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Dreadnought to Polaris: Maritime Strategy Since Mahan

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gradually worked their way into the routines of postwar life. The admiral was tired and in this last duty he left no important and lasting impression on the functioning of the War College, though he did the next generation of naval officers a great favor by scrapping Admiral Kalbfus' manual, *Sound Military Decision*. With retirement on 1 July 1948, Admiral Spruance sought respite from the cares of a career of steadily increasing responsibilities. Four years later his gardening on the Monterey Peninsula was interrupted by appointment as U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of the Philippines. Buell provides a good deal of information about the admiral's activities in the Philippines that has not been published previously. Filipino nationalists will not appreciate the clear confirmation of what they had suspected all along. The United States, through Spruance's embassy, did work covertly to see that Ramon Magsaysay won the presidential election of 1953. While not approving of the admiral's mission and the deceit he had to practice to accomplish it, Buell accepts Spruance's activities in the spirit of "the end justified the means." Upon return to America in April 1955, Admiral Spruance then remained fully retired until his death on 13 December 1969.

Commander Buell deserves the thanks of the Navy, those who served with Admiral Spruance's forces during World War II, and the reading public in general for this excellent biography. His industry and honesty are evident from beginning to end. While he did not exactly adhere to Admiral Moore's prescription, he did leave us with a readable and believable biography of a truly superb naval officer. It has the quality that the "Quiet Warrior" would have appreciated.

GERALD E. WHEELER
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Hyatt, A.M.J., ed. *Dreadnought to Polaris: Maritime Strategy Since Mahan*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1973. 125p.

Discussions of naval strategy frequently fall into one of two categories: the highly speculative or the greatly detailed. Happily, this modest volume avoids both categories. Instead, it is a thoughtful and reflective collection of essays originally presented as papers at a conference at the University of Western Ontario in 1972. The contributors include distinguished and well-known historians, such as Theodore Ropp and Arthur Marder, as well as several lesser known men. All the papers are of a uniformly high scholarly and literary quality.

In discussing Sir Julian Corbett's work, D.M. Schurman emphasizes Corbett's insistence that national policy and need should govern naval policy. Lest this point appear simplistic, Theodore Ropp points out in "German Seapower: a Study in Failure" that prior to World War I, Germany failed to reexamine the strategic implications of the political decisions to build the High Seas Fleet. This failure, he maintains, was as much individual as it was institutional.

Following World War I, the United States seized the initiative and proposed a specific formula for naval arms limitation at the Washington Conference. A particularly good essay examines the objections raised by Adm. Sir Herbert Richmond to the Washington formula. Richmond's objections merit considerable study and reflection, because his proposal called for smaller navies and hence less expensive ones than those authorized. According to his analysis, these navies would be more effective because they would be more closely tied to the needs of national policies.

Current problems and concerns are also reflected in informative and enlightening essays on the problems of arms control and the high seas in the

104 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

light of current American-Soviet agreements. The even more nettlesome and difficult problems facing the Law of the Sea Conference in 1974 are enumerated and analyzed in clear and lucid prose.

The concluding essay is particularly thought provoking. Ian Smart, of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, notes that at the beginning of the 20th century, Dreadnought enjoyed mastery of the seas. Today, Polaris can dominate the land from the sea. He discusses possible new roles for navies in the light of current trends. Fortunately, his analysis is free from the glittering, glib generalities one frequently hears in discussions of this sort. For example, he cautions that naval presence should not be "translated into imprudent commitment."

Dreadnought to Polaris raises issues that require more, newer, and deeper thinking into the fundamentals of naval strategy. These issues are of particular importance to the professional naval officer. The profession as a whole will ignore them at its peril.

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Ott, D.J., et al. *Public Claims on U.S. Output: Federal Budget Options in the Last Half of the Seventies*. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1973. 218p.

The principal purpose of the authors of *Public Claims on U.S. Output* is the presentation and discussion of a set of Federal policy options worthy of consideration during the next 6 years. Contained in the book are essays discussing the problems with current programs and suggesting areas for improvement in eight important budget areas: defense; agriculture; science, technology, and industry; housing and community development; education; manpower; health; and income security.

These areas are analyzed separately, and the trade-offs and priorities among them that must be considered in forming an overall policy (and budget) are not considered. Nevertheless, the problems raised and reforms suggested in the individual areas are generally worthy of consideration.

The chapter on national defense is a disappointing one in that it fails to break any new ground in terms of overall policy. Primarily, the chapter focuses on existing programs that might be eliminated or streamlined so as to induce budget savings. Reversing the "grade creep" among both civilian and military personnel and revising the services' rotation policies are suggested as means of lowering manpower costs. Additional base closures are proposed as an efficient means of reducing support costs. Lower procurement costs would be realized by smaller or delayed procurements of several systems: the B-1, SAM-D, AWACS, Trident, and nuclear carriers. Unfortunately, no new or convincing case is presented for any of these possible savings, and the unanswered question appears at the end of the chapter: "If all the reductions envisioned here are found to be consistent with existing security objectives, . . ." The need for innovative thought about our defense policies is at least as great as that in the other areas covered; it is a disappointment that this need is not better met here.

The stance of the authors on the nondefense areas is generally economically conservative in that reforms which encourage individual choice rather than governmental dictation are advocated. A striking example of this philosophy is found in their proposal for a "variable voucher" system of financing elementary and secondary education. Under this plan, each child would receive a voucher, redeemable only for tuition, which the parents could "spend," perhaps supplemented by their own funds, at a public or