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Families in the Military System

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adopts a strikingly different tone. Perhaps the greatest weakness of our strategic thinking is the lack of a sound historical perspective, and Mr. Jenkins is typical in being much impressed by the role of new technologies in magnifying the destructive potential of terrorism. He gives a long catalogue of innovations which terrorists could readily put to use, from portable SAM's to mini-machine guns. He fails, however, to recognize that new technologies give still greater advantages to the counter-terrorism: since his paper was presented, aircraft hijacking has virtually ceased thanks to some low-cost detectors (and much passenger inconvenience). His lack of perspective is manifest in the treatment of terrorism as a *new* phenomenon, but terrorism is as old as the organized state (before that we were *all* terrorists), and technological innovation has *systematically restricted its potential:* the Romans had to fight terrorism without even having a material with which to build fences, let alone instant ID cards and X-ray detectors.

This book can be read with profit by all interested in the current shape of nonnuclear war, and its reference value is enhanced by a solid 50 pages of weapon definitions and specifications (to be used with care: there are many errors). Now we have another reason to be grateful to the Fletcher crowd.

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McCubbin, Hamilton I., Dahl, Barbara B., & Hunter, Edna J., eds. *Families in the Military System.* Beverly Hills/ London: Sage Publications, 1976. 393pp.

The 10 studies which this volume presents, together with a review of research and a nicely annotated 153-item bibliography, touch on many matters of personal concern to today's career military, most of whom are married, many with dependent children in the house. Unfortunately, whatever spontaneous interest these topics may arouse is severely taxed by a style of presentation that outsiders like to dub as "academic jargon." Actually, it more closely resembles the language used in technical reports of behavioral studies so widely prevalent in military personnel management and the medical services.

In contrast to the best of academic work, which tends to be reflective, the contributions hew closely to the tangible responses contained in questionnaires, data from personnel records, and similarly quantified information. Of course, they include the "mandatory" reviews of the "literature" and the hypotheses devised from "theory" as well as "discussions" of results, but these tend to be tagged on (before or after) the crosstabulations and correlations. There is not enough in the way of synthesis that interprets the diverse findings against the appropriate social and organizational setting. While the preface and introduction attempt to do this, they are all too brief, and the one chapter that serves as a review essay is primarily an evaluative summary of what research has so far revealed.

However, I do not mean to write off the volume because of these evident flaws. A careful reading will uncover many observations, important for an understanding of the military, even though their full implications are not always adequately articulated by the authors. What clearly emerges is that the military family is no longer encapsulated in the military community, nor its claims totally subordinated to those of the organizational hierarchy, to the degree they once were. To this extent, then, it is in the family, the most basic of human institutions, that civil-military conflict manifests itself in its most personal, if not its most elementary, form. As every officer knows, the claims

of a system that has frequent relocation, prolonged and enforced family separation, and early retirement built into it impedes but does not necessarily preclude an ordered family life.

None of these contingencies, which are the focus of much family research, are of course entirely unique to the military. Their consequences therefore essentially parallel those in civilian life. For example, one study finds that the comparatively low divorce rates among Air Force officers are partly explained by educational level (family instability is greater among the less educated) and that the effect of relocation on these rates is at least consistent with what one would infer from the assignment patterns of different officer groups. High educational achievement is also associated with the quest on the part of officer wives to further their education and seek a career, with the school performance of their adolescent children, and so forth. Another highly determining factor, because it affects access to resources that help weather the contingencies examined, is military rank. Differences between the ranks turn up for nearly everything examined in these studies.

Yet despite this focus on problems, several of the studies point also to opportunities afforded by military life. While too frequent a rupture of social relationships due to continuous moves can cause malaise, an occasional move is broadening and educational. As one study reveals, those children of military families who had experienced a moderate amount of geographical mobility had higher school achievement than those with either high or low mobility, a finding consistent with findings on the impact of frequent moves on children generally.

The impact of deprivational features is further softened by the military support system, ranging from informal mutual assistance spontaneously rendered by peers to the formal provision of resources and therapeutic services. The volume contains data on how much different parts of that system are utilized and on the adequacy of what is provided. Both dissatisfactions and deficiencies are identified. Beyond that, the outlines of a basic dilemma begin to emerge from data presented in a variety of contexts.

To the extent that the officers and servicemen identify with the military community and look to it as their most basic source of gratification, the more easily are the difficulties of service borne. As one study documents, families who least identified with the military encountered the most problems during relocation. The finding may appear "obvious" but gains significance when considered in conjunction with other findings indicating that an identity too closely built around one's military status creates problems in other areas.

One such area is military retirement. The difficulties faced in the forced status changes that go with early retirement have repercussions on other family members. All face similar problems in trying to pick up the pieces of a shattered identity, and here of course is where preparatory counseling helps. However, in another problem area the dynamics are different. Wives who adjust to prolonged forced separation from their husbands, such as wives of POW's, by finding a new focus for their lives can gain independence that puts additional strain on family stability. The wife's involvement in the military community may act as a constraint against outside interests, but in that case she becomes a "waiting wife" who subordinates her own needs to the claims of the military organization. Another aspect of this central dilemma involves the wife who exists primarily to foster her husband's military career. The basic question is: how deeply should the nonmilitary members of the military family become involved?

American society is changing and so is the position of women in it. An increasing number of military wives today have full-time outside employment. Equally important but probably more widely recognized is the second-career problem, which the military in former times did not have to face. Both present problems in how to accommodate to the requirements of the military while recognizing the competing claims exerted by the military's linkages with/and position within civilian society. The book presents ample material that should lead the reader to reflect on the pressure family life demands place on the military career as presently structured and as it may evolve.

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Nathan, James A. and Oliver, James K. *United States Foreign Policy and World Order*. Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1976. 598pp.

This volume is a broad history of the United States and its interaction with other actors on the international stage over the past 30 years. It is a history of success and failure in particular episodes of the cold war, but more than that, it is a history of how little the outcomes of these individual policy decisions have affected the underlying concepts and assumptions on which foreign policy is built. Thus the central "lessons" learned from Nazi aggression and the years immediately following the Second World War have been applied and reapplied ever since. In a 1965 speech, for example, President Johnson was able to say that "the central lesson of our time is that the appetite of aggression is never satisfied. [The lesson of Munich, 1938.] To withdraw from one battlefield means only to prepare for the next ... [domino theory]. The rulers of Hanoi are urged on by Peiping ... a nation that is helping the forces of violence on every continent [monolithic communism]." These are the same assumptions about the state of world politics that had led the United States to become involved in Korea and are described by the authors as the culture in which American policymakers have operated and continue to operate since the latter days of the Second World War.

The book is divided in two parts. The first covers the events on the international stage, but the second, perhaps the most interesting and certainly the most thought provoking, deals with the changes that have been forced on the American system of government by our assumption of the mantle of world leadership: these changes have led to the ever-increasing power of the executive branch at the expense of the Congress, for example; power that was necessary if the United States was to have the ability to respond quickly to events in a crisis.

The history opens with the first, decidedly unfriendly encounters of the West with the fledgling Bolshevik government in 1918 and links the direct origins of the cold war to the events of WW II. The inability or, as seen in the eyes of the Soviets, the unwillingness of the Western allies to give material aid to the struggling Russian armies in the field gave little impetus to good will after 1945. These doubts about Anglo-American intentions were well founded. By early 1943, despite the much publicized Allied landings in North Africa, the Western forces were engaged with no more than 12 German divisions. The Soviets were engaged with 185. Indeed, the invasion of France and the opening of a second front, promised to Stalin throughout the war, was only to come after the Soviet victory in central Europe was inevitable—and the Russians were convinced that it was Allied policy to bleed them white. Similarly, the Soviets viewed Western plans for the unification and reconstruction of