

1975

## Book Review

The U.S. Naval War College


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## PROFESSIONAL READING

Gross, Feliks. *The Revolutionary Party: Essays in the Sociology of Politics*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. 280p.

Were I to seek insight into the complex world of radical politics, Feliks Gross' collection of essays, *The Revolutionary Party*, would appear perfectly suited. Here, one might guess from the title and a brief look at the table of contents, is a study of the structural patterns, loyalties, values, and goals which almost daily fill front pages with terrorist violence or the fall of an unpopular government.

Unfortunately, such is not the case. *The Revolutionary Party* is written along historical lines, focusing first on the development of the political party (revolutionary and otherwise) from Rome to 18th century France to the underground forces of the Second World War. This approach makes for interesting reading but, at the same time, leaves something to be desired if one's primary interest lies with current events. The Palestine Liberation Organization, for example, receives mention on but one page, and the IRA, subject of two paragraphs, is discussed only in terms of the earning power of its average member! In contrast, the Polish underground of World War II is the focal point of several of Dr. Gross' essays.

The fact that *The Revolutionary Party* does not address the subject matter in a way one would expect does not, however, entirely condemn it. Dr. Gross has used his examples to take a broad

look at the problem, discussing in turn the origins, dynamics, ideologies, and tactics of various party types without delving into the specifics of individual movements. Perhaps he has made use of the historical rationale: by avoiding specific and currently volatile subjects, one can also avoid much of the prejudice in discussing the issues involved. His intent notwithstanding, Dr. Gross' wealth of structural diagrams and models could have been of much greater value to both the political sociologist and general reader if he had made a greater effort to identify them with modern, currently active parties.

While each of the essays appearing in *The Revolutionary Party* are competent works in themselves, together they present a less than satisfying whole. Many of the essays deal with similar topics and tend to be a bit redundant. Further, the separate units do not always add to the total topic of the book. The section devoted to political assassination is certainly informative as to the goals and methods of mass genocide, selected political targets, et cetera, but never satisfactorily links the assassination type to a type of party or party goal. Neither does it comment on why a party would resort to such tactics. The last three essays or chapters are particularly guilty and almost seem to be in the wrong book.

With his book's title, Dr. Gross has capitalized on the recent fascination of the American public with political radicals, underground movements, and revolution, but in *The Revolutionary Party*

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the accent is firmly on "party" and on the sociology of political organization. He has, I think, written an interesting book, failing largely in that it is directed at too narrow an audience, an audience where the general reader, still seeking insight into the world of radical politics, feels left out.

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Hollick, Ann L. and Osgood, Robert E. *New Era of Ocean Politics*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974. 131p.

Borgese, Elisabeth Mann. *Pacem in Mari-bus*. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1972. 382p.

The concepts of seapower and command of the sea are enshrined as indispensable fundamentals in the orthodoxy of naval thought. Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett provided their historical and philosophical justifications. These rest on three assumptions about the characteristics of the sea: (1) the sea cannot be reduced to possession; (2) own or enemy forces cannot subsist upon the sea; and (3) the sole positive value of the sea is that of a medium of communication.

In the last 30 years technological and political developments have severely challenged each of these three assumptions. Offshore oil rigs and deep sea mining prove that today the sea can very well be reduced to possession. The development of nuclear power and other technological advances permits naval forces to remain at sea for indefinite periods. The sea still remains a valuable medium of communication, but man's ability to use the sea in a variety of ways has made it intrinsically valuable for the first time in history.

Since the characteristics of the sea have changed significantly in the last 30 years, it behooves naval officers to become aware of the implications of

these changes. But implications are only conclusions drawn from a complicated mass of evidence embracing both technical and nontechnical or political factors. These political factors fall into what is now known as the area of ocean politics, a most pervasive and complex field which is literally as broad as the ocean itself.

With consummate skill, Ann Hollick in *New Era of Ocean Politics* explains the basic issues of ocean politics in terms of competing interests, each with valid arguments and positions, which are frequently in conflict with each other. She discusses the issues in terms of exploitation of the seabed, the breadth of the territorial sea, transit rights through straits, conservation and allocation of fisheries, and, finally, pollution. A common factor to all of these issues is the allocation of ocean space.

In reviewing competing national and transnational interests, she describes what she perceives as the sometimes Byzantine politics of the U.S. Government and its competing bureaucratic baronies. Her review of the processes of international negotiations and national policymaking is illuminating as well as succinct.

Robert E. Osgood completes this Johns Hopkins Study in International Affairs by reviewing United States' security interests in the use of the four major zones of ocean space: the seabed, the subsurface, the surface, and the superjacent air. He concludes his review of "U.S. Security Interests in Ocean Law" with a discussion of the possible advantages of a comprehensive law of the sea treaty: (1) uniformity—there would be no need to make *ad hoc* arrangements with the various littoral states; (2) bargaining position—the United States can make concessions in some areas in order to ensure transit rights; and (3) the political advantage of a resolution of conflicting interests in one treaty applicable to all states.

An entirely different approach is

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taken in the collection, *Pacem in Mari-bus*, edited by Elisabeth Mann Borgese. These articles were originally produced by the *Pacem in Mari-bus* Convocation in Malta in 1970. Their common thread is a deep concern for the establishment of an international regime to regulate and to exploit the resources of the sea for the benefit of all of mankind. To this end, Mrs. Borgese proposes to internationalize ocean resources in a draft treaty which she includes in the appendix.

The normative internationalists see the central problem of ocean politics as the just distribution and rational utilization of the resources of the sea. They are all too aware that technology has produced the means to reduce the ocean to possession of states or individuals, but they are also aware that this has not yet occurred, which gives them a sense of urgency in the establishment of a rational regime.

Even though their ideas may strike some as utopian and far out, they have succeeded in raising some fundamental questions which must be addressed, no matter what conclusions one reaches, such as: who or what is to have dominion over and possession of the wealth of the oceans and on what terms? The problems they discuss cannot be ignored, especially by professional naval officers whose operational environment is the air above the sea, the subsurface and the sea itself.

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Kaplan, Morton A., ed. *NATO and Dissuasion*. Chicago: University of Chicago Center for Policy Study, 1974. 150p.

It is a commonplace by now that NATO has paid too much attention to its deterrent strategy at the expense of its war-fighting strategy and to the consequent detriment of both. Morton

Kaplan and associates at the Chicago Center for Policy Study have, with this volume, proposed a new strategy to bridge NATO's gap between deterrence and war-fighting strategies. The Kaplan group's new strategy is called "dissuasion" and has three major elements. First, noting the vulnerability and the arguable character of such weapons systems as Pershing missiles and quick reaction aircraft capable of delivering nuclear warheads into the western Soviet Union, Kaplan's group suggests withdrawing them some distance to decrease both vulnerability and provocative invitation to Warsaw Pact strikes. Secondly, they advocate dissuasion of Warsaw Pact forces from participation in any aggressive move against the NATO countries by threatening the East European countries with drastic nuclear punishment and—in the dully menacing language of strategic studies—"high collateral damage" if those countries contribute to a Soviet-led or Soviet-directed attack. Thirdly, in the event that conventional warfare, once begun, should not go well for NATO and that the United States, Great Britain and France should prove unwilling to use strategic nuclear weapons for the sake of NATO's integrity, the authors propose a final component of the strategy, called "quick transfer," in which an unspecified number of fully armed Polaris submarines would be turned over to the NATO country or countries prepared to use them as last ditch deterrent or punishment against Warsaw Pact forces, including the Soviet Union. To be effectuated in any contingency, that last proposal would require pre-training of crews from the NATO countries that might wish to resort to the measure someday.

There are serious criticisms of the strategies proposed. The first, made repeatedly by writers from European nations, is that Kaplan and his associates overestimate the freedom of decision left to the Warsaw Pact nations. Those

nations could not dissociate themselves from a Soviet initiative no matter what the cost, these writers say. Worse, the proposal to remove Pershing missiles and quick reaction aircraft from forward positions may weaken the credibility of American commitment to use nuclear weapons in defense of the NATO countries and would force precisely the kind of political accommodation to Soviet pressures—the so-called Findlandization of Europe—that NATO planners most wish to avoid. As for the quick transfer idea, the critics agree that the only country interested in assuming the responsibility of taking over and perhaps using such weapons as Polaris submarines would be Germany, and that such weapons in the hands of the Germans—even prospectively in their hands—would destabilize all of Europe, East and West, including the Soviet Union, and would therefore be not only unacceptable but dangerous strategy.

Readers of this volume will have to decide for themselves the ultimate value of the strategy of dissuasion. Surely they will be able to agree, as do all the writers represented in the volume, that NATO's problems are great and urgent. But many assumptions and arguments in the book depend on subjective appraisals of important elements: political and military relations among the Warsaw Pact countries, the balance and capabilities of conventional forces in Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the ambiguous nature and implications of nuclear doctrine and deployment amidst these other complications. Each reader's personal estimate of such factors will influence his assessment of the proposed strategic innovations.

There is one sign of hope. In the last year, despite the failure of the much heralded Year of Europe, the problems of continental politics and defense have received an increasingly high level of attention. One recent Undersecretary of State has written that in the United States, contrary to popular belief,

policy trickles upward rather than trickling, or flowing, downward. If that is so, then to the extent that real contributions to an improved NATO strategy and force can come from the United States, a new and improved era of strategy and policy in NATO is at hand.

PROFESSOR THOMAS H. ETZOLD  
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Sarkesian, Sam C. *The Professional Army Officer in a Changing Society*. Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1975. 268p.

Sam C. Sarkesian's book *The Professional Army Officer in a Changing Society* leaves the reader with mixed feelings of respect and regret. Formerly a career Army officer and now a professor of sociology at Loyola University of Chicago, Mr. Sarkesian possesses both the experience and perceptiveness that produce interesting and penetrating insights into contemporary service life. His major point that the Army must not drift off into isolation from today's society but instead must insure a role for itself that will earn respect from that society and attract dedicated new officers is one that is certainly well taken.

Unfortunately, however, the book is flawed in several respects. The least of these flaws, some nagging distractions, are several minor factual errors. To name but a few, Sarkesian refers to an important officer record form (Form 66) that is no longer employed; he describes the mechanics of an efficiency report form that was last used in 1972; he appears to equate the CGSC and War College, two different levels of Army schooling; he has lieutenant colonels serving on battalion staffs; in discussing below the zone promotions, his percentage figures are quite incorrect; he asserts that 600 officers each year attend senior service college, double the actual number; in two slips that are difficult to understand, an old trooper gives an incorrect figure for monthly

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jump pay, and as a former instructor at West Point uses "West Point Military Academy," a term that would be reserved for lay articles.

More disturbing are the questionable assertions that the "hard core professionals," as junior officers, are the West Point graduates and that "the top levels are dominated by academy-trained officers." This reviewer's experiences would not support the first contention, and statistics and organization charts would not seem to support the second. About 20 percent of the book deals with West Point and its graduates, thus adding to the more than adequate coverage on this subject. One begins to wonder if it is not perhaps time that Annapolis or the Air Force Academy take its turn.

The final weakness of the book is perhaps unavoidable and Sarkesian acknowledges it in his epilog. His active duty ended in 1968, and the manifold changes of disengagement from Vietnam and conversion to an all-volunteer force lessen the value of his perceptions as an insider. The additional changes, both within the Army and in American so-

ciety and during the period between the writing of the book and its appearance in the bookstores, compound the problem. It is even less clear now, under the impact of recession, rising unemployment, and reduced force levels, whether the military is in any real danger of isolating itself from society or whether it will have serious difficulties in attracting well qualified officers and men. The basic question appears to be: Is what we have seen been just another swing of the pendulum or is society indeed moving off in a new direction? If the former, books such as this lose their relevance.

For all the criticism, there is no question that this book is worth reading and belongs on the shelf of the concerned professional soldier. It is to be hoped that Sarkesian, having now written his avowedly descriptive book, will wait perhaps a year or so to let the volunteer Army settle in a bit and will then publish an unabashedly prescriptive work to place on the shelf beside it.

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