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The Politics of Defense Analysis

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and complexities of the policies of these three nations.

Quester ends with an insight into the monitoring instrument of ratified world nuclear agreements—the International Atomic Energy Agency—and warns that the work of this bureaucracy can easily be manacled by any power so disposed.

He allows himself the freedom of four hypotheses, testing the validity and success of nonproliferation, and is encouraged, but practical. This is a competent, able analyst. If he is encouraged, we all have reason to be satisfied.

In terms of current literature generally available, Quester's book neatly complements John Newhouse's excellent *Cold Dawn: the Story of SALT* (Holt, 1973), T.G. Plate's ultracritical *Understanding Doomsday* (Simon and Schuster, 1971), Quester's own earlier *Nuclear Diplomacy* (University Press, 1971), and Roman Kolkowicz's edited but interesting and valuable volume *The Soviet Union and Arms Control* (Johns Hopkins, 1970).

George Quester has presented us with a readable, informed, and well documented review of the status of world power in relation to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. He has dealt successfully not only with the major actors, both nuclear and nonnuclear, but with the would-be nuclear nations as well. I much recommend this book for its clarity, nontechnical approach, and most particularly for its candor and astuteness.

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Sanders, Ralph. *The Politics of Defense Analysis*. New York: Dunellen, 1974. 361p.

The introduction of the technique of systems analysis into the Department of Defense in 1961 by Robert McNamara created a great deal of controversy. The advocates of systems analysis hailed it as the most rational method of dealing

with the nagging question of "How much is enough?" Its critics argued that the method relied too much on quantifying the unquantifiable and ignored the role of experience. Systems analysis was hailed by many as the management tool that enabled the Secretary of Defense to assert his proper control over the vast Pentagon bureaucracy. Others argued that the technique functioned as a device to legitimize the Secretary's disregarding of the military's input into the decisionmaking process. However, a decade later, systems analysis is such an accepted technique in the Department of Defense and its role in the decisionmaking process has been so institutionalized that there is an Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation on the assistant secretary level and each service chief of staff now has his own analysis shop.

In his recently published work, *The Politics of Defense Analysis*, Ralph Sanders, Professor of Public Administration at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, recounts the history of systems analysis and its impact on the Department of Defense over the past 12 years. Dr. Sanders, who spent 6 months on McNamara's systems analysis staff, divides his analysis into three parts: the use of systems analysis, its effect on political practice, and its influence on decisionmaking concepts. Although the book is reasonably thorough and up to date, as a work of scholarship it suffers from a number of weaknesses.

First, there is nothing really new in it. All of what the author says has been presented before and often times better. Alain Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith's *How Much Is Enough* and James Roherty's *Decisions of Robert S. McNamara* are much better sources of the political dynamics of systems analysis. Second, the author relies too much on nonscholarly sources to substantiate many of his arguments. His notes are replete with reference to such sources as *Newsweek*, *Business Week*, and several

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newspapers. Third, Sander's analysis often fails to penetrate beyond the formalities of the decisionmaking processes to its realities. This is particularly true of his treatment of the National Security Council (NSC) system under Nixon. The author would have us believe that it was in the subcommittees of the NSC system that foreign policy was formulated. After reading his account of Nixon's NSC system, one wonders why the State Department was unaware of our new China policy or why the military liaison officer on Kissinger's staff was making "extra copies" of documents for the Pentagon.

Fourth, the book repeats too many clichés and bits of traditional wisdom that simply do not stand up to rigorous analysis. Sanders states that declining defense budgets should lead to a renewal of the kind of interservice rivalry that existed in the Eisenhower era. Defense budgets have been declining in real terms for 5 years but this has not happened yet, nor is it likely to happen as long as the military is confronted with a nonsympathetic Congress, media, and public. Fifth, he leaves many of the critical issues about the politics of analysis unanswered. In discussing whether or not systems analysis can be

used to legitimize decisions already made, Sanders concludes by remarking only that this "raises the interesting question" of whether the analytical capabilities of the services can do nothing more than reaffirm what the military chiefs already have decided. Finally, the book contains a number of inaccuracies. The author has Adm. George Anderson retiring as CNO in 1965 instead of being fired in 1963. Moreover, Sanders asserts that in 1956 General Matthew Ridgway (spelled incorrectly as Ridgeway throughout the book) complained publicly about the Eisenhower administration's defense policies in spite of opposition from the Secretary of Defense. The author is apparently unaware that since Ridgway retired in 1955, he no longer worked for Secretary Wilson.

For those unacquainted with systems analysis and Department of Defense procedures over the past decade, this can be a useful book. But for anyone familiar with the subject, it is as useful as a basic American Government textbook would be to a graduate student in political science.

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People say that life is the thing, but I prefer reading.

Logan P. Smith, Afterthoughts, 1931