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Book Reviews


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PROFESSIONAL READING

Alden, John D. and Holm, Ed. *The American Steel Navy: a Photographic History of the U.S. Navy from the Introduction of the Steel Hull in 1883 to the Cruise of the Great White Fleet, 1907-1909*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press; New York: American Heritage Press, 1972. 396p.

In writing the introduction to a famous collection of photographs, Carl Sandburg remarked that the visual record was "a camera testament, a drama of the grand canyon of humanity, an epic . . ." Looking into the portraits and snapshots of both great and ordinary men, he understood their personalities and feelings in the moment that had been recorded on film. "Often the faces speak," he said, "what words can never say. Some tell of eternity and others only the latest tattlings."

So it is with this excellent collection of photographs compiled by Alden and Holm. Within these pages one can find views of the warships that served in the U.S. Navy between 1883 and 1909 and also a great deal about the men who manned these ships, the condition of their lives, and the world in which they lived.

Here one can see, on board the Presidential yacht, the earnest face of "Fighting Bob" Evans as he received final instructions for the Great White Fleet from Theodore Roosevelt. The reader looks in on a meeting of the General Board in a mapstrewn room at the Naval War College, the reading of regulations to a ship's company at sea under sail, divine services

on the deck of the battleship *Texas*, and the addition of a tattoo to an already fully decorated sailor. The glimpses of a seaman's life range from the galley and sickbay to "Sharkey" Smith's victorious boxing match on the deck of *Oregon*. Some faces reflect the painful regimentation of posed photographs, while others, like the impish grin of an apprentice boy in *Brooklyn*, echo the vitality of life across the decades.

The ship portraits by famous photographers such as Enrique Muller and E.H. Hart are well represented, along with views depicting the important naval events of the era: the Samoan Hurricane, the *Bennington* disaster, the sinking of the *Maine*, the Spanish-American War, and the cruise of the Great White Fleet.

Beautifully bound and well laid out, the book is organized into three major sections: "Ships of the American Steel Navy," illustrations of all the major ships; "Forging a Modern Steel Navy," a consideration of construction and repair, arms, engineering, communications, command, and the Shore Establishment; and "Men and Operations of the American Steel Navy." Following the main portion of the book is a 30-page appendix devoted to reference material: biographical sketches and portraits of important individuals, technical data, a typical shipboard daily routine, a glossary of terms, and 50 line drawing profiles of the major warship classes by Arthur D. Baker III.

Throughout the book great attention has been paid to technical details, ship design, and construction. In this regard,

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naval buffs will find the book of great interest. On the photographic side, the work is excellent. With the exception of a misplaced caption (pp.42-43), and the lack of an illustration of *Dewey* drydock, little more can be asked. Certainly the tow of that mammoth floating drydock from the east coast to the Philippines in 1906 was one of the great feats of seamanship in the era.

The text which accompanies the photographs provides an adequate and generally accurate description of events. It is focused on technical matters and operational details. In this sphere it is excellent and well written, but the text provides little new insight into a complex era. There seems to be little appreciation for these years as seminal ones in a time of transition. This was a period of change in all aspects of the naval profession, and the new trends were characteristically reflected in the professional controversies of the day. In some areas the text omits discussion of some of these major debates. For instance, a controversy in training and education raged through this period. On one side were those who advocated training apprentices at sea under sail and steam; on the other side were those who promoted military training ashore in marching platoons. At the same time, the leaders of educational reform led by Stephen B. Luce promoted abstract, strategical education and practical application of theory. Others advocated additional technical training. The issue and the viewpoint expressed in this controversy were reflected time and again in nearly every area of the profession from ship construction and strategy to organization.

The battleship *North Dakota* is completely omitted, along with the violent controversy over her design instigated by Albert L. Key and William S. Sims at the time of the Great White Fleet's cruise. The "Key Board" and the reorganization attempts during the administration of Theodore Roosevelt marked

the end of this era and planted the seed for the beginning of a new period in naval management. This reviewer cannot agree with the authors' dismissal of the reform effort under Roosevelt and Taft (p. 242). The work of the Moody Board in 1909, the refinements to its recommendations, and the establishment of the "Aid" system by Secretary Meyer culminated in the creation of the Chief of Naval Operations in 1915. The drive for reform in the Navy Department continued throughout the period considered by this book. The early attempts and innovations in organization may have faltered, but they can hardly be considered "minimal or even regressive." Rather they were the foundation stones for an organization that was still being constructed in 1966 and is in use today.

In spite of these shortcomings, the book as a whole is valuable and worthwhile. With the authors, one hopes that its publication will encourage the discovery and preservation of additional photographic records of this type. Providing more than a mere gratification for the details of mechanical gadgetry, the selection of these photographs demonstrates a sympathetic appreciation and understanding of the Navy. Although concentrating on the forms of a passing phase, they succeed in presenting some of the eternal elements in naval life.

JOHN B. HATTENDORF
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Engle, Louise and Paananen, Lauri. *The Winter War: the Russo-Finnish Conflict, 1939-40*. New York: Scribner, 1973. 176p.

During recent years revisionist historians and politicians in Finland have come to view the two conflicts between Finland and Russia in 1939-1940 (the Winter War) and 1941-1944 (the Continuation War) as the consequence of a Finnish failure to understand the Soviet

Union's difficult geopolitical and military situation in the late 1930's and 1940's. This interpretation of Finnish history, which runs counter to the opinion of most historians, was most forcefully stated by Finnish President Urho Kekkonen's address at Helsinki in April 1973 on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Russian-Finnish mutual assistance and friendship treaty (1948). President Kekkonen's new version of Finnish history occasioned some surprised reactions in the Finnish press and some resentment on the part of many Finns.

But the older view cherished by most Finns is given added support by Louise Engle and Lauri Paananen in their new book *The Winter War*, which reviews the course of the 1939-1940 war and sets it in the context of the Russian demands which preceded the opening of the war in November 1939. A reading of their book leaves no doubt that the Soviet Union's invasion was a blatant and ruthless violation of Finland's sovereignty predicated upon flimsy excuses and a staged border incident.

In their analysis of the war, Engle and Paananen show how the tiny Finnish army, under Field Marshal Carl Gustav Mannerheim, was able to stymie and terrorize the Russian attacking forces of 1.5 million men and kill 1 million of them in 105 days (both figures confirmed by Nikita Khrushchev in *Khrushchev Remembers*, published in 1970). The Russians, under General Meretskov, had expected to win the war in no more than 10 or 12 days and sent their badly trained and poorly equipped forces to the Karelian front in summer uniforms and with minimum logistic support. The Finns fought bravely and stubbornly, with all the perseverance suggested in the Finnish word *sisu* (guts), and in the end were not militarily defeated. Only when it became clear that there was to be no meaningful military aid from other nations (who supplied reams of sympathetic messages

and righteous denunciations of the Soviet Union) and that there was no hope of stalling the Russians forever did the Finns sign a truce in March 1940. For her magnificent defensive sacrifices, Finland was forced to give up to the Russians 10 percent of her land area (the home of 12 percent of her population), her military base at Hanko, her second largest city (Viipuri), her Arctic port and mines at Petsamo, and much of her industrial capacity in wood, chemicals, metals, and textiles. She also lost 25,000 dead and 55,000 wounded.

The book is admirably illustrated with photographs, maps, and some rather bittersweet cartoons of the period by Jussi Aarnio. In our present age of highly technological and impersonal warfare, it is intriguing to read of what a few thousand good men with meager arms and great patriotic fervor could do against a monstrosity large and seemingly irresistible military machine.

ROBERT C. STEENSMA
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Kirkpatrick, Lyman B., Jr. *The U.S. Intelligence Community: Foreign Policy and Domestic Activities*. New York: Hill and Wang. 212p.

The postwar rise in the involvement of the United States in worldwide intelligence operations is the subject of this tidy, reasonable, and balanced work by a former War College faculty member, Professor Lyman Kirkpatrick of Brown University.

The strength of the study rests in its moderation. As Kirkpatrick repeatedly points out, American intelligence operations grew up as a direct result of our increased international role in an era of "cold war." Intelligence, Kirkpatrick observes sagely, was but a new weapon brought on by the lessons of World War II and the exigencies of our postwar policies. Professor Kirkpatrick is also at pains to indicate, quite properly, that

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the development of the American intelligence community was in line with administration and congressional wishes; it would not have happened, otherwise. This is an important point to note, especially today when the furies of frustration reach out to indict and accuse the CIA and the FBI of lives independent of control. Nonetheless, the experienced Kirkpatrick is realistic and candid enough to recognize that authorization for an intelligence organization is one thing and implementation and control of operations is quite another. In fact, there is a refreshing implication, at least, that not all intelligence (especially covert) operations are brilliantly conceived and executed.

The book is grouped about seven basic chapters which simply and effectively detail the need, legal basis, organizational makeup, and the operations, at home and abroad, of the intelligence community, comprising principally the CIA, FBI, the various military intelligence services, and the National Security Agency.

The book describes with interest and fullness three prime examples of covert intelligence failures: the U-2 incident, the Bay of Pigs in Cuba, and, for good measure, the Vietnam operation known as "Phoenix" which sought to identify and remove the NLF infrastructure.

The book will be a primer for intelligence specialists, a revelation for novices, and a tribute to its author who has done a doubting American citizenry a public service with this forthright report on U.S. intelligence, warts and all.

R.F. DELANEY

Forrest Sherman Chair of Public Diplomacy

NWC

Price, Alfred. *Aircraft versus Submarine*. London: Kimber, 1973. 268p.

The author, Alfred Price, writes not as an interested layman or a military historian, but from the vantage of operational experience as an officer in

the Royal Air Force (American readers must remember that the RAF has the mission of long-range maritime patrol). Evidence of the author's expertise in electronic warfare and aircraft weapons can be found throughout the book. However, it should be stressed that *Aircraft versus Submarine* is eminently readable with sufficient explanation of both tactics and weapons to include the layman in its audience.

Our story commences in 1916 when two flying boats from the now defunct Austro-Hungarian naval air arm chanced upon the French submarine *Foucault*. After an initial iron bomb attack, the damaged submarine surfaced—a prudent move when in a minefield. To his horror, the French captain found his ship face to face with two angry flying machines. Following a few more attacks, the French scuttled their boat and became the first submarine victim to the flying machine. In the name of chivalry, the flying boats taxied up to the scene and allowed the crew to cling to the floats until rescuers arrived. However, each Austrian aircraft returned home with a humiliated French officer, a trophy of the victory.

Stories of light humor and keen insight abound throughout the volume. The progression of tactics comes under scrutiny in the following example. Early masochists devised a plan whereby a seemingly helpless seaplane would alight on the sea, baiting an enemy submarine to surface and take the cripple under fire. Meanwhile, a submerged submarine, in league with the aircraft, would maneuver to torpedo its gullible opponent. Today some flippant aviators may claim this "live worm" tactic to be a credible role for destroyers.

This reviewer would be remiss if he were to overemphasize sea stories in this review. The pattern of innovation in the ASW duel reveals the elements of a management case study. A crucial part in the World War II Battle of the Atlantic was played by the technocrats.

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The race between lower frequency radars (British) and passive receivers (German) resulted in a lost battle for the submarine. The challenge of wedding technology and tactics gave birth to a thought process which commands our attention today, systems analysis. Perhaps the words of Lord Blackett (scientific adviser to Britain's Coastal Command) in 1941 should be embossed on the backside of all Pentagon security badges or framed in each corridor.

One of the tasks of an Operational Research Section is to make possible at least an approach to a numerical estimate of the merits of a change-over from one device to another, by continual investigation of the actual performance of existing weapons, and by objective analysis of the likely performance of new ones . . .

In general, one might conclude that relatively too much scientific effort has been expended hitherto in the production of new devices and too little in the proper use of what we have got.

Unfortunately, Alfred Price seemed to tire of writing after 235 pages. His last chapter of less than 20 pages covers the period from 1945 through 1972. Devoting a paragraph to carrier borne aviation and two pages to helicopters, the author continues to emphasize the RAF role of patrol aviation at the expense of naval ASW aircraft.

Admittedly, security and classification begin to hamper the military writer as he approaches the present. Nonetheless, considerably more attention could have been devoted to the use of helos on destroyers, and the new capital ships of ASW, the Soviet's *Moskva*, the Royal Navy's through-deck cruiser *Invincible*, and the American sea control ship. Discussion of the interaction between seabed sonar systems and patrol aircraft was needed.

Finally, the author held out the perennial hope that science would wave

its wand and make the sea transparent with a "supersensor." We might just as well request some deity to part the waters of the Atlantic and leave all the submarines high and dry. The application of Lord Blackett's advice holds more promise.

In summary, *Aircraft versus Submarine* offers a fascinating and useful history of ASW aviation from which the reader can gain a valuable historical perspective. The book's shallow coverage of the current picture does not hamper the knowledgeable officer and fulfills the needs of the layman.

W.W. PRICE, III
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy

Summersell, Charles G., ed. *The Journal of George Townley Fullam*. University: The University of Alabama Press. 229p.

Few events in a nation's history can match the brutality and horror of that self-inflicted disaster, the civil war. The American "War Between the States" was no exception. Fought with the rudiments of technology that would mature in future wars (the ironclad, rifled gun, and submarine, to name a few), this semimodern war retained many of the romantic characteristics of an earlier age. Nowhere was this paradox more apparent than in the adventures of the commerce raider C.S.S. *Alabama*.

The Journal of George Townley Fullam, boarding officer of the *Alabama*, is not and was not written to be another of the many historical documentations of her cruise. Indeed, the account ends with the unresolved entry, "This afternoon our commander . . ." dated several days before the climactic confrontation with the U.S.S. *Kearsarge*. The *Journal* is, however, one man's record of the day to day life and labor aboard the most famous of Confederate war cruisers, and as such it succeeds well.

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Fullam, one of the first officers who signed on with hull #290, an alias the ship often used, begins his report with the deceptive departure of the vessel from the Laird Bros. shipyard in England on "trials" and follows her virtually around the world, faithfully recording the emotional reactions of men on a long and, at times, tedious voyage. The reader is led to understand that, in the eyes of the crew at least, the voyage was more of a pirate venture than the actions of a ship of war. The potential for combat was eagerly looked forward to by everyone on board, Fullam included, and the greatest disappointment to the crew during the entire cruise was apparently the inability to attack the ships in New York harbor due to a shortage of coal. Much of this may have been simple bravado, but in the only actual engagement of the *Alabama* outside her disastrous defeat off Cherbourg, that with the U.S.S. *Hatteras*, the crew of the raider performed well. "Everyone [was] delighted at the prospect of a fight," he writes. "The watch . . . of their own accord commenced preparing the guns," and during the actual combat ". . . our fellows peppering away as though the action depended on each individual."

A far more serious enemy of the

crew, as evidenced by Fullam, was the boredom of the long periods between prize captures. Apparently afraid of little, the tedium of shipboard life drove ever-increasing numbers of the ship's company to "jump ship" at any available port of call, all of which is recorded with painstaking detail from the desertion to the subsequent trial and sentence of the unfortunate sailor.

In addition to and, in my opinion, secondary to the accounts of life at sea are the records of *Alabama's* many captures. These are passed over as more or less routine by Fullam, but are extensively commented on by the editor, Charles Summersell. Expanding on the writings of Fullam, Summersell provides the reader with the background knowledge assumed by Fullam, as well as letters, official documents, and other material to substantiate the basic text.

At 21, George Townley Fullam provided a blend of thorough marine education and youthful enthusiasm. Charles Summersell has added to this meticulous scholarship to produce a book that should be a welcome addition to the library of any true lover of the sea.

J.P. BACHER
Ensign, U.S. Naval Reserve



When a book raises your spirit and inspires you with noble and courageous feelings, seek no other rule to judge the event by; it is good and made by a good workman.

Jean de la Bruyère