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Defeated

L.W. Jackley

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against the State Department during the years of McCarthy's power.

Balanced against these accusations of Dulles being shortsighted, stubborn, tactless, and hypocritical, Hoopes cites the formulation of the Japanese Peace Treaty as an act of lasting importance. SEATO is also described as having had constructive potential—albeit economic rather than military.

The author portrays President Eisenhower as a strong—if too infrequent—restraining force on his Secretary of State. In Korea, in Indochina, in the Middle East, and in the Formosa Straits, it was Eisenhower who took the cool and correct view of the possibilities and military limitations of American policy.

The author's work also reflects the afterglow of Vietnam. Dulles approached the 1954 Geneva conference with distaste and later played a significant role in frustrating these accords. Even if there is little evidence that the Geneva agreements were ever viable, regardless of American action, Dulles did, intensify and espouse a long-lasting, damaging policy in Southeast Asia, a policy born from ignorance of the area and an erroneous view of world communism.

Townsend Hoopes is a writer of skill and academic achievement. This book is excellent history. If it is to be faulted, it is only that he presents his case within the first 200 pages, and what follows is somewhat anticlimactic. Most importantly, he successfully delineates the importance of objectivity and an awareness of the real and changing world in the conduct of foreign policy.

BERNARD D. COLE

Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Loory, Stuart. *Defeated*. New York: Random House, 405p.

"Wounded, confused, drugged, demoralized, numbed by political intervention, knotted in bureaucratic tape and nursing a feeling of be-

trayed . . . Duty, Honor and Country have been replaced by a new trinity—Me, Myself and I . . . it is now an organization incapable of defending the nation against attack . . . it is defeated." These are the charges against the Armed Forces of the United States in 1973. The charges have been prepared and signed by Stuart Loory, a former White House correspondent for the *Los Angeles Times* and the co-author of "The Secret Search for Peace in Vietnam." Under a grant from the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and bearing a letter from the Center for Constitutional Rights in New York addressed to its "Dear Brothers in Peace," asking for its antimilitary representatives to cooperate with him, Loory toured many of the installations where U.S. military forces are stationed. *Defeated* is an indictment of the U.S. Military Establishment and hierarchy but purports to be in sympathy with the private, sergeant, and lieutenant.

These are serious charges and bear serious examination. They are akin to rape: easy to allege, difficult to prove, and impossible to defend against. They should not be taken either defensively or lightly, but examined in open court and on the best evidence. A number of basic questions are implicit in this examination: are the charges true, are they in perspective, and is the evidence based on impartial and objective investigative methods or is this a search for warts? In short, is this a fair, reasonable, and accurate portrayal of the U.S. Military Establishment?

The book is a logic nightmare, a potpourri of selected "facts" loosely intertwined around the general subjects of major weapons systems' operational capability, corruption within the officer and NCO ranks, racial and drug problems, and careerism (versus dedication). There appears to have been no attempt at serious fact-gathering; rather, Loory uses selected small samples from those who were willing to talk to him and

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presents heroic and sweeping generalities. For example, the indictment of the F-111 is based primarily on conversations with a disgruntled mechanic. Perhaps the most obvious display of pejorative bias is the flagellation of Fort Bragg, N.C., for its drug and race problems. Loory's investigation of Fort Bragg was confined to interviews with prisoners in the stockade, principally blacks, and medical officers who were members of the Concerned Officers' Movement, an organization composed of anti-Vietnam war officers. Subsequent discussions with military officials who were present at the time of his visits have confirmed that Loory showed not the slightest interest in the thousands of soldiers conducting their normal training in the 82d Airborne Division or in the Green Berets of the JFK Center—only the dissidents. It should not be the least surprising that such an intensive search for warts yielded a goodly supply to describe in detail. With few exceptions, the wart-discovering approach apparently was used throughout the book—the deliberate search for the corrupt and self-serving officer and NCO, the disgruntled enlisted man, and the inoperable or poorly maintained piece of fighting gear.

There are some areas of the book, however, which are uncomfortably accurate, but in most instances they concern problems already under intensive review within the military services. The discussions of the Army's Efficiency Report system will be heartily endorsed by almost every officer in uniform. This problem of inflated performance reports has received the personal attention of every Chief of Staff since World War II. A number of cures have been attempted, but none to date has been successful. Loory's comments on the excessive number of generals and admirals will certainly find a sympathetic ear in the Congress, which has been pressuring the Department of

Defense toward reductions. A principal factor here is the number of senior officers assigned to special positions outside their uniformed services—for example, attachés. Still, the numbers undoubtedly are excessive, and Pentagon action following congressional guidelines is likely to be forthcoming. The discussions of Lavelle's private war, the aftermath of My Lai and the Army's former domestic intelligence program are both reasonably close to the mark and *deja vu*.

Loory concentrates 61 pages of the book on the escapades of former Sergeant Major of the Army William Wooldridge, Brig. Gen. Earl Cole, *inter alia*. Not only is this discussion old hat with the reading public, but the rip-off's which may have been committed or condoned by this group are not symptomatic of the officer/NCO corps. Loory's "investigative" reporting in this section was confined principally to the Congressional Record.

Loory tries to make a case for military institutional bias toward blacks and civil rights dissenters. That such bias has existed and continues, in varying degrees, is certainly true, but the military services have demonstrated an exemplary societal leadership in this area. No other American institution has acted so forthrightly to change its corporate being with respect to a national social problem.

Loory's use of expert witnesses is subject to considerable skepticism: Lt. Col. Edward King, retired and disgruntled author of "The Death of the Army"; Col. David Hackworth, retired and disgruntled multitoured Vietnam fighter with a hotly disputed reputation at the end of his service, and former Private Andrew Stapp, the organizer of the American Servicemen's Union, all participate in the collective masochism.

To correct these perceived military evils, Loory suggests a number of sweeping changes—Universal Military Service, abandonment of overseas

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stations, and the formulation of a Joint General Staff with its officers permanently divorced from the services (exactly what the Congress has continually tried to prevent through the years). Any of these unoriginal ideas may well be legitimate issues for congressional and executive evaluation, but Loory has failed to present any acceptable credentials to support his judgments.

Defeated is a compendium of wild charges, allegations, and half truths—McCarthyism in print. Like McCarthy, Loory has just enough germs of truth to make his points appear credible, on the whole, to those who would prefer to believe that the country's Armed Forces are indeed "defeated." The book is, at best, sloppy and biased journalism and demonstrates that Loory simply has not done his homework very well. The evidence cannot, however, be discarded out of hand—as in rape, there are many degrees of consent related with the act. To the original questions of fairness, reasonability, and accuracy, the answers all must be no. To the larger question of whether Loory may have pointed out problems and symptomatic conditions that should require the full attention of our military hierarchy, the professional reader must respond with a qualified yes. The military professional is quite conscious of the need for aggressive, thoughtful examination, and overhaul of his institution. There are just enough uncomfortable truths in Loory's book to compel some agonizing evaluations about the status and future of the American Military Establishment, and, to this end, Loory's uninhibited allegations may be useful. The U.S. Armed Forces can well use a first-rate book that provides a hard, balanced, and objective analysis of its status and values. Such a book must be believable and based on thorough investigation, perceptive insights, and a fundamental understanding of the organization, people, and societal role of the Military Establishment in America. Un-

fortunately, *Defeated* fails on all counts.

L.W. JACKLEY
Colonel, U.S. Army

Padfield, Peter. *The Battleship Era*. New York: McKay, 1972. 321p.

Except during a brief appearance of *New Jersey* in the late 1960's, few Navy men on active duty today have ever seen a battleship. Once the dominant factor in naval thinking, battleships are a part of the old Navy and, but for a few floating museums and "mothballed" ships, are extinct.

The eclipse of the battleship by the carrier during World War II was a result of technological developments, much like the rise to prominence of the battleship had been a triumph of the technology of the Industrial Revolution. Peter Padfield has ably chronicled the rise and fall of the battleship in a way that should fascinate navy men and naval buffs alike.

The commencement of what was to be a revolution in naval thinking came on 4 March 1858 when the French laid the keel of *Gloire*. Shellproof iron plates were bolted over timber to give the protection needed to counter the effect of newly developed projectiles. Although considerable expense was involved, the French felt the cost necessary if they were to outflank British naval superiority in the naval arms race. Unfortunately for the French, however, British industrial might proved to be an irresistible force far superior to what the French could muster. A month before *Gloire* was launched, the British launched H.M.S. *Warrior*, a ship that, with 4½ inches of solid wrought iron over wood and engines that combined with sails could give her 14½ knots, was stronger and faster than *Gloire*.

America has the honor of being the scene of the first battle between iron-clads. Yet even before the *Monitor-Merrimack* standoff in Hampton Roads on 9 March 1862, *Merrimack*, renamed