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The Road to Stalingrad: Stalin's War with Germany

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skillfully weaves a cohesive pattern of analysis of complex problems, outlines and documents policies and events, and adds appropriate quotations from contemporary opinions. The final updating, apparently made shortly before publication and easily identifiable in the text, seems to show that Canadian reactions to the American presence have now reached a critical point where Canada is likely to resist further change tenaciously. Much will therefore depend on whether the United States can respond rationally to what often seems to be merely Canadian hypersensitivity but, as Dr. Dickey shows, really has great validity.

Dr. Dickey accepts the "Canadianization" of many aspects of life as a natural phenomenon, a healthy manifestation of a desire for a distinctive identity and for independent Canada. He is not unduly alarmed by the strident cries of many contemporary Canadian nationalists. Instead, he elaborates on the ways in which their aspirations could bring head-on collisions with preconceived American goals and objectives. He agrees that preservation of a strong independent Canada is a prime American interest that can only be guaranteed by relaxation of the effects of the American presence that have become intolerable to Canadians. His underlying pleas, therefore, is for a fuller American understanding of the legitimate concerns and ideals of the neighbor to the north. Failure to achieve that understanding may bring too much American infiltration and domination and this, in President Dickey's view, could lead to the breakup of Canada, an eventuality he regards as undesirable for the future well-being of the United States itself. What he infers is that the Balkanization of Canada would mean a new open front on the north like that in Central and South America. The United States, in Dr. Dickey's view, has a vital need of a strong Canada on the northern

flank, even if it is an independent-minded one.

It is pointed out in the book that the chief obstacle to sound American policymaking to cope with the rising flood of Canadian nationalism is America's lack of knowledge of her northern neighbor, not merely on the part of the officials who have to make decisions, but also in the private sectors of American society. If it reaches the vast mass of the general public in the United States (which is not very likely), this book could help to counter the prevalence of apathy about Canadian affairs. However, what President Dickey did not stress was that at the root of American ignorance of Canada is the fact that not only the media in the United States but also the whole educational system, at all levels, convey virtually nothing about Canada. It is in curricula, if anywhere, that the long-range solution lies. For a better appreciation of the Canadian problem, Canada must become a subject of study in the United States; and the emphasis must be on teaching about Canada itself, and not merely on Canadian-American relations which, without a basic knowledge of the other country, are often unintelligible for Americans.

RICHARD A. PRESTON
Duke University

Erickson, John. *The Road to Stalingrad: Stalin's War with Germany*. New York: Harper & Row, 1975. 595pp.

Professor John Erickson's latest book is the first of a two-volume study of the Soviet Army in World War II. *The Road to Stalingrad* examines a wide range of topics including Soviet prewar planning and doctrine, the course of military operations, Russian command decisions, and Soviet performance in battle.

The introduction and book I provide a clear, lucid account of the Soviet Army's efforts in 1940 and 1941 to prepare for the inevitable conflict with

Hitler. Erickson points out that Stalin's purge of the military destroyed thousands of trained, talented leaders and seriously undermined the army's morale. Stalin's employment of politically loyal cronies, many of whom had learned nothing since the Civil War, further compounded the command problem.

The Russian Army was also saddled with poor equipment. The Soviets had large numbers of tanks, for example, but most of them were no match for the German panzers, and the excellent T34's only came into production in 1940. Similar problems beset the air and artillery arms.

The Red Army's armored doctrine was also insufficient to meet the Nazi challenge. Although among the first nations to evolve tank and mechanized warfare techniques, Russia had actually regressed in the late 1930's. Many of Stalin's military henchmen opposed mechanization and concluded that the Spanish Civil War demonstrated that large armored formations were not necessary. Stalin, therefore, disbanded his armored divisions and reduced his tank corps to an infantry support role. German triumphs in Poland and France convinced the High Command to restore large armored formations, but in 1941 the recreated units lacked experienced leaders, realistic training, and coherent doctrine.

Finally, Stalin's refusal to accept numerous intelligence reports indicating that Hitler was going to strike in the early summer of 1941 placed the Red Army at a severe tactical disadvantage. Thus, on 22 June 1941 the well-trained, victorious German Armies struck a foe tragically unprepared for modern war.

Book II deals with the course of military operations from the opening of the Nazi onslaught until the successful Soviet counterattack at Stalingrad. Erickson's account is based upon the extensive use of Soviet sources as well as German documents.

There is, however, a major problem with the detailed description of the campaigns; namely, the fact that the book does not have a single map. Even the *West Point Atlas of American Wars* vol. II, which contains an extensive section dealing with the Soviet-German war, is not sufficient to enable a reader to follow the unfolding of events. The failure to include maps thus robs the narrative of much of its impact. The book would have been greatly strengthened had the author or publisher seen fit to delete the section of illustrations which are poorly chosen and basically pointless and instead inserted some useful maps.

Although difficult and at times impossible to follow, the narrative of military operations does make a number of interesting and significant points. Erickson notes that in addition to being completely surprised in June 1941, Stalin and his High Command contributed to a whole succession of disasters by insisting upon immediate counterattacks. In September, Stalin's reluctance to withdraw from Kiev contributed to the entrapment and destruction of five field armies. Erickson also indicates that the traditional view of Budenny's incompetence needs major revision. Stalin, Shaposhnikov, and Voroshilov were the real architects of the Kiev disaster. Similar inefficiency on the part of Stalin and his staff produced the Bryansk and Vyazama catastrophes in October.

Blunders did not cease in the winter of 1941, and after Zhukov's inspired defense of Moscow, Stalin ordered counteroffensives of a magnitude far outweighing the army's tactical and material capabilities. Losses suffered in these ill-devised offensives in turn paved the way for the 1942 German summer offensive. By this time, however, the Russians had begun to produce new equipment and had evolved an officer corps well versed by experience in the nature of *blitzkrieg* warfare. After some

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hard blows, the Russians managed to hold the Germans at Stalingrad. Erickson's detailed description of the fighting in the city is excellent but again suffers from the absence of maps. While the fighting on the Volga raged with sustained fury, the Soviets planned and executed a massive strategic counter-blow.

Professor Erickson has written a useful and informative book. The section on sources provides a valuable bibliography for anyone wishing to study aspects of the Soviet military in World War II in greater detail. Only the absence of maps detracts from the clarity of the narrative. Hopefully, the second volume will rectify this serious error.

PROFESSOR S.T. ROSS
Naval War College

Gallucci, Robert L. *Neither Peace nor Honor: The Politics of American Military Policy in Vietnam*. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research for the School of Advanced International Studies, 1975. 187pp.

This is a good book with a bad title. By describing the politics of American military policy in Vietnam from 1961 to 1967, at best the author might succeed in demonstrating that there is no honor among bureaucratic politicians. The book is about the politics of the Kennedy and Johnson era Pentagon and not about the complex and still bewildering nature of the struggle in Indochina that ended in April of 1975, with a Communist peace. If anything, moreover, the book is an indictment of Lyndon Johnson's war management and not the negotiating policies of Richard M. Nixon who claimed that peace with honor had been achieved when the Paris agreement was signed.

This was originally Gallucci's Ph.D. thesis at Brandeis University and is one

of a number of recent studies stimulated by the creative work of Graham Allison (*Essence of Decision*) on the styles and impact of bureaucratic politics on foreign policy. Gallucci's starting point is the debate, *inter alios*, between Arthur M. Schlesinger on one side and Daniel Ellsberg and Leslie Gelb on the other over how Vietnam happened. Gallucci is searching for an explanation between the Schlesinger view (expressed in *The Bitter Heritage*) that the United States gradually became entwined in a complex struggle motivated by a misbegotten view of its importance and the Ellsberg-Gelb view (represented by articles published in *Public Policy* and *Foreign Policy*, respectively) that, while never very optimistic about the outcome in Vietnam, U.S. policymakers could not face extrication because its costs always appeared too high given what had already been invested.

Gallucci looks to the bureaucratic environment in which decisions about the war were made to explain what went wrong. Drawing largely on the *Pentagon Papers*, he argues in the Allissonian metaphor that the United States was not a

unitary actor seeking, in a rational manner, to maximize its utility with respect to some set of national goals. By adopting the bureaucratic perspective, we move to a lower level of analysis where . . . the policy of the United States in Southeast Asia is accounted for in terms other than the pursuit of the national interests or the protection of national security. It is a perspective that leads, instead, to explanations for policy in terms of the politics internal to large organizations, politics among senior government actors, and at times, the politics of national elections (pp. 137-138).

The findings of this study will not be surprising to anyone familiar with how