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Neither Peace nor Honor: The Politics of American Military Policy in Vietnam

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hard blows, the Russians managed to hold the Germans at Stalingrad. Erickson's detailed description of the fighting in the city is excellent but again suffers from the absence of maps. While the fighting on the Volga raged with sustained fury, the Soviets planned and executed a massive strategic counter-blow.

Professor Erickson has written a useful and informative book. The section on sources provides a valuable bibliography for anyone wishing to study aspects of the Soviet military in World War II in greater detail. Only the absence of maps detracts from the clarity of the narrative. Hopefully, the second volume will rectify this serious error.

PROFESSOR S.T. ROSS
Naval War College

Gallucci, Robert L. *Neither Peace nor Honor: The Politics of American Military Policy in Vietnam*. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research for the School of Advanced International Studies, 1975. 187pp.

This is a good book with a bad title. By describing the politics of American military policy in Vietnam from 1961 to 1967, at best the author might succeed in demonstrating that there is no honor among bureaucratic politicians. The book is about the politics of the Kennedy and Johnson era Pentagon and not about the complex and still bewildering nature of the struggle in Indochina that ended in April of 1975, with a Communist peace. If anything, moreover, the book is an indictment of Lyndon Johnson's war management and not the negotiating policies of Richard M. Nixon who claimed that peace with honor had been achieved when the Paris agreement was signed.

This was originally Gallucci's Ph.D. thesis at Brandeis University and is one

of a number of recent studies stimulated by the creative work of Graham Allison (*Essence of Decision*) on the styles and impact of bureaucratic politics on foreign policy. Gallucci's starting point is the debate, *inter alios*, between Arthur M. Schlesinger on one side and Daniel Ellsberg and Leslie Gelb on the other over how Vietnam happened. Gallucci is searching for an explanation between the Schlesinger view (expressed in *The Bitter Heritage*) that the United States gradually became entwined in a complex struggle motivated by a misbegotten view of its importance and the Ellsberg-Gelb view (represented by articles published in *Public Policy* and *Foreign Policy*, respectively) that, while never very optimistic about the outcome in Vietnam, U.S. policymakers could not face extrication because its costs always appeared too high given what had already been invested.

Gallucci looks to the bureaucratic environment in which decisions about the war were made to explain what went wrong. Drawing largely on the *Pentagon Papers*, he argues in the Allissonian metaphor that the United States was not a

unitary actor seeking, in a rational manner, to maximize its utility with respect to some set of national goals. By adopting the bureaucratic perspective, we move to a lower level of analysis where . . . the policy of the United States in Southeast Asia is accounted for in terms other than the pursuit of the national interests or the protection of national security. It is a perspective that leads, instead, to explanations for policy in terms of the politics internal to large organizations, politics among senior government actors, and at times, the politics of national elections (pp. 137-138).

The findings of this study will not be surprising to anyone familiar with how

the Pentagon does its business: "A wretched policy for the United States may be perfectly understandable as a superb compromise among competing interests" (p. 153). Gallucci describes and judges the policies that resulted, in essence, from the competition between "bureaucratic actors" (call them presidential advisors who came from a particular agency and tended to advance that agency's interests) over the initial shaping of the Vietnam commitment, the decision to initiate Rolling Thunder, the myriad of decisions to expand the bombing of the North between 1965 and 1967, and the overall strategy to be pursued on the ground. For the reader who cannot take the time to plough through the volumes of the *Pentagon Papers* dealing with these issues, Gallucci presents a faithful and competent rendering of the substance and thrust of the analyses there.

The task force assigned to reorganize the NSC in November 1976 should probably read the concluding pages of this book. While conscious that far too many wrong lessons have been already drawn from the Vietnam experience, Gallucci does suggest two concrete ways the decisionmaking and information processing functions of the NSC system could be changed to reduce the effects of interservice rivalry and the imperative of bureaucratic compromise. These, again, owe much to Allison's work, and if implemented would go far towards institutionalizing the debating and decisionmaking forum that Robert Kennedy idealized so long ago in *Thirteen Days*.

ALLAN E. GOODMAN
Central Intelligence Agency

Goldhamer, Herbert. *The Soviet Soldier: Soviet Military Management at the Troop Level*. New York: Crane, Russack, 1975. 352pp.

Dr. Goldhamer is a faculty sociologist at Rand Corporation, and the pur-

pose of his work is best expressed by its terminal sentence, "We wish only to caution the readers against accepting uncritically some current images of the Soviet soldier [10' tall syndrome] and the Soviet military and to provide him with some considerations that both explain observable deficiencies and suggest possible existence of others that are not so readily discernible." Where did the author get his information? From the Russians: he made a study of unclassified military journals—as if a Russian had searched out U.S. Navy policies, practices, concerns, accomplishments, tensions, problems, and complaints by reading the *Navy Times Naval Institute Proceedings*, *Naval War College Review*, *Shipmate*, et cetera. Using this methodology, he looks at Soviet military manpower policies, training, discipline, morale, political indoctrination, and the unique interface between the Communist Party and the military. Good organization and straightforward style enhance this sophisticated work which has enough new material and perceptive handling of established concepts to reward professional readers without being a book for the cult of the "devil watchers" only.

Among the things uncovered are familiar vexations (specialist-leadership conflicts, NCO shortages and downgrading of NCO's, lack of professionalism in the officer corps, indifferent reservists, manipulation of statistics, "hippie" youth problems, et cetera). Also familiar is the Russian desire to turn sociological and psychological techniques into military manpower assets and, with it, the inherent implication that traditional responses are somewhat defective. There may also be significance as well as amusement in the insistence by higher commanders that military service—not just war—must be seen as "romantic" and "heroic" and the exhortation to officers and their wives to be "elegant." There are also some unique institutions described for