scholars. Other essays provide analyses of the economic background and development of the crisis; of the actions of the oil-producing countries, the United States, Europe, Japan, and the Soviet Union during the crisis; of the role of the multinational oil companies; of the functioning of OPEC, and of the efforts of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) for international energy cooperation. The book concludes with three essays in a section called "Synthesis," which Vernon, in the preface, says, "should be read in the same spirit as the Japanese novel *Roshomon--Three Versions of an Incident*."

One conclusion the authors reach which is worth noting is that the multinational oil companies showed a greater ability to adapt to the embargo and output restrictions than did the governments of the importing states. Robert Stobaugh's analysis of the distribution of crude oil supplies during the embargo period indicates that the companies rearranged their worldwide production and distribution of oil to equalize the shortages in the consuming nations according to an "equal-suffering" rule. It is doubtful that following chauvinistic national government guidance would have led to an oil allocation which would have been better when longrun political and economic interdependence are considered.

Readers of this journal will be interested in Klaus Knorr's essay, "The Limits of Economic and Military Power." In response to the question "Why this reluctance to resort to force [by the oil-importing nations]?" Knorr says that the magnitude of the military effort against the Arab oil producers would have had to have been far in excess of a modest show of force or small expeditionary force given the