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The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation

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C.S.S. *Virginia* by the Confederates, had proven the value of ironclad warships in combat with ships of wood. *Virginia* had the day before rammed and sunk the Federal sloop-of-war *Cumberland*. A second ship, *Congress*, fled before this formidable foe but had the misfortune to run aground before being finished off by *Virginia*. The most notable point of the action at Hampton Roads was the invulnerability of iron ships to gunfire.

The iron warships of the 19th century saw only two open sea fleet actions. The first was in the Adriatic at Lissa in 1866 between Austrian and Italian forces. Ironclads were involved in this knockdown, drag-out fight, but only two ships were sunk. A small Italian gunboat blew up after a shell hit her magazine, and the Italian flagship *Re d'Italia* was sunk after having been rammed by the Austrian flagship. This ramming, combined with the sinking of *Cumberland*, unfortunately gave rise to a preoccupation with ramming that lasted almost until the first World War.

The final fleet action in the 19th century involving ironclads occurred at the Battle of the Yalu in 1895 between the Imperial Chinese and Japanese fleets. The Japanese victory can, however, be attributed more to the superior handling of superior ships against poorly handled inferior ships than to any effect of armor.

Mr. Padfield has used exciting accounts of naval engagements and substantial amounts of detail to develop his central theme: the battleship was a product of technology which, in turn, worked to eclipse it. Within 50 years the world's major navies had evolved from wooden ships with muzzle loading guns driven by the wind to steel ships with breech loading guns driven by steam turbine engines. How naval architects and the leading navies kept apace of what must have seemed to be bewildering kaleidoscopic change not only makes good reading, but it also gives some insight into present attempts to

keep abreast of technology.

Battleships were built for battle fleets, the purpose of which was to engage enemy battle fleets and destroy them. This concept, brought into vogue by Alfred Mahan, dominated naval thinking for most of the first part of the 20th century. World War II showed the limitations of the battleship, but recent experience in Vietnam showed a continuing need for big guns, even if they are not used against an enemy battle fleet. Again, the demise of the battleship demonstrates that the ultimate naval weapon is vulnerable to technological development—that obscure weapon system fermenting in the minds of men.

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Quester, George. *The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973. 245p.

One of the most fundamental aspects of nuclear diplomacy is the relationship between the number of nuclear actors and the risk of deliberate or accidental holocaust. As the number of nuclear nations increases, the risk of nuclear war also rises, but at a greatly accelerated rate. Recognizing this fact, the major world powers in the late 1960's sought to permanently limit the number of nuclear nations.

In discussing this attempt, Cornell University political scientist George Quester has done a first-class piece of research, thinking, and writing in *The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation*. Professor Quester marches straight through the politics, complexities, and national fears of this amazingly vital but little understood international issue. His positive, nontechnical, and candid discussion, based on a lifetime of observation and study, deserves a wide readership.

The strength of Quester's work lies in his organization and presentation of

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facts. He approaches the problem of nuclear proliferation as a political, nationalistic, diplomatic, and military interface shaded with superpower superiority and small power pretensions. Quester sees the chances for world ratification of a Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as dependent on variables not really in the hands of either Washington or Moscow. He first sets his stage by recounting the steps which, by July 1968 had led to a nonproliferation treaty, drafted largely by the United States and the U.S.S.R., and then ingeniously divides the world into 17 capitals, examining chapter by chapter the policies, politics, and programs of each major subsequently involved nation.

As the most deeply involved of the world's capitals, Moscow and Washington are first discussed, both in terms of their mutual suspicion and allies and the internal considerations each nation has had to deal with. A balanced discussion results, emphasizing these superpowers' fear of eroding sovereignty for the sake of world respectability.

He continues with a view of the nuclear world as seen from New Delhi, capital of a land that can produce nuclear bombs and has, because of her subcontinent political posture, refused to sign the NPT. The economic costs to India (and the political costs to the United States and the U.S.S.R.) are thoughtfully examined. This chapter is an eye opener for the reader since it demonstrates vividly the pride and fear of competent, developing nations that they might be left behind in the division of world power.

The pretensions of smaller powers—particular in the volatile Middle East—coupled with legitimate defense needs are reflected in a chapter titled "Jerusalem." The issue, of course, is the Arab-Israeli stalemate and Israel's determination not to be taken for granted or to be caught off guard.

Stockholm, usually ignored in works

on diplomacy and nuclear strategy, represents the unique position of a modern state forsaking nuclear weaponry. Here Quester may well have sacrificed objectivity (he was the guest of the Swedes for 4 months), but since few people understand the motives behind Sweden's standdown (and its research to enable it to start nuclear development if need be), this chapter is well presented and interesting, even if biased.

South American powers are presented in a fascinating combination of "don't leave us out" coupled with "follow the leader." In Brazil's case, signing the NPT would likely prevent use of nuclear energy, locally produced, from exploiting and opening this vast rich land. Argentina and Chile, for fear of Brazil's growth, refuse to sign the treaty in a monumental reflection of that tired Latin game: "After you, Gaston."

The attitudes of the major commonwealth countries and the German Federal Republic are shown to be in marked contrast. Britain is in the club, but as Quester points out, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand want proliferation stopped, even at their own risk (i.e., not having the weaponry or the active technology), confident that the United States-United Kingdom friendship will suffice to protect the other major English-speaking nations. Not so with Bonn, where fear of U.S. cutbacks and an "America first" strategy leaves Bonn psychologically nude. Although Bonn has signed the NPT, doubts and fears exist and will not disappear even if world ratification comes about.

The positions of Paris, Pretoria, and Peking, all nonsigners, are extremely well presented. With France's pride at stake, that nation does not intend to inhibit its own nuclear diplomacy. With Pretoria the matter is commercial, for South Africa is a major supplier of uranium. With China it is revolutionary politics and world competition (not to mention survival). Author Quester does a splendid job of explaining the vagaries

and complexities of the policies of these three nations.

Quester ends with an insight into the monitoring instrument of ratified world nuclear agreements—the International Atomic Energy Agency—and warns that the work of this bureaucracy can easily be manacled by any power so disposed.

He allows himself the freedom of four hypotheses, testing the validity and success of nonproliferation, and is encouraged, but practical. This is a competent, able analyst. If he is encouraged, we all have reason to be satisfied.

In terms of current literature generally available, Quester's book neatly complements John Newhouse's excellent *Cold Dawn: the Story of SALT* (Holt, 1973), T.G. Plate's ultracritical *Understanding Doomsday* (Simon and Schuster, 1971), Quester's own earlier *Nuclear Diplomacy* (University Press, 1971), and Roman Kolkowicz's edited but interesting and valuable volume *The Soviet Union and Arms Control* (Johns Hopkins, 1970).

George Quester has presented us with a readable, informed, and well documented review of the status of world power in relation to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. He has dealt successfully not only with the major actors, both nuclear and nonnuclear, but with the would-be nuclear nations as well. I much recommend this book for its clarity, nontechnical approach, and most particularly for its candor and astuteness.

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Sanders, Ralph. *The Politics of Defense Analysis*. New York: Dunellen, 1974. 361p.

The introduction of the technique of systems analysis into the Department of Defense in 1961 by Robert McNamara created a great deal of controversy. The advocates of systems analysis hailed it as the most rational method of dealing

with the nagging question of "How much is enough?" Its critics argued that the method relied too much on quantifying the unquantifiable and ignored the role of experience. Systems analysis was hailed by many as the management tool that enabled the Secretary of Defense to assert his proper control over the vast Pentagon bureaucracy. Others argued that the technique functioned as a device to legitimize the Secretary's disregarding of the military's input into the decisionmaking process. However, a decade later, systems analysis is such an accepted technique in the Department of Defense and its role in the decisionmaking process has been so institutionalized that there is an Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation on the assistant secretary level and each service chief of staff now has his own analysis shop.

In his recently published work, *The Politics of Defense Analysis*, Ralph Sanders, Professor of Public Administration at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, recounts the history of systems analysis and its impact on the Department of Defense over the past 12 years. Dr. Sanders, who spent 6 months on McNamara's systems analysis staff, divides his analysis into three parts: the use of systems analysis, its effect on political practice, and its influence on decisionmaking concepts. Although the book is reasonably thorough and up to date, as a work of scholarship it suffers from a number of weaknesses.

First, there is nothing really new in it. All of what the author says has been presented before and often times better. Alain Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith's *How Much Is Enough* and James Roherty's *Decisions of Robert S. McNamara* are much better sources of the political dynamics of systems analysis. Second, the author relies too much on nonscholarly sources to substantiate many of his arguments. His notes are replete with reference to such sources as *Newsweek*, *Business Week*, and several