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The First South Pacific Campaign: Pacific Fleet Strategy, December 1941-June 1942

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military manpower, and the material on regional impacts of defense spending, in which a simple regional model is developed. However, even in reading those parts, most could get by without previous economics background. The level of difficulty is certainly below that in much of Hitch and McKean. The American reader uninterested in the British defense establishment will not find the U.K. orientation a significant drawback. Other than in the first part of Chapter 4, the book is not descriptive of British institutions. In fact, because the research and the literature are so dominated by American scholars, much of the description and analysis is in a U.S. context. My judgment, then, is that the book can be used as a text in an introductory Defense Economics course in the United States, if it is fairly liberally supplemented with other reading.

In short, *The Economics of Defence* is a compact introduction to a great many topics in defense economics. The specialist in defense economics will learn little from this volume—but it is not designed for him. For the economist unfamiliar with the defense sector, it provides an introduction into a range of defense problems to which economics can contribute insight. For the military professional with little or no training in economics, the book provides a good introduction to the applications of economics to national defense. In this regard, Kennedy has written a very useful book.

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Lundstrom, John B. *The First South Pacific Campaign: Pacific Fleet Strategy, December 1941-June 1942*. Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1976. 240pp.

It is probably no exaggeration to say that far more print has been expended on the events leading up to the war with

Japan than on the war itself. About the 3½ years of war in the Pacific there are virtually no historiographical controversies. The single episode which has been carefully studied and debated is the decision to use the atomic bomb and this discussion has been concerned more with the origins of the cold war than on the climax of the war with Japan. Other writing about the war generally falls into two categories, a rehash of the official histories or breathless "human drama" accounts which tell the reader exactly how Gunner's Mate Joe Jones was feeling when he shot down his first zero.

The First South Pacific Campaign falls into neither of these tired categories. It is instead a major reinterpretation of the first half year of war in the Pacific which demonstrates that there is still much to be learned about the strategic and operational aspects of the war. Relying heavily on the CINCPAC-FLEET war diaries and a private translation of the Japanese Self-Defense Agency official history, Lundstrom shows how the South Pacific, an area of secondary interest to both Japanese and American strategists at the beginning of the war, gradually became an area of decisive importance in determining the success of the American "defensive-offensive" during the first phase of the war.

Lundstrom's interpretation differs in a number of important respects from the standard account in Samuel Eliot Morison's *History of U.S. Naval Operations*. For example, in discussing the unsuccessful relief of Wake Island, Morison criticizes Adm. Frank Jack Fletcher for pausing to fuel his destroyers instead of pressing on toward Wake on 21 December 1941 when he could have caught the Japanese invasion force unloading and without air cover. Lundstrom, however, shows that Vice Adm. William S. Pye, who relieved Adm. Husband E. Kimmell as CINCPAC-FLEET on 17 December slowed down

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the timetable for the relief expedition to allow reinforcements to reach Fletcher and specifically "ordered Fletcher to fuel before he approached the island." Lundstrom also shows that Nimitz did not learn of the impending Midway offensive until mid-May and originally expected that the Coral Sea battle would be the decisive engagement with the Japanese carrier fleet. "Coral Sea could easily have been as decisive as Midway, had the Japanese actually committed forces there in the magnitude which Nimitz thought [sic]."

It is impossible within the space of a short review to do justice to all of the author's new and provocative interpretations. Some, such as his discussion of Halsey's operations with Task Force 16, in the Ocean-Nauru campaign, will certainly be the subject of some contention. The heroes of Mr. Lundstrom's book are, not surprisingly, Admirals King and Nimitz, Marshall, Arnold and their staffs come off as a rather inept bunch who never clearly appreciated the danger in the Pacific and "pushed vigorously for premature offensives in northern Europe." This is a view which will probably appeal to Pacific veterans, but may strike others as somewhat unfair. Whatever their views, students of World War II cannot afford to ignore this book.

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Rickover, Hyman G. *How the Battleship MAINE Was Destroyed*. Washington: Naval History Division, 1976. 173pp.

The explosion of the U.S. battleship *Maine* at her anchorage in Havana harbor on 15 February 1898 was one of the events which impelled the United States into war with Spain. As a result of victory in the ensuing conflict, the United States acquired a protectorate over Cuba and colonies in the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico. Possession of the Philippines did much to

make the United States an Asian/Pacific power and in that sense opened the way to the often controversial 20th-century American involvement in Asia. The importance of the Spanish-American War in shaping the modern pattern of America's global commitments interested Adm. Hyman G. Rickover in the conflict and drew his attention to the aspect of the coming of the war most within his field of knowledge and experience: the sinking of the *Maine*.

The U.S. Navy itself twice attempted to pinpoint the cause of the explosion that shattered the bow of the *Maine*, killed 266 of the 354 officers and men of her crew, and sent the ship to the bottom of the shallow harbor. In March 1898, a court of inquiry headed by Capt. William T. Sampson, a former chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, concluded that the *Maine* had been demolished by the explosion of one or more of her forward magazines and—what was at the time politically crucial—that the magazine explosion had been set off by an initial explosion outside the ship, probably that of a mine planted by persons unknown.

A second Navy board of inspection conducted another, more thorough investigation in 1911 while the Army Corps of Engineers was preparing to raise the wreck. The engineers built a cofferdam around the *Maine* and pumped out most of the water within the dam, permitting close inspection of the exposed hulk before it was raised, towed out to deep water, and sunk to prevent it from continuing to obstruct harbor traffic. This second Navy investigation contradicted the findings of the Sampson court by placing the site of the fatal explosion farther aft in the bow section than had the earlier court but again insisted that a mine had set off one of the magazines. At the time of the disaster and throughout the years that followed, naval officers, experts on ship construction and explosives, and journalists and historians, in the United