

1976

## Gestapu--Ten Years After

L.K. Burgess

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review>

---

### Recommended Citation

Burgess, L.K. (1976) "Gestapu--Ten Years After," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 29 : No. 1 , Article 8.  
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol29/iss1/8>

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu](mailto:repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu).

*The 1965 abortive coup by the Communist Party of Indonesia against the established political order was a unique and extremely important event in Asian history. Although it was totally unsuccessful and was suppressed in less than 2 days, the consequences included a massive and bloody elimination of Indonesian Communists and their sympathizers. Captain Burgess describes what took place during the revolution and its aftermath. He examines the objectives of the revolutionary leaders, the means they used, and how and why they failed. In so doing, he discusses many problems he found inherent in the Indonesian Communist Party.*

## **GESTAPU—TEN YEARS AFTER**

by

**Captain L.K. Burgess, U.S. Marine Corps**

March 1976 commemorates the 10th anniversary of the culmination of a series of events which is one of the watersheds of contemporary Asian history. These events began in October 1965 with an attempt by the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) to overthrow the government of President Sukarno and establish itself as a revolutionary power at a time when similar Communist attempts in Southeast Asia were not going well. Indonesian military forces under the skillful leadership of General Suharto quickly rallied and turned the tide against the Communists and in favor of the established political order.

Indonesia is as much a keystone to stability in Southeast Asia today as it was 10 years ago. Had the PKI been successful in October 1965, it would have established a base from which it

could have expanded its control over the resource laden archipelago.

The significance of the Suharto victory takes on added importance when it is viewed in the light of the political developments in Southeast Asia in 1975. Less than a decade ago, many scholars, analysts, and political leaders quickly dismissed such notions as the "domino theory" as so much nonsense while they proclaimed "wars of national liberation" were merely civil conflicts of little matter to the policies of the United States. Today, after the rapid and successive loss to the Communists of three Southeast Asian nations, an assessment made in 1966 that a PKI victory would have ensured the spread of Communist power "like a great nutcracker with one prong stretching southward from Hanoi and the other northward from Jakarta"<sup>1</sup> seems reasonable.

## 66 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Such a victory could have generated a serious and immediate challenge to the independence of Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, while ensuring inevitable Communist pressure on the Philippines and Australia. General Suharto's victory and its subsequent effect wrought havoc upon the Chinese inspired Communist grand strategy in Southeast Asia.

**The Attempted Coup.** During the night of 30 September and through the morning of 1 October 1965, a group calling itself the "September 30th Movement" struck at the established political order in Indonesia.<sup>2</sup> It was under the announced leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Untung, Commander of the Tjarkabirwa, the Presidential Palace Guard. Six key general officers of the Indonesian Army were either shot to death in their quarters or kidnapped and later brutally murdered within the confines of the Halim Air Force Base by elements of Indonesian dissident military forces and the PKI's youth (Permuda Rakjat) and women (Gerwani) fronts.<sup>3</sup> In addition, a seventh and key member of the military elite, Defense Minister and former Army Chief of Staff A.H. Nasution, narrowly escaped death by fleeing his quarters and hiding in the garden of a neighboring diplomat. The six officers who lost their lives were the Army's Chief of Staff, Gen. A. Yani, and five members of his Central Headquarters Staff (known to the PKI as the "Council of Generals") including Major Generals Sooprapto, D.I. Pansjaitan, and Soetojo Sisnomihardjo.<sup>4</sup>

The conspirators captured the Djakarta facilities of the Indonesian national radio network, the central telecommunications office, and other key points within the capital city. Within hours, they announced to Indonesia and to all the world the formation of an Indonesian Revolutionary Council:

In the interest of the State of the Indonesian Republic, in the interest of safeguarding the

implementation of the Pantjasila,\* in the interest of the safety of the Army and the Armed Forces in general, at midnight, Thursday, September 30, 1965, a purge was carried out in the Capital City against members of the Council of Generals . . . a subversive movement sponsored by the CIA. A number of Generals have been arrested. Means of Communications and other vital installations . . . have fallen under the control of the September 30th Movement.

The September 30th Movement is a body entirely confined within the body of the Army to put an end to arbitrary actions of Generals who were members of the Council of Generals.

For the time being . . . to facilitate the followup action of September 30, 1965, the leadership of the September 30th Movement will set up an Indonesian Revolutionary Council whose members will consist of civilian and military individuals who unreservedly support the September 30th Movement. The Indonesia Revolutionary Council will constitute the source of all authority in the Republic of Indonesia.<sup>5</sup>

Soon after, Gen. Omhar Dhani, Chief of Staff of the air force, threw the air force in support of the coup led by Lieutenant Colonel Untung. However, by the afternoon of 1 October 1965, the army, under the command of Lieutenant General Suharto, who had not been included on the assassination list, had mounted a countercoup through a series of deft and bloodless maneuvers. By the end of the day, the broadcast

---

\*Pantjasila, or the five principles, are the guiding points of the Indonesian union enunciated by Sukarno in June 1946. They are: belief in God, humanism, nationalism, democracy, and social justice.

facilities of Radio Indonesia had fallen to the army and, by the next morning, the rebels were in full flight. Having gained complete control of Djakarta, the army announced that a revolt had been crushed and declared martial law throughout the nation.<sup>6</sup> This period of less than 2 days, together with the events leading up to it and those proceeding from it, has been the subject of no small amount of controversy and investigation.<sup>7</sup>

There are two major theories concerning the events and forces which precipitated the September 30th Movement. A number of leading analysts believe that amidst the increasing malcontent of economic and social turmoil, the PKI saw the opportunity to advance the timetable for its long planned revolution. Accordingly, this view holds that the PKI attempted to purge the army of its central leadership and thereby clear the way for its own eventual ascendancy. By employing members of the military specifically cultivated by its Special Bureau, the PKI had hoped to make the coup appear as an "internal army affair."<sup>8</sup> The chronology of events of the coup as reconstructed by the Indonesian Army is essentially accurate and its explanation by the Indonesian Army substantiates this view.

Other analysts adhere to a second theory, notably that Gestapu<sup>9</sup> was instigated by a "Council of Generals" and was, in fact, the result of internal army political squabbling.<sup>10</sup> This theory is posited by McVey and Anderson in the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project.\* It has been denounced by the Indonesian Government as "one-sided and non-factual."<sup>11</sup> More importantly, reliable sources have indicated to me that the Anderson-McVey work, widely known as the "Cornell Report," was con-

structed on the basis of either "second-hand information" (since neither author was in Indonesia at the time of or immediately following the coup) or from accounts received from persons close to President Sukarno.<sup>12</sup> Also, key figures at Cornell University have subsequently "disassociated themselves, to varying degrees, from the report" while "few, if any, Indonesian scholars outside of Cornell credit the report with any validity at all."<sup>13</sup>

The Indonesian Government sees the coup as having been masterminded by the PKI's chairman, D.N. Aidit, working through the clandestine operatives of the Party's Special Bureau. Using opportunistic officers like the army's Lieutenant Colonel Untung and the air force's Marshall Dhani and Brigadier General Supardjo, the PKI did not seek to establish an outright Communist government, but rather, it had hoped only to move the political posture of the Indonesian Government sufficiently to the left to ensure its own survival in the anticipated and imminent post-Sukarno era. Pressed by both the young militant elements within the party and the Chinese Communists, Aidit devised a plan to achieve two different, but interdependent, objectives. The first objective was simply to remove the strongly anti-Communist Army General Staff and to replace it with men who would be less antagonistic toward the PKI. The second goal was to achieve what Sukarno had called a Nasakom regime, i.e., a coalition government in which the Communists would play a major role for the first time and from which the Communists could bring forth the eventual socialist state. Since, at this time, the PKI's goals were essentially limited ones, its attempted coup was more in the nature of a putsch rather than a call for, or an attempt at, outright revolution.<sup>14</sup> This strategem had the advantage of involving a limited number of individuals, therefore it helped to maintain the essential element

\*Benedict R. Anderson and Ruth T. McVey, *A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965 Coup in Indonesia* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1971).  
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1976

## 68 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

of surprise. Furthermore, if the Gestapu could be made to appear as merely an internal army affair, it would be less likely to invite foreign intervention, and should it fail it would not necessarily implicate the PKI.

Hindsight shows that Aidit's plan came very close to succeeding.<sup>15</sup> The plotters' fatal mistakes were in letting General Nasution and General Surosumpono escape the death planned for them<sup>16</sup> and in not marking General Suharto, a commander with units under his command in the capital, for liquidation.<sup>17</sup>

**The Aftermath.** In the aftermath of Gestapu, Indonesia became the scene of an intensive and exceedingly violent reprisal by the Indonesian Government. Hundreds of thousands of Indonesians and Chinese living in the archipelago were killed for being members of or sympathizers of the Communist Party. Estimates of the number of people killed have varied from 78,000 (admitted to by a nine-member group of government investigators in 1965)<sup>18</sup> to a figure of one million dead (which reportedly was the conclusion drawn by a detail of University of Indonesia graduate students working under a grant from the Army).<sup>19</sup> The consensus is that between 300,000 and 500,000 persons were killed.<sup>20</sup> The purge of the Communists and their sympathizers began in late October 1965 and continued through the end of the following January. It now appears that most of the mass killing was accomplished by elements of the militant youth groups of the PKI's rival political parties, the PNI and the NU, under the subtle auspices of the army. It is safe to conclude that among the dead were many persons who had very tenuous connections, at best, with the PKI and others who were eliminated simply as a result of old grudges or through cases of "mistaken identity."<sup>21</sup>

It is generally accepted that the spark

which incited the violent reaction against the Communists was the sight of inhumanely mutilated bodies of the six generals as they were being exhumed from the well in which they had been dumped early in the morning of 1 October 1965.<sup>22</sup> Gruesome photographs and graphic accounts were communicated to the Indonesian masses by the army using the government's well-heeded mass media system. News of the brutal massacre of the six generals, as well as the slaughter of Nasution's innocent baby daughter, sent a shock wave throughout the entire nation. The mutilations and tortures of the victims were seen to be "un-Indonesian" and the work of evil and alien forces within the country. The fact that the generals had been hacked to death with razor blades and knives was interpreted by many Indonesians as a characteristically Chinese action. This notion did much to bolster the idea that a pro-Peking group was behind the coup. Although these factors may have been the catalyst for the anti-PKI reaction following the murders, the underlying reasons for the extreme retribution visited on the PKI had heavy religious overtones. There appears to have been a widespread feeling that the failure of Gestapu was a result of the will of God, who had finally expressed his displeasure with this dark and seamy element of Indonesian society. To the religious purists, it was clearly their responsibility to carry out God's will by exterminating the Communists.

The aftermath of the PKI's abortive coup had a devastating impact on the PKI. U. Alexis Johnson has referred to its failure as one of the most historic turning points in Asia in this decade.<sup>23</sup> Even more significant than the widespread slaughter of party members was the capture and execution of the leading figures of the party. Additionally, property of the party and its numerous frontal groups was confiscated and destroyed.

The once powerful Communist organization was broken, its principal leaders were executed, imprisoned, or driven into exile, and on 11 March 1966,<sup>24</sup> the PKI was officially banned in Indonesia. This decree, when coupled with the staggering loss of life and the elimination of PKI leadership and organizational vitality, constituted a striking setback for the international Communist movement. The French periodical *Le Monde* referred to the events in Indonesia following the September 30th Movement's attempted coup as "the most costly defeat in the history of International Communism."<sup>25</sup> A study prepared and published by the Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, indicates that the total Communist Party membership in the non-Communist world dropped a full 42 percent from 4.5 million to 2.6 million members as the result of the decimation of the Indonesian Communist Party.<sup>26</sup>

To determine why the PKI was so easily eliminated as a viable force in Indonesia, particularly in the light of many estimates of its strength and power, it is necessary to examine a number of critical areas and to dispel a prevailing myth.

It is important to point out that while Communist sympathizers have stated that the PKI was an unwitting victim of the machinations of the CIA,<sup>27</sup> there is no evidence to support this claim. Investigations by on-the-scene journalists such as John Hughes of the *Christian Science Monitor* and Seymour Topping of *The New York Times* failed to find any substantiation for the Communists' allegations against the United States. In fact, even the pro-Communist Swedish paper *Tidsignal* concluded that:

To be sure, the methods used correspond well to what I have seen of the CIA in Latin America and Southeast Asia, but personally, I do not believe that the

CIA has been mixed up in the events of Indonesia, even though it [CIA] has been...no doubt...delighted by the developments. For once, the CIA does not seem to have been needed; events played into their hands nevertheless.<sup>28</sup>

The simple fact of the matter is that: "Although American contacts within Indonesia's military...had an indirect impact on the events of 1965, the spectacular reversal of events of 1965 owed nothing to American intervention."<sup>29</sup>

The total and rapid collapse of the PKI under the pressure levied against it by the army and its religious allies can be attributed directly to the internal weaknesses of the PKI itself. Twice before in its history—in 1926 and 1948—the PKI had attempted to alter dramatically the course of events in the Indonesian political arena. It had failed both times with disastrous results for itself. Although these abortive efforts occurred under different circumstances, a clear pattern of errors in party tactics and strategy has emerged.

The PKI had been historically faced with the problem of dealing with an essentially nonrevolutionary public. For this reason it had opted for a broad, free, loose organization with a large mass following rather than for an elite corps of dedicated revolutionaries. As a result, the party leadership, in each of the principal eras, became dependent upon a mass membership whose political orientation was limited to little more than slogans. This weakness was fairly obvious after the 1926 and 1948 debacles, yet the post-1948 PKI clung to the implicit notion that quantity was necessary to develop quality. Thus, the PKI concentrated its efforts in developing a mass membership in the 1950's and again in the early 1960's.

Another persistent and related problem was the PKI's inability to educate adequately sufficient numbers of its

## 70 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

membership in Communist doctrine or even to a degree that it could be considered properly cadred. The haphazard ideological preparations which characterized the pre-1929 and 1948 party were recognized as weaknesses by Aidit. Nevertheless, the oft-announced goal of developing a thoroughly indoctrinated membership appears to have been abandoned in an effort to build party membership. The perils of this type of party development were readily discernible by Nikita Khrushchev who told the PKI's leadership that the strength of a Communist movement was not judged by its numbers but, rather, by militancy and revolutionary nature.<sup>30</sup> During a visit to Indonesia, Party Chief Khrushchev warned that "the Communist Party is not a grocery store where the more customers you attract, the more soap, rotten herring or other spoiled goods you sell, the more you gain."<sup>31</sup> By 1965 the PKI's central leadership appears to have been alarmed by the overall low quality of its membership and to have begun efforts to eliminate this flaw. It was, however, a case of too little, too late.

A third chronic failure of the PKI was its long-lived inability to impose discipline upon its cadres, particularly in times of a crisis. Both the 1926 and 1948 incidents had seen the PKI adversely affected by the activities of its own followers who were acting independently of party policies. In spite of the fact that Aidit often spoke of developing an organization in which discipline was to be a paramount desideratum, the Communists were to fail again in the final analysis. In the events surrounding the Gestapu, there appears to have been a critical lack of discipline within the party as evidenced by the horrible tortures and mutilation of the six generals marked for assassination. It is difficult to believe that Aidit, as shrewd as he appears to have been, would have ordered the atrocities, knowing, as he must have, that the

reaction, should the coup fail, would be a draconian suppression of all elements suspected of complicity in the coup.

A fourth ingredient in the failure of the PKI's attempts to gain political power by revolution was the hasty, uncoordinated and ill-prepared nature of the three coups. While it is certain that the Communists had some plans for each attempt, these plans appear to have been either sketchy efforts or they lacked flexibility by failing to take into account a number of critical contingencies. Prior to the 1965 coup attempt, the plans of the Special Bureau were elaborate and greatly detailed. Nevertheless, as the events of the affair unfolded in unforeseen ways, these plans became useless, since any semblance of discipline and order among the PKI disintegrated in the surrounding hysteria and confusion of the event. A commentator in a Marxist periodical in 1966 claimed that the leftist leaning conspirators Untung and Supardjo, "... acted beyond the anticipation, desire or expectation of the Communists and the left-wing Marhaenist forces. The Communists were clearly not ready for a showdown, and even if they were, they should not have acted with the precipitation and clumsy haste of LtCol Untung."<sup>32</sup>

Closely associated with these chronic problems of the PKI was the PKI's seeming dependence upon foreign assistance during periods of great crisis. There are indications that many Indonesian Communists fully expected financial and material assistance from the People's Republic of China following the disastrous events of the September 30th Movement,<sup>33</sup> but the Chinese Communists, who have been implicated in the planning for the coup, simply did not respond in any significant manner.

Nonetheless, charges that the Chinese Communists were involved in the planning and the execution of Gestapu followed quickly upon the heels of a

massive army-initiated anti-PKI campaign. The Indonesians have proclaimed that the events of Gestapu were "planned and controlled from Peking as part of the Chinese Communist program for world revolution" and furthermore, that Chairman Mao had a personal role in it.<sup>34</sup> The evidence that supports this contention is circumstantial. In the year prior to Gestapu, the Chinese were shipping weapons and munitions along with building materials for the construction of the Conefo (Congress of Emerging Forces) Headquarters in Djakarta.<sup>35</sup> Apparently, these shipments were spared the normal customs inspection through the direct intervention of the pro-Peking Foreign Minister Subandrio.<sup>36</sup>

While it is true that there is little conclusive evidence to prove a Chinese role in the Gestapu, there is little doubt that the Indonesian Government holds the Chinese culpable for the coup. In September 1966, Adam Malik, the Foreign Minister and a member of the so-called "New Order" consisting of himself, Suharto, and the Sultan of Jogjakarta, openly accused the Peking Government of having sponsored the coup.<sup>37</sup> General Suharto asserted: "It is an established fact that the Chinese People's Republic has directly influenced the September 30th Movement."<sup>38</sup>

The likelihood that the Chinese Communists actually planned and executed the coup is remote. The PKI, while under heavy domestic and foreign pressure, especially Chinese, was nonetheless an independent party that made its own decisions. It is possible, no doubt, that the PKI may have formulated plans in response to various pressures and that they had informed the PRC of its plans. It would have been extremely difficult for the Chinese to have devised a plan for the PKI to execute. It is more probable that the Chinese influenced the timing of the attempt, given their ready access to knowledge of the state

of the President's health.<sup>39</sup> In the final analysis, there is little evidence to prove any significant Chinese role in the coup.

It is reasonable to conclude that the post-World War II bulk of the leadership of the PKI could have profited from the lessons of the 1926 affair. Additionally, it seems apparent that Aidit and his deputies, Lukman and Njoto, were cognizant of the previous errors of the party; yet, in the final analysis, they too were found to be woefully deficient.

It is a distinct possibility that the reason for the PKI's varied and repetitious failures can be found in its very success. The PKI had little difficulty in attracting members and sympathizers. Furthermore, its various programs of grievance articulation and aggregation, as well as its strong "nationalistic" posture and close association with Sukarno, resulted in the enlistment of literally millions of members in front groups. These gains, however, turned out to be Pyrrhic victories. Because of the party's prevailing policy of cooperation within the existing political structure, the PKI sacrificed an element characteristic of the international Communist movement of the era. The PKI's determination to follow the united front policy resulted in its forfeiture of the ability to develop a "hard-core" militant membership, carefully indoctrinated in the techniques of subversion, rigid discipline, and fanatic devotion to the Communist cause. Historically, these elements have been the stock in trade of a successful Communist movement, which, according to Lenin, is the indispensable basis for a successful acquisition of power.

It is apparent that the party's leadership was attempting to create a pragmatic and efficient political organization, which is certainly not the equivalent of a powerful revolutionary movement. It is not possible to conclude that had the PKI been successful in developing an overt revolutionary force while avoiding army suppression



## 72 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

or premature conflict (perhaps an impossible task), it would have been any more effective in a crisis situation. Indonesia has a cultural preference for compromise, the so-called *gotong rojong* spirit, not only in decisionmaking but in nearly all forms of social and political intercourse.<sup>40</sup> There is almost a compulsion within the political leadership to seek a satisfactory middle ground on controversial issues. Classic Leninist doctrine, on the other hand, carries demanding requirements for creating conflict, for exacerbating relationships, and for the polarization of issues. Basically, a Western political philosophy developed with industrial states in mind, communism tends to require unswerving discipline, efficient and pragmatic organization, unalterable decisions, and a distinct, if not utter, contempt for those who happen to hold contrary persuasions, including those Communists who deviate from the established party doctrine.<sup>41</sup> What most probably caused the deep resentment among Indonesians toward the PKI may well have been the seriousness, the purposefulness, and the dedication of its most prominent leaders on both the national and local level. The PKI's desire to be efficient, organized, mobilized, and, when necessary, to be cunning and ruthless in carrying out its aims ran into direct confrontation with the deeper cultural and religious preferences of the majority of the Indonesian people.<sup>42</sup>

This, more than any other factor, was the problem of greatest significance faced by the PKI. While it concentrated on developing a pragmatic, grassroots political organization that found acceptance among a significant proportion of the Indonesian population, it did so at the cost of its revolutionary zeal and ardor and, in the process, lost its ability to seize political power. Consequently, when the PKI attempted to exert a militant and conspiratorial force within the archipelago, it encountered massive popular resistance. That same popula-

tion eventually destroyed by it.

It may well have been that the central leadership of the PKI was very deeply troubled by this predicament, which could very well explain the tactics employed in Gestapu. In the final analysis, the PKI's Marxist credo required it to eschew practicality, popularity, and seize political power—the ultimate goal of all Communist organizations. The Gestapu, on the other hand, offered a convenient compromise: if successful, it would not have involved the Communists in an outright revolution; at the same time Communists could not have been accused by its younger militant cadres and foreign allies of simply waiting for the whole of Indonesia to fall like a ripe plum into their hands.

It would appear that the PKI has been effectively destroyed as a political force within Indonesia. However, events in Southeast Asia over the past decade, as well as the PKI's own history, indicate that Asian communism, particularly the Indonesian version, has proven

---

### BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Capt. L.K. Burgess, USMC, entered the Marine Corps after graduation from the College of Steubenville in 1969. Following Basic School, the Marine Corps Engineer Officer course, and the Petroleum Products Analysis course, he was assigned duty at Danang, Republic of Vietnam, where he remained until July 1971. After a tour of duty at Camp Lejeune, N.C., he attended the University of Tennessee under the auspices of the Marine Corps Advanced Degree Program where he earned a master's degree in international relations in December 1973. Captain Burgess was then assigned to Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, until July 1975 when he assumed his duties as aide-de-camp to Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.

to be notoriously resilient. Such an observation might lead one to recall the words of the 19th century French pub-

lisher Fernand Desnoyers: "il est des morts qu'il faut qu'on tue"—"there are some dead who must be killed."

## NOTES

1. Home Minister Ismail bin Abdul Rahman, Malaysian Information Service, 18 July 1966, as quoted in Arnold C. Brackman, *Indonesia: The Gestapu Affair* (New York: American-Asian Education Exchange, 1969), p. 42.

2. Victor M. Fic, "September 30th Movement in Indonesia: 1965 Gamble that Failed," in an unpublished paper presented at the International Conference on Asian History, August 1968, Department of History, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, pp. 25-64, presents a detailed and authoritative review of the PKI's planning for this attempt.

3. Francoise Cayrac-Blanchard, *Le Parti Communiste Indonesien* (Librairie Armand Colin et Fondation Nationale Des Sciences Politiques, 1973), pp. 141-142.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 142. In addition to the officers mentioned, an eighth officer, General Surjosumpono, CG, Jogjakarta, escaped death while Nasution's aide-de-camp and 5-year-old daughter were mortally wounded by the conspirators.

5. "Decree No. 1 on the Establishment of the Indonesian Revolutionary Council," quoted in Benedict R. Anderson and Ruth T. McVey, *A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965 Coup in Indonesia* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1971), pp. 123-124; see also *Harian Rakjat*, 2 October 1965, as translated in Indonesian, I, April 1966, p. 134.

6. Anderson and McVey, p. 18; also John Hughes, *Indonesian Upheaval* (New York: McKay, 1967), *passim*.

7. At least five book-length treatments of the attempted coup in Indonesia are in print. They are: Hughes; Cayrac-Blanchard; Justus M. Van der Kroef, *Indonesia after Sukarno* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1971); Tarzil Vittachi, *The Fall of Sukarno* (New York: Praeger, 1967); Rex Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1974). The Indonesian Government published a semiofficial account of the coup by Col. Nugroho Notosusanto and Ismail Saleh, *The Coup Attempt of the September 30th Movement in Indonesia* (Jakarta: Pembimbing, Masa, 1968). There is also an excellent account of the events in the research paper by Fic. In addition, numerous articles have appeared in scholarly journals and periodicals, the more valuable of which are listed here: Frederick Bunnell, "Indonesia's Quasi-Military Regime," *Current History*, January 1967; Arthur J. Dommen, "The Attempted Coup in Indonesia," *The China Quarterly*, January-March 1966; Donald Hindley, "Political Power and the October 1965 Coup in Indonesia," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, February 1967; Justus M. Van der Kroef, "Gestapu in Indonesia," *Orbis*, Summer 1966; Daniel Lev, "Indonesia: The Year of the Coup," *Asian Survey*, February 1966; Guy J. Pauker, "Indonesia, 1966: The Year of Transition," *Asian Survey*, February 1967; Lucien Rey, "Dossier of the Indonesian Drama," *New Left Review*, March-April 1966; John O. Sutter, "Two Faces of Konfrontasi: Crush Malaysia and Gestapu," *Asian Survey*, October 1966; W.F. Wertheim, "Indonesia Before and after the Untung Coup," *Pacific Affairs*, Spring-Summer 1966; and Denis Warner, "Indonesia: The General Who Got Away," *The Reporter*, 21 October 1965. Additionally, see Jerome R. Base, "The PKI and the Attempted Coup," *Journal of Asian Studies*, March 1970; Donald Hindley, "Indonesian Politics, 1965-1967, The September Movement and the Fall of Sukarno," *The World Today*, August 1968; J.C. Johavi, "The Fall of Sukarno and the Suppression of Communism in Indonesia," *Journal of African and Asian Studies*, Spring 1969; Justus M. Van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism Since the 1965 Coup," *Pacific Affairs*, Spring 1970; Justus M. Van der Kroef, "Interpretations of the 1965 Indonesian Coup: A Review of the Literature," *Pacific Affairs*, Winter 1970-1971; Donald E. Weatherbee, "Interpretations of Gestapu: The 1965 Indonesian Coup," *World Affairs*, March 1970.

8. U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, *Testimony of Dr. George M. Kahin Before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee Hearings on United States Foreign Policy Towards Asia*, 89th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966). In addition to Pauker, the works cited in footnote no. 7 above by Dommen, Sutter, Van der Kroef, Cayrac-Blanchard, and Vittachi propose that the PKI was deeply involved in the abortive coup. The opinion of Pauker, a highly respected Rand specialist, is of importance as he initially felt that the PKI had no part in the affair but changed his mind following attendance at the trials of the conspirators and having been made privy to evidence by the Indonesian Government.

9. "Gestapu" is a common acronym by which Indonesians refer to the September 30th Movement. It is constructed from the Indonesian "Gerakan September Tiga Puluh," and it is

## 74 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

preferred by anti-PKI elements because, sounding so much like the Nazi's "gestapo," it has overtones of evil.

10. House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee. In addition to Dr. Kahin, the works noted in footnote no. 7 above by Bunnell, Wertheim, Lev, and Rey ascribe to this view.

11. Letter from the Minister Counselor of the Embassy of Indonesia to the author, 19 March 1973, p. 1.

12. The author has been able to obtain pertinent information regarding this matter and matters which follow from extremely reliable sources which maintain a strict policy of nonattribution.

13. This information was given to the author from an individual of unimpeachable academic credentials who also has requested that a policy of nonattribution be maintained. Brackman, pp. 39-41, provides a very frank assessment which is in consonance with this position.

14. John H. Sullivan, "The U.S. and the New Order in Indonesia," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, the American University, Washington, D.C., 1970, p. 165.

15. Carolyn K. Colwell, *Indonesia: Political and Economic Developments* (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, Legislative Research Center, October 1968), p. 12.

16. Apparently all the generals killed in Gestapo were friendly to the United States or were at least trained in the United States. It appears that the PKI was more interested in eliminating those officers who had opposed them in the past rather than eliminating those who might turn to hurt them in the future; see Warner, p. 39.

17. Suharto was the Commanding General of the Army's Strategic Reserve Forces (Kostrad); see Van der Kroef, *Indonesia After Sukarno*, p. 13.

18. For detailed accounts of the bloodbath, see Hughes; Seth S. King, "The Great Purge in Indonesia," *The New York Times Magazine*, 8 May 1966, pp. 25, 89-92; Donald Kirk, "Bali Exercises Evil Spirit," *The Reporter*, 15 December 1966; Horace Sutton, "Indonesia's Night of Terror," *The Saturday Review*, 4 February 1967; also, accounts of these events are provided by Seymour Topping, "Slaughter of Reds Gives Indonesia a Grim Legacy," *The New York Times*, 24 August 1966, p. 1:6; and Stanley Karnow, *The Washington Post*, 17 August 1966.

19. "Indonesia: One Million Dead?" *The Economist* (London), 20 August 1966, pp. 727-728.

20. *The Congressional Record*, 26 April 1967, p. A2058.

21. Interview with Dr. Guy Pauker, 8 August 1975.

22. Sullivan, p. 184.

23. Address by the Honorable U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary of State, 4 October 1966, Department of State Press Release, p. 184.

24. Justus M. Van der Kroef, "Sukarno's Fall," *Orbis*, Summer 1967, pp. 498-505.

25. *Le Monde*, 30 December 1965.

26. U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, *World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations, 1966*, 18th ed. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966), p. 1.

27. One such statement by Second Deputy Njoto goes like this: "Necolm activities, in particular the CIA, were there not only before, but also during and after the September 30th Movement, the CIA and the prologue and epilogue of the September 30th Movement," *New Left Review*, (London), March-April 1966, p. 37.

28. Christer Hogstedt, "Indonesia's Political History and the October 1 Coup—A Swedish View," *Tidsignal*, 15-21 June 1966, p. 3, JPRS translation #37,363 of 3 August 1966.

29. Stanley Hoffman, *Gulliver's Troubles, or the Setting of American Foreign Policy* (New York: McGraw-Hill: 1968), p. 370.

30. Sullivan, p. 196; and Robert Shaplen, *Time Out of Hand; Revolution and Reaction in Southeast Asia* (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), p. 71.

31. *Ibid.*

32. M.A. Jaspam, "Indonesia, Counter Revolution and Rebellion," *Science and Society*, Winter 1966, p. 67.

33. *The Indonesian Herald*, 25 November 1965, p. 3.

34. "Chinese Communist Involvement in the Indonesian Coup Attempt," *Angkatan Perjudjanta*, 25 April 1966, p. 1.

35. Dommen, p. 151; also see Justus M. Van der Kroef, "The Sino-Indonesian Rupture," *The China Quarterly*, Summer 1968, pp. 19-20; and O.G. Roeder, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 4 November 1965, p. 189.

36. Van der Kroef, "Sino-Indonesian Rupture," p. 19.

37. Sullivan, p. 422.

38. Speech to the Indonesian Parliament, 16 August 1967, Antara, Djakarta.

39. Brackman, p. 18.

40. Hildred Geertz, *The Javanese Family: A Study of Kinship and Socialization* (New York: Free Press, 1961); and Claire Holt, *Indonesian Civilization, Addresses, Essays and Lectures* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972).

41. See Alfred G. Meyer, *Communism* (New York: Random House, 1960); also Herbert Marcuse, *Soviet Marxism* (New York: Random House, 1961); A.G. Meyer, *Marxism: The Unity of Theory and Practice* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954); and Leonard Schapino, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (New York: Random House, 1960).

42. Ariten Bey, "A Dialogue in Search of a Consensus: The Roots of Indonesian Political Conduct, 1949-1959," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., 1963, pp. 45-62.

