

1974

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Recommended Citation

Desfosses, Louis R. (1974) "Developing an Alternate Approach to Race Relations Education: Identifying Military Management Resistance," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 27 : No. 4 , Article 7.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol27/iss4/7>

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An overriding concern for the dignity of the individual, institutionalized as the Navy Human Goals Plan, has been one of the fundamental interests of Adm. Elmo Zumwalt as Chief of Naval Operations. Unfortunately, the race relations segment of this program—based on the identification and alteration of racist attitudes—has met with considerable opposition and has not achieved its primary goal. A new approach to the problem is needed, one aimed primarily at behavior rather than attitudes, and one that, through an unemotional process, allows the rational manager to see the contradiction between his leadership goals and his prejudice.

DEVELOPING AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO RACE RELATIONS EDUCATION: Identifying Military Middle Management Resistance

A research paper prepared by

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On the 6th of August 1973, the Navy Human Goals Plan became a formal naval instruction with the force of law. In a personalized sense it can be viewed as an institutionalization of Admiral Zumwalt's manifest concern for humanism in the Navy. It is also a response to the Department of Defense Human Goals Credo which begins with an encompassing statement:

Our nation was founded on the principle that the individual has infinite dignity and worth. The Department of Defense, which exists to keep the Nation secure and at peace, must always be guided by this principle. In all that we do, we must show respect for the serviceman, the servicewoman and the civilian employee, recognizing their individual needs, aspirations and capabilities.

The Human Goals Credo goes on to say more specifically that we strive: "... to make military and civilian service in the Department of Defense a model of equal opportunity for all regardless of race, sex, creed or national origin, and to hold those who do business with the Department to full compliance with the policy of equal employment opportunity."¹ The Navy Human Goals Plan responds to this challenge by making a commitment: "To reemphasize the important role of middle management in implementing policy and in giving strength to the chain of command."²

It is important to note that the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1973 strengthens the original act of 1946 and requires that minority groups be proportionally represented in all employment categories. Complete commitment is required to the spirit of these laws if their

intent is to be fulfilled within a reasonable period of time. While prior programs have substantially increased awareness of the problem, the Human Goals Program must move from this base and provide a process which encourages commitment to the implementation of equal opportunity.

It is the intent of the authors to present a rationale and design for an alternative approach to race relations education for the naval (military) middle manager. Hopefully, this new concept will capitalize on the success of previous programs, but avoid any shortcomings. It is designed to encourage a modification of behavior and prejudicial attitude by building on the basically sound values of the military officer. The military middle manager is defined here as one who is responsible for the implementation of policy. In this sense both the senior noncommissioned officer and senior commissioned officer are sometimes considered as middle managers. Junior and middle-grade officers to the O6 level are considered, however, as the bulk of middle management.

The middle manager is targeted for particular concern because by definition and practice he is charged with the implementation of policy; and, furthermore, because affirmative action policies designed to ensure equal opportunity for all minorities are likely to be successful only if they are supported by middle management.

Evaluation of past programs is presently being conducted by the Systems Development Corporation of California. This research group is particularly interested in the Executive and UPWARDS seminars, programs which are currently the major thrust of the Navy's race relations program. The objectives of these seminars are essentially two: first, to increase awareness of individual and institutional racism; second, to increase commitment to deal with racism through affirmative action.

By 30 September 1973, 185,000 E5

through O6 personnel had attended UPWARD or Executive seminars.³ The evaluation of the impact of these programs in terms of their goals is not yet complete. In an interview with project analysts, however, it was learned that past efforts appear to have increased somewhat the awareness of racism.⁴

At this point in the evaluation of past programs, it is simply not possible to demonstrate that the UPWARDS and Executive seminars have significantly increased commitment to deal affirmatively with racism.⁵ It is clear, however, that past programs were not primarily designed to provide skills for handling racial problems.

Furthermore, the approach taken by such programs has created a reaction among much of middle management which may have been counterproductive to the human goals program. This reaction may be typified by the words of Adm. Hyman S. Rickover who said,

Can you imagine what these paid vacations are doing to the readiness of ships that are already undermanned? The amateurish programs enacted thus far by the Navy have been poorly conceived, poorly executed, are a joke in the fleet and are inimical to building a strong fighting force.

Sociological experimentation of this nature, including group dynamics and sensitivity techniques, must not be permitted.

A return to the more traditional concepts of competence in doing the job at hand, hard work, good example, and commonsense reasonableness, without sociologist interplay, is what is needed.⁶

A survey (see figure 1) was conducted at the Naval War College to determine if the feelings expressed by Admiral Rickover reflected those of the Navy's middle manager. The survey utilized a Likert, six-point, forced

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choice format. It was administered to the naval officers of the class of 1974 at the War College. (The main thrust and result of the survey will be briefly reviewed.) Six statements (five included here) about Admiral Rickover's three

paragraphs comment were directed to the respondents, asking them to indicate their degree of agreement or disagreement. Our review of the results here will lump all degrees of agreement percentage for each category.

Statement 1: "Overall this statement (Admiral Rickover's) concurs with my feelings about past Navy efforts with Human Goals Programs."

49 % (percents rounded) commanders/captains agreed
 38 % lieutenant commanders/lieutenants agreed
 45 % who had taken part in a race relations seminar agreed
 37.5 % who had not taken part in a race relations seminar agreed
 0 % under 30 years agreed; 49% between 30-34 years agreed
 41.5 % between 35-39 years agreed; 47.5% over 40 years agreed

Statement 2: "Navy Human Goals programs have been 'amateurish, poorly conceived and poorly executed.'"

68.5 % commanders/captains agreed; 50% lieutenant commanders/lieutenants agreed
 58 % who had taken part in a race relations seminar agreed
 55 % who had not taken part in a race relations seminar agreed
 30 % under 30 years agreed; 48% between 30-34 years agreed
 66 % between 35-39 years agreed; 63% over 40 years agreed

Statement 3: "Navy Human Goals programs are a 'joke in the fleet.'"

36.5 % commanders/captains agreed; 38.5% lieutenant commanders/lieutenants agreed
 41 % who had taken part in a race relations seminar agreed
 30.5 % who had not taken part in a race relations seminar agreed
 20 % under 30 years agreed; 45.5% between 30-34 years agreed
 31.5 % between 35-39 years agreed; 42% over 40 years agreed

Statement 4: "Paragraph number 2 expresses my view. ('Sociological experimentation.')

34 % commanders/captains agreed; 24% of lieutenant commanders/lieutenants agreed
 29 % who had taken part in a race relations seminar agreed
 25.5 % who had not taken part in a race relations seminar agreed
 11 % under 30 years agreed; 26% between 30-34 years agreed
 27.5 % between 35-39 years agreed; 22% over 40 years agreed

Statement 5: "Paragraph number 3 expresses my view. ('A return to more traditional concepts . . .')

65 % commanders/captains agreed; 56% lieutenant commanders/lieutenants agreed
 55 % who had taken part in a race relations seminar agreed
 70 % who had not taken part in a race relations seminar agreed
 50 % under 30 years agreed; 58% between 30-34 years agreed
 58.5 % between 35-39 years agreed; 63% over 40 years agreed

Survey Results

148 naval officers responded
 57 were commanders or captains; 91 were lieutenant commanders or senior lieutenants
 10 were less than 30 years of age; 47 were between 30 and 34 years
 53 were between 35-39 years; 40 were older than 40 years
 98 officers had taken part in a race relations seminar
 50 officers had not taken part in a race relations seminar

Fig.—Naval War College Survey

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It can be argued that because naval officers are selected for the War College they may not comprise a true random sample. These authors are inclined to argue, however, that in terms of attitudes and reactions, War College attendees are a representative sample of the whole naval officer population of similar rank. We therefore believe the survey accurately represents a rather adverse reaction to past efforts and is worthy of note. This suggests that at least the following points can be tentatively concluded:

- That a larger percentage of naval management has misgivings about past programs, especially with the way they were conducted. That senior officers have more misgivings than junior officers. That older officers have more misgivings than younger. That officers who have actual experience in Navy race relation programs have more misgivings than those who do not.

- That most naval officers are not against sociological efforts in the Navy.

- That most officers desire a return to traditional concepts and values.

- That most officers tend to equate Human Goals Programs to race relations efforts.

It may be possible to identify five probable causes for middle management resistance to past race relations programs:

1. Some middle managers who are aware of their racial prejudices fear the potential exposure of their attitudes in the group process; some simply resist having the security of their prejudices disturbed.

2. The middle manager, particularly the officer, is uncomfortable in a seemingly confronting and often emotional group process which includes all enlisted rates and officer ranks.

3. The group process employed by some programs (UPWARD) often involves the normal work group of the participants. This tends to place the regular leaders (middle managers) of the

group in unfamiliar and unsettling roles.

4. The middle manager perceives these programs as a challenge to his concept of leadership and as damaging to "traditional" Navy discipline. He is, furthermore, reluctant to entertain a process which may appear to suggest abandoning what he believes to be a personally successful leadership formula.

5. The middle manager resists these programs because he is not yet convinced that a system exists which will reward the leadership behavior proposed by such programs.

Personal anxiety may be at the core of the resistance of middle management to race-relations education. Our first three probable causes relate to this concept. It is hypothesized that the prejudiced middle manager is often threatened by current programs and as a result of raised anxieties can be expected to resist these programs.

The works of Rokeach, Adorno, and others deal with the personal anxiety experienced by prejudiced people. Rokeach, in his book entitled *The Open and Closed Mind*, develops the concept of closedmindedness. He found a statistically significant relationship between this concept and anxiety.⁷ His work elaborated on that of Adorno, et al. Adorno's several works analyzed the relationship between authoritarianism and ethnocentrism. A high correlation was found between them.⁸ Rokeach found that dogmatic or closedminded (prejudiced) individuals were more anxious and tended to have difficulty dealing with new ideas. Rokeach's dogmatic or closedminded individual is similar to Adorno's authoritarian or dogmatic individual with one notable exception. Rokeach's concepts deal with individuals of all political persuasions. Adorno's original concept dealt only with the right and particularly with the anti-Semitic Fascist.

The group process format of past Navy programs has tended to border on

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confrontation. A critical variable in this seems to have been the attitude of the facilitators.* Some facilitators direct their efforts toward making each participant "deal with" or "own up" to his prejudice. This environment of exposure is not comfortable for the anxious or threatened individual. He may well "own up" to his prejudices, but that is no insurance that he will alter or control them. Programs which are perceived as confronting may well be restricting their success by turning off that participant who is most in need of the program.

Dr. James Thomas—a black researcher instrumental in the Army's efforts in race relations—said in an interview that the Army believes it has come upon evidence of an actual hardening of prejudicial attitudes after training. He theorized that those persons who were openminded may have benefited from the training, while those who were closedminded or dogmatic may well have become more so.⁹ This kind of thinking tends to be supported by the work of Howland, Janis, and Kelly, whose extensive studies led them to state: "when the (emotion arousing) communication contains no reassurance or immediate way of obtaining reassurance then the emotional reaction may lead either to avoidance of thinking about the communication or to minimization of the importance of the communication."¹⁰

The anxious individual, therefore, can be expected to raise his defensive barriers and block confronting communication in a group process which

threatens exposure of certain deep-seated personality traits.

For the closedminded or anxious middle manager, a group process which deals with racism and prejudice within his immediate work group becomes an ordeal. The patterns of relationships and leadership hierarchy which are developed over time are difficult to maintain. A group process which appears to impinge on these relationships is bound to be threatening to the manager. The recent work of D.J. Hanson and A.M. Bush supports this notion. Their studies, reported in the *Psychological Reports*, showed that anxiety created by situational threat increased closedmindedness.¹¹

This is important because it suggests that even those officers who are normally openminded may tend to become closedminded when placed in awkward or threatening situations. When the participants of a group process are of the same family work group, the normal manager or leader of that group is in a new and threatening situation. This kind of confronting process might work with groups formed voluntarily and dedicated to solving problems of reasonable proportions. However, when these problems are buried deep inside the individual, when these problems relate to basic belief systems, and where these problems are obscured by an overlay of emotion, the confronting atmosphere of a family work group is not the answer. Awareness of the problem may be increased, but an increased commitment to deal with it is not a likely outcome.

Our first three probable causes have dealt with the relationship of anxiety and resistance created by threatening situations. It has also been suggested that the prejudiced person is likely to be anxious and resistant. Before proceeding to our final two probable causes, a short discussion of some of the characteristics often exhibited by the prejudiced personality is appropriate here.

*These facilitators, however sincere, are perceived by many officers as unprepared to handle a group process dealing with such intense subjects as racism and prejudice. They are the products of a 4-week Navy school and do not always have any prior relevant background. Informal interviews conducted at the Naval War College suggest strongly that facilitator credentials may have increased skepticism about these programs among the officer corps.

A variety of terms has been used to describe the prejudiced personality. These terms—dogmatic, authoritarian, closedminded—though not precisely synonymous may be considered so for our purposes. Sanford's view of the authoritarian is usefully summarized into subparts. They are:

- *Conventionalism.* Rigid adherence to conventional middle-class values.

- *Authoritarian Submission.* Submission, uncritical attitude toward idealized moral authorities of the in-group.

- *Authoritarian Aggression.* Tendency to condemn, reject, and punish people who violate conventional values.

- *Anti-intracception.* Opposition to the subjective, the imaginative, the tenderminded.

- *Superstition and Stereotype.* The disposition to think in rigid categories.

- *Power and Toughness.* Preoccupation with the dominance-submission, strong-weak, leader-follower dimension.

- *Destructiveness and Cynicism.*

- *Projectivity.* The projection outward of unconscious emotional impulses.

- *Sex.* Exaggerated concern with sexual "goings on," and punitiveness toward violations of sex mores.¹²

An educational effort in an academic nonthreatening environment which focuses on these personality characteristics might allow a useful process of internalization to ensue. Such a process should lead the middle manager to a better understanding of the specific components of his personal prejudices. Better understanding should help allay anxiety and thereby reduce his resistance to dealing with prejudice.

Two final causes for middle management resistance are cited here as existing in the unwillingness of military leaders to abandon the values and behavior of a leadership style which they perceive as (1) successful and as (2) rewarded.

The results of the survey conducted at the Naval War College showed that 65 percent of the senior officers and 56 percent of the junior officers polled agreed with Admiral Rickover's statement that, "A return to the more traditional concepts of competence in doing the job at hand, hard work, good example, and commonsense reasonableness, without sociologist interplay, is what is needed."

The Hicks congressional subcommittee report lends further support to this interpretation of middle management resistance. It stated as a finding,

... obviously there has not been any removal of the tools to maintain discipline aboard ship or anywhere else in the Navy, but the attitude toward the use of such tools has changed.

The change in part has been occasioned by the use of minority affairs representatives, human relations councils and human resources staffs which too frequently bypass the chain of command.¹³

The naval officer has an ingrained leadership value system which has been identified in two independent studies, one by G.W. England (University of Minnesota)¹⁴ and a second by A.L. Wermuth (center for Advanced Studies and Analysis).¹⁵ Programs which tamper with a value system so pertinent to a manager's daily life are bound to raise resistance. Recently a visiting consultant at the Naval War College asked a class of senior students "what would you say if I told you I intended to show you how to lead!" One of the printable responses was "incredible."¹⁶ Effective leadership behavior is for some learned at great personal cost. Attempts to change it can expect to meet with resistance.

To be effective, a race relations education program must be perceived not as threatening to but as relevant to

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leadership concepts. G.W. England, in his studies of naval officers' values, cites decisionmaking ability as one of those traits most valued by naval officers. Commitment to dealing constructively with prejudice might therefore be increased by associating it with being an effective decisionmaker. Rokeach's concept of belief systems offers an excellent way for middle management to recognize the potential detriment of prejudice to good decisionmaking. Rokeach asks rhetorically, "If we knew something about the way a person believes, is it possible to predict how he will go about solving problems that have nothing to do with his ideology?"¹⁷

Although Rokeach straightforwardly criticizes certain methodological shortcomings of some of the findings cited in *The Authoritarian Personality*, he manifests considerable agreement on findings which pertain to the dynamics of decisionmaking. In referring to the Adorno effort he states:

... some major findings that come out of such studies are that persons who are high in ethnic prejudice and/or authoritarianism, as compared with persons who are low, are more rigid in their problem-solving behavior, more concrete in their thinking, and more narrow in their grasp of a particular subject; they also have a greater tendency to premature closure in their perceptual processes and to distortions in memory, and a greater tendency to be intolerant of ambiguity.¹⁸

In a variety of experiments conducted to measure perceptual synthesis, Rokeach found considerable support for the hypothesis that prejudiced or closedminded persons have more difficulties in certain kinds of decisionmaking or problemsolving situations than do unprejudiced openminded individuals.¹⁹

These are vital points because they suggest that an effective race relations

education program should deal with the dynamics of decisionmaking. The behavior (decisions) of the prejudiced manager is likely to be made discriminatory by virtue of the decisionmaking process he uses. It is precisely this sort of behavior that race relations education is designed to control. To be effective, an alternative approach must deal with the dynamics of decisionmaking. Indeed, to ensure effectiveness, an alternative approach to race relations education should be made relevant to as many leadership values as possible.

Relevancy is not, however, enough. Behavior modification is not likely to occur without the impetus of reward. Rudolph Winston of Harvard Business School (Dr. Winston is black and has done work in race relations for the U.S. Army) discussed at length in an interview at the Naval War College the relationship of reward to behavior change. He concluded his comments by saying emphatically "reward for change must be evident if change is to take place."²⁰ Dr. Wendy Wyatt, behavioral consultant for Associates for Human Resources, Inc., stated recently that her experience both in industry and in the military indicates that change is likely to occur only when the reward-punishment system is perceived as encouraging change.²¹ The well known Porter and Lawler Model, which relates reward and the perceived probability of reward to performance, gives added credence to this concept.²²

Naval officers do not yet perceive that the "system" will reward human goals oriented behavior. Officer detailers at the Bureau of Naval Personnel generally do not encourage line officers to take human resource development billets unless they want to "take a chance with their careers." Senior officers associated with field activities known in the past as HRMC's (Human Resource Management Centers) have been regularly passed over for the next rank while in such billets or prior to assignment to

such billets. The rear admiral selection board just concluded did not nominate for the rank anyone with a specialty in the human resource management field. While no doubt justifiable on the basis of normal selection criteria, these actions are nonetheless often perceived as a failure of the system to reward concern in this field.

A race relations education program cannot, of course, ensure the middle manager that he will be rewarded for affirmative action. That is the purview of the military hierarchy. An education program might, however, succeed in relating concern for race relations to those leadership and management traits which the middle manager already perceived as being rewarded. This parallels and reinforces our efforts to make race relations education relevant to leadership.

We know, for example, from Wer-muth's efforts that the naval officer values organizational and battle efficiency.^{2,3} He is assumed to perceive reward for attaining such efficiency. A program designed to demonstrate that race relations education is relevant to organizational efficiency should capture the attention of the military middle manager. Modern behavioral literature on the organization lends support to such efforts to relate prejudice to low personal achievement and contribution within the organization. Professor David C. McClelland, a well known organizational psychologist, has said, "data show that lower-class Negro-Americans have a very low level of achievement need (n-ACH). This is not surprising. Society has systematically discouraged and blocked their achievement striving."^{2,4}

Professor David Bowers of the University of Michigan has made a related observation based on his research, "A management system which denies him (the individual) influence, appreciation, respect and confidence diminishes his motivation to be a contributing member of the organization."^{2,5}

Hopefully, a rationale of this sort will cause the middle manager to relate his leadership value system to the reward system in a manner which will reduce resistance to race relations education.

This paper has thus far examined some of the probable causes of middle management resistance to past race relations programs. It turns now to describe briefly what an alternative program might be.

The objectives of an alternative race relations program must, of course, be compatible with the Navy Human Goals Plan. That is, they must contribute to the determination of the Navy "to ensure equal opportunity in the Navy by making prejudice of any kind an unacceptable practice and to identify and eliminate individual and institutional racism." More specifically, the education considered here will be targeted at the middle management population of the Navy. This population can be considered to be rationally versus emotionally oriented. The alternative approach would be based on an educational framework designed to avoid initial anxiety arousal. It would attempt to control communication avoidance and to maintain relevancy.

Every effort would be made to relate the entire process to the present value system of middle management and, hopefully, by extended logic to the perceived reward system. In this sense the program is not designed to alter present leadership values. It is designed rather to utilize those values to encourage both a behavioral and an attitudinal modification. The unemotional approach of the process allows the rationally oriented manager to see the contradiction between his leadership values and his prejudicial attitudes. This will hopefully lead to a modification of those attitudes. The practical case study aspect of the process should allow the manager to experiment with new behavior and relate it to the reward

system. It should, at the very least, increase his confidence in dealing with racial problems and thus encourage a modification of behavior.

This paper wishes to avoid the debate of whether a race relations education program should be designed to alter attitude or behavior. Morally, one might wish that attitudes be changed; pragmatically, changing behavior may be more feasible if only because it is more visible and measurable and therefore more subject to the reward system. C.A. Insko in concluding his comprehensive work *Theories of Attitude Change for the Century Psychology* series, states, after an extensive review of the literature:

... from the present vantage point the most glaring weakness of contemporary theorizing is the lack of emphasis upon the relation between attitudes and behavior. A different approach to the relation between attitude and behavior is to concentrate not on behavior change following attitude change but on attitude change following behavior change.²⁶

Both for practical and theoretical reasons then, this paper suggests that an alternative approach to race relations should strive for both behavior and attitude modification and not just attitude changes.

An educational process designed to alleviate racism must deal with both the personal and societal aspects of prejudice. Simpson and Yinger give credence to this approach in their well-known work *Racial and Cultural Minorities: an Analysis of Prejudice and Discrimination*. They regard prejudice as a complex phenomenon resulting from various societal structures and cultural norms. By this reasoning, situational, cultural, and personality inputs can be said to affect the learning and expression of intolerance.²⁷

Rokeach also establishes the distinction between two kinds of prejudice, (1)

that which results as an aspect of the personality trait closedmindedness and (2) that which is a matter of social and cultural norm.²⁸ G.W. Allport breaks down the dynamics of prejudice into a variety of societal and personality factors with special emphasis on the power of the group.²⁹ In a more specific but similar vein, Professor J.C. Brigham, in recently discussing one important dimension of ethnic prejudice (stereotyping), cited two causes for stereotyping and two potential cures. First, stereotypes are sometimes based on conformity and should be cured by reality-oriented education. Second, stereotypes are also based on ego defense functions or personality and may be cured by insight.³⁰

Once the bases of racism—personal and societal prejudice—have been presented in an intellectual and relevant manner, the specifics of institutional and individual racism will be dealt with. Racism is often rationalized away on the bases of educational or talent differentials. To avoid this, our alternative approach will first present a body of carefully collected data which manifest the reality of racism in the Navy. Secondly, the dynamics of racism will be dealt with in the classic forms of position, influence, and power denial. Thirdly, the manifestations and habits of racism such as avoidance, address, and assumption will be considered.

With the intellectual approach complete, the middle manager will then be given an opportunity to deal with the problems of racism and equal opportunity through the case study method. This method allows the individual to compare his personal reactions with those of his peers, to obtain feedback relevant to his behavior, and to acquire practice and confidence in dealing with problems which involve race. Each case will be formed on a critical incident which has multiple complications and implications. The cases are not designed to scrutinize an officer's values or atti-

tudes. They are designed rather to allow him to test his perceptions and behavior against some model solution. The model solution is not considered sacrosanct, but it does give some basis for comparison.

In conjunction with the case study method, a decisionmaking game designed to be run under the pressure of time and operational objectives is being developed. The decision game atmosphere is established with some competition in the environment to ensure that the middle manager personally wrestles with the concepts and difficulties of human-oriented management that is also mission directed. The considerable involvement with peers encouraged by this process should allow for some confrontation of ideas, but a controllable confrontation founded on a substantial amount of academic background. Confrontation can thus be resolved within some rational framework.

The decision game is designed, furthermore, to reward results. Results would be measured both in terms of the degree to which mission objectives are met and the cost of the human resource involved. A series of decisions would be

called for in a buildup phase, an incident phase, and a postincident phase. Each decision would have some bearing upon follow-on situations.

The case study method and the decision game are self-educational in concept and are designed to give both the junior and senior officer practice with sensitive problems in a feedback environment. It is a way of moving from theory to application in a manner which hopefully will increase a leader's skill in handling emotionally charged situations and the change process itself. It should at least increase awareness of the limits of an individual's perception. In doing this there is some hope that better decisions will be made and fewer prejudices enacted into discrimination.

The administrators of the Human Goals Program at the U.S. Naval War College are attempting to mold this suggestion for an alternative Approach to Race Relations Education into the overall Human Goals Program of the Naval War College in a manner which makes it compatible with the goals of that institution. If this is accomplished, an evaluation of its effectiveness is planned. Hopefully, an evaluation will suggest that the integrated process sug-

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Lt. Comdr. Peter H. Cressy, U.S. Navy, did his undergraduate work at Yale University, holds an M.S. in international affairs and diplomacy from George Washington University, an M.B.A. from the University

of Rhode Island, and is a graduate of the College of Naval Command and Staff. He has served as an aviation flight officer in Patrol Squadron 18 and Patrol Squadron 49 and has also served as Aide to Commander, Caribbean Sea Frontier. Lieutenant Commander Cressy is currently assigned as a Research Associate to the Department of Advanced Research at the Naval War College.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Professor Louis R. Desfosses did his undergraduate work at Villanova University, received his MBA from Boston College, and his Ph.D. from the University of Massachusetts. He has done research and

published in the fields of organizational behavior, leadership, business policy, and management theory. Professor Desfosses is on the faculty of the University of Rhode Island and serves as a consultant to the Naval War College.

gested here will be worthy of consideration by other military institutions which deal primarily with the military middle manager or officer.

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Ψ

There are, in every age, new errors to be rectified, and new prejudices to be opposed.

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