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The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations has, since its inception in 1915, extended its managerial responsibility to virtually every facet of the Navy. In doing so, it has violated most of the fundamental rules of good bureaucratic management and is now unable to cope with the hard decisions necessitated by a world of resource scarcity and international naval competition. What is called for is a major structural change, one incorporating the basic functional objective of "effectiveness" in a vertically structured system designed to accommodate both specialization of effort and unity of command by clearly delineating authority.

A RATIONAL APPROACH TO RESTRUCTURING THE OFFICE OF THE CNO

A research paper prepared

by

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THE PROBLEM

A common pastime for many naval officers assigned to OPNAV is speculating on how OPNAV could be organized to better perform its mission. Different officers always seem to have various perspectives on how this could be accomplished, usually influenced by the point of view of the particular area to which they are assigned. Although all such solutions are offered to "make OPNAV function better," each proposal tends to reflect the particular problem of the moment and to support the personal interests of the designer. Thus, some suggestions would promote greater efficiency in handling personnel or resources, others would expedite the decisionmaking process, and still others would put related activities together.

Never explicitly offered as reasons for restructuring OPNAV, but undoubtedly extant, are such bureaucratic reasons as "empire building," "gaining access to resources," or personal career enhancement.

In opposition to a full-scale re-vamping of the OPNAV structure are easily recognizable organizational constraints which tend to ensure that any structural changes are incremental at best and the fact that the personal motivations of each of the rivals for influence and position are readily recognized and opposed by each of the other actors.

This paper has attempted to draw back from the intra-OPNAV squabbling form of reorganizing OPNAV, get to the heart of some of the real problems, and design a simple, comprehensive solution

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based on an objective and rational approach to the problem of "how can OPNAV perform better?"

THE DEVELOPMENT OF OPNAV

The missions of the Office of the CNO have been stated in varying terms by Congress, by Executive Order of the President, by the U.S. Code, and by the Navy itself. Each of these has had the effect of building upon the other rather than redefining CNO's mission and have therefore tended to expand CNO's role within the Naval Establishment. All of them tend to relate the duties of CNO to the preparation, readiness, training, support, and operations of the fleet; determining objectives and requirements for the Navy; and coordinating the administration of all naval activities. In addition, the CNO is charged with being the Navy representative on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and acting as adviser for naval matters to the President and to the Secretary of the Navy. Finally, the CNO is responsible for establishing policy, developing plans, and for controlling the allocation of resources within the Navy. OPNAV, the staff of the CNO, is expected to serve the CNO in all of these roles.

It has not been ever thus. The Office of the CNO was instituted in 1915 to provide professional military assistance to the Secretary of the Navy as to the conduct of war and the operations and support of the fleet. The Secretary of the Navy at that time personally ran the Navy both operationally and administratively through the various offices and bureaus.¹ As naval warfare became more technical, the Secretary of the Navy increasingly felt the need for professional expertise. Unfortunately, no one bureau had authority over another, and all six reported directly to the Secretary of the Navy. The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations was created to be responsible to the Secretary of the Navy for "rendering

decisions [as to requirements] upon which the various Bureaus and offices may base their administrative work."² CNO (and OPNAV) was still not an operational command, being authorized only to provide liaison for the Secretary of the Navy between the naval activities and the administrative bureaus and offices of the Navy. The adjacency of the Office of the CNO to the Secretary of the Navy had a strong effect however, and increasingly the Secretary called on one man—the CNO—to determine the status, operations, and requirements of the naval service. This situation continued until World War II, with OPNAV evolving into the focal point for information about the Navy as the CNO gradually considered his control over the bureaus and offices. But with the onset of the two-ocean war, the President felt the need for immediate professional advice about the conduct of naval operations. Since the Office of the CNO was by design only an administrative office and the desire to maintain the bilinear system continued,³ the new position of Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet (COMINCH) was created to monitor the operational side of the Navy and to advise the President and the Secretary of the Navy on war plans and operations. In March 1942 the two jobs were combined under one person, but separate staffs were maintained for the offices of the COMINCH and the CNO, thus preserving the spirit and intent of the bilinear system. By the time the office of COMINCH was disestablished immediately following World War II, the CNO was accustomed to both operational and administrative matters. The Navy had effectively become a unilinear system, and the Chief of Naval Operations, rather than the Secretary of the Navy, was thenceforth the most controlling force in the Navy.

The passage of the National Security Act of 1947 merely formalized what had already taken place. The fact that unified commanders were established to

direct U.S. military operations has not reduced the operational importance of the chiefs of the services. Since only the service chiefs have control over the resources (budgets, weapons, manpower, et cetera), the unified commanders are virtually powerless unless they are both authorized to operate by the JCS and are provided with the resources by the individual services.

The evolutionary trend toward centralizing the power formerly held by the Secretary of the Navy, the Navy bureaus, and the fleet commanders all into one office was not without its problems. As early as 1954, the first of five major studies on how OPNAV might be improved noted a "poor pattern of responsibility; and inadequate internal and external relationships."⁴ Twenty years, four studies, and three major reorganizations later, a special study informed us that "lines of accountability, responsibility, and channels of communications are unclear," indicating a general lack of effective management control.⁵

The significant point is that no study has yet concluded that OPNAV was performing at an adequate level of efficiency. The 1962 report recommended that CNO, through OPNAV, assume the sole responsibility for planning, for determining requirements, and for formulating programs and controlling the budget and that a Chief of Naval Supply be established to act as a "Single Executive Producer" to report directly to the Secretary of the Navy (rather than to the CNO). The latter recommendation would have removed the administrative and support roles from the CNO and left him free to control plans, operations, and programs as well as perform as chief spokesman for the Navy and JCS member. In keeping with the recommended breakdown of roles, a hybrid developed in the form of the "Major Staff Office" concept, wherein the directors of these new OPNAV offices (called DMSO's) were to

monitor and conduct liaison with the respective bureaus while the Deputy CNO's would only determine requirements and develop programs. However, both the DCNO's and DMSO's were to report to the CNO and had the effect of increasing the size and decreasing the coordination within OPNAV by adding to the number of power centers. The DCNO's were reluctant to give up their previous authority to deal directly with the bureaus, and the DMSO's tended to evolve into representatives for special aspects of warfare, thus competing against the DCNO's for resources rather than coordinating with them.

A 1966 study once again recommended that a single command be set up to coordinate the efforts of the Navy's bureaus, that functional tasks which need not be performed at the OPNAV level be removed from OPNAV, and that OPNAV concentrate on policy, objectives, requirements, and programs. This time the Naval Material Command was established, and the various bureaus became subservient to the Chief of Naval Material. But rather than have CHNAVMAT report to the Secretary of the Navy, the system was structured so that he would report to the CNO. By virtue of the fact that the Naval Material Command was subservient to OPNAV, the DCNO's and DMSO's continued to monitor and control the functions formerly performed by the bureaus and offices by instituting program sponsors to parallel CHNAVMAT's project managers. Rather than reduce OPNAV's role, as had been intended, once again the power and size of OPNAV had been increased, and once again management of the Naval Establishment became more complex.

Subsequent internal reorganizations of OPNAV have also failed to correct the chronic problems. Various realignments have only succeeded in changing the players and their roles and have done little, if anything, to improve on the problems of overlapping juris-

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diction, lack of accountability, and unclear channels of communication.

In addition to reorganizations which usually follow major studies, OPNAV undergoes frequent minor reorganization. These minor changes include the establishment of new offices; the promotion or demotion of a power center by changing the level in the hierarchy at which it reports; the combining or splitting of existing offices; and the "buying" and "selling" of various shops as bureaucratic empires are born, grow, and dwindle within OPNAV. These frequent organizational changes may result from any of the following factors:

- *New offices may be created to deal with special problems.* This can be the case where an office is created within OPNAV either specifically to deal with a new or particular problem (such as the now defunct OP-093 to deal with the ASCM threat) or to coordinate various ongoing activities in the Navy which bear on a particular problem (such as OP-097 for Ship Acquisition and Modernization).

- *OPNAV may be forced to modify its existing structure to conform to the requirements of higher authority.* These requirements most often come directly from the Department of Defense, either formally as in the 1970 move to centralize all operational authority in the JCS, which resulted in the demotion of OP-03 from the DCNO for Operations and Readiness to the DCNO for Surface Warfare, or informally as in the rise of the programing and analysis offices in the early 1960's to keep pace with the Systems Analysis Office at the DOD level. Impetus for reorganization may also come from outside of DOD, most often from Congress, when the Navy perceives that a different organization will provide it with better congressional liaison and a better bargaining position in the pursuit of a higher budget.

- *Normal bureaucratic maneuvering often prompts intraorganizational restructuring.* Competition for resources,

attempts to acquire better access to power centers, maneuvers to improve liaison capabilities with external agencies, efforts to consolidate one's own personal power, and even routine conflicts in interpersonal relationships may all contribute to providing various stimuli for a reordering of the hierarchy. Depending upon the source of the stimulus, actors may form alliances which may eventually result in consolidation of their respective offices, or a particularly strong actor may argue that his efforts can be performed more efficiently if the resources of some other office or offices are moved under his control. Depending also on the intensity of the conflict, the object of the competition may range from the size of office space or the number of personnel to a complete restructuring of that portion of the organization which is involved.

- *Finally, OPNAV may be reorganized for no other reason than that it allows the CNO a greater degree of control for a greater, if still temporary, period of time.* Aspects of both the bureaucratic and the organizational models tend to restrict the CNO's flexibility in controlling the affairs of the Navy and limit his options in determining directions for the future. It therefore seems that the CNO, particularly early in his term, tends to reorganize OPNAV on a recurring basis in order to disorient bureaucratic power centers to allow him to operate, at least temporarily, without being thwarted by his own staff. In addition to his own instincts for the type of staff organization and system he desires, reorganization early in his term also secures the new CNO's role as "the boss," setting him up as the one cohesive element in the new structure (since theoretically only he knows how the new relationships are supposed to work). The threat of future reorganizations serves to ensure future compliance with his desires. Finally, an early effort to reorganize OPNAV to his liking is a test of the

personal and suasive power of the new CNO, for to the extent to which he is successful in restructuring OPNAV will the new CNO's forcefulness, influence, and authority be perceived by the other major actors within OPNAV.

In summary, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations has been reorganized repeatedly for various reasons, ranging from major efforts to improve efficiency to reactions to external realities, to internal bureaucratic maneuvering. Yet, despite the many changes, study after study finds the same basic faults and problems in the organizational system. If, as seems likely to this writer, OPNAV's chronic problems are fundamentally systematic flaws rather than structured weaknesses (i.e., faults in the way the decisionmaking process works rather than a failure to hit on the right set of organizational relationships), it follows that these chronic problems are not correctable simply by continuing to switch responsibilities within the basic framework of the venerated DCNO/DMSO structure. It is therefore proposed that a totally new structure would then be required, one developed specifically to overcome the systematic weaknesses which are increasingly restricting OPNAV's—and the CNO's—ability to make the necessary decisions for the future and therefore ultimately to control the Navy itself.

THE CHRONIC PROBLEMS IN OPNAV

In order to develop a model for a new organizational system for OPNAV, the chronic problems must first be reviewed. The most recent major study of OPNAV⁶ identified numerous problems, but almost all are summarized in the following five categories:

- Lack of accountability and responsibility and unclear channels of communication;
- Overlapping missions and charters and a resultant excessive competition for resources.

- Duplication of functions resulting in conflicts, redundancies, continual internecine warfare, and a consequent reduction in efficient and systematic management;

- Excessive informal organization and extraorganizational growth; and,

- Lack of responsiveness to the decisions, desires, and directives of the CNO.

From table I it can be seen that these broad problem areas stem from fundamental roots: the areas of authority, anatomy, jurisdictional boundaries, structure, and organizational style. A sixth problem area not specifically mentioned in the report, but which seems to transcend and pervade the other five areas, is that of inability to agree on the really hard decisions. This indicates a lack of common perception of organizational direction.

If the general conclusions of the matrix in table I are accepted, one is forced to realize that more than just structural weaknesses underlie the problems in OPNAV. This being the case, more than just tinkering with the existing structural framework will be required to correct these chronic and increasingly crippling problems.

Perhaps the basic problem lies with the scope of the CNO's job. No one man can do it all, and no single staff can do it for him. The CNO should retain the right to make the decisions and to don any of his caps at any time in order to be able to do so, but he ought not to be required to wear all of the caps at once. That then becomes a question of how the CNO should best delegate his authority. Ideally, he ought to delegate all but the most important and far-reaching decisions and reserve to himself only those hard decisions which cannot be made at a lower level. Doing so would allow him greater personal flexibility of time, action, and choice, but would necessarily involve the greater risk of his specific desires not being brought di-

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TABLE I: MATRIX OF OPNAV ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS

Problems in OPNAV (grouped by origin)	Essence of Problem	Origin of Problem	Solution
Lack of accountability Lack of responsibility Unclear communications	Delegation, hierarchy, lack of interpersonal relationships	Authority	Clearly identify and adhere to relationships and communication patterns and channels
Missions overlap Excessive competition for resources	Line vs. staff confusion Loss of integrity of resources	Anatomy	Separate planning from execution
Duplication of efforts Lack of efficient management	Coordination, interfacing, size, variety of tasks	Jurisdiction	Simplify, establish jurisdictional limits
Excessive informal organization Uncontrolled organization growth	Organizational rigidity Resistance to change	Structure	Clearly define roles of leading actors
Lack of responsiveness to CNO	Centralization/ decentralization	Style	Firmly locate point of decisionmaking authority
Inability to make hard choices	Lack of agreement on objectives	Direction	Implement hierarchical organization based on single objective

rectly to bear. However, this delegation of authority to make decisions, despite its risk, is also one of the glues that holds an organization together. The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations has to step back from being a party to every decision in order to be able to make the really hard decisions.

The notorious duplication of efforts and the lack of efficiency is a consequence of the size, variety of tasks, numerous interfacing, and the persistent and increasingly frustrating attempt at "coordination" within OPNAV. As far back as 1919, the CNO set forth in his "Organization Orders" that decisions were to be coordinated and that every office and officer should feel free to talk to any other about any matter being considered. The stated purpose of this OPNAV coordination system was to "ensure a unified approach, and to avoid overlapping, duplication, and contradictions, and to avoid

rigid channels of communication."⁷ This effort at informal coordination, possible perhaps when the CNO's staff consisted of three deputies and less than 50 officers, has taken on a hallowed aspect and still demands that each decision be a mutually agreed position even though OPNAV now consists of 12 major deputies and over 1,100 officers. In view of such size, if every office is expected to keep track of other related offices and their programs, it is not surprising that shadow organizations continually crop up and that duplication of effort exists. It should be recognized that the tight informal organization envisioned by Admiral Benson in 1919 no longer exists; OPNAV is a colossus which can only be managed by delegating authority, setting firm jurisdictional boundaries, clarifying channels of communication, simplifying the coordination process, and relying on unbiased professional expertise and

responsibility to overcome the inherent risks.

The abnormal amount of informal organization and extraorganizational growth is primarily due to the Navy's propensity to create new offices for new problems rather than work within the existing structure. This results in the creation of new power entities which often capitalize on their broad charter, unusual open access to resources, and high visibility to compete with existing entities rather than self-destruct once their original missions are accomplished. Prime examples are the Special Projects Office when BUAER and BUORD could not agree in jurisdiction over the nuclear submarine program and the creation of OP-095 (ASW) when platform sponsors could not coordinate a broad effort in the ASW field. The reasons why the CNO is inclined to go outside the existing framework are:

- The strong pressures against CNO to avoid "playing favorites" in the face of the tight competition for resources among the existing power brokers.

- The difficulty existing power centers have in gearing up for new crash efforts since funding categories assigned to each tend to become rigid, and new program categories are likely to be challenged by rival centers as mere maneuvers to obtain more funds.

- The difficulty that existing OPNAV offices have in operating outside of established channels.

This is a result of normal organizational pressures, including a lack of open and complete communications and organizational rigidity with the consequent uncertainty, mistrust, high conformity, and low performance levels.⁸ If, as organizational theorists frequently point out, overcomplexity of organizational structure is one of the most fundamental and important causes of poor management of people and resources, then this propensity of OPNAV to function outside of channels is detrimental to the efficiency and morale as

well as the structure of the organization. The organization, particularly in its higher echelons, must be kept simple and avenues of communications kept clear.

Where a chief executive attempts to participate in every decision, there is a tendency to become bogged down in details, pragmatism, and relatively short-term problem solving. The increasing centralization of Navy decisionmaking at the OPNAV level has had the effect of reducing the autonomy of other commands and thereby reduces their ability to make decisions on issues more relevant to them or on which they often have more expertise. However, while these issues are drawn to OPNAV—usually on the argument that coordination can be better effected there—the CNO himself does not usually make these decisions, and the issues tend to be hashed out at lower levels of OPNAV. Often, although not always, if the CNO is personally consulted at all, his decision is usually in the form of a "GO-NO" decision on a single, well-coordinated position rather than a choice from among alternatives.⁹

Underlying all of the specific problems seems to be the fact that OPNAV simply is not organized or oriented toward making the difficult decisions. Apart from the anatomical, jurisdictional, structural, and stylistic organizational problems, all of which relate to efficiency, there appears to be a lack of general agreement as to objectives in the Navy which contributes to a lack of effective decisionmaking at the highest echelons. This, in large part, may be attributable to the well-known conflicts inherent among the air, surface, and subsurface communities, not to mention the operations versus support and mission versus platform conflicts. To an extent, disagreement as to objectives is healthy, for it helps bring alternatives to the attention of the CNO. However, after the CNO's decision is made, he should be able to expect the support of

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his subordinates, rather than having his directions ignored or delayed. This has become increasingly important as recent budget requests have met with a greater amount of skepticism from Congress. Previously there was enough to go around to satisfy, at least in part, all competing viewpoints and proposals. Now, with a firm lid on budget ceilings, with increasing sophistication of new systems, and with correspondingly increasing costs, the slack in the competition for resources has been taken up and goals can no longer be so widely differing. A consolidation of goals is becoming essential for the Navy, but the likelihood of any agreement as to what those goals should be has lessened. Since coordinated decisionmaking requires mutual values and expectations, it should not be surprising that it is becoming increasingly more difficult for OPNAV to make decisions on the tough questions. In fact, where goals are incompatible, the goals themselves tend to be modified to the extent that the means become part of the goals. This is exactly what is now happening in OPNAV—there is no longer much pretense of pursuit of specific goals, the goal is becoming the ability to survive within budget constraints, and thus the budget more and more is driving the Navy rather than the other way around. Organizational success does require agreement on goals and on means to those goals, but in lieu of general agreement, one of the most important functions of authority is to permit decisionmaking to be effected even without agreement of all of the actors.¹⁰

The conclusion to be drawn is that if the CNO is to, in fact, run the Navy, a strong system for the making of even the most difficult decisions and the clear authority to make those decisions must be vested in the CNO. This authority must be reinforced by an organizational structure modeled for efficiency in its ability to present options


and implement decisions. To be efficient, this structure must accommodate both specialization of effort and unity of command by clearly delineating authority. The CNO would then be able to provide direction to the Navy, even lacking prior agreement of his subordinates as to goals, but he would delegate responsibility for execution and implementation of his policies (as well as for most of the decision-making) to a minimal number of subordinates. An organizational system to implement these concepts, if one could be derived, might not correct all of the chronic problems that have been noted in OPNAV, but it would appear to have a better chance of attacking all of them at once than would just another effort to change only the structure.

A PROPOSAL FOR A NEW ORGANIZATION

To develop a model for a new organizational system at the Navy's highest command level,¹¹ the functional objective of that system must first be clearly established. Whatever subgoals may be argued, ultimately there seems to be general agreement that "readiness" is the end of all of the activity of the Navy. In normal peacetime, readiness is "preparedness"; in a combat environment it is "effectiveness." But in both cases readiness is the Navy's *capability* to perform from both equipment and personnel aspects; warfare *effectiveness* (which includes fleet operations and training, strategy, and tactics); and *planning*, which includes strategic objectives, establishing requirements, and fiscal control in both the long and short term.

Using these four categories as the basic inputs, a model has been developed for naval readiness and is included in table II. The model includes in series sequence the various contributors to each major input and, where applicable, roughly identifies the operations

TABLE II--INPUTS TO NAVAL READINESS



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of each by relating it to the OP-code of an existing office of OPNAV or to the command title of an existing office or bureau in the Naval Establishment.

The model is adaptable to a hierarchical system for managing the Navy. One Deputy CNO could be placed in charge of the four input areas. In place of the time-honored, horizontally structured coordination system, decision-making and decision execution would be accomplished by establishing vertical relationships between offices in each input quadrant. Each office would operate with greater autonomy, but also with greater responsibility for its own performance and, ideally, with greater expertise.

There are several specific revolutionary concepts inherent in this proposal, aside from the specific structure and system itself. There would be no bureaus or offices operating outside of the cognizance of the CNO and his Deputy CNO's. Commands now established as separate entities would assume roles within the proposed structure. Perhaps most noteworthy of all, the Naval Reserve would be directly incorporated into the proposed structure under respective elements of the DCNO's rather than operating as a semiautonomous organization. An alternative would be to establish the Chief of Naval Reserve as a fourth DCNO and develop a shadow organization for the Naval Reserve to parallel and interface with the proposed basic structure.

Figures 1 and 2 outline one proposed hierarchical structure derived from the model. The major difference from the model is that the DCNO for Naval Management is a member of the CNO's direct staff in order to act as arbitrator, while the other three DCNO's function with more autonomy in heading up their own quadrants but hierarchically are placed at an immediately subordinate level to the CNO. The commanders of the fleets would, of course, continue to report directly to the CNO. The Vice

Chief of Naval Operations would function less as chief administrator of the Naval Establishment (as is now the case) and be able to devote more time to operating as the alter ego for the CNO, thus easing the personal obligations of both the CNO and VCNO.

The advantages of the proposed system would seem to be numerous. Authority would be delegated and channels of communications clarified, thereby reducing duplications and inefficiencies. Planning would be separated from execution, responsibilities for implementation would be clearly assigned, and jurisdictional boundaries would be definitive, thereby avoiding internecine warfare and eliminating the tendency to go outside the system to handle new problems. The total structure would be vastly simplified and the number of persons reporting to the CNO reduced. In addition to being a systematic approach to dealing with the previously identified chronic problem areas of authority, anatomy, jurisdiction, structure, and style, the new system would be organized (as has been repeatedly recommended by the last four major studies) so that the central programming function would be positioned to provide strong direction and discipline to all Navy efforts, thus dealing with the sixth problem area, "direction." By retaining direct control over plans and the budget, the CNO would have the authority and ability to provide direction to and control over the entire Naval Establishment, but by limiting the functions of the CNO staff to plans and programming, functions performed at other levels would not be duplicated at the CNO level.

CONCLUSION

In view of both the magnitude and direction of this proposal, it is worth recalling FDR's famous comment concerning the Navy's adaptability: "To change anything in the Na-a-vy is like




Fig. 1—Proposed New OPNAV Organizational Structure




Fig. 2—Proposed Organization of CNO Staff

punching a feather bed. You punch it with your right and you punch it with your left until you are finally exhausted, and then you find the damn bed just as it was before you started punching."

Possibly the Navy still consciously prefers to be the "feather bed" that FDR found it to be, since it can thereby avoid being pinned down or made to serve a particular master. And with Congress looking for places to cut the defense budget, it may be making it easy for them to pin the Navy down, if we conform to a clear and simple organization structure. On the other hand, we are finding that Congress has taken to making across-the-board cuts even when they cannot pinpoint the user on the program that is being hurt, but the services are having to take the cuts out of their hides anyway. In that case it may be better to take the initiative in streamlining ourselves for effective utilization of our resources so that the rationale for our budget requests becomes clearer.

Perhaps the Navy still covets its position of being a service apart with its own traditional autonomy and therefore accepts a given amount of lost efficiency in order to preserve that autonomy. If that is the case, however, then that too ought to be a hard and conscious decision, because to preserve our autonomy by losing resources through a lesser efficient system of management means ships and planes and weapons sacrificed for the objective of tradition itself.

The writer accepts the fact that these and other valid organizational and bureaucratic for not accepting the proposed model do exist; to deny them would be unrealistic. The constant striving for visibility and adjacency to power has more practical implications as well. The ability to wield influence on Capitol Hill and within other circles of the Government, particularly in mustering of support and funds for new

programs, is often perceived to be a function of the right of the representative of the special interest to speak directly to and for the CNO. Organizational resistance to change, the historical continuity of the basic OPNAV structure, and the ingrained habit of "coordinating" and compromising would all add to the difficulty of implementing the new system. If these reasons are more important than operating at peak efficiency, then a rationally modelled system as has been proposed herein is not wanted. If, on the other hand, it is necessary to obtain and efficiently manage all the resources we can if we are to be the best Navy we can be, then a rational system such as has been proposed should be given serious consideration.

Major organizational change requires new ideas and a strong stimulus for a change. To be successful the change has to be so thorough that entrenched interests can neither resist it nor ignore it. The theory set forth herein of rationally modeling the structure and system of OPNAV is new, and the OPNAV structure proposed would be nothing if not a total change. The stimulus may exist in the ever-increasing competition for an ever-decreasing usable portion of the defense budget.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Lt. Comdr. Kenneth R. McGruther, U.S. Navy, graduated from Dartmouth College and has done graduate work at Indiana University. He has served in U.S.S. *Loyalty* (MSO-457), U.S.S. *Hissem* (DER-400), and U.S.S. *Roark* (DE-1053) as Operations Officer and had a tour in Washington with the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. He recently graduated with distinction from the College of Naval Command and Staff.

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The proposed system is one suggestion and does not pretend to be either a panacea or complete in itself. The purpose of this article was not to write a new organization manual for the Navy, but to establish that there is more to

improving OPNAV than just moving boxes around on an organization chart and also to suggest that an efficient and effective organization is possible. Hopefully these ideas are not just two more punches at the feather bed.

NOTES

1. In 1915 the Navy Department bureaus consisted of the Bureaus of Medicine and Surgery, Supplies and Accounts, Yards and Docks, Ordnance, Shops, and Personnel. The Bureaus of Navigation and Aeronautics were added later.

2. U.S. Office of Naval Operations, *Revised Organization Orders of the Office of Naval Operations* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1919).

3. The bilinear system referred to the clear separation of operational responsibility from administrative and support responsibility. The civilian government, through the Secretary of the Navy, controlled operations, while the service, through the CNO, was charged with its own administration and support.

4. U.S. Navy Department, *Report of the Committee on Organization of the Department of the Navy* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1954).

5. Richard A. Beaumont, *Major Organizational Considerations for the Chief of Naval Operations* (New York: n.p., 1973).

6. *Ibid.*, p. 72.

7. U.S. Navy Department, *Review of the Management of the Department of the Navy*, NAVEXOS 2426B (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1963).

8. Chris Argyris, in *Organization and Innovation* (Homewood, Ill.: Irwin, 1965), has constructed an excellent model of organizational rigidity, the derivation and pattern of which is recognizable in the OPNAV structure and method of operations.

9. The development of the CNO Executive Board (CEB) has helped in bringing varying viewpoints to the personal attention of the CNO, but the majority of decisions either still tend to be previously coordinated by the organization or bureaucratic factors tend to influence members of the CEB to avoid taking isolated and unpopular positions.

10. Herbert A. Simon, *Administrative Behavior*, 2d ed. (Toronto: Collier-Macmillan, 1965), p. 161.

11. The term "OPNAV" will henceforth become increasingly ambiguous in this paper. Since the new system which will be proposed would include the entirety of the Naval Establishment, the new highest level of command could be conceived of either moving all other major Washington commands directly into the present OPNAV structure or removing most of what is now OPNAV to a different command level subordinate to the CNO. For simplicity the term "OPNAV" will continue to be used but should be understood to mean the broad superstructure of the Naval Establishment rather than the now existing Office of the CNO.

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Camels are horses designed by a committee.

Parkinson