

1976

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Recommended Citation

Bruneau, Thomas C. (1976) "Portugal: Problems and Prospects in the Creation of a New Regime," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 29 : No. 3 , Article 7.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol29/iss3/7>

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PORTUGAL: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS IN THE CREATION OF A NEW REGIME

The collapse of the Salazar-Caetano regime in Portugal in 1974 was followed by a rapid and seemingly precipitate end to the ancient and extensive Portuguese colonial empire in Africa. In addition, Portugal itself has experienced a political ferment in which the military forces, Communists, Socialists, and others have all sought to bring about one or another form of political order. In this examination of the Portuguese revolution, Professor Bruneau is guardedly optimistic that democracy may yet be the result of this complex political process.

by

Professor Thomas C. Bruneau

If the overwhelming majority of foreign observers were surprised but encouraged by the coup of 25 April 1974 which signaled an end to the Salazar-Caetano regime, the responses to developments since that time have been mixed. In part this ambivalence can be attributed to the developments themselves which are both difficult to comprehend and almost impossible to place in a fixed context. Indeed, there is no fixed context. Not only have the boundaries of the Portuguese state changed radically with the independence of the African colonies and could change even more if the threatened independence of the Atlantic islands comes to pass, but the nature and even the tendencies of the Portuguese political system have been volatile and

contradictory. The center of the political spectrum has shifted wildly from one side to the other, mainly in a reactive manner, and the observer has been treated to a whole series of seemingly mutually antagonistic political solutions to the "Portuguese crisis." That there is a crisis is obvious, for not only must the Portuguese recover from an extremely rapid decolonization and determine the nature of their economic system, but they must further resolve the crucial questions of legitimacy, the role of the masses, and the state in a very short period of time. What took centuries in the rest of Western Europe must be confronted in Portugal immediately, and while the ideas are now present for a resolution of these problems the socioeconomic

conditions may not be. The political alternatives have understandably varied radically.

If the initial guided liberalism of General Spínola was familiar and even expected, the institutionalization of the Armed Forces Movement (MFA) was less so and the alliance of the MFA and the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) was completely unanticipated. In the face of these developments, most English speaking foreign observers have demonstrated less than optimum ability in deciphering the overall situation and the role of groups and individuals within it. Not long ago on the Oped page of *The New York Times*, it was argued that the media coverage on Portugal is biased.¹ This is indeed the case, and any scholar who has studied recently in Portugal can immediately recognize in most reports serious and often blatant factual errors and misinterpretations. However, the author of the comment made precisely the same error, but from the other side of the ideological spectrum. He contrasted the "pro-Socialist Government of Gen. Vasco Gonçalves" with the "Socialist in name only, given its pro-capitalist policies" of Mario Soares, and the highlights of the Vasco Gonçalves government were emphasized. Thus the apparent solution to a bias on the Right is a bias on the Left with the anticipation that the latter will counter the former. Presumably, objective reality will emerge as the synthesis. The discussion arising from the imprisonment in January 1976 of Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho is another typical case of difficulties in interpretation. For some it meant that the Trotsky of this revolution finally received his due; Richard Gott saw it as the end of the revolution.² Those who have followed the revolution very closely know that neither interpretation is accurate, but the person of Saraiva de Carvalho is in many ways typical of the whole series of contradictory and even surrealistic developments during these past 2 years.

Quite simply, in order to comprehend what has been taking place in Portugal we must not use the terms such as "Left," "Right," "Socialist," "Communist," "Fascist," and so forth as though they have some kind of fixed and immutable meaning. Rather, we must locate the events and personalities within the Portuguese context and begin analysis from this point. Objectivity is not gained by countering one misinterpretation with another, but by attempting to get at the essential character and the dynamics of the Portuguese regime.

It is understandable that interpretations of events in Portugal since the coup would be inaccurate. The Portuguese have been involved in an intense struggle for power, and the 40-odd political groups or parties along with the politicized news media have used terms and facts in ways best suited to their immediate and long-range gains. It is to be expected that sympathetic or unsympathetic foreigners would accept (or in the latter case reject) the same misuse of information. This tendency is increased when we remember that there is little tradition among academics or journalists to study recent Portuguese politics. There has also been a recent influx of observers, some less than competent in the language, who are seeking "to tell it as it really is." Unfortunately, too few people are interested in Portugal *per se*. Rather, they are interested in the impact any changes there might have on Africa, relations between the United States and the U.S.S.R., on the EEC, NATO, and so forth. Therefore, because of three factors, we have not been well served by what has been published outside of Portugal: (1) the real complexity of what has taken place during these 2 years; (2) the confusing and nonobjective use of terms relating to the situation; and (3) the relative lack of preparation of foreign observers.

Now would seem to be an appropriate time to set forth an analysis establishing both the context within which political events take place and the roles of significant individuals, groups, and institutions. The revolution has experienced enough zigzags that the mean trajectory is becoming apparent. The Portuguese themselves have published enough good books so that most of the facts can be ascertained, if only by comparing differing interpretations. Foreigners have produced enough analytical material of various sorts so that the nature of the previous regime can certainly be understood. The Portuguese newspapers are filled with insightful political reporting as well as interviews so it is possible both to fill in the past and to understand the present through the eyes of the participants. And after 5 years of observing, I personally feel that an effort should be made to put an analysis together.

My underlying assumptions are that politics is a conflict over scarce resources in which the institutions themselves are fought for and with, and are, in fact, relatively autonomous from society; that that conflict is channeled through structures; that regimes can be analyzed according to which groups, and thus conflicts, are excluded from decisionmaking and the classification by means of pluralism and mobilization; that politics is not determined; and that elites do, in fact, have a role in superseding cleavages and thus formulating stable regimes. The themes are, then, the nature of the structures and organizations, the conflicts which are denied, and the solutions which elites devise for ruling.*

The Salazar-Caetano Regime. A number of different terms have been coined to characterize the regime formulated by Premier António de Oliveira Salazar from 1928 and continued unchanged by Marcelo Caetano after Salazar's stroke in 1968. Undoubtedly the most

misleading term is fascism and the two most accurate are clerical conservatism and corporative-authoritarian.³ Even the latter two, however, tend to be misleading. In clarifying these terms, some degree of understanding this *Estado Novo* (New State) can be achieved.

The term "clerical conservatism" can be accurately applied to the Salazar-Caetano regime, for it was indeed a return to an ordered, hierarchical, and largely prebourgeois society after the failure of the First Republic (1910-1926). According to José António Saraiva, it was a return to the rural areas, to the feudal lords, the great families, and the priest.⁴ And, in the words of António de Figueiredo, "Portuguese 'integralism' was emphatically spiritualist, a sentimental abstraction more devoted to resurrecting a romanticized past than to creating a new future."⁵ It was not neurotically both forward and backward looking like fascism. It was traditionalist, but not in the sense that the Church reigned supreme as the term "clerical" might imply. Salazar was, in fact, a seminarian, but like Stalin he did not allow this fact to interfere in his rule. True, he continued to attend mass, remained the best of friends with Cardinal Cerejeira, included many of the CADC members in the government, and the Church regained some of the prerogatives lost

*These themes and assumptions are elaborated in Ralf Dahrendorf, "Conflict and Liberty: Some Remarks on the Social Structure of German Politics," *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. XIV, no. 3, 1963, and *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1959); Arend Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," *World Politics*, vol. XXI, no. 2, 1969, and Kenneth McRae, ed., *Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974); Juan J. Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," Nelson Polsby, ed., *Handbook of Political Science* (Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley, 1975).

during the First Republic. But, a study of the relations of the Church and state during this period makes it clear that Salazar dominated the Church to a very high degree and used it to provide legitimacy for the regime. The bishops, not to mention priests, were not autonomous actors in this "clerical" regime for they were cleared with the government before the Holy See nominated them. Church publications were censored. Church organizations were treated like all others, and even a bishop was forced into exile for 10 years by Salazar. Thus, if the Church did receive some prestige from the regime, it remained a poor, dominated, and passive institution which traded support for Salazar in turn for relatively minor benefits.⁶

The term "corporative-authoritarian" is misleading only with regard to the corporative aspect. Several excellent studies of Portuguese corporatism show that the corporative state was a con game which did not represent the interests of the population but rather controlled them. Such a degree of unanimity among roughly a half dozen political scientists and anthropologists is amazing, and one can only wonder why anyone ever took the regime's claims to corporatist interest representation seriously for so long.⁷ It is now obvious that the various "casas," "gremios," "sindicatos," and corporations did not include the population, did not represent them, and, in fact, the Corporative Chamber itself only had a consultative role. It was, as a system, a way to include the population, to snarl the people in red tape, and a means to anticipate and drain potential demands.

It is most accurate therefore to refer to the Salazar-Caetano regime as conservative authoritarian. It was authoritarian in the sense that it denied structured access, and with it the representation of conflict and of the masses of the population. The corporative system did not serve a function of representation

and neither did the electoral system. Scholars are again in complete agreement in showing that elections did not, in fact, represent interests. Not only was there but one official party (União Nacional; after 1968 *Acção Nacional Popular*), but the suffrage was so limited as to be almost static, the President was indirectly elected after 1959, and the National Assembly did not function as a policymaking body.⁸ It was authoritarian also in that it severely restricted both pluralism and mobilization. This was accomplished through the nature of the corporative and electoral system and through the operation of the state apparatus. Studies by anthropologists have shown that the formation of groups was impossible and mobilization was restricted by the fact that no lower level of government had control over any upper level. Demands were pre-empted before they could ever be formulated.

The regime was conservative in both its legitimation and its structure of control. The legitimation was a combination of some elements of Catholicism and of the papal encyclical "Rerum Novarum," as well as bits and pieces of a glorified Portuguese past. It assumed different colorations, depending on events outside Portugal, and it could be termed fascist only because it was formed when this ideology was on the rise. The structure of control was the central bureaucracy and the apparatus of repression. Again we are fortunate in having an excellent study of the administration which shows the predominant role of the bureaucracy in virtually all aspects of society, which states, "For all practical purposes, the making and implementation of public policy in the New State came to be limited to the bureaucratic arena."⁹ Further, the author notes, "Control was established through the use of personalism, and Salazar utilized reciprocal relations effectively as a means for tying to himself those within his immediate

constituency." And, "from 1932 onward all effective power was concentrated in the hands of the President of the Council of Ministers [Salazar]."¹⁰ Therefore, because of the personal element in the predominant bureaucracy, the 40 long years of personal control, and the personal imprint Salazar gave to virtually all aspects of the regime, it would seem appropriate to characterize his government as a *conservative authoritarian regime of personal rulership*.

Further, while we are all aware of Salazar's penchant for balanced budgets, his austere dress and manner, and his propensity against taking risks, it seems that José António Saraiva has captured the crucial element of this strategy of personal rulership by comparing Salazar's control of Portugal with the manner in which the small rural shopkeeper administers his affairs: "Salazar administers the State as a small businessman of the province administers his business."¹¹

This, then, was the regime formulated and elaborated by Salazar over four decades. It was conservative in legitimacy and administration and authoritarian in that it denied conflict and the representation of interests. Generally it controlled through anticipation and cooptation of demands, but when necessary it did possess an elaborate apparatus of repression to control dissent. It survived for 40 years because Portugal was extremely underdeveloped when the regime was initiated and class interests could thus be structured according to the priorities of the apparatus itself. Salazar minimized external influences by discouraging industrialization and by complete control over the news media. Education was limited, and the society and the population were generally maintained in their minority. This regime was passed on to Marcelo Caetano, who was not able to change anything except a few of the names of the less popular organizations.¹² Thus a regime of personal rulership came under

the formal control of another person and, despite some efforts at innovation, it remained essentially as before.

The Demise of the Salazar-Caetano Regime. The stability of the regime, even under Caetano, probably could have been maintained had it not been for the African wars. There is probably a lesson here about the strengths and weaknesses of such a regime if we compare its inability to withdraw from the wars with the French in Algeria and the United States in Vietnam. While it was more difficult for France than the United States because Algeria was also considered an integral part of the mother country, at least some means of representation existed so that the views of the population could be expressed in public policy. Portugal was anything but responsive to the views of its citizens. The following description by José António Saraiva is apt:

Caetano received from Salazar the immense, uncontrollable, and unmovable weight of an extremely centralized bureaucratic machine, [which was] meticulously adjusted, perfected, and experimented during 36 years by only one person—a machine superseded history but which found its unmeasurable inertia in its capacity to passively resist any wish to change, the real reason of its force.¹³

Within the regime it was impossible to balance gains with the losses and to make a decision to pull out of Africa. Withdrawal from Guinea would have been an important step in the continuation of the regime, but it was unable to innovate even to this point. Personal rule served Portugal poorly for not only was the country too small and underdeveloped to profit fully from the colonies, let alone profit the colonies themselves, but the society had to be changed to pursue the wars.¹⁴ Change was most manifest when the economy

was opened up to heavy foreign investment in 1965. But, if, on the one hand, large foreign investment and industrialization caused a certain mobilization of the society, on the other hand, it limited the independence and ability to cope with the changes on the part of the government. To fight the wars the government was forced to surrender part of its sovereignty. The social changes brought about by industrialization were aggravated by the forced draft necessary to maintain a very large army and the other option of emigration by those refusing to serve or unwilling to continue paying for the follies of the regime.¹⁵ The evidence is substantial that Portugal was undergoing a "general crisis of society" by 1973. The regime had no solution to this crisis. President Americo Thomaz was reimposed in 1972. The liberals elected to the National Assembly in 1969 were not allowed a role and resigned. The election campaign of 1973 was no more representative than usual and had absolutely no practical impact except to make the population a bit more cynical. The repressive apparatus became more active as the crisis grew. There is evidence that Marcelo Caetano attempted to solve it and thus save the regime, first by offering to resign and then by allowing the publication of Spínola's book, *Portugal and the Future*.¹⁶ Neither ploy succeeded, and the reaction to the book simply hastened the coup which solved the problem of the wars by eliminating the regime. Change was not, therefore, the forte of this conservative authoritarian regime; indeed, any change necessitated the elimination of the whole apparatus.

In this regime, structured as it was to deny representation as well as being largely isolated from society, the only possible solution lay with the military. However, it is worth noting that in the face of the crisis, even sectors of the Catholic Church opposed the government, but they were crushed.¹⁷ They

were put down not only by the state itself but by that part of the Church most closely integrated into the regime—the hierarchy. Essentially the same applied to the military. General Spínola and General Costa Gomes and a very few other high-ranking officers opposed the regime even as it became clear it was collapsing. The overwhelming majority of officers above the rank of major were part and parcel of the regime, were incorporated in various sectors from censorship to industry, and had no behavior independent of it. The coup thus came from those elements most marginal, or most exposed, in the regime, who also had direct control of the men, and only in the face of the greatest provocation.

The coup came from a vastly expanded army with a very high level of expertise after 13 years of guerrilla war in Africa. It was made by the inflated middle ranks—lieutenant to major—who were both closest to the horrors (such as massacres) and dangers of war and who realized that they could not win. Their anticipation of certain defeat was highlighted by the American defeat in Vietnam. They were further aware, largely because of what happened in Goa in 1961, that they would be held responsible militarily for a political defeat. Attacks on officers in Beira, Moçambique, in January 1974 suggested the kind of disgrace and punishment that lay in store for them.

The instigation for the coup began in the most innovative theater of the war—Guinea—where General Spínola allowed criticism and where democratic communities were encouraged. The coup plans took form only when the government issued decree law 353/73 in July 1973 which threatened the prestige and professional status of the regular officers ("quadro permanente"). These middle-range officers had little choice but to act against the regime. Most were from the lower middle class and a military career offered a means of social

mobility. Their status was threatened by the decree law, while the higher officer ranks normally had a higher class background and were fully part of the regime. When political thought became possible under General Spínola in Guinea from 1968 to 1973, it did not require much inspiration to see that a political solution would have to be found to a military impasse. General Spínola attempted to convince the Caetano government of this fact, but was rebuffed. Caetano simply did not have the power necessary to change the composition and orientation of the regime he had inherited in order to resolve the economic and almost moral crises brought on by the wars. Further, movements were being formed on the Right to pursue the wars with more vigor, and, if anything, a replacement for Caetano would have been worse. In this situation General Spínola published his book; the Right was galvanized into action under President Thomaz and Admiral Tenreiro; and it became clear that there could be no solution to the wars—and thus the crisis of society—without a change of regime.

Fatal Flaws in the State and the MFA. An understanding of the reactions to the publication of General Spínola's book is fundamental to an explanation of what followed the coup of 25 April. It seems certain that Marcelo Caetano allowed the book to be published in order to break the impasse in the wars and to encourage people to think about negotiating a settlement. If this was his intention, he failed because he lacked control over the regime. The "ultras" in the regime forced him to give up that strategy and instead he turned further to the Right, defending his African policy in no uncertain terms in the National Assembly on 5 March and receiving an oath of loyalty from 120 generals and admirals. In short, the regime continued on its own momentum and was unable to change. The very

high level of repression by the secret police (DGS) was a certain sign of weakness rather than strength. At that time there was little support for the regime. Certainly the urban or rural lower classes hit by inflation and "stabilized wages" did not support it; neither did the middle classes who had to pay the taxes for the war, send their sons into the army or exile, and who were also hit by inflation; and neither did the large industrialists who were increasingly turning to Europe and away from the colonies. The social basis of the regime had eroded. It maintained itself by the fact that it was structured to do just that in isolation from the society and its conflicts. The reaction to Spínola's book indicated, as later events were to prove, that the state was a hollow shell, lacking structural content, and largely without support. This would be the inheritance of the MFA.

The publication of General Spínola's book and the reaction to it galvanized the Captain's Movement into action. The book encouraged them to believe, as General Spínola himself had done previously, that a solution could be found. The reactions showed not only that a political solution to the wars would not be found but also that possibilities even for changing the regime were becoming increasingly limited. Spínola and Costa Gomes were dismissed by Caetano and key elements of the movement were imprisoned or posted in isolated parts of the country. Thus the Captains' Movement was forced to take action before they were prepared in any but the technical sense, and for that matter they had possessed this capacity for some years in the theaters of war.

The best book on the MFA and the coup is *O Movimento dos Capitães e o 25 Abril: 229 Dias para Derrubar o Fascismo* by Avelino Rodrigues, et al.¹⁸ The subtitle is important, from the first meeting of the officers on 9 September 1973 until 25 April 1974 there was an

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interval of only 8 months in which to prepare. Again, the technical preparation for the coup was simple for a group such as this, but gaining power was one thing and acting positively with it would be another. In the latter respect they have shown themselves sadly lacking. Perhaps it was a vicious circle in which a regime which was unable to change was also unable to prepare a group to replace it. The officers, like Portugal, had been isolated from other experiences both personally and through study. Thus they did not profit from the experience of Egypt and Peru. In a practical sense, they also lacked political experience. Only Major Melo Antunes had any such prior experience: he had been an opposition candidate in the elections of 1969. The others, as another key figure of the MFA—Victor Alves—has clearly stated, were unprepared for assuming political roles.¹⁹ Lacking both theoretical and practical preparation, they were not cohesive even though the group had a maximum of 200 members. They had graduated from the academy at different times, served their commissions with different groups, and were not unified as a group. All of this became clear from interviews with the members of the core group of the MFA and goes far to explain why they tried to keep behind the scenes for as long as they did. The fact that they were unprepared, divided, and rushed into the coup sheds light on their program published on 26 April and tends to explain their selection of General Spínola as head of the Junta of National Salvation (JSN) and then later provisional president.

The "Programa do Movimento das Forças Armadas" was broadcast to the country on 26 April. It was a short but ambitious document. In it, and in the efforts of the MFA to follow it, are the roots of many of the problems of the revolution. It recognized the crisis of the society and properly placed the emphasis on the wars in Africa for its

causes. In fact, the *sine qua non* for any improvement was properly seen to be a political solution for the wars. It also provided for the dismembering of the old regime, the immediate democratization of the country, and serious social and economic changes. While at the same time destroying what was left of the old regime, the MFA guaranteed an expansion of mobilization, pluralism, and extensive reforms which amounted to a revolution.

It is unclear even today why democratization was linked to the solution of the wars and social reforms; the documents and secondary material concerning this point provide no answer. Judging from what evidence is available, the officers seemed to think that democratization would somehow solve all the problems both in Africa and at home.²⁰ There are several reasons for this interpretation. The officers recognized what was lacking in the old regime, and thus they linked together peace, democracy, and reform. In a more practical vein, after hearing for so many years propaganda about the importance of the colonies, they undoubtedly wanted to sweeten the certain loss of these historic areas with benefits at home. The loss of the colonies would be traded for other benefits in Portugal itself. While they knew much about the wars, they knew little or nothing at all about politics in Portugal or elsewhere. For this reason they did not really have a coherent program, but rather they copied bits and pieces in a nonselective manner from opposition groups, parties, and meetings held during the past 5 years.²¹ While they eliminated the old regime and provided for democratization and reform, they failed to formulate an institutional means whereby they could direct the whole process. Still, they might have been able to succeed had they rallied behind one of their own or even established a junta, instead of appointing General Spínola as provisional chief.

Only in retrospect is it clear that the MFA had little to worry about either at home or abroad. General Spínola was selected as provisional chief because of the respect he inspired. This, they hoped, would help them to avoid civil war and to gain international recognition. The events on 25 April and immediately thereafter show that their worries were groundless, but at the time of preparation things were not so clear. However, in selecting him the MFA inadvertently began a dialectical process which would make it impossible to create a new regime to replace the one they destroyed: the synthesis was increasing radicalization.

General Spínola was simply very different from the middle-range officers. He was of an upper class and military background, possessed conservative tendencies, and, above all, he wanted to rule. Before assuming the position of chief, he forced changes in the program, and from then on he would be in conflict with the MFA over the important points of the program.²² Rather than independence for the colonies, he wanted further negotiations; rather than immediate democratization, he wanted a period of "guided democracy"; and rather than fundamental reforms, he wanted a few changes in a liberal direction. General Spínola may have been able to formulate a new regime, but the MFA knew that what he intended was not quite what they had in mind, and conflict between him and his followers (including Firmino Miguel, Almeida Bruno, Sanches Osório, and Palma Carlos) and the MFA arose. Indeed, each high point of this conflict—July 1974, September 1974, and March 1975—was a plateau on the radicalization of the revolution. By late 1974 the old regime was either completely destroyed or paralyzed; there was a simultaneous political and social revolution; and no single organization or group was able to formulate a new regime.

Group Proliferation and Political Mobilization in the Absence of Structures. By late 1974 a combination of three factors: the final destruction of the old regime, the conflict between the MFA and General Spínola, and the declaration of serious social reforms had created a situation of rapid group formation and political mobilization. The main thread linking this process was the growing alliance between the MFA and the Portuguese Communist Party. The PCP was virtually the only organization which remained intact during the changes before and after 25 April. The party also benefited from a history of heroic struggle against the regime which the MFA overthrew. Moreover, in addition to these important resources, the PCP also possessed the Leninist assets of ideology and organizational skill.

The PCP took advantage of the open situation and immediately placed its elements into critical positions in the bureaucracy, the mass media, local governments, and the commissions being formed in factories and neighborhoods. As the conflict between the MFA and General Spínola developed, the MFA relied more and more heavily on the PCP not only for its organization and its cadre, but also for its ideology. The PCP, unlike other movements, did not disagree with the MFA at any point and gradually, by means of a concerted effort in the mass media, in the Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares, through the Fifth Division, and through general publications, the PCP gave a Marxist interpretation to the old regime, the actions of the MFA, and to the whole nature of the revolution. The PCP simply superimposed their ideology on the whole system.²³ It is somewhat beside the point to debate whether Maj. Varela Gomes, Adm. Rosa Coutinho, and Brig. Gen. Vasco Gonçalves were or were not

always Communist sympathizers. What is clear from the interviews and books published by and about the MFA is the fact that these men were not sophisticated in terms of ideology, and thus they were amenable to interpretations which seemed to explain for them what they had done and what they should be doing. The PCP, in conjunction with some elements in the MFA, were thus, in fact, formulating a new regime to replace the previous one. The party, under Alvaro Cunhal, seems to have been frozen in the Stalinist form.

Yet, if the PCP-MFA alliance predominated from approximately October 1974 until August 1975, it was not in complete control. The MFA, not the PCP, made the coup and their program provided for a general democratization. Thus, other parties proliferated, so that by the time of the elections for the Constituent Assembly in April 1975 there were more than 40.²⁴ Except for a few of the most radical Left groups, the parties were formed in Portugal after 25 April 1974 and brought together elements that had either been in exile, underground, or previously had not been involved in party politics in Portugal. There was not only a wild proliferation of parties, but each one was characterized by divisions and tensions. While a certain stability characterized the MFA-PCP alliance, it did not characterize the other groups. They were too new, so questions of program, leadership, and strategy, let alone organization at the national and local levels, had not been resolved. The Socialists (PS) had been formed as a party in Germany only in 1973 and the Popular Democrats (PPD) only after 25 April. Although it was not possible for one or two of these groups to provide an alternative to the PCP, they too participated in the political struggle and attempted to counter the PCP in the drive for hegemony.

Virtually everything in Portugal became politicized in this struggle. The state apparatus, such as it was, went through "saneamentos," or purgings, and finally was paralyzed. The Church and its various organizations went through polarization. Finally, the bishops just withdrew and assumed the roles of martyrs. The news media controlled by the PCP was countered by other media bringing together the Socialists, PS, and groups to the far Left. The commissions in the neighborhoods and factories were countered by others dominated by groups to the Left of the Communists. The best known cases of this struggle for power involved the Intersindical, Radio Renasçenca, and the newspaper *República*. They are only indications of what was occurring throughout the country. It is largely because of this complete struggle for power that the terms "Left," "Right," "Socialist," "Fascist," et cetera, lost all their content.

In the midst of this proliferation and mobilization, the elections for the Constituent Assembly were held on 25 April 1975. Whereas in the elections of 1969 only 19 percent of the population over 21 years of age were registered and only 61.6 percent of these voted, in this election 72.1 percent were registered and 91.7 percent of these voted. Despite the extremely high turnout and the obvious success of the center parties (PS-37.8 percent; PPD-26.38 percent) in contrast to the PCP (12.53 percent), this did not imply that the center parties had won. Specifically, the parties were bound by the Party Pact of 11 April 1975 which they were forced to sign and which both institutionalized the MFA and guaranteed it a dominant role in politics for up to 5 years.²⁵ The pact simply demonstrated what was already clear: the liberal democratic form was not in the ascendant. Thus electoral success was taken from the center parties, the Constituent Assembly was limited to its possible

functions, and it was unclear just what type of political regime and socio-economic system Portugal was to have. What is more serious, the politicization penetrated all sectors of the armed forces so that it became impossible within the MFA, and even within the directive body, the Revolutionary Council, to agree on policies.

Because of politicization within the armed forces, the original program was superseded by the Plan of Political Action—PAP—of 21 June, which was then superseded by the Direct Democracy of Otelo's COPCON of 13 August. All of these programs, and there were more, attempted to define a regime and, in essence, the whole nature of Portuguese society. This proliferation of programs and the politicization of the armed forces paralyzed the state apparatus. Quite simply, there was now a very high level of group and party formation, extremely high political mobilization, with no channels to regulate their competition. The state itself, or what remained of it, was part and parcel of the struggle and thus would not regulate it. In this situation there was also no single principle of legitimacy, but rather several in competition. Therefore, an election was about as useful as a demonstration or a strike or an ultimatum from the military or even a statement of some individual like Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho for the resolution of the political contest. The high pluralism of groups and the mobilization were all the more serious because the armed forces were politicized at all levels and the country was facing a very serious economic crisis.²⁶

The breakthrough began in August 1975 with the publication of the Document of the Nine. This document was written by Major Melo Antunes and signed by other core members of the original MFA. It sought, in effect, a return to the original program and offered a type of regime commensurate with that program.²⁷ Beginning with

this document, steps were taken to force out Vasco Gonçalves, limit the role of the PCP, discipline the military, give the government coverage in order to function, and to begin to make a regime. These steps were taken through the Revolutionary Council with the support of mainly the PS and PPD. They led to the attempted coup by the far Left within the military on 25 November 1975. With the failure of the attempted coup, the imprisonment of Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, the replacement of General Fábão, and a certain purging within the military, it would seem that the worst excesses of the past 2 years have been superseded. But the facts remain that there is still no single regime, groups continue to proliferate, mobilization continues, and the economic crisis grows worse.

In this context, and with this background, it is important to evaluate the tendencies toward a coalescence of forces in the formulation of a new regime. The old regime has been destroyed, the revolutionary processes are still without precise definition, and there is a great deal of political activity. However, certain tendencies or trends are apparent, and it seems most appropriate to evaluate them in comparison with a liberal democratic regime.

Tendencies Toward a Liberal Democratic Regime. It may still seem optimistic at best and naive at worst to discuss the possibilities of liberal democracy in Portugal, and one must be cautious not to predict that this or that regime *must* emerge. But at the present time the tendencies are in the direction of a liberal democracy of sorts. Since there have been many surprises during these 2 years, it is conceivable that most foreign observers will be surprised and that Portugal will become democratic.²⁸ Power is currently held by the Revolutionary Council. Those in power are well aware of the problems of the past, the great socioeconomic crisis, and

the need for a stable government. Civil war has been faced more than once, and they know the impediments to other possible regimes that have been proposed. Further, it is recognized that the Right has been in the ascendant since 25 November 1975, and if a repeat performance of 1926 is to be avoided, then some form of civil regime must be formed.

The trend toward a liberal democratic regime is based not on optimism but rather on the absence of any other viable alternative. It has been argued that democracy emerges from a balance of forces, a standoff of social groups.²⁹ There is evidence that the parties in Portugal are coming to represent social groups and that they will be in balance. As this pattern emerges, it will mean that a system of conflict regulation will be structured in which votes are the main means of influencing decisions. This form has emerged in the past from military regimes in Colombia and Venezuela, and the examples of countries such as Austria, Belgium, and Holland are also relevant.³⁰

What is critical for Portugal is the ability of the elites to recognize that political fragmentation must be controlled in order to form a relatively stable regime. In this case fragmentation is not based on cultural cleavages (nor was it in Colombia and Venezuela) but rather on class and on the proliferation and mobilization during the past 2 years. The political elite must be willing to give up a little in order to gain a lot: compromise and accommodation are the values to be emphasized. Further, the elites must have a great deal of autonomy or independence from their groups in order to make these compromises. The elites in Portugal, in fact, do enjoy substantial independence from the masses.³¹ If this pattern can become established, then legitimacy can be developed from the process itself.

Currently there is no single legitimacy principle and what would be most

likely is some kind of procedural justification rather than one of the "great ideologies" which have been discredited in the instability of the past 2 years. To get to the point of having a process develop legitimacy, however, there must be a transfer of power from the Revolutionary Council to civilians and the latter must, in fact, make these compromises. This implies less pluralism and certainly less mobilization. The elites, Leftist rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding, must make accommodations.

There are several factors which seem to favor the transfer of power to a civilian regime. These include the following: (1) The original Program of the MFA advocated a civilian regime in which elections would be the means of recognizing power and provided for liberties and immunities to guarantee the value of these elections. Despite radicalization these elections were held on 25 April 1975 and 1976 and liberties and immunities continue to be recognized. Censorship, coercion, the outlawing of parties have occurred, but the general trend has been continuing democratic liberties. (2) The Constituent Assembly elected in 1975 began meeting in June and in April 1976 completed its work. This Constitution is an amalgam of all kinds of traditions and is surrounded by limitations, but it can provide a feasible charter for a government.³² The Constitution could easily replace the program and thereby develop legitimacy of a process. (3) In general, the key elements in formulating the program and MFA itself are still in power. They include officers like Melo Antunes, Vasco Lourenço, and Victor Alves, and while superseded for a time, they are clearly at the center of power in the Revolutionary Council at present. They have favored a civilian regime all along and were the ones to counter the alliance of the MFA-PCP. From their positions they can continue to promote the original intention of a civilian

regime. (4) There is now a distinction made between the "politicos" and the "operacionais" with the former mainly in government and latter in direct command of the armed forces. The core MFA group are largely politicians and the operationals may have been but are generally not. Vasco Lourenço is both in that he is Chief of the Military Region of Lisbon. Ramalho Eanes is Chief of Staff and Pires Veloso is Chief of the Military Region of the North. These key operationals, and those directly under them, are bringing the military under control after the process of politicization and all are in favor of moving the armed forces out of politics. They have not only stated this clearly in many interviews, but in December 1975 they passed a decree law clearly defining the apolitical character of the institution. Since the beginning of the year the armed forces have been decreased in size, reorganized, and are being more closely linked to NATO ideology and structure.³³ Thus both the politicians and the operationals want to hand over power to civilians, and with their efforts to control the military there may actually be some power available. (5) The leadership recognizes the international realities of Portugal's position. The economic situation is extremely grave and the country must seek aid abroad.³⁴ The U.S.S.R., for any number of reasons, is not willing to underwrite another Cuba and thus Portugal is dealing mainly with OECD countries. When it seemed likely that an alliance of the MFA-PCP would adversely affect the PS and other parties of the center, some Western European countries not only provided direct support to these parties but also required that Portugal adopt a pluralistic political system before aid would be granted. Their strategy has worked on all accounts, and not only is the PS now predominant among the political parties but the leadership in general realizes that Portugal has no option but to be part of the OECD,

NATO, and finally the EEC. The foreign countries are now, in fact, providing aid and would appear to have a very great deal of influence on the evolution of the regime.

These five factors, therefore, suggest that the military will eventually hand over power to a civilian regime. There are, however, at least two important points which tend to challenge the five just discussed.

First, in the face of what was regarded as irresponsible behavior by the political parties in late 1974 and culminating in the attempted rightist coup on 11 March 1975, the MFA was institutionalized, the Revolutionary Council formed, and a Party Pact imposed. In the pact, which was accepted by the most important parties, including the PCP, PPD, and PS, the parties and the Constituent Assembly and any resulting civilian regime would be extremely limited.³⁵ The Revolutionary Council as the executive of the MFA was to fulfill a tutelary role for between 3 and 5 years. After the attempted leftist coup of 25 November, the alignment of forces in both the armed forces and the parties changed and there was pressure to revise the pact. The negotiations were handled for the Revolutionary Council by Ramalho Eanes, Vasco Lourenco, Melo Antunes, Canto e Castro, and Martins Guerreiro and directly by the political parties. Despite substantial limitations on the overt role of the MFA, the revised pact, which was signed by the five main political parties on 26 February 1976, does not remove the armed forces from politics. The tutelary role is much diminished but a review of the short text shows clearly that the political system will be semipresidential and semimilitary in that the Revolutionary Council supervised the President who, in turn, supervises the government. The armed forces, therefore, through the Revolutionary Council, have the formal role to guide and supervise the civilian political situation.

Second, the pact could not be completely revised for the same reason that there was pressure to do so. After 25 November there was a realignment of forces both within the military and among the parties with the Right on the upsurge. One possibility, as always, was a coup from the Right with or without the participation of the various "liberation movements" located in Spain. Another was that the Right might actually win the elections for the National Assembly in April 1976. In fact, the vote for the rightist CDS increased substantially, but, in general, the results were inconclusive with the vote distribution roughly similar to the elections the year before.³⁶ The PS with 35 percent won the highest percentage but not enough to guarantee a government which is to be formed after the Presidential elections in late June or early July 1976. The results from the elections do support the general orientation of the new Constitution whose future was much in question before the elections. Still, there is no guarantee that the formal, but largely unimplemented, gains of the revolution will be consolidated. In this situation the Revolutionary Council is aware of the threat and is not eager to surrender its tutelary role.

This factor tending against the full transfer of power to a civilian regime also severely limits the possibilities of elite accommodation. If the parties lack full power they can afford to act irresponsibly, to attack each other and the Revolutionary Council, and to sabotage the effective operation of the government. They have not too much to lose and possibly something to gain. They do not have power, the rules of the game are still not theirs, and there is little priority to accommodate. Thus the PPD could demand that the Constitution be approved in a referendum and the PCP could define its opposition even while participating in the government. The parties acted in a nonaccommodative

manner because the situation was so unclear that each could believe it would win the elections. Now that the results are in it is obvious that nobody won, but the PS, with the highest percentage, can form various kinds of alliances. So far the PS refuses to form alliances to either the Right (PPD and CDS) or the Left (PCP) and indicates that it will rule alone. It can be intransigent because, under the terms of the pact, for the next 4 years the role of the President, and thus of the Revolutionary Council, will be predominant. Power does not lie, therefore, with the parties, and for this reason they have not gone as far as they might in developing strategies of cooperation and consensus.

The balance of these many points remains unclear. The tendencies at present, even after the elections for the Assembly, are also hazy. The political parties are defining more realistic positions for themselves along an ideological spectrum. The PCP is at the Left; the PS a Social Democratic Center; the PPD a liberal Center; and the CDS the Right. The first three parties have been involved in various of the provisional governments and thus have some experience at working together. More recently they have cooperated somewhat in implementing unpopular measures such as austerity programs, negotiation of loans, and the reemergence of the police. Much depends now on the figures that emerge in the election for the Presidency. Popular wisdom would seem to suggest a military candidate and most of the contenders (such as Ramalho Eanes and Pinheiro de Azevedo) would work well with the PS and the present Constitution. This being the case, the PS, although a minority party, would have a majority President and would be able to govern. It would then be likely that the other parties would split and there would be a realignment of the political forces. This being the case, the PS could probably emerge in 4 years as a majority party or be defeated

by another party winning a majority. This not being the case, there must be some means developed to include the other parties in the government at some levels in either the Cabinet or the ministries themselves. If this is not provided, there will be much opposition to the government from Left and Right and it will be unstable.

Conclusion. On balance, the prospects for the emergence of a liberal democratic regime are promising. Of primary importance is the stability of the Revolutionary Council and the results of the Presidential election. With some luck it is conceivable that a liberal democratic regime will emerge as all other options have thus far been countered and there are enough elements tending toward this form to provide a structural basis. It is still very tentative and almost any other combination of factors such as another big move by the far Left or Right, extreme violence by the Angolan refugees, or complete intransigence by any of the main parties could sabotage the democratic tendency. The seriousness of the economic crisis cannot be overstated, and now that the Europeans have helped the PS and the PPD defeat the PCP it remains to be seen whether they will provide the necessary means to buoy up the new regime. If the liberal democratic regime does emerge, it will probably necessitate elite accommodation and thus a weaker

or diluted form of democracy which will not fully represent the pluralism and mobilization of the past 2 years but still more appropriate for Portugal's level of modernization than the previous conservative authoritarian form. Conflict obviously exists in any social system. To deny it is impossible and the human costs are great in the effort. To exacerbate it, without an organization to direct the process, is irresponsible. Now it remains to be seen whether the Portuguese elite have the foresight and ability to create the structures whereby what conflict there is can be managed in a regularized and continuous manner.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



A graduate in political science from the State University at San Jose, Calif., Thomas C. Bruneau earned his M.A. and Ph.D. at the University of California at Berkeley. He has been a member of the

faculty of the Department of Political Science at McGill University in Montreal since 1969. He has conducted research in India, Brazil, and Portugal. In addition to various articles published in Great Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands, he is author of *The Political Transformation of the Brazilian Catholic Church* (Cambridge University Press, 1974). He will spend the summer of 1976 in Portugal doing research for a forthcoming book.

NOTES

1. Michael Parenti, "A 'Double Standard' in Reporting News from Portugal," *The New York Times*, 24 January 1976, p. 27:2.

2. Richard Gott, "The End of the Revolution," *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, 1 February 1976.

3. H.R. Trevor-Roper, "The Phenomenon of Fascism," in S.J. Woolf, ed., *European Fascism* (New York: Vintage, 1969); José António Saraiva, *Do Estado Novo a Segunda Republica* (Amadora: livraria Bertrand, 1974).

4. Saraiva, p. 59.

5. António de Figueiredo, *Portugal: Fifty Years of Dictatorship* (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1975), p. 28.

6. Thomas C. Bruneau, "Crises of Sword and Cross; Church and State in Portugal," *Journal of Church and State* (Forthcoming), Autumn 1976. In this article I argue that the Church can be seen as a microcosm of the whole regime's inability to change and adapt.

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7. José Cutileiro, *A Portuguese Rural Society* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971); Lawrence S. Graham, "Portugal: The Decline and Collapse of an Authoritarian Order," *Sage Publications in Comparative Politics*, 1975; Joyce Riegelhaupt, "Peasants and Politics in Portugal: The Corporate State and Village 'Non-Politics,'" mimeo 1973; Philippe C. Schmitter, "Corporatism and Public policy in Authoritarian Portugal," *Sage Publications in Political Sociology*, 1975; Howard J. Wiarda, "The Portuguese Corporative System: Basic Structures and Current Functions," mimeo 1973. For a detailed account of the nature of the corporative system see Manuel de Lucena, *A Evolução do Corporativismo Portugues, I, O Salazarismo* (Lisbon: Perspectivas e Realidades, 1976).

8. Year of elections	Population	Voters	Percentage
1938	6,985,000	743,930	10.6
1945	7,563,000	909,456	12.0
1949	7,956,147	1,140,000	14.6
1953	8,024,853	1,161,932	14.4
1958	8,360,760	1,213,381	14.5
1961	8,562,271	1,236,000	14.5
1965	8,610,200	1,278,387	14.8
1969	8,700,000	1,700,548	19.54

Source: Figueiredo, p. 250.

9. Graham, p. 14.

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 19 and 29.

11. Saraiva, p. 56. See on this theme Guenther Roth, "Personal Rulership, Patrimonialism, and Empire-Building in the New States," *World Politics*, January 1968.

12. The matter of change/static is clearly one of degree but in the core issues of the African wars, representation of interest, and the regulation of conflict there was minimal change. For details on evolution of the corporative system see Lucena.

13. Saraiva, p. 84.

14. The decrease in the importance of the colonies for Portugal's trade is illustrated in these figures. The same could be done for the trading partners of the colonies.

METROPOLITAN COMMERCE BY COMMERCIAL TRADING BLOCS

Blocs	1959	1967	1972	1973*
Exports				
EFTA	17.6%	34.3%	40.8%	13.9%
EEC	22.7%	16.6%	20.5%	48.6%
Colonies	29.8%	24.4%	14.7%	14.8%
Other	29.9%	24.7%	24.0%	22.7%
EEC & EFTA	40.3%	50.9%	61.3%	60.5%
Imports				
EFTA	20.6%	22.9%	24.4%	11.7%
EEC	31.1%	33.5%	31.4%	45.2%
Colonies	14.2%	14.3%	11.6%	10.1%
Other	34.1%	29.3%	32.6%	33.0%
EEC & EFTA	51.7%	56.4%	55.8%	56.9%

*The 1973 data reflect the enlargement of the European Economic Community and therefore are not really comparable with the earlier years.

Figures taken from Gerald Bender, "Portugal and Her Colonies Join the Twentieth Century: Causes and Initial Implications of the Military Coup," *Ufahamu*, Winter 1974, p. 127. Graham gives further evidence showing the decreasing trade with the colonies but makes the proper

argument that even with the decrease Portugal could not afford to lose the colonies for she was herself too underdeveloped to "continue the relationship through other means," pp. 21-27.

15. Figueiredo notes that on 28 April 1965 Decree No. 46412 was passed which "guaranteed foreign investors the free transfer of interests, dividends and capital gains obtained with 'lawfully imported capital,' as well as the right to complete repatriation of such capital," p. 215. "As a result of the open-door policy, most recent industrial developments had been undertaken by foreign companies, whose stake in Portuguese industry increased from only 1.5 percent in 1960 to 27 percent in 1970," p. 228. Figueiredo also notes the impact of emigration by citing that the Portuguese population decreased by more than 180,000 between 1960 and 1970. On the very important topic of emigration see Joel Serrão, *Emigração Portuguesa* (Lisboa: Livros Horizonte, n.d.). The armed forces came to include around 200,000 men; the armed forces were 11.2 percent of the men of military age and thus highest in the world after Israel with 12.8 percent.

16. Paulo Madeira Rodrigues, *De Subito, me Abril* (Lisboa: Arcadia, 1974), p. 11, and Saraiva, p. 34, discuss the offer to resign. António de Spínola, *Portugal e o Futuro* (Lisboa: Arcadia, 1974).

17. See my article as in note 6 above; Padre José da Felicidade Alves, *Católicos e Política* (n.p., n.d.); Eloy Pinho, et al., *O Segundo Julgamento do Padre Mário* (Porto: Afrontamento, 1974).

18. Avelino Rodrigues, et al., *O Movimento dos Capitães e o 25 de Abril* (Lisboa: Moraes Editores, 1974).

19. See the long interview in *Expresso*, no. 142, 20 September 1975. See also M. Manuela de S. Ram and Carlos Plantier, *Melo Antunes: Tempo de Ser Firme* (Lisboa: Liber, 1976).

20. Avelino Rodrigues, et al., pp. 96, 99, 208. For their lack of plan, see also Insight team of the Sunday Times, *Insight on Portugal* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1975), pp. 179, 185.

21. *Expresso* of 27 April 1974 showed the similarities with the program of the CDE of 1969. Other similarities are found with the Congress of Aveiro of April 1973, the CDE of October 1973, and the PS of May 1973. See Rodrigues, et al., p. 212.

22. Rodrigues, et al., p. 21. Insight team, pp. 114-39, 181-88, 219-32.

23. See *Movimento: Boletim Informativo das Forças Armadas*. A collection of the main political articles can be found in Serafim Ferreira, *MFA: Motor da Revolução Portuguesa* (Lisboa: Diabril Editora, 1975).

24. Two very useful descriptive books of the political parties and movements are Albertino Antunes, et al., *A Opção do Voto* (Lisboa: Intervoz, 1975) and *Partidos e Movimentos Políticos em Portugal* (n.p.: SOAPLI, 1975). *Expresso* of 23 April 1976 gives a useful chart on origins of parties.

25. The pact can be found in the papers of the time, in *A Capital* of 19 September 1975 and discussed in Albertino Antunes, et al., *Portugal: Republica Socialista?* (n.p.: Heptagono, Estudos e Publicações, 1975), pp. 84-92.

26. For reasonably objective and ongoing analysis of the economic situation, see the special section in the weekly *Expresso*.

27. The Document of the Nine was published in *Expresso* of 9 August 1975. Signers included Capt. Vasco Lourenço, Maj. Victor Alves, and Brig. Franco Charais.

28. This perspective was formulated when I did a first draft of the paper in February 1976. Now, and especially after the Assembly elections, most foreign media seems to assume that democracy is established in Portugal. This optimism now seems as misplaced as the earlier pessimism, for most observers still do not seem to grasp the dynamics of the Portuguese situation. See, for example, "Coming in from the Cold," *The Economist*, 6 March 1976, pp. 15-16; "Portuguese Miracle," *Washington Post* 14 March 1976; or, "Milestone in Portugal," *The New York Times*, p. IV 14:2; 29 February 1976. The reporting in the *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, especially by António de Figueiredo, has been well-balanced and realistic all along.

29. See Randall Collins, "A Comparative Approach to Political Sociology," in Reinhard Bendix, ed., *State and Society* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968), especially pp. 65-66. This is a dominant theme also of John Kautsky, *The Political Consequences of Modernization* (New York: Wiley, 1972), pp. 197-237. It is also clear in the work of S.M. Lipset.

30. See Robert Dix, *Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967); Daniel Levine, *Conflict and Political Change in Venezuela* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973); and Kenneth McRae, ed., *Consociational Democracy* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1974). On the support of the parties in the April 1975 elections, see Jorge Gaspar and Nuno Vitorino, *As Eleições de 25 de Abril: Geografia e Imagem dos Partidos* (Lisbon: Livros Horizonte, 1976). For a comparison with the elections of April 1976 see *O Jornal*, 30 April 1976, and *Expresso*, 30 April 1976.

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31. For survey support see *Os Portugueses e a Política-1973* (Lisboa: Moraes Editores, 1973), passim; Albertino Antunes, et al., *Portugal*; pp. 21-24; and the survey reported in *Expresso* of 30 April 1976.

32. The projects of the main parties were published as a special number of the *Diário da Assembleia Constituinte* of 24 July 1975, Suplemento ao Numero 16. The new Constitution has now been published.

33. An interview with Gen. Pires Veloso can be found in *O Jornal* of 23 December 1975; the law was published in *Expresso* of 13 December 1975; *Expresso* of 24 January 1976 gives details on the plans for a new military.

34. For vivid details on the economic crisis, *Conjuntura* of the Gabinete de Estudos Economicos e Financeiros, *Banco Portugues do Atlantico*, no. 8 of December 1975 is especially grim. The recognition of this situation is demonstrated in the Budget for 1976. See *Diario do Governo*, 31 December 1975.

35. Albertino Antunes, et al., *Portugal*; pp. 84-92 and elaborations thereafter.

36. The results are: PS 34.97 percent, PPD 24.03 percent, CDS 15.91 percent, and PCP 14.56 percent. Extensive comparisons and regional variations can be found in *Expresso*, 30 April 1976.

