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*The Gorshkov articles represent a "window" into the planning offices of the Soviet Navy. Admiral Gorshkov speaks from a background of vast experience and from a position of authority. He presents a clear message that the Soviet Navy is no mere transitory phenomenon on the world's maritime stage.*

# THE MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE GORSHKOV ARTICLES

A research paper prepared for the  
Naval War College Strategy Study

by

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**Introduction.** The Gorshkov series represents 11 articles which appeared in *Morskoy Sbornik*, the Soviet *Naval Digest*, from 1972 into 1973.<sup>1</sup> The entire series was entitled "Navies in War and Peace" and consisted of 50,000 words of sustained, forceful prose. The author of the work is Adm. Sergey Georgievich Gorshkov<sup>2</sup> who, since 1956, has been the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy and who has reputedly enjoyed the trust and confidence of both Khrushchev and Brezhnev. He is the architect of the modern Soviet Navy and is, by this accomplishment alone, the most distinguished naval officer that Russia, the great landpower, has yet produced. Without a doubt the Gorshkov articles are by far the most significant and comprehensive pronouncement on seapower ever to come out of Russia. Because of their breadth, because of their authorship, because of their publication in the professional naval journal of the Soviet Navy, and because they have occurred at a time when historic shifts in the

distribution of naval and world power are in progress, these papers merit a most careful consideration.

The general title of the series and the subtitles listed below suggest the general content and comprehensive nature of the writings.

- [Navies in War and Peace] No subtitle (Ed.)
- Russia's Difficult Road to the Sea
- Into the Oceans on Behalf of Science
- The First World War
- The Soviet Navy
- The Building of the Navy (1928-1941)
- The Second World War
- The Soviet Navy in the Great Patriotic War
- The Basic Missions Executed by Navies in the Course of the Second World War
- Navies as a Weapon of the Aggressive Policy of the Imperialistic States in Peacetime
- Some Problems in Mastering the World Ocean

Gorshkov's announced purpose for publishing the series was to "foster the development in our officers of a unity of views on the role of navies under various historical conditions" and "to determine the trends and regularities in the role and place of navies in war, and also their peacetime use as an instrument of state policy."<sup>3</sup> It is an official interpretation of Russian naval history, and while it is by no means objective history, it serves admirably as a vehicle for Gorshkov's ideas. In his description of history and historical lessons, it becomes obvious that he intends to present modern analogies and that he wishes these to be abundantly clear. Throughout this book-length naval history, Gorshkov constantly reiterates the vital necessity for having large modern naval forces, both for use in war and in peace. Benefits deriving from such a navy have been great, penalties for not having such a navy severe. The tone of the articles is assertive, at times polemical; and while it is apparent that Gorshkov is under pressure from budget constraints, the army, and possibly SALT negotiators, he seems self-assured with the situation. He justifies a larger, more balanced navy by advancing, seemingly, every conceivable argument, including the protection of state interests and the requirements for a modern version of gunboat diplomacy. The articles provide a powerful rationale for expanded Soviet seapower that is often Mahanian in the force of its appeal and in its urgency.

Nevertheless, a search for the real reason *why* the series was written ultimately resolves into the question: "Is it announcement, or is it advocacy?" Is Gorshkov *announcing* that a new, long-term naval program to construct a larger, even more modern navy has already been approved? Is he then acting as the spokesman for this decision, providing explanation and rationale to support it? Or is he *advocating* a large and modern navy in an ongoing

defense debate in which substantial criticism of such a fleet exists? Is he then rebutting critics, arguing for a favorable, yet to be made decision on the size and role of the future Soviet Navy? The contention of this commentary is that Gorshkov is announcing a decision already taken. At the same time, he is using the series as a forum to rebut critics and the various arguments they have advanced. On basic questions he seems to be making authoritative pronouncements. Not only does he announce continued expansion of Soviet naval power, but he announces the continued growth of Soviet seapower in other areas—merchant marine, fishing fleet, oceanography, and even ocean mining and ocean exploitation in general. Accepting this "announcement" interpretation, the Gorshkov series is a significant forewarning of the future magnitude of the total Soviet maritime effort and of the challenge it represents to Western seapower.

An acknowledged Soviet custom calls for the most authoritative person available to treat comprehensively any important subject on which an official position has not been established previously. Ideally, this authority should be a professional man in a high official position. Admiral Gorshkov—a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, a Deputy Minister of Defense, and the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy—is admirably suited to deal with naval strategy. Therefore, while some of Gorshkov's conclusions are questionable and a bit contrived, they do reflect the Soviet Navy's official view of the lessons of history on seapower.

It is unlikely that Gorshkov established this official interpretation of history solely to justify larger appropriations for the navy or solely to preserve allocations at present levels, although these elements are present in the series. His routes for appropriations are through either the Politburo, the Cen-

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tral Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the General Staff, the Ministry of Defense, or the Council of Ministers or a combination of these. An appeal for appropriations through the pages of *Morskoy Sbornik* would not only be futile under the Soviet system, but unthinkable as well. Publication of the series seems to reflect a Soviet command desire to acquaint as many Soviet officers as possible with the official interpretation as the reasoning behind current and forthcoming naval developments.

The main idea, the constantly recurring theme in the Gorshkov series, is that the Soviet Union requires a large, modern, and powerful navy commensurate with her global interests, both in war and in peace. He provides what purports to be a historical review of Soviet naval power, reinterpreting history as necessary to support his view. This historical review contains numerous and intended modern-day analogies, each supporting his view that a large and modern navy is an essential power ingredient of the Soviet state. Once he has established the general requirement that such a navy is needed in war and peace, he then discusses Soviet naval requirements and the uses of naval power in war and peace in present and past contexts. Lesser themes recur sporadically throughout the series. But before examining this central idea, as well as the diffuse lesser themes, it is necessary to look first at the strategies and general compositions of the Soviet and United States Navies. The Gorshkov series, to be understood, must be interpreted in the framework of the differences in philosophy and historical development of the world's two most powerful navies.

**Differing Strategies.** Soviet naval strategy is defensive and deterrent.<sup>4</sup> It is a strategy of sea denial rather than sea control. It is a strategy reactive to our Navy, designed to prevent us from

accomplishing our mission. Their navy has traditionally been subordinated by landpower thinking Soviet generals.<sup>5</sup> This army-dominated thinking has traditionally assigned the Soviet Navy to an inferior, defensive role in direct or indirect support of the Soviet Army. Consistent with this thinking and with a defensive strategy, their major mission in war is to destroy or repulse our Navy should it attempt to approach the Soviet Union.<sup>6</sup> They have not included in their navy sea-control and projection capabilities such as aircraft carriers or any significant amphibious capabilities. Their capital ship, itself a sea-denial weapon, is the nuclear submarine, which they have constructed in quantity. Many of their ships and submarines are equipped with surface-to-surface missiles designed to destroy U.S. ships and deny them the use of the seas. In wartime the Soviets envision operating their ships within the range of land-based air cover, a condition that further commits them to a defensive posture. Nor do they have, even if air cover were available, either the overseas base structure or the at-sea distant-water support capabilities to permit sustained blue-water naval operations in wartime.

Soviet geographical constraints, of which Gorshkov reflects an acute awareness, have further oriented their navy to the strategic defensive. To protect their maritime frontiers, they have been forced—because of peculiarities of their geography—to fragment their navy into four fleets in peripheral seas. The Soviet Northern Fleet is stationed in the Barents Sea, while the other two European fleets are situated in the Baltic and Black Seas. They also maintain a permanent “squadron”<sup>7</sup> in the Mediterranean with the ships for this force drawn primarily from the Black Sea and Northern Fleets. Their fourth fleet—stationed over 5,000 miles away from their other fleets—is the Pacific Fleet located in the Sea of Japan. This geographic separation has forced each fleet

to be organized largely as an independent fleet since their geographic locations negate close mutual support.

Each separate fleet must also pass through interdictable straits to reach the open sea. The Northern Fleet must pass through the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap, the Baltic Fleet through the Danish Straits, the Black Sea Fleet through the Turkish Straits, the Mediterranean "Squadron" through the Sicilian Straits and Gibraltar, and the Pacific Fleet through straits leading from the Sea of Japan. These fleets are distant from the major world maritime routes which they must interdict if they are to deny an enemy use of the sea. Finally, the extreme northerly orientation of their country ensures hostile climatic conditions for their Northern, Baltic, and Pacific Fleets, with attendant problems of severe weather, closed harbors, ice, et cetera for significant parts of the year. In sum, a consistent landpower mentality and physical handicaps of geography have further inclined the Soviets toward a defensive, sea-denial strategy as opposed to an offensive, sea-control strategy.

U.S. naval strategy, by contrast, is an offensive, sea-control strategy. It is a strategy which seeks to gain and maintain control of the seas, to ensure their use by friendly forces, and to deny their use to an enemy. Central to this strategy are aircraft carriers, which ensure the availability of organic fleet air cover in seizing control of the seas and protecting naval formations and amphibious operations. Not confined to operations under the narrow umbrella of land-based air, the U.S. Navy has global sea-control capabilities. Consistent with this strategy, it has developed efficient amphibious projection capabilities which provide the capability to project power across oceans and onto hostile shores. It also possesses well-developed at-sea support capabilities and forward bases to permit sustained distant-water operations and, in response to the huge

Soviet submarine force, has developed considerable antisubmarine warfare capabilities—maintaining a sizable lead over the Soviets in this area.

Nor does U.S. naval power suffer from serious geographic handicaps. Granted, the U.S. Navy is divided into two fleets, but this fleet fragmentation problem is in no way as severe as the Soviets'. U.S. naval bases front on the open ocean, and the major world maritime routes are at our ocean doorstep. While a landpower mentality and geographical constraints on naval power seem almost to have predestined the Russians to a defensive sea-denial strategy, the U.S. maritime mentality and relative lack of geographical constraints on naval power seem almost to have predisposed an offensive, sea-control strategy.<sup>8</sup>

The "Big-Navy" Theme. Gorshkov maintains that great national power and a powerful navy are indispensable concomitants. To be a great power, a state must also be a maritime power; and when maritime power declines, great-power status diminishes also. "All of the modern great powers are maritime states."<sup>9</sup> Further:

Naval might has been one of the factors which has enabled certain states to advance into the ranks of the great powers. Moreover, history shows that states which do not have naval forces at their disposal have not been able to hold the status of a great power for a long time.<sup>10</sup>

And again: It is evident . . . that every time ruling circles in Russia failed to properly emphasize development of the Fleet and its maintenance at a level necessitated by modern-day demands, the country either lost battles in wars or its peacetime policy failed to achieve designated objectives.<sup>11</sup> In the 16th century Spain neglected to maintain an adequate navy and, as a result, lost her overseas possessions "and was gradually

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transformed from a great power into a third-rate state."<sup>12</sup> In the 17th century, Holland lost her great-power status and colonies because her navy was not sufficiently strong; she "became a second-rate colonial power."<sup>13</sup> Conversely, in the 18th century, England became the leading capitalist country through her naval power, and in the early 19th century Napoleonic Wars, "the course of the war at sea and the gaining of domination by the English Fleet had a great effect on the further policy of the belligerents."<sup>14</sup> Therefore, to be and remain a great power, a country must also be a great maritime power; and Russia "has been and remains a great seapower."<sup>15</sup>

Gorshkov—in support of the big-navy theme of the series—cites historical precedents and arguments to assert the existence of a longstanding navalist tradition for Russia.<sup>16</sup> He states that the more enlightened czars, Lenin, and even the Communist Party itself, since 1917, have followed a strong navy policy. The people too are seen as having a historic affinity for the sea. Peter the Great, in Gorshkov's second article, is thus shown as seeing the requirements to build both an army "and a powerful Navy with all urgency."<sup>17</sup> Presumably, if the need for a powerful navy was evident to Peter the Great, it should be clear to present-day Soviet officials. In article five he alludes to "Leninist theses," associating them with the growing importance "of our building an oceanic fleet,"<sup>18</sup> to show that Lenin too was a strong navalist. Invoking the authority and prestige of Lenin on the side of naval expansionism, no matter how speciously done, establishes a powerful precedent. In this same article he further associates the party with these same Leninist theses "which comprise the basis of the military policy of the Party."<sup>19</sup> This last touch seems to place any opponents of continued expansion in opposition to the party. Throughout Russian history, "the qualities of a sea-going people"

have been "inherent in Russians since ancient times."<sup>20</sup> It has been a "slenderous assertion that the Russians are not a sea-going nation but rather a dry-land nation, that the sea is alien to them, and that they are not gifted at seafaring."<sup>21</sup>

Running through the Gorshkov series is the proposition that the naval expansion program should occur as rapidly as the Soviet economy and shipbuilding capacity will permit. He states this idea in the first article, saying that: "Every social-economic system has built up armed forces, including navies, commensurate with its economic and technical capabilities."<sup>22</sup> Also in the first article, he cites the British example, which he would obviously like the Soviet Union to follow: "Supported by a powerful economy which provided England the supremacy of the strongest fleet in the world . . . , it took over the leading position among the capitalist countries and held it for almost two centuries."<sup>23</sup> To support his ideas with naval activity during the Lenin and Stalin eras, Gorshkov must largely engage in generalities while lauding whatever navy achievements he can. However, he can state that in 1938 the U.S.S.R. attained the world's largest submarine force, indicating that this was but part of an approved larger construction program—interrupted by the war—for a "large sea and oceanic fleet" in which "major surface ships were . . . to be its nucleus."<sup>24</sup> Pursuing this claimed precedent on into the present, Gorshkov states in his last article: "The need to build a powerful ocean-going Navy . . . was backed up and is being backed up by the vast capabilities of the military economic potential of the Soviet state and by the achievements of our science and technology."<sup>25</sup>

Gorshkov then seems to conclude this proposition with the forthright assertion that the Soviet economy can well support such a large and sustained naval construction program:

In speaking of the military-economic potential of our country, it should be noted that it possesses vast, practically inexhaustible energy, raw material, and fuel resources. This high, stable rate of growth of the economic power of the USSR, observed throughout its entire history, confirms the stability, planned nature, and harmoniousness of the Soviet state.<sup>26</sup>

Gorshkov, in this proposition for an all-out naval expansion program, seems to be advocating more than announcing. If he is in fact announcing here too, then surely he must realize—as must the Soviet leadership—that the United States is likely to respond with an expanded naval construction program of its own. Therefore, it seems likely that, while continued and diversified Soviet naval expansion may be forthcoming, it will not be so dramatic as Gorshkov would like.

Gorshkov also sees the solution to Russia's traditional fleet fragmentation problem as residing in a larger, more powerful navy. In the third article he recounts historic Russian problems of inadequate or nonexistent naval strength in the Baltic, the Black Sea, and the Far East. Speaking of czarist times, for which the obvious modern-day analogy exists: "The considerable difficulties for Russian seapower stemmed from its geographical position, which required having an independent fleet capable of ensuring the performance of the missions confronting it in each of the far-flung naval theaters."<sup>27</sup> He goes into particular detail with Russia's great naval disaster at Tsushima in 1905. In this recounting he is implicitly arguing for stronger fleets to handle any potential enemies in these areas, since time-distance and other factors prevent one fleet from effectively reinforcing another in wartime.

He criticizes czarist governments because they constructed a fleet "basically

from considerations of prestige, and not the true interests of the state."<sup>28</sup> They did not, Gorshkov asserts, take into account operational conditions and ignored "requirements, unique to Russia, stemming from her geographical location."<sup>29</sup> For "Russia needed a separate fleet on each sea, which was usually weaker than the fleets of potential opponents in the given theater."<sup>30</sup> Further, "One of the most important characteristics of utilization of the Russian Fleet was the need for inter-theater maneuvers, governed by the absence of the necessary quantity of naval forces in individual theaters."<sup>31</sup> Thus, Gorshkov's resolution of his navy's fleet fragmentation problem is classically simple: provide each of the four fleets with sufficient naval power to independently handle any potential opponents!

As further big-navy justification, Gorshkov depicts a powerful navy as a force to assist in the historic Russian drive for open ocean access through the interdictable straits. Gorshkov's solution to this problem is a wartime breakout strategy. He portrays czarist naval history as consisting of a sustained struggle to gain free access through seizure of the straits. Having lost her window on the Baltic and her Black Sea outlet prior to Peter the Great, "Russia was not resigned to being cut off from the seas and continually waged a struggle for outlets to them."<sup>32</sup> As he devotes attention to czarist efforts to obtain the use of the Turkish Straits, it becomes apparent that Gorshkov intends a modern analogy and that he does not rule out the possibility of seizing them in a limited war scenario. In articles two and three, he seems to argue for a strengthened Soviet Mediterranean Squadron that could control the Eastern Mediterranean against 6th Fleet and NATO naval forces while the Soviet Army seized the Straits. In article three, he says: "... historically it has turned out that when a threat arises of an

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enemy encroachment on the territory of Russia from the southwest, the Russian Fleet has been moved into the Mediterranean Sea where it has successfully executed great strategic missions in defending the country's borders from aggression."<sup>33</sup>

While Gorshkov presents a scenario only for the Turkish Straits, it is easy to project a similar breakout strategy for the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap or the Danish Straits as well. It also seems clear in article four of the series that Gorshkov views the lack of open ocean access for his fleets vis-a-vis NATO and the United States to be analogous to the strategic German dilemma with her fleet, bottled up in the Baltic, vis-a-vis the British in World Wars I and II. Breakout is Gorshkov's recommended solution, which will require in part a big navy both to effect and to make the effort worthwhile.

Gorshkov describes unique peacetime uses of a navy to support the global interests of a powerful state as a further rationale for a large navy. He couches this rationale in both general and specific terms. As a general proposition, it is a "special feature" of a Navy that it "can be used in peacetime for purposes of demonstrating the economic and military might of states beyond their borders."<sup>34</sup> And "over a period of many centuries it has been the solitary form of armed forces capable of protecting the interests of a country overseas."<sup>35</sup> It will therefore be "useful to examine questions related to this specific feature of naval forces as a . . . part of the military organization of a state."<sup>36</sup> It is, Gorshkov asserts, quoting Engels, "the political force at sea" which has "a most important significance as a political weapon of the great powers."<sup>37</sup> He notes that "the fleets of the Western states have represented not only a part of the armed forces, which were employed in war in the naval theaters, but also a weapon of state policy in peacetime."<sup>38</sup> West

ern nations with numerical and fire-power superiority have in the past "striven to employ . . . naval forces as an important political instrument to create definite prestige in the international arena and in mutual relations with other states."<sup>39</sup> While this is his general thesis, he also cites two specific roles for navy use in peacetime as being gunboat diplomacy (although he does not call it this by name) and as being a negotiating lever.

In gunboat diplomacy applications, "Maritime states with great economic capabilities have," says Gorshkov, "widely used their naval forces in peacetime to put pressure on their enemies, as a type of military demonstration, as threats of interrupting sea communications, and as a hindrance to ocean commerce."<sup>40</sup> He notes in his 10th article that the sudden appearance of naval forces in an area has sometimes "permitted the achievement of political goals without resorting to military operations by only threatening to initiate them."<sup>41</sup> He then goes on to define further his conception of gunboat diplomacy:

Consequently the role of a Navy is not limited to the execution of important missions in armed combat. While representing a formidable force in war, it has always been a political weapon of the imperialist states and an important support for diplomacy in peacetime owing to its inherent qualities which permit it to a greater degree than other branches of the armed forces to exert pressure on potential enemies without the direct employment of weaponry.<sup>42</sup>

While most of his examples of gunboat diplomacy are drawn from alleged actions and policies of Western navies, he leaves no doubt that he thinks that it should be a policy of the Soviet Navy as well. In the second article, Gorshkov provides historical examples of success-



ful Russian gunboat diplomacy. In one example, in 1769 a Baltic Fleet squadron was sent to the Mediterranean "to support the making of important political moves by Russia by threatening Turkey from the sea. . . ."43 In his final article, Gorshkov leaves no doubt in his belief in the efficacy and desirability of using gunboat diplomacy in select situations, when he asserts:

. . . it is the Navy which is this kind of force, capable in peacetime of visibly demonstrating to the peoples of friendly and hostile countries not only the power of military equipment and the perfection of the naval ships, embodying the technical and economic might of the state, but its readiness to use this force in defense of state interests of our nation or for the security of the Socialist countries.<sup>44</sup>

Having a large navy, Gorshkov indicates, permits a state to negotiate from a position of strength and protects it from unnecessary concessions to other strong maritime powers. In article three he illustrates this concept from Russia's unfortunate experiences of the Crimean War:

The significance of the Navy in this war was also determined by the extent to which its presence in a given theater could be used by the diplomats of the belligerent sides to support their positions at the peace talks. Russia, almost totally deprived of her fleet in the Black Sea, was unable to oppose the fleets of the enemy states with her own naval power, and therefore had to accede to the provisions of the Paris peace treaty. Great Britain and France, having consolidated their position at sea, acquired new possibilities for exerting pressure on Russia with the threat of attacks against her from the southwest, consolidating their control over the Turkish

Straits zone, and increased their influence in the Near and Middle East.<sup>45</sup>

Earlier, in his first article, Gorshkov also indicated that a strong navy was valuable in any type of negotiations:

Many examples from history attest to the fact that . . . all problems of foreign policy were always solved on the basis of taking into account the military might of the "negotiating" sides, and that the potential might of one state or another, built up in accordance with its economic capabilities and political orientation, permitted it to conduct a policy advantageous to itself to the detriment of other states not possessing a corresponding military power.<sup>46</sup>

While unspoken, the importance of negotiating from a position of strength with a large and powerful navy in any arms limitations talks is obvious, as Gorshkov undoubtedly intended it to be.

The Navy, the Army, and the Budget. Gorshkov clearly reflects that he is under budget constraints. He is either competing with the army for an increase in present resources or is attempting to forestall arguments for diminishing the navy budget or both. Although he and the navy are subordinate to Marshal Grechko (and other marshals in the Ministry of Defense), he nevertheless competes fiercely for resources and is often, directly or indirectly, sharply critical of the army and of their land-power mentality in the process. He constantly stresses the navy's unique capabilities and favorably compares it with the army at every opportunity. Thus, in the first article:

The hallmark of naval forces is their high degree of maneuverability, and ability to concentrate secretly and to form powerful groupings which are of surprise to the enemy. At the same time

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naval forces are more stable against the effects of nuclear weaponry than land forces. All of this has catapulted the navies into the front ranks of the diverse modern means of armed combat.<sup>47</sup>

He also implies that the navy either now is, or should be, ascendant in the budget: "In some stages of the history of states ground forces have played the main role, and in others, the Navy."<sup>48</sup> In discussing the Seven Years' War (1756-1763), he states that events then required restoration of the fleet and "an increase in its role within the system of armed forces."<sup>49</sup> A contemporary analogy seems intended here—that the navy now merits a larger budget share. He further states, polemically:

The opponents of Russian seapower have widely used (and are widely using) falsification of its military history. In particular they assert that all of Russia's victories have been gained only by the Army and that it can be powerful only by strengthening the Army at the expense of the Navy.<sup>50</sup>

He frequently cites the uneven historical development of the Russian Navy. He is obviously attempting to avert a recurrence. Historically, he says: "... the . . . Fleet developed rather unevenly. Surges in the naval might of Russia gave way to declines. And each time a reduction in its seapower evoked new difficulties on the historical path of the state and led to serious consequences."<sup>51</sup>

While he blames czarist officials, landpower enthusiasts, and Western imperialists and their propaganda for many of the Russian Navy's historic travails, it is apparent that he holds equally guilty the living and that he seeks, or seeks to retain, present resources. The answer may be, in accord with the announcement postulation, that he is rebutting critics who desire to

supposition then explains his pointed quotation of Lenin in the fifth article: "Like a red thread the idea runs through all of Lenin's directives, letters, and orders concerning the need for firmness and purposefulness in carrying out intended plans, and of the falseness of any kind of wavering and indecisiveness at the crucial moments of the struggle."<sup>52</sup>

Gorshkov forthrightly defends Soviet Navy deployments to the Mediterranean. Presumably, the permanent presence of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron and its attendant high costs have been under attack. He justifies its cost-effectiveness in terms of the defense<sup>53</sup> it provides the Soviet Union against attack by 6th Fleet aircraft carriers and missile-equipped submarines:

Today, when the capabilities of the imperialist aggressors to attack the Soviet Union directly from the Mediterranean Sea have increased extraordinarily, this region has assumed especially important significance in the defense of our Homeland. The constant presence there of the U.S. Sixth Fleet with aircraft carriers and missile-carrying submarines has as its basic mission a surprise attack against the Soviet Union and the countries of the Socialist community. The U.S. Navy command openly states that the missiles of the nuclear-powered submarines and the carrier aircraft from the Mediterranean Sea are aimed at objectives in the USSR and the states of Eastern Europe and are in a constant state of readiness to deliver nuclear strikes against them.

It is natural that in response to the direct threat the Soviet Union is forced to undertake defensive measures and implement its indisputable and legal right to have warships in the Mediterranean Sea. They are there not to

threaten peace-loving peoples, and not to implement any sort of expansionist desires, which are alien to the very nature of our Socialist state, but in order to nip aggression in the very bud, if the imperialists attempt to undertake it from this region.<sup>5 4</sup>

Gorshkov's arguments for the necessity for the operations of the Mediterranean Squadron are among the most direct and vigorous in his series. By implication he also defends distant-water deployments and their costs in general to the Indian Ocean, the Hump of Africa area near Guinea, and the Caribbean. Gorshkov obviously believes that his navy should operate beyond home waters and that the associated costs are well worth it. He seems in effect to be announcing that Soviet naval deployments out of home waters will continue.

**Weapons, Weapon Systems, and Projection.** On weapons and weapon systems, Gorshkov at the very outset of his series remarked on the difficulty of making meaningful modern-day comparisons of warships and navies:

The qualitative transformations which have taken place in naval forces have also changed the approach to evaluating the relative might of navies and their combat groupings: we have had to cease comparing the number of warships of one type or another and their total displacement (or the number of guns in a salvo or the weight of this salvo), and turn to a more complex, but also more correct appraisal of the striking and defensive power of ships, based on a mathematical analysis of their capabilities and qualitative characteristics.<sup>5 5</sup>

This problem is particularly acute in the case of the Soviet and American Navies because the navies are differently configured in response to different

strategies and missions in war and peace. He is also aware this difficulty has important ramifications in assessing relative levels of Soviet and United States naval strength<sup>5 6</sup> and in naval arms limitation talks. In part, Gorshkov makes use of this difficulty as another reason for approaching any naval arms limitation talks (which he clearly opposes) between the Soviet Union and the United States with caution. In Gorshkov's opinion, the Soviet Union should engage in such talks when it has a big and powerful navy in being, well in excess of current capabilities.

While he has in the past been identified with *antidétente*<sup>5 7</sup> (he is a hard-liner), Gorshkov bases his present opposition on the alleged ineffectiveness of such talks in curbing naval arms races, on the fact that they only affect navies and not armies and air forces as well, and on the supposed advantages they confer on imperialist powers. He is obviously concerned with the effects that any naval arms limitations talks might have on the size of his navy, as well as on the large construction program which may have been approved and which he may, in part, be announcing in his series. Again, he presents his arguments circuitously, using historical examples which have modern analogies:

Recognizing the essential role of navies in war and in peace, the imperialist powers repeatedly attempted in the period after the First World War to regulate the growth of naval arms in special conferences (it is interesting that other forms of armed forces were not subjected to this). However, as is well known, all of these attempts did not lead to a reduction of the navies of the powers, and from the mid-1930's a new unrestrained and in no way regulated naval arms race began.<sup>5 8</sup>

In the early articles of his series, Gorshkov made the point that negotiations

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should proceed from strength, that one should, by implication, consider engaging in naval arms talks only if one already has a large and powerful navy to provide a negotiating edge. But such talks are, in Gorshkov's view, only the "war of the diplomats for supremacy at sea."<sup>59</sup>

While he maintains that such talks do not contain naval arms races anyway, he also pointedly notes that armies seem exempt from similar talks. The conferences of the 1922-1935 period:

... fulfilled only a delaying function in the naval construction of the largest states and then only up to the mid-1930's (thereafter the naval arms race proceeded without any sort of limitations). It is interesting that no such attempts were undertaken until our day with respect to the other branches of the armed forces. Even today, when the arms limitation talks have become a reality and ways of solving this problem have been defined, arms control is still only being extended to strategic missiles, including those belonging to the navies.<sup>60</sup>

Imperialist powers invariably initiate naval arms talks to seek allies or to delimit the naval power of a competitor, Gorshkov alleges. He claims that the London naval arms limitation talks only showed that "the imperialist powers were aligning themselves not for ... limiting naval armaments, but to wage the forthcoming war and to seek allies. . . ." <sup>61</sup> Further:

The failure of the 1936 London Conference . . . served as a signal for an unlimited arms race by the imperialist powers. Just the very fact of repeated attempts to regulate naval armaments by international agreements, especially after the First World War, attests to the important significance the major imperialist powers attached to naval forces.

Gorshkov provides no meaningful clues concerning what the Soviet Union will or will not do about constructing aircraft carriers. He simply does not discuss it, and we are left only to speculate. It is, in any event, the major area in which the Soviet Navy remains clearly inferior to the U.S. Navy. Regardless of what the Soviets may do, it is not a shortcoming that they can readily correct. Even under a parity principle achieved through naval arms talks, the costs of constructing a fleet of carriers would be enormous. Our lead in operating carriers is great, both in technology and in experience. Soviet carriers would suffer from the geographic handicap of no direct access to the open ocean. They also lack overseas bases for forward support and distant-water, at-sea replenishment capabilities. Gorshkov does not discuss these matters but neither does he withdraw his previous criticisms of carrier usefulness in nuclear war. Likewise, Gorshkov fails to mention the new Kiev class of small carriers which intelligence has now confirmed the Soviets are constructing in the Black Sea.<sup>63</sup> In his final article he defends the unique construction paths his navy has taken, saying that these have met their needs "to the maximum degree" without copying Western construction, presumably including carriers:

The utilization of the achievements of science and industry together with the introduction of scientific methods in determining the more valuable mix of weapons and equipment characteristics, taking into account economic factors, has made it possible for naval development to approximate the Navy's vital needs to the maximum degree, without copying naval construction in the Western countries and following our own national path which best corresponds to the specific tasks facing the Navy and the conditions for carrying them out.<sup>64</sup>

The nuclear-powered missile submarine remains, in the Gorshkov perspective, the capital ship of the Soviet Navy. This is the result of the confluence of developments in nuclear weapons, ballistic and cruise missiles, nuclear propulsion, and electronics.<sup>65</sup> Nuclear weaponry has been "the decisive factor"<sup>66</sup> that has permitted the navy's submarine forces to become a part of the country's strategic nuclear forces. These strategic forces employ ballistic missiles for use against "strategic targets of the enemy deep in his territory from different directions," while tactical nuclear submarines employ cruise missiles for "the delivery of powerful and accurate attacks from great distances against the enemy's major surface ships."<sup>67</sup>

Nuclear power plants have transformed submarines into "genuine undersea warships, incorporating... such basic earmarks of sea power as maneuverability, hitting power, and concealment."<sup>68</sup> Equipping "submarines with nuclear power plants has made possible a sharp increase in the speed and range of their underwater navigation. And this is understandable, since the power-to-weight ratio of submarines with a nuclear-power plant considerably surpasses that of diesel submarines."<sup>69</sup> Electronics decisively permits "depicting the situation"<sup>70</sup>—presumably through radar and other displays of tactical information from assisting air platforms. Thus, "a course has been charted in our country," Gorshkov states, "toward the construction of an oceangoing Navy whose base consists of nuclear-powered submarines of various types."<sup>71</sup>

The Gorshkov articles may imply a withholding strategy<sup>72</sup> for Soviet ballistic missile submarines in a nuclear exchange, while other wartime missions may be interdiction of Western sea lines of communications and antisubmarine warfare. He stresses the desirability of employing surface and submarine forces in concert, which also constitutes an

argument for a large, balanced navy. If the withholding strategy is correctly inferred from the Gorshkov series, it probably derives from the greater survivability of ballistic missile submarines, compared to land-launch facilities. Even after a general nuclear exchange that would leave Soviet land-launch capabilities destroyed, submarine-launch capabilities would remain to ensure destruction of any strategic targets left in the United States.

A wartime mission of interdicting Western sea routes emerges from Gorshkov's discussion of German submarine operations in both World Wars and from the known capabilities of his huge submarine force. Specifically, he says that "it is clear that submarines in World War II were, and even more so under modern conditions are, the main means of combatting the enemy's shipping."<sup>73</sup> Concerning antisubmarine warfare, he notes that in World War II submarines "operated successfully against enemy submarines."<sup>74</sup> In his final article, he states that "Submarines are also becoming valuable anti-submarine combatants capable of detecting and destroying the enemy's missile-carrying submarines."<sup>75</sup>

That Gorshkov is sharply critical of the Germans for not using surface and aviation forces to support their submarines implies that he would not make the same mistake. Despite the successes of Hitler's armies in Europe, England remained unconquered and the attempted submarine blockade on Britain failed. Gorshkov feels this was because: "... despite the exceptional threat to submarines on the part of anti-submarine forces, the German naval command did not conduct a single operation or other specially organized combined action aimed at the destruction of these forces."<sup>76</sup> While German submarines inflicted great losses, they failed.

One of the important reasons for this was that the submarines did not have the support of other forces and above all of aviation,

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which could have carried out reconnaissance for the submarines and destroyed anti-submarine forces, as well as operated against the enemy's economy by hitting his ports and targets in the ship-building industry, not to mention his ships at sea. These reasons considerably reduced the effectiveness of German submarine employment in cutting off the enemy's shipping in the Atlantic.<sup>77</sup>

In sum, says Gorshkov: "... a modern fleet, designed to conduct combat operations against a strong enemy, cannot be simply a submarine fleet. The underestimation of the need to support submarine operations with aviation and surface ships cost the German command dearly in the last two world wars."<sup>78</sup>

Gorshkov has relatively little to say about other areas of naval power in which the United States enjoys a substantial lead and advantage—antisubmarine warfare (ASW), amphibious projection and intervention, at-sea and distant-water replenishment, and forward bases. As with carriers, the Soviet Union cannot overtake the U.S. lead in any of these areas without large costs and without years of concentrated effort. Gorshkov denigrates, for example, the efficacy or potential of ASW as a realistic counter of Polaris. He seems to accept that a large and expensive effort to attempt to counter Polaris through at-sea detection and prosecution is both unrealistic and cost-ineffective. The reality of the relative invulnerability of Polaris has become more manifest with the expanded missile ranges of U.S. missile submarines which provide even greater expanses of ocean in which to roam and hide. As noted above, he recognizes the value of another submarine as an ASW platform, but no large or costly effort to expand the ASW capabilities of submarine platforms seems evident.

No increases in amphibious forces to

a level of strategic significance seem apparent. Accordingly, Soviet naval infantry (marines) will probably remain peripherally tasked in areas such as the Baltic, Black Sea, and the Scandinavian Peninsula. This suggests that no strategic intervention capability such as the United States possesses seems forthcoming, except for the possibilities of naval gunboat diplomacy. Again, costs appear to be a major factor. The allocation of resources in designing and constructing the wide range of amphibious ships and craft required, in expanding and training the Soviet marines, and in providing means to protect and support them at sea and in the amphibious objective area would be enormous. Such costs appear prohibitive in view of other, competing, and more urgent Soviet naval requirements.

While the papers reveal no apparent major program to improve at-sea and distant-water replenishment capabilities, some progress can be expected over a period of years, and their new *Chilikin* class oiler is a step in this direction. They also do not possess multi-commodity ships which permit replenishing of an entire formation, task group, or force with fuel, food, ordnance, and supplies in one operation, using alongside and helicopter replenishment techniques. Soviet underway replenishment problems in distant waters are compounded by vast distance from home bases. Placing nuclear power in surface ships would partially solve the problem the Soviets would have in supporting distant operations in wartime, but there is no indication that this is planned for surface ships, and Gorshkov states that only submarines will be so powered.

In his final article, Gorshkov stresses "balanced forces" and new requirements for forces and for the means to support them. He speaks of long oceanic cruises and the long stay of ships in the ocean. He notes the importance of improved habitability standards which

permit sustaining a high combat capability<sup>79</sup> for extended at-sea periods. Extended employments to the Mediterranean—and presumably elsewhere—thus appear likely to continue. Gorshkov seems well aware of his at-sea and distant-water support problems, their magnitude, and the need to overcome them. Despite these problems and the large costs involved, a major effort will probably continue to keep substantial Soviet naval units in distant deployments.

Finally, Gorshkov is acutely aware that he does not have a system of forward bases for his navy. In his third article, he complains that: "Many islands discovered by Russian seafarers in the Pacific were not added to Russian possessions, although as their first discoverer she was fully entitled to this right."<sup>80</sup> The tone in his articles concerning forward bases is pessimistic: the inference is that he either does not expect to get them or at this point in time he cannot count on them. He obviously recognizes this as a critical deficiency which the United States does not have—what with the base facilities available to the United States in NATO countries, the Mediterranean, the Caribbean, at Pearl Harbor, in Japan, in Taiwan, at Subic Bay, in Australia, et cetera. Absence of forward bases and lack of an at-sea replenishment capability are problems which mutually compound each other. In summary, it is in these additional areas of naval power in which the United States has a decided advantage—ASW, amphibious projection and intervention, at-sea and distant-water replenishment, and forward bases—that the Soviet Navy will likely remain in arrears, perhaps substantially, for at least a number of years.

**Components of Soviet Seapower.** Gorshkov, in his final article, makes a bow, elegant but brief, to the other "necessary components" of the Soviet Union's "constantly strengthening . . .

seapower."<sup>81</sup> These three components are oceanographic research, the merchant marine, and the fishing fleet. He further indicates that the Soviets' sea and ocean industry will be increased to exploit ocean resources. His navy directly controls some of the oceanographic research effort and exerts influence on the course of many of its other activities. The Soviet oceanographic effort, much of it in response to navy requirements, will also expand: "We are presently conducting a large volume of research on the hydrosphere. Yet the World Ocean still remains the least studied section of the globe, and the scale of work on trying to understand it must and will be expanded in the future."<sup>82</sup>

Gorshkov describes the value and the comprehensiveness of the Soviet oceanographic effort:

In order to exploit the World Ocean and to utilize its resources, it is essential to have detailed and comprehensive knowledge of the hydrosphere of the Earth, to understand the processes occurring in it, and its effect on the land and the atmosphere, and on the formation of weather. Knowledge ensuring navigational safety in the oceans and seas and flights over them is also needed. Moreover, reliable information on the various resources existing in the hydrosphere and on possible methods of exploiting them is necessary. Special expeditionary research oceanographic ships, scientific organizations, equipment, and, of course, the appropriate personnel are required to understand the seas and oceans. All of this is one component of the seapower of a country.<sup>83</sup>

The Soviet merchant marine is also growing. The shipbuilding and ship repair industry he mentions are of course important to his navy. One reason for having a large navy is, ostensibly, to be

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able to protect the interests of the merchant marine, as well as those of the distant-water fishing fleet and the oceanographic research effort. Nevertheless, he disposes of the Soviet merchant marine in two paragraphs:

An important integral part of seapower is the equipment and personnel which make possible the practical utilization of the oceans and seas as transport routes connecting continents, countries, and peoples. For this, it is essential to have a merchant marine, a network of ports and services supporting its operation, and a developed shipbuilding and ship repair industry.

In 1972 the Soviet Merchant Marine, which is growing at a rapid rate, was sixth among the merchant fleets of the world. A majority of its ships have been built in recent years and are among the more technically advanced ships.<sup>84</sup>

While what Gorshkov says here is true, the Soviet merchant marine has not yet commercially adopted, to any substantial degree, such advanced methods of sea cargo transportation as containerization, LASH (lighter aboard ship) type ships, and roll-on, roll-off ships. Yet the Soviet merchant marine is huge, is growing rapidly, and is a significant component of Soviet seapower.

As a final component of seapower Gorshkov discusses the Soviet fishing fleet which appears regularly off the New England and Newfoundland coasts with large modern ships: "The next component of seapower is the ships, technical equipment, and the personnel needed for the practical exploitation and utilization of the resources of the World Ocean, that is, the fishing fleet. Today our country has the strongest fishing fleet in the world at its disposal."<sup>85</sup> Elsewhere in his final article, he speaks in glowing terms, as a true seapower enthusiast, of the ocean's vast

resources of food which the Soviet fishing fleet, as a part of the world fishing fleet, is exploiting:

The reserves of animal protein, i.e., fish, sea animals, plankton, etc., in the World Ocean (if measures are taken to restock them) make it possible to consider it to be one of the most important sources for solving the food problem for the growing population of the world. Today the catching of fish and other "gifts of the sea" is carried out only in a small section of the ocean surface, consisting of about 10% of it. The annual world catch of fish equals some 60 million tons, but in the near future it may reach 100 million tons or more.<sup>86</sup>

In his discussion of the fishing fleet, he indicates that the Soviets' "sea and ocean industry" will expand:

The sea and ocean industry will also be developed in the future, will exploit new areas, and will expand the assortment of products of the sea being captured. The broadest prospects are opening up in the creation of equipment for extracting mineral resources from the water, from the sea bottom, and from beneath it.<sup>87</sup>

In his final article, Gorshkov includes an eloquent discussion on the resources of the ocean waters, the deep seabed, and the Continental Shelf. He refers to the tides, currents, temperature gradients of the water, et cetera as "truly inexhaustible energy resources" and notes that seawater contains all the elements, that manganese nodules rich in metallic content cover considerable parts of the deep seabed, and that vast reserves of oil and gas lie within the ocean floor.<sup>88</sup> He speaks, somewhat inaccurately, of the truly inexhaustible wealth of the World Ocean which, presumably, the expanding sea and ocean industry will exploit: "The reserves of



metals, minerals, fuels (oil, gas, and coal), various chemical raw materials, nuclear material, power and food reserves, locked in the seabed, are so vast that there is no comparison whatsoever with the known reserves existing on land."<sup>89</sup>

This "industry" probably refers to ocean mining and offshore drilling ventures. Magnesium, salt, and other minerals and substances may be extracted from seawater; manganese nodules may be scooped up from the deep ocean seabed in the Pacific for their manganese, cobalt, copper, and nickel content; and oil and gas wells may be drilled in offshore locations on the Continental Shelf. U.S. firms are now exploiting the oceans, their seabeds, and the Continental Shelf for such minerals and fossil fuels. That the Soviets will follow suit in such endeavors to exploit ocean wealth is hardly surprising.

While Gorshkov argues for the continued growth of Soviet seapower on virtually all fronts—navy, oceanographic research, merchant marine, resource exploitation—it is quite clear that in his mind the navy is the preeminent component. "However, we must consider the most important component of the seapower of the state to be the Navy, whose mission is to protect state interests of the seas and oceans and to defend the country from possible attacks from the direction of the seas and oceans."<sup>90</sup> A few paragraphs later, he says yet again that the Soviet Navy is expanding into a new, oceangoing navy: "The Communist Party and the Soviet government fully appreciated both the threat to our country which is arising from the oceans, and the need to deter the aggressive aspirations of the enemy through the construction of a new, ocean-going Navy. And this need is being answered."<sup>91</sup>

In his closing work, Gorshkov expresses considerable concern over those law of the sea matters which have significant impact on Soviet naval

power. His positions on these are in many cases identical with those of the U.S. Government. Littoral states, he notes, have increasingly begun to divide up the World Ocean because of the possibilities for exploitation of its resources. His implicit concern is that such actions will curtail naval power through restricting the areas in which a navy operates. He criticizes, in particular, the highly alarming symptom of some states to expand the limits of their territorial seas out to 200 miles, a practice he views as extreme and nothing other than an attempt to seize great expanses of the ocean.<sup>92</sup>

Expansions of the territorial seas are having a definite and deleterious effect on the status of the high seas and freedom of navigation. Yet experience has shown the viability of the 12-mile limit which the Soviets claim as their territorial waters for the breadth of the territorial sea. While he avoids the Soviet positions on the Arctic seas peripheral to Russia and on the Sea of Okhotsk (over which, in both cases, the Soviets exercise considerable control), he is concerned that other areas, such as the Mediterranean, may be divided up among littoral nations through expansion of the territorial seas. Such action could virtually prohibit the operations of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron, although Gorshkov does not openly express this fear.<sup>93</sup>

He is concerned with the problem of the innocent passage of combatants and auxiliaries and of aircraft overflights through international straits. Obviously, should some or all of the more than 110 straits being used for international shipping turn out to be closed territorial seas of littoral states, then this too will restrict Soviet naval power. He criticizes, as have Western writers, the vagueness of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf in defining the limits of the shelf over which littoral states have jurisdiction. The vagueness of the definition has helped precipitate

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controversies over division of the seabed adjacent to the coasts of littoral states. He also urges the complete demilitarization of the seabed, ostensibly in conjunction with ending the arms race.<sup>94</sup> Adoption of this standard Soviet line would of course outlaw any devices on the seabed for submarine detection, which—in view of the huge Soviet submarine force and the alleged existence of such devices in Western hands—would redound to Soviet naval advantage.

Gorshkov seems preoccupied with the potential effects on Soviet naval power of any dividing up of the seabed. In the vigor of his condemnation of this danger to expanding Soviet seapower, he not only defends international maritime law, but even criticizes developing countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America for opting for such practices:

Today the serious threat of a further division of the World Ocean exists. Therefore, it is not by chance that many countries and a great number of international organizations, beginning with the UN and ending with dozens of different types of intra-governmental and nongovernmental organizations and organs, are engaged with questions of the legal regime and with the development of new norms regulating the use of the World Ocean. The most characteristic feature in their work in the current stage is the fact that several Afro-Asian and Latin American developing countries are insisting on a review of all existing norms regulating the use of the World Ocean, based on the fact that they are not participating in the exploitation. In particular, they assert that current international maritime law is outmoded and does not reflect changes which have occurred in the world since 1958. Representatives of these countries put their position on the plane of a struggle

between the poor and the rich, the backward and the industrially developed countries. . . .<sup>95</sup>

Gorshkov is painfully aware of the potentially profound effects that law of the sea matters may have on the naval power resident in world navies. Freedom to use the seas is essential for the application of naval power. The degree that that freedom is diminished through dividing up of the World Ocean among littoral states—through the extension seaward of territorial seas, through the nationalizing of previously international straits, through closed sea regimes imposed by countries littoral—is the degree that naval powers will lose their ability to effectively employ their forces.

**Conclusions.** The major and overriding conclusion to this commentary is that the Gorshkov articles are essentially announcement, particularly in their broad outlines. Accepting this proposition, Gorshkov has told us a great deal, and it appears possible that the content of his articles allows one to make some reasoned judgments on the course of Soviet seapower in general and of Soviet naval power in particular.

The most positive element in the Gorshkov announcements is that Soviet seapower—of which the navy is the key component—will, in general, continue to expand on virtually every front. Gorshkov clearly said that the Soviet merchant marine, the Soviet oceanographic effort, and the Soviet ocean exploitation effort will all expand. He did not elaborate on the fishing fleet, merely noting that it was already the world's strongest fleet. Soviet seapower will therefore present an increasingly larger challenge in the aggregate to traditional Western seapower superiority.

The Soviet Navy seems destined in particular to grow into a larger, more modern, more balanced navy. While submarines will remain at least for several years as the Soviet Navy's capital ship, their navy is likely to see increased

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numbers and variety of modern, but conventionally powered, surface ships. The future role of aircraft carriers in the Soviet Navy remains unclear and will probably remain so at least until the new Kiev class carriers now being built in Russia begin operations. (This writer believes that the Soviets have not yet made a commitment to build a fleet of carriers but wish to analyze the Kiev's performance before making the costly, long-term, and strategic decision to proceed with additional construction.) Soviet at-sea and distant-water replenishment and support capabilities seem likely to improve, perhaps substantially, in coming years; but no major increase in Soviet amphibious projection capabilities or in antisubmarine warfare seems forthcoming. The Soviets continue to need, and lack, a system of forward bases to support deployments beyond home waters; this deficiency will probably continue for some time.

The Soviet Navy will thus continue to lag behind its U.S. competitor in several key areas, but particularly in the at-sea air cover in the open ocean which at present only fleet carriers can provide. At the same time, the huge Soviet submarine force will continue to pose both a strategic nuclear threat against the continental United States and a

strategic interdiction threat against its sea lines of communication. The Soviets will continue to work under the strategic hardships of unfavorable geography which both fragments and encloses their naval power. From the vantage point of this writer, the Gorshkov papers confirm that Soviet Naval Strategy will generally remain defensive and deterrent for the next several years and perhaps for a decade or more.

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### BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Comdr. Clyde Smith, U.S. Navy, holds undergraduate degrees from both Oklahoma State University and the University of Maryland, a master's degree from Oklahoma State University, and is a graduate

of the Russian Language School. As an intelligence officer he has served in West Berlin, on the staffs of Commander 7th Fleet and Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Group 8, and has had three separate tours in Vietnam—Naval Intelligence Adviser in the Naval Advisory Group (1964-65), Staff Intelligence Officer to Commander River Assault Flotilla 1 (1966-67), and Chief of Operational Intelligence to Commander Naval Forces Vietnam (1970-71). Commander Smith is currently a student in the College of Naval Warfare.

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### NOTES

1. Each of the 11 articles of the Gorshkov series will be published, on a one-per-month basis, in the January through November issues of the 1974 *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*.

2. For biographical information on Admiral Gorshkov, see Edward L. Crowley, et al., eds., *Prominent Personalities in the USSR* (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1968), p. 194.

3. *Morskoy Sbornik* (Hereinafter *MS*), No. 2, 1972, pp. 20, 23.

4. For a more comprehensive discussion of these aspects of Soviet naval strategy, see Robert W. Herrick, *Soviet Naval Strategy* (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1968), pp. 143-57.

5. For example, in Marshal V.D. Sokolovsky, ed., *Military Strategy* (Moscow: Soviet Ministry of Defense, 1968), all of the authors and reviewers of the official Soviet view of military strategy were army marshals, generals, or colonels.

6. In such efforts the Soviets have stressed anticarrier operations. See John T. Funkhouser, "Soviet Carrier Strategy," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, December 1973, pp. 27-37, for a good discussion of this aspect of Soviet naval strategy.

7. While it is common in U.S. Navy circles to refer to this Soviet Mediterranean force as a

"fleet," the Soviets themselves call it a "squadron" (*ehskadra*).

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8. For further discussion of the influences of geography on Soviet and United States naval strategies and on fleet composition, see the exchange of letters between Senator Proxmire and Admiral Zumwalt, in May and June 1972, as appearing in the U.S. *Congressional Record*, vol. 118, No. 94, pp. S9179-95. Hereinafter, the "Zumwalt-Proxmire Exchange."

9. MS, No. 2, 1972, p. 24.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 23.

11. MS, No. 4, 1972, p. 23.

12. MS, No. 2, 1972, p. 25.

13. *Ibid.*

14. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

15. MS, No. 3, 1972, p. 20.

16. For further discussion of Gorshkov's "big-navy" theme, see Herrick, "The Gorshkov Interpretation of Russian Naval History," as contained in Michael K. McGwire, ed., *Soviet Naval Developments: Capability and Context* (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 1972), pp. 275-89; and Robert W. Herrick, "Soviet Navy Commander-in-Chief Advocates Construction of a Much Larger Navy," Working Paper, Center for Naval Analyses, Arlington, Va., 9 May 1973.

17. MS, No. 3, 1972, p. 22.

18. MS, No. 6, 1972, p. 14.

19. *Ibid.*

20. MS, No. 3, 1972, p. 22.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

22. MS, No. 2, 1972, p. 24.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

24. MS, No. 8, 1972, p. 18.

25. MS, No. 2, 1973, p. 19.

26. *Ibid.*

27. MS, No. 3, 1972, p. 22.

28. MS, No. 4, 1972, p. 22.

29. *Ibid.*

30. *Ibid.*, p. 23.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 23.

32. MS, No. 3, 1972, p. 24.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 31.

34. MS, No. 2, 1972, p. 23.

35. *Ibid.*

36. *Ibid.*

37. MS, No. 5, 1972, p. 24.

38. MS, No. 2, 1972, p. 29.

39. MS, No. 5, 1972, p. 22.

40. MS, No. 2, 1972, p. 29.

41. MS, No. 12, 1972, p. 16.

42. *Ibid.*

43. MS, No. 3, 1972, p. 27.

44. MS, No. 2, 1973, p. 21.

45. MS, No. 4, 1972, pp. 13-14.

46. MS, No. 2, 1972, p. 21.

47. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

48. *Ibid.*, pp. 21-22.

49. MS, No. 3, 1972, p. 26.

50. *Ibid.*, pp. 20-21.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

52. MS, No. 6, 1972, p. 14.

53. As if in illustration of this concept, Gorshkov, in the name of the Soviet Union, deployed over 90 ships into the Mediterranean during the recent Arab-Israeli crisis. This was the highest number of Soviet Navy ships ever deployed to the Mediterranean at one time and is over twice the size of the normal Soviet Mediterranean Squadron.

54. MS, No. 3, 1972, pp. 32-33.

55. MS, No. 2, 1972, p. 20.

56. Both Admiral Gorshkov and Admiral Zumwalt are in essential agreement on this. As Admiral Zumwalt stated in the Zumwalt-Proxmire Exchange:

a direct comparison of the two fleets, unless heavily footnoted, cannot mean very much. With very few exceptions, U.S. ships are not designed to fight Soviet ships of similar

classes. Therefore it is of little value to contrast . . . characteristics. . . . What is important is how well the platform, or the fleet, can carry out its assigned tasks.

57. Michael K. McCWire, "The Gorshkov Series—'Navies in War and Peace'—a Summary Report," Working Paper, Center for Naval Analyses, Arlington, Va., 8 May 1973, p. 2.

58. *MS*, No. 5, 1972, p. 24.

59. *MS*, No. 8, 1972, p. 14.

60. *MS*, No. 12, 1972, p. 18.

61. *MS*, No. 8, 1972, p. 24.

62. *MS*, No. 9, 1972, pp. 14-15.

63. Two Kiev class carriers are currently under construction there.

64. *MS*, No. 2, 1973, p. 19.

65. *Ibid.*

66. *Ibid.*

67. *Ibid.*

68. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

69. *Ibid.*

70. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

71. *MS*, No. 2, 1973, p. 20.

72. For a full exposition of this possible withholding strategy, see James M. McConnell, "Admiral Gorshkov on the Soviet Navy in War and Peace," Working Paper, Center for Naval Analyses, Arlington, Va., 1 October 1973, pp. 1-21.

73. *MS*, No. 11, 1972, p. 27.

74. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

75. *MS*, No. 2, 1973, p. 20.

76. *MS*, No. 11, 1972, p. 25.

77. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

78. *MS*, No. 2, 1973, p. 20.

79. *Ibid.*, pp. 21-22.

80. *MS*, No. 4, 1972, p. 11.

81. *MS*, No. 2, 1973, p. 18.

82. *Ibid.*

83. *Ibid.*

84. *Ibid.*

85. *Ibid.*

86. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

87. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

88. *Ibid.*

89. *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14.

90. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

91. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

92. *Ibid.*

93. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

94. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

95. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

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Superiority in naval power will henceforth consist in keeping up a proper naval establishment in discipline. The first naval nation to fall will be the one that is first caught napping.

Sir Charles Napier, 1786-1860