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The Politics of the Chinese People's Republic Navy

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The Communist Party and government leadership of the People's Republic of China have recognized that development of the Navy required its exemption from the political demands that have been placed on other branches of the People's Liberation Army. Lieutenant Muller describes how the party has exercised ultimate control over the Navy while the service has maintained only the outward appearance of continuing participation in the seemingly perpetual Chinese revolution.

THE POLITICS OF THE CHINESE

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC NAVY

by

Lieutenant David G. Muller, Jr., U.S. Navy

Throughout its long history, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) has been the instrument of the Chinese Communist Party, used, not only to conquer and defend China, but also to indoctrinate, mobilize, and control the Chinese people. The extensive literature on the political role of the armed forces, however, has virtually ignored the Navy, which organizationally is a branch of the PLA.

Quite unlike the land army, the Navy has been granted a position of privilege in the Chinese system of compulsory political participation. The degree and conditions of this exemption have varied over the past 27 years. A basic and recurrent issue in the relationship between the Party and the armed forces has been the definition of the proper proportion of time and resources the PLA should expend in developing professional military expertise as opposed to developing political awareness and activism. In response to perceived needs and the political inclinations of those in leadership positions, the degree of attention devoted to military training on the

one hand and political activity on the other has varied widely. The pattern of Navy politics has paralleled the changing tides of politicization and professionalization in the army, but only to a limited, often qualitatively different, extent. The Party has consistently allowed the Navy to assume a superficial appearance of politicization while pursuing a program of virtually apolitical professional development.¹ While ultimate Party control over the Navy has been maintained, a symbiotic relationship has evolved between the two. The Party has provided the Navy with the resources and the freedom from extensive political participation which it has needed for rapid development; for its part, the Navy has participated verbally and symbolically in politics, has

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remained loyal to the Party center in times of stress, and has performed its coastal defense mission with increasing effectiveness.

The history of the Chinese People's Navy can be divided into six periods, each with distinct political characteristics: the early years through 1957, the Great Leap Forward, the first 6 years of Lin Piao's tenure as Minister of Defense, the Cultural Revolution, the period between the Ninth Party Congress and September 1971, and the years since the fall of Lin Piao.

As might be expected, the body of source material on the status of the Navy in the Chinese political system is quite lean. Thus the analysis presented here is based upon intensive scrutiny of the little material which is available. No answers were found for many important questions, yet because of the basic consistency in the style of Navy politics since 1949, it has been possible to make a number of observations.

The Early Years, 1949-1957. Analysis of the early period in the history of the Navy reveals how the Party-Navy symbiosis evolved. The Navy in 1949 was faced with the task of building a structure of modern naval expertise on the foundations of a relatively primitive infantry tradition. The rapid acquisition of technology sufficient to build, maintain, and operate modern naval forces was an overriding responsibility. The early 1950's were demanding years for the Navy in a strategic sense: the presence of the U.S. 7th Fleet in the Western Pacific, the offshore islands crisis of 1954-55, frequent Nationalist raids on the coast and on merchant and fishing vessels, all made painful China's lack of a modern navy. In this environment, political indoctrination other than that directed at former Nationalist personnel took a distant second place to technical training. To use the Chinese keywords, the Expert gained ascendancy over the Red.

The attributes of heroes, models, and activists described in the Chinese press are useful indicators of the Red/Expert situation. If subjects for emulation are praised for political activities or ideological purity, the Red is probably in the ascendant. Conversely, emphasis is on the Expert if models are chosen because of their technical abilities or performance in combat. The press described three of the men attending the Navy's first Congress of Heroes and Models in Peking in early 1953: the commanding officer of a torpedo boat which sank a Nationalist warship, a "class A" combat hero, and an expert communications technician.² Another example of the Navy's Expert over Red bias is found in the goals set by a conference of the fleet air arm in Peking in 1955. Political objectives were not even mentioned. The four goals outlined were: (1) the strengthening of training, (2) the continuation of the spirit of assiduous study, (3) the quick mastery of advanced flying techniques, and (4) the struggle to build a modern, regularized People's Naval Air Force.³

Concern with the development of technical proficiency did not, however, blind the Navy to the need to maintain its public credentials as an armed force which helped the masses and which was, in turn, supported by them. The civilians with whom the Navy was said to come most into contact were the fishermen. At intervals throughout these early years of naval development, the following theme recurred in the press: "The coastal units and Navy of the PLA diligently guarding the coast of the fatherland day and night are the most intimate friends and sincerest protectors of the fishermen."⁴ This friendship was demonstrated in the following manner: "During the fishing season, the PLA marine patrol units would escort the fishing boats to go out to sea to fish, and patrol in the neighborhood to protect the fishermen."⁵ The press also occasionally described the Navy's coast

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guard role in rescuing fishing boats during storms and after accidents.

Ch'ingtao, Shanghai, Canton, and the other port cities with naval bases all had ample "masses" with whom the Navy men could have been "most intimate friends." Yet, prior to the Great Leap Forward, such mass-Navy relations were rarely reported. In spite of the emotional tenor of the descriptions in the press, the relationship between the Navy and the fishermen was merely a professional one. The patrolling of fisheries was one of the major missions of the Navy. In a manner which was to become a pattern, naval publicists described and interpreted a purely military task in such a way as to fulfill the political requirements which the Party had levied upon the Navy.

The Navy's model for development in the early years was, of course, the Soviet Union, and the U.S.S.R.'s influence on the service was pervasive. As a Navy representative exhorted in 1951, "The Soviet Navy is an example for the Navy of the Chinese people and is the direction of construction of the Chinese People's Navy. We should learn from the great Red Navy in order to speed up the building of a powerful people's navy."⁶

The People's Naval Academy was established at Luta (Dairen) in March 1950, and most of the instructors at this and other naval schools were Soviet.⁷ As early as 1950, an estimated 1,000 Soviet naval advisers were in China.⁸ Approximately 2,500 advisers are thought to have been in China in 1954, when the U.S.S.R. began to add modern ships to the Chinese inventory.⁹ While personnel figures for the Chinese Navy for this latter year are hazy, even using the highest estimate available, one arrives at a ratio of 1 Soviet adviser to every 30 Chinese naval personnel.¹⁰

The effects of such close contact with the Soviets must have been profound. Although no specific conflicts between the Party and Navy can be identified in the small volume of source

material available, it seems likely that the Navy went so far in the direction of ignoring its political roots due to Soviet influence and the technical-elitism which it bred that even as early as 1953 Mao felt the need to reorient the service. He made an inspection tour of the East Sea Fleet in February of that year. The tour was not reported in the press at the time, signifying that the visit was for other than ceremonial purposes, and Mao stayed for 4 days, an indication that there were significant problems to be solved.

Anniversary celebrations of Mao's trip in subsequent years have noted that he "called meetings of cadres where he gave important instructions" and paid "meticulous attention to the political progress of the cadres and fighters and the revolutionized building and growth of units."¹¹ It thus seems probable that Mao in 1953 was combating the Navy's tendency to forsake the ideology and style of the revolutionary-period PLA. Mao is reported to have made a similar trip to the North Sea Fleet in January 1956, although little is known of the visit.¹²

It does not seem that Mao was disseminating a particularly radical line to the Navy in 1953, however. He was quoted as addressing a ship's crew: "The workers and peasants [in the crew] are becoming intellectuals, and the intellectuals are cultivating the consciousness of the workers and peasants."¹³ Because in Maoist doctrine the workers and peasants are celebrated as the source of political consciousness, this statement is striking in its depiction of the proper relationship between these social groups and is indicative of the political latitude Mao was allowing the Navy.

Also in the vein of Party guidance applied to the Navy, a prolonged effort was made in the mid-1950's to prevent the wholesale, uncritical acceptance of Soviet naval doctrine. The following statement appeared in *Jiefangjun Bao*

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(*Liberation Army News*) in October 1956:

The Naval Department of the Military Academy has accomplished much in learning the advanced experience of the Soviet Union. However, not enough has been done to fully develop the spirit of independent thinking during study, and to flexibly apply these experiences to teaching work in accordance with actual conditions.¹⁴

While this theme is politically significant, it should be remembered that it was also wise, pragmatic advice and not simply anti-Soviet or chauvinistic exhortation. In the 1950's the Soviet Navy was still backward in many respects. In addition, its doctrine was based, for example, on such factors as Arctic climate and its virtually landlocked fleet areas, which did not apply to China.

The tasks for 1957 that Navy Political Commissar Su Chen-hua set before a Congress of Navy Activists in Peking showed that the emphasis on mastering professional military skills was still paramount toward the end of the early period. Admiral Su called upon the Navy to practice economy, raise the quality of the armed forces, elevate the tactical expertise of all units, continue to build up the defense of China's territorial waters, and continue to escort merchant convoys and protect fishing fleets.¹⁵ The daily newspaper published in the North Sea Fleet headquarters city of Ch'ingtao exulted at the time that "the study of military skills has become the rage" in the Navy, and that the fleet's representatives to the Activists' Conference had been elected for having studied hard to become "Master Technicians."¹⁶

Although the main themes of the 1957 Navy Activist Conference were decidedly technical in nature, some political content did appear in the proceedings. The three general goals established at the conference were, first, to

serve the people and raise political awareness in order to defend national construction; second, to follow the line of "army building with thrift and industry," and third, to implement the mass line, which was defined as using the ideas of the "masses" of Navy men to develop the state of naval science.¹⁷ The political nature of these tasks was so circumscribed, however, as to leave them significantly diluted. The program seemed to indicate that the Navy should raise its political awareness only in order to accomplish better defense work; it should pursue the mass line, but only within the Navy itself and for the purpose of developing naval science. Politics was seen as useful mainly for serving the ends of technology.

Evidence of political rectification, however, surfaced in July 1957 in an essay by Navy Chief of Staff Vice Adm. Chou Hsi-han.¹⁸ Chou reflected upon the achievements of the Navy since 1949 and made this assessment: "The Navy has been able to accomplish such results in the past eight years basically because of the Party's unlimited concern for, and correct leadership of, the building of our navy." Four additional reasons for the Navy's success were, in the order cited, the support of the people, the assistance of the rest of the PLA, the enthusiasm of Chinese naval personnel, and last, the "benefit of Soviet experience." Chou Hsi-han called for a stronger party leadership role in the navy. "The rightists," he declared, "have been trying to remove the Party's leadership from the armed forces. . . . The highly class-conscious members of the Navy realize fully that the Party's leadership of the people's armed forces is absolutely necessary. . . . So they are hitting back resolutely at the rightists." Evidently the stimulus for Chou's essay was the necessity to affirm the Navy's approval of and participation in the antirightist campaign launched at a meeting of the National People's Congress a few weeks earlier.

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In view of the substance of Chou's comments, it is possible that some naval personnel had indulged in the overt criticism of the Party in June 1957 known as the Hundred Flowers movement. The antirightist campaign was begun in July 1957 in response to this wave of criticism. The details and the issues of the antirightist movement within the Navy have not been revealed, but no doubt some controversy centered on the naval technicians at all levels who had become enamored of the Soviet approach to technical endeavor and were failing to adhere to the proletarian and peasant tradition of the PLA.

Following the appearance of Chou Hsi-han's admonitions, press reports on the Navy began in mid-1957 to include items attesting to the claimed proletarian outlook of the service. Navy units engaged in self-supporting agriculture (but only when conditions permitted), helped build tractor stations and fishermen's cooperatives (but mainly through monetary contributions rather than labor), and promoted fishery production (but only by means of carrying out regular rescue and protection duties).

The Navy had thus been warned to remember that the Party was providing its privileges. Furthermore, the Navy was admonished to remain a servant of Party authority and to cultivate at least the facade of proletarianism as it embarked on an ambitious program of technical development. No high-level purge took place. The symbiotic relationship between the Navy and the Party was thus forged by 1957. The Navy not only performed its defense mission but also professed loyalty to the Party and gave the appearance of participation in its political programs. The Party, in return, allowed the Navy not only the resources but also the freedom from political involvement necessary to fulfill its mission effectively.

The Navy in the Great Leap Forward. Except for apolitical news reports

of the naval engagements near the offshore islands during the 1958 crisis, the Navy nearly disappeared from the national press during the Great Leap Forward.¹⁹ In spite of its preoccupations, however, the Navy did make a few appearances in the press in a political role. The device of interpreting fishery patrol work as a politically motivated production function was used several times. The following account was typical of the period:

Inspired by the forward leap in fishing production, officers and men of the various naval forces volunteered to extend their times on patrol. Statistics show that in the first five months of this year [1958], the time on patrol was one half more than in the whole of last year. . . . A squadron of gunboat units on the Fukien front has not landed for two months from its patrol to guard fishing and navigation.²⁰

A speech by a minor admiral to the National People's Congress in 1959 comprised the Navy's only major public political statement made during the Great Leap. Rear Adm. Teng Chao-hsiang noted that the Chinese Navy had gone through a rectification campaign (probably in reference to 1957), as well as socialist and communist indoctrination. These programs, he said, had raised the consciousness of the officers and men so that they were able to carry out the 1958 training program in excess and ahead of schedule. Teng reserved most of his remarks for what was ostensibly the Navy's primary contribution to the Great Leap Forward: the repair of ships by crewmembers rather than by specialized dockyard workers. This practice had several important benefits, according to the speech. It freed shipyard labor for production and provided increased availability of naval craft for operations and training. The program also instructed crews in engineering and technology, enabling them to

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make emergency repairs during combat.²¹

The practice of crews making the relatively minor repairs which Rear Admiral Teng described, however, is common to all the world's navies. It is not a revolutionary innovation but is rather an old tradition born of necessity. But the manner in which the program was heralded made it sound to the uninitiated as if the Navy were engaged in a politically motivated production effort in keeping with the temper of the Great Leap period. Perhaps the practice of self-repair was intensified during the Great Leap, but, if so, any benefits which might have been derived from the program were in the Navy's immediate interest. If dockyard workers and drydocks were freed from a certain amount of repair work, they could then be used in the Navy's burgeoning construction effort. If repairs were finished more quickly, the Navy's ship availability and combat readiness would be increased. If crews learned more about the workings of their vessels, the Navy's level of technical expertise would be raised and the units would be more effective. Admiral Teng publicized the program as "the right approach to 'Red and Expert'" in a time of Red ascendancy over the Expert in the political system, yet self-repair actually represented no departure from the longstanding emphasis of technology over politics in the Navy, of the Expert over the Red. In fact, it is probable that the self-repair program had been in effect since the earliest days of the Navy's development.

There is another interpretation of the Navy's extended patrol and self-repair efforts of this period, but it still points toward the Navy's primary concern with professionalization. It is possible that in 1958 the service was trying to overcome some problems of tradition by means of the Great Leap campaign. If personnel had tended to avoid staying at sea for long periods showing the traditional

distaste of many Chinese for the maritime life, then Great Leap propaganda may have been used to induce them to overcome their aversion through "voluntarily" extending their patrols. Secondly, a large proportion of sailors was relatively well-educated. If they had retained some of the disdain for manual work traditionally felt by most educated Chinese, then the self-repair program may have been used to acclimate them to the needs of the Navy. Thus the Navy may have used the political themes of the Great Leap for its own purpose: to build a professional ethic within the service.

It should not be thought that the Navy was deceiving cognizant Party authorities as to its true concern. Significant investments were being made in the Navy, and the national leadership would undoubtedly have issued admonitions had the service failed to maximize its ability to use its new equipment. Moreover, the political leadership was depending in part upon the Navy's performance in the Quemoy operation. The position of privilege afforded the Navy in the early years of its development was thus confirmed in the Great Leap Forward, the PRC's first period of intense politicization.

Between the Great Leap and the Cultural Revolution. Large investments were made in the Navy in the lean years following the collapse of the Great Leap. Although the depressed economic conditions of the period provided a surplus of machinery not usually available for military construction, the degree of investment in the early 1960's nevertheless represented a great effort, especially considering that most Soviet aid and advice had been withdrawn from the naval program.

In the early years, a naval expansion program of the type launched in 1959 would have been noted in press articles which emphasized the technical training and proficiency of ships' crews, with a

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heavy Expert over Red bias. But the Navy tended toward caution in this regard following the Party's admonitions of 1957 and the Great Leap politicization. Thus, in the 1959-63 period, when the Navy appeared in print it seemed anxious to maintain its political credentials, and, in these years of economic hardship in China, chose not to publicize the investment going into new construction.

The period produced, for example, articles about the Navy's schools which pointed out that the students were practicing the Yen-an spirit of diligence and frugality.²² Also, the theme of the Navy's role in the protection of fishermen was again emphasized. Several instances of naval units helping communes with labor power during agricultural emergencies were noted. Combat actions involving fisherman militia drew more press attention than those involving regular Navy units. It is evident, however, that the Navy had not actually become politically mobilized, for such themes as the study of Mao's thought, Red over Expert, Man over Weapons, People's War, and similar key indicators of a trend to politicization were lacking. Such a trend, however, was underway in the rest of the PLA. Lin Piao had been appointed Defense Minister in 1959 and in 1961 began an intensive campaign within the armed forces to raise political consciousness and loyalty to the Party.

The Navy seems to have been brought very late into the indoctrination campaign. Press reportage on the Navy was virtually nil during 1963, a year of widely reported army mobilization in the Lei Feng and other ideological campaigns. One of the first orders for increased politicization in the Navy was issued in March 1963: a prolix document entitled "Regulations Concerning Political Work in the Warships of the Chinese PLA." The document began, "In order to ensure the absolute leadership of the Party, and to conduct Party and political work, primary Party

organizations shall be established and a political commissar or political instructor appointed on each warship."²³ The interpretation immediately suggests itself that many ships did not have political officers aboard, an indication of the low priority the Navy placed on political indoctrination. The captured secret PLA *Work Bulletin* revealed that such a situation was not uncommon in army units several years earlier. Even in the 1963 document, however, political officers were made responsible for more than purely political work. In addition to their indoctrinational and disciplinary duties, they were assigned such command functions as overseeing the execution of training and combat tasks and improving units' combat effectiveness.

In an article published several years later, a model PT boat unit recalled that 1963 had been a turning point in ideological work:

During that year, the Party committee of the unit, in accordance with instructions issued by Vice Chairman Lin to the Navy, began to implement earnestly the resolution passed by the enlarged conference of the PLA Navy Party committee. . . . The commanders and fighters sharply criticized the erroneous tendency which had appeared among some comrades to downgrade political ideological work and the study of Chairman Mao's works.²⁴

Yet even in this "pacesetter" unit, recognized to be more conscientious than most in the Navy, there was general retrogression soon thereafter.

Press coverage of the Navy's belated entry into the political mobilization campaign underway in the PLA began in February 1964. In the following month reports appeared about a conference of representatives of units and individuals cited for political activism.²⁵

Although the Navy had been supporting fisherman militia in the past as

auxiliaries in coastal defense, in 1964-65 the Navy's role in militia training was widely publicized. The first reports of a formal naval militia organization appeared in 1965.²⁶ Militia schools were established in Ch'ingtao, Shanghai, and Canton, where middle-school aged trainees took courses in navigation, weapons, engineering, and communications.²⁷ Periodic reports appeared in the press during this time span describing the battles and the training in which the militia engaged.

Militia training is a task levied on the PLA in times of political activism, and this new emphasis on the maritime militia should not be underestimated in its political significance, but the Navy's knack for deriving dual benefits from such a program is evident. On the one hand, publication of militia-training efforts served the Navy's political needs by demonstrating its devotion to the concept of people's war. On the other hand, the arming of some coastal merchantmen and fishing vessels served the purpose of discouraging depredations by Nationalist raiders on maritime activities; in fact, this concept had been in use since the PRC's earliest days.²⁸ As mentioned in some of the press reports, a host of alert, radio-equipped fishing boats off the coast could also help the Navy in its surveillance tasks. In addition, if the Navy was training mostly middle-school-aged students in technical naval subjects, it seems likely that these boys would later be inducted into the Navy.

Any attempt to explain the trend toward outward politicization in the Navy between 1963 and 1965 is necessarily speculative, but several identifiable factors were no doubt at work. Obviously the Navy needed to respond in some way to Lin Piao's program for the indoctrination of the PLA. Moreover, contemporary reports in the West and later references in the Chinese press indicate that, for the first time since the Korean war, investment in naval

construction was being curtailed.²⁹ While strategic concerns certainly had the decisive impact on spending priorities, perhaps the Navy was being pressured through the withholding of resources to embrace Lin's plans for military politicization. The underlying theme of the need for further naval development was rarely absent from articles in the press that dealt with naval affairs. In sum, however, the Navy remained far less involved in the public political process during the 1963-65 period than did the Army.

The Navy's Role in the Cultural Revolution. In January 1966, Navy Political Commissar Su Chen-hua initiated a campaign for the emulation of Mai Hsien-te, a South Sea Fleet sailor wounded in a 1965 battle with the Nationalists. Aside from the fact that Mai was the first naval hero honored in a national campaign, there seemed to be nothing extraordinary about the movement during its early stages.³⁰ In fact, however, it was a preemptive campaign designed to protect the positions of Commissar Su and others in the Navy leadership. Su attempted to ward off criticism by involving the service in a high level of political activity, ostensibly in the spirit of the Cultural Revolution which was then beginning.³¹ Actually, the campaign was directed at more innocuous goals, i.e., the encouragement of bravery and the application of Mao's thought rather than the displacement of revisionist leadership. As the Mai Hsien-te campaign continued through the spring and summer of 1966, the hero was never tied in with the rising Cultural Revolution. On 21 August, the last article of the Mai Hsien-te series appeared; it differed in tone and content from preceding reports. The article reviewed Mai's stay in the hospital and noted plaintively, as if to justify the attention paid to the hero, that

During this period of time, the Party Central Committee,

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Chairman Mao and Vice Chairman Lin had shown the greatest concern for him. Chairman Mao had specifically instructed Comrades Ho Lung and Yeh Chien-ying to visit him in the hospital. Leaders of the Party and the State including Tung Pi-wu and T'ao Chu had also come to see him.³²

At last, Mai Hsien-te was said to be "earnestly studying articles concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution."

Renmin Ribao (*The People's Daily*) reported that on the same day, 21 August, the Navy leadership in Peking held a meeting of high-ranking officers to "celebrate" the Cultural Revolution.³³ For apparently the first time since the stirrings of the Cultural Revolution began, the Navy appeared in the national press singing paeans to Mao, Lin, and the political upheaval underway throughout the country. After 21 August, press coverage of the service dropped off abruptly. Less than 3 months later, on 11 November 1966, Navy Commissar Su Chen-hua made his last public appearance.³⁴ Nor was the Deputy Commissar Tu Yi-te seen subsequent to that date. Two days after Su was last seen, and at the end of the 3 months of silence which followed the most active 7-month period of press coverage since the Navy's founding, the service again appeared in print with an article quite unlike the Mai Hsien-te series in content and style, extolling the Cultural Revolution.³⁵ The article quoted extensively the remarks of Navy Deputy Commander Wang Hung-k'un, who was soon identified as the Navy's new Second Political Commissar. It was evident that a turnaround had occurred in the position expressed by the commissariat: while the Cultural Revolution had been ignored by Su Chen-hua in favor of themes such as bravery, technical proficiency, and the

application of Mao's works, Wang Hung-k'un not only called upon the Navy to participate in the Cultural Revolution, but he seemed to attack the "bourgeois reactionary line" of his predecessor as well.³⁶

Criticism of Su and Tu in the national press was both rare and vague, and the two commissars were not cited by name. A *Renmin Ribao* article of June 1967 dealt with the issue as follows:

At the beginning of the great proletarian cultural revolution, the power-holders inside the Party organizations in the Navy . . . stubbornly enforced the bourgeois reactionary line, confused the two kinds of contradictions of different nature, strenuously pressed the argument that the armed forces were "exceptional" and that the class struggle was extinct. A part of the masses was hoodwinked for a time.³⁷

The connection of the Mai Hsien-te campaign with deposed head of state Liu Shao-ch'i, the most highly placed target of the radicals in the Cultural Revolution, is tenuous, but Liu's name had been invoked several times during the campaign as one of Mai's well-wishers. As late as 30 July 1966, Mai was reported to "warmly support" a statement by Liu Shao-ch'i on foreign policy.³⁸

Perhaps most significant in the entire Mai Hsien-te affair is the fact that Navy Commander Hsiao Ching-kuang remained aloof from the campaign as it was reported in the press. In fact, only two flag officers other than Su publicly participated in the campaign: Navy Deputy Commander Chou Hsi-han and South Sea Fleet Commander Wu Jui-lin. As the commander of the fleet to which Mai was attached, Wu could hardly have avoided making an appearance. In any case, each lent only scant support and

both survived the Cultural Revolution apparently unscathed.

Li Tso-p'eng, a protégé of Lin Piao, replaced Su as First Political Commissar. The reason for the choice of Li becomes clear if events are studied from Lin Piao's viewpoint. In the highest echelon of the Navy as of mid-1966, only Li Tso-p'eng could be counted as personally loyal—a "Lin man." Li, however, was just one of several Navy Deputy Commanders. He did not have the authority to bring the Navy under Lin Piao's personal influence. Thus, in Lin's eyes, Li Tso-p'eng had to be promoted. The post of Navy Commander, however, was not available: Hsiao Ching-kuang, a loyal personal friend of Mao, could not be deposed. Commissar Su Chen-hua was evidently more vulnerable. Although Li Tso-p'eng had been a professional commander (as opposed to political commissar) since his earliest days in the military, he made the unusual shift to the commissariat to satisfy Lin Piao's desires. Su Chen-hua's misfortune was not so much that he had committed ideological errors but rather that he was occupying a post coveted by the ambitions of Li Tso-p'eng and Lin Piao. As commissar, and no doubt with the aid of his patron, Li began to encroach upon the powers of Navy Commander Hsiao, soon assuming a position of *de facto* command over the service.³⁹ Li's favored status was formalized when he was appointed to membership in the Ninth Politburo, while Hsiao remained simply a member of the Central Committee.

The fortunes of a number of other naval officers during the upheaval are unclear, but at least eight others in addition to the commissars were definitely ousted: Navy Chief of Staff Chang Hsueh-ssu (a son of the prerevolutionary Manchurian warlord Chang Tso-lin), Deputy Director of the Navy Political Department Hu P'eng-fei, Head

of the Naval Military Institute K'ang Chih-ch'iang, East Sea Fleet Commander T'ao Yung (see note 48), North Sea Fleet Commissar Lu Jen-lin, South Sea Fleet Commissar Fang Cheng-p'ing, Head of the Sixth Ministry of Machine Building (the organization responsible for the construction of ships and other naval equipment) Fang Ch'iang, and Vice Minister of Communications in charge of merchant shipping and former East Sea Fleet Deputy Commander P'eng Te-ch'ing. The latter two individuals had probably retained their Navy status while assigned to these maritime-related ministries. Navy Deputy Commanders Liu Tao-sheng and Tun Hsing-yun were also absent following criticism in the Cultural Revolution, but their situations are less clear. The grounds for the removal of these officers have not been revealed, but a number may simply have been singled out as targets by the loosely controlled Red Guards. It is possible that the Navy sacrificed them as tokens of its "wholehearted support" of the Cultural Revolution. A number of other officers—including Hsiao Ching-kuang and Li Tso-p'eng—were similarly attacked but were supported by Lin Piao or Chou En-lai.⁴⁰ Perhaps others were purged by Li Tso-p'eng for opposition to his accession to the Navy leadership. About half of those purged have reappeared since the fall of Lin Piao.

In the months that followed the purge of the Navy's top commissars, the press reports on naval activities became highly political in tone. The themes of Man over Weapons, Red over Expert, close military relations with the masses, and the value of guerrilla warfare were constantly reaffirmed. Virtually no mention was made of the need for technical training which had characterized the Mai Hsien-te campaign.⁴¹

The fleets offered the promise of support for the Maoist Left soon after Peking's January 1967 call for active PLA intervention in the chaotic political

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situation on behalf of favored radical groups. Once these promises were reported, however, coverage of Navy activities dropped off. Little more was heard from the service in this respect until it began to summarize its Cultural Revolution activities in 1969. The Navy claimed that "the commanders and fighters of the North China Sea Fleet have resolutely responded to Chairman Mao's great call that the PLA should support the broad masses of the Left."⁴² The other fleets and Navy Headquarters issued similarly vague statements.

The degree and nature of the Navy's actual involvement in the PLA intervention are far from clear. There are indications both of Navy aloofness and of Navy participation. In the original orders to the PLA in January 1967, coastal defense forces were exempted from direct involvement.⁴³ And, in the words of a Military Affairs Commission order of May 1967, "military factories attached to naval bases and top secret factories are excepted" from participation in the political struggle.⁴⁴ The numerous articles about armed forces interventions in such port cities as Canton, Shanghai, and Ch'ingtao were usually ambiguous in identifying the units which participated, but they seemed to mention only army and sometimes air force units; rarely were navy units mentioned. Furthermore, when the Revolutionary Committees appeared as the organs of local and provincial political power, few naval personnel seem to have been members.⁴⁵

There are, on the other hand, indications that the Navy did play some role in the PLA intervention. Most concrete was the case of the Wuhan incident of July 1967.⁴⁶ When Gen. Ch'en Tsai-tao led the central Chinese industrial area of Wuhan in rebellion against Peking, the East Sea Fleet sent a number of vessels up the Yangtze to within firing range of the cities. One source reported that Lin

Piao himself directed the operations against the Wuhan cities from one of the ships.⁴⁷ Navy Political Commissars Li Tso-p'eng and Wang Hung-k'un were prominent in the group which met the Maoist envoys Hsieh Fu-chih and Wang Li as they returned to Peking from Wuhan, where they had been imprisoned.⁴⁸

One further instance of civil strife in which the Navy intervened apparently occurred at Wuhan after the July incident. In early November 1967, a rally was held in Hangchou to welcome the return of several vessels from Wuhan. "In October of this year," the report read, "these naval ships were sent by the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee to Wuhan in support of the left at the crucial moment of the violent struggle between the two classes, two roads, and two lines."⁴⁹

The remaining identifiable naval interventions in political controversies during the Cultural Revolution benefited the Navy directly. Whether the Navy actually supported the Left in these cases is an unanswered question. An account appeared in October 1967 of the struggle that had plagued the Sixth Ministry of Machine Building—the ministry responsible for the building of ships and other naval equipment. The press reported that "previously the Ministry was split into two big opposing sides, with twelve mass organizations in all."⁵⁰ The problem was solved by "the PLA men stationed in the Sixth Ministry of Machine Building," in other words, Navy men. A similar situation in the Shanghai Dongfanghong Shipbuilding Yard was solved "with the help of a PLA naval unit."⁵¹ In Canton in 1968, "the personnel of a certain unit of the Navy helped the Huangpu Harbor Bureau to set up its newborn revolutionary regime in the turbulent storm of class struggle."⁵²

Persuasive indirect evidence of the Navy's general aloofness from the imbroglgio, however, is found in the

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naval construction program. Naval construction in 1967 (and subsequent years) leaped to very high levels. Projects included new classes of nuclear and diesel submarines, destroyer escorts, and missile-firing patrol craft. The construction of small combatant craft also proceeded at unprecedented rates.⁵³ While Li Tso-p'eng may have been heavily involved in Cultural Revolution politics, most naval personnel were training in order to man the new ships and boats. Indeed, a *Renmin Ribao* article in October 1968 noted that "with the development and growth in strength of the People's Navy," there was a heavy demand for many more technically capable naval personnel.⁵⁴

The opening paragraph of a highly significant essay entitled "Building the World's Strongest People's Navy," published in January 1968, affirmed that: "Only by advancing unswervingly and boldly along the red course opened up by Chairman Mao, the great helmsman, is it possible to build the world's strongest navy—the navy of the Chinese People's Liberation Army."⁵⁵ Loyalty to Mao was regarded as the path by which the Navy could achieve the following aim: "In our lifetime we must bring to an end the era when imperialism reigns supreme over all the oceans of the world." Such loyalty, however, was probably not seen as the mystical guide to naval expansion that the text of the article suggests. Rather, an indirect benefit accrued to the Navy through its professions of allegiance: only the center of power in Peking, controlled in the latter 1960's by Mao and Lin, disposed of the resources necessary for naval construction. In William Whitson's words, "If Maoist sponsorship promised a larger share of budgets and faster development of advanced weapons, then it would pay to support Mao."⁵⁶ Mao, Lin, the Party Central Committee, and the Cultural Revolution Group all received delegates from a naval conference held in early

September 1968, demonstrating "the greatest concern, inspiration, and education extended by our great leader Chairman Mao to the Navy."⁵⁷

Even in so highly politicized a period as the Cultural Revolution, the Navy was still paying lipservice to political orthodoxy while pursuing its own aims. When Cultural Revolution activity was at its most frantic, the Navy openly sought to divest itself of involvement in politics and production. For example, a "certain South Sea Fleet unit" contrasted Mao's motto for the Navy, "in order to oppose imperialist aggression, we must build a powerful navy," with that allegedly offered by Liu Shao-ch'i: "build a powerful navy to develop China's maritime industry." The analysis continued:

The commanders and fighters pointed out that implicit in Chairman Mao's brilliant inscription was his constant injunction to the PLA to remain forever a fighting force, defend the dictatorship of the proletariat and carry the anti-imperialist struggle and the world revolution through to the end. By contrast, what China's Khrushchev [an epithet applied to Liu Shao-ch'i] was telling the naval men was to lay down their arms, give up the anti-imperialist struggle and, in effect, submit to imperialist aggression. . . . According to this reasoning, the warships of the navy could be turned into fishing boats and merchant ships and the commanders and fighters could engage in "maritime industry." In a word, the final intention was the disintegration of the armed forces of the proletariat and the overthrow of the proletarian dictatorship.⁵⁸

This case was developed further in the accusation that "China's Khrushchev blustered that the Navy was built to 'develop maritime enterprises,' and he reduced the scale of naval defense

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construction."⁵⁹ It thus appears that the Navy attempted to use the political references of the Cultural Revolution as the basis for its abstention from the production and civilian economic management work in which the Army was becoming heavily engaged. In the same manner, it also sought to increase resource allocations for ship construction.

A highly significant report on the politics of the Navy during the Cultural Revolution appeared in Hong Kong early in March 1969.⁶⁰ Lin Piao, in a speech delivered to another branch of the PLA between 18 and 20 February 1969, was said to have "emphatically criticized some units of the Chinese Communist Navy, saying that they had not made enough study, nor had they an adequate mastery of Mao Tse-tung's thought." He believed that there were remnant counterrevolutionary and revisionist elements still at large in the North Sea Fleet. The East Sea Fleet, however, was singled out as politically the most troublesome. According to the report, both Mao and Lin had inspected the East and South Sea Fleets between November 1968 and February 1969 in order to remedy errant political views. Lin was also said to have accused the Navy as a whole of being lax in its execution of a political activism program during 1966 because it took an inordinately long time to select delegates for a conference in Peking. Even then the delegates were said to have been unenthusiastic.

As if to give credence to this Hong Kong report, Shanghai radio carried a story 2 weeks later on an East Sea Fleet political conference. The fleet's political commissar, Liu Hao-t'ien, was quoted as emphasizing the need to "speed up revolution in the PLA East China Sea Fleet." The radio commentator concluded by saying that "the fleet would not have had a correct orientation if the congress had not been held."⁶¹

By the time that the Cultural Revolution had subsided, the Navy was in a

stronger political position than before. Resources had been allocated for a major technology-intensive construction program which has continued at least until recently.⁶² The service's personnel had suffered relatively little in the Cultural Revolution. Naval figures rarely appeared as local and provincial administrators as had so many other PLA members, which was no doubt in the Navy's interest. Its sustenance came from Peking, not from local power bases. Moreover, involvement in local politics and production could only have distracted the attentions of the Navy from its construction and training programs and from the operation of its new ships. Before the Cultural Revolution, only Hsiao Ching-kuang had represented the Navy on the Central Committee. Su Chen-hua had been an alternate member, but he lost this seat when purged in 1966. The Ninth Central Committee appointed in 1969, however, seated four Navy figures as full members and five more as alternates. While the appointment of Li Tso-p'eng to the Politburo was a reflection mainly of his close relationship with Lin Piao, nevertheless it represented a significant naval presence in the decisionmaking circles of the People's Republic.

The Party-Navy symbiosis had survived for a decade and a half because China's leaders recognized their need for a Navy. This need became greater during the latter 1960's than it had been since the founding of the PRC. To the familiar potential threat posed by American forces in the Pacific had been added that of the Soviet Navy. The Chinese expressed alarm as well at the beginnings of Japanese naval reconstruction, which they felt was "obviously directed against socialist China."⁶³ Hsiao Ching-kuang and most other flag officers went largely unmentioned in the press in 1967 and naval personnel were rarely cited for support of the Left, all at a time when the Army and even the Air Force, in contrast, were

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being mentioned daily in the media. In essence, nothing had changed. During the Cultural Revolution, the Navy continued to enjoy its privileged position in the Chinese political system at a time when other institutions were thrown into chaos.

Navy Politics since the Cultural Revolution. The Navy under Li Tso-p'eng made a halfhearted effort in the 1969-71 period to keep up the appearances of political activism cultivated during the Cultural Revolution. As they had done in the past, naval publicists tried to make routine activities sound like revolutionary deeds. Fishery patrols were described as acts of devotion to the masses. Consideration of suggestions for technical improvements offered by junior officers and enlisted men was again billed as the use of the mass line. The Navy revived the self-repair program of the Great Leap period as its response to Mao's 7 May directive ordering ideological cultivation through labor. Thus, while many people from other sectors of Chinese society left their usual occupations to labor in the countryside, ships' crews continued to perform maintenance on their vessels much as they had always done.⁶⁴ While such work may, in fact, have intensified, it was not without direct benefit to the Navy: "Self-repairs carried out by the fleet have greatly strengthened war preparedness. The navigational efficiency [probably ship availability] of the fleet has increased by 25%."⁶⁵

In the Red/Expert area, naval units tended to take an apolitical approach to military tasks. The reproofs, however, were muted: "We sometimes forget about politics and give undue prominence to military affairs when work pressure is heavy. Can we lay claim to be closely following Chairman Mao?"⁶⁶ To remedy this situation, classes for the study of Mao Tse-tung's thought were convened, but, in the manner of the period, mention of such sessions was

both sparse and perfunctory. Indeed, the problems of formalism in study—of going through the motions to get it over with—and of slighting political study altogether were cited as well.⁶⁷ By early 1971, outward signs of an antipolitical trend had become apparent: "The understanding of some comrades in giving prominence to proletarian politics became one-sided. This obstructed the implementation of Chairman Mao's army-building (navy-building) line."⁶⁸

Naval development in the face of the increasing naval capabilities of the Soviet Union and Japan clearly was a preoccupation of the service, but further possible reasons for the languid political situation in the Navy can be postulated. Li Tso-p'eng, a career commander, was not an expert in political work, nor had he been previously noted for an interest in political mobilization. Overshadowing Hsiao Ching-kuang in the leadership of the service, Li was undoubtedly occupied with many of the Navy's nonpolitical command and administrative functions. His Politburo duties must also have consumed a great deal of his time. For these reasons, political mobilization was allowed to drift. It is also conceivable that the political indirection described may have been, in part, the result of an effort by Navy Commander Hsiao to fill the central political offices with his "own" men, brought in from the fleet areas. Five high-ranking officers, four of them career commissars, are known to have been transferred to Navy Headquarters between the beginning of the Cultural Revolution and 1968.⁶⁹ All were retained and at least one promoted after the fall of Lin Piao and Li Tso-p'eng in September 1971. Hsiao, along with the now-deposed Su Chen-hua, had for almost two decades maintained the comfortable Party-Navy relationship and was no doubt bent on preserving it. If the interpretation of the post-Cultural Revolution Mao-Lin relationship offered by Philip Bridgham⁷⁰ is applied to these

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events, one can see Mao himself supporting his personal friend Hsiao (they had been on good terms since school-days in Ch'angsha) as part of his wider effort to undermine Lin's power base in the PLA.

The failure of Lin Piao in his apparent coup attempt of September 1971 brought the political maneuvering within Navy Headquarters to a rapid climax. Commissar Li Tso-p'eng disappeared, as did at least three other flag officers stationed in Peking: two Deputy Commanders of the Navy and the director of the Navy's Political Department.⁷¹ No officers from the fleet areas seem to have been affected. The backgrounds of the officers purged offer no surprises. Like Li Tso-p'eng, Deputy Commander Chou Jen-chieh and Political Department Director Chang Hsiuch'uan had been associates of Lin Piao in their prenavy days. All had been officers in Lin's Fourth Field Army. Like Li, both seem to have been loyal to Lin during the Cultural Revolution: Chang was a member of the PLA Cultural Revolution Group, while Chou, as a deputy commander of the East Sea Fleet, survived the purge of the fleet commander T'ao Yung. Chou had subsequently been assigned to Peking in 1970.⁷² Little is known about the fourth officer dismissed, Chang Ching-yi.

The removal from the Navy of both Li Tso-p'eng and of Lin Piao's influence was followed by a strong, unveiled resurgence of the Expert over the Red in naval political policy. This trend seems to have continued basically unchanged up to the present.

Press coverage of the navy has been sparse since 1971, but the reports that have appeared in national publications and in radio broadcasts form a clear pattern. Several accounts of the exploits of individual naval units appeared in the year following the disappearance of Li Tso-p'eng; all tended to emphasize the units' technical abilities. A definitive

statement then appeared in *Renmin Ribao* at the end of the first year of the post-Lin/Li period. Written by a South Sea Fleet Party Committee and entitled "The Dialectical Unity of Politics and Military Science," the document acknowledged that "military science must serve political ends," but also that "it will not do to talk merely of politics without grasping military affairs." In the past several years, the essay continued, "swindlers" had "advocated that politics might overrule everything else, thus in effect negating military science and professional work." The inappropriateness of what were evidently perceived in the Navy as irrational political regulations was criticized: "Naval units are an arm of technical complexity and require organizational work to a high degree of concentration, meticulous planning and exactness. This in turn must be ensured by regulations and systems that conform to objective laws."⁷³

In 1972 at least 4 of the 10 admirals definitely purged in the Cultural Revolution reappeared.⁷⁴ The most notable of these was Su Chen-hua. At first, Su was described as a Deputy Commander of the Navy, but this title was soon dropped. Su's resumption of his duties as First Political Commissar was confirmed by his formal appointment to that post by the Fourth National People's Congress in January 1975. He also succeeded Li on the Politburo (as an alternate member) and frequently appears in Navy uniform at government and Party functions. In a political system in which personal relationships are often very important, perhaps it is significant that Su worked closely with Teng Hsiao-p'ing in the Second Field Army in the revolution; the rehabilitation and advancement of Su Chen-hua after the fall of Lin Piao and Li Tso-p'eng paralleled that of Teng Hsiao-p'ing in the early 1970's. Likewise, however, it is possible that Su's position has been endangered by

the criticism of Teng underway in early 1976.

The largely apolitical character of public pronouncements on the Navy continued through 1973. Press coverage was slim, however. A handful of stories described the heroic deeds of Navy men—usually without mentioning the name of Mao Tse-tung. Several reports on the activities of the Soviet Navy appeared, each warning of its aggressive intentions. The year 1974 began with a recollection of Mao's 1953 tour of inspection of the fleet—an anniversary which several years earlier had occasioned sycophantic ecstasies. Now, however, recollection of the visit was said to be "the basis of a heightened awareness" of the need for a Navy in an era of social-imperialism (i.e., the Soviet threat), and that the crew of the ship Mao had visited "has rapidly whipped up a new wave of enthusiasm for military training."⁷⁵

The Navy's response to the anti-Confucius/anti-Lin Piao campaign in 1974 was minimal and predictable:

The criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius fired the commanders and fighters with greater fervor for fighting to defend the dictatorship of the proletariat. They keep equipment in order and train in the spirit of seizing the day and the hour. They patrol the seas and are pledged to redouble their vigilance in defending the... coast of the motherland.⁷⁶

For the Navy, the outstanding event of early 1974 was the battle with South Vietnam over the Paracel Islands in mid-January. An epic poem describing the battle appeared, giving an idea both of how the Navy wants the Chinese political system to see it and, at the same time, how it sees itself.

The young naval power of new
China,

The warships of the proletariat!

Sing for the fresh miracles created by
the sea fighters of the motherland!

Sing for the victory of the battle of
self-defense that lasted no more
than thirty minutes!

The People's Navy of new China that
took part in the action

Has neither the so-called "Komar-
class destroyers"

Nor the so-called "Styx-type guided
missiles."

We are the small fighting the big.

The weak opposing the strong.

And we have only begun to test our
swords. . . .

The People's Navy founded and com-
manded by Chairman Mao! . . .

Making a sight of wonder and opening
a new page

In the annals of people's war on the
seas.⁷⁷

The Navy made a symbolically significant move in May 1974 when it restored the traditional officer and enlisted uniforms that had been abandoned in the PLA's egalitarian innovations of 1965.⁷⁸

A final fact which should be mentioned is the Navy's standing at the end of the Tenth Party Congress held in August 1973. In addition to the appointment of Su Chen-hua as an alternate member of the Politburo, he, Hsiao Ching-kuang, and Wang Hung-k'un were made full members of the Party Central Committee (no Navy men appeared as alternate members). These figures represent a considerable reduction from the four full and five alternate memberships issued by the Ninth Congress in 1969, but this phenomenon is not at all surprising, considering the vastly inflated representation that the PLA as a whole enjoyed on the Ninth Central Committee. This imbalance was largely redressed in 1973 for all the services. But if the Tenth Central Committee is compared with the pre-Cultural Revolution Eighth, it is evident that the Navy gained appreciably in the councils of Party power.

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Undoubtedly, the Navy has gained much of its recent freedom because of a heightened awareness by the Chinese that the development of seapower is essential for their defense. For the first time since the diminution of the threat from Taiwan, China has been faced with a serious enemy—the Soviet Union. In the West, the Soviet military threat to China is usually envisioned as a combination of ballistic missile, air, and ground attack launched from the interior of Asia. The Chinese, however, are fully cognizant of the Soviet Navy's recently developed capabilities: a blockade of the Chinese coast and naval raids on coastal targets would very likely accompany a Soviet invasion from the north and west. Such a strategy could cut China off from outside sources of supply, divide the PLA's attention geographically, and could result in some destruction of coastal industry.⁷⁹ Indeed, the U.S.S.R. could apply a blockade to the Chinese coast in situations short of full war. Thus, a navy capable of denying control of the waters off China to the Soviet Union is a necessity.

In a less immediate but more probable situation, China will require a regionally strong navy to protect what it evidently perceives as its proprietary interests over its extremely wide, mineral-rich continental shelf, including the Paracel and Spratly Island groups. In this respect, not only the Soviet but also the Japanese and other Asian navies are seen as potential adversaries. These two fundamental problems—defense in a Sino-Soviet war and the reservation of primary rights to marine resources—have come into clear focus only within the past half decade. It is also evident that only recently has native Chinese technology progressed to the point of being able to produce a navy adequate for these tasks.

The apolitical turn within the Navy during the recent period is, therefore, not surprising. The naval command has evidently stressed as the service's driving

force “the importance of the work”⁸⁰ rather than the various intangible motivations that true “Maoist” warriors are supposed to feel. Thus, patriotism and professional challenge, not political slogans, now underlie the Navy's desire to perform effectively. Perhaps it has always been so.

Conclusions. Since 1949 the national leadership has increasingly recognized China's need for a navy and has invested considerable resources in its development. The government and Party have recognized as well that the navy must be largely exempted from such political demands as have frequently been placed upon the Army. The national leadership has, however, sought both to ensure ultimate party control over the Navy and to maintain the *appearance* to the casual political observer that the Navy is participating in domestic affairs along with the rest of the PLA.

Thus, at no time has the Red ever been emphasized over the Expert except in a superficial and even cynical manner. This phenomenon will no doubt continue, as the naval command of pre-1949 guerrilla origin is replaced by

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



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officers who have spent their entire careers in this politically privileged organization.

The Navy can only increase in size and importance, and as it grows, its

political stature will increase as well. The presence of the essentially apolitical Navy in the councils of power in Peking may add a new factor to the Chinese decisionmaking process.

NOTES

1. The Party is referred to frequently below in this capacity. The identity of the individual Party organ concerned is both indefinite and varied. The authorities referred to as "the Party" may in some cases have been the Military Affairs Commission, the PLA General Political Department, or Party organs within the Navy. The basic arrangement described here, however, no doubt has the sanction of the Politburo.

2. New China News Agency release (hereafter cited as NCNA) 19 March 1953, in *Survey of China Mainland Press*, American Consulate Hong Kong (hereafter cited as SCMP) 535, 20 March 1953, p. 6.

3. NCNA 21 May 1955, SCMP 1053, 21-23 May 1955, p. 37.

4. NCNA 4 March 1954, SCMP 761, 6-8 March 1954, p. 35.

5. *Ibid.*

6. NCNA 8 November 1951, SCMP 212, 10 November 1951, p. 5.

7. Gene Z. Hanrahan, "Report on Red China's New Navy," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, August 1953, p. 851.

8. John Gittings, *The Role of the Chinese Army* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 144.

9. *Ibid.* Some of this number may in fact have been regular Soviet naval personnel stationed in Port Arthur. It is unlikely, however, that the number of Soviet naval advisers in China dropped much or for long after the Soviet withdrawal from the base in 1955.

10. Using figures from *Jane's Fighting Ships*, (London: Low, Marston, 1954-55 edition).

11. *Peking Review*, Peking, 8 March 1968, p. 5.

12. L. Bruce Swanson, "The Chinese Communist Navy: 23 Years of Theory and Practice," Unpublished MS, American University, Washington, D.C., 1972, p. 58.

13. China News Service release, 27 March 1954, SCMP 777, 30 March 1954, p. 6.

14. *Jiefangjun Bao*, 13 October 1956, in *Union Research Service*, Hong Kong, vol. 6, p. 100.

15. NCNA 9 March 1957, SCMP 1492, 19 March 1957, p. 9.

16. *Ch'ingtao Ribao*, 31 July 1957, SCMP 1653, 18 November 1957, p. 9.

17. *Renmin Ribao*, 12 March 1957, SCMP 1498, 27 March 1957, p. 5.

18. *Renmin Ribao*, 30 July 1957, SCMP 1596, 22 August 1957, p. 17.

19. The Great Leap Forward, begun in 1958, was a period of intense mass political indoctrination and reorganization. A primary purpose of the campaign was to bring about a vast increase in industrial and agricultural production in a very short time. This led to such moves as the backyard production of steel in primitive furnaces and the reorganization of the populace into communes. The rapidity with which unplanned and frequently irrational innovations were instituted, the breakdown in accountancy, popular resentment, and poor weather all condemned the Great Leap to failure and plunged China into a serious depression and famine.

20. NCNA 1 August 1958, SCMP 1828, 8 August 1958, p. 13.

21. *Renmin Ribao*, 1 May 1959, in *Current Background*, American Consulate Hong Kong, 2 June 1959, p. 1.

22. *Guangming Ribao*, 13 October 1959, SCMP 2141, 23 November 1959, p. 6.

23. Ying-mao Kau, et al., *The Political Work System of the Chinese Communist Military: Analysis and Documents*, mimeographed (Providence, R.I.: Brown University, 1971), p. 287.

24. Peking radio, 15 December 1967, Foreign Broadcast Information Service *Daily Report on China* (hereafter cited as FBIS), 21 December 1967, p. C1. Unfortunately, the documents referred to are apparently unavailable.

25. *Nanfang Ribao*, 3 March 1964, SCMP 3197, 13 April 1964, p. 4.

26. *Communist China Problem Research Series*, EC 39, Union Research Institute, Hong Kong, p. 70.

27. NCNA 9 April 1965, SCMP 3438, 14 April 1965, p. 23.

28. Swanson, chapter II.

29. See the appropriate editions of *Jane's Fighting Ships*; there is a contemporary report of the cutback in Edward J. Cummings, Jr., "The Chinese Communist Navy," *United States Naval*

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Institute Proceedings, September 1964, p. 66. Resource reductions in this period were criticized in a Peking radio broadcast of 24 July 1968, in FBIS 146-68, 26 July 1968, p. B9.

30. See, for example, NCNA 11 January 1966, SCMP 3625, 27 January 1966, p. 23, NCNA 26 January 1966, SCMP 3627, 31 January 1966, p. 21, NCNA 1 February 1966, SCMP 3633, 8 February 1966, p. 3.

31. The Cultural Revolution revolved around the effort by political radicals to gain power at the expense of many of the more conservative figures in authority. These individuals were accused of revisionism—perverting Marxist-Leninist-Maoist doctrine—and were driven from office.

32. *Yangcheng Wanbao*, 21 August 1966, SCMP 3770, 29 August 1966, p. 26. It is interesting to note that two of these four eminent visitors were soon to lose their positions. A revealing Red Guard poster seen on 15 January 1967 accused Ho Lung of "supporting a certain Su in the Navy, a supporter of P'eng Te-huai, planning to take over the Navy." (*China News Summary*, U.K. Regional Information Office, Hong Kong, 154, 19 January 1967, p. A2) Most of the six lesser dignitaries from the Canton area who visited Mai in the local hospital were purged as well.

33. *Renmin Ribao*, 23 August 1966, p. 2.

34. *China News Summary*, 180, 27 July 1967; Su reappeared after the fall of Lin Piao, see below.

35. NCNA 13 November 1966, SCMP 3823, 18 November 1966, p. 6.

36. This sequence of events makes it probable that Su Chen-hua and Tu Yi-te were removed from effective power between 11 and 13 November 1966. This contrasts with the estimates offered in other sources, which range from January to June 1967.

37. *Renmin Ribao*, 25 June 1967, *China News Summary*, 180, 27 July 1967.

38. NCNA 30 July 1966, SCMP 3753, 4 August 1966, p. 23.

39. William W. Whitson, *The Chinese High Command* (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. 297.

40. Swanson, p. 100.

41. See for example *Renmin Ribao*, 14 November 1966, SCMP 3828, 28 November 1966, p. 1.

42. Tsinan radio, 4 January 1969, FBIS 4-69, 7 January 1969, p. C13.

43. *Jiefangjun Bao*, 14 January 1967, *Communist China Problem Research Series*, EC 41, 1969, p. 202.

44. *Communist China Problem Research Series*, EC 47, 1969, p. 210.

45. The only reference to such membership found was a March 1972 description of East Sea Fleet Political Department Director Ch'ai Ch'i-k'un as Secretary of the Chekiang Province Revolutionary Committee.

46. For a study of the Wuhan incident, see Thomas W. Robinson, "The Wuhan Incident: Local Strife and Provincial Rebellion During the Cultural Revolution," RAND P-4511 (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, December 1970).

47. *Hong Kong Ming Bao*, 31 July 1967, SCMP 3993, 2 August 1967, p. 8.

48. NCNA 22 July 1967, SCMP 3989, 27 July 1967, p. 1. An important sidelight on the Wuhan incident is the fact that T'ao Yung, the commander of the East Sea Fleet, was suddenly relieved of his command in August 1967. It thus seems likely that T'ao may have resisted Peking's orders to assist in quelling the Wuhan rebellion. T'ao had also come under attack by Red Guards in 1966.

49. Hangzhou radio, 9 November 1967, FBIS 14 November 1967, p. D1.

50. NCNA 26 October 1967, SCMP 4050, 30 October 1967, p. 30.

51. Shanghai radio, 4 July 1968, FBIS, 12 July 1968, p. C8.

52. Canton radio, 28 December 1968, FBIS, 31 December 1968, p. D1.

53. See the annual editions of *Jane's Fighting Ships* published during this period.

54. *Renmin Ribao*, 13 October 1968, SCMP 4288, 29 October 1968, p. 1.

55. *Peking Review*, 3 January 1968, p. 40.

56. Whitson, p. 554.

57. NCNA 4 September 1968, SCMP 4254, 10 September 1968, p. 17.

58. Peking radio, 22 August 1967, FBIS, 23 August 1967, p. C1.

59. Peking radio, 24 July 1968, FBIS, 26 July 1968, p. B9.

60. *Hong Kong Xingdao Ribao*, 9 March 1969, p. 4, in Joint Publications Research Service report 48063, 20 May 1969.

61. Shanghai radio, 23 March 1969, FBIS, 2 April 1969, p. C14.

62. *Jane's Fighting Ships*, annual editions.

63. Peking radio, 19 March 1968, FBIS, 21 March 1968, p. B9.

64. *Renmin Ribao*, 7 May 1969, SCMP 4421, 22 May 1969, p. 6.

65. *Renmin Ribao*, 6 May 1971, SCMP 4899, 17 May 1971, p. 14.

66. Peking radio, 7 April 1970, FBIS, 16 April 1970, p. B2. Also see *Renmin Ribao*, 25 February 1971, FBIS, 11 March 1971, p. B2.
67. Peking radio, 17 May 1970, FBIS, 26 May 1970, p. B7.
68. Peking radio, 5 March 1971, FBIS, 8 March 1971, p. B1.
69. Chang K'uei-yi, Kuei Shao-pin, Liu Hua-ch'ing, P'eng Lin, and Wu Jui-lin.
70. "The Fall of Lin Piao," *China Quarterly* 55, July/September 1973.
71. *Hong Kong Xingdao Ribao*, 23 April 1972, Joint Publications Research Service report 56153, 1 June 1972, p. 2.
72. Chou Jen-chieh was again cited as a "leading member of the PLA" in February 1973.
73. *Renmin Ribao*, 8 September 1972, SCMP 5218, 19 September 1972, p. 42.
74. Hu P'eng-fei, Lu Jen-lin, Su Chen-hua, and Tu Yi-te. A fifth, Fang Ch'iang, had reappeared by mid-1974. Liu Tao-sheng also began to appear in the press again in August 1972, though whether he had ever actually been dismissed is unclear.
75. *Guangming Ribao*, 2 January 1974, SCMP 5542, 28 January 1974, p. 84.
76. Peking radio, 9 April 1974, FBIS, 10 April 1974, p. H3.
77. Peking radio, 16 March 1974, FBIS, 22 March 1974, p. B1. The Navy has had the missile-armed Komar boats for over a decade.
78. NCNA 1 May 1974, SCMP 5612, 6 May 1974, p. 16.
79. This assumes that in the event of war, some elements of the Soviet western fleets would probably be deployed to the Pacific. The Suez Canal could benefit the U.S.S.R. in this respect.
80. *Renmin Ribao*, 25 February 1971, FBIS, 11 March 1971, p. B2.

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