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All too often consideration of questions of logistics is deferred in favor of the more glamorous and more exciting questions of strategy and tactics. Even so, the task of logistics is to provide, train, equip, and maintain military forces capable of conducting sustained combat operations. For this reason logistics establishes very real limitations to what strategy can accomplish, and at all times it must be a personal concern of commanders at all levels. Writing on the basis of his experience at the highest operational and staff levels, Vice Admiral Weschler, in a letter to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics), discusses some fundamentals, current problems, and future prospects of logistics. Some of his recommendations are sure to excite discussion.

PRIORITIES AND EMPHASES FOR LOGISTICS, 1976-78

by

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Dr. John J. Bennett
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Room 3E808
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Dear Dr. Bennett:

You have asked me to examine today's logistics principles and precepts and then, in the light of current opportunities or limitations, to indicate what steps could be taken to bring about the best possible logistics improvement. First, as to the principles of logistics, the best discussion is Henry E. Eccles' classic *Logistics in the National Defense*.^{*} There are also valuable lists published by the Joint Logistics Commanders in 1967 and again in the Logistics Systems Plan "LOGPLAN FY 75-81."

Logistics in the National Defense is so comprehensive as to be a textbook and is based on the author's own firsthand logistics experience in World War II. It is a distillation of the fundamentals of logistics and logistics' place in the military scheme. Thus, it is as relevant today as it was nearly 20 years ago. Four basic points have been developed from this and other sources:

^{*}Henry E. Eccles, *Logistics in the National Defense* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole, 1959).

1. Logistics is the bridge between the national economy and military capability. As such it is both the military side of national economics and the economic side of military capability.

2. Strategic logistics, as a reflection of national economic strength, commitment, and responsiveness, sets the upper boundary of national strategy.

3. Tactical logistics, as the measure of available and sustainable means of war, establishes limitations on tactical plans and capabilities.

4. There are three major phases to logistics:

a. Requirements determination—the military process of careful planning and forecasting.

b. Producer logistics—an essentially civilian operation to provide the means of war through the nation's industrial machine.

c. Consumer logistics—an essentially military operation which takes the means of war from the industrial heart of the nation to the battle area in the right quantity and at the right time.

History provides numerous examples of how these basic points have been perceived, developed, and implemented. History also demonstrates that flaws in command relationships, flaws in planning, and flaws in execution lead to inefficiencies which reduce combat effectiveness, and which result in waste. Unfortunately, these flaws tend to be repeated from one war to the next, as the histories and experience of World War II, Korea, and Vietnam show. The number one historical lesson is that though we analyze these wars with perfect hindsight, we do not take to heart the lessons learned.

Drawing on these excellent sources of the science of logistics and its fundamentals, I have explored the war histories in some depth, as well as the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel study and the congressional hearings on logistics in Vietnam. My aim was twofold: (a) to note driving factors in the industrial or military world which have changed or will change sufficiently to require adjustment of the logistics process, and (b) to determine specific areas requiring urgent improvement or renewed emphasis. In selecting the areas, I have, of course, been influenced by my own experience in Vietnam and by my last tour for 2 years as Director for Logistics, Joint Staff, OJCS.

My overall impression is that inflated combat standards, inadequate reliance on indigenous support, inadequate and halfhearted pruning of superfluous governmental or military specifications, and only token sharing of support tasks when more was possible have made the logistics costs of the Armed Forces today higher than they need to be. The immediate result is that our war planning requirements are higher than they have to be. Every military professional must be concerned with logistics because there is a direct trade-off between unnecessary logistics support and more combat capability. I was told that in FY 75, 1 day of Air Force logistics repair part

pipeline support was worth \$63 million. Thus, every day pared out of that pipeline airlift was immensely important. The same point probably applies almost equally to the Army. There are still too many types of cups or forks or MilSpecs, or too many engineers or too much documentation or too many technicians in a ship or squadron, or redundant training. Every dollar extra in logistics is a dollar lost to combat capability or readiness. These leaks are generally small and they require care to pinpoint and correct, but, if corrected, the net effect will be doubly good in the extra combat potential funded as well as in the improved logistics discipline and planning.

Before delving into specifics, I want to say something about two basic problems in the military budget system, three current factors which have changed logistics today, and an old chestnut whose day has come. These items reinforce my impression of room for improvement and lead directly to an action program.

The two basic budget problems require a policy statement by the Secretary of Defense concerning logistics. Such a statement should cover (a) peacetime accommodation versus war planning and readiness, and (b) the dichotomy between the budget/service chain of command on the one hand and the operations/war planning chain on the other. The policy statement cannot eliminate these factors because they are inherent in the system, but it can insure that all players—responsible civilian and military officials—are aware of them so that the daily realities of Pentagon life do not eclipse the war task toward which these daily realities are ultimately directed.

Specifically, peacetime accommodation is generally aimed at efficiency in a monetary sense, whereas combat effectiveness in war must be the primary test. Thus, each adoption of an "efficient" improvement must include an analysis of its impact on "combat effectiveness." Where such an impact is negative, a justification must be made showing how "combat effectiveness" is safeguarded or will be restored—without sacrificing the "efficiency" which prompts the change. An "efficiency" which cannot meet this test should be rejected, or, if adopted, an accompanying statement should make clear for how long or under what circumstances the "efficiency" was accepted, even though it lessened military effectiveness.

The dichotomy between the budget/service chain and the operations/war planning chain is more pernicious. The two chains involve almost all the same players, but peacetime offices and procedures stress service roles and budgets at the expense of war plans and readiness. Resolution of this difficulty can come only from awareness at the Secretary's level and continuous pressure for improvement from key agencies such as your office, ASD(I&L), and the JCS. Here is a simplified statement of what I mean:

The law requires the Armed Forces to be led by the National Command Authority through the JCS to the Unified Commanders who direct all forces in the field. Thus war plans stem from each Unified and Specified Commander, and the JSOP, JSCP, and JFM of the JCS both guide the preparation of these war plans and reflect the theater/command evaluations. The war plans of each Unified Commander are based on the inputs and advice

of the JCS and the service Component Commanders. These war plans and JSOP, JSCP, and JFM lead to and influence—as well as result from, in the iterative planning process—the SecDef Policy Planning Guidance, the Fiscal Guidance, and the specific budget decisions. Thus, at this level, the budget and war plans are suitably and closely interlaced. The specific war plans call out, by theater and command, forces required, prestock levels, base development plans, and schemes of maneuver from which support requirements are deduced.

The services, based on budget guidance and service concepts of strategy and priority, develop annual programs to implement the joint plans and FYDP. These programs are not based as closely on the war plans of the component commanders as they are on the perceptions of the individual service leaders of what is necessary for the vitality of their respective services as combat forces. In fact, there is no direct review at senior service levels of the logistic requirements as set out in the approved war plans and the capabilities, as provided by the current budget, for the implementation of those plans. Though readiness reports from existing forces speak directly to day-to-day operational and mission capabilities, they do not cover sustainability of operations and status of repair part levels and war reserve stocks today or in the future. Thus, combat support or service support forces may be budgeted which are not spelled out in any plans, or war reserve stocks may not be budgeted for war plans which count on them. Certainly, a budget of scarcity cannot meet all desired or necessary needs, but there should be a comparison process inherent in the system so that superiors in the review chain are made aware of shortfalls or excesses and so that the JCS can review this aspect of the budget in their role as military adviser to SecDef and the President. Obviously, some of this comparison and review does take place, but it is a matter of degree—and the degree is such as to diminish the role of the JCS and of the Unified Commander and his assignment as field commander for execution of the plans in war.

There is equal room for improvement in the Unified Commander's plan as the synthesis of the plans of his Component Commanders. Guided by the services or lacking Unified Command guidance, the Component Commanders write their plans on varying assumptions. The result is the overall component war plans are not in complete agreement as to logistics timetable, extent of host nation support to be relied on in terms of manpower and material, and prestockage to be achieved. This, too, is a matter of degree. However, combined with the loose fit at the Washington end, it permits substantial divergence between war planning or requirements determination—the first step in logistics—and the budget, the means of acquiring logistics wherewithal.

A good example of what I am talking about is the authority sought by the Defense Department to be allowed to call to active duty a maximum of 50,000 Reserves without full mobilization. It would save having a comparable number on active duty, assuming adequate leadtime and trained reservists. It is an excellent initiative which ties in directly with greater economy and with the point of adequate support of theater war plans. Since shortage of support troops is a chronic peacetime condition, and one already existing to some degree in Europe now, this selective callup, if initiated in time, could get the

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necessary personnel in place to restore the sustainability of combat action—and to be ready for mobilization—should it be necessary. Periodic exercising of such capability is essential, air and sealift must be ready to respond, and the unit equipment for such groups must be ready in CONUS or overseas as required. This excellent initiative should be pushed. It should produce a demonstrable economy, with acceptable reduction in combat effectiveness as long as intelligence can give the necessary warning time and the noted safeguards are implemented.

There are at least three driving factors in the industrial or military world which have changed or will change sufficiently to require adjustment in the logistics process:

1. The world is rapidly becoming industrialized so that the primitive conditions found in Vietnam and Africa of 20 to 40 years ago are less likely to be repeated. In addition, our series of alliances, overseas bases, and international commitments provide us at least with strong footholds for power projection so that our combat machine can rely more on indigenous support and need not put as much effort into "over the shore" and "destroyed civilization" buildup and penetration methods. Significantly, in World War II we received about \$1 billion in indigenous support in continental Europe, outfitting nearly one-third of the support forces and providing substantial quantities of food, clothing, and emergency requirements. This was despite 5 years of war in these countries and without compromising their basic civilian needs.

2. The tremendous boost in capability for fast lift, air and sea, provides a basis for reevaluation of our general war strategy, for reconsideration of bases and overseas stockpiles, and for optimization of overhaul and repair procedures for overseas equipments. A corollary is the emergence of renewed emphasis on control of sea and air which requires the Navy and Air Force to recognize changed combat priorities.

3. As a result of the recession, the impact of OSHA, and the internationalization of the marketplace, the industrial base in the United States is going through a period of adjustment which adversely affects war readiness. This means that closer attention must be paid to the industrial base through imaginative programs to bolster its readiness; that key shortages must be obviated by selective stockpiling or advance determination of alternatives; and that particular industries must be subsidized, if necessary, to keep them alive.

The old chestnut whose day has come is life cycle cost. With so much emphasis on procurement in terms of OSD, OMB, and congressional review, too little attention is paid to the fact that each procurement carries with it a huge logistics tail in terms of life cycle costs. Each procurement forecasts, but too often without searching review, changes in downstream budgets in terms of people, repair parts, consumables, training, tools, overhaul facilities, and documentation. It is generally taken for granted that more complex equipment requires a larger logistics tail. Thus, today's disagreeable situation in which a tight budget is not able to encompass all the men, procurement,

and logistics needed would get worse. Worst of all, this situation is accepted as inevitable. It *need not* be so and *is not* so in several programs. It is a point so basic that immediate and unremitting attention should be paid to it. Reduction of the logistics tail will have a combat payoff—not only in heightened readiness through better reliability and maintainability as in most of our strategic missile programs—but also in a larger share of defense dollars being available for combat arms instead of support costs.

ACTION ITEMS

1. In the budget process, whenever an “efficiency” is introduced which has an adverse impact on “combat effectiveness,” it should not be adopted without a proviso for how long it is to be in force or the circumstances under which it is to be set aside or modified to make it an acceptable part of the process of readying for war.

2. The war planning/requirements process must be tightened at both the Unified Commander and national headquarters levels in order to insure better support of war requirements by the budget. Two specific steps which could guarantee this are a service-by-service forecast of the budget impact on the readiness of the combat forces in the coming year, and a JCS critique of the budget in terms of its support of war plans and combat readiness.

3. War plans and contingency plans must make proper allowance for indigenous support in countries in which wars are fought, with appropriate adjustment for constantly improving sea and airhead facilities which make power projection easier in a logistics sense. This is a matter for JCS-Theater Commander review and action.

4. Air and sea strategic mobility has made so many dramatic advances that national strategy must recognize the changed emphasis possible for conventional war versus nuclear war (general or tactical). There are also major implications for overseas bases and stockpiling. The impact on theater war plans and transportation agencies will be significant. Such mobility increases the importance of the Air Force and Navy combat tasks to control air and sea lines of communication and to minimize attrition. It is a subject for NSC discussion and review as well as for SecDef-JCS discussion and action.

5. The industrial base requires closer monitoring to keep it responsive and ready. This includes better programs to bolster it, some selective stockpiling to sustain or ease it over rough spots, and direct subsidies for particular war-related industrial capabilities which would otherwise disappear. This is a matter for SecDef policy statement, appropriate ASPR support, and detailed service implementation.

6. Logistics must be a principal concern in all new procurement to insure that one of the technical goals is the best trade-off of reliability and maintainability versus manpower and cost. In this way downstream logistics will be less of a battlefield and budget competitor with combat arms. A further SecDef policy statement and DSARC and service implementation will be required.

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Further, each new equipment support plan must provide for only the minimum organizational and field maintenance and the lowest practicable requirement for training of organizational and field technicians. Such training should be based on straight substitution of parts with fault identification to that replacement part level. Repair beyond this point should be performed at the depot or factory.

7. Improvements in strategic mobility may have an impact on overseas basing. Unified Commanders should be given appropriate guidance and then review and update their plans. JCS and SecDef would review and then approve.

8. As a concomitant of the review of overseas bases, war reserves and overseas stockage should also be reviewed. A SecDef policy statement and aggressive action with Congress is necessary to authorize any stockpile for Allied use. Particularly important are selected end item stockpiles in CONUS earmarked for emergent requirements such as Israel needed in 1973. Stockpiling of combat equipment and reserves for U.S. combat use must be reexamined to determine what is to be stocked, the total number of days stockpiled, and the appropriate balance of the stockpile in CONUS and overseas. There must be substantial agreement and similar implementation among the services of JCS guidance to insure balanced Unified Commander support, along with a common policy toward host nation capability and facilities utilization.

9. Within CONUS, regionalization should be examined as a means to simplify or to reduce costs. The aim is less duplication and greater advantage of "scale." Regionalization is not appropriate for major industrial or military installations such as NARF's, (Naval Aviation Repair Facilities) and ALC's (Air Force Logistics Centers) shipyards, bases, and the like. It is likely to be appropriate for personnel agencies, finance agencies, transportation pools, fire departments, and the lesser adjuncts of overhead which, in aggregate, tie up substantial personnel and other assets. It may be, as with fire departments or Armed Forces police, that an entire function can be eliminated in certain areas by relying on the comparable civilian agencies or, in the case of police, augmenting civilian agencies with temporary duty personnel for specific occasions. This concept should be explored first by a regional pilot program, then by a CONUS-wide test phase, before final decision for permanent implementation is made.

10. Overseas, we must require more aggressive leadership and effort by each Unified Commander to achieve common logistics support where two or more services are involved and where combat effectiveness will not be sacrificed. Specific possibilities are such peacetime logistics functions as schools, buses, PX's, civilian personnel administration and finance centers, housing agencies, and dependent service centers of all sorts. Commonality may be applicable to such agencies as metrology and calibration labs, transportation pools and repair facilities, bakeries, dispensaries, and print shops. Some of these functions may better be done by local procurement or contract instead of using U.S. military or civilian personnel. The senior representatives of the Component Commanders, meeting regularly, should be

the group responsible for such efforts at commonality and efficiency (while retaining combat effectiveness). At least annual review by the Unified Commander and the Component Commanders themselves will be necessary. DSA (Defense Supply Agency) may continue to be the administrator of the program (as it is now for DRIS—Defense Retail Interservice Support), issuing reports of achievements and trading ideas among the Unified Commands. Nevertheless, the thrust and zeal must come from the commanders. This should be spelled out in a SecDef instruction giving policy and direction.

11. Improvements in airlift and sealift capabilities make factory and depot repair only in CONUS attractive. An added advantage is the avoidance of excessive lift into a combat theater early in a war. Repair parts stockage can be trimmed accordingly. The JCS should be aware of this policy so that they can earmark retrograde lift for reparable and reserve lift for return of repaired units as the system matures. Once the services concur in this program, it should be promulgated as a part of JCS guidance to Unified Commanders for war planning.

12. As a part of the goal of minimizing logistics confusion and avoiding excessive buildup of stocks in initial phases of a war, Component Commanders must be required to include in their logistic plans a restrictive repair parts policy which limits stocks in theater to those actually required for such organizational and field maintenance as they expect to accomplish. For example, General Besson, in discussing the Joint Logistics Review Board recommendations on this point, felt that the Army in Vietnam might have gotten along with about 20,000 line items in contrast to the some 350,000 actually stocked. This requirement should be spelled out in JCS logistics guidance to Unified Commanders for war plans. The same policy and degree of repair should apply in peacetime unless there is clear economy gained by some alternate approach.

13. The repair parts system for all services overseas should be based on premium transportation, with OST (Order and Ship Times) established to suit, and stockage levels for procurement and inventory adjusted downward accordingly. Exceptions should be based on special considerations such as excessive weight or size, local substitutability, insufficient savings, or high use. Implicit are overseas stockage levels adequate for initial combat which would allow for diversion of premium transportation to force deployments at the outbreak of war as well as for attrition. The JCS should provide guidance on considerations controlling theater stock levels.

A SecDef instruction should direct the use of premium transportation and establish OST (Order and Ship Times) for various areas. Premium transportation does not refer to any particular mode and does not restrict OST's to only the very fastest achievable. Rather, it rules against use of the slowest means of transportation for repair parts and against OST's at the long end of the spectrum, except in specific, justified cases. Though transportation is the basic feature addressed, OST standards may be stringent enough to require services to adjust their internal supply procedures in order to achieve them. For the same priority in different classes of supply, OST's actually achieved have differed by as much as a factor of 2 or 3 to 1.

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14. Implementation of the greatly increased strategic mobility capability (accelerated combat deployment) inherent in modern air and sealift requires suitable service support and JCS leadership.

For *airlift*: continue an airlift enhancing program to insure a suitable minimum military airlift capability, which is immediately responsive, whether or not there is mobilization; a civilian augmentation program with subsidy of civilian airlines as necessary to insure availability in time of war of particular features or numbers of aircraft; and an aerial refueling capability—at least for the military portion of airlift—to insure minimal reliance on overseas bases or other countries for long-distance projections of U.S. power or for support of Allies. The civilian augmentation program must, as a minimum, be immediately available under mobilization, but preferably it should continue, as at present, with gradations of numbers of aircraft made available under varying conditions from administrative urgency to all-out war.

For *sealift*: rejuvenate the military owned nucleus fleet to insure that fast lift is immediately available pierside and is suitable for combat deployments. Provisions are necessary for additional sealift under conditions ranging from no mobilization to full mobilization, which should include a combination of readily activated ships from the National Defense Reserve Fleet and a speeded up Sealift Readiness Program (diversion from the commercial fleet). The Navy should examine the feasibility of using amphibious and service force lift for common user services, especially deployment, when primary mission tasks of these ships do not interfere.

JCS planning should spell out what airlift and sealift is required to support selected areas or to implement certain plans unilaterally under *no mobilization* as well as that required to meet speeded up *major combat* deployments. The purpose of such planning is to permit adequate sizing of the *nucleus* (no mobilization) air and sea transportation fleets for a minimum capability and to insure meeting the *full* (major combat) transportation requirements in general war.

15. As a concomitant of war planning, overseas units should be supplied over wartime logistic routes. Where it is not economical in peacetime, periodic logistic exercises of adequate duration should be scheduled, using wartime LOC to insure proper familiarity with them at all levels. The basic aims are: Adequate communications and contractual relationships over the war routes; familiarity with and use of all transportation modes; and suitable government-to-government/military-to-military understandings and agreements concerning the wartime LOC's. These understandings and agreements should include proper assurances, priorities, capacities, as well as minimum interference with host country, other Allies, or other U.S. Government agencies, plus necessary provisions for dependents and retrograde movement. Exclusively peacetime shipments, such as household goods and automobiles, should not be affected by this policy and can move as MTMC (Military Traffic Management Command) directs for maximum economy.

16. Traffic management is a key to effective theater logistics. It is a direct responsibility of the Unified Commander. Having this responsibility, he

should be accorded the authority however he may implement it. Traffic management refers not only to what enters each overseas port or airhead and the priority or degree of offloading there, but also to the forecasting of what can be handled and where, the diversion from one point to another, the collection of retrograde, and the changes in priorities. When necessary, it may reach as far back as the air or seaport of embarkation in CONUS to dictate special loading of aircraft or ships, diversion or speedup and, when containers are used, even to the supply points or factories. This last point with containers is to control stuffing to suit theater optimized handling. To this end (1) RedCom should be the CONUS agent and the interface for the theater commanders in terms of Army/combat deployments; and (2) MTMC should be the CONUS traffic manager and the interface for the theater commanders in terms of retrograde and resupply.

17. Containers will play a more and more significant role as they become more extensively utilized throughout the commercial world and as military deployment procedures are improved to capitalize on their benefits. SecDef must establish a specific container policy for the Armed Forces. The policy should call for all administrative deployments and resupply to move by container unless they are outsize, uneconomical, unsound, or wasteful of breakbulk sealift. In implementation of this last consideration, certain military cargoes such as bombs, certain vehicles, fortification and construction materials, and the like (cheap, bulky, and not highly pilferable items or materials) need not be containerized and may be shipped breakbulk in order to use all available shipping to the best advantage. Continued efforts must be made to solve the problem of container handling for combat deployments and resupply involving LOTS (Logistics over the Shore, as in amphibious operations) or movements through heavily damaged ports.

- The SecDef instruction must also specify container control in terms of broad guidance as to length of hold at any point in the system, use as covered storage or refrigerated storage, degree of combat exposure or risk acceptable, and minimum levels awaiting fill required to keep the system functioning. Each Unified Commander must have a theater container policy and an ADP system implementing the SecDef policy. MTMC should be the overall container data collection center and information source and should be tied in with each Unified Commander ADP system. All DOD container information systems should utilize commercial systems to the full to avoid duplication and excess cost.

- The whereabouts of all containers in the system (in transit visibility) must be known. This is a key to replacement in the event of ship or aircraft loss. Each container must have good documentation as to its destination, its contents, and the requisitions it fills.

- The Theater Commander must have complete knowledge of all ports in his theater, including information on their ability to offload nonself-sustaining container ships, to store containers, to load them on trains or barges, and to unstuff or stuff cargo in them. This should also include ports' ability to handle coasters carrying containers and the availability of cranes in country, land, or water, which could supplement container operations.

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18. As general policy, SecDef should:

- In energy, stress alternates to fossil fuel (except coal) energy sources for shore installations, especially in CONUS, such as nuclear power, solar energy, and waste-product derived fuel.
- In conservation, stress recovery of materials such as iron, aluminum, copper, glass, silver, paper, and waste-derived fuel in order to save money in the waste disposal area and to earn money from the recovery or use of such materials.
- Safeguard adequate petroleum reserves while continuing to press for full exploration and development so the reserves are available for immediate use.

19. SecDef should instruct DSA and the services to work continuously at appropriate levels to prune stocks of outmoded items; to consolidate dissimilarities without significant difference; to reduce numbers of sizes or types of items; to make items "common" and not "service peculiar"; to substitute commercial equivalents where practicable; and to encourage contractors and designers on alterations, new production, or procurement to standardize on existing national stock numbered items instead of introducing new ones. These actions should be supplemented by an annual report from DSA and each service to SecDef on results achieved, with DSA indicating overall progress in total line items, commonality, and eliminations. The existing "low use" system of pruning stocks is acceptable as a part of such service action, but is not sufficient for the whole task.

20. SecDef could take the initiative in the NATO arena to urge the establishment of a NATO stock catalogue under the aegis of DSA. DSA has already started such a catalogue and several countries are participating. For this reason, DSA can move quickly to broaden the base. The catalogue would cover items in FMS (Foreign Military Sales), items in use in NATO now, or equipment, in military sales to United States such as Roland. It would show the producing nation's national stock numbers along with other nations' corresponding stock numbers (if other than just a change of national indicator, the first two numbers).

The catalogue should be expanded as rapidly as possible, as is now being done in the medical area and to some extent in fortification material area, to identify the U.S. national stock number with other nations' national stock number equivalents. This is most important for consumables and soft goods where volumes are large or items are perishable in order to expedite their procurement overseas and to minimize shipments from CONUS. (Even at the height of the German submarine campaign during World War II, U.S. forces deploying to the United Kingdom for subsequent combat in Africa or Europe satisfied 31 percent of their technical needs from the domestic British market—not to mention a substantial amount of their food and fuel.)

21. A JCS planning document should be issued on theater logistics which will require each Unified Commander, through or in conjunction with his Component Commanders, to establish:

- Standards for vertical and horizontal construction, for outfitting such buildings, and for their utilities.
- Standards and guidance for requisitioning buildings and equipment from host countries and the degree of reliance to be placed on such sources.
- Standards for PX, commissary, other personal use items, and general guidance for living off the host nation's economy and methods of implementation.
- Forecasts of availability, throughout, and operational status of ports, airheads, and routes for logistics or operational use. These will specify the degree of manning or outfitting required to make the port or field operable.

These standards should be reflected in all plans and should be reviewed by the services and the JCS as part of the regular process of reviewing Component Commander and Unified Commander plans. These standards will be reflected in the requirements for construction equipment and material and in the numbers and size of support and service support units called out.

22. The JCS should require each Unified Commander to issue a basic logistics plan implementing the guidance in previous items and summarizing his and his Component Commander's plans for theater support. Unless there is sound reason to the contrary, there should be (1) a fairly restrictive repair parts policy providing for organizational and field maintenance, with retrograde planned for more extensive maintenance or overhaul; (2) limited depots which are sufficient only for the repair parts called out; (3) "premium transportation" derived stock levels; (4) a theater-wide ADP system covering logistics, as necessary for each service, with Unified Commander visibility in common use and container use areas; and (5) communications and monitoring covering all LOC's marshalling and staging areas and host nation liaison or control points, in order to insure up-to-date information on flow and status, to recognize need for priorities or adjustments, and to institute them.

The JCS, in calling for a Unified Commander's basic logistics plan, should make clear that logistics is the Unified Commander's wartime responsibility and that it is discharged in peace and war through the service Component Commanders who are an essential link in the dual budget/logistics chain. In peace, the service Component Commanders will go as far as practicable to implement their plans and those of the Unified Commander, subject to the budget limitations and the priorities established at the service level. The regular readiness status report from the Unified Commander and his components, together with the forecast of change in readiness over the next year as a result of the budget, will make available to the Secretary of Defense through the JCS an evaluation of the adequacy of the budget and of the priority support at the component level by theater for the next year.

The JCS should specify that basic policy for resupply should be "pull" all the time, assuming stockage to predetermined levels. If stockage has not reached such levels, there may be "push" to reach them and "pull" thereafter. Careful review and control by each Unified Commander will be required to avoid excesses and to keep down logistics overhead.

23. Despite all these instructions and plans, there can be no substitute for top-level interest and awareness. Unified Commanders in their war planning and logistic reports will have a good basis for discussion and exchange with the JCS. The Assistant SecDef (I&L) must keep SecDef informed of the magnitude of the logistics costs in personnel and material, the heightened capability that strategic mobility (faster combat deployments) provides in conventional war, and the results that can be achieved in new weapons systems acquisition under DSARC. The Chairman, JCS, must bring to SecDef's attention the impact of a new budget on existing war plans, the state of theater readiness today and that projected a year from now based on the new budget. Such specifics should capture SecDef's interest and encourage him to visit and to review specific areas and installations. The ASD(I&L) should also meet with the Unified Commanders when they are in the Pentagon. The J-4 Worldwide Logistics Conference may be another means of stimulating high-level interest, though it tends to be "in the logistics family." Nevertheless, participation by a CINC each year can help to give the conference a broader drawing power and to insure wider JCS and Unified Command staff involvement.

24. SecDef (along with his assistants for Installations and Logistics, and International Security Affairs) must take the lead in regulating foreign military sales as practicable to realize the maximum benefits from them and to minimize possible adverse effects, both immediate and delayed. The problems in foreign military sales are multiple. Personnel costs in the military procurement and management system far exceed the slight overhead charges allowed; there is little forecasting of what the demands will be; the priorities assigned sometimes result in active or reserve U.S. line units losing equipment either on hand or destined for them; there is often no planning or support for the repair parts, manuals, training, and technicians required for the end items; and most countries require the U.S. military to be their procurement source instead of working directly with industry. Specific steps that could be taken are:

- Emphasis should be on other countries contracting directly with industry. When equipment is purchased through the U.S. military services, they should include an adequate charge for overhead to insure reimbursement for services rendered. Foreign military sales and industrially funded enterprises must be exempted from congressional personnel ceilings in order to permit handling all FMS business without adverse impact on other controlled areas.

- The Assistant SecDef(ISA) should prepare annual forecasts of foreign military sales so that the respective services can use them and their own budgets to work out the optimum size and readiness of their industrial base. Such a procedure will also permit consolidated reports to ASD(ISA) showing levels of equipment likely to be available for FMS over the coming and out years.

- Based on inventories of equipment sold abroad, the services should prepare annual usage levels of repair parts for participating countries so that U.S. stockage planning will be adequate for both U.S. and foreign needs. This

will also help size and keep ready the industrial base. The Air Force has aggressively insured that all countries buy in "open-ended" for logistics support of their FMS equipment. All services must follow suit so that the supply of repair parts to foreign countries can be planned for and paid for on a continuing basis.

- Unified Commanders must plan for and be aware of Allied plans for the support of U.S. equipment in Allied hands. The needs of Allies will be in addition to those of our own forces and provision must be made for them in the theater war plans. Such provision must include requisitioning procedures, transportation, and priority assignment. So long as the Allies in a particular theater are fighting alongside U.S. forces, it is probably best that their U.S. resupply be a part of the regular U.S. theater support, including provisions for retrograde for out-of-theater repair or overhaul. At the very least, the Unified Commander must be aware of the recipients in his theater of foreign military sales, their provisions for peacetime support, and their plans for support in the event of a war. These support plans will vary depending on whether there is war involving only the United States, only the Ally, or both. Where support of an Ally involves transportation of fairly large quantities of material, the Ally should be required to contribute to the transportation system.

Though the thrust of all these action items tends to be toward efficiency, there is no intention to downplay the importance of logistics. Logistics is pervasive. It establishes the limits of strategy as well as dictating what tactics can do on the battlefield. However, logistics is generally taken for granted until field shortages develop. These action items aim at top-level recognition of the requirements of sound logistics in peace and war, and particularly in the planning and budget cycle. Implementation of them will flag inadequacies by pointing out declining readiness and will influence the elimination of frills by providing specific and tough-minded combat-oriented policies. The basic aim remains: combat effectiveness under variable combat conditions.

Sincerely,

Thomas R. Weschler
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Vice Adm. Thomas R. Weschler, U.S. Navy (Ret.), graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy with the Class of 1939. He holds a master of science degree from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is also a graduate of the Naval War College and the National War College. Following a variety of duty in destroyers and cruisers and a wide range of experience in amphibious warfare, he was assigned as Commander Naval Support Activity at Danang. He assisted in the development of the Polaris submarine missile, and he was instrumental in the development of the *Spruance*-class destroyers. He has served as Commander, Cruiser Destroyer Flotilla 2 and Commander, Cruiser-Destroyer Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. Prior to his retirement in 1975, he served as Director for Logistics, Joint Staff, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He is currently serving as Director of the Center for Continuing Education at the Naval War College.
