

1974

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Recommended Citation

Trout, B. Thomas (1974) "Naval Strategy and Naval Politics: Peacetime Uses of a Wartime Naval Force," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 27 : No. 4 , Article 3.

Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol27/iss4/3>

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There has, in recent years, developed a striking similarity between the rationales developed by both the United States and the Soviet Navies in their battle for resource allocation. In particular, they have each stressed the unique capabilities of a navy short of war. The recently published series of articles by Admiral of the Fleet Sergei G. Gorshkov are a fine illustration of the evolution of Soviet naval thinking along the lines of traditional U.S. naval rationale.

NAVAL STRATEGY AND NAVAL POLITICS: PEACETIME USES OF A WARTIME NAVAL FORCE

An article prepared

by

Professor B. Thomas Trout

The steady development of the Soviet Navy as a competitor to the United States Navy has stimulated new interest in questions of naval strategy. This has centered for the most part on the effect of the shifting naval balance—deployments and force structure—on national security and foreign policy. But in naval competition, as in any military competition, there are other points of view. These consider strategy as an internal as well as an external phenomenon. As one author expressed this:

... we should focus attention not upon threat perception—that is, upon triggers beyond the states in question—but upon domestic processes, strategic doctrines, moods, bureaucracies and interests that interact to produce defense decisions. Once an adversary has been identified, a close watch

will be kept upon his shifting capabilities and intentions, but the major pressures for change in force structures will be internally derived.¹

Factors associated with the institutional behavior of navies at home may then affect the development and use of naval forces abroad. Those factors may, in turn, provide a critical perspective on the growth of Soviet-American naval competition.

This paper will therefore suggest an institutional perspective on the behavior of the United States and the Soviet Navy. The argument is based on the necessity for a naval establishment to

This is an abbreviated version of a paper presented at the 1974 annual meeting of the International Studies Association, St. Louis, Mo., March 1974.

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advance and maintain its needs not only in the larger strategic context, but also in a specifically institutional one. In doing so, navies must respond predominantly to peacetime environments rather than to wartime (i.e., general or sustained war). Thus a navy's strategic position tends to be supported by the advance and maintenance of a peacetime naval role. In the evolution of both American and Soviet naval thought, this helps account for recurring emphasis on a wide spectrum of naval roles and continuing advocacy of conventional force postures and political applications. Under these circumstances, naval strategy may be less of a determinant of naval missions than is the need for the naval establishment to survive as an institution.

To establish the setting in which the Soviet and American Navies operate, strategy may be broadly defined as "the employment of force—functional and purposeful violence—to achieve the objectives of policy."² With that meaning, modern strategy derives from two post-war characteristics: the existence of a particular kind of force, nuclear weapons and their delivery systems; and a particular political condition, the bipolar international system. Hence, at first, Soviet and American possession of nuclear weapons was so dominant that strategy was taken to apply only to nuclear force. Then, as each side acquired the capacity to destroy the other, interest shifted to indirect rather than direct application.³ Nuclear strategy concentrated on force as a means to deter rather than strike an adversary—with some assurance in American strategic thought, with far more skepticism in Soviet thought. At the same time, this challenged the utility of nuclear weapons for more common policy objectives. As a consequence, the use of force came to include a number of different levels, each contributing to an overall strategic posture but most fitting well below the thresh-

old of nuclear war. Force therefore remained available, not merely to deter or react, but as a positive instrument to achieve policy objectives in peacetime as well as war. At these levels, however, strategy also tended to become more ambiguous and ill defined.

Naval strategy responds to this setting. It does so prominently in deterrence with the submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) serving as a naval extension of strategic nuclear forces.⁴ But beyond deterrence there is an extensive range of maritime strategy options which relate only indirectly to nuclear force. These emphasize control or denial of control of the sea through the variety of means summarized in the ambiguous phrase "seapower." This constitutes a basically conventional posture, utilizing the unique aspects of flexibility and manipulability of the traditional naval operating unit, the ship at sea. Naval units avail themselves in peacetime of a medium providing freedom of action well supported by legal convention and unmatched by land or air forces.⁵ Consequently, naval force is widely recognized in political application to possess powerful latent effects and great selectivity:

The mere presence of a naval force in a region serves a political function, regardless of its composition, its missions, or its activity, and even in the absence of any diplomatic activity directed towards similar ends. The existence of the force automatically causes the states of the region to weigh a new factor in their calculations of the balance of power and in their expectations of the probable behavior of other states in various contingencies. As such, a state that establishes a peacetime naval presence in a specific region is apt to gain influence in the affairs of that region.⁶

The conditions of application continue to be those largely of peacetime. There

force may be employed effectively without reference to actual military capability and strategy tends to be most subjective and ill defined.⁷ Thus, naval force seems suitable at all levels of the nuclear setting to achieve policy objectives.

This serves as a reminder, however, that strategy includes policy objectives as well as force. Strategic determinations emerge from a broad and complex integration of the international sphere with national policy. This has led to a relatively constant and fundamental national security posture involving deterrence and defense. Both the United States and the Soviet Navy consistently present the deterrent role of the SLBM as first priority in contemporary naval strategy. On the associated question of wartime defense of the homeland, however, the approaches differ. The United States adopts what is termed a "forward strategy" in which the Navy plays a key role. Soviet naval forces, on the other hand, have remained subordinate to a continental defense necessitated largely by the geographical and international configuration of the U.S.S.R. On broader issues affecting foreign policy, there has been a persistent increase in the points of intersection between Soviet and American interests. Thus, compared to the rivalry of the early postwar period, the Soviet Union now possesses a growing global outlook and capability to match that of the United States. In the international sphere then, there has been a continuing attentiveness in both the United States and the Soviet Union to military and foreign policy conduct.

But defense and foreign policy are only the broadest and most obvious issues of strategy. Strategy is also affected by strictly allocative aspects of policymaking. Thus, the classic economic dilemma of "guns versus butter" is also a classic strategic dilemma. Scarcity of resources and, as a result, considerations of cost are involved. So are

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1974

considerations of risk.⁸ Determinations of force levels, service missions, weapons acquisition, and the like all take place within such considerations. The navy must therefore compete for resources with other institutions of society and with the other military services. As a result, activities in support of naval claims on resource allocation tend to assume a fundamental political character.

This is a postulate held for both the Soviet and American Navies. In making demands and seeking support, each naval establishment operates in a policy arena populated by other units of the defense and political establishment.⁹ In determining naval strategy, this arena provides both the impetus and the opportunity for political activity. In the American case the political arena is characterized by relatively autonomous units promulgating their own priorities and seeking support both inside and outside of government. In that context, the U.S. Navy has operated to sustain its programs and to advance its strategic position. It has done so primarily through the central defense organization and through the appropriations oversight of Congress.¹⁰ The Soviet case is less clear. That the Soviet Navy is clearly not autonomous is demonstrated by the dominance of land-force personnel within the unified Soviet defense structure, including both the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff. Nevertheless, to specify elaborate and justify uniquely naval claims, as seems inherent in the structure, implies political activity on behalf of the Soviet Navy's needs. Although the direct points of access for these naval claims remain uncertain, their public presentation through the periodical press is not. In both the American and Soviet cases, therefore, there is evidence to support the premise of institutionally discrete naval establishments.

In addition, the United States and the Soviet Navy have shared a similar

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postwar experience. In both cases naval roles came under close and continuous scrutiny with the assessment of nuclear weapons. These weapons tended to overshadow equally any conventional force utilization or peacetime application associated with naval strategy. Thus, nuclear force seemed to operate on behalf of the claims and force structures of other services. And the navy existed for differing periods in each country as the least favored service in the allocation of missions and resources. Yet there is now evidence that in each case the navy was able to retain and even advance its position in defense allocations. In the United States, the Navy in recent years has shown both relative and absolute increases in appropriations.¹¹ Although the Soviet case has again been less certain, there is a visible advance in the technological level and modernity of its fleet units which suggests decisions taken to invest in naval forces. Hence, in some measurable degree, the Soviet Navy seems also to have benefited from recent military budgets.¹² In both instances, the navy appears to have succeeded in enhancing rather than diminishing a naval role.

In this contemporary strategic setting, the institutional conduct of the two navies has tended to follow three patterns. One pattern has been *adaptation*, concentrating on the technological reconfiguration of naval forces in order to play a role in nuclear strategy. This has resulted in both a juxtaposition of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems onto existing naval technology and true technological innovation. A second pattern has been that of *promotion*, in which naval spokesmen advocate the continuing applicability of conventional naval force and its political effects to contemporary strategy. At the center is the peacetime utilization of naval force. Finally, there has been a pattern of *symbiosis*, utilizing the forces of an adversary to extend the range of naval force postures. Each navy con-

centrates on postulating a threat from the opposite nation's navy; for in the ability to define that threat there is also the ability to define force requirements. Each of these patterns has arisen in direct support of naval roles.

The adaptive pattern is the most direct and clear-cut, being the naval response to the nuclear weapons delivery systems. These systems emerged at the foundation of postwar strategy. In the United States, the Air Force had already delivered an atomic bomb in combat with an apparently decisive effect. It therefore laid exclusive claim to nuclear weapons delivery and to strategic roles. In response the Navy began immediately to adapt its own operating forces as delivery systems.¹³ After some interim demonstrations to show that existing naval aircraft could deliver nuclear weapons, this effort concentrated on configuring the aircraft carrier for nuclear delivery. That meant acquiring larger aircraft to deliver the heavier nuclear weapons and therefore acquiring larger aircraft carriers.¹⁴ Though losing this early effort for a primary strategic role, the Navy was at the same time attracted to a second delivery system, the missile. Coming to rest on submarine-launched missiles, this led to the notable success which wedded the ballistic missile to the submarine. The result, of course, was the Polaris system and the concept of the fleet ballistic submarine.¹⁵ The latest version of this concept is the Trident system which combines a new nuclear submarine with advanced ballistic missiles to extend the range, and therefore the operating area, and relative invulnerability of the platform.

Adaptation in the Soviet case differed somewhat from the American experience. First, the nuclear deterrent posture of the Soviet Union developed more narrowly. It was largely an effort to match American strategic power in which the Navy's role was initially limited by its own operating constraints.

Although apparently expanding in the postwar years to include interdiction of Western sea lines of communication, the Soviet Navy still existed in a subordinate mission structure to continental defense. Second, and related, there was no independent (i.e., sea-based) air arm to adapt nuclear capability readily to the Soviet Navy once the U.S.S.R. had acquired nuclear weapons. The Soviet Navy sought, and apparently gained, approval of aircraft carriers in the postwar period.¹⁶ But these were apparently supportive of the limited conception of deterrence and defense which focused on the coastal areas of the Soviet Union and, in fact, never came to pass.¹⁷ What is more, there is no evidence that the carriers or the fleet were ever visualized as nuclear delivery systems. In fact, there is evidence suggesting the contrary. Viewing this period retrospectively, the current Soviet Navy Commander in Chief, Admiral Gorshkov, was critical of:

... the lag in the level of naval art behind the possibilities which appeared in connection with the development of technology and the growth of economic power of the country. The achievements of science, which by the end of the war had given a new stimulus to the activation of fleet operations and to the raising of its combat capabilities, were not taken note of in a timely manner because of the element of stagnation and formalism in naval theory.¹⁸

There was, in short, no apparent opportunity for the Soviet Navy to adapt to nuclear strategy roles. So the Soviet Navy eventually had adaptation imposed. In developing a deterrent capacity in the face of U.S. strategic weapons, the Soviet Navy was directed first to strategic defense (initially against aircraft carrier strike forces and later against ballistic missile submarines) and then to strategic offense. In the latter role, the ballistic missile sub-

marine extended deterrent forces, leaving the Soviet Navy, like the United States Navy, in an acknowledged position in its nation's strategic posture.

An adaptive pattern of naval conduct, though it sustained the navy's institutional claims in the overall strategic force posture, was limited. Since it concentrated on overall nuclear strategy, there seemed to be no provision for the navy to operate across the range of maritime options. To overcome that constraint, then, a promotional pattern of naval activity seemed far more productive in the evolution of naval roles.

The promotional pattern is characterized by a persistent theme: an argument for a multipurpose (though not necessarily *all-purpose*) or balanced force, coupled with a specification of a wide spectrum of applications of such force. This has two components. First, a multipurpose or balanced force must rely upon conventional force postures. In the United States this has centered on the aircraft carrier. In the Soviet Union it has meant balancing heavy emphasis on submarines, legislated under Khrushchev, with surface ships. Second, with such forces there must be a flexible spectrum of use. This spectrum relates, of course, to that part of strategy which is least defined and specific. In the promotional approach, therefore, both the arguments for multipurpose forces and those for wide application of such forces emphasize breadth and flexibility, rather than specificity. For, the more indistinct the objectives in which naval force is to be used, then the wider are potential naval roles. Thus American and Soviet naval spokesmen have tended to stress applications which are furthest from the threshold of nuclear exchange. To promote and maintain a traditional naval role, the United States and, more recently, the Soviet Navy have each advocated the utilities of a peacetime naval force.

In the United States, the postwar nuclear environment deemphasized

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conventional forces in general and the Navy's in particular. The Navy responded by stressing flexibility and the maintenance of a balanced force:

Any exclusive adoption of a single weapon or type of weapon immediately limits freedom of defense. War is a phenomenon of immense complexity whose problems are solved pragmatically by hard experience and clear thinking. There is danger that investigations of a single aspect of one war may give rise to an unbalanced interpretation.¹⁹

A balanced force meant a force of nonspecific application. Thus, all foreseeable contingencies were included in the Navy's promotion of its position. As one scholar summarizes this approach:

... the Navy's case was primarily a set of claims asserting the relative advantages and many uses of naval forces in a wide variety of situations, especially forces composed mainly of aircraft carriers, in contrast to non-naval forces employed alone. Among these assertions were that naval units were always deployed and ready to go into action without delay in key trouble spots around the world, that mobility allowed these forces to move and regroup very quickly as conditions might require, that ships at sea were relatively less vulnerable to debilitating attack than fixed Army and Air Force bases on land, and that ships were also less vulnerable to shifting political tides in foreign countries in which the availability of bases to U.S. forces could be decreased.²⁰

On such broad terms the Navy nearly succumbed before the hard Air Force arguments for nuclear strategy.²¹ But after the Korean war intervened in support of the need for a flexible, multipurpose approach, the Navy succeeded in utilizing the same approach to

maintain and modernize its conventional forces, particularly the aircraft carrier.

Following the pattern thus set, the U.S. Navy has continued to present its case in terms of multipurpose options. Arguing through its institutional contacts in Congress, the Navy has been able to blunt major challenges. This can be illustrated with the recent questioning of funding for a new, nuclear-powered carrier (CVAN-70). The mode of argument by the Navy began first with a general framework. In an opening statement, Admiral Moorer, then Chief of Naval Operations, laid the basis for defense of the carrier on "the entire forward defense posture, which is the undergirding concept of our national defense strategy."²² This was introduced in a classic example of traditional naval strategy: national defense depends on "free use of the sea," "free use of the sea" depends on airpower, and airpower can only be deployed in forward areas reliably by the aircraft carrier.²³ But the actual presentation was much broader, echoing all the assertions noted in the earlier approaches—constant deployment, mobility, relatively low vulnerability, and protection from political instability.

The argument thus moved on the character of the application and not of the force. This was presented within a "spectrum of warfare" which placed most contemporary engagements under essentially peacetime conditions.²⁴ The carrier's role was stated to be most appropriate in just such conditions, especially when politically sensitive.²⁵ The advantages of the aircraft carrier stemmed from the traditional naval functions of the ship at sea and were thus only marginally associated with the peculiarities of the unit. This policy emphasis became even clearer in another part of the Navy's case, where it was stated that:

... aircraft carriers support a number of continuing U.S.

political objectives. These include the following:

To maintain the confidence of our allies in our strength and readiness to fulfill our commitments.

To reassure other friendly states of U.S. interest in the peace and security of the region, and to remind unfriendly states of that interest.

To add to the leverage we can bring to bear through political efforts in order to resolve peacefully disputes affecting our interests.²⁶

These activities derive from an analytical division made between missions which are primary ("supremacy at sea") and those which are collateral. The primary mission is always expressed in sweeping and emphatic terms. The collateral mission, on the other hand, is expressed flexibly. It focuses on gradations of the use of force. These gradations cover the indistinct levels of peacetime naval uses. Thus a multipurpose role for naval force (in this case, the carrier) is generally promoted for its flexibility across a wide range of largely peacetime political applications.

The Soviet Navy seems to have adopted a remarkably similar pattern in order to promote its own institutional requirements. Two things make the emergence of this pattern particularly interesting. One is that there is little evidence to suggest that the Soviet Navy has altered its basic strategic functions of deterrence and defense. Although there is clearly an expanding appreciation of forward deployment, the extent of application is still limited. The second is that Soviet naval capabilities have not, or at least not yet, given it the flexibility (particularly in the area of replenishment and supply) actually to perform the broad roles it has come to support. Still, the promotional pattern of advocating multipurpose forces and

wide political application now characterizes Soviet naval conduct.

The Soviet Navy began the postwar era with an institutional base far less secure than its American counterpart. To begin with, the World War II Soviet naval role was minimal. And it was followed by a period of stagnation under party and land-force dominance. Like the United States Navy, the Soviet Navy seemed to have been invalidated by the advent of nuclear weapons. As Admiral Gorshkov later complained:

It turned out, unfortunately, that we had some very influential "authorities" who considered that with the appearance of atomic weapons the Navy had completely lost its value as a branch of the armed forces. According to their views, all of the basic missions in a future war allegedly could be fully resolved without the participation of the Navy, and even in those circumstances when to do so would require the conduct of combat operations on the broad expanses of the seas and oceans. At that time it was frequently asserted that only missiles emplaced in ground launching sites were required for the destruction of surface striking forces and even submarines.²⁷

It was not until the midfifties, as a result of the Soviet sense of overall strategic inferiority, that the Soviet Navy had an opportunity to develop its institutional position. But this ran counter to multipurpose forces. Rather than the surface ships required by such forces, Khrushchev's defense policy concentrated on submarine-launched missiles—cruise and ballistic—intended to counter U.S. naval forces and to provide strategic strike capability. Despite naval criticism, this view prevailed at least until 1964 when Khrushchev described the course of development:

Ten years ago the question was asked about the necessity to

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rearm our Navy, which at the time was based on cruisers and destroyers, and other, mainly surface vessels. This weapon to a great extent has become outmoded for conducting wars in modern conditions because all surface means are now vulnerable from the air as well as from the shore, and they can be destroyed by an enemy from a far distance.²⁸

This not only challenged the force composition for broad naval operations, but also seemed to deny altogether potential peacetime naval roles.

The Soviet Navy was slow to respond effectively to such a challenge. But as responses were made, they bore a marked similarity to American statements in the face of the same challenge:

Soviet naval thought opposes the one-sided exaggeration to an extreme of any particular arm [of the Navy]. Naval combat operations will develop over enormous ocean and coastal areas and will require the cooperation of all forces as well as comprehensive combat support for the main striking forces—the submarines. Surface ships in particular will have to solve a large number of tasks which in contemporary warfare conditions have become exceptionally complex.²⁹

This was expanded into a Soviet view of a balanced, multipurpose fleet. That view was introduced authoritatively by Gorshkov in 1967.³⁰ It meant the acquisition of multipurpose forces (as distinct from all-purpose forces) in the form of a variety of surface as well as subsurface ships and their application to achieve "state interests on the sea in peacetime."³¹ Hence, the Soviet Navy began to adopt a promotional pattern advocating a broad naval role.

This pattern has grown with recent advances in capability and deployment of Soviet naval forces. The Soviet Navy

has begun to conduct itself as if it were fulfilling a multipurpose naval role. And it has expressed support of such a role with peacetime applications. The most notable statement has come from the now celebrated series of articles by the Commander in Chief of the Navy, Admiral Gorshkov, under the informative title of "Navies in War and Peace."³² Gorshkov presents an extensive discussion, using a broad historical context (a typical protective covering for assertive statements in Soviet politics). Despite its scope, Gorshkov's discussion bears a remarkable resemblance to mission statements issued annually by the Chief of Naval Operations in the United States on behalf of appropriations requests. It is a statement advocating a wide range of naval force utilization:

Proceeding from the special features of the Navy as a military factor which can be used in peacetime for purposes of demonstrating the economic and military might of states beyond their borders, and from the fact that over a period of many centuries it has been the solitary form of armed forces capable of protecting the interests of a country overseas, in our view it is useful to examine questions related to this specific feature of naval forces as a real component part of the military organization of a state.³³

In presenting this case, Gorshkov promotes the institutional requirements of the Soviet Navy (the opening article indicated that the series would "foster the development in our officers of a unity of views on the role of navies under various historical conditions").³⁴ These requirements exist in the face of evident opposition which Gorshkov identifies in terms such as "opponents of Russian seapower," "bourgeois theoreticians," or as obscure historical figures.

Among Gorshkov's concerns are naval capabilities. Here he repeatedly

asserts the need for technologically advanced and versatile ships, noting that the navy "embodies in itself as many means of armed combat as practical of those which the other branches of the armed forces have at their disposal."³⁵ But in supporting versatility, Gorshkov appears to be deliberately indefinite about force utilization. He abjures a numerical comparison of navies on two separate occasions—in the opening and again in the closing article.³⁶ In the first instance he states that:

The qualitative transformations which have taken place in naval forces have also changed the relative might of navies and their combat groupings; we have had to cease comparing the number of warships of one type or another and their total displacement (or the number of guns in salvo or the weight of this salvo), and turn to a more complex, but also a more correct appraisal of the striking and defensive power of ships, based on a mathematical analysis of their capabilities and qualitative characteristics.³⁷

On previous occasions Gorshkov had made similar admonitions against counting naval capabilities in "commission pennants."³⁸ But an interesting facet of this theme is that it echoes arguments presented by the U.S. Navy for a balanced force beginning in the immediate postwar period and continuing to the present.³⁹ Like his American counterparts, Gorshkov argues for an indeterminate measure of naval force requirements.

Hence, perhaps the principal argument Gorshkov makes about naval forces is their utilization for political purposes. This is a recurrent theme throughout the series and is, in fact, the subject of one entire article.⁴⁰ Although identifying such political applications with the aggressive intentions of imperialist states, Gorshkov does not dissociate the Soviet Navy from the

means, only from the intent. Gorshkov is clearly an advocate of such uses:

... the role of a Navy is not limited to the execution of important missions in armed combat. While representing a formidable force in war, it has always been a political weapon of the imperialist states and an important support for diplomacy in peacetime owing to its inherent qualities which permit it to a greater degree than other branches of the armed forces to exert pressure on potential enemies without direct employment of weaponry.⁴¹

This case is vigorously supported with an explicit argument for conventional forces, i.e., surface ships, "intended to accomplish a wide range of missions both in peacetime and in war."⁴²

Implicitly, Gorshkov also expresses a sense of the analytical division between primary and collateral roles. He is, in other words, not promoting an alternate employment of naval forces but an additional employment.⁴³ He therefore acknowledges the primacy of submarines and their deterrent role, embraces the defensive posture of Soviet naval forces, and at least mentions naval support for continental land forces. But Gorshkov is interested primarily in promoting the collateral role, the conventional operation of naval units at sea. Thus he displays the breadth and emphasis on flexibility in the use of naval force characteristic of the promotional pattern.

It appears that this pattern has great utility in the service of institutional naval requirements. Regardless of differences in overall strategy, geographical configuration, naval evolution, or institutional context, the United States and the Soviet Navy have therefore followed a similar line of argumentation in support of their needs. Furthermore, this line has placed particular stress on precisely those areas of the use of force where policy objectives are ill defined.

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And these are the areas more concerned with foreign policy applications than with exclusively military capabilities.

With Soviet adoption of a promotional pattern, a third pattern of naval conduct has begun to emerge, that of symbiosis. This postulates a threat from the naval forces of a potential adversary to endorse one's own naval development. It is characteristic of naval arms races. The pattern thus utilizes competition with an adversary as a support in competition with institutional rivals.

Essentially domestic institutions seeking to maintain or enlarge their budgetary and influence bases need to enlist or harness the functional hostility of an external rival. If an enemy (or, preferably, enemies) cannot be specified, if graphs or extrapolated enemy capabilities cannot be produced, then it is a little difficult to insist upon improvement in weapons, or system replacement, let alone quantitative increase. General references to an uncertain future tend not to be persuasive to budget officials or to politicians insistent upon there being specific dangers against which a defence effort must be provided.⁴⁴

With regard to naval strategic issues, this pattern of symbiosis has been a relatively recent development in the Soviet and American cases.⁴⁵ That has largely been due to the lack of occasion, given the relative neglect of the Soviet Navy. In time, however, attention to American naval capability clearly shaped Soviet naval modernization. And, more recently, the process has become reciprocal. Now the United States and the Soviet Navy have come to refer to each other directly in support of claims upon resources.

This kind of reference is used in supporting the force capabilities of the opposing navies. But in each case the arguments are broadly construed. For example, in recent budget hearings

(fiscal year 1975), Admiral Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations, addressed the "relative balance between our naval forces and the naval forces of the USSR," stating that:

It is now evident, even to the most casual observer, that the historically land-oriented Soviet Union has embraced naval power as a major element of their foreign policy. They have acquired the ability to compete most effectively with us in the peacetime, para-diplomatic use of naval power. . . .⁴⁶

Admiral Gorshkov uses similar evidence to support his own navy's development. After describing the forward deployment of American naval forces, to which the Soviet Union "cannot remain indifferent," he asserts that:

Only powerful armed forces capable of blocking the unrestrained aggression displayed today all over the world can deter the aggressiveness of imperialism. In addition, of course, to the strategic missile forces, it is the Navy which is this kind of armed force capable in peacetime of visibly demonstrating to the peoples of friendly and hostile countries not only the power of military equipment and the perfection of the naval ships, embodying the technical and economic might of the state, but also its readiness to use this force in defense of state interests of our nation or for the security of the socialist countries.⁴⁷

Hence, both the American and Soviet Navy point to each other as a threat. They are, as one author has noted, "in vital functional alliance against domestic interests which argue for lower levels of defense expenditures and for a more benign interpretation of the forward naval deployment of the other side."⁴⁸ The most easily recognized elements of

this are SLBM forces. But, here again, only a narrow naval role is engaged.

A broader naval role, however, may be seen in symbiosis in the Mediterranean Sea. Both Soviet and American naval spokesmen have emphasized the presence of the opposite force there in order to support their own positions. American spokesmen have cited increasing Soviet Mediterranean deployments in arguments for a general U.S. naval force structure. On behalf of CVAN-70, for example, it was noted that while the Soviet Fleet had even outnumbered the American 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean, only the presence of U.S. aircraft carriers made the difference.⁴⁹ However, the arguments are generally not made in terms of military engagement, but those of political influence. Thus, Admiral Zumwalt has observed:

... there has been a significant political realignment of the countries along the Mediterranean. There is a correlation in our judgment between the existence of Soviet power in the Mediterranean and the strength of Soviet presence along the coastal area. If you look at 1960 and compare it to 1970, you can see that the Soviet influence has grown dramatically.⁵⁰

This statement and others like it indicate that the peacetime political implications of the use of Soviet naval force are a primary concern.

Soviet treatment of the Mediterranean emphasizes equally the American presence. Although still couched in the overall historical vein of the series, Admiral Gorshkov devotes considerable space to Mediterranean operations. The implication for contemporary naval deployment is clear:

The stay of the Russian Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea is an outstanding example of *autonomous operations by a large naval formation* completely cut off from its home ports, which

increased the international authority of Russia and evoked warm sympathy toward Russia by all peoples of the Mediterranean Sea basin.⁵¹

Gorshkov also supports Soviet presence on the basis of defense of the homeland. Although the threat for the Soviet Union is not specifically identified as the United States and the historical context is again stressed, the contemporary relevance of the argument is indisputable:

As is seen historically, it has turned out that when a threat arises of an enemy encroachment on the territory of Russia from the southwest, the Russian Fleet has moved into the Mediterranean Sea where it has successfully executed great strategic missions in defending the country's borders from aggression. In other words, our Fleet has shown the whole world that the Mediterranean Sea is not anyone's preserve or a closed lake and that Russia is a Mediterranean power.⁵²

Gorshkov then moves directly to the present and supports the Soviet Navy's position as a counterforce to the 6th Fleet, arguing that Soviet presence will enhance the prestige and influence of Soviet policy.⁵³ The connection is thereby made to the peacetime political roles of naval force.

Through symbiosis, the Soviet and American Navies each seek force structures pegged to that of the other. This includes qualitative improvements in naval capabilities. And leadtime, that measure of the period required to develop from planning to actual employment, adds a sense of anxiety. The terms of expression nevertheless remain imprecise. They refer to the ill-defined range of policy applications which exist at the lowest levels of the nuclear setting. These are again the peacetime and not the wartime uses of naval force where direct action between the two

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navies is unlikely. What matters in symbiosis, however, is not the likelihood of combat or a common strategic approach, but the support of conventional naval force represented in the political influence of naval forces of the other side.

From an institutional perspective, all of these approaches—adaptation, promotion and symbiosis—continue to function within the constraints of contemporary nuclear strategy. The mutual possession of the capacity to destroy completely requires that force used in pursuit of ordinary political objectives be amenable to selective and explicitly limited application. Nuclear strategy therefore provides a shelter for the advance of traditional naval roles. Conventional naval force can be applied selectively across a wide spectrum of indefinite policy goals. This has been the fundamental rationale for the entire

postwar force structure of the U.S. Navy. It is now emerging as the rationale for changing force structure in the Soviet Navy.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Professor B. Thomas Trout received his B.A. in international relations from the University of California at Los Angeles and his M.A. and Ph.D. from Indiana University, as well as the Russian

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NOTES

1. Colin S. Gray, "The Arms Race Phenomenon," *World Politics*, October 1971, p. 74.
2. Michael Howard, "The Transformation of Strategy," J.L. Moulton, ed., *Brassey's Annual, 1972* (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 1.
3. Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966).
4. Edward Wegener, "Theory of Naval Strategy in the Nuclear Age," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, May 1972, p. 200: "Carriers of atomic weapons at sea are thus, properly speaking, part of the 'strategic' atomic forces of a nation. The navy acts merely as a trustee. The line is then clearly drawn: naval warfare is not involved. 'Strategic' submarines have nothing to do with the battleships of former time."
5. L.W. Martin, *The Sea in Modern Strategy* (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 167.
6. Barry M. Blechman, *The Changing Soviet Navy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1973), p. 20.
7. *Ibid.*, also James Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force* (New York: Praeger, 1971), p. 131 "... the motives for which warships are built seldom foreshadow the actual nature of their employment, even in war, and are almost irrelevant to their utility in time of peace."
8. This was exemplified in the remarks of a naval spokesman before Congress: "... the difference between the forces that you can acquire in view of the fiscal restraints and the forces that are considered required on the basis of military judgement in light of the threat and the strategic objectives . . . is simply a measure of risk." Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, U.S. Congress, Joint Senate-House Armed Services Subcommittee on CVAN-70 Aircraft Carrier, *CVAN Aircraft Carrier*, Joint Hearings, 91st Congress, 2d sess. (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970), p. 287. Hereafter cited as CVAN-70.
9. Some qualifications should be entered. First, although the similarities in naval institutional roles will be stressed here, the differences in the overall political processes should not be overlooked. Second, by stressing institutional roles it should not be assumed that the forces and capabilities of the adversary are ignored, only that the effort to respond is internal. Finally, it should not be assumed that a naval establishment is monolithic; intraservice disputes, though not addressed here, may have a bearing on determinations of strategy.

10. For a full discussion see Vincent Davis, *The Admirals Lobby* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1967).

11. Blechman, p. 37. See also *Wall Street Journal*, 5 February 1974, p. 5.

12. For a discussion of the Soviet Navy's share and the problems associated with its calculation see Raymond Hutchings, "The Economic Burden of the Soviet Navy," Michael McGwire, ed., *Soviet Naval Developments* (Halifax, N.S.: Dalhousie University, n.d.), pp. 182-197.

13. In testimony before Congress in September 1945 (just 1 month after the atomic bomb was first used), then Secretary of the Navy Forrestal stated the Navy's "intention to adapt the atomic bomb to carrier-based planes." U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Naval Affairs, *Composition of the Post-War Navy*, Hearings, 79th Congress, 1st sess., 1945, p. 1165. Quoted in Davis, p. 188.

14. Dominic A. Paolucci, "The Development of Navy Strategic Offensive and Defensive Systems," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, May 1970, p. 207.

If seapower were going to continue to make a contribution to U.S. security and international affairs, the United States Navy should have the capability of delivering the most powerful weapons of the time, in this case, atomic bombs, from the sea. The U.S. Navy was behind at this juncture, but not too far. A new 60,000-ton aircraft carrier was on the drawing boards and design competition was underway for an attack plane with a 10,000-pound payload capacity.

15. The evolution of this system is well presented in Harvey M. Sapolsky, *The Polaris System Development* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972).

16. Robert W. Herrick, *Soviet Naval Strategy* (Annapolis, Md.: United States Naval Institute, 1968), pp. 63-64.

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 57-66.

18. S.G. Gorshkov, "Razvitie sovetskogo Voennno-morskogo iskusstva," *Morskoi sbornik*, No. 2 (February) 1967, p. 16. Quoted in Herrick, p. 63.

19. This statement is from a booklet issued by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in 1947—quoted in Davis, pp. 206-207.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 209.

21. Paul Y. Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers: Appropriations, Strategy and Politics," Harold Stein, ed., *American Civil-Military Decisions* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1963), pp. 465-567.

22. CVAN-70, p. 5.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 61:

The primary function of the United States Navy is to gain and maintain general naval supremacy, to control vital sea areas, to protect vital sea lines of communication, to establish and maintain local superiority (including air) in an area of naval operations, to seize and defend advanced naval bases and to conduct such land and air operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign; in short, to gain, maintain and exploit control of the seas and the air over the seas, in support of our national objectives. . . .

The attack carrier is the principal ship of the surface fleet through which our Navy maintains its supremacy at sea. The attack carrier fills this role because it represents airpower at sea. History has conclusively demonstrated that naval surface forces cannot survive in the face of a strong air threat without air superiority.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 17. The "spectrum of war" was presented in a slide which read as follows: Nuclear war, major conventional war, limited war, sublimated war, cold war.

Peace—most probable future conflicts will be below the threshold of major conventional war.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 222.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 63.

27. Gorshkov, pp. 19-20. Quoted in Herrick, p. 68.

28. N.S. Khrushchev, *Pravda*, 9 July 1964. Quoted in George E. Hudson, "Soviet Naval Doctrine, 1953-1957," Michael McGwire, ed., *Soviet Naval Developments* (Halifax, N.S.: Dalhousie University, n.d.), p. 251.

29. V. Prokof'ev, "Glavnaia udarnaia sila v voine na more," *Krasnaia zvezda*, 13 January 1962. Quoted in Herrick, p. 73. This statement can usefully be compared with that quoted in Davis, pp. 206-207 (fn.19).

30. Hudson, p. 252.

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31. For an introduction to the concept of balance see George E. Hudson, "The Soviet Doctrines of Balance and Denial," a Paper prepared for the Seminar on Soviet Naval Developments. 14-17 October 1973, Halifax, N.S.

32. Published in 11 installments in *Morskoi sbornik*, over a 12-month period, No. 2 (February) 1972 to No. 2 (February) 1973. A 12th article (No. 7 (July) 1972), under Gorshkov's signature, interrupted the sequence with an obvious and inadequately explained *non sequitur*. Such occurrences in Soviet publications commonly indicate debate over or disapproval of the content of an article.

33. S.G. Gorshkov, "Voенно-морские флоты в войнах и в мирное время," *Morskoi sbornik*, No. 2 (February) 1972, p. 23. Cited hereafter as Gorshkov, "voенно- . . .," with identification of the specific article.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

36. Gorshkov, "Voенно- . . .," *Morskoi sbornik*, No. 2 (February) 1972, p. 20; Gorshkov, "Voенно- . . .," *Morskoi sbornik*, No. 2 (February) 1973, p. 21.

37. Gorshkov, "Voенно- . . .," *Morskoi sbornik*, No. 2 (February) 1972, p. 20.

38. Herrick, pp. 82-83.

39. In September 1945, then Chief of Naval Operations Admiral King said in congressional testimony (quoted in Davis, p. 186):

I hope that you gentlemen will not take numbers as measuring the relative strength of navies. I would like to emphasize that the strength of the Navy does not lie in the number of ships alone . . . the Navy's losses at Okinawa emphasize more clearly than any other thing the variety of tasks that the Navy has done and should be ready to do. It is not ship against ship alone.

As recently as 1972, the Chief of Naval Operations stated that (U.S. Congress, Senate, Appropriations Committee, *Department of Defense Appropriations Fiscal Year 1973*, Hearings, 92d Congress, 2d sess., 1972, p. 77: ". . . comparing two navies principally on the basis of numbers of ships, weapons and aircraft may not constitute an accurate assessment of their relative strengths. Many intangibles must be considered. . . ."

40. Gorshkov, "Voенно- . . .," *Morskoi sbornik*, No. 12 (December) 1972, pp. 14-22.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

42. Gorshkov, "Voенно- . . .," *Morskoi sbornik*, No. 2 (February), 1973, p. 21.

43. This point is expanded in Robert Weinland, "The Changing Mission Structure of the Soviet Navy," Michael McCWire, ed., *Soviet Naval Developments* (Halifax, N.S.: Dalhousie University, n.d.), pp. 260-274.

44. Colin S. Gray, "The Urge to Compete: Rationales for Arms Racing," *World Politics*, January 1974, p. 216.

45. See Thomas W. Wolfe, "Soviet Naval Interaction with the United States and Its Influence on Soviet Naval Development," Michael McCWire, ed., *Soviet Naval Developments* (Halifax, N.S.: Dalhousie University, n.d.), pp. 215-245.

46. Chief of Naval Information, *Weekly Newsgram*, 28 March 1974.

47. Gorshkov, "Voенно- . . .," *Morskoi sbornik*, No. 2 (February), 1973, p. 21.

48. Gray, "The Urge to Compete. . . .," p. 217.

49. CVAN-70, p. 384. The argument was that airpower was the Soviet weakness:

The more numerous Soviet Mediterranean Fleet was without adequate bases, without air cover, logistically vulnerable and heavily dependent upon surveillance by their surface units using visual means. Their entire surface force was vulnerable to our long range air attack from the carriers, whose aircraft outrange their cruise missiles and naval guns.

50. U.S. Congress, Senate, Appropriations Committee, *Department of Defense Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1972*, Hearings, 92d Congress, 1st sess., 1971, p. 17.

51. Gorshkov, "Voенно- . . .," *Morskoi sbornik*, No. 3 (March), 1972, p. 27. [Emphasis added.]

52. *Ibid.*, p. 31.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 32.