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# THE 1945 SOVIET MANCHURIAN CAMPAIGN: A MODEL FOR SINO-SOVIET WAR

*Relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China have the potential for violence. Given the expanding nature of China's nuclear capability and the perceived threat this expansion represents to the Soviet Union, one can easily recognize the pressure on the Kremlin to act while the situation is still of manageable proportions. Should this hostility break into open warfare, it is reasonable to predict that the strategy of the Soviet Army will follow a pattern similar to that which proved successful in their 1945 campaign against the Japanese in Manchuria. However, an expected short and decisive conflict similar to the 1945 model is unlikely and could begin World War III.*

An article prepared

by

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The current Sino-Soviet conflict has all the trappings of a traditional, xenophobic confrontation between two ideologically opposed states. Antagonisms, rooted in the past and driven by re-kindled Chinese nationalism and historical Russian imperialism, have placed these two great powers on what appears to be a collision course. Given the old territorial antagonisms and the great cultural, historical, social, and ideological differences which separate the Chinese and the Russians, one can better perceive and understand the structure of the present Sino-Soviet conflict.

Of particular interest is the volatile situation along the 4,500 mile Sino-Soviet border. Since 1963 thousands of border incidents have taken place. In 1969 the intensity and scope of these clashes brought tensions to the break point.<sup>1</sup> Although the potential for open

frontier war was significantly reduced as a result of the October 1969 Kosygin-Chou Peking airport "understanding," old antagonisms and suspicions remain beneath a calm surface, and each country continues to prepare for war. These military preparations are unprecedented and are by far the "largest military buildup of forces in history without a major war as a cause."<sup>2</sup> Sovietologist Professor Lucian Pye of MIT's Center for International Studies points out, for example, that the Soviet buildup in the Far East now far exceeds that which they have arrayed against NATO in central Europe.

Recent Foreign Broadcast Information Service reports indicate the serious concern with which the Communist Chinese view this Soviet buildup.<sup>3</sup> Joseph Alsop, recently returned from a visit to Communist China, reports that Chinese Government officials told him

of some 30 new Russian airfields near the frontier that, along with the significant amounts of armor, mechanized equipment, artillery, and tactical nuclear weapons also deployed in Eastern Russia, lend credence to the Soviet threats.<sup>4</sup>

Other salient indicators of Soviet inclinations are found in the huge Far Eastern troop deployments. Estimates place between 44 and 49 Soviet tank and motorized infantry divisions along the Sino-Soviet frontier.<sup>5</sup> Significantly, this is double the force the Soviets had deployed in 1969.<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, in a departure from normal doctrine, these divisions and corps recently were issued tactical nuclear missiles.<sup>7</sup> Taken together, the attitudes exhibited by the Soviet leadership, the size of the deployed Soviet forces, and the deployment of both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons to these peaceful Soviet forces on the Sino-Soviet frontier do not augur well for Sino-Soviet harmony.

Given the momentum of the present situation, we can discern the seeds of the classic self-fulfilling prophecy. The Russians, uncomfortably aware that a viable Communist Chinese nuclear capability will erase Soviet military superiority and fully establish a mutual nuclear "balance of terror," are under increasing pressure to act. That a full-scale Sino-Soviet war based on a preemptive Russian strike is a very distinct possibility cannot be discounted.

With this background, this paper considers a likely scenario the Soviet strike might follow. Specifically, the Soviet Manchurian campaign of 1945 is used as the model along with some additional insights provided by the 1968 Czechoslovakian invasion. Each will be considered in light of present developments.

#### **The Defeat of the Kwantung Army.**

As Harrison Salisbury has observed, there are few geographical areas in

which the Russians have had more extensive military experience than in Manchuria.<sup>8</sup> In the past 70 years Russian armies have fought three major campaigns in the Far East against the Japanese. The Russians were defeated in the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War by a combination of their own logistical ineptitude and Japanese thoroughness; however, during the 1938-39 frontier clashes and in the 1945 Manchurian campaign, the Russians achieved convincing victories.

If war should come with China, the Soviets will probably follow an updated version of the scenario patterned on these last two successes. The little-studied 1945 Soviet Manchurian campaign, in particular, appears to be the most likely basis for any present Soviet war plans in the Far East, and it is significant that present Soviet dispositions are quite similar to those used by Soviet forces in 1945.<sup>9</sup>

Similar to the present situation, time was of essence in the Soviets summer of 1945 campaign. By February 1945 Germany was virtually defeated, and the Soviet High Command turned its attention to the Far East in response to U.S. pressure.<sup>10</sup> Accordingly, they shifted over 650,000 men, 4,800 aircraft, and 3,500 tanks—some 5 armies, 1 tank army, and supporting air armies—from the European front to the Far East between February and August 1945. By early August the Red army had massed an estimated 1.5 million men, 26,000 guns and mortars, 5,500 tanks and self-propelled artillery pieces, and 3,900 combat aircraft on the Soviet-Manchurian frontiers: a force of approximately 40-45 divisions.<sup>11</sup>

With the Soviet renunciation of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact in April 1945, the Japanese High Command began to build up the Kwantung Army in Manchuria. This effort was intensified to keep pace with the Soviet preparations, and by August 1945 the Kwantung Army consisted of some 24

divisions and 9 independent mixed brigades.<sup>12</sup>

In May 1945 final Japanese defensive plans were formulated. The Kwantung Army would fight a delaying action from Manchurian frontiers back to the defensive redoubt in the Changpaishan Mountains along the Yalu River. From this position they planned to defend Korea from Soviet penetration.<sup>13</sup>

In contrast to Japanese plans, the Soviet High Command's strategic plan called for three simultaneous converging offensives aimed at Central Manchuria. The Transbaikal Front was to strike east from the Tamtsak salient on the Mongolian People's Republic frontier in the west; the Second Far Eastern Front was to attack along a broad front from the north, cross the Amur River, and strike south from the area southwest of Khabarovsk; and the First Far Eastern Front was to attack westward from the Primorye. Soviet objectives were "to split up the Kwantung Army, isolate it in Central and Southern Manchuria, and destroy it piecemeal."<sup>14</sup> In the main effort, the Transbaikal attack was to seize the decisive communications centers of Mukden, Changchun, and Port Arthur. Accordingly, the Soviets weighted this main effort with a battle-seasoned Guards Tank Army to facilitate the anticipated dash across the Manchurian plains once the Greater Hsingan Mountains were forced. The thrust from the Amur in the north was to assist the destruction of the Kwantung Army by fixing its northern elements, while the Transbaikal and First Far Eastern Front enveloped the Japanese from the west and east, respectively. In coordination with the Transbaikal Front's attack, a secondary effort by the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army (MPRA) was to strike from the vicinity of Ude, Mongolia, and make a dash for Peking and Tientsin.<sup>15</sup> These initial Soviet war plans were based on the assumption that it would take 6 to 8 weeks to destroy the

Japanese Kwantung Army and to occupy Manchuria and the Korean Peninsula.<sup>16</sup>

**Some Problems.** General Shtemenko, Soviet High Command, writes in a recent history of the war that the Soviet plan was not without its share of problems. Inadequate coal to support railroad operations, ammunition shortages, inadequate support aircraft, and a shortage of water containers, without which, Shtemenko pointed out, the offensive would have inevitably ground to a halt, are but a few of the significant organizational and logistics problems that plagued the Soviet buildup. Further, he mentions shortages of communications personnel, underequipped medical units, and disorganized tank maintenance units. Shtemenko also decried the disposition and condition of the essential 6th Guards Tank Army, the repeated delay of trains carrying the army's troops and equipment, and the fact that the tank army had no motor transport because its vehicles were left behind in Europe. Finally, the tank army was short 3,000 personnel.<sup>17</sup>

Although Shtemenko's narrative does not indicate whether or not these specific issues were favorably resolved, much effort was expended to improve the logistical situation. In any case, the Soviet timetable of operations was advanced several weeks in response to the two U.S. nuclear attacks on Japan. The Russians were concerned that the Japanese would surrender before the scheduled D-day, thereby robbing them of a share in the Japanese spoils. On 8 August 1945, logistical problems notwithstanding, the Russians declared war on Japan.<sup>18</sup>

Shtemenko's account of the Soviet sweep into Manchuria mentions no further logistical problems. This would lead to the conclusion that the Soviets overcame earlier rear service problems, but Japanese sources indicate otherwise. During the campaign the Japanese inter-

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cepted uncoded messages from the motorized divisions of the Transbaikalian Front, urgently requesting fuel supplies.<sup>19</sup> In 1955, as a result of intensive research based on these Japanese debriefs, U.S. Army intelligence analysts concluded that the problems of fuel and transportation would continue to be a major constraint in any future Soviet operations in the Far East. They also noted that the actual operations in Manchuria were so brief [as in Czechoslovakia 23 years later] that the fighting ended before the factors constraining the Soviet rear supply greatly influenced operations.<sup>20</sup> In this light it is very easy to appreciate why Shtemenko neglected to highlight this serious deficiency for interested potential enemies.

**Soviet Blitz.** Despite having a fairly accurate estimate of the Soviet situation, the Kwantung Army was surprised by the Soviet attack on 9 August. General Yamada, Commander of the Kwantung Army, had anticipated that the Russians would be unable to mount their offensive before the end of August.<sup>21</sup> Although, their estimate was accurate, the Japanese could not have known the Soviet scramble to secure the rights of belligerency against Japan would invalidate Yamada's estimate. As a result, the Russians achieved complete tactical surprise.

The overwhelming power and speed of the combined Soviet assault paralyzed the Japanese High Command during the critical first days of the campaign. Soviet air interdiction against key communications centers effectively isolated the head of the Kwantung Army from its body. Unable to communicate with the field units, Yamada was completely in the dark as to the details of the rapidly deteriorating situation. As far as the Kwantung Army field elements were concerned, the fighting soon degenerated into an uncoordinated, piecemeal defense. Soviet air superiority made it almost impossible

for Yamada to reinforce seriously threatened areas on the front. What reinforcements were committed came in dribbles, too little, too late, while Russian ground and air pressure rendered the actual execution of the planned delay ineffectual. Owing to superior Soviet mobility, attempted Japanese withdrawals were turned into disorganized, disparate actions along the front.<sup>22</sup>

Unable to organize a cohesive defensive effort, due to both well-coordinated Soviet spearheads and parachute assaults on key Japanese headquarters locations, the Kwantung Army fell into confusion and was defeated in detail.

The Soviet offensive was a classic example of the blitzkrieg. By 14 August the Kwantung Army ceased to exist as an effective force capable of offering meaningful resistance. On 19 August 1945 Marshal Vasilevsky, Commander in Chief of Soviet Far East Forces, accepted the formal unconditional surrender of the Kwantung Army.<sup>23</sup> Thus, in little more than 10 days after the beginning of hostilities, the once proud Kwantung Army lay shattered.

**Repeat Performance?** Today the Soviet Far East Forces are deployed along the very same Soviet-Manchurian borderlands. The locations of the army groups and the weight of their concentrations in the eastern Mongolian People's Republic and on the Amur and Ussuri Rivers all match the pattern necessary to sever Manchuria and its vital industry from China.<sup>24</sup> There are but a finite number of ways in which Manchuria can be realistically defended. Like the Japanese, to protect the industrial bases in central Manchuria, the Chinese are deployed forward in precisely the same areas in which the Kwantung Army was deployed. And, like the Japanese in 1945, the Chinese envision an initial delaying action to draw the powerful Soviet spearheads into the depths of the interior. How-

ever, where the Japanese foresaw a final, classic setpiece defense from their redoubt in the Changpaishan Mountains, Peking envisions a people's war of protracted duration until the Soviet economy and military forces are bled white, however long it may take.<sup>25</sup>

Since the evidence suggests that the Soviets will be the initiators of such a war, it is not too difficult to imagine the Soviet plans if one uses the 1945 model as a starting point. The update, of course, should include consideration of Soviet mobility, firepower, and doctrine, as well as the last Soviet operation, Czechoslovakia. Based on these, the Soviet scenario would call for nuclear strikes at key Chinese nuclear facilities and missile bases in Manchuria, North China, and Sinkiang, followed closely by invading armored and mechanized formations supported by tactical nuclear and chemical-biological weapons. The Soviets, using classic blitzkrieg tactics to rupture Chinese defenses at points of the Russians' choosing, would strike for key objectives contiguous to the border, while airborne assaults seized key communication centers and airfields to await follow-up air assault elements and linkup with the ground forces. Key to Soviet success would again be, as it was in 1945, the seizure of Peking, which is only 400 miles from Ude, Mongolian People's Republic. The Chinese capital would be critical for the same reasons that Moscow was the main objective of the original German operation plan Barbarossa, in 1941.

The Soviet High Command envisions a 7- to 10-day campaign<sup>26</sup> to achieve their limited objectives of neutralizing the People's Liberation Army (PLA), to destroy China's nuclear capability and potential, and to topple the Mao regime in favor of a friendlier, more predictable, and tractable Communist Chinese Government. The 1945 Manchurian campaign and the 1968 Czech invasion are the standards of Soviet military

doctrine. If war does come, we already have the game plan.

If the Soviets were free to choose, when would they strike? Brooke Nihart suggests that the Russians would prefer winter as the time to fight. The Soviet Army, Nihart points out, is better equipped for the severe continental Asian winters and is better prepared for winter warfare in general. Since the Soviet formations are mechanized, they "carry their foxholes with them." In contrast, the PLA is ill equipped to fight in the winter. Its predominantly infantry, foot-mobile army would be at a severe disadvantage in a winter environment against mechanized forces. If ever turned out of their prepared defenses, the Chinese would be hard pressed to reconstitute a cohesive defense in terrain in which the frostline is several feet deep, a particularly serious disadvantage when caught in the open by mobile combined-arms forces. Nihart also observes that the winter weather would also facilitate Soviet air operations. Owing to a stable high-pressure cell over central and northeast Asia during the winter months, flying conditions would be excellent, thus insuring Soviet ground forces the vital air support they would require in operations against the Chinese.<sup>27</sup> Additionally, the prevailing winter winds to the southeast and southwest<sup>28</sup> would facilitate Soviet CBN attacks since the downwind and fallout patterns would blow away from the advancing Soviet columns.

**Rear Support: Soviet Achilles' Heel?**  
We have established that the Soviets experienced serious logistical problems in their 1945 Manchurian operations. The 1955 study of this campaign concluded, in part:

If economic self-sufficiency in Far Eastern Russia remains inadequate in the future and if the Trans-Siberian continues to be the only line connecting FER with the Ural area, the most effective

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methods of weakening the advancing power of the Soviets . . . would seem to be to cut the Trans-Siberian (railroad), prevent the use of battlefield railroads, obstruct logistical transport facilities, and destroy all fuel dumps. It would not be necessarily difficult to accomplish these tasks, provided air superiority is seized. *If air control is secured by the foe, Far Eastern Russia as an operational base would become very insecure.*<sup>29</sup>

The present Communist Chinese Air Force is rated as one of the world's largest,<sup>30</sup> and, although little information is available as to the overall effectiveness of its air force, China can at least initially be counted on to vigorously contest the Soviets for air supremacy since overall victory or defeat could well ride on this factor alone. Whichever side gains and keeps it would probably hold the key to tactical success in China.

More recently, Leo Heiman, in a study of the Czechoslovakian invasion, suggested that, assuming the Czechoslovakian experience is an accurate measure of the present state of Soviet logistics, any Soviet operations lasting more than a few days would begin to falter because of the inherent weakness of Soviet rear service support. Heiman points out that, although the operation against the Czechs was marked by great operational efficiency, the subsequent occupation was marred by surprising shortcomings and deficiencies in organization, administration, communication, and supply.<sup>31</sup>

Present Soviet logistical doctrine stresses the primacy of fuel and ammunition as the essential ingredients of modern mechanized warfare. However, the doctrine apparently overlooks the human side of the equation. Machines get fed, but the troops may not. Soviet doctrine stresses maximum troop reliance on local resources for troop

administration and logistical support. In Czechoslovakia the Russians, for political and psychological reasons, did not impound sufficient fuel, food, billets, blankets, beds, hospitals, et cetera, to make themselves self-supporting. The Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia was little more than a peacetime maneuver. In wartime Soviet troops could expect even fewer local resources to be available. Had the Czechs resisted, Heiman believes the Soviets would have lacked many essential items after the first day in actual combat conditions.<sup>32</sup> He finds the Soviet logistical doctrine and system remain fundamentally unchanged from that which supported their operations in World War II. Some examples are in order to illustrate this point. Consider rations and fuel.

Soviet rations are essentially the same as those issued in 1945. The Russians apparently do not have high-energy, precooked sealed rations such as those found in most Western armies.<sup>33</sup> In Czechoslovakia the Russians were issued exactly 3 days' rations. Following Soviet doctrine, most Soviet troops simply went hungry on the 4th day because the Czechs refused to share their food with them. In a CBN environment the Soviet "live-off-the-land" doctrine would not be adequate to the task. Such a policy during operations in a devastated, contaminated environment following a nuclear attack such as envisioned in a China war could have disastrous consequences. Fuel, as in 1945, remains the bottleneck of Soviet logistics. While present Soviet operational doctrine calls for thrusts of up to 125 kilometers a day, the Russian logistical system can support only a "25-mile a day" army. Heiman concluded that Soviet formations in Czechoslovakia lacked sufficient organic transport for their own immediate needs, and the new Soviet doctrine of advance highlighted an outdated logistical system that evidently cannot provide adequate rear support to forces engaged in a full-scale

war of any significant duration.<sup>34</sup>

This weakness would be disastrous in a war with China. Nothing less than an uninterrupted, well-executed "blitzkrieg" will have the desired effect against Communist China. To defeat a determined Chinese Army, to bypass strong points, and to drive deep toward key objectives in a CBN environment, Soviet forces must be capable of rapid, sustained advances. Smooth execution comes hard in war, and any Soviet pause for resupply of food, fuel, and ammunition would invite drowning in Mao's promised "human sea."

This brings us full circle, and we must address the most difficult question: What might be the outcome of a Sino-Soviet war? Could the Russians win a quick victory? Few observers think so. Tai Sung-an's scenario perhaps typifies the majority opinion. Tai concludes that, although Soviet airpower, firepower, mobility, and technical superiority would enable the Russians to win most of the early battles, China's great vastness and manpower reserve would allow her to absorb the initial frightful blow. Accordingly, Tai gives little chance to Soviet hopes of conquering the Chinese mainland in the conventional military sense. He points out that Peking *expects* 300 million Chinese to perish in a Soviet preemptive nuclear strike and that even after such an attack, Mao would still have over 500 million angry souls with which to engage the Russians. Should the Soviets decide to attack China, they run the great risk of bogging down in a guerrilla war of unprecedented magnitude. And out of this, Tai forecasts widespread Western-assisted revolt in Eastern Europe.<sup>35</sup> Tai expresses a "rational" view of the situation, but it does not necessarily follow that the Soviet leadership has the same references and values or that they are able to deal with the situation "rationally."

The Soviet Union, more than any other country, faces the most im-

mediate threat posed by a resurgent, unpredictable, bellicose, nuclear-armed China. Actual Chinese ICBM deployments will irrevocably alter the power balance between the Soviet Union and the CPR. Moreover, these deployments will also greatly reduce the present Soviet strategic and tactical superiority and will greatly inhibit Soviet freedom of action in the Far East. The Russians may feel compelled by this knowledge to preempt China before this potential is realized. Also consider Russian past performance when tough decisions had to be made: Hungary, 1956; Poland, 1956; and Czechoslovakia, 1968.

Judging from past world reactions to Soviet interventions in these countries, the Russians might well conclude that the United States and its allies would continue to follow their old patterns and not interfere. The Russians might also reason that, since world opinion has little combat value, what nation is now strong enough to intercede? What country now would be willing to run the risk of a direct nuclear confrontation with Russia over the fate of China? When it comes to making the hard decision, for example, would the United States risk a holocaust for Communist China? Would France? Britain? The Soviets might reasonably conclude that the other nuclear powers would be constrained from supporting Peking or making serious moves against Russia, particularly if the Soviet attack were quick and successful, presenting the world with another *fait accompli*.

**Some Conclusions.** There is growing evidence to support the hypothesis that, in spite of its "irrationality," the Soviet Union might be committed to a preemptive war against China. In the immediate future the Kremlin will be under increasing pressure from the military "hawks" to remove the growing Chinese nuclear threat while it is still a manageable task. Given the nature and the scope of Soviet deployments, both



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conventional and nuclear, the decision may have already been made to use nuclear weapons when the circumstances are right or when the Kremlin feels compelled to act by events. In such an event Soviet war plans are most probably based on their successful Manchurian campaign in 1945. Such a strike fits into known Soviet strategy and doctrine and would fit the pattern of the war the Soviets are prepared to fight in the Far East.

Will the Russians take the gamble? Key to the decision must be their own assessment of their weaknesses and strengths and their confidence in their capability to conclude the war rapidly and on their terms. However, if Russia attacks China and fails to conclude the hostilities in a timely manner or if she underestimates Mao's popular support, a protracted guerrilla war would be seemingly inevitable. The Soviets then

would be in the same position of "Burr Rabbit and the tar baby." The repercussions of such an outcome in a restive Eastern Europe are not hard to imagine. Such a protracted conflict would probably be the Soviet Union's undoing, if not the beginning of World War III.

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### BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Maj. Michael E. Ekman, U.S. Army, is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, holds a master's degree from Indiana University, and has served on the faculty of the U.S. Military Academy. An infantry officer, he served in Vietnam with Special Forces, the 173d Airborne Brigade, and Headquarters, MACV. Major Ekman is currently a student in the College of Naval Command and Staff.

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### NOTES

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2. Lucian Pye, quoted in Oton Ambroz, *Realignment of World Power* (New York: Speller and Sons, 1972), p. 144.
3. See the following *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Reports*: Monday, 26 August 1973, No. 161, vol. III; Friday, 17 August 1973, No. 161, vol. III; Thursday, 16 August 1973, No. 159, vol. III; Monday, 20 August 1973, No. 161, vol. I; Tuesday, 7 August 1973, No. 152, vol. I; Monday, 6 August 1973, No. 151, vol. I.
4. For interesting analyses of the Sino-Soviet dispute, see Joseph Alsop, "Will Russia Attack China?" *Reader's Digest*, August 1973, p. 79.
5. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1972-1973* (London: 1972), p. 7; "Military Notes," *Military Review*, March 1973, p. 101.
6. Tai Sung-an places the Soviet strength in 1969 at 400,000; in 1972 International Institute for Strategic Studies places Soviet strength at 800,000.
7. *Soldat and Technik*, quoted in "Military Notes," *Military Review*, March 1973, p. 100.
8. Harrison E. Salisbury, *The Coming War Between Russia and China* (London: Cox and Wyman, 1969), p. 159.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 166.
10. For political considerations from Soviet point of view for the 1945 Manchurian campaign, see S.M. Shtemenko, *The Soviet General Staff at War, 1941-1945* (Moscow: Progress, 1970), pp. 322-341.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 348; U.S. Dept. of the Army, *Japanese Studies on Manchuria, Study of Strategic and Tactical Peculiarities of Far Eastern Russia and Soviet Far East Forces* (Washington: Military History Section, Hq Army Forces Far East, 1955), vol. XIII, p. 118.
12. U.S. Dept. of the Army, *Japanese Preparations for Operations in Manchuria, Jan 43-Aug 45*, Japanese Monograph No. 138 (Washington: Military History Section, Hq Army Forces Far East, 1953), p. 139. Though a formidable force at first glance, Japanese postwar debriefings indicate the Kwantung Army of 1945 was a mere shadow of the much vaunted KA of the 1930's and early 1940's. Using the 12th Division, one of the KA's former elite formations, as a measure,

these 24 divisions had a fighting effectiveness of only 8 divisions. There were seven additional divisions stationed in northern Korea of equally dubious effectiveness.

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 133-134, 144.
14. Shtemenko, p. 341.
15. *Ibid.*
16. *Ibid.*, p. 338.
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19. *Japanese Studies on Manchuria*, vol. XIII, pp. 129-130.
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 130-131.
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 138-140, 162.
22. Shtemenko, pp. 352-354.
23. *Ibid.*, pp. 356-357.
24. Salisbury, p. 166.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 177.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 166.
27. Brooke Nihart, "The Sino-Soviet Conflict," *Armed Forces Journal*, 24 January 1970, pp. 352-354.
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31. Leo Heiman, "Soviet Invasion Weakness," *Military Review*, August 1969, pp. 38-39.
32. *Ibid.*, pp. 42, 44.
33. *Ibid.*
34. *Ibid.*, pp. 39, 45.
35. *Ibid.*, pp. 131-135.



Nothing remains static in war or in military weapons, and it is consequently often dangerous to rely on courses suggested by apparent similarities in the past.

*E.J. King, A Naval Record, 1952*