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Book Reviews


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PROFESSIONAL READING

Review Article

The American Revolution

John Adams, the sage of colonial America, raised three questions in 1815: "Who shall write the history of the American Revolution? Who can write it? Who will ever be able to write it?" Page Smith, an eminent 20th century historian, has answered the challenge of these questions by producing a mammoth two-volume tome.* It is a formidable accomplishment and reveals just about everything that anyone would want to know about the American Revolution.

At this time when the book market is flooded with a plethora of books, articles, and monographs on the American Revolution, the first natural reaction by anyone reasonably familiar with this period in American history will be to ask: "Why still two more volumes on the Revolution?" But one should not be intimidated, for this work takes on a new dimension as Professor Smith unfolds his brilliant and colorful narrative. The first part of *A New Age Now Begins* is largely social and cultural history describing the emergence of colonial America's consciousness of being uniquely "American" and tracing the slow and unrelenting drift toward independence, and the remaining portions

deal largely with military and political events.

The author, a professional historian of high standing, a longtime scholar of early American history and culture, includes among his many publications the highly acclaimed two-volume biography of John Adams. His leitmotif as a historian is that "the truth of an event is to be found in the full and careful telling of it—that . . . the event, properly told contains its own interpretation." In his latest work he carries out this maxim unreservedly.

Page Smith subtitles his monumental work *A People's History of the American Revolution* because he has concluded that the Revolution was essentially a people's movement. He stresses the fact that the Revolution, as John Adams wrote, took place in the "hearts and minds" of Americans long before the direct, revolutionary action happened. This is the main theme of his narrative, and he proceeds to trace this development in the early chapters on life in colonial America. Professor Smith, master historian that he is, gives an incisive interpretation of this first popular movement of modern times:

The fact was that nothing like it has happened before in modern history—the movement of a *whole people*, or enough of them to make a revolution, to assert themselves on the stage of world history. . . . The colonists were doing something so new in human experience that they could only explain it in terms of something

*Smith, Page. *A New Age Now Begins: a People's History of the American Revolution* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1976), 2 vols.

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old: a "fight to preserve their constitutional rights as Englishmen."

The colonists' aim was not just to free themselves from the mother country but to initiate a new age that would be copied as a model by people suppressed and exploited throughout the world. Indeed, the American Revolution was the stimulus for what one historian has called the "Age of Democratic Revolutions." Another unique aspect of this revolution was that the War for Independence was distinguished by its emphasis upon "legality," i.e., rights of Englishmen and rights of man. We would do well to remind ourselves that the Revolution was both a war for independence and a civil war, but it certainly was not a class war in the sense that so many future European revolutions were to be class wars.

Professor Smith presents some new viewpoints, including the thesis that the British cause was hopeless, that American independence was sooner or later a sure thing. As he describes it:

For the Americans, it was a matter of simple endurance. They had only to endure to be independent, and endure they did—but at the cost of infinite suffering and hardship, at the cost of many lives and much property, at the cost of much bitterness between patriot and tory neighbors, between sons and fathers, friends and relatives.

By the careful and full use of narrative history (as Professor Smith says in his Introduction, "A narrative full of surprises, of dramatic adventures, defeats, victories; of words, speeches, newspapers, letters, diaries, journals and public documents"), the reader is swept into the events themselves—the long and weary deliberations of the Continental Congress, the enormous problems that faced the states, the British side of the revolution with its divided loyalties, a balanced treatment of the major and military events, including the significant

naval warfare by the American privateers, the untold sufferings the colonists endured—and stirred by these events the reader shares the same emotions with the Americans of the 18th century.

A good half of the narrative is devoted to military campaigns and naval aspects of the war. The naval officer who has just completed his graduate courses at the Naval War College in strategy and tactics will relish and thrive on the descriptions of warfare embodied in these volumes. It is in his treatment of the war that the author shines and gives an *élan vital*—a new freshness to the campaigns which are familiar to most of us, and describes many of the unknown minor engagements as well in the Southern Campaign and the frontier war in the West. His treatment of the unheralded minor engagements such as Cowpens, King's Mountain, Hobkirk's Hill, and Green Spring Farm in the Southern Campaign (18th century guerrilla warfare) shows that the struggle in America was "less a story of contending armies than of ordinary citizens determined to be free." Nor does he neglect the striking figure of George Rogers Clark and the frontier fighting which, although it was "less important from the military point of view than what it reveals about the temperament of the frontier settlers, who constituted such a colorful and consequential element in the evolving American character."

Smith shows himself to be a capable military historian. He captures the full reality of military events in which "men died, often painfully and horribly, or suffered desperate wounds, went hungry, sweated with fear." He pays great tribute to the common soldier who continued to fight in spite of great hardships and sufferings because he considered himself a revolutionary soldier determined to overthrow tyranny.

Joseph Martin, an enlisted man, wrote in 1777:

I had experienced what I thought sufficient of the hardships of a

military life the year before, although nothing in comparison to what I had suffered in the present campaign. We had engaged in the defense of our injured country and were willing, nay, we were determined to persevere as long as such hardships were not altogether intolerable. . . . But we were now absolutely in danger of perishing, and that too, in the midst of a plentiful country.

Later, as an old man, Joseph Martin wrote: "Almost everyone has heard of the soldiers of the Revolution being tracked by the blood of their feet on the frozen ground. This is literally true, and the thousandth part of their suffering has not, nor ever will be told."

In particular, the accounts of Bunker Hill, George Washington's Christmas-time attack on Trenton, and General Burgoyne's surrender at Saratoga to General Gates are excitingly new.

The naval story revolves about the fact that naval warfare made a vital contribution to the American victory, but the Americans made only a comparatively small contribution to the naval warfare. Yet Smith does not neglect the part played by the three classes of American vessels as represented in the Continental Navy, the individual state navies, and the thousands of privateers. It is significant to note that the American Navy, born during the Revolution, began the great traditions of the United States Navy.

Professor Smith does a first-rate job in describing naval warfare, as for example:

Naval warfare in the eighteenth century much like land warfare, counted heavily on a devastating initial shock at close range, a brutal battering force too much for human flesh and blood to endure, too much for a ship, however stout, to withstand. From thirty to fifty-five cannon of large caliber, throwing pro-

jectiles that weighed as much as fifty pounds, belched forth destruction. Often it was destruction to their own crews, as guns exploded under the pressure and were turned into murderous shrapnel, or broke loose from their fittings and hurtled backward, smashing bulkheads into kindling.

His chapter describing John Paul Jones in his epic Battle of the *Bonhomme Richard* vs. *Serapis* is brilliant and fascinating.

Professor Smith does not dwell upon the global aspects of the Revolution where fighting took place over the western oceans: the Caribbean, Grand Bank of Newfoundland, Strait of Gibraltar, and the North Sea, which were part of the great series of 18th century Franco-British naval wars. For this reason, the naval buff may want to address himself to a recent book by Antony Preston, David Lyon, and John Batchelor, *Navies of the American Revolution*, and still another by the artist Norman Van Powell, *American Navies of the Revolutionary War*. Both books have magnificent illustrations, including many in color, along with essays and descriptive notes on the maritime war abroad.

Page Smith's new viewpoints on the French military and naval alliance, the Battle of Saratoga, and the Siege of Yorktown require thorough study and are best left for the reader to evaluate. These are good places for the well-informed recent Naval War College graduate to apply his graduate studies and meet head-on the conclusions of this excellent historian.

His colorful vignettes brimming with keen insights into the human character of the people who played great and small roles in the American Revolution make for illuminating reading. But best of all is his broad treatment of George Washington as a selfless person, a heroic general, and an astute politician. Many

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historians have treated the Revolution as the personal achievement of George Washington. Professor Smith destroys this myth without demeaning Washington's greatness. Moreover, he succeeds admirably in rescuing our Revolution from the stigma of being merely "Washington's War."

Washington appears not as a distant and even slow-witted hero, but as an amiable, skillful manager of men, and all this without sacrificing his integrity. His faults are presented along with his military tactical errors—most of them of minor importance except for the Battle of Monmouth. Actually, forces under Washington's command lost more battles than they won. Professor Smith argues succinctly that Washington having "molded an army by the most herculean efforts, . . . had simply to keep it in existence to ultimate triumph. That he had created it and was able, in the face of every discouragement to preserve the army was the seed of the new order." All of which he accomplished by the absolute power of determination and force of personality.

It is interesting also to read the author's personal estimates of Washington's character in the chapters entitled "Congress, Rope of Sand" (pp. 1769-1777), and "The Army Disbands" (pp. 1792-1797). It is indeed a classic treatment and comparable to James T. Flexner's recent single volume (a condensation from his prizewinning four-volume study) *Washington: The Indispensable Man*. Here, for example, is one brief paragraph from *A New Age Now Begins*:

His genius was the ability to endure, to maintain his equilibrium in the midst of endless frustrations, disappointments, setbacks and defeats. The American colonists had only to likewise endure to become their own masters—free and independent—and George Washington became the symbol of that determination to endure.

Smith has chosen to omit footnotes and we should rejoice in this, although some professional historians may frown upon his lack of systematic footnoting which he says is the "classic imprimatur of scholarly respectability." But he can be forgiven for this deletion since an academic production of this size with didactic footnotes would be cumbersome, lead to distraction, and could easily add another volume to the already existing two volumes.

This work is intended primarily for the general reader. But it should be evident even to the casual reader of history that the author has consulted all of the primary sources, "the words and actions—as recorded in letters, diaries, journals, newspapers, public documents and memoirs—of the men and women who were involved in the event out of which this nation was born." He quotes judiciously in the main part of the text, which allows the narrative to move smoothly, creating without impediment a complete awareness of the Revolution as the People's Revolution. A bibliographical note describing the main sources appears at the end of volume II, but this may not appease the academicians.

Smith summarizes his conclusions as follows:

The American Revolution is still a potentially vital force in our national life and in our future and the future of the human race; the Revolution was not the work of a few middle class radical intellectuals . . . nor was it the consequence of a quarrel over the profits from the colonial trade. It was a profound popular movement of a people, or a substantial portion of those people, against the state of dependence and subordination in which they found themselves in relation to the mother country. In the long struggle that resulted from the effort of Americans to be masters of

their own destinies, a new understanding of the relations between the governors and the governed developed, a new sense of the potentialities that lay in ordinary men and women, a new appreciation of possibilities of a better life for people in every continent and every nation.

And finally, he adds: "If we can understand our proper relation to the American Revolution, I believe we will be much better able to cope with the often demoralizing and confusing world in which we live today."

His last chapter "Novus Ordo Seclorum," which is an impressive summary of his 1,814 pages of history, merits a careful reading and will be welcomed by all for its retrospection.

Because the story of our American Revolution has been treated by Smith as all body and soul, it merits a permanent place in the personal library of every naval officer at sea or at home. Reading a few chapters, such as the ones on Arnold's March, the Boston Massacre, or Bunker Hill, will easily whet the appetite for a complete reading of this impressive work.

When the reenactment of the battle at Concord Bridge took place in April 1975, a sign fluttered over the festivities which read: "The Revolution is not over." The words have deep meaning for the revolution indeed is not over—and the United States must continue to give it impetus and direction. America must reawaken itself to what President Ford called the "American concept and fulfillment of liberty that have truly revolutionized the world." Reading these volumes will be helpful in stimulating this revival, for Professor Smith has successfully recreated and revived the era of the American Revolution—the People's Revolution.

AUGUST C. MILLER, JR.
Naval War College

Binkin, Martin, and Record, Jeffrey. *Where Does the Marine Corps Go From Here?* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1976. 93pp.

This study examines the U.S. Marine Corps to determine its role in current and future U.S. defense requirements. Binkin and Record believe the Marine Corps with an amphibious assault capability is necessary but that there should be changes in the Corps' posture and mission orientation. Their findings are that the Marine Corps is not organized to meet the likeliest threats to our national interests; that its air arm requires too large a proportion of the Marine Corps' budget; and that to maintain the present size of the Corps, many people who do not fit the "good men" category must be accepted.

After presenting their critical findings the authors make the following recommendations:

1. Retain only four regiments with associated air, and structured primarily for amphibious warfare.
2. Transfer one BLT from the Pacific to bolster U.S. capabilities in the Middle East.
3. Sharply reduce the size of the Marines' tactical air capability.
4. Disband most of the Marine Corps Reserve.

Should these recommendations be adopted there would still be a question of what to do with the remaining Marine personnel. The authors offer four possibilities:

1. Reduce USMC personnel ceiling to reflect the new structure as presented in the four recommendations stated above. A personnel strength of 112,000 would result.
2. Assign the Marine Corps ground responsibility in Asia presently borne by the Army. Corps personnel strength here would be 175,000.
3. Give Marines the assignment as the U.S. quick reaction force, thus replacing the Army's 82d Airborne Division. A Corps of 142,000 would result.

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4. Organize Marines for combat in Central Europe; this would require 175,000 personnel.

When one evaluates the study and its recommendations, the authors' assumptions should be kept in mind. Binkin and Record use the term "likeliest threats." Without entirely disagreeing with their categorization, one must remember that their views are based on certain assumptions which are not easily identified as such but which are stated as facts.

Their assumptions are important in their examination to determine regions where amphibious operations are "likely" or "unlikely." The authors evaluate Latin America, Africa, the Indian Ocean, and Southeast Asia as "unlikely" areas because U.S. public opinion does not favor a security role in the developing world and Asia. Binkin and Record state that "this view seems unlikely to change." Such a critical assumption neglects the fact that Americans have changed their attitudes before. The 1920's and 1930's were strongly anti-interventionist and anti-war. During and after the Korean war, many Americans held similar views. Still, we fought two wars.

This study assumes the "likely" regions for amphibious operations are Japan, on the flanks of NATO, and in the Middle East. The authors state that the presence of indigenous and/or U.S. forces in these areas may lessen the need for amphibious assaults. However, Japanese defense forces, while modern, are small and have a widely dispersed island nation to defend. In Europe SACEUR would probably want to agree with the study that he could hold long enough to permit administrative reinforcement, but with recent growth of Soviet military strength, SACEUR cannot be positive NATO could hold. Regarding the Middle East, the study states that amphibious operations in this area cannot be prudently discounted. In view of U.S. overtures to the Arab world,

prudence may dictate otherwise! Thus other strategic factors must be taken into account when considering the authors' area analysis.

The study's discussion of amphibious doctrine should also be viewed with some restraint. Doctrine is dear to Marines, because it was developed through hard experience and blood. At one point the authors use the vulnerability of helos in the *Mayaguez* incident as an illustration of weakness in the Corps' vertical envelopment doctrine. Perhaps Binkin and Record do not realize that the *Mayaguez* operation had little relationship to a Marine or Navy amphibious operation. The *Mayaguez* rescue was commanded from Washington for political purposes and was conducted within that context.

When the study expands its analysis to include all Marine air, cost statistics are irrefutable. The authors question the need for a Marine tactical air capability, but the answer is that here again the Corps has become wedded to doctrine by experience and blood. The Navy may not always be able to support operations ashore with carrier air, so Marines want their own. The U.S. Army has its air force for similar reasons.

Operations ashore involve support in addition to tactical air. The study takes note that naval commitments may prevent naval air and seaborne base support for long periods of time. Marines know this and have pressed the Navy to develop an adequate gunfire capability and to modernize amphibious shipping. The lightweight 8-inch gun and the LHA have been part of the Navy's answer and have gone further than the study reflects. R. & D. projects under consideration will help meet the study's criticism also.

The study uses Marine disciplinary problems as additional justification for restructuring the Corps. Again statistics cannot be refuted, but other factors merit consideration. These factors are: the statistics were taken mostly from a

time when Marines were crowded aboard ships off Vietnam for as long as 88 days without a break; race relation problems are common to all services; Marines tend to use court martials more freely than other services. However, all these problems are to a great extent solvable. Higher recruiting standards recently initiated by the Marines should lower the number of disciplinary incidents.

The Navy/Marine team must continue to provide the strategic planner with the special options offered by an amphibious force. Binkin and Record's study should motivate the Marine Corps and Navy to review deployment plans, R. & D. and personnel procedures in order to maintain this important capability.

WARREN W. ERIKSON
Captain, U.S. Navy

Corse, Carl D., Jr. *Introduction to Shipboard Weapons*. Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1975. 398pp.

The efforts of the United States Naval Institute to revitalize its practice of publishing texts dealing with the basic aspects of the naval profession are most commendable. Lieutenant Commander Corse's fine book is the sixth volume in the *Fundamentals of Naval Science Series* which thusfar has focused on the disciplines of shipboard organization, operations, and navigation.

In his preface, the author informs us that his intention is to provide a basic textbook on shipboard weapons systems which can be utilized in its entirety as an integrated program or in segments dealing with specific topics. Lieutenant Commander Corse envisions the majority of his readers as prospective naval officers, but he has selected and organized the material in a manner which will make this book an excellent reference for a newly commissioned officer to carry with him to his first command.

Introduction to Shipboard Weapons is divided into five parts: Introduction to Fire Control, Sensors and Detection Devices, Guns, Missiles, and Antisubmarine Weapons. The author explains that he is limiting his scope to include only those systems found on surface combatants, and, with the exception of a short digression on the Polaris fire control system in chapter 25, he follows this plan. Although the table of contents gives the appearance of a balanced analysis, an emphasis on gun systems is most evident—of some 390 pages of text, 230 pages are dedicated to guns and their support systems. A very good argument can be made that the solution of the gunfire control problem has been the basis for modern shipboard weapon technology and consequently a sound knowledge of these fundamentals is a prerequisite to understanding newer systems. Lieutenant Commander Corse's approach supports this philosophy, but there is some concern in this reviewer's mind that the detailed gun sections are inconsistent with the broader perspective utilized for other systems.

The sections on gun fundamentals are well prepared, and it is to the author's credit that he has based his development of linear rate systems on the MK-68 system and allowed the venerable MK-37 system to take its proper place in history. The discussions of digital MK-86 and MK-92 systems, which are included in the DD-963 and FFG-7 programs, are timely and informative. Further sections dealing with the MK-45 lightweight 5 inch/54 gun, the 76mm Oto Melara gun, the 20mm Close-in Weapon System (CIWS), and guided projectiles make excellent reading for naval officers without intimate knowledge of these new systems.

The chapters on sensors cover the full range from electro-optical devices to sonars. The introduction to radar fundamentals utilizes a clear approach characterized by excellent pictorial presentations and an absence of confusing technical detail. Sonar and MAD techniques

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are well presented and excellent graphics portray the fundamentals of acoustic propagation.

Chapters 21 through 25 provide a fine overview of shipboard missile technology. A brief historic development leads into a description of the Talos, Terrier, Tartar, and Standard missiles in the context of area and point defense employments. The Basic Point Defense Missile System (BPDMS) and Harpoon programs are treated, and the chapter concludes with an excellent section on launchers. A concise and well illustrated overview of missile guidance systems provides a useful introduction to this highly technical area, and an excellent chapter on the integration of missiles, weapons direction systems, and the Navy Tactical Data System (NTDS) effectively draws together the earlier chapters on individual components. Lieutenant Commander Corse wisely emphasizes the importance of digital processing techniques and the need for compatibility of future shipboard sensors with weapons and command, control, and communications functions.

The sonar chapters do not include the detail of earlier sections and emphasize basic technology. The SQS-26 and the newer passive systems, including towed arrays and acoustic analysis, could be more fully developed.

The chapters on antisubmarine weapons and fire control systems encompass most modern developments with sections on the MK-46 and MK-48 torpedoes, the Light Airborne Multi-purpose System (LAMPS helo), and the ASROC Underwater Battery Fire Control System.

In summary, *Introduction to Shipboard Weapons* is a valuable addition to the instructional literature of the naval profession. The photographs and diagrams are outstanding and, with few exceptions, well chosen. Photographs of a crewmember supporting a 5-inch projectile by the nose fuze and of an un-protected bridge team firing a

"combat" mission off Vietnam are unfortunate selections for a teaching text. A short glossary of weapons terms is followed by an excellent bibliography and comprehensive index.

Lieutenant Commander Corse points out that his book is the first unofficial textbook on U.S. Navy weapons to appear since 1937. His efforts will certainly contribute to a better understanding of this complex subject, and one hopes that another 38-year hiatus will not transpire before a new edition appears.

PAUL TOBIN

Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Drucker, Peter F. *Management: Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices*. New York: Harper and Row, 1974. 811pp.

If you believe management involves more than the inventory control of rifle stocks, you may be ready for this book. If you believe this country's social, political, and economic systems are worth managing and fighting for, you will appreciate this treatment of management and its alternative: tyranny. If you aspire to high rank and its attendant leadership/management positions, you will better understand the unique tasks, responsibilities, and practices expected, rather required, in such positions. Professor Peter F. Drucker, long a noted author in the management discipline and the acknowledged dean of managerial philosophy, has provided a signal work on the subject which contains profound insight and advice.

Management, according to the author, is dominant within each institution comprising our pluralistic society. It is not limited in any way simply to the caring of business. Some comments of note to the military mind, for example: "Management, that is, the organ of leadership, direction and decision in our social institutions, . . . is a *generic function* [author's emphasis] which faces the same basic tasks in every

country and, essentially, in every society." Management gives direction; it thinks through the institution's mission, it sets its objectives, it organizes its resources.

"It has to lead . . .".

Management must also

"perform the mission . . ."

and be responsible for the impacts of the accomplishment of that mission.

Further, government agencies also need management. "They all have people who are designated to exercise the management job, even though they may not be called managers, but administrators, commanders, directors, executives, or some such title. These public-service institutions . . . are the real growth sector of a modern society." As Drucker sees it, public-service institutions face, with business, the challenge of innovation and have to manage growth, diversity, and complexity. He means DOD, and the Navy and Marine Corps, among others.

Regarding Drucker's view of officers and their unique condition relative to the time dimension and the futurity of decisionmaking, he states:

A military leader, too, knows both times. But traditionally he rarely had to live in both at the same time. During peace he knew no "present"; the present was only a preparation for the future war. During war he knew only the most short-lived "future"; he was concerned with winning the war at hand. Everything else he left to the politicians. That this is no longer true in an era of cold wars, near wars, and police actions may be the single most important reason for the crisis of military leadership and morale that afflicts armed services today. Neither preparation for the future nor winning the war at hand will do any longer; and as a result, the military man has lost his bearings.

His considerations regarding public-

institution management are many and profound; he discusses the often related excuses for poor management in such institutions and prescribes solutions: definition of purpose, objectives and goals, priorities, measurements of performance, feedback and self-control from results, and an organized audit of objectives and results. Discussion ranges from clarification of profit motive to recruiting, to management by objectives. He accepts as a basic premise that every governmental agency be conceived as impermanent, that it be subjected to performance tests, and that it focus primarily on effectiveness vs. efficiency.

Other areas of concern for the military officer include our changing political-economic systems: multinational (transnational) corporations, a world market, national sovereignty, need for leadership; our changing socio-economic system: profit motive, work and the knowledge worker, reward and punishment, achievement, and management by objectives (MBO).

This is an excellent book; it is theoretical, yet tied to reality by Drucker's past and present examples. It has wide application to both private sector and public sector with many explicit references to DOD, the armed services, and individual military leadership. For the professional officer, it could become a bible of managerial philosophy, to serve for many years as a reservoir of thought. Drucker's comments are valid regarding officers as managers/leaders, regarding business management as the leadership group of the future (vice church, political, or strictly military leadership groups), and regarding the idea that services must examine mission before examining size, locations, structure, and/or technology. Drucker points out, correctly, that the worker of today and tomorrow is different—he performs difficult jobs, marches to different drums, and responds to different stimuli (or differently to normal stimuli) regarding his work, his pay, his benefits, and his

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career opportunities. *Management* is recommended to any officer seeking a contemporary basis for management thought, to any officer schooled or curious in private enterprise management or curious about military application. It is not recommended to any officer looking for an easy book in management and business affairs. It is not a casual treatment of the subject. Rather it is a profound work, 61 chapters of carefully conceived and delivered statements regarding the state of this art. No graphs, no formulas, no quick answers to success. Drucker is verbose, seemingly redundant at times, with good result; he wants the reader to realize fully the significance of his statement and often it bears repeating. The majority of his text deals with American-based business organizations, as they serve as the most visible examples of good and bad management activities. This is not a shortcoming, but a strength. As mentioned earlier, if we are willing to fight for something, it might help to know what it is we are fighting for.

B.J. FAGAN
Major, U.S. Marine Corps
U.S. Naval Academy

Higham, Robin, ed. *A Guide to the Sources of United States Military History*. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1975. 599pp.

At first blush a bibliographic essay appears to be something that would interest only researchers with specific questions in mind. However, this extraordinary compendium will appeal to a rather broad spectrum of students of U.S. military history, because it points out quite clearly those areas and topics that have received study, as well as those areas that so far have been neglected.

The editor wisely divided his subject into 19 chapters, ranging from "European Background of American Military

Affairs" to "Museums as Historical Resources." The contributors are highly qualified, competent, and respected historians, such as Russell Weigley, B. Franklin Cooling III, and Dean Allard.

The ground rules given to each contributor were for 20 pages of double-spaced text pages followed by 300 entries. After first surveying the general literature, the contributors were asked to "proceed logically to cover policy, strategy, tactics, planning, logistics and operations as practicable." Following these guidelines, the 19 contributors produced informative and succinct essays on substantive historical topics, as well as comprehensive bibliographies, frequently exceeding 300 entries. The result is a useful reference as well as an impressive summary of U.S. military history.

Unfortunately, the major flaw in this otherwise splendid volume is an excessive number of irritating typographical errors. For some unknown reason, the editor did not list this journal in his introduction with 128 other journals as a source of military history. However, this journal is included in the bibliography on "The Navy 1941-1973." A supplement will be forthcoming in 1978.

B.M. SIMPSON III
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Kahan, Jerome H. *Security in the Nuclear Age: Developing U.S. Strategic Arms Policy*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1975. 349pp.

Quanbeck, Alton H. and Wood, Archie L. *Modernizing the Strategic Bomber Force: Why and How*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1976. 116pp.

These two recent publications from the Brookings Institution are in no sense two peas from the same pod: the first is as careful, impressive, comprehensive, and balanced a treatment as has yet to appear on the question of forging a

strategic arms policy; the second is essentially a diatribe against the B-1 bomber.

At first glance one might be led to question the need for another book such as Kahan's. Ever since Henry Kissinger's *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* appeared in 1957, each passing year has seen the bibliography on strategic nuclear policy and arms control grow by leaps and bounds. In more recent years the works of Chalmers M. Roberts, Herbert F. York, and Harland B. Moulton* would seem to have covered the ground treated by Kahan in the opening half of *Security in the Nuclear Age*. And yet while Kahan's style is neither as lively as Roberts' nor as impassioned as York's nor as detailed as Moulton's, it is an improvement over all three on the level of dispassionate analysis. It is also, of course, more current, bringing the story down to the opening months of 1974.

Kahan's historical treatment runs from the New Look to the Vladivostok Accord and leaves one with the dominant impression that the Nation has yet to think through the nuclear aspects of strategy in the modern world. To start with, nuclear weapons were introduced into our forces simply because they existed. They were just one more weapon, and President Eisenhower made it quite clear early on that they were to be viewed in that light. Speaking to the U.N. General Assembly in December 1953, he spoke of them as "having virtually achieved conventional status within our armed services." As late as March of 1955 he could speak of using them "exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else." The attainment of a

nuclear capability by the Soviets made nonsense of such thinking on any plane other than that of pure deterrence and led the Kennedy-Johnson administrations into a search for more realistic options regarding the use of force. Then came what future historians may come to call The Great Interruption in modern American life—the war in Vietnam, a topic that Kahan all but completely ignores, but which was probably the last thing we needed given the greater priority that should have accrued to finding a way to avoid a nuclear Armageddon.

President Nixon seemed to realize this and set in motion a concerted plan to liquidate the Vietnam venture so that the Nation could return its energies and attentions to more important matters (arms control, China, energy, et cetera). Like other American Presidents, he was seriously hampered, in the initiatives he might put forward for discussion, by the constraints imposed by considerations of electioneering. (Most Americans still agree with Ike in looking at nuclear weapons and confusing them with guns or bullets; the politician who would attempt to campaign on a finite or minimum deterrence platform would not get past the New Hampshire primary.) And yet some progress was made in SALT, although it was quickly condemned by the intellectuals of the guns and bullets crowd, and then came the political demise of Nixon on an unrelated issue. In the absence as yet of a clear mandate from the people, President Ford's options are even more severely constrained and the future for nuclear arms control is no clearer now than it was over a decade ago. The record thus far is something less than confidence inspiring.

Kahan fingers no villains in the piece, seeing McNamara's famous analogy of the "action-reaction phenomenon" as the driving force in the arms race without regard to persons or parties. "The calculus of conservative planning,"

**The Nuclear Years: The Arms Race and Arms Control, 1945-1970* (New York: Praeger, 1970); *Race to Oblivion: A Participant's View of the Arms Race* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1970); *From Superiority to Parity: The United States and the Strategic Arms Race, 1961-1971* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973).

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he writes in his restrained way, "was often inconsistent with the objectives of mutual stability and arms control" (p. 132).

The concluding half of Kahan's book delineates the issues for the coming decade, concluding with a plea for the introduction, by both sides, of at least some "principles of stable deterrence."

A mutual stability approach . . . rests on the premise that the U.S. is benefitted if the Soviet Union maintains a strategic deterrent capability comparable in overall strength to our own . . . Accordingly, while . . . retaining a confident deterrent force, the U.S. should also seek to avoid posing a threat to the USSR's deterrent or, more generally, should attempt to avoid causing Soviet leaders to fear that the U.S. is seeking a form of strategic superiority. (p. 272)

That kind of talk will never get very far in an election year, but there may be some possibilities after November. The politician (or analyst) who would seek some guidance in laying out the issues for the coming decade would be well advised to ponder this book long and hard. No brief review can do justice to the precise and lucid manner in which it lays out the cases for alternative nuclear postures and policies, or to the scrupulous manner in which the author presents the opposing arguments of hawks and doves, both American and Russian. (Indeed, this book has more paragraphs starting with "On the other hand" than any I have seen on any subject!) If one believes that the present instability of the so-called nuclear arms race poses almost as great a threat as the weapons themselves, he will find Kahan's analysis helpful in structuring his own ideas. If he does not, if he will have none of stability (or "parity" or "sufficiency" or "détente" or other bad words), he will probably find the book subversive at best and defeatist at worst.

* * * * *

Quanbeck and Wood's *Modernizing the Strategic Bomber Force* should come as no particular surprise to those familiar with Quanbeck and [Barry M.] Blechman's *Strategic Forces: Issues for the Mid-Seventies*, another Brookings study that appeared 3 years ago. Pages 43-50 of the 1973 study outlined a plan calling for cancellation of the B-1 in favor of a force of wide-body superjets in the role of standoff "bombers" carrying cruise missiles. In the 1976 study, Quanbeck returns to the lineup with a new teammate but with no change to the game plan. The basic proposal remains the same, albeit extended now from 7 to 116 pages and replete with all the systems analysis concepts so dear to those now or ever associated with OSD's PA&E office.

The authors do not dispute the need for a manned bomber to serve as "insurance against the failure of the missile forces." They are, however, alarmed at the projected cost of the B-1 program, so much so that they are led to bias the argument against the B-1 by holding that a new jet tanker will be required to service it. (This they do, in the face of repeated denials by the USAF Chief of Staff, on the basis of a remark by the then CINCSAC during a Senate hearing more than 5 years ago.)

The analysis begins by identifying five alternative bomber forces:

- modified B52G/H's (including rocket assistance for faster takeoffs)

- B-1's

- a derivative of large transport aircraft, such as the C-5 or the Boeing 747

- new aircraft (unspecified) designed for maximum ability to survive a surprise attack

- a derivative of large transport aircraft with rocket assistance for faster takeoff

The first two of these forces would be armed with decoys and short-range attack missiles; the other three would carry long-range ballistic or cruise

missiles. The analysis then proceeds by way of a theoretical evaluation of the five alternative forces with cost, pre-launch survivability, and penetration ability as the prime comparative factors. Next come the now all but canonical statements of assumptions, charts, graphs, tables, and comparison of analytical results. From these are drawn two conclusions:

-There are marked economic advantages for a bomber force that carries standoff missiles, which would be an alternative to the B-1 in modernizing the bomber force.

-There appear to be no significant military advantages to be gained by deploying a new penetrating bomber such as the B-1 in preference to this alternative.

The first conclusion may well prove out in the long run, if "marked economic advantages" is long for "it's cheaper;" the second conclusion strikes this reader as nonsensical.

The argument is based on assumptions about ALCM's (air-launched cruise missiles) that suggest they are an already proved weapon of quite remarkable powers, to include that of penetrating to targets heavily defended by SAM's—this despite their inability to perform evasive maneuvers, their zero ECM capability, and their subsonic speed! (Not even to mention the possibility that the next round of SALT will see an agreement limiting the allowable range of ALCM's to less than 400 miles.)

The discussion about standoff 747's loaded down with a gaggle of ALCM's brings to mind a picture of great "battleships of the skies" tooling around out there over the ocean wastes presenting a target of incredible vulnerability. This possibility does not bother Quanbeck and Wood; they simply point out that the Soviets do not now have a proved capability to defend against our bombers at long range and are unlikely to develop such a capability. There is no footnote to the effect that assuredly the

best way to see them develop such a capability in record time is to deploy such easily tracked dreadnoughts.

The authors point out that their proposed standoff bombers carry much more fuel than either B-52's or B-1's and therefore would not require any tanker support. Conveniently, they do not bring up the obvious question of the *duration* of airborne deployments, surely the *single* crucial factor in determining tanker requirements.

In short, the conclusions arrived at by the authors are certainly to be seen as arguable rather than as proved, if not with regard to projected dollar costs than certainly with respect to comparative (or alternative) combat capabilities. So-called cost-benefit analysis can be a valuable technique, the more so when the systems being compared are truly comparable in capability. That they are in the present instance remains to be demonstrated. Finally, and perhaps equally important, it is only fair to point out that one of the best arguments against Quanbeck and Wood is contained in the closing pages (332-33) of Kahan's *Security in the Nuclear Age*.

In the course of arguing his case for the recognition of some mutually acceptable principles of stable deterrence, Kahan points out that "despite the likely continued safety of submarines, diversity is essential for stable deterrence." The particular diversity he favors is one involving a diad of SLBM's and manned bombers, the latter by virtue of their penetration and launch-on-warning capabilities providing a particularly effective hedge against the possibility that the Soviet Union might evade or abrogate the terms of the ABM treaty. He concludes that given the known capabilities of these systems and in the interests of mutual stability, there would appear to be no need to introduce entirely new types of systems (such as ALCM's or air-launched ICBM's) in a misguided effort to provide greater diversity in our strategic

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posture. Or, one is tempted to add, to get off cheaper.

DAVID MacISAAC
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force

Knightley, Phillip. *The First Casualty From the Crimea to Vietnam: the War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist, and Myth Maker*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975. 465pp.

The central issue of this utterly fascinating book comes close to the core of the Republic: under what circumstances, if any, must a free press exercise restraint in favor of the true and legitimate interests of a nation engaged in wartime survival? There is an accompanying corollary of concern to public servants: when, if ever, may officials deceive or lie in order to suppress "bad news"? It was former Pentagon spokesman Arthur Sylvester who, during the heat of the Vietnam conflict, suggested that a government might lie to protect itself, thus giving this age-old controversy a modern update. The issues involved, if history is a guide, remain largely and pragmatically speaking unresolved, adding emphasis to the usefulness of this intriguing and well-written history of wartime foreign correspondence.

Phillip Knightley, the author, is an experienced British journalist of catholic interests. His research is impressive and his documentation is careful and ample. His prejudice is obvious: the burden of proof of honesty must be borne by the government. In this regard, he follows the philosophical lead of the Persians and Greeks of antiquity, as well as the more contemporary view of CBS Vice President William Small, who share the feeling that bad news brings nothing but a desire "to kill the messenger."

This then is Knightley's starting point. Wars, he suggests, may be necessary and in their course heroism, selflessness, and national determination may

be found and accentuated. But, no matter, he argues, the "first casualty" turns out to be candor--the truth--which, he feels, gives way to suppression not so much of facts as of trends, developments, and attitudes. He supports his thesis with a brilliant series of historical vignettes tracing war correspondence and reportage from the Crimean War to Vietnam.

There is much to contemplate. Not only does author Knightley allege "coverup" of government press policies and conduct, but he is candid enough to admit the often overlooked inadequacies of the press from the paid propagandists, nee correspondents, in the American Civil War to the "proto-journalists" of Vietnam, men with no journalistic experience save a yearning to make a name out of the misery of Vietnam.

The book's approach is straightforward, the methodology historic and easily analyzed. In the Crimea, for example, foreign correspondence received its first great modern impetus. Rather than crib from foreign papers or rely on letters from serving officers, the British press posted to the front its own great war correspondent William Howard Russell of *The Times* of London. The results were impressive: from a reform of the British Army's officer patronage system, to Florence Nightingale, to the heroic story of that great error, the Charge of the Light Brigade. In the War between the States, the rise of the telegraph added a currency to war reportage but did little for the competency of the correspondents who were generally ill-equipped for the task and largely venal to boot. The first Battle of Bull Run was, to make the point, reported as a major Union victory.

With the flowering of literacy in the Western World, war correspondents developed into a breed apart and from 1865 to 1914 their fame grew, most especially that of Luigi Barzini, whose

son is today a prominent Italian author journalist; Winston Churchill in the Boer War; and America's first great war reporter, Richard Harding Davis.

In all cases, not only were these men action oriented, the precursors of Peter Arnett, Ernie Pyle, Drew Middleton, and Neil Sheehan, but they were men of notable intellect prepared and indeed eager to put their stories in perspective, even if it meant a direct challenge to authority.

This tradition found its zenith in World War II (World War I having been a news war of propaganda, censorship, and bad judgment) where Murrow, Cronkite, Schoenbrun, Friedin, and a host of other living journalists carried the story with flair and understanding. The governments and journalists largely meshed in their common objective without sacrifice of the basic truth. However, by Korea and certainly in Vietnam the issue had been joined in a brawling, open sense of antagonism which did no one any good.

The book concludes with a relatively moderate and balanced portrait of Vietnam coverage. The names are all there: Halberstam, Hersch, Safer, Sheehan, Bigart, Higgins. The issues are there: My Lai, Cambodia, the bombing, TET, the corruption, the heroes, the devils. Where does it end? As it began: when does the press bite its tongue; when does officialdom speak out? The author suggests truth can never win out given the stakes. It is for the reader to decide in this superior discussion of an aspect of war—its reportage—so important today to every professional officer.

PROFESSOR ROBERT F. DELANEY
Naval War College

Liska, George. *Beyond Kissinger: Ways of Conservative Statecraft*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975. 159pp.

Readers who assay Professor Liska's short profound critique of Henry

Kissinger's foreign policy will be intrigued by his use of classic models of statecraft as the basis for analysis. They will also be frustrated by a prolix style that renders this potentially engaging intellectual exercise a laborious endeavor. Their efforts will be rewarded, however, by an imaginative and stimulating inquiry which compares the Secretary's policy with the grand statecraft of Kaunitz, Metternich, and Bismarck. Whether such a basis of comparison is entirely valid in terms of the realities of contemporary politics, or whether the subsequent critique based upon it is wholly justified, does not seriously diminish the originality of this inquiry.

According to Liska, great statesmanship consists of "divining" the correct "constellation," or configuration, of international power and adapting a national foreign policy to that pattern. The configuration that he currently perceives is a tripolar one, the United States, Soviet Union, and People's Republic of China constituting the centers of power around which lesser and Third World nations orbit with varying degrees of influence. The range of foreign policies which he suggests as applicable to this configuration is encompassed by three classic models. These are (1) the Kaunitzian, a dramatic reversal of alignments by a weakening power to postpone its own further decline and prevent the preponderance of a major rival; (2) the Metternichean, whereby a diminished power, incapable of independent initiatives, seeks security by enlisting stronger, like-minded, conservative powers in a multistate system to preserve the status quo; and (3) the Bismarckian, the creation and manipulation of a flexible system of checks and balances by an ascendant power in order to neutralize opposition to its development and consolidation and to preserve options for future initiatives. It is within this configuration and against these diplomatic models,

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that Henry Kissinger's policies are judged.

By such criteria, the Secretary's policies do not fare well. At the outset of his tenure, conditions seemed ripe for imaginative new departures in American policy; the Nation still possessed a preponderance of power and the domestic environment favored alterations of futile cold war policies; the major Communist powers appeared to have already embarked upon new programs compatible with American interests. Kissinger thus had the opportunity for a truly Bismarckian policy. Indeed, he seemed initially to be bent on pursuing such thorough rapprochement with China that promised the potential for manipulating the tripolar balance to American advantage. Liska feels that this course should have been followed up by even greater consolidation of the Chinese relationship and encouragement of a more unified and activist Western European bloc and a more independent Japan.

These tactics would have created a configuration on the order of Bismarck's multistate system of the 1880's in which America would operate much as did Germany, manipulating and counterpoising her adversaries and allies with minimum risk and effort, while retaining maximum security against the ascendancy of any potential rival. Within this pattern of great power relationships, the United States could undertake long-range solutions to the problems of the secondary regions of the world.

Unfortunately, from Liska's point of view, Kissinger pursued no such dynamic Bismarckian diplomacy. Instead, he contented himself with a more Metternichean approach, designed to conserve American assets at home and abroad, normalize relations with principal rivals, and mediate lesser conflicts with a potential for disturbing the status quo—a posture of implicit weakness.

essentially static, bilateral arrangement by a concessionary strategy normalizing European military and political conditions, granting parity in strategic arms, and soliciting cooperation through generous economic agreements. This was accompanied by personalized "summitry" and "shuttle diplomacy," in which sensational, tactical negotiations were substituted for creative and enduring solutions to the problems of Europe, Southeast Asia, or the Middle East. In the meantime, overtures to China stagnated, no further moves were made to encourage autonomous European or Japanese participation in a multistate system, and no creative initiatives were undertaken in the Third World.

This Metternichean policy, Liska argues, frittered away United States superiority, strengthened Russia without compensating advantages for America, ignored the potential of China in the triangular system, and made the European allies suspicious of United States intentions. However, it provided no hedge against either future Russian defection and reassertiveness or the possible realignment of the two Communist superpowers. The net result has been a relatively weaker United States, relying primarily on Soviet good behavior, with no compensating system for either security or leadership. This is a condition which, if uncorrected, Liska feels may ultimately leave a desperate Kaunitzian realignment of American policy with China as the only recourse in the event of renewed Russian aggression.

Clearly Professor Liska feels the international configuration and American capabilities warrant a Bismarckian *démarche*. He would have the Secretary of State create and manipulate a multistate power balance that would neutralize our great power rivals and promote American leadership in the world at large. For this reason, he perceives Henry Kissinger's "divination" of the

international "constellation" and America's role in relation to it to be incorrect, and he judges the Secretary's conservative, normalizing diplomacy of détente to be far inferior to the grand designs of his 18th and 19th century counterparts.

This is a provocative interpretation, and one which reveals serious limitations in recent American foreign policy. However, before consigning the Secretary to the limbo of mediocrity, it should be noted that this indictment hinges on Liska's unique version of the present world configuration and the ascendant or declining state of American power therein. Not all readers will share his perceptions. Nor will they find convincing the assertion that the Bismarckian approach is either possible or desirable. Did Kissinger have the option of a creative and dynamic foreign policy given the American domestic mood of the late 1960's and early 1970's? Was there an alternative to a personalized diplomacy of stabilization and peripheral negotiation, lacking any popular consensus on policy? Is a Bismarckian system as readily attainable and controllable as Liska suggests? Even the Chancellor's success was an admixture of good fortune and genius, and in a nuclear environment the consequences of genius may be very costly. Finally, can Henry Kissinger's ultimate contribution be adequately assessed before his policies are complete or their ultimate effects discernible?

RICHARD MEGARGEE
Naval War College

Russett, Bruce M. and Elizabeth C. Hanson. *Interest and Ideology—The Foreign Policy Beliefs of American Businessmen*. San Francisco: Freeman, 1975. 296pp.

Yale Professors Russett and Hanson have written a deceptively important book investigating, as it does, a range of business attitudes toward American

foreign policy positions and goals. The research and documentation are impressive, based upon a survey methodology and an analysis of data carefully gathered and presented, and most impressively explained throughout the text.

The book is an excellent example of political polling and attitudinal examination. It highlights the usefulness of opinion and survey research both as a policy tool and as a perceptive insight into basic belief systems. As a consequence, this book could easily be used as basic reference in university classes on foreign policy and public opinion.

In eight carefully designed chapters, plus a survey questionnaire appendix of delight to researchers, the authors compare elite samples of business leaders (drawn from the *Fortune* "500") and military officers (students at the senior service colleges) over a range of issues extending from economic expansion, U.S. political contraction, intervention, interdependence, neoisolation and the impact of armed conflict on the stock market. In its sweep, yet its prudence, the book is remarkable for its balance between survey results and conventional theories. On this latter point, the book is especially thoughtful in its efforts to set the stage for analyzing the survey results by first discussing both historic and current views and positions covering the points at hand. Thus student scholars and readers alike gain perspective and insight.

It would be impossible to do justice to the wealth of material in this reference work. It combines both conventional elite responses as well as a measure of surprises. There is much to examine and ponder. For example, the conventional hypothesis seems to hold that businessmen will favor military preparedness more than will other elites, but less than military men strive for. Yet, somewhat surprisingly, businessmen are less-prepared to defend allies and neutrals from insurgency than are

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the military, but businessmen are more hostile toward Socialist and Communist governments in less-developed countries than other elites.

Against this sort of intriguing point and counterpoint there is a strong and revealing analysis of the business and military press relative to U.S. intervention in nine postwar cases which clearly establishes the influence potential provided by the specialized media.

Altogether, this book rewards student, teacher, and reader alike. It is a gold mine of information and insight, laboriously prepared and documented. It is nice to know that the Advanced Research Center of the Naval War College had the vision to encourage the authors in their scholarly search.

PROFESSOR ROBERT F. DELANEY
Naval War College

Russett, Bruce M. and Stepan, Alfred, eds. *Military Force and American Society*. New York: Harper and Row, 1973. 371pp.

To put it simply this is a book which serious students of international relations and military affairs will want to buy and keep in their personal libraries. It consists of five articles and an annotated research bibliography of some 175 pages.

In "A Personal Statement," Army Maj. James S. Dickey argues cogently that there exists a "... need for continuous review of the army's missions with a view toward reducing, wherever possible, their social and political impact" (p. 32). Dickey is upset—and with good reason—by the number of clearly nonmilitary assignments and missions entrusted to the military in recent years. While Dickey's essay is largely confined to this principal point of the need to insure that the military is responsible for *military* missions, he raises a number of other, equally intriguing, questions. For example, Dickey believes that the Army should allow its officers to resign

for cause when they believe that their duties clash with their Constitutional loyalty. Such an issue, of course, deserves extended treatment, but Dickey has introduced the question well.

A second essay, "The New Military Professionalism," by C.L. Abercrombie, III and Army Maj. R.H. Alcalá, is a study of service school instructional periods and of service professional journals. The chief finding is that today's professional soldier is becoming increasingly more involved in political matters. I have no quarrel with the quantitative methodology used in this essay, but I am not at all persuaded that the authors ever came to grips with what they mean by "political." In fact, as I read the essay, it seems as though the authors have tried almost desperately to segregate supposedly "military" from supposedly "political" matters—something very hard to do in theory and (it seems to me, at least) impossible to do in practice.

In a third article, Jong Ryool Lee contends that "... a high defense priority is likely to lead to increased foreign commitments and to hurt sound economic growth as well" (p. 62). In fact, the article deserves a lengthy treatment, both because of its conclusions and because of its quantitative techniques (chiefly, multidimensional scaling and factor analysis). The author has marshaled a great number of data, and he uses them convincingly—except in the case of his impressions of national needs as perceived by Presidents. The use of content analysis to judge such matters seems to me to be highly unreliable if only because a difference often exists between what decision-makers say the policy is (or, declaratory policy) and what policy *really is* (or, the actual policy). Content analysis simply cannot provide for this, and, on this count, I think the article—which is otherwise absorbing—begins to falter.

Wayne Moyer's article is an effort to use multiple-regression analysis (and

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similar methods) to assess the performance of Congressmen in the area of defense matters. Moyer's hypothesis is that "ideological factors" determine House voting on defense questions and that constituency and "idiosyncratic factors" are of only secondary importance. The evidence presented is convincing, but, again, I am not persuaded that enough attention has been given to the terms around which so much of the study revolves. It may seem disputatious, but it appears as if Moyer has amply demonstrated *something* (although precisely what escapes me because of his failure to be clear about words which themselves resist clear definitions).

Douglas Rosenberg's "Arms and the American Way" is a stimulating essay. If the three preceding articles attempt to achieve mathematical clarity about issues, Rosenberg's essay bravely explores one of the haziest areas in contemporary military affairs scholarship: What is the relationship between the national myth and the national might? It is intriguing that an essay of the type written by Rosenberg appears in a book the bulk of which is quantitatively oriented. Only very rarely does one find in military affairs scholarship reference to such concepts as political culture, the myth, and the noble lie; it sometimes seems as if students of military affairs want to close themselves off from consideration of all the great questions in Western civilization. In fact, it may only be in the heat of battle that someone may find that as men have lived and thought as civilians, so will they fight as soldiers.

Rosenberg and Major Alcalá have prepared one of the best research bibliographies I have seen. The bibliography runs about 175 pages and contains more than 2,500 entries, cross-referenced. The bibliography is organized by categories, which are in turn subdivided. For example, if a student at a service (or civilian) college wishes to investigate or

research the topic, "The Military Mind," he will find in this bibliography a separate subheading just for that topic (which includes about 50 entries). It is a remarkably comprehensive bibliography—even including entries from such sources as *Berkeley Tribe*, *Black Panther*, and *Village Voice*. This excellent list of sources should be of great value to military instructors, authors, staff officers—and to anyone with a serious interest in military affairs and international relations. It alone is easily worth the price of the book.

In short, the entire collection is a valuable addition to the literature. It is well worth a close reading, and well worth, too, the price of purchase.

JAMES H. TONER
University of Notre Dame

Savell, Isabelle K. *Wine and Bitters: An Account of the Meetings in 1783 at Tappan, N.Y. and Aboard H.M.S. Perseverance, Between George Washington and Sir Guy Carleton, Commanding Generals of American and British Forces at the Close of the American Revolution*. New York: Historical Society of Rockland County, Publishing Center for Cultural Resources, 1975. 60pp.

This slim, readable monograph is an excellent example of what good local history can be. Isabelle K. Savell and the Rockland County Historical Society provide us with a clear, well-researched account of "the only time that the military leaders of the conflict . . . met in peace and on an equal footing." The time was 6 and 7 May 1783; the place, Tappan, N.Y., and on board H.M.S. *Perseverance*, anchored in the Hudson off Sneden's Landing. The subject of the meetings—when Washington served his guest wine and bitters—was the details of the British withdrawal from New York City. As the author says, the conference sessions resulted in little of substance, for Carleton was uncertain of

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his orders from London and, in any case, he was too short of vessels to complete the evacuation for 6 months. Yet the protocol displayed was of the highest significance. Great Britain, represented by Sir Guy, "accorded to the commanding general of an independent United States of America, all the honors due a sovereign power."

PROFESSOR DON HIGGINBOTHAM
U.S. Military Academy

Stivers, Reuben Elmore. *Privateers & Volunteers, The Men and Women of Our Reserve Naval Forces, 1766 to 1866*. Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 1975. 397pp., Appendices.

In this volume, Reuben Elmore Stivers has attempted to provide a history of America's irregular naval forces—forces which he believes to have had a history distinct from that of the professional navy. His dual theme is first, that the efforts of naval volunteers, usually enlisted for the duration of a crisis, made a significant contribution to America's naval prowess in three wars—the American Revolution, the War of 1812, and the Civil War—and second, that these volunteers were "the predecessors of the modern, uniformed, naval force that supplements the U.S. Navy" today. The book apparently is intended to inspire enthusiasm for today's U.S. Naval Reserve among an audience of general readers. As a result, it is not as thoroughly objective as it might be and it suffers from Stivers' insistence that all irregular naval forces of whatever character or motivation be labeled "naval reservists."

Rather than explore the century-long debate between the proponents of a regular navy on the European model and those of a militia navy founded on the minuteman concept, Stivers has chosen instead to write a somewhat glamorized compendium of the contributions made by "privateers and volunteers" from colonial days through the

Civil War. While on the one hand he ridicules the opponents of naval expansion, such as Thomas Jefferson (whose ideas are described as "ill-conceived"), he praises their arguments in favor of a reserve naval force. He finds himself in such a dilemma because whereas Jefferson saw a militia navy as an *alternative* to a regular naval force, Stivers sees it only in its modern context as a *supplement* to the regular navy. Unable to accept the essentially anti-navy viewpoint of the proponents of a militia navy, Stivers solves his dilemma by relegating Jefferson's important proposals to a footnote while concentrating instead on the more glamorous achievements of privateers in the War of 1812.

Stivers claims that the privateersmen in both the American Revolution and the War of 1812 were motivated by patriotism rather than by pecuniary incentives. While this may have been true in many cases, he offers no quantitative corroboration for statements like: "their sole objective" was "to fight the enemy." The privateersmen are depicted as being unable to resist attacking British men-of-war because of their ferocious hatred of Englishmen, and of fighting with "a spirited romanticism" more appropriate to the pages of a Kenneth Roberts novel than to a scholarly work of naval history. In describing a confrontation between an American privateer, the *General Armstrong*, and a British man-of-war (which took place, it should be noted, only because the man-of-war had disguised herself as a merchantman), Stivers writes that "The British cries of 'no quarter' gradually changed to death gurgles and bleating cries for mercy." Perhaps his most serious overstatement is his offhand claim that America "won" the War of 1812.

The much longer section on the Civil War is better, though constant references to "naval reservists" (even when the subject is a gang of unruly conscript soldiers) strain the limits of credulity. 20

Moreover, the large percentage of volunteers in the Civil War navy, especially on the western rivers, makes it difficult to keep the history of the volunteer navy distinct from that of the navy proper. Stivers therefore contents himself with describing some of the more heroic exploits of the naval forces and then relating the fact that x percent of the participants were "naval reservists," i.e., volunteers.

It is praiseworthy that Stivers has recognized the inestimable contributions of America's irregular naval forces during the Nation's first century, and he is to be commended for challenging A.T. Mahan's claim that the privateers did not affect the outcome of the War of 1812, an assertion which British records clearly indicate was false. But it is unfortunate that his desire to "provide some enlightenment for those politicians and regular navy officers who are every day struggling with policy concerning the U.S. Naval Reserve" led him to adopt a lobbyist's subjectivity toward his subject.

CRAIG SYMONDS
University of Florida

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. *The Arms Trade with the Third World*. Rev. and abr. ed. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1975. 362pp.

This book is an impressive collection of facts and figures regarding the sale of arms to the Third World. It is mistitled because its main concern is only with trade involving major weapons and not small arms. Major weapons are defined as aircraft, naval vessels, armored fighting vehicles, and missiles. Consideration of small arms was omitted because "information about the transfers of these weapons is fragmentary and unreliable." Unfortunately, Third World military capabilities and limitations cannot be properly considered without data on the small arms trade.

However, the magnitude of this deficiency in the treatment of the topic is quantified for those who find solace in numbers. The trade figures for major weapons "cover just under half the total trade in military equipment" with Third World nations. If one still cares to pursue the topic of "Arms Trade," one will find an interesting and informative discussion on less than half the arms traded with the Third World.

Nevertheless, the book is well organized and lends itself to ready reference. Part I identifies the general features of arms trade and provides an introduction and overview of what follows. This is perhaps the most informative section. Realizing the book's overall limitations, Part I will suffice for those whose time is limited.

Part II identifies the major suppliers of arms to the Third World; namely, the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and the People's Republic of China. This part also examines the quality and quantity of arms traded, current trends of sales, and speculates on future possibilities and consequences. No conclusions are reached.

Part III examines the Third World recipients of the arms sales. The examination is organized along geographical lines as follows: Far East, Indian Subcontinent, Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa and South Africa, and Latin America. This part also treats domestic defense production in the Third World countries, for what it is worth.

Part IV discusses control of the arms trade and offers proposals concerning such trade. It is a recitation of suggested measures for the regulation of the arms trade since the end of the 19th century. The supporting discussion provides nothing new and the conclusions have all been offered before. What is not addressed is the inevitability of the problem. Until the basic economic principle of supply and demand is

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altered, trade, including arms, will continue.

F.A. HART

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. *World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1975*. Cambridge, Mass.: and London: MIT Press; Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1975. 618pp.

SIPRI is still a relative newcomer in the field of armaments and disarmament reporting. Their yearbooks go back to 1968-69, and since 1972 there has been an annual volume, six for the series so far.

The SIPRI Yearbook is at least as valuable to the professional military man as the International Institute for Strategic Studies' *Military Balance*. In some dimensions, explained below, it is even more useful.

Massive in size, the book is divided into part I, the year in review; part II, developments in world armaments; part III, advances in weapon technology; and part IV, developments in arms control and disarmament. Each part has chapters, replete with appendices and tables and diagrams, including much valuable statistical data and original documentation. For example, the recent UN agreed definition of aggression is reprinted as appendix 14F. Difficult-to-come-by data is given in profusion, as in appendix 15K which gives a summary of all important multilateral agreements on disarmament and a list of states that have signed and ratified each. A tabular list of all nuclear explosions between 1945 and 1974 is given at appendix 15B.

But, if that were all, it would not make the SIPRI Yearbook outstanding and unique—as it surely is for certain of its characteristics. Turn for example to chapter 11, entitled "Long-range Cruise Missiles," pp. 311-338. Here is not only an elaborate description of the tech-

nology behind cruise missile development but a sophisticated discussion of how miniaturization has

made possible what is essentially a new method for the accurate delivery of tactical or strategic weapons (conventional or nuclear) over long ranges, since cruise missiles can now be fitted with terminal guidance based on terrain matching and recognition, and remotely piloted vehicles with wide-band jam-proof communication links.

Then "terrain matching" and each of these other parts of the new developments is explained in full detail and in simple language. Because this kind of full exposition is given throughout the book, it is a very valuable text key to all kinds of military technology. The discussion of satellite photography and the degree of resolution obtainable is at a level far above the usual literature—and the book is full of such things.

Despite the hefty price, this book is well worth the price to any military man with a lively sense of intellectual curiosity or a need to know, on an informed basis, the most recent facts and figures on world weapons. Of course it has a bias—against arms and for disarmament. But that bias in no way interferes with its professional sense of what is relevant.

FREDERICK H. HARTMANN
Naval War College

Wegener, Edward. *The Soviet Naval Offensive*. Annapolis, Md.: United States Naval Institute, 1975. 134pp.

The key to this concise and orderly study is found in the first sentence of the preface: "The spectacular naval armament of the Soviet Union since World War II is an event of global political significance." The Soviet naval expansion is indeed spectacular; it is clearly global; and it gives every indication that it will, in retrospect, have been of transcendent political significance.

The whole book, and it is only a little more than a hundred pages long, is clear, factual, straightforward, and generally free of the emotional overtones that often cloud discussion of these matters.

As well or better than any I have encountered, Admiral Wegener manages in a few pages to get past the problems of terminology—naval power, mastery of the sea, seapower, etc.—without getting bogged down in hairsplitting or straining at too precise a definition. This may, in part, be due to clear thinking in the original German text and, in part, perhaps the greater part, to an uncommonly fine English translation by Henning Wegener.

With first an adequate recognition of modern technology, including nuclear propulsion and weapons, and an appreciation of Russian attitudes toward navies under the Czars and the Soviet attitudes in the Stalin period, the author proceeds to the evolving Soviet concepts and actions with respect both to the peripheral seas and the open oceans.

There are two cracking good chapters, one on the role of Soviet naval forces in peacetime and one on Soviet naval forces in the future. Then Admiral Wegener concludes with a discussion of the two naval strategic concepts, saying that "on both sides [United States and Soviet], the overall conceptions have matured only fairly recently. The rivalry for mastery of the oceans has only just started. In the process, the Soviet Union is likely to arm itself more quickly than the West."

By and large, this is an excellent primer for the understanding of the basic problem facing the United States. Most USN officers probably have an intuitive (if sometimes vague) understanding of this situation. For them this is a good and easy way to help bring order to their thinking. I do wish there were some way to get free copies to members of the Armed Forces and Appropriations Committees of the

Congress (and to their staffs) and to journalists and commentators who apparently shape so much of our national attitudes. If these men were to take an hour to read this short book, it might provide a context within which the naval budget requests would make more sense for the future health of the United States and Western society.

J.C. WYLIE

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

Whiting, Allen S. *The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975. 299pp.

Allen Whiting is best known for his definitive work on China's entry into the Korean war, *China Crosses the Yalu*. While drawing on this previous work, Whiting more importantly draws on his service in the State Department from 1961 to 1966 as Director of the Office of Research and Analysis. He also served as the American representative in Hong Kong (1966-1968). Currently he is Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan's Center for Chinese Studies.

The author seeks to delineate Chinese politico-military policy with respect to perceived foreign threats and uses the Sino-Indian clash of 1962 as the primary example. Whiting conducts a day-by-day examination of this conflict, concentrating on the period January to November. By generalizing on his findings, substantiated by the Korean and Indochinese conflicts, he arrives at a "calculus of deterrence" which he defines as the "attempt to infer what general strategy underlies persistent patterns of behavior aimed at persuading a perceived opponent that the costs of his continuing conflictual activity will eventually prove unacceptable to him because of the Chinese response."

Political scientist's jargon aside, Whiting attempts to establish a scale by which the validity of China's deterrent

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moves may be measured. Unfortunately, he fails in this attempt for two reasons.

The first and more general of these reasons is the difficulty in accounting for the subjectivity of the human element in decisionmaking. How does one quantify a personality trait? How can the mood or temper of a political leader be particularized? These are examples of questions that Professor Whiting's "calculus" cannot allow for. The second reason is more specific: the lack of timely information about decision-making in the People's Republic of China. The author is aware of both of these problems. He attempts to overcome them by utilizing the maximum possible sample of information about the Chinese polity.

The Sino-Indian conflict did not result from a sudden move by China. Whiting briefly sketches the murky history of the Himalayan border. This border was based on disputed treaties and arbitrary definitions; it ran through the highest and some of the most barren territory in the world. The Chinese argued that the border followed the foothills on the Indian side of the Himalayas. India averred that the border was defined by the crest of the mountains.

Negotiations between the two countries were held during the 1950's and as late as September 1962, after armed clashes had already occurred. These talks were inconclusive. The situation was exacerbated by China's construction of a road through part of the disputed territory in 1959-1961.

Nonetheless, China was more conciliatory toward compromise than was India. Whiting discusses at length Prime Minister Nehru's intransigence, resulting from considerations of India's domestic politics. In fact, in late 1961 the Indian Army began executing a "forward policy." That is, patrols and bases were pushed into and beyond the disputed territory.

China responded both diplomatically

and militarily. Efforts were made to negotiate with India and army forces were greatly strengthened in the region. Thus, when in October 1962 China launched a military attack in the area, it was with forces which outnumbered the Indian units by 5 to 1 and which were vastly superior in firepower and supply.

The Indian forces were routed. For instance, no Chinese were taken prisoner while there were almost 4,000 Indian POW's. The Chinese forces quickly reached a position from which they could sweep into the Assam Plain; then, they unilaterally withdrew to positions along the border. China occupied no territory it had not claimed prior to the outbreak of the fighting. The author describes this unilateral pullback as "unprecedented in modern times." He cites it as demonstrating China's carefully orchestrated use of military force as a tool of diplomacy.

However, Whiting believes the fact that military force was resorted to indicates its failure as a deterrent. Likewise, he believes that China's attempts to utilize military threats and troop movements as a deterrent in Korea failed in the face of MacArthur's insensitivity to these signals.

Whiting suggests that the deterrent effect of the Chinese Army was realized—and then only partially—in Indochina during the 1960's. He cites the presence of 50,000 Chinese troops in North Vietnam and the joint Chinese-North Vietnamese air defense network as signals which were effective in deterring the United States from such steps as invading north of the DMZ or bombing the Red River dikes. The author argues that the United States was significantly deterred by the threat of expanded Chinese military participation in the Indo-Chinese conflict.

This last point may be debatable; the author does not pretend to have investigated thoroughly the American decisionmaking process of the period. However, what is most questionable about

this book is the attempt to delineate a Chinese "calculus of deterrence" through quantitative analysis of Chinese official statements and press releases. The sample taken is too small; what is omitted or not available may alter or negate the results of the analysis.

The conclusions are unexceptional. Whiting avers that Chinese decision-making in foreign policy is basically rationalistic and that China makes extensive use of civil and military signals prior to taking military action. Whiting also believes that China overestimates collusion between perceived enemies. Thus, in 1962 China incorrectly believed India to be acting in close concert with the United States in pursuing the "forward strategy." In fact, American aid—apart from scattered CIA involvement—came only after armed conflict had begun.

Whiting's most significant finding is the close intertwining of the foreign

policy process with internal conditions in China. Thus, during the chaotic aftermath of the "Great Leap Forward" in 1960-1962, the Chinese leaders assumed that their perceived enemies would take advantage of their weakness. Hence, China's own foreign posture became more militaristic; recourse to military action was considered more probable.

This book is valuable chiefly for its description of the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict. The author also writes authoritatively about the Indo-Chinese war. Despite the invalidity of the proffered "calculus," Professor Whiting has written an important book. However, the reader must work through the unsuccessful attempts at generalization and systemization to find a timely and perceptive description of the use of military force in the formulation and execution of Chinese foreign policy.

BERNARD D. COLE
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

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