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

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

FOREWORD

The *Naval War College Review* was established in 1948 by the Chief of Naval Personnel in order that officers of the service might receive some of the educational benefits available to the resident students at the Naval War College. The forthright and candid views of the lecturers and authors are presented for the professional education of its readers. Lectures are selected on the basis of favorable reception by Naval War College audiences, usefulness to servicewide readership, and timeliness. Research papers are selected on the basis of professional interest to readers. Reproduction of articles or lectures in the *Review* requires the specific approval of the Editor, *Naval War College Review* and the respective author or lecturer. *Review* content is open to citation and other reference, in accordance with accepted academic research methods. The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the lecturers and authors and are not necessarily those of the Navy Department nor of the Naval War College.

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Cover: The cover of this issue of the *Review* is a copy of an engraved plate from *L'Art des Armées Navales, ou Traite des Evolutions Navales* (Lyons, 1727) by Paul Hoste, 1652-1700, French Jesuit and professor of mathematics at the Royal Naval College, Toulon. The work, which first appeared in 1697, is the earliest known study on naval tactics. A 1727 second edition containing additions and corrections is included in the Navy War College Library's Rare Book Collection.

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PRESIDENT'S NOTES

As a preface to these, my first words to the readers of the *Naval War College Review*, I would like to say that I feel most privileged to be serving as the 37th President of the Naval War College and to be associated with the outstanding men and women who contribute so much to the vitality of this historic institution.

The college, as you know, has just undergone a time of profound innovation, and I believe it essential that we now pause long enough to take our bearings, to consolidate the substantial progress that has been made, and to continue the examination of our academic policies and curriculum. Of course, a dynamic world requires a dynamic curriculum, and some changes may prove necessary. However, for the present, I anticipate that the current academic year will be carried out essentially as now structured.

In future President's Notes, I will have more to say concerning the academic course at the college. For the present, let me just note that I strongly support the idea of an active learning process which requires substantial individual effort on the part of the student. Whatever the future course, I will bend every effort toward a Naval War College that meets the future needs of the Navy and the outstanding officers who come here to study.

As might be expected, the changes here at the college have had their effect on this publication. This is as it should be, for the *Review* is our forum, our link with the wider maritime community through which we can shape and test ideas, particularly the ideas of those who will eventually lead our Navy.

Of the several interesting articles in this issue, I would like to draw to your particular attention Professor Gaddis' paper on lessons that policymakers have drawn and will draw from the cold war. He reminds us of Santayana's statement, "those who do not remember the past are condemned to repeat it," but Professor Gaddis cautions the reader by stressing that "those who oversimplify the past in an effort to draw lessons from it will live to regret it."

His treatment of four critical areas of foreign policy—definition of interests, perception of threats, formulation of responses to threats and its public justification—is thought provoking and deserving of serious consideration by all military officers. Since there are differing points of view on this problem, I encourage anyone wishing to be heard to write to the editor—on this or any other article. It is the process of mentally challenging Professor Gaddis *et al*, that stimulates the professional growth of each and every one of us; and, after all, that is what this journal is all about.

Julien J. LeBourgeois

JULIEN J. LEBOURGEOIS
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College

American policymakers during the years of the cold war, seemingly unable to distinguish between unique events and recurrent trends in their interpretation of history, have repeatedly misused the lessons of the past. Much of the problem has been a lack of precision in the four areas critical to successful policy; definition of interest, perception of threats, formulation of response to those threats, and public justification for actions taken. Only when our policymakers discontinue their habit of making sweeping proclamations based on limited and possibly inapplicable historical evidence will the true value of past experience become evident in American diplomacy.

THE COLD WAR:

SOME LESSONS FOR POLICYMAKERS

A lecture given at the Naval War College

by

Professor John L. Gaddis

It is with considerable trepidation that I approach this topic, because as any good historian will tell you, one cannot draw lessons from the past. What has gone before, they will argue, is an infinite aggregation of variables which, by their very definition, are unique, particular, and incapable of repetition. Some historians despair even of describing the past accurately, much less drawing lessons from it. And, in a way, they are right; the past is never exactly repeated.

Historians who argue this way are also somewhat impractical, however, because they forget that selectivity in the perception and ordering of experience is a prerequisite for sanity. If human beings waited for all the facts before acting, no action would ever take place. Any man who acts does so on the basis of selective evidence, and, invariably, past experience will make up the majority of the information upon which action is based.

In terms of U.S. foreign policy during the post-World War II years, one generally tends to focus on mistakes when discussing lessons of the past, and certainly many have been made. The impression this creates, however, should be put into a more balanced perspective. The ultimate objective of any nation's foreign policy is to create and maintain, by means short of war, an international environment congenial to the survival and prospering of the nation's domestic institutions. There seems little doubt that our diplomacy has met this test: we have at least survived and, excluding the political turmoil of the Vietnam years, without serious derangement of what we refer to as "the American way of life." The real measure of foreign

policy, as of military strategy, involves more than attaining ultimate objectives –it requires also an efficient adaptation of means to ends, and it is in this regard that our record in foreign policy is uneven.

The problem has been, I believe, a lack of precision in four areas critical to the success of any foreign policy: the definition of interests, the perception of threats, the formulation of a response to threats, and public justification. Furthermore, in discussing both the causes and consequences of this imprecision, one finds that, in most cases, it arose at least in part out of misperceived lessons of history. Hopefully this paper will provide food for thought and assist policymakers to better determine which lessons of history are applicable to particular situations and which are not.

Definition of Interests. What were the basic requirements for preserving a congenial international environment after World War II? George F. Kennan, in his typically succinct manner, has outlined these requirements:

> Repeatedly, at that time and in ensuing years, I expressed in talks and lectures the view that there were only five regions of the world–the United States, the United Kingdom, the Rhine valley with adjacent industrial areas, the Soviet Union, and Japan–where the sinews of modern military strength could be produced in quantity; I pointed out that only one of these was under Communist control; and I defined the main task of containment, accordingly, as one of seeing to it that none of the remaining ones fell under such control.[1]

Kennan acknowledged, of course, that protection of the four remaining non-Communist strongpoints would require control of surrounding and intervening areas: lines of communication across the Atlantic and Pacific, for example, and Western Europe. It should also be noted that when Kennan used the word "Communist" in this context, he had in mind primarily the Soviet variety. With these qualifications, his assessment of the irreducible national interest stands up, in retrospect, as at least plausible. Certainly it was consistent with the principal, if often obscured, thrust of American foreign policy in the 20th century: control the Western Hemisphere and preserve a balance of power in Europe and the Far East.

The way in which we actually defined our postwar interests, however, was very different. Statements of war aims were frequent from the time of the Atlantic Charter on, but essentially they boiled down to five major objectives: (1) destruction of the warmaking capability of Germany and Japan; (2) preservation of the wartime Grand Alliance; (3) self-determination: the right of people everywhere to choose their own form of government; (4) multilateralism: the lowering of barriers to trade and investment throughout the world; and (5) collective security: the creation of a new international organization which would assume eventual responsibility for maintaining world order.

Had these principles been put into effect, they might well have created the congenial international environment we so avidly sought. Unfortunately, they could not be put into effect given the configuration of power which existed in the world after the Second World War. We could not, for example, have both self-determination in Eastern Europe and cooperation with Russia because the Russians considered the denial of self-determination in that part of the world as vital to their security. Similarly, we could not destroy the warmaking capabilities of Germany and Japan without impairing the prospects for multilateralism: the industrial base of both countries was essential to world economic recovery. Nor did we have the power, at least as far as the Russians

were concerned, to compel compliance with our postwar plans. The atomic bomb was useless for such purposes, and our economic aid was not sufficiently valuable to the Russians to induce a more cooperative attitude. At any rate, principles like self-determination, multilateralism, and collective security cannot really be forced, they must proceed from mutual interests and mutual consent. These simply did not exist, so far as Soviet-American relations were concerned, in the postwar period.

Why did we proclaim war aims so far beyond our effective capability? Largely we did so because we based our postwar planning not on an informed estimate of what the postwar situation was likely to be but on preventing the circumstances that had led to World War II. Thus the destruction of German and Japanese warmaking capacity would correct the mistake of having left German industry intact after World War I; maintenance of the Grand Alliance would avoid the interallied bickering which, during the 1920's, had allowed the defeated Germans to play the victors off against one another; self-determination would forestall irredentism of the kind which had allowed Hitler, until 1939, to cloak his aggressive intentions behind the argument that he was only righting the wrongs of Versailles; multilateralism would prevent a new global depression similar to the one which had stimulated German and Japanese militarism; and finally, the United Nations would atone for what most observers now saw as the "great betrayal" of 1919—the failure of the United States to join Wilson's League of Nations. There was thus an underlying logic to American postwar aims, but it was a logic more closely related to the past than to the real world in which these principles would have to be applied.

Our postwar planners sought to construct, on the basis of a single set of historical experiences, nothing less than a universal formula for the prevention of future wars. Such a grandiose program, it would seem, ought to be based on broader foundations than that, however shattering or intense the particular experiences in question. Lessons of the past are important in defining interests, but so too are careful assessments of national capabilities and the circumstances in which they are likely to be used. One is forced to the conclusion that Kennan's formulation of the irreducible national interest, based both on a recognition of where power resided in the world and the need to keep it in balance, met these criteria better than did the millennial pronouncements with which we, in fact, greeted the postwar world.

Our definition of interests changed once it became apparent that bipolar confrontation, not great power unity, was to be the fact of life in the postwar world. For a time, in 1947 and 1948, we did define our interests much as Kennan had suggested: our policy was oriented toward keeping crucial power centers in Europe and Asia out of the hands of the Russians, not dissipating our energies in peripheral areas like China, Palestine, Korea, or Indochina. This proved to be only a transitory policy, however, for, as the dramatic events of 1950 showed, interests are as likely to be defined by emotions as by rational calculation.

Despite the fact that we had explicitly excluded South Korea from our security perimeter, the blatant nature of the North Korean attack in June 1950 made the defense of that country a vital interest, even if it had not been before. Analogies with the past proved too overwhelming to ignore: Truman specifically recalled the 1931 Japanese invasion of Manchuria while others harked back to the 1936 Rhineland crisis. Aggression, the argument ran, had to be nipped in the bud; otherwise, like cancer, it would grow until it engulfed the entire international organism. It followed from this that distinctions

between peripheral and vital interests were unwise: international order was a seamless web which, if rent at any point, would imperil the structure of peace everywhere. Maksim Litvinov had been right all along: peace was indivisible.

But this again was a generalization based on limited, and in this case, misperceived historical evidence. It assumed that all aggressors have unlimited ambitions, something certainly not true of the Japanese and possibly not true of Hitler either. Objectives notwithstanding, the nature of power on the international scene is such that even unlimited aggression is a function of both will and capabilities, neither of which are infinite.

The concept that peace is indivisible assumes much the same thing about interests: that the security of peace-loving states is best served by the proliferation of interests. But again history does not sustain the argument: the whole history of late 19th century imperialism can be seen as a process by which great powers sought security through the expansion of interests, only to feel, as a result, less secure. One of the main reasons why the United States did not join the League of Nations in 1919 was the very fear that an indiscriminate proliferation of peacekeeping commitments would increase, rather than decrease, the danger of war. It is a classic principle of strategy that great power widely dissipated increases the vulnerability of the state, a principle completely forgotten by the argument that peace and therefore interests are indivisible.

The extent to which this belief in the indivisibility of peace has affected our foreign policy since 1950 hardly needs to be emphasized. The much criticized "pactomania" of John Foster Dulles grew out of it as did the "domino theory." Until very recently we continued to seek security far more often through the proliferation of interests rather than through their stabilization or contraction. Since World War II one gets the distinct impression that our leaders perceive a unique obligation, not shared by other nations, to maintain order in the world. It is an assumption marked more by national pride, I suspect, than by a precise calculation of where the national interest lies.

The precise definition of interests and the recognition that because power is limited, threats and the response to threats must be also, would, I believe, have resulted in a far more efficient adaptation of means to ends in our recent foreign policy. It is for this reason that I propose it as a first major lesson we might legitimately learn from the cold war experience.

Perception of Threats. A nation's perception of external threats is closely related to its interests: as threats increase, interests tend to also, and vice versa. Because the two are so interdependent, precision in the perception of threats is just as important as precision in the definition of interests. And, as in the definition of interests, an imprecise perception of threats has been, I believe, one of the major difficulties in postwar American foreign policy.

Much of this can be traced to a widespread belief after 1950 that ideology took precedence over the national interests of the Communist States. Convinced that all ideologies serve, to some degree, as a blueprint for action, we came to view our antagonists as Communists first, Russians or Chinese or North Korean or North Vietnamese second. As a result we fell into the unwise habit of exaggerating the unity of our adversaries while neglecting some very profound divisions among them, divisions of which we have only recently begun to take advantage.

How did we come to focus so narrowly on ideology as a means of anticipating our adversaries' behavior? The

tendency stems, I believe, from three separate experiences Americans have had in dealing with world affairs in the 20th century:

First was a vague, almost unstated, assumption, dating from pre-World War I days, that autocratic governments tend to be irresponsible and quite probably aggressive in their conduct of foreign affairs. Growing to a large degree out of our concern over the ambitions of czarist Russia and imperial Germany around the turn of the century, this conviction that there is a positive correlation between the internal structure of governments and their external behavior was well established by the time Woodrow Wilson set out to make the world safe for democracy. It also influenced, in turn, our attitudes toward Japan and Germany in the 1930's and the U.S.S.R. and Communist China after World War II.

Further evidence perceived as supporting the conclusion that ideology is a blueprint for action grew out of what we might call the "*Mein Kampf* syndrom." During the early years of Hitler's career, foreign observers felt that his sole objective was to correct the inequities of Versailles. It came as a great shock to discover, after Munich, that he had more in mind than simply bringing all Germans into the Reich. Because Hitler had been specific about his larger ambitions in *Mein Kampf*, it became an article of faith among statesmen of the period that had they read more deeply into Nazi ideology, they would have discovered the ultimate objectives of Nazi aggression. (How anyone could have made much out of the obscure pomposities which make up *Mein Kampf* is difficult to see; the signal was there, but it was pretty deeply buried.) From this developed the belief that all ideological writings should be taken literally. As the Soviet Union and later China became areas of concern, policymakers sent their staffs burrowing through the ponderous writings of Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao in an effort to find out what the Communists were going to do next. John Foster Dulles was particularly taken with this approach: he regarded Stalin's *Problems of Leninism* as nothing less than the Soviet equivalent of *Mein Kampf* and, we are told, kept a well-worn copy of it at his bedside throughout his tenure as Secretary of State. Nor did the tendency stop there: as late as 1967 Washington officials were citing the ideological pronouncements of the now unlamented Lin Piao in the same somber way.

This emphasis on ideology as a means of understanding our adversaries' behavior was by no means useless. Ideology obviously does play an important role in Communist societies, but the belief that by reading the ideological classics of communism one could predict how the Russians or the Chinese were going to behave strikes me as a rather fundamental misunderstanding of what that role is. Ideology is a powerful instrument for justifying the actions of Communist regimes, both by invoking the "laws" of historical imperative and the threat of a hostile outside world. It gives such governments a degree of influence they might not otherwise have in certain parts of the world by promising shortcuts in the development process. It also serves, consciously or unconsciously, as a perceptual filter, creating stereotypes through which Communist leaders perceive external reality. It does not, however, provide clear-cut blueprints for action; indeed, by the mid-1950's, ideology had been modified so many times in Communist societies that it is hard to see how it could have served as a guide to much of anything. Certainly it does not influence behavior with sufficient regularity to be reliably predictable from the outside.

The relationship between Moscow and the international Communist movement before and during World War II also served to reinforce the idea that

ideology took precedence over national interest. Americans noted the mechanical manner in which Communist Parties throughout the world accommodated themselves to every twist and turn of the Kremlin's line, and most saw no reason to anticipate that things would be different after the war. Yet there was some reason to expect the Communist monolith to become less monolithic. China's Communist Party had maintained its independence from Moscow, as those few Americans familiar with its activities acknowledged. Moreover, before 1945 none of the major non-Russian parties had had any experience with the practical business of running a government. American observers might well have anticipated that, once in power, Communist Parties in areas like Eastern Europe would, where possible, begin to modify ideology to accommodate national interests. The Russians had done this, after all, time and time again. There were officials in the Truman administration who foresaw this: they quickly took advantage of Yugoslavia's defection in 1948 and hoped, during 1949 and 1950, to encourage a split between Moscow and Peking.

It proved difficult to get across to the American people, however, the idea that communism was dangerous only where clearly an instrument of Soviet foreign policy. The belief in ideology as a predictive instrument was too strong to overcome, and the administration's own imprecise rhetoric had done little to clarify the situation. Aside from Yugoslavia, there seemed to be little evidence that the monolith was about to crumble; certainly Mao showed few public signs that he would eventually break with Moscow. Nor did the domestic atmosphere encourage differentiation between varieties of communism: the Alger Hiss furor was at its height, and Senator McCarthy had just begun his highly conspicuous search for subversives in government. As a result, this early anticipation of polycentrism within the Communist bloc had little practical effect. Most Americans remained firmly convinced that all Communist activity everywhere could be attributed to the machinations of the Kremlin, and, after the traumatic shock of Korea, almost all top officials of the Truman administration came to share this view.

This inability, or unwillingness, to distinguish between varieties of communism imparted to our diplomacy some of the worst characteristics of our adversaries. It caused us to use ideological orientation, not pragmatic self-interest, as the chief criterion by which we distinguished friends from enemies. It reduced opportunities for negotiation; where absolute good confronts absolute evil, chances for an amicable resolution of differences seem small. It narrowed the options open to policymakers, since every alternative had to meet the test of not being "soft" on communism. Finally, and most important, it got us into wars with the wrong enemies. Whatever the view at the time, it seems clear now that neither Communist China nor North Vietnam posed mortal threats to our security in the way the Soviet Union did. Yet, because we considered communism, not just Russia, to be our opponent, we managed to stumble into bloody and protracted conflicts with both.

The lesson in all this is clear: an imprecise perception of adversaries can lead to a devastating imbalance in the relationship of means to ends in diplomacy. While ideology has been significant in shaping the behavior of Communist States, it has more often been modified to reflect national interests for the wise policymaker to rely very much on it as a means of anticipating how his adversaries are going to behave.

Formulation of Responses to Threat. Precision is also vital in formulating the proper response to threats. Such responses, it would seem, should be

closely calibrated to the nature of the perceived danger. Too narrow a response may fail to deal with the problem in such a way as to deter one's adversary. Too broad a response may be seen by the other side or by some third party as a counterthreat in itself and lead to unwanted escalation and the distinct possibility that resources may be dispersed in peripheral areas. The proper calibration of response is an extremely difficult thing to achieve, since both interests and threats are relative and subjectively measured entities. Yet such calibration must be made if a nation is not to perpetuate the very conflicts it seeks to settle.

The tendency in postwar American strategy and diplomacy, I think, has been to overrespond to threats while underresponding to opportunities through negotiation. I should like to discuss each of these patterns briefly.

Overresponse to threats stems largely from our leaders' proclivity for worst-case analysis which, in turn, rests on two basic assumptions: (1) that an adversary's capabilities are likely to be less flexible than his intentions and hence more predictable; (2) that by planning on the basis of an adversary's capabilities one can therefore minimize risks. The main influence of this policy, of course, has been in the area of strategic weapons policy, but it was also reflected in our tendency, for a long time, to see communism everywhere as an instrument of the Kremlin.

What have not been given sufficient attention are the assumptions upon which worst-case analysis rests. Are capabilities really more predictable than intentions? Does planning on the basis of capabilities actually minimize risk? The history of the cold war, I suggest, indicates that both of these generalizations are questionable.

The problem with planning on the basis of an adversary's capabilities is that capabilities are not solely a function of physical resources: they are also the product of deliberate decisions within a government on resource allocation and hence cannot really be separated from intentions. There is not much doubt that the Russians had, and probably still have, the physical capacity to invade Western Europe with relatively little difficulty. But what, at any stage of the cold war, has been the likelihood of their doing this, given the probable relationship of costs to benefits? There is no question that the Russians had, after 1957, ICBM's capable of reaching any point in the United States. But the fact was that in the late 1950's they chose not to deploy enough of them to achieve a first-strike capability. Emphasis on an adversary's capabilities as the basis for planning ignores one of the fundamental principles of strategy: that national power is as much a function of will as of capacity; that just because a nation has the power to do something does not mean that it will, in fact, do it.

Worst-case analysis is also a questionable device for minimizing risks, since there is nothing to prevent your adversary from interpreting measures you take in your own defense as threats directed against him. An opponent's capabilities are likely to be the product, in part, of his perception of external threat. Indeed, much of the history of the arms race can be understood in terms of self-fulfilling prophecies brought about through the application of worst-case analysis.

Finally, worst-case analysis is questionable because it violates the principle of concentrating force. Contingencies are infinite; one cannot arm against them all. Some calculations of probability in assessing threats, some selectivity in formulating responses are necessary if a nation is not to spread its resources too thin and to maintain the proper relationship of means to ends.

The American proclivity for worst-case analysis has not been the only tendency which has interfered with the

proper calibration of responses to threat. Another difficulty has been the surprising reluctance of U.S. officials, until recently, to rely on negotiations as the primary means of resolving differences with adversaries.

Sincere, though frustrating, efforts were made to negotiate differences with the Russians during the early years of the cold war, but by 1949 the negotiating instrument had begun to grow rusty from disuse. Acheson refused to deal in a substantive manner with the Russians on the German question, despite evidence that the Soviet Union was prepared to make promising concessions in order to prevent the rearmament of West Germany. Reversing earlier inclinations, he refused to recognize the People's Republic of China or to support admission of that state to the United Nations, despite the fact that he had foreseen the Sino-Soviet split and had hoped to take advantage of it. Dulles continued Acheson's policy by studiously ignoring gestures of conciliation emanating from the Kremlin after Stalin's death: whether these were sincere or not, they did reflect uncertainty and confusion in Moscow, and, for that reason alone, ought to have been pursued. This reluctance to negotiate also showed up in Dulles' notorious pessimism regarding summitry, his scarcely concealed contempt for the 1954 Geneva accords on Indochina, and his continued rigidity in dealing with China at a time when interesting opportunities had begun to develop regarding that country's estrangement with the Soviet Union. Adam B. Ulam is not wholly exaggerating the situation when he writes that if Moscow had proposed a joint declaration in favor of motherhood during the Dulles period, it

> would have called forth position papers from the State Department's Policy Planning Council, somber warnings from Senator Knowland, and eventually a declaration that while the United States welcomed this recognition of the sanctity of family life on the part of the Russians, it would require clear indication that the U.S.S.R. did not mean to derogate from the status of fatherhood.[2]

Even Kennedy, who did initiate discussions with the Russians on disarmament and Southeast Asia, felt unable to enter into a dialog with Communist China, though he privately admitted the desirability of doing so. The Johnson administration's reluctance to negotiate on Vietnam, rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding, is amply documented in the Pentagon Papers. Only with the advent of Nixon and Kissinger did negotiations again come into their own as the chief means of resolving differences, and even in that administration there persisted a curious inhibition about normalizing relations with Cuba.

This reluctance to negotiate, stemming as it does from a nation which, for the past quarter-century has possessed physical power at least equal to and usually superior to that of its rivals and a nation which has historically prided itself on the peaceful resolution of disputes between nations, seems odd indeed.

The explanation, I think, is caught up in the ticklish problem of maintaining credibility: we have concerned ourselves so much with making our policies credible to our adversaries, our allies, and ourselves that we have lost sight of the ultimate aim of diplomacy —the settlement of international conflicts through negotiation.

The problem of maintaining credibility with adversaries has been cogently discussed by Coral Bell in her book *Negotiation from Strength*.[3] As she demonstrates, there has been a widespread concern, based to some extent on the experiences of the 1930's, that too obvious a willingness to negotiate might be taken by the enemy as a sign of weakness; negotiations, to paraphrase

Dean Acheson, ought never to take place until one is in a position to negotiate from strength. The difficulty, of course, is that strength is a relative concept which cannot be measured accurately short of actual combat. There will always be soft spots of one kind or another in one's armor, and the nation which preoccupies itself with building impregnable positions may well never find the right time to negotiate.

An inhibition of equal importance has been the problem of maintaining credibility with allies. Alliances have an obvious value both in strengthening one's own position and in deterring irresponsible acts on the part of the other side. But they do multiply greatly the requirement of consultation, and this can delay negotations indefinitely while positions agreeable to all members of the alliance are worked out. Negotiations can also be delayed if there is a constant necessity of reassuring one's allies that no sellout to the enemy is contemplated. The net result is that the progress of negotiations becomes more dependent not on the skill of diplomats and the tractability of issues but on the morale of allies. This, of course, leads to the question that if the morale of allies is so weak it cannot stand negotiations with the adversary, how significant would be the assistance of such allies in time of war?

Finally, there is the problem of maintaining credibility with the American public. The problem here is twofold: the fear that by engaging in negotiations one may lull the public into a sense of complacency, the isolationism which our policymakers have seen lurking ever since the 1930's, and the concern, based on experiences like Yalta, that negotiations might cause a public backlash against what it perceives as a sellout. That the two fears seem mutually inconsistent has not caused them to carry any less weight in the view of Washington officials. Together they have produced the curious conviction that popular support for containment is dependent upon the enduring credibility of the threat which that policy was supposed to contain.

It is impossible to say, of course, that American-Soviet negotiations would have ended the cold war any sooner. The Russians, too, had their problems of maintaining credibility with adversaries, allies, and, in their own way, domestic constituencies. It is, however, difficult to point to any advantages gained by our reluctance to negotiate, and there were several substantial disadvantages. Not the least of these was that our inhibitions prevented us from taking advantage of the weaknesses and divisions which already existed among our rivals. And it seems very likely that our "image," whatever that is worth, would have been better: too often the Russians and the Chinese were able to convey the appearance of wanting to negotiate, whether they were sincere or not, while the United States had to take the blame for continuing the confrontation.

Something is probably wrong when a nation feels it cannot afford to negotiate. It may have taken positions which are untenable, nonnegotiability is often a good sign of this; it may be bogged down in bureaucratic inertia, serious negotiation is hard work, much more difficult than the unthinking defense of fixed positions; or may have exaggerated its own weaknesses and its adversaries' strengths. At the very least, it would seem that a nation which is interested in the preservation of peace but which finds itself unable or unwilling to negotiate has lost sight of the proper relationship of means to ends in diplomacy.

If one accepts, therefore, that precision in calibrating responses to threats is all-important, worst-case analysis and excessive inhibitions about negotiations are two tendencies which can seriously impair a successful foreign policy.

Justification of Response. Precision in explaining policy, both within and outside the government, is as important as precision in formulating it. This is so because, in the final analysis, policy cannot be separated from the language with which it is justified. If the gap between them becomes excessive, either rhetoric must be modified to better fit the policy or, as has more frequently been the case, policy must be altered to make it consistent with rhetoric. The consequences of this latter alternative can be serious indeed: policy can become the prisoner of rhetoric, with results far removed from those originally intended.

Why do gaps between policy and rhetoric develop? Why do our leaders' public rationales not always coincide with their private ones? The chief enemies of precision in the justification of policy, I suggest, are the use of hyperbole and secrecy as a means of expanding freedom of action in the field of foreign affairs.

Hyperbole follows a long and distinguished tradition in American domestic politics and is usually interpreted in the context intended. However, in foreign affairs, Americans seem more prone to take inflated rhetoric literally and to demand explanations when policy fails to follow suit. Hence, many Americans fully expected the post-World War II world to reflect, literally, the principles of the Atlantic Charter, and much of our difficulty with the Russians over self-determination in Eastern Europe stemmed from Roosevelt's futile efforts to make reality coincide with rhetoric. Similarly, when the Truman administration sold aid to Greece and Turkey on the grounds that it was in our interests to stop communism everywhere he later had difficulty explaining why nothing was done to prevent Mao's victory in China. John Foster Dulles had comparable problems with slogans like "liberation," "massive retaliation," and "agonizing reappraisal." American leaders have often had difficulty in sorting out short-term from long-term advantages. Exaggeration may be an effective short-run technique for "selling" a particular policy but, in the long run, may restrict rather than increase freedom of action by pledging the Nation to unintended, long-term commitments.

In recent times, secrecy rather than hyperbole has become the favorite tool of those seeking freedom of action in foreign affairs. The Vietnam war is full of examples in which the public was either misled or simply not given the whole story, examples such as the ambiguous 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident, the introduction of ground combat forces in 1965, and the secret bombing of Laos and Cambodia during the first years of the Nixon administration. No one seriously argues that secrecy can be eliminated in foreign affairs, but the purpose of secrecy, it must be remembered, is to keep essential information out of the hands of the enemy. In each of these cases, the enemy already had the information: it was the American public which was being kept in the dark. Leaving aside moral and constitutional questions, this kind of secrecy is debatable on purely pragmatic grounds. The simple fact is that things rarely remain secret very long, and one wonders whether the relatively small advantages of being less than candid in explaining these situations to the public outweighed the long-term disadvantages of disillusionment, recrimination, and the erosion of trust in government which were bound to follow.

Credibility gaps are not, however, entirely one sided. They can also result from information which is available to the public not getting through to the policymakers. Government agencies tend to believe that official, and therefore confidential, sources of information are more likely to reflect reality than the information which appears in

the newspapers or on the network news programs. This tendency is intensified, I think, when the press and the Government are at odds with each other. Yet history simply does not bear out the assumption that just because information is secret, it is accurate. Roberta Wohlstetter has shown, for example, that President Roosevelt would have learned more about Japanese fleet movements prior to Pearl Harbor by reading *The New York Times* than by relying on highly secret intercepted Japanese communications. David Halberstam's reporting from Vietnam in 1963 is generally acknowledged to have conveyed a more accurate picture of what was happening in that country than the secret reports available to Kennedy from diplomatic and military sources. The phenomenon by which intelligence is skewed to fit official or bureaucratic preconceptions is, or ought to be, familiar; nonofficial and even public sources of information can be an effective safeguard. But in order for government officials to benefit from this safeguard, a certain amount of mutual trust must exist along with a willingness on the part of government to abandon many of its misplaced assumptions. Unfortunately, the entire process is impossible when the gap between policy and rhetoric yawns too large.

The justification of policy, therefore, is yet another area in which the absence of precision has caused us problems. Foreign policy in a democratic society depends, ultimately, upon public support if it is to be effective. This, in turn, requires candor, a quality not enhanced by excessive hyperbole or secrecy. The lesson, then, is to level with the American people in discussing foreign policy. They will not be shocked to discover that our policy is designed to promote our interests, and if this is not its objective, then something is badly wrong. The necessary secrets of foreign diplomacy are still valuable, but in these days of instant journalism the real reasons why the Government has acted are generally known anyway, whatever the official line has been. The public will, however, get a better sense of what is possible and what is not in foreign policy, and there will certainly be less likelihood of disillusionment. Finally, policymakers themselves may learn something by finding out what the informed public knows. Freedom of information is an admirable objective for the average citizen, but we need it for the men who run our Government as well.

Lessons of the Past. The final lesson of the cold war which I should like to discuss may seem somewhat incongruous with the rest of the paper: that an excessive preoccupation with the past can be just as dangerous in its consequences for policy as complete ignorance of it. The philosopher Santayana once said, in a statement often repeated by history teachers, that those who do not remember the past are condemned to repeat it. In the light of recent experience, we might well modify that to read: those who oversimplify the past in an effort to draw lessons will live to regret it.

One does not have to look very far in the history of recent American foreign policy to see how the past has been oversimplified: Americans tried to stay out of World War II by passing neutrality legislation which might have kept us out of World War I; U.S. war aims during World War II were determined not by the realities of the postwar situation but by a determination to avoid mistakes which had led to that conflict; our response to Stalin in the late 1940's was shaped primarily by our view of what we should have done to contain Hitler in the 1930's; our response to the North Korean attack in 1950 was influenced largely by ideas of what we should have done to resist Japanese aggression in Manchuria in 1931; our response to Communist China

in the 1950's was based largely on what had worked to contain Russia in the late 1940's; our abortive attempt to overthrow Castro in Cuba in 1961 was influenced to no small degree by our success in overthrowing communism in Guatemala in 1954; our response to Vietnam was conditioned by the experience of successful counter-insurgency operations in Greece, Malaya, and the Philippines, and, when these did not work, by the strategic bombing experiences of World War II. And it is quite likely that the foreign policy of the next decade or so will be governed, in ways we cannot yet foresee, by a determination to avoid the mistakes of Vietnam.

None of this is particularly surprising: policymakers have no choice but to base their decisions on past experience, but not in the limited, superficial, or biased manner they have tended to employ. As Ernest May has written in his new book *Lessons of the Past*,

> Policy-makers ordinarily use history badly. When resorting to an analogy, they tend to seize upon the first that comes to mind. They do not search more widely. Nor do they pause to analyze the case, test its fitness, or even ask in what ways it might be misleading. Seeing a trend running toward the present, they tend to assume that it will continue into the future, not stopping to consider what produced it or why a linear projection might prove to be mistaken.[4]

The problem, in a nutshell, is that our leaders have not been able to distinguish recurrent from unique historical phenomena. Admittedly this is difficult, but by paying attention to some elementary rules of generalization, rules one might find in any basic handbook on logic or even on the use of statistics, one can, I think, come up with a few practical guidelines which might help policymakers use history better.

One such guideline would be to examine the number of experiences upon which the historical generalization is based. David Hackett Fischer, a historian who has done much to prod his colleagues into thinking logically about the past, tells the story

> of a scientist who published an astonishing and improbable generalization about the behavior of rats. An incredulous colleague came to his laboratory and politely asked to see the records of the experiments upon which the generalization was based. "Here they are," said the scientist, dragging a notebook from a pile of papers on his desk. And pointing to a cage in the corner, he added, "and there's the rat."[5]

One gets the impression that all too many of the generalizations American officials have made about aggression and appeasement during the past three decades have been based on the experience of dealing with one particular rat, Adolf Hitler, and would not hold up well if applied to other authoritarian regimes. The soundness of any generalization, it would seem, increases in direct proportion to the number of experiences upon which it is based. No reputable statistician would make sweeping generalizations on the basis of a single sample, yet our policymakers, some of whom have prided themselves on their statistical abilities, have often done just that.

A second way to avoid the misuse of history would be to avoid generalizations derived from dissimilar experiences. One cannot, in science, apply a hypothesis based on one set of phenomena to a completely different set, yet American officials have frequently done this in the realm of foreign policy. The most vivid recent example, I suppose, was their attempt to predict the effectiveness of strategic bombing in

Vietnam on the basis of the World War II experience with Germany and Japan. What they failed to note was the difference between highly industrialized societies whose factories, transportation networks, and distribution facilities were vulnerable to bombing and a predominantly agrarian society like North Vietnam where productive facilities were dispersed, transportation was largely a matter of foot power, and bombing could accomplish little other than to blow holes in the ground. Generalizations derived from one context but applied to wholly different ones are extremely hazardous enterprises, whether in comparative history or the realm of policy.

Another pitfall to avoid in generalizing about the past is the tendency to neglect relevant evidence. Selective inattention—the phenomenon in which the mind focuses on what it wants to perceive, filtering out all the rest—is a well-documented syndrome. Again, Vietnam provides the best recent example. In assessing the possibilities of a successful counterinsurgency operation in Vietnam, we accepted successful antiguerrilla movements in Greece in the late 1940's and in Malaya and the Philippines in the 1950's as conclusive proof of the potential for the success of counterinsurgency in Vietnam. Unfortunately, we ignored precedents which might have been more instructive: the experience of the Japanese in China, for example, or the Dutch in Indonesia or, most relevant of all, the French experience in Indochina itself. A good way to avoid this problem of selective inattention is to apply to each generalization the test of purpose: for what purpose is the particular historical analogy being made? Is it actually the basis upon which policy is being decided or is it being advanced to justify a course of action already decided upon? If the latter, beware, because the body of historical evidence is sufficiently vast to provide the resourceful advocate with support for almost any generalization.

It is easy to suggest lessons; it is much more difficult to put them into effect. There are encouraging signs, I think, that under the Nixon administration several of the most important lessons of the cold war were taken to heart. For example, the downgrading of ideology as a means of predicting behavior, the increased reliance on negotiations as a means of settling differences, and, particularly since Kissinger became Secretary of State, increased candor in the public explanation of foreign policy. Whatever the Nixon administration's disaster rate in domestic affairs, its foreign policy record was impressive. Much of its success stemmed, I think, from its greater precision in thinking about world affairs.

Imprecision remains a problem, however, in what is probably the most critical area of all: that of defining what our national interests are. The restraint promised by the Nixon Doctrine has yet to be tested in a major crisis. Congress persists in defining our interests not just in terms of protecting our own society but of reforming others. Bureaucracies, civilian and military, continue to con-

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

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fuse their own interests with those of the Nation as a whole. Nor are we wholly free from the danger that foreign policy may again, as it has in the past, become an instrument of domestic politics.

Therefore, despite progress, much remains to be done. Increased precision in defining interests, together with continued precision in perceiving threats, formulating responses, and justifying them will, I believe, provide our best insurance that the mistakes of the cold war are not repeated. The past is, after all, one of our most valuable resources. It is up to our policymakers and, ultimately, to the American people themselves, to see that it is used wisely.

NOTES

1. George F. Kennan, *Memoirs: 1925-1950* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), p. 359.
2. Adam B. Ulam, *The Rivals: America and Russia Since World War II* (New York: Viking Press, 1971), p. 230.
3. Coral Bell, *Negotiation from Strength* (New York: Knopf, 1963).
4. Ernest R. May, *"Lessons" of the Past: the Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. xi.
5. David H. Fischer, *Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p. 109.

The problem in thinking about navies, as in thinking about anything else, is that preconceptions determine the structure of thought which determines the conclusions. Here the author asks what have we overlooked not only in thinking about the Soviet Navy but also about our own. The place to start, he suggests, is not with comparisons of hardware but with goals. How is a navy to be used? He finds that if we try a functional approach we might discover that we have been playing military checkers when the game is politico-military chess.

THE PATTERNS OF NAVAL ANALYSIS

An article prepared

by

Captain Robert B. Bathurst, U.S. Navy

It must be an enormous satisfaction to the Soviet Naval Staff that it has finally received a benediction by Western maritime commentators. Not when it put the first antiship missiles on patrol boats; not when it designed the first gas-turbine destroyer; not even when it confronted us with a ship such as we had never seen before, the *Moskva*, did it make such headlines as when it published Admiral Gorshkov's naval history and doctrine. The tribute paid by 11 of the U.S. Navy's admirals in the *Institute Proceedings* is unique, the sort of attention paid in memorial editions, normally organized for obituaries. A short time ago, few had even heard of Gorshkov, much less equated him with Mahan. The lights will surely be burning late at Naval Staff Headquarters in Moscow as position papers are prepared explaining the implications of this new attention.

The current message from Gorshkov was more elegant, more complete—translating years of debate into some positive steps toward doctrine—but it was not essentially new. In 1968 he had said,

> The basis has been laid for creating a well-balanced fleet. Because of its strength, weapons and equipment, it is capable of meeting its commitments in a nuclear-missile war as well as in a non-nuclear war. In addition, it can safeguard the peacetime interests of the Soviet state anywhere.

That statement embodied some essential notions he had expressed

For the ordering and sharpening of some of my ideas, I am indebted to exciting discussions and insights of the participants of the Dalhousie University Conference on Soviet Naval Developments.

earlier. At the same time, there was a widespread discussion of the need for "balance" in the other services. That also began in the sixties when the Soviets debated their version of flexible response and general purpose forces. But balance did not signify an adoption of a resurrected Mahan. It meant a new doctrine on war—that it could be both conventional and nuclear.

Why has this message penetrated now when it did not earlier? Why does the public view the increased tempo of Soviet shipbuilding as ominous only now although it had its inception a decade and a half ago? After all, the medium is the message, and the message conveyed by missile carrying ships, submarines, and airplanes is not particularly obscure. It takes an enormous obtuseness to be indifferent to the construction of 990 new ships and submarines in less than 15 years in a country where the peasants cannot be sure of their daily bread. Telegraphing the message, the Soviets began writing prodigiously about the revolution in naval warfare.[1] They meant missiles.

The disregard of this earlier but quite deadly theoretical work on war with the West in inexplicable. The general attitude is that it was some form of propaganda and therefore not true, although even propaganda tells us a considerable amount about how men think. Certainly, if the Soviets were trying to distract the world from their intentions, it was by a new technique, that of so saturating the mind with information that it would cease to perceive it. If it were true that the Soviets did not mean what they were writing about war, operations, and strategy, imagine the problems facing the editors of *Red Star* and *Morskoy sbornik*. They would have to fill their pages with information that was consistent philosophically, morally uplifting within the country and deceiving outside of it. Perhaps there is a parallel in the way we read *Mein Kampf*. When military intentions are broadcast, they are less convincing. Still, since the Soviets have a clear doctrine on war which is part of the theoretical basis of their whole system, one would expect it to be the starting point for any military analysis, certainly naval.

Surely, that is the crux of the problem: what do people mean? Admiral Gorshkov has said the same thing, more or less, for at least 7 years, and, finally in the 7th, his theoretical position was closely examined. It was not what he said that had changed, it was the context in which he said it. The sheer size of the Soviet Navy, its innovations and changes suddenly discredited any placid assumption that they were trying to be like us. Our perceptions had been shaken into a new awareness, although with surprising slowness.

The first scapegoat one might choose for this delayed reaction is the naval analyst, but few will find consolation there. Actually, over the years, the estimates of Soviet shipbuilding in *Jane's, The Congressional Record,* from testimony, and elsewhere have been within the range of plus or minus 15 percent accurate. There have been many underestimates and some failures in prediction, but hardly enough to obscure the major outline of the development of the Soviet Navy.

A second likely scapegoat could be Soviet misinformation—the "orchestrated deception" as Professor Roman Kolkowicz so aptly put it. But that does not provide much satisfaction either. The pride with which the Soviets displayed their submarines—the porpoise-like sporting of the "F" class entering the Mediterranean; the effrontery of the "C"—the increasing tempo of port visits with a specially trained postgraduate class of port-visiting officers and men, and that arrogant strut through the world's seas called "Exercise Okean"—while surely orchestrated hardly suggested planned deception. Whether or not they could perform as intended, these forces were meant to destroy.

The trouble was that the Soviet Navy just did not make very much sense to the sons of Mahan, that is, until Admiral Gorshkov dotted the i's and crossed the t's. The conceptual problem is clearly exposed in the introductions to Admiral Gorshkov's articles in the *Institute Proceedings* written by very distinguished U.S. naval officers. When Admiral Gorshkov mentions "control of the sea," it is interpreted that he means what we mean by "sea control"; when he writes of the "internal struggles," it is assumed he means to build a "blue-water navy" free from army domination; and so on. These comments, representative of naval analysis generally, can be grouped into conceptual schools where the preconceptions clearly shape the conclusion.

The examples are legion. Because the Soviet Navy operates in all oceans, it is argued, it is now a "blue-water navy." The words--"blue-water navy"--however, carry specific connotations drawn from the history of the United States and British navies. The meaning of the Soviet operations abroad, it is thus implied, is the same as the meaning historically attributed to the past of our fleets. Another example is the reaction to the Cuban missile crisis. One reads repeatedly that it "taught the Soviets the meaning of seapower" or that it helped Gorshkov with the allocation of resources. While it may have taught Khrushchev something about the meaning of seapower--he liked cruisers only for state visits--it is unlikely that it taught the Soviet Navy anything it did not already know. The harm caused by such simplistic explanations is that they obscure the larger issues such as the place of the Cuban missile crisis in the Soviet doctrine on war.

For the Mahanians and the world domination theorists, the Soviet lack of amphibious lift capability was a persistent mystery. How could the Soviets solve the tasks that we had assigned them with their ships? The obvious conclusion was that they would either build more or had not learned how to use them. That they had other means of solving that tactical problem was seldom considered. Their lack of interest in rapid underway replenishment was also a heartening sign that they were 10 or 20 years behind, depending on how hawkish one is. The French, Italians, and Brazilians could do it, but the Soviets, although they had men in space, could not, or so it was argued.

The analytical preconceptions, with rare omissions, projected American experiences and attitudes onto the Soviets as if the Soviets had no imagination, no experience, and lived in an institutional and geographic environment almost like ours. The analytical approaches became standard. There was the "Double Entry" approach, with its subcategories of "either/or" and "paired opposites"; the "Rational Man" and "Elitist Group" approach; and, finally, the "Institutional Functions" scheme.

Under the "Double Entry" techniques, the "either/or" school is the most popular. Either you are "offensive," or you are "defensive"; either you "support the flanks of the army"; or you "control the seas"; either you are going to dominate the world, or you are going to mature, converge, or rationalize. Even in making the most cautious of statements, one can hardly exaggerate the pervasiveness and influence of this conceptual pattern.

Of course, such analysis is not simply negative. It forces us to establish separate categories, to be specific, to assign values to minute segments. Its danger is that it obscures interconnections. Too often it leads us to overlook the fact that something can be "both/and." That a navy may be both defensive and offensive, may protect the flanks of the army and at the same time try to control the sea, may support state interests and police maritime borders are to us strange bedfellows.

The fact that Gorshkov called for a "balanced" fleet in 1973 was widely

interpreted to mean official confirmation that at last the Soviet Navy was "aggressive." Immediately, the assumption was that the Soviet Navy would be balanced in our sense of the word, as if anyone ever built an unbalanced navy. A navy is built for the tasks assigned it, according to the ideas of those who are in control. "Balanced" may have meant, but did not necessarily, a "blue-water navy."

This conceptual approach was so strongly entrenched that Robert Herrick concluded in his pioneering work on Soviet naval strategy, begun in the fifties and written in the sixties, that the Soviet Navy could not be aggressive because it did not have aircraft carriers. The either/or process had identified one class of ship that could explain a national strategy.[2]

In large measure, the idea that the Soviet Navy has become aggressive, has changed to "a blue-water navy," is what has helped to focus so much attention in the West on its development. This is curious since, in some contexts, such as the NATO scenarios, it would have been, while still defensive, just as lethal. The application of the word "aggressive" somehow makes it a more worthy opponent. There exists a kind of hierarchy of values, a scale of bravery, assigned to the missions of a navy in which the defensive jobs, the most critical for peace in the final analysis, are always listed last. As applied to the Soviet Navy, this hierarchy of values is often conveyed by the style. Rather plain prose suddenly becomes metaphoric as in, "The Russian Bear has learned to swim; and he is mastering the currents of the world's seas and oceans."[3] The most serious danger might well be in Gorshkov's "protection of state interests."

Vying with the "either/or" approach in the "Double Entry" model and sharing some of its attributes are the "paired opposites" categories. A weapon is strategic or tactical, war is nuclear or conventional. This leads to comparing ships, weapons, strategies, and forces. The inevitable result is that categories are established which impose our patterns on the information to be considered. For example, Soviet ships do not fit our classes of cruiser, destroyer, frigate, and destroyer-escort, but they must be positioned in our lists. A weapon is declared to be strategic or tactical so that it can be properly paired with its Western counterpart; otherwise, it might not be counted as was possibly the fate of the *Komars* and OSA's, so long neglected in strategic concepts.

This approach is also, inevitably, deeply destabilizing for our allies because it tends to obscure other smaller navies and other maritime problems. They cannot be paired.

The complications of this approach are endless. It leads to comparisons of navy vs. navy, ship vs. ship, weapon vs. weapon, to the exclusion of other forms of reality. In the "paired opposites" world, there is only one service. Armies, air forces, the diplomatic corps, NATO, and the Warsaw Pact fade and disappear unless they can make a list. The whole world is seen reacting to commands from the bridge.

Elements of a force which cannot be paired may acquire unusual prominence, as in the following statement, reduced to basic concepts:

> The Soviet Navy suffers from one basic weakness a lack of sea-based tactical air. It is therefore more dependent on land-based air support than we are. This deficiency is only partly compensated for by anti-ship missiles. Thus, the sea-based air power of the United States Navy, which is vital to both sea control and projection missions, marks a key difference between our Navy and the Soviets'. They must compensate in the near term by access to ports and airfields around the

world. They are doing this at an impressive rate . . .[4]

From the Soviet point of view, the lack of sea-based tactical air is a weakness in the South Atlantic and much of the Pacific, but, on the other hand, it is not much of a problem in the Sea of Okhotsk, the Baltic, or the Arctic. Furthermore, if the problem is to interfere with sea lines of communication, as Admiral Zumwalt suggests elsewhere, and if you have submerged launched cruise missiles, you might find little use for tactical air in any case. There is usually a close tie-in with sea control and projection. The implication, if one is not specific about geography, is that one cannot accomplish these missions without sea-based tactical airpower. The contributions of airborne divisions are forgotten.

The process here appears one of making navies into abstractions. Admiral Zumwalt's statement would seem to imply the existence of an ideal navy, almost a Platonic navy. Such a navy has sea-based air, and if it does not, then it makes compensatory moves such as acquiring access "to ports and airfields around the world." Logically, it is made to appear that a navy's lack of sea-based tactical air could be driving diplomacy into the Indian Ocean, to Aden and Somalia. The temptation is to assign a naval explanation to the entire range of governmental decisions.

What was omitted was an examination of whether the Soviet Navy might have made other choices or planned to fight another kind of war in another location not requiring our mix of forces. The "paired opposites" approach does not promote that kind of consideration. The mind, in limiting the number of plays the navy will practice, fails to foresee the end run.

What are some of the end runs? First, the surface-to-surface missile. Even after it appeared on the *Komars*, we failed to generalize its tactical significance. Why? Because of a concentration on sea-based tactical air. That was our game and we assumed that that was the way to go—specifying a certain kind of war in given geographical conditions. Inasmuch as the U.S. Navy pioneered its own weapons and since it was 20 years ahead (in "paired opposites" you are always having to come up with that kind of figure), it was expected that foreign navies would imitate the U.S. inventory. That they did not might have been illuminating.

Sometimes the "paired opposites" has positive value, usually when you have a large figure which you cannot balance. That was our problem with the Soviet antiship missiles. After there were several thousand of them, our sense of order was disturbed, our trust in figures—who is ahead—made us suspicious. The pendulum quickly swung *allegro con brio* to restore the balance. We must be cautious that we do not build ships which solve only that problem.

The drive for parallelism even inspired the absurd demand for comparison of costs in dollars! One would have thought that the one thing our defense leaders understood about the Soviet Union was that it was not a supply and demand economy. Rubles are not, strictly speaking, money.

The very fashionable "net assessment" sprang from the mentality of "paired opposites." It tries to take into account all of the quantifiable elements, stuffing everything into little boxes, rounding off corners, forcing a symmetry in order to make neat lists that please the eye and quiet the mind. It is as if to study a cube you had first to flatten it into a single plane.

In academic circles, the dominant analytical approach is that of the "Rational Man."* This has several

*There is something very attractive about this and the Bureaucratic Policy Model, the favorite devices of those who write from outside the military and the bureaucracy. They can project more freely what often turns out to be like a literary recreation of a chamber of horrors.

variations. One is the "Great Man" theme which posits that there is one figure – Lenin, Stalin, Gorshkov – so powerful that he gets what he wants. Using this method, you tend to trace all manifestations of a certain idea back to a single source. In the hands of Kremlinologists, this is a tool for dividing organizations like the Politburo into the rightists, centrists, and leftists, or the hard and soft line. In naval circles, vast amounts of power are ascribed to one figure, currently Admiral Gorshkov, whose navy is alleged to be his, almost personal, design.

A general preconception behind the "Rational Man" theme is, of course, that whoever makes decisions (no matter in which culture) does so on a rational and pragmatic basis motivated by his self-interest. It is hardly surprising that such a person would inevitably decide to do what the analyst himself would do. This approach is beautifully simple and wonderfully accurate if you assume that growing up in Simferopol is like growing up in Kansas City. The "Rational Man" approach, no matter what the disguise, can hardly end up any way but as a vehicle for a projection of one's own values, unless, of course, the values of the other culture are known intimately. Even then it is hardly useful unless you are dealing with a man like Stalin whose control and absolute power are almost incontestable.* When we are dealing with Gorshkov, we know practically nothing. Reconstructions of his decisions are simply interesting games which should not be taken very seriously.

The "Elitist Group" is a subset of the "Rational Man." Elite groups are nearly always assumed to act rationally within the bounds of their authority. But almost nothing is known, as a rule, about either the composition of the group or the bounds of authority, especially when we are talking about the Soviet Navy. In order to overcome that, patterns are projected. If Gorshkov and Brezhnev were born in the same province (for this purpose, the vastness of Russia is foreshortened) and if they fought on the same front or served in the same branch of service, then it inevitably follows that Brezhnev supports Gorshkov's interests. The analysis is carried even further. There is a story that Gorshkov pulled Brezhnev out of the Sea of Azov during the war. From this it is concluded that Gorshkov can have an aircraft carrier if he wants it on the basis that Brezhnev is "The Great Man," Gorshkov is in "The Elite Group," and that he is "A Rational Man" making decisions on a "logical" basis-meaning that he chooses an "Aggressive Navy," therefore he is opting for sea-based tactical air.

A charge that this description is a gross exaggeration is certainly justified; nevertheless, many analyses not only of naval but also of political events in the Soviet Union fit this pattern precisely. Take the introductions to the Gorshkov articles in the *Naval Institute*, for example. Of the nine that have so far appeared, only one emphasizes the importance of our being given a glimpse into a mind shaped by different cultural perceptions. The rest search his writing for proof that he is influenced by what influences us.

Behind all these approaches is an enormous simplification, that even if one did know a great deal more, one could assign a consistent pattern of predictable decisionmaking to those in power, studying them in a kind of isolation from their culture and from other decisionmaking groups. This is depressing Kremlinology, especially when applied to the naval staff which for a great continental landpower is

*It should be sobering for those who use this model to remember how many Stalins and Hitlers there have been whose insane acts on a vast scale were rationally explained or overlooked by some of their wisest contemporaries.

surely the least independent of military institutions.

A brief examination of one kind of analysis may be useful. The reason for the Gorshkov series—in Kremlinology, a special "reason" has always to be found —is that he is fighting for a greater share of the budget to build his "blue-water navy," or so it is argued. Yet, the only solid fact available is that the articles are attributed to him. We cannot even verify his style. Beyond that, we know nothing about Kremlin fights for the military budget. But there is a parallel. This is how fights for the budget are waged in the United States, so some assume that this is how it is done in the Soviet Union. We know nothing about Soviet plans for force structures. It is simply assumed that Gorshkov wants more for a big navy; that he is the dominant force in designing that policy; and that his tactics are somehow separate, as ours would be separate, from an overall military doctrine and strategy.

This whole argument is nothing more nor less than a projection of the American naval institutional behavior onto the Soviets. It may, be correct, but it smells of self-centeredness.

What we do know is that power is dangerous in the Soviet Union, or certainly has been for Gorshkov's generation; that opposing the adopted line has meant disgrace, at the least, and death rather commonly; and that a certain amount of debate is allowed in censored, Party-controlled publications until a decision is made and that then the debate about any basic policy is stopped. If Gorshkov had been opposing a Party decision, then it could be confidently stated that he would have been removed from power long before the series ended.

Finally, there is great attraction in the "Institutional Functions" scheme, sometimes called the "Bureaucratic Policy Model." In this approach, one tries to assume that it is not people, as such, who make decisions but institutional interests and processes which move forward with enormous inertial force. This is the preserve of the wiring diagram which, in the case of the Soviet Union, consists of a complex design of connecting cubes, many of which we cannot name. An enormous creative demand is required to describe what is in a box and how it reacts to other boxes.

The assumptions behind this theory are (1) that bureaucracies act, more or less, according to the same dynamic rules; (2) that Soviet bureaucracies are mirrors of ours; (3) and that institutions act in predictable patterns. In this scheme, the word "bureaucracy" replaces "Rational Man" and "Elite Group" but functions in the same way. This approach, too, is a temptation for partisan, cultural projection.

All of these approaches can contribute something to our knowledge. The problem is that we are never sure what they are obscuring. The record of the past suggests that, applied in isolation, they produce unreliable results. These are largely mechanistic theories, whether or not they adopt terms like "net assessment," or "input/output." They try to force information into an artificial symmetry, a balance, or an order usually based on non-Russian models. While posing serious questions, they tend to exclude those dependent on the emotional, psychological, and ideological forces of a nation such as, "When might the Soviet Navy fight a war at sea?"

A disquieting aspect of these approaches is that they are, semantically, binary and thus too easily adapted to the computer. That kind of manipulation reinforces patterns of thought which channel ideas into a symmetrical pattern for no other reason than that it is adaptable to present technology. Questions requiring philosophical and anthropological analysis, not being measurable, are not asked. Political and military leaders do not even realize that

they are not being given the critical information. They are distracted by endless questions about capabilities and are not being informed about the will and the conditions for using them. They are diverted into simple games of military checkers while the Soviets are preparing for a grand master's contest in politico-military chess.

If, then, these approaches have serious faults as methodology, what is an alternative? You could, as our Navy has done, define missions: sea control, projection, deterrence, and presence. The drawback is that the concept of "missions" fit the U.S. way of thinking but is not adequate when applied to the Soviets. Deterrence relates to strategy, the only clear strategy we have, and sea control and projection relate to naval operations. "Presence" is a kind of equivalent to Gorshkov's "protection of state interests." None of these, however, is presented as a dynamic concept which tells us where we are going. They describe a kind of static situation: this is what we have; this is what we can do. That is fair enough. If we had a national strategy of liberating all countries with X kind of government, then we would have a more imaginative naval policy. In the analytical game, however, the Soviets do have that kind of strategy and that kind of naval policy.

A further drawback is that once we have defined our missions to our satisfaction, we will inevitably see how the Soviets compare. The "Double Entry" analysis will take over. That will lead to further attempts to adjust the balance and finally to another strategic detour.

Perhaps nothing could be more revealing than to turn from Admiral Gorshkov's 11th article on modern navies to the naval departmental testimony in Congress. Hardly a paragraph of Gorshkov's, even when he is dealing with the czarist navy, is far from a social, political, or philosophical context. On the other hand, in the congressional statement, one concludes that, to some extent, the words themselves control the concept and that social and political forces are absent. For example:

> The Soviet naval building program . . . gives unmistakable evidence that the USSR recognizes the value of naval forces and that they intend to attain predominance at sea. Our own initiatives —particularly those in the area of sea control—are directed toward denying them this capability and to this end we are making the best use of the dollars allotted to us . . .

In this particular passage, there is the approach of the "paired opposites" they want it; we deny it of "either/or"- once you recognize the value of navies you go on to predominance at sea and the "Bureaucratic Policy" model in that the "building program" is treated as an institutional decision with purely naval consequences.

In fact, this is institutional testimony of a familiar, cultural kind. The object is the budget. The method is to focus on the navy's needs and not to divert attention to the army and air force by describing their roles. "Sea control" is meant to emphasize naval airpower; "projection" is understood as a maritime concept, not involving the infantry.

It is also applied Mahanian philosophy. It implies totalities in terms of either/or. Either predominance or not predominance; either maritime control or not control. Modifiers are missing. Where or why or for what purpose the Soviets are going to try to attain predominance at sea is not examined, and the implication is that the only way to stop them is with a navy acting, it would seem, in splendid social isolation.

Perhaps this isolation from a context best fits our patterns of thought, but it leads our naval analysis down to a dead end when we talk about the Soviet Navy. At least that is their view of our

methodology: "One of the essential shortcomings of bourgeois military science, which affected even the most advanced schools and theories, was an ignoring of the importance of economic and moral political factors and an exaggeration of the role of military art of operational plans."[5] It is true that the U.S. Navy has no concept of dealing with "economic and moral political factors." Such ideas would be put down as not its business. Certainly its fascination with technology has obscured people-oriented factors such as the uses of surprise and deception.

It does not follow that one system of thought is better than the other. They simply produce different results. In any case, U.S. bureaucratic thought can hardly escape the 2- to 4-year billet rotation structure, insuring a short learning period that favors a forced feeding of input/output, net assessment, and other deterministic schemes. Even if we wished to, there is not time to think dialectically, uncompetitively, or even unegotistically in our system. We are limited to working with the input and the structure.

An alternative approach in the study of naval power might be to think of navies as primarily functional parts of a system. They embody values which are relative to and which cannot be isolated from the structure which gives them meaning. For example, a U.S. aircraft carrier 3 miles from Havana or a Soviet cruiser at Casablanca are signs related to a history of events that preceded and events which will follow. As signs, in this one limited example, they have meanings that go far beyond the estimates of their firepower. We cannot understand how they function without taking those meanings into account.

At issue here is some means of effectively determining power embodied in navies and of navies as a function of "state interests," as Gorshkov put it, or of foreign policy, to use an older term. The job is to state how that power is expressed and how it is perceived, the intention of the actor and the reaction of those acted upon.

The crux of the problem was stated by Admiral Zumwalt when he said, "Without adequate naval capability, we cannot deter conventional war, let alone win it." What is adequate? What deters? The most magnificent navy in the world might convey no serious message, fail to function as a sign in the absence of other elements of power. For example, the Maginot line was understood by the French to be a deterrent to aggression and by the Germans as only a problem in planning.

This raises another issue that must always be tied to the sign, the threat, or the deterrent; what are you trying to convey and how is it understood? It is not enough just to have it. The deterrent has to be perceived, which means you have to go to the trouble of studying the object to be deterred. Our modes of naval analysis and decision-making rarely take that into account. We frighten ourselves with our own concepts and assume they are universal. All people seem able to learn to live with some kinds of danger. A sign that is at first very threatening generally loses its value with overexposure and may cease to deter. So we have to learn how to use the signs; it is not enough just to have them.

A navy is also a system of means appropriate to an end or intent. In order to understand the meaning of a navy, it is essential to consider its connections within a system. If the systems are very different, then one should suspect that points of convergence with other navies may be few.

Obviously, a navy is also relative to certain special relationships. For example, a *Kynda* in the English Channel, SONAR in New York Harbor, or mines in the Philippine Sea. A *Kynda* is not at that moment a missile cruiser because it cannot function effectively in that role. It is only potentially a *Kynda*, which

may be sufficient for "presence" but not for "sea control."

The most important thing of all, however, is that a navy is an instrument that is used for the attainment of goals that are perceived through a series of lenses: cultural, political, and psychological. These set some kind of limit on the kinds of action that might be taken. The manipulation of these lenses is a high priority in all strategic and tactical thought. This the Soviets demonstrated brilliantly in their invasion of Czechoslovakia when a Warsaw Pact exercise masked the real thing. There was a kind of total function of the whole structure: army, air, diplomatic, Party, and press. No "mission" alone could possibly have defined this act.

Studying this structure, then, will give us the context within which the navy will function. We can examine its operations, or functions, as part of that totality to test assumptions and the basis of our analysis. (With other approaches, we find ourselves constantly surprised by developments we had not expected.) The Soviets even help our understanding by telling us the nature of the war they are preparing for and consequently the role of their navy. They also describe our characteristics to us as their adversaries. The scenario never sounds as if it is going to be over Diego Garcia. Here is a recent version:

> As regards its socio-political nature, the future war, should the imperialists succeed in unleashing it, will be a bitter armed clash between two diametrically opposed social systems, a struggle between two coalitions, the socialist and the imperialists, in which every side will pursue the most decisive aims.
>
> As regards the means used, this war may be a nuclear one. Even though nuclear weapons will play the decisive role in the war, final victory over the aggressor can be achieved only as a result of the joint actions of all the arms of the services, which must utilize in full measure the results of the nuclear strikes at the enemy and fulfill their specific tasks.[6]

Soviet doctrine increasingly stresses seizing the initiative, the importance of surprise, the need to use all means available, and a cataclysmic struggle to the end. Furthermore, and more importantly for the systems analysts, they have been writing since the sixties about the revolution in military science, the danger of relying on past wars as guides to the future, and of being influenced by habit. All must be new, different, flexible, and changing. But tactics are also closely tied to cultural concepts. For example, "the rapid rate and result of an offensive, in a modern war are largely determined by the ability correctly to account for and to utilize political, class, national and other contradictions in the opponent's camp." Do we think about that on patrol in the Mediterranean?

It may be quite right to dismiss this doctrine on war as the result of a fevered imagination, but it would be impossible to demonstrate that it is irrelevant.* If one adopts the "Bureaucratic Functioning Model," then Soviet institutions have been formed on the assumption of the truth of this doctrine; if one adopts the "Great Man" or "Elite Group" approach, then Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev have all, in one form or another, supported the doctrine and elites of all kinds are

*It is becoming increasingly popular in academic and journalistic circles to attack those who consider seriously the Marxist-Leninist doctrine on war. It is rather difficult to comprehend why since so much of Soviet energy is devoted to its elucidation. It is probably the ritual of American rhythms, our cyclical time sense which leads these observers to conclude that we have repeated that theme too long. Other than mental fatigue, there is not a good excuse for abandoning that study. In any case, the Soviets have not.

forced to act upon it; if one adopts one of the "Double Entry" procedures, then it has been Leninist doctrine that although in the long run the proletariat would prevail, in the short run either capitalism or socialism would survive in a death struggle caused by the rise of Soviet power.

The navy has a clear and distinct function in that system which means that it does not have to dominate the seas, although it may, or be a "blue-water navy," though it may, or resent protecting the flanks of the army, although it may. It simply cannot be understood separately from the Soviet state as the majority of our naval analysts try to do.

Perhaps the kind of factually accurate but conceptually false analysis that is so common, so obviously influenced by our budgetary system, leads in the long haul to the detriment of our preparedness. The picture often presented to the public of Soviet submarines popping up anywhere and surface ships likely to start firing at random to dominate the seas paints such a picture of chaotic terror that the mind retreats from contemplating it.[7]

The argument here is *not* that this capability is unimportant or to be ignored but that it is meaningful only in a context and that the context is frequently not presented. As a simple test of the accuracy of this point, let it be asked at a naval "threat" lecture how the capabilities described fit into the Soviet total doctrine on war.

The advantage of describing a navy as a function is that you are forced to keep referring back to the society which gives it meaning and which controls its action. You do not start from the point of view, for example, that navies are optimally organized around some one platform, although that may be your conclusion. With this kind of approach, which only demands a little wider scope, you give up some lists of parallel factors, but then you do not have to abandon some thesis about the predominance of submarines when an aircraft carrier is built. "Either/or" has given way to "why not both/and?"

That keeping a context firmly in mind is a successful aid to analysis has been demonstrated most successfully by Professor/Commander Michael MccGwire, one of the most consistently accurate of naval analysts. The turn in his analysis came some years ago when he tried assuming, just as a variation on a theme, that the Soviets really meant what they said, that they seriously thought the West would attack, that it was impetuous, dangerously mercurial, and aggressive. Using the functional approach, with a few "Elite Group" interpolations, he found that his data suddenly fell into place.

Various methods of analysis tend to channel thought into various patterns. While probably none of the questions asked here were overlooked by naval analysts, many dynamic developments, not fitting into the budgetary, mission, or logical model systems, were not fully

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

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understood with all of their implications and interconnections. It may have been the contradiction of trying to define the dialectical Soviet process in static terms. In any case, plans for war at sea from the point of view of a society whose official philosophy is one of constant and permanent struggle cannot be the same as that of a society whose assumption is that states, like men, tend to do the rational thing. Fortunately, our future, unlike our method, will not be determined by *either* the one assumption *or* the other, for no matter how many ways we look at reality, it seems that there is always at least one more.

NOTES

1. See, for example, N.A. Lomov, ed., *Scientific-Technical Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs* (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1973).

2. Herrick's exhaustive research and analysis were by no means so simplistic, but that concept was implicit in his work and baldly interpreted that way by his critics.

3. Frank R. Barnett, "Preface," Norman Polmar, *Soviet Naval Power* (New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1972), p. 5.

4. *Statement of Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States House of Representatives Concerning FY 1973 Military Posture and Budget of the United States Navy.* It is perhaps unfair to use this statement in a battle of the budget forum as representative of Admiral Zumwalt. It is, however, representative of much naval thinking.

5. *Leninism-Marxism on War and Army* (Moscow: Progress, 1972), p. 309.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 304.

7. Such an analysis, for example, was presented by Desmond P. Wilson and Nicholas Brown in "Warfare at Sea: Threat of the Seventies," CNO Professional Paper No. 79 (Arlington, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 4 November 1971). This paper is very imaginative in discovering possibilities for conflict at sea, but one gets the impression that the authors would consider any reference to Soviet doctrines or to Marxism-Leninism as irrelevant, the few references to Gorshkov notwithstanding.

THE ISSUES AND COSTS OF THE NEW UNITED STATES NUCLEAR POLICY

The changes in strategic defense policy recently articulated by Secretary of Defense Schlesinger have given rise to considerable speculation on the relative strengths found in United States and Soviet nuclear arsenals. The intrinsic complexities of measuring throw weight, accuracy, and both warhead and launch vehicle number, further complicated by the difficulty of President Nixon and Premier Brezhnev in achieving any significant progress toward limiting the new technology, have made such speculation relatively subjective and open to a wide variety of opinion. Unfortunately, any disequilibrium in the nuclear equation is bound to be one that, although created in the name of national security, makes the actors on both sides feel progressively less secure.

An article prepared

by

Professor Lawrence J. Korb

Introduction. For the past two decades, the cornerstone of U.S. strategic policy has been the deterrence of nuclear war by assured destruction. We have sought to develop and maintain the ability to absorb any potential nuclear assault and, following such an attack, to launch a massive retaliatory strike which would destroy so great a percentage of the target population and industry that even an irrational and desperate leader would be deterred from initiating a nuclear attack. Against our major nuclear rival, the Soviet Union, American strategists have calculated the levels of assured destruction at between a fifth and a third of Soviet population and between a half and three-quarters of their industrial capacity. Once these levels of destruction are reached, the effectiveness of additional attacks is minimal because all the worthwhile targets would already be destroyed. By 1967, when the United States had developed a triad force of 1,054 ICBM's, 656 SLBM's, and about 500 long-range bombers, it appeared that this force generated a sufficient quantity and variety of delivery systems to maintain an assured destruction capability against the Soviet Union and other potential enemies for the foreseeable future. Since 1967 the United States has concentrated on improving the quality of its delivery systems, e.g., increasing accuracy and range through multiple reentry vehicles (MRV) and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV). The number of its delivery platforms has not been increased since 1967.

With the signing of the first SALT agreements in 1972, most observers felt that the doctrine of assured destruction

had been codified and legitimized by the United States and the Soviet Union. This was apparently achieved by limiting each nation to two ABM sites and setting upper limits on the number of offensive launchers that each side could build, thus providing a guaranteed mutual assured destruction capability on each side of the Atlantic.

However, within 1 year after SALT I, the concept of assured destruction had come under attack in this country on two grounds. First, in light of the post-SALT advances in Soviet strategic offensive weaponry, e.g., testing an MIRV ICBM and deploying an SLBM with a range of 4,200 miles, many have argued that the assured second-strike capability of the United States is rapidly eroding and that this Nation could find itself subject to nuclear blackmail or immobilized by a Soviet first strike. Second, assured destruction by massive retaliation alone has been attacked as too narrow or limited a policy. Many analysts feel that in the event of a nuclear attack upon the United States, the President should have options other than an all-out response or no response at all. For example, since taking office in mid-1973, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger has consistently stated that the United States must have the capability to launch limited nuclear attacks against military targets in the Soviet Union.

Beginning in late 1973, the Pentagon reacted by launching programs designed both to counter the Soviet strategic buildup and to give this Nation the capability of flexible or controlled nuclear response, i.e., the ability to attack military targets as well as people and industry. When the existence of these programs became public knowledge in early 1974, the long moribund debate over U.S. strategic policy sprang to life. Prestigious journals which for years had virtually ignored questions of nuclear strategy were now filled with analyses of the new programs.[1]

At the time that these new programs were announced, there was a great deal of wishful speculation that DOD did not intend to develop these systems fully. Initiatives were seen as "bargaining chips" to influence the Soviet Union toward an acceptable arms limitation agreement prior to the Moscow summit. However, Nixon and Brezhnev did not even come close to an agreement on offensive missiles during their July 1974 meetings, and, with the approval of a heretofore skeptical Congress, the Pentagon now plans to proceed with the development of these new strategic programs. Therefore, it is now time to take a close look at the two issues, i.e., the arms balance and massive retaliation strategy and the costs involved in the new U.S. nuclear policy.

The Arms Balance. In discussing strategic offensive capabilities, at least four elements must be considered: the number of delivery vehicles, their throw weight, or payload, the number of deliverable warheads, and the accuracy and explosive force of these warheads. Frequently, different estimates of the relative strength of United States and Soviet strategic capabilities stem from a different emphasis placed on any one of these measures. For example, Senator Henry Jackson (D-Wash.) emphasizes delivery vehicles; Secretary of Defense Schlesinger stresses payload; and Secretary of State Kissinger accents the number of warheads.[2] All of these measures must be taken into account if one is to obtain a true picture of American and Soviet capabilities. Table 1 summarizes United States and Soviet capabilities in all of these categories.

There are three types of delivery vehicles which the United States and Soviet Union can use to launch a nuclear attack against the other: land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), and intercontinental or long-range bombers which can carry

TABLE I—UNITED STATES AND U.S.S.R. STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES IN MID-1974

Type	Number		Throw weight[1]		Warheads		Accuracy		Yield[2]	
	U.S.	U.S.S.R.	U.S.	U.S.S.R.	U.S.	U.S.S.R.	U.S.	U.S.S.R.	U.S.	U.S.S.R.
ICBM	1,054	1,575	800	4,000	1,854	1,575	.35	1.0	1,500	9,500
SLBM	656	651	1,000	1,000	3,536	651	.60	.96	461	651
Bombers	452	140	12,000	3,000	2,550	420	NA	NA	1,700	308
Total/Average	2,162	2,366	13,800	8,000	7,940	2,646	.45	.99	3,661	10,459
Without Bombers	1,710	2,226	1,800	5,000	5,390	2,226	.45	.99	1,961	10,151

[1] In tons.

[2] In megatons.

Sources: Thomas H. Moorer, *United States Military Posture for FY 1975;* Report (Washington: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, n.d.); Lawrence Martin, *Arms and Strategy* (New York: McKay, 1973), pp. 11-33; James Schlesinger, *Report of the Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger to the Congress on the FY 1975 Defense Budget and the FY 1975-1979 Defense Program, March 4, 1974* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974); Center for Defense Information, *U.S. Strategic Momentum,* May 1974; Donald Brennan, "Détente and the Strategic Decisions Ahead," *Occasional Paper Series* (Worcester, Mass.: Clark University, April 1974), p. 3.

both missiles and bombs. As indicated in table 1, the Soviet Union has 521, or 49 percent, more ICBM's than the United States, but the United States has 312, or 223 percent, more long-range bombers than the Russians. The United States and the Soviet Union have virtually the same number of SLBM's. Overall, the Soviet Union has 204, or 9 percent, more delivery vehicles than the United States, significant largely in terms of the number of targets a first strike would have to destroy to be effective.

The payload, or throw weight, of a delivery vehicle is a measure of the amount of weight that the vehicle can carry to a target. The Soviet Union's ICBM force can lift 3,200 more tons than U.S. missiles, while the U.S. bomber force can carry 9,000 more tons than their Soviet counterparts. In the SLBM area, the payload of United States and Soviet submarines is approximately the same. Overall, the United States enjoys a 5,800 ton throw weight advantage over the Soviets.

Warheads are the nuclear weapons which are carried by the delivery vehicles. Up until 5 years ago, each missile carried a single warhead. However, with the development of MIRV,[3] some U.S. missiles can now carry as many as 10 of these independently targetable warheads and thus can attack several different targets simultaneously. Although the Soviet Union is on the brink of developing and deploying MIRV, their arsenal now is believed to contain only MRV weapons whose multiple warheads cannot be independently targeted. Consequently, the United States has a huge advantage over the Soviets in the number of warheads. As indicated in table 1, the U.S. ICBM force has 279 more warheads than the Soviet, its SLBM force has 2,885 more, and its bomber force 2,130 more. Overall, the United States has three times as many warheads as the Soviet Union.

The accuracy of missiles is expressed as circular error probable (CEP), i.e., the radius of a circle within which a reentry vehicle has a 50 percent chance of falling. On the whole, U.S. missiles are estimated to be more than twice as accurate as their Soviet counterparts.[4] As is indicated in table 1, the average CEP of a U.S. missile is less than ½ mile, while that of a Russian missile is about 1 mile. Yields of weapons are measured by reference to the amount of the chemical explosive TNT required to provide an explosion of similar force. The equivalent of a thousand tons of TNT is expressed as a kiloton (KT) and a million tons as a megaton (MT). As indicated in table 1, Soviet nuclear weapons have a 50 percent greater yield than those of the United States. The Soviet advantage in this area comes primarily from their larger ICBM warheads which have more than a 6 to 1 advantage over the United States in megatonnage.

The damage that can be done by a warhead against a particular target is a combination of both its accuracy and yield. For example, a 1 MT warhead dropped ½ mile from a target will exert the same force against the target as 10 MT warheads dropped 1 mile from the same target. If the target is a large, soft target like a city, yield is more important than accuracy, but if the target is a small, hard target like a missile silo, accuracy is far more important than yield. Thus, Soviet missiles can inflict much more damage against cities, while U.S. missiles presently have a higher kill probability against hard targets.

In looking at the present configuration of United States and Soviet strategic offensive forces, this Nation has what might be called an advantage. The United States has the edge on the Soviets in accuracy, the number of warheads, and payload, while the Soviets exceed the United States in the number of delivery vehicles and weapon yield. However, many analysts agree that this advantage may be more

apparent than real. Much of the relative American strength comes from its preponderance in long-range bombers. If one looks at the five measures of strategic offensive capability without including bombers, which are the most vulnerable and, some would argue an obsolete portion of the strategic offensive systems, a different picture emerges.[5] As indicated in table 1, without bombers, the Soviet Union has 516 more delivery vehicles than the United States, three times as much payload, and five times as much yield. Without bombers, the United States still has the advantage only in number of warheads and accuracy. However, this advantage is a result of a 6-year headstart in the MIRV area and technological superiority in the inertial guidance area. The Soviets are now on the brink of deploying MIRV and are outspending the United States in R. & D. by about 2 to 1. When they deploy MIRV, their superiority in payload and numbers of launchers could enable them to overcome the U.S. warhead advantage very rapidly, and their huge R. & D. investment may enable them to overcome the U.S. lead in accuracy.

Perhaps the most important reason why many believe the U.S. advantage is more apparent than real results from a comparison of ongoing United States and Soviet programs in the missile area.

Although both the United States and the U.S.S.R. are modernizing and improving their missile forces, the Soviet effort is considerably greater than that of the United States, what Secretary Schlesinger has characterized as gross and disproportionate. To understand the implications of the new programs on the United States-U.S.S.R. balance, it is necessary first to take a detailed look at the present composition of United States and Soviet ICBM and SLBM forces. Table 2 contains a breakdown of United States and Soviet ICBM forces with their salient characteristics. The U.S. ICBM force is presently composed of 1,054 missiles. Fifty-four of these missiles are obsolete, virtually unprotected, medium-yield Titans which carry a 5 to 10 MT warhead with a CEP of .75 miles. The other 1,000 ICBM's are light or low-yield Minutemen which cannot carry a warhead larger than 2 MT but which have a small CEP and which are located in hardened silos.

TABLE 2—UNITED STATES AND U.S.S.R. ICBM FORCES IN MID-1974

Name: U.S.	Number	Accuracy	Warheads Number	Per Yield[1]	Total Warheads	Total Yield[1]
Titan II	54	.75	1	5-10	54	270-540
Minuteman I	100	.75	1	1-2	100	100
Minuteman II	500	.35	1	1-2	500	500-1,000
Minuteman III	400	.20	3	.2	1,200	240
Total/Average	1,054	.35	1.7	1.3	1,851	1,110-1,880
U.S.S.R.						
SS-7	100	2.0	1	5	100	500
SS-8	109	1.5	1	5	109	545
SS-9	300	.5	1	20-25	300	6,000-7,500
SS-11	1,006	1.0	1	1-2	1,006	1,006-2,012
SS-13	60	.75	1	1	60	60
Total/Average	1,575	1.0	1	2.1	1,575	8,111-10,617

[1] In megatons.

Sources: Moorer; Martin; Schlesinger; Center for Defense Information; Brennan.

Approximately 400 of the Minutemen have the capability to carry three independently targetable warheads with CEP's of .2 miles. The Soviet force is about 50 percent larger than that of the United States. Three hundred of the Soviet ICBM's are giant SS-9's which can carry a 20-25 MT warhead with a CEP of ½ mile, while another 209 are medium-yield SS-7 or SS-8 ICBM's, comparable to the Titan. The main part of the Soviet force is composed of 1,006 light-yield SS-11's, which are similar to Minuteman II and which are located in equally hard-to-destroy silos. The Soviets also have 60 SS-13's which are much like the Minuteman I. The Soviets have not yet MIRV'ed their ICBM force nor have they perfected their guidance systems to the extent of the United States. Thus, they have 179 less warheads in their ICBM force and about one-third the accuracy. However, they have about a fivefold advantage in yield.

Table 3 contains the breakdown of the United States and Soviet SLBM forces. The United States presently has 656 missiles deployed on its 41 ballistic missile submarines. Approximately one-half of the U.S. force is comprised of the more accurate Poseidon missiles which carry 10 MIRV for distances of nearly 3,000 miles. The other half of the U.S. force is made up of Polaris A2 and A3 missiles. The A3 has the same range as the Poseidon but is less accurate and only has an MRV capability. The A2 is a single warhead SLBM with a range of 1,750 miles. The Soviets presently have 5 less SLBM's than the United States on 46 nuclear submarines plus 13 diesel boats. Soviet SLBM's are of three types: a short-range SSN-5, the medium-range SSN-6, and the long-range SSN-8. The Soviet SLBM's do not have a MIRV capability nor the CEP of U.S. missiles, but the SSN-6 and SSN-8 have MRV. The 1,300-mile SSN-6 currently comprises 79 percent of the Soviet force, but the 4,200 mile SSN-8 is joining the force at the rate of 60 per year. The United States currently has a fivefold advantage in the number of warheads and accuracy, while the Soviet SLBM force has a slight edge in overall yield. The advanced range at which the SSN-8 can operate becomes significant when one considers the enormous ocean area from which they can be used.

The United States is presently working on three missile programs while the Soviets are developing four. As is indicated in table 4, the United States will finish its only ICBM program, Minuteman III, during the upcoming fiscal

TABLE 3—UNITED STATES AND SOVIET SLBM's IN MID-1974

Name	Number	Range	Accuracy	Warheads Number	Per Yield[1]	Total Warheads	Total Yield[1]
U.S.							
Polaris A2	176	1,750	1.0	1	.8	176	141
Polaris A3	160	2,880	.7	1	1	160	160
Poseidon	320	2,880	.3	10	.05	3,200	160
Total/Average	656	2,577	.6	5.4	.48	3,536	461
U.S.S.R.							
SSN-5	63	750	1.0	1	1	63	63
SSN-6	528	1,300	1.0	1	1	528	528
SSN-8	60	4,200	.75	1	1	60	60
Total/Average	651	1,745	.96	1	1	651	651

[1] In megatons.

Sources: Moorer; Martin; Schlesinger: Center for Defense Information; Brennan.

TABLE 4—MISSILE SYSTEMS UNDER DEVELOPMENT BY THE UNITED STATES AND U.S.S.R.

Name: U.S.	Type	Dates	Replace	Range	Warheads	Yield	Number	Improvement
Minuteman III	ICBM	1970-75	Minuteman I	8,000	3	.2	200-650	Warheads/Accuracy
Poseidon	SLBM	1970-76	Polaris A2	2,880	10	.5	176	Range/Warheads/Accuracy
Trident C-4	SLBM	1980-85	Polaris A3	5,760	17	.5	170-656	Range/Warheads
U.S.S.R.								
SSX-18	ICBM	1975-82	SS-9	4,200	5-8	5	313	Warheads/Payload/Accuracy
SSX-17/19	ICBM	1975-82	SS-11	5,500	4-6	1	1,096	Warheads/Payload/Accuracy
SSX-16	ICBM	1975-82	SS-13	5,000	3	2	60	Warheads/Payload/Accuracy
SSN-8	SLBM	1974-78	SSN-5	4,200-4,900	MRV	1	168	Range

Sources: Moorer; Martin; Schlesinger; Center for Defense Information; Brennan.

year. Present plans are to replace 150 Minuteman I's and II's with the MIRV'ed Minuteman III's. When this is completed, the United States will have 550 Minuteman III's and an additional 400 warheads in its inventory and a 17 percent overall increase in accuracy. The Soviets are developing three new ICBM systems with MIRV capability: the SSX-16, SSX-17/19 and the SSX-18. These missiles are thought to be replacements for the presently deployed SS-13, SS-11, and SS-9 ICBM's, respectively. In addition to having a MIRV capability, these three new missiles will have greater throw weight. All three missile systems will become operational within the next year and, should they be fully deployed, will add an additional 5,000 warheads and 2,000 tons of throw weight to the Soviet ICBM force. To what extent they will increase accuracy is unknown. But there is little doubt that the new missiles will be substantially more accurate than their predecessors.[6]

As is indicated in table 4, the United States is developing two SLBM programs and the Soviets one. Within 2 years the United States will place the Poseidon missile on 11 more Polaris submarines, which currently have the Polaris A2 missile. Completion of this program will give the United States an additional 1,566 warheads and 176 more missiles with a range of 2,880 miles and a 33 percent increase in accuracy. Beginning in 1980, the United States will begin deployment of its first Trident submarine. This submarine will carry a missile with twice the range of the Poseidon and nearly twice as many warheads on each missile. When this program is completed in 1985, it will add an additional 1,200 warheads to the U.S. SLBM force. The Soviets began deployment of the long-range SSN-8 missile on board its *Delta*-class submarines in mid-1973. The U.S.S.R. had 5 *Delta* submarines operational, 4 others built, and approximately 10 others under construction. When these are completed in 1978, the Soviets will have at least 228 SSN-8 missiles in their SLBM force.

If the United States and the Soviet Union complete the missile programs discussed above and do not introduce any new programs, by 1982 their relative positions in ICBM's will be quite different than they are today. As indicated in table 5, the Soviets could enjoy a vast superiority in the ICBM area. They would have 34 percent more missiles, a threefold advantage in both warheads and yield, and a sevenfold advantage in payload. This Nation will be in a somewhat better relative position in the SLBM area. The Soviets will have about 100 more missiles, higher yield weapons, and longer range missiles, but the United States will have nine times as many warheads beneath the seas, assuming the Soviets do not MIRV their SLBM force.

Overall, the Soviets will lead in every category except warhead numbers, where both will be approximately equal. By 1982 the Soviets could have 27 percent more missiles and a 4 to 1 advantage in payload. Both sides will have more than 8,000 warheads.

Several analysts argue that these nuclear numbers games are meaningless and even border on the absurd. As the noted balance of power theorist Hans Morgenthau puts it, "If a country has the capacity to destroy its enemy ten times over, but the enemy has only the capacity to destroy the country five times over, it does not make that country superior to its enemy."[7] Secretary Schlesinger, however, maintains that the United States could not live with this projected imbalance and must take steps to redress it.[8] The Defense chief's position stems from two considerations. First, such a numerical lead might give the Soviet Union an unacceptable psychological advantage. In contemporary international politics, perception is often more important than

TABLE 5—UNITED STATES AND SOVIET OFFENSIVE MISSILES (CIRCA 1982)

UNITED STATES							U.S.S.R.					
Missile	Warheads			Total			Missile	Warheads			Total	
Name	#	#	Yield[1]	Warheads	Yield	Payload[2]	Name	#	#	Yield[1]	Warheads	Payload[2]
ICBM												
Titan II	54	1	5-10	54	270-540		SSX-16	60	3	1	180	
Minuteman II	450	1	1-2	450	450-900		SSX-17/19	1,036	5	.2	5,480	
Minuteman III	550	3	.2	1,650	330		SSX-18	313	6	3	1,878	
Total/Average	1,054	2	.6	2,154	1050-1770	800		1,409	5	.9	7,538	6,000
SLBM												
Polaris A3	64	MRV	1	64	64		SSN-6	528	MRV	1	528	
Poseidon	496	10	.05	4,960	248		SSN-8	372	MRV	1	372	
Trident C4	96	17	.05	1,632	82				8			
Total/Average	656	10	.06	6,656	394	1,000		900	1	1	900	1,000
Total Missiles	1,710	5	.2	8,810	1444-2164	1,800		2,309	3	.9	8,438	7,000

[1] In megatons.

[2] In tons.

Sources: Moorer; Martin; Schlesinger; Center for Defense Information; Brennan.

Note: Under SALT I the U.S.S.R. can increase its SLBM force above 740 up to 950 only by decreasing its older ICBM's. Our projections assume a 160 SLBM increase and a 209 decrease in ICBM.

reality and the huge Soviet quantitative missile lead could be perceived by other nations as indicators of superiority vis-a-vis the United States.

Second, the vast Soviet superiority in the ICBM's might make it possible to launch a successful preemptive strike against our Minuteman missile silos, with only a portion of their ICBM force. Furthermore, this attack might be completed without destroying a very large portion of our population or industry. This would leave the United States with only its SLBM force as a guaranteed retaliatory weapon. However, because of the accuracy and yield constraints on SLBM's, they are not suitable for use against hard targets like missile silos, and an American President would be faced with the uncomfortable decision of either retaliating against the Soviet population with the knowledge that our population would be destroyed in return or ignoring the Soviet attack and giving in to whatever demands they might make.

These arguments of Schlesinger are persuasive, and it is certainly within the realm of reason that neutral nations and some of our allies could be influenced by a Soviet numerical advantage in certain areas of missile strength. The behavior of our NATO allies toward Israel during the oil crisis of 1973 can certainly be cited as an indication of their giving in to intimidation. Ironically, the psychological argument of the Secretary of Defense may become self-fulfilling: If Schlesinger continually maintains that missile payload is the ultimate determination of nuclear strength, other nations may be persuaded and act accordingly.

Likewise, although controversial, one cannot reject out of hand the Secretary's argument about our ICBM force being vulnerable to a preemptive strike. A recent Air Force study concluded that it is technically impossible to mount an overwhelming first strike against our Minuteman force because many of the warheads directed against the ICBM's would destroy each other rather than the silos. This is due to a phenomenon known as fratricide by which the X-rays given off in the initial blast at any given target would badly damage or destroy the fragile components of incoming missiles. According to Secretary of the Air Force John McLucas, "Our studies have indicated that attacking a dense complex of hardened silos is very complicated because of nuclear effects which restrict the number of MIRV's which can be used effectively."[9] However, McLucas does concede that this problem of fratricide might be overcome by improvements in missile accuracy. This position is supported by Fred Iklé, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, as well as the Federation of American Scientists. In an interview on 1 February 1974, Iklé stated that ICBM's will become increasingly vulnerable to attack from the other side as missile accuracy inevitably improves. The federation predicts that the increasing accuracy of the ICBM will enable one side to annihilate the other's land-based forces by striking a surprise first blow.[10]

Massive Retaliation and Controlled Response. To properly understand the objection to assured destruction by massive retaliation, it is necessary to consider the differing forms which a retaliatory attack can take. Although somewhat of an oversimplification, there are essentially two types of nuclear strikes and two classes of targets against which these weapons can be aimed. Nuclear strikes can be massive, all-out harbingers of mutual suicide or flexible, limited, and controlled. If the target of the attack is population or industry, the strike is countervalue, but if the target is military, e.g., a missile silo or an airfield, the strike is known as counterforce. Oftentimes the terms "massive retaliation" and "flexible" or

"controlled response" connote both the type and target, i.e., massive retaliation is understood as an all-out countervalue strike while flexible response indicates a limited counterforce.

From the early 1960's through 1973, the United States relied primarily upon a policy of "massive retaliation" to deter the Soviet Union. Although accepted as policy until quite recently, there have been repeated questions raised about its continued utility. For example, since 1970 President Nixon has on several occasions complained about being left with the single option of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians.[11] In 1972 Secretary of Defense Laird unsuccessfully sought to obtain from Congress the funds to develop a flexible response against military targets in the event of a limited nuclear attack. Theoretically, the concern over massive retaliation is independent of the recent Soviet buildup, but there is little doubt that Soviet strategic initiatives, focused as they are on the whole spectrum of strategic weapons, have made it easier for Secretary Schlesinger to bring the issue before the Congress and the American people in the FY 1975 Defense budget.

Objections to the policy of massive retaliation fall into three categories. First, massive retaliation against population centers could violate the moral principle of proportionality. For example, in the event of a limited counterforce attack against the United States, would an American President be justified in ordering the mass slaughter of millions of people? Fred Ikle', the present head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, has been particularly vocal in his attack on massive retaliation as morally repugnant.[12]

Second, massive retaliation can be self-defeating. President Nixon made this point succinctly in his 1970 foreign policy statement when he said that a President who ordered the mass destruction of enemy civilians would be faced with the certainty that such a move would be followed by the mass slaughter of Americans.[13] Third, in light of the first two considerations, is massive retaliation really credible unless all-out countervalue attack has been launched against the United States? Secretary Schlesinger underscored this point when he told Congress that our deterrent has become weak because our only response is suicidal.[14]

Critics of Schlesinger initiatives to move toward a flexible response capability raise three objections. First, U.S. moves toward acquiring a flexible response capability may be misinterpreted by the Soviet leaders as an attempt toward a first-strike capability. If the United States had the capability to disarm the Soviets in a first strike, it would be an unacceptable threat to their deterrent which, in turn, might lead them to acquire new capabilities or to adopt a highly dangerous launch on warning strategy. Both nations now are assumed to operate on a policy by

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

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which enemy missiles must impact before they themselves launch a retaliatory strike. Senator Thomas McIntyre (D-N.H.) claims that our new counterforce program will put "a hair trigger on nuclear war."[15]

Second, the whole concept of flexible or controlled response might tempt leaders to initiate a nuclear attack under the mistaken assumption that nuclear wars can be controlled. Those who raise this objection point out that the purpose of any nuclear strategy is to prevent nuclear wars, not to fight them.

Third, counterforce weapons are quite expensive. In order to have more than a 50 percent chance of destroying a missile silo with a hardness of 150 psi, one would have to place a 1 MT warhead within ½ mile of the missile silo. Since most Russian silos are believed to be at least twice as hard as 150 psi, the United States will have to spend large sums to increase the accuracy and yield of its weapons to have a meaningful counterforce capability against the present Soviet force. Moreover, the Soviets have the capacity to increase the hardness of their silos well beyond their present level.

The Costs. In an attempt to keep pace with Soviet weapon development and to acquire a meaningful flexible response, DOD has already retargeted some missiles from countervalue to counterforce targets[16] and has taken a number of steps in the strategic program area of its FY 1975 budget. These steps include: increasing the Trident construction program from one submarine per year to two, starting on a new ballistic missile submarine *(Narwhal)*, improving the accuracy and yield of the ICBM force, developing a maneuverable reentry vehicle with terminal guidance (MARV) (a development that had been rejected earlier as too provocative), keeping the Minuteman III production line open after the planned level of 550 is reached, starting on a new ICBM, and developing a cruise missile which will give the U.S. bomber fleet a standoff option of 1,500 to 3,000 miles and thus markedly decrease its vulnerability to Soviet air defense. The total costs of these initiatives, which are listed in table 6, will not be very high in FY 1975. If they are approved in toto by Congress, these systems will come to about $900 million. However, the total costs of these programs would be quite expensive. These new initiatives will cause a real increase of 43 percent in strategic spending by 1980.[17]

TABLE 6—THE COST OF STRATEGIC INITIATIVES IN THE FY 1975 DOD BUDGET
(In millions of dollars)

Program	Cost
Trident[1]	514
Narwhal	16
Accuracy/Yield	77
MARV	74
New ICBM	37
Minuteman III	23
Other Counterforce	44
Cruise Missile	125
	910

[1]The additional cost of the second submarine. Total cost for Trident in FY 1975 is $2 billion.

Sources: Schlesinger; U.S. Office of Management and Budget, *The Budget of the United States Government for Fiscal Year 1975* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., n.d.); and Department of Defense, Program Acquisition Costs by Weapon System, 4 February 1974.

Conclusion. The SALT I agreements, which limit the number of offensive missile launchers, expire in less than 3 years. At the 1974 Moscow summit the United States and the U.S.S.R. did not even approach a new agreement. The only significant effort made was the

pledge to seek a new agreement limiting the quantity and quality of strategic arms before the expiration of the SALT I agreements. However, given the technical complexities involved and the internal and external constraints on both nations, a new agreement before 1977 is by no means certain.[18] What is certain is that the United States and the Soviet Union are now embarked on a very expensive and a potentially very destabilizing strategic path which makes future arms control agreements less and less likely. Secretary Kissinger has repeatedly acknowledged that it becomes more difficult every 6 months to reach a meaningful arms control agreement.* Within the next few years, the superpowers will have accumulated about 17,000 nuclear warheads with an average yield of 500 kilotons. This may be sufficient to give the United States and the Soviet Union both first- and second-strike capability and the capacity for both counterforce as well as countervalue attacks. Neither will have a significant military advantage, but instead of deterrent and détente, the new strategic policy may be based on threats and terror. Finally, both sides will still be seeking the answer to the trenchant question raised by Kissinger at the close of the Moscow summit, "What in the name of God is strategic superiority . . . and what do you do with it?"

*In order for the Soviet Union to MIRV its ICBM force, it will have to spend about $45 billion between now and 1980.[19] If the United States implements its new strategic programs, defense outlays will rise to $150 billion annually by the end of this decade.[20]

NOTES

1. For example, Herbert Scoville, "Flexible Madness," *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1974, pp. 164-77; and Ted Greenwood and Michael L. Nacht, "The New Nuclear Debate: Sense or Nonsense?" *Foreign Affairs*, July 1974, pp. 761-780.

2. James R. Schlesinger, *Report of the Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger to the Congress on the FY 1974 Defense Budget and the FY 1975-1979 Defense Program, March 4, 1974* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974), p. 26; and Henry Kissinger, Press Conference, 26 April 1974.

3. Some delivery systems have a multiple reentry vehicle (MRV) capability to place several warheads on a single target. MRV vehicles are counted as having a single warhead.

4. No data is available for bombers.

5. The Soviet Union has 11,000 SAM and 2,750 interceptor aircraft to launch against our bomber force.

6. According to Gen. George Brown, Chairman of the JCS, the Soviet Union has thus far made surprisingly slow progress in improving missile accuracy.

7. Quoted in "Summit's Deadly Stakes," *Time*, 1 July 1974, p. 25.

8. Press Conference, 3 July 1974.

9. Letter from John McLucas to the Senate Armed Services Committee quoted in John Finney, "Missile Threat to Silos Is Called Limited," *The New York Times*, 20 June 1974, p. 1:2.

10. Michael Getler, "Destruction of Land Missiles Urged," *Washington Post*, 27 January 1974, p. A17:1.

11. U.S. President, 1969 (Nixon), *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: the Emerging Structure of Peace*, A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States, 9 February 1972 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972), p. 158.

12. Fred Ikle', "Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the Century?" *Foreign Affiars*, January 1973, pp. 278-82.

13. Quoted in Schlesinger, p. 35.

14. Testimony to the House Appropriations Committee, 7 February 1974.

15. Thomas McIntyre, "Increasing the Nuclear Danger," *Washington Post*, 6 June 1974, p. A23:1. McIntyre is Chairman of the Research and Development Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

16. The United States has always targeted some of its missiles against military targets but only as part of a massive counterattack. The new policy targets more military targets and is programed as part of a limited nuclear attack.

17. Long Range Budget Project (LRBP), American Enterprise Institute, forthcoming in the Fall 1974.

18. According to the postsummit remarks of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the United States and the U.S.S.R. must not only negotiate with each other but "have to convince their military establishments of the benefits of restraint and that does not come easily to either side." *Washington Post*, 4 July 1974, p. A1:7.

19. Testimony of Secretary Schlesinger to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 4 March 1974.

20. LRBP estimate; assumes 6 percent inflation.

Contrary to reports by the press--which viewed the recent Law of the Sea Conference as 10 weeks of high living in South America the meeting in Caracas provided for a very necessary educational process and, according to some observers, brought many delegations closer to negotiating positions. However, with the great multitude of unresolved issues (12 of which are described), one can hardly be overly optimistic for any early general agreement on a Law of the Sea treaty.

THE LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE:

ISSUES IN CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS

A lecture given at the Naval War College

by

Professor Lewis M. Alexander

As all of you are probably aware, the 10-week-long Caracas session of the Third Law of the Sea Conference was recently concluded. One hundred and thirty-seven delegations were at the Conference, representing 90 percent of the independent states of the world. All types of countries were in attendance—coastal states, landlocked, shelf-locked, island states, archipelagos, straits states, and states through which landlocked countries must transit to obtain access to the sea. There was also, of course, the familiar dichotomy of developed and developing countries.

No tangible progress was made at Caracas toward the conclusion of a new Law of the Sea Convention. No articles of the new Convention were adopted; no formal votes were taken on substantive issues; and no declaration of principles emerged from the proceedings. This is hardly surprising, not only in view of the number and diversity of countries attending, but also because of the complexity of issues involved in the new Convention. For many delegations the decision matrix presented to them was little short of bewildering. In their opening statements at the early plenary session, a number of countries pointed out the need for a "package" arrangement, in which one country or group of countries would make concessions on certain issues in order to win support for other issues. But the conditions under which such trade-offs might be made never seemed to coalesce. Moreover, highly complex issues such as liability provisions for tankers of the price-setting functions of the proposed Seabed Authority were sometimes looked upon as great-power ploys to divert the attention of the less

developed countries from their more immediate objectives. The solidarity of the so-called "Group of 77" developing states (which, in reality, now has 103 members) was often strained, and some less developed countries suspected the maritime powers of exacerbating these strains by pointing out to certain of the less developed countries how much their real-world ocean interests differed from those of their neighbors. For example, many of the developing landlocked states were insisting on their rights to benefit from the fisheries resources off their neighbors' coasts (a right which had been supported by a recent declaration of the Organization for African Unity). But adjacent coastal states, as, for example, Tanzania, while agreeing to this in principle, were sobered by the facts; first, that they have only limited fisheries resources in their coastal waters; second, that they may be bordered by two or more landlocked nations (Tanzania has five such neighbors); and third, that most of the landlocked countries have a number of coastal neighbors and thus the potential for sharing in the resource development of several offshore zones. How would the allocation of economic zone resources then be worked out? The United States and Canada, I might note, have no landlocked neighbors to worry about.

I emphasize this problem of access to the sea and its resources because it points up so clearly one of the divisive elements within the Third World bloc--and within geographic groupings of the less developed countries, such as the Latin American, African, and Arab blocs. The many pressures for and against bloc solidarity were superimposed on the already complex issues of the individual states' ocean interests, leading one to speculate as to just what the processes will be whereby individual delegations decide on how to cast their votes--when the time for vote casting finally comes.

There was something of a built-in resistance to decisionmaking at Caracas in that no deadlines existed for voting. Everyone knew there would be at least one follow-up session next summer, and indeed one has been scheduled for Geneva next 17 March to run until early May. Add to this the facts; first, that the delegates had before them at the opening of the Conference no single draft text with which to work; and second, that the voting procedures themselves are extremely cumbersome. The chairman of the Conference must officially find, for every issue voted on, that no consensus is possible before a vote--based on the principle of a two-thirds majority of Conference participants can take place.

So far as the law of the sea issues themselves are concerned, I have arbitrarily arranged them into 12 items and combined them under certain headings. My intent is to consider each of the 12 in terms of the problems involved, the U.S. position as presented at Caracas, and of the interests of other countries in the issue. And before I begin, one caveat is necessary. Although I attended the Conference for a time this past summer as an adviser (or "expert" as we were termed) with the U.S. delegation, my remarks today should in no way be construed as reflecting official U.S. policy. I speak only as a private citizen.

Now first, a rundown on the 12 issues.

Under the general heading of "Zonal Arrangements" are three topics: *the territorial sea, the economic zone,* and *limits to seabed jurisdiction.*

A second general heading is "Traditional High Seas Freedoms" and includes *freedom of navigation, freedom of fishing,* and *freedom of scientific research.*

Under the third heading, "Environmental Protection" is only one issue--*establishing and enforcing pollution control measures.*

Issues eight and nine come under the

title "Exploiting Seabed Resources." Number eight is *The International Seabed Resources Authority*, and nine is *revenue sharing on the outer continental margin*.

Another general heading is "Dispute Settlement Arrangements" and contains only the one issue, *criteria and machinery for handling international disputes*.

The last two issues involve "Regional Arrangements." First, there are what I would call *mutual benefit systems*, such as regional fisheries or pollution control agreements. Then there are *compensatory arrangements* which are designed to benefit the geographically disadvantaged states.

In establishing my list of 12 issues, I do not mean to imply that they are all of equal complexity. And someone else, in looking over the list of some 100 topics the Conference is supposed to deal with, might come up with a different grouping of subjects. But this listing is intended only to serve as a means of organizing a lot of complicated material into a manageable form.

One point should be noted early on. The delegates to the Third Law of the Sea Conference are not working in a vacuum. There exists already a body of rules and regulations on the public order of the oceans, which was hammered out at the First Law of the Sea Conference in 1958 and which has been modified somewhat by subsequent court decisions and by state practice. Although some of the more extreme delegates have declared the 1958 Conventions to be obsolete and of another era, these Conventions nevertheless provide the base upon which the new Law of the Sea is to be built. Unless and until the Convention articles are superseded and/or formally renounced by most of the world community, they would appear, according to most authorities of which I know, to remain in force.

Let us start now with the first issue, *the territorial sea*. Two sets of problems are involved here: the breadth of the territorial sea and the baselines from which the breadth is measured. Most states of the world now favor 12 miles for the breadth of the territorial sea, even though by such action most of the international straits of the world are closed off by territorial waters. About half of the coastal countries of the globe now adhere to 12 miles. The United States has announced its willingness to support the 12-mile principle, providing satisfactory arrangements can be worked out on the question of transit (or passage) through international straits. But some 10 countries, most of them in Latin America, claim a 200-mile territorial sea and have indicated no willingness to reduce this distance to 12 miles, even if a new Convention came into force. One problem seems to be to prevent other states from going to a 200-mile limit before a new treaty is signed and ratified.

The baseline delimitation question was, to some extent, resolved in the 1958 Convention, but there remain problems such as historic waters, atolls, drying rocks and reefs, artificial structures, and other topics not covered adequately at the First Law of the Sea Conference. And there is the problem of archipelagos—a topic now recognized as a separate and distinct issue which must be dealt with apart from the question of islands. One problem here concerns delimitation; in all cases can the archipelagic state connect its outermost islands and drying rocks with straight baselines (regardless of the distances and extent of waters involved) and from these baselines measure seaward its territorial waters? What of mainland states, such as Greece and Canada, which have offshore archipelagos? Can the islands as a group be closed off here, as in the case of midocean situations? Should archipelagos still under colonial rule, such as the Cook Islands and the New Hebrides, be closed off by straight baselines the same as for independent states? The

United States, here as in other cases of baseline delimitations, has tended to follow a somewhat cautious and conservative approach.

Perhaps more important than the delimitation details is the question of passage by foreign vessels through archipelagic waters. One suggestion is that the archipelagic state establish sealanes through its interisland waters. Within these lanes both commercial and military vessels would have transit rights, although some states have suggested that these rights extend only to commercial vessels. The United States would favor the principle of unimpeded passage through such sealanes, including overflight and the passage of submarines submerged.

A related topic is that of the contiguous zone. In the past this zone has existed between the outer limits of the territorial sea and 12 miles from shore. Within it the coastal state has the right to prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, sanitary, and immigration laws. If all states go to a 12-mile territorial sea, is the contiguous zone concept still necessary? Some states favor applying it to a zone seaward of the 12-mile limit, but to this the United States is opposed.

Beyond the territorial sea will be an economic zone, extending to a maximum distance of 200 nautical miles from shore. If a 12-mile territorial sea were adopted by all countries, the maximum breadth of the zone would, of course, be 188 miles. Most states agree that within the economic zone there will be freedom of navigation and overflight (although they do not mention the passage of submarines submerged) and freedom to lay underseas cables and pipelines.

The United States has indicated its willingness to support the economic zone concept, providing "correlative coastal state duties" are accepted. In his speech of 11 July, Ambassador Stevenson, head of the U.S. delegation, suggested that the coastal state rights include "full regulatory jurisdiction" over the exploration and exploitation of economic zone resources, but 4 weeks later, the U.S. Draft Articles on the Economic Zone mentioned the "sovereign and exclusive rights" of the coastal state to explore and exploit these resources. Among the "correlative coastal state duties" which the United States seeks to obtain are the prevention of unjustifiable interference with navigation, overflight, and other nonresource uses and compliance with international environmental obligations. We also seek full utilization of fisheries resources in the coastal economic zone, freedom of scientific research there, and flag-state enforcement of pollution control measures. These duties will be considered in more detail later.

If a 200-mile exclusive economic zone were adopted worldwide, some 37 percent of the world ocean would be closed off within national limits. Several countries would acquire large areas (the United States alone would receive 2.2 million square miles of ocean space), but many states would get little or no additional territory. Thus the rationale for "compensating" the landlocked and other geographically disadvantaged states by permitting them to share in the benefits derived from resource utilization in their neighbors' economic zones. Some of the disadvantaged at this time claim rights only to the living resources of neighboring zones; others want to share also in the exploitation of nonliving resources, particularly oil and natural gas.

A special delimitation problem for the 200-mile zone relates to islands. Any naturally formed area of land above water at high tide is an island entitled to its own territorial sea. Will it also be entitled to a 200-mile economic zone? If so, a single midocean rock might have surrounding it an economic zone which closes off 125,000 square nautical miles of ocean. On this question of economic zones about islands,

the United States has not declared its position one way or the other.

Beyond the 200-mile economic zone of certain countries there may still exist portions of the continental margin. In some instances the shelf itself may extend more than 200 miles from shore. In other cases only the continental slope and/or rise may continue so far from land. The United States and several other states have suggested that national control over the resources of the seabed and subsoil should extend either to 200 miles off shore or to some alternative limit on the seabed, for example, the 3,000-meter isobath, whichever gives to the coastal state the greatest amount of seabed areas. No specific criterion for fixing this outer limit, beyond the 200-mile boundary, has been specified by the United States. Probably it would be based on some depth criterion; the two depth figures most often cited are 2,500 and 3,000 meters. The isobath selected might provide a very general basis for the boundary location, with straight lines joining fixed geographic coordinates marking the precise boundary position. Obviously the greater the area of seabed under national jurisdiction, the less will remain as the "common heritage of mankind." Extending coastal state jurisdiction over seabed resources to 200 miles and/or the outer portion of the continental margin would mean that the hydrocarbon resources of the ocean floor would, for all practical purposes, be lost to any International Seabed Authority.

According to the U.S. Draft Articles of this past summer, the coastal state's sovereign rights over the Continental Shelf are restricted to the purposes of exploring and exploiting its natural resources. Other uses of the seabed beyond territorial limits by member states of the international community presumably are not affected by these coastal state rights.

One problem common to all three zonal issues mentioned so far is the delimitation of boundaries between opposite and adjacent zones. What weight shall be given to uninhabited islands and rocks located close to a proposed boundary? What of islands in dispute between countries; how can they be taken into consideration in determining limits? Under what conditions can recourse be had to "special circumstance" situations? Such questions have existed in the past, and in a few areas, such as the North Sea and the Persian (or Arabian) Gulf, they have been resolved. But soon delimitation problems may be magnified through the establishment of the extended economic zone beyond territorial limits.

We come now to the general heading "Traditional Freedoms of the High Seas," and the first of these is *freedom of transit*. So far as territorial waters are concerned, the right of innocent passage is guaranteed in the 1958 Geneva Convention. Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal state. But some people claim that the determination of "innocent" and "non-innocent" passage can become a subjective matter. Take, for example, vessel-source pollution standards. A coastal state may claim that foreign vessels which do not observe the coastal state's pollution control regulations are endangering the state's interests; hence, passage by such vessels is not innocent. Or, a coastal state may assert that transit through—or overflight—of its territorial waters by the military craft of certain foreign powers endangers its security and thus is not innocent. Which brings up the problem of straits.

The United States favors unimpeded passage through straits used for international navigation. Passage includes the movements by surface vessels—both commercial and military—by aircraft and by submerged submarines (although through some straits, such as Malacca, passage submerged is highly dangerous, if not impossible). The United States is

willing to accept obligations so far as taking reasonable measures to insure against vessle-source pollution in straits and to in no way interfere with the internal security of states bordering the transited strait.

There are many variations on this theme. Some countries distinguish between straits connecting two parts of the high seas with one another and those connecting the high seas with territorial waters; only in the former situation, according to these proponents, would freedom of transit be guaranteed. There are states which want prior notification and a constant requirement for the passage of military vessels through international straits; there are others which balk at the submerged submarine concept. Perhaps only a selected number of straits should be designated as coming under the regime of unimpeded passage. Here is an issue with which only a relatively small number of states are directly involved (those bordering on the affected straits and those seeking passage through them), but an issue with strong emotional overtones and the potential for conflict between the developed maritime and many of the developing nonmaritime countries.

Another traditional freedom of the high seas is fishing. But in the economic zone the coastal state will have jurisdiction over living resources. The United States has suggested that within its economic zone the coastal state has the duty to conserve these resources. More important, perhaps, the United States has joined with several other countries in supporting the "full utilization" principle; that is, if the coastal state is unable to harvest the full fisheries potential in its economic zone, it is obligated to permit foreign fishermen to come in and exploit the unutilized species. This is a worthy concept; without it the total world catch might decline as coastal states fail to harvest the full potential within their economic zone. It is estimated that over 90 percent of the world fisheries catch is taken within 200 miles of shore.

But what body is to set the "optimal yield" for a given economic zone--that is, the total allowable catch per year according to biological, economic, and other considerations? It is the difference between the coastal state's harvest potential and this optimal yield figure which foreign fishermen are to exploit. And who will set the priorities for determining which foreign fishermen will be permitted to harvest the unutilized stocks, and what fees or royalties they will pay to the coastal states for the privilege of such exploitation? These seem the type of questions for international dispute settlement machinery to handle.

The United States has suggested that for highly migratory species such as tuna an international organization should control exploitation, even in the coastal states' economic zones. And in a move away from high seas freedoms, the United States has suggested that the coastal state retain control over anadromous species (particularly salmon) which in their early life cycle inhabit its rivers. These fish move down to the oceans for most of their mature life, before returning to the rivers to spawn and die. Coastal state control over the harvesting of such species would be retained no matter where in the ocean such fish move to during the salt water phase of their cycle. Such an arrangement currently exists in the Northeast Pacific under a treaty involving the United States, Canada, and Japan.

Freedom of scientific research is an issue on which the United States has few supporters. We are willing to carry out certain obligations, including prior notification of the intent to carry out research in a foreign state's economic zone, permission for scientists from the coastal state to participate in the research project, and open publication of the research results. But we balk at the

suggestion of a consequent requirement to seek permission for research beyond territorial limits; first, because of the possibility that a coastal state will withhold consent for capricious reasons; and second, because of the interminable delays which have often been experienced in acquiring permission (or being denied it) for U.S. vessels to carry out research involving foreign states' continental shelves. My own guess is that the principle of freedom of scientific research in foreign states' economic zones may turn out to be one of the casualties of the Third Law of the Sea Conference.

Next is *environmental protection*. How will vessel-source pollution control standards be established and enforced in a coastal state's economic zone? One point of view is that these matters are coastal state prerogatives and, indeed, that it might be possible for less developed countries to set up a system of double standards—one for the vessels of developed countries which use the coastal state's ports and/or pass through its national waters, and a more liberal set of requirements for ships of the coastal state itself and perhaps those of its neighbors. Countering this is the viewpoint that internationally agreed upon standards should be put into force (the standards to be set by the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization or some like body) and that enforcement of the standards should be primarily the responsibility of the flag state. If a U.S. vessel, for example, were found to be in violation of the international standards off the coast, say, of a West African state, the offense would be a matter for the United States to handle. Only in cases where a direct disaster threatens the coastal nation or if the flag state has proven itself to be consistently unable or unwilling to police its own ships would the coastal state be entitled to step in and, on its own, enforce the environmental standards.

Between these two extremes are all manner of positions. Can the coastal state, for example, adopt in its economic zone, pollution-control standards which are more severe than those set by an international body? Are government vessels, including warships, immune from a state's pollution-control regulations? How will liability provisions be enforced? Should there be an international liability to take care of incidents such as the *Torrey Canyon* disaster? Environmental protection is one area in which many delegates often found themselves way over their heads so far as arguments over jurisdictional problems were concerned.

The same might be said for the next issue—the *International Seabed Resources Authority*. Nearly everyone agrees that the resources of the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction are the common heritage of mankind and that a portion of the revenues derived from their exploitation should go to an international fund to be distributed to the nations of the world, particularly the developing states. But at this point, agreement ends. Let me suggest just a few of the contentious issues:

- Will the Authority exploit the seabed minerals itself or license individual companies and states to carry out the exploitations? (The United States favors the licensing arrangements.)
- Will the Authority be permitted to regulate rates of exploitation and/or to fix prices in order to stabilize the minerals market and prevent undue hardships to the economy of land producers of copper, nickel, cobalt, and manganese? (The United States is against production and price controls.)
- How will the Authority be governed? What states will be represented on the governing bodies?
- How will decisions be made as to allocation of the international funds? Will a portion of these funds be set aside to run the Authority itself?

• How will the danger of pollution from seabed exploration and exploitation be handled?

Some experts contend that no appreciable revenues will be forthcoming from seabed mineral exploitation during the decade of the 1970's. It is the developed countries which initially carry out that exploitation. If the rules and regulations on seabed development are perceived by them as being too onerous, will the developed states ignore international procedures and go ahead unilaterally with their exploitation? For some observers of the Third Law of the Sea Conference, this appears to be a very real possibility.

A related and, in my table of organization, a separate issue is that of revenue sharing from mineral exploitation on the outer continental margin. This is pretty much an exclusive U.S. initiative. Several years ago the United States suggested the creation of a "Trusteeship Zone" on the continental margin beyond the 200-meter isobath. In this Trusteeship Zone, which extended seaward to the international area, the seabed would be under international control, but only the coastal state or its lessee could explore and exploit the resources. Although the Trusteeship Zone concept seemed to have something in it for everyone, it received little support.

Now the United States suggests that the coastal state have jurisdiction over the outer continental margin's resources but that a portion of the revenues derived from resource exploitation beyond the 200-meter isobath or the 12-mile territorial limit (whichever is farthest from shore) be turned over to the international fund. There are two advantages to this proposal. First, it provides that *some* funds will become available to the International Authority in the near future (as soon as the oil companies, which are now exploiting offshore in a maximum of about 400 feet of water, move to depths beyond 656 feet); second, it ensures that some portion of the revenues from hydrocarbon exploitation on the outer continental margin will get to the international fund. Surprisingly, this U.S. initiative has also met with little support—either from developed or developing states.

Arrangements for Dispute Settlement, the 10th of my 12 issues, is very much up in the air. The United States strongly supports compulsory settlement of disputes—an interesting development inasmuch as we have never, I believe, taken an international dispute in which we were involved for settlement by the International Court of Justice.

Most of the U.S. draft proposals have in them compulsory dispute settlement provisions. But many countries are wary of this approach. The decisionmakers in the settlement process will tend to be from the developed states. The costs of going to such a tribunal will be difficult for poor countries to sustain. The number of disputes requiring tribunal action may become overwhelming. Rather than negotiate seriously, developed states may elect to try the tribunal route to settlement. Here is an issue the outcome of which I have a hard time visualizing. It is my understanding that no one of the three Committees at Caracas became involved this past summer in the dispute settlement problem.

Since I have mentioned the three Committees, let me elaborate. At the Caracas Conference there was, first, a plenary session for about 3 weeks during which the Rules of Procedure were adopted and delegations were given a chance to present their countries' views. About 115 delegations availed themselves of this opportunity. By the time this plenary session was ending, meetings were beginning of the three Committees. These three were modeled on the Subcommittees of the Seabed Committee which met six times,

alternatively in New York and Geneva, from 1970 through 1973.

Committee I was concerned with the international seabed area and with the Authority which was to be set up to manage it. The Committee made no tangible progress whatever at Caracas. The United States adopted a hard-line position on the Authority and held to it. Committee III handled Pollution Control, Scientific Research, and Technology Transfer. It also made little progress, although the diverse views on research were narrowed down to four alternatives, ranging from the "absolute freedom" of the Soviets to the "absolute control" of the Group of 77.

Committee II, which concerned itself with fisheries, straits, economic zones, and other jurisdictional problems, was under the able leadership of Andres Anguilar of Venezuela. While it probably had the most complex problems of any of the three Committees, it also made the most progress. Ambassador Aguilar was able to reduce national positions on a whole host of issues to a series of three or four alternatives for each topic and to pave the way for serious negotiations on these issues next summer.

The last two issues of my outline come under the heading "Regional Arrangements." These involve a bit of crystal-ball gazing. Multistate regional arrangements to date have been very limited in scope. There are, for example, certain international fisheries organizations, but decisive action within the framework of many of these is subject to the unanimous consent of the parties concerned. There are bilateral and multilateral agreements (as, for example, the Baltic Sea Pollution Control Agreement recently concluded), but even these tend to be limited in extent and to involve long-established developed countries. Yet, should there fail to be a global Convention on the new Law of the Sea in 1975 (or perhaps 1976), recourse may be necessary to regional agreements—at whatever level agreements can be arranged.

One type of such arrangement would be exclusionary in nature; exclude nonlittoral fishing vessels from the Andaman or East China Seas; keep out noncoastal military ships from the Baltic or the Sea of Okhotsk. Such arrangements cost little to the states of the region. But how about situations in which the littoral states invest something in the future of their common offshore waters? They might enact common pollution control regulations. They might have a common approach to fisheries conservation and management. They might contribute to a regional fund for improving navigational facilities or eliminating shipping hazards. Such moves would be particularly appropriate for enclosed or semienclosed seas. These conditions correspond to what I referred to earlier as "mutual benefit" systems. Within semienclosed seas, littoral states might agree on some mechanism for settling mutual boundary delimitation issues in offshore waters and for handling other types of disputes involving the marine environment.

In contrast with this are what I would term "compensatory arrangements." And here I confess to being way out of my depth. It is one thing for Tanzania to grant port facilities at Dar es Salaam for copper shipments from Zambia; it is another to give equal rights to the companies of Malawi, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zambia to share in the development of Tanzania's economic zone resources. Pakistan has closed the use of the port of Karachi to Afghanistan because of border difficulties. Lesotho is entirely dependent on the apartheid-oriented regime of South Africa for its access to the sea. Bolivia must depend on the vagaries of Chilean politics for permission to use the port of Arica. Who, I ask myself, is really going to agree, as a matter of universal policy, to the principle of compensatory

arrangements for landlocked and other geographically disadvantaged states? Here is a concept which may require decades to work out satisfactorily. It is difficult enough to win approval of the principle of access to the sea for landlocked countries. Much more difficult will be the task of gaining support for the concept of access by a disadvantaged state to the resources of another country's economic zone.

Having covered, albeit briefly, the principal topics at Caracas, let me now make a few general observations on the Conference as a whole.

First, what are the prospects for some sort of Convention emerging from the Third Law of the Sea Conference?

As I noted earlier, one of the roadblocks to any conclusive action in Caracas was the absence of deadlines. There were almost no serious concessions made, despite the talk of a "package" solution. But if the timetables hold (and we do not go on to a 1976 meeting in Africa or Asia—or as *The New York Times* facetiously noted, of meetings in Pnom Penh, Ulam Bator, and finally, of all places, Philadelphia!), then Geneva next spring is where agreement if it is to be reached at all must be concluded. And despite all the complexities and uncertainties, it is possible that what some observers say is true—namely, that the delegations from the major powers (including the United States) have instructions from their government to bring home an agreement from the Third Law of the Sea Conference, and they will therefore work hard to meet this requirement.

It may be only a partial agreement on some items. And it may take years for even these agreements to be ratified and to come into effect. Thus we are faced with a protracted period in which interim arrangements may be necessary. Due to time limitations, I shall not dwell on such arrangements, other than to note that they will have both international and domestic implications witness the impatience of some groups in the United States to proceed with the 200-mile fisheries zone and deep sea mining bills rather than to wait for international action on these issues.

My third and last point is, What might the United States expect to achieve in the way of its own special interests from the Conference?

Here, I feel, we have to consider certain alternatives, one of them being that the United States might not sign and ratify certain provisions of any agreed Convention. I think we may lose on the freedom of scientific research issue, on international control of highly migratory species, and perhaps on the issue of full utilization of fisheries in the economic zone. If we continue to maintain a hard line regarding the Seabed Resources Authority, we may find ourselves isolated there as well, and I have heard it said we might find it impossible to sign and ratify the type of final agreement on this issue which proves acceptable to a majority of the world's states.

On three items, I just do not know. I think it will be extremely difficult for us to get general acceptance of compulsory dispute settlement, and I have no knowledge as to what our fall-back position on this might be. We may also be hard pressed on the pollution control issue. Certainly we may have to compromise somewhat on the rules setting and rules enforcing procedures, but there is also, it seems to me, the possibility (as might also be the case with compulsory dispute settlement) that these items could be kept aside for some future deliberations rather than being embodied in a 1975 convention.

Finally of particular interest to you here is the question of passage through straits. My own feeling for this is contained in two observations. First, there are only a limited number of countries directly involved in this controversy. If it can be kept from becoming an absolute article of faith on the part of the

less developed countries (and of Spain) and considered in terms of its own merits and of the countries it affects, then some solution may be possible. Second, there are, I believe, only a limited number of straits involved in the problem—particularly in terms of military ships and aircraft. Again, the number of players can be narrowed considerably and trade-offs may be possible, involving not 100-plus countries, but perhaps half a dozen or so.

If one examines the Law of the Sea negotiations in detail, one finds two categories of participants. One are the interest groups, geographic blocs, and other expressions of multistate solidarity. Second are the ocean interests of the individual states themselves—their access to the sea and its resources, their investments in marine-related activities, their dependence on the sea for food, income, security, or employment opportunities, and their general relations with their neighbors or other relevant countries. Remember, any state's ocean policies are but a part of their total national policies. If a state has generally poor relations with one or more of its neighbors, it can hardly be expected to cooperate closely when it comes to ocean issues.

Since the close of the Caracas session, the press has been not altogether favorable. Of what use, it is asked, were the preliminary Seabeds Committee meetings in New York and Geneva if nothing tangible came out of 10 weeks of high living in South America? What can we expect from the money that will be spent at Geneva next spring? Some of the critics, I think, are unduly harsh. Nearly 50 new delegations were at Caracas which had not been represented previously on the Seabeds Committee. There was an enormous educational process necessary in Venezuela, and despite the absence of tangible agreements, many of the delegations—according to some observers—are a lot closer to negotiating positions as a result of last summer's experience than they were several months ago. But my optimism declines when I speculate on the fact that only 6 weeks or so are allotted next spring for concluding a new Law of the Sea Treaty. And I am thankful that the title assigned to me for this talk was "Issues in Negotiations" rather than "The Consequences of No Agreement at All."

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Professor Lewis M. Alexander did his undergraduate work at Middlebury College and earned both his master's and doctorate degrees from Clark University. He has served the faculties of Hunter College and Harpur College, as a consultant in geography to the U.S. Department of State, as Executive Director to the Law of the Sea Institute, and as Deputy Director to the President's Commission on Marine Science, Engineering, and Research. Professor Alexander is chairman of the Department of Geography at the University of Rhode Island, is Director of the University's Master of Marine Affairs program, and recently served as an expert for International Law and Relations on the U.S. Delegation to the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference.

The Nixon Doctrine, first articulated in the summer of 1969, provides the opportunity for a new era in American foreign policy—one based on multipolarity, flexibility, and, perhaps most important, paradoxical support of both détente and military strength. In providing opportunities for diplomacy, however, the doctrine presents an interesting challenge to the defense decisionmaker who must deal with the uncertainties of manpower, weapons, and force levels needed to meet the variety of potential commitments.

DIPLOMACY AND DEFENSE PLANNING

An article prepared

by

Lieutenant Commander John G. Kost, U.S. Navy

INTRODUCTION

When the Nixon Doctrine was first announced on Guam in the summer of 1969, few perceived its impact beyond the immediate problem of Vietnam. The events of the 1970's, however, have presented dramatic evidence that the Nixon Doctrine is indeed a fundamental departure from American post-World War II foreign policy and the beginning of a new era of international relations.

The doctrine, some critics argue, is vague and contradictory, but what the critic may perceive as vagueness and contradiction is, in fact, a carefully designed pattern of paradoxes essential to a flexible, creative foreign policy which seeks to go beyond the exhausted, simplistic remedies of the past. In the opening chapter of his 1961 book *The Necessity for Choice*, Henry Kissinger, the Nixon Doctrine's architect, provides an illuminating view on the crucial importance of paradox:

> We must be willing to face the paradox that we must be dedicated both to military strength and to arms control, to security as well as to negotiation, to assisting the new nations towards freedom and self-respect without accepting their interpretation of all issues. If we cannot do *all* these things, we will not be able to do *any* of them. Our ability to master the seeming paradoxes will test even more than our ability to survive; it will be the measure of our worthiness to survive.[1]

A NEW ERA

Writing in 1961, Kissinger warned that America must give up its illusions of omnipotence and invulnerability, two of the cornerstones of a foreign policy that went bankrupt after 25 years. He criticized foreign policy for having been overly partisan and critically analyzed

international environment, Hahn targets his attack on the implementation of the declared goals. Though the classical balance of power system may have been displaced by the concept of a "stable structure," as stated in the doctrine, Hahn maintains that the guiding principles of realpolitik still obtain. ". . . so long as the United States maintains the requisite strength, we can play by the rules of Realpolitik . . . indeed . . . Realpolitik appears to be the regulating mechanism of the multipolar balance envisaged by the Nixon Doctrine."[15]

A critique by Earl Ravenal, writing in *Foreign Affairs*, expressed a similar idea in more harsh and apocalyptic terms. Both writers were concerned in the main with the implementation of the doctrine—whether the requisite military strength would or could be maintained to assure America's ability to meet the doctrine's professed goals and commitments. He challenged the statement from the initial foreign policy report that claimed the NSC review of national strategies was bringing foreign policy objectives and defense budgets into balance, arguing instead that the Nixon Doctrine represented a severe imbalance.

> Essentially we are to support the same level of potential involvement with smaller conventional forces. The specter of intervention will remain, but the risk of defeat or stalemate will be greater; or the nuclear threshold will be lower. The fundamental issues of interests, commitments and alliances are not resolved.[16]

This is essentially the most frequent criticism of the Nixon Doctrine, the perceived imbalance between global commitments and the generally observed decline in United States general purpose force capabilities. In a later article, also written in the Asian context and before the President's visit to Peking, Earl Ravenal further developed his critique of what he referred to as the "President's protean doctrine."[17] Reflecting on the term "stability," commonly used in the language of the doctrine, Ravenal interpreted its use as no more than a "neutral and sophisticated euphemism for 'containment.'"[18] Extending this interpretation, he postulated that Vietnamization "may have finally succeeded in endowing South Vietnam with the ability to keep the United States perpetually involved in Southeast Asia."[19] With this view of the Nixon Doctrine as a disguised continuum of the postwar containment policy, Ravenal concluded that without either a retrenchment of commitments or an adequate general purpose force to meet the commitments, the danger of the United States resorting to tactical and strategic nuclear weapons is greatly enhanced.[20] In closing, Ravenal became philosophical, analogizing the Nixon era with Byzantium:

> The coming age could be neo-imperial, or it could be post-imperial. And the transition could be grudging, baleful retreat, or it could be a tolerant concession to the condition of America's prospective long haul: the abandonment of the principle that this nation has a privileged purpose that it must impress on the rest of the world.[21]

Both the Hahn and Ravenal critiques apparently expect immediate and decisive effects from the Nixon Doctrine. The only immediate effect, in my view, has been the cessation of direct American military involvement in Vietnam. The language of the doctrine abounds with gerunds—building, emerging, shaping, growing, balancing. The reader of the annual foreign policy reports is constantly reminded that the Nixon Doctrine is keyed to the future, providing thematic guidance during the complex transition of international relations from that of a bipolar world to a multipolar world. Putting aside the role of guarantor of the free world is a

long-range goal of the Nixon Doctrine and not an instant objective. Though more than 600,000 men have been withdrawn from Asia, they were largely in a direct or indirect supportive role of Vietnam, and, to a degree, Asian forces have been restructured and augmented with the homeporting of a carrier task force in Japan and the delivery of increasingly more modern weapons to the Vietnamese and Koreans. Substantial forces have not been withdrawn from Europe, despite increased congressional pressure. Detente with the Soviet Union and rapprochement with the People's Republic of China are still more in the category of process than fact, reconstitution of the Atlantic Alliance is hardly beyond the "squabbling" stage referred to by Henry Kissinger in 1961, economic equilibrium among the United States-Japan-Western Europe triangle remains dangerously fragile, and the world is coming off the second Middle East war in less than a decade under the continued threat of Arab oil embargoes. In my judgment, the Nixon Doctrine is still very much in its formative years, though the framework, which is a fundamental departure from past policy, has been sufficiently established to be adopted by the succeeding administration. The Nixon Doctrine is not in the same definitive style of the Monroe, Truman, or Eisenhower doctrines. Without being amorphous, it has been loosely structured to accommodate the *opportunities for creative diplomacy*. To understand *containment* is a far simpler intellectual challenge than to understand the *fluid nature of the new multilateral diplomacy*.

Seeming to acknowledge this difficulty, Henry Kissinger wrote in 1969: "In the years ahead, the most profound challenge to American policy will be philosophical: to develop some concept of order in a world which is bipolar militarily but multipolar politically."[22] The Nixon Doctrine faces that challenge head on; yet, in my view, retains the flexibility to maneuver diplomatically and militarily. For the Nixon Doctrine to succeed, however, the defense side of the defense and diplomacy equation will have to make critical adjustments, both in philosophy and in hardware.

THE CENTRAL PARADOX: A LARGER ROLE FOR DEFENSE

> Thus we maintain strong military power even as we seek mutual limitation and reduction of arms. We do not mistake climate for substance. We base our policies on the actions and capabilities of others, not just on estimates of their intentions.[23]

Understanding the Paradox. Building on the fundamental themes of partnership, strength, and a willingness to negotiate, the Nixon Doctrine prescribes two patterns of diplomacy for the conduct of American foreign policy. First, maintain all treaty commitments in a genuine bilateral arrangement, sharing with our allies the responsibility for their defense. Second, seek the new opportunities for creative diplomacy presented by the changing international system. Both patterns, developed independently or concurrently, add a broad new dimension to defense planning.

The pledge to keep all present treaty commitments is not a mere continuum of the postwar containment policy. American economic and military assistance to countries threatened by aggression will continue, but in the future America "will look to others for a greater share in the definition of policy as well as in bearing the costs of the programs."[24] Those countries most directly threatened will have to assume the primary responsibility for providing manpower. Moreover, in keeping commitments, America will also look for a demonstrated spirit of regional responsibility. As the doctrine states, "without the foundations of self-help and regional

help, American help will not succeed."[25] There is no express indication that an ally's current inability to assume a greater share of the defense responsibility will vitiate the present level of American commitment, but, at the same time, the doctrine is clear in that the United States considers commitment maintenance as a dynamic process in which the levels of military and economic contributions are subject to changing conditions.

Such flexibility gives little comfort to the American defense planner. He must now deal with the variables of manpower, weapons systems, and operational force levels to meet whatever commitments the foreign policy decisionmakers may require at any given moment. Always compounding his problem are fiscal constraints and the budgetary requirement for projecting needs in 5-year increments. In past years the American commitment to the various alliances was very nearly stable at some fixed level of men, ships, aircraft, missiles, and other equipment. It was costly, but predictable. Now the defense planner must make some extraordinarily critical judgments, the foremost of which must be the viability of the burdensharing concept itself. Though the judgments will not be unlike those made by defense planners in implementing Vietnamization, the conditions will be far less ideal, for in Vietnam costs were not a serious constraint, and it was deemed that the United States had a vital, vested interest.

While the Nixon Doctrine is careful to confirm existing commitments, it states forthrightly that new commitments will be concluded only after very "rigorous yardsticks" are applied:

> What precisely is our national concern? What precisely is the threat? What would be the efficacy of our involvement? . . . We are not involved in the world because we have commitments; we have commitments because we are involved. Our interests must shape our commitments, rather than the other way around.[26]

Below the rhetorical surface, the language seems to say that the simpler measure of "containment" will no longer suffice.

The most familiar slogan of the Nixon Doctrine has been its professed goal to move from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation. The instrument for attaining that goal lies in the opportunities for creative diplomacy made possible by "an increasingly heterogeneous and complex world" transitioning from a rigid condition of bipolarity to a more flexible condition of multipolarity.[27] Particularly important contributors to this transitional condition have been the schism between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, the reemergence of Japan as a world power, Western Europe's economic and political revival, and the attainment of strategic parity with the United States by the Soviet Union. In an unprecedented series of diplomatic initiatives, the President, within the 12-month period between January 1972 and January 1973, conversed with Chinese leaders in Peking, conducted a summit meeting with the leadership of the Soviet Union, concluded a Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement with the Soviet Union, and signed a Vietnam truce settlement.

As an instrument of this creative diplomacy, defense forces are measured primarily by their political utility in the diplomacy of commitment maintenance. A principal objective, in the context of the Nixon Doctrine, is to achieve a "durable peace" whereby the skeletal structure of commitment maintenance can become a reality. Skeletal structure refers to an allied economic and military partnership which minimizes the role of the United States in both the "definition of policy" and in "bearing the costs of the programs."[28] The political utility of military forces

can be examined from various perspectives. In both Korea and Vietnam, U.S. military forces exercised political as well as military utility, but in the context of this paper the political utility of military force is defined as influence on the attainment of a diplomatic objective rather than a military combat objective. Useful recent examples of political utility can be found in the decisions to acquire an antiballistic missile system, accelerate construction of the Trident submarine, and the retention of a substantial number of U.S. troops in Western Europe. Each of these had a profound effect on related negotiations, giving the United States a much stronger bargaining position.

The winter 1973 Middle East crisis provides a poignant example of the political utility of military forces. Almost immediately following the outbreak of fighting between the Arabs and the Israelies, the United States and the Soviet Union commenced incremental diplomatic maneuvers, reinforced by history's biggest airlift of military arms to their respective allies.[29] The United States deployed a carrier task force to the western Indian Ocean, augmented the standing 6th Fleet forces in the Mediterranean, and, as the diplomatic exchanges became more direct, the strategic air force was put on full alert. At home, concern was being expressed whether the United States had sufficient on-scene and reserve military power to influence the diplomatic initiatives. Senator Jackson used the opportunity to reveal, in his judgment, the weakened position of the U.S. Fleet in the Mediterranean. In an interview before NBC's "Meet the Press," he noted that the Soviets had augmented their Mediterranean Fleet by 25 percent and outnumbered the U.S. 6th Fleet 95 vessels to 60. He also stressed an important qualitative trend in the Soviet capability: "For the first time in the long imperial history of Russia they have naval infantry aboard the ships in the Mediterranean; probably equivalent to a battalion, with landing craft offshore at this very hour."[30] Similarly, Howard K. Smith warned on ABC news that "before long, we'll have to back down," not only in the Middle East where the U.S. fleet was "outnumbered and outgunned," but elsewhere in the world if U.S. defense forces continued to decline in the face of the growing Soviet capabilities.[31]

The United States, in the Middle East, had run the full range of military capabilities, from airlift to the inherent threat of a full strategic alert, in order to support the ongoing diplomatic battle. Though the United States employed no direct military force against the Soviets or Arabs, a significant show of force was obviously considered necessary to influence the diplomatic objective. Already the Defense Department is assessing where the capabilities were deficient, how significant a drawdown of military equipment was caused by the resupply of Israel, the price tag, and, most importantly, what the implications are for meeting the future demands of creative diplomacy. In the Mediterranean a substantial U.S. force was present as part of the NATO commitment, but no such forces, inadequate as they may have been, according to critics such as Senator Jackson and Howard K. Smith, are so conveniently prepositioned elsewhere to provide the required diplomatic support.

During the closing months of the Vietnam war, a combined air and sea armada, unmatched in size or capability since World War II, was launched against North Vietnam, no longer to achieve a military objective, but rather to emphasize the American position on the negotiations which had temporarily been suspended. Even following the agreement, a multicarrier task force was kept combat ready in the Tonkin Gulf as a powerful signal to the North Vietnamese Government of our diplomatic resolve.

The concept of a *central* paradox, as I have attempted to develop, should not be considered as a variation on the theme of the Hahn/Ravenal critique. On the contrary, I maintain that the Nixon Doctrine is not a mere rhetorical disguise but that it makes a genuine effort to balance American commitments with military, economic, and psychological realities. Moreover, the message of the Nixon Doctrine, as it has evolved through the President's annual foreign policy reports, supports military strength and fully acknowledges that negotiation paradoxically requires a larger military role than confrontation. As was pointed out in the Ravenal critique, our present force levels are indeed overcommitted, and few, including administration officials, would argue that the balance can ever be determined exactly. The practical exigencies of executing the Vietnam drawdown have no doubt exerted an extraordinarily disruptive influence on the military planning process which, at any rate, lags behind political adjustments. Hopefully, the war-related disruptions are only temporary, and the onus remains squarely on the defense planners to adapt to the thesis of the Nixon Doctrine and produce forces sufficient to the purpose of both patterns of diplomacy.

An Era of Austerity. Following a particularly strenuous budget review session in the Pentagon, Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, serving as the Chief of Naval Operations, was heard advising his Navy planners to adjust for a move from a four-room house into a three-room house. This analogy presents a discerning awareness of the intellectual adjustment required of the Department of Defense by the economic and political imperatives of the 1970's. Two principal forces compel the Defense Department to move into that three-room house. They are the change in domestic attitudes and the astronomic increase of weapons acquisition and personnel costs.

In the late 1960's, disillusioned and frustrated by the Vietnam war, a growing segment of the American population began to criticize both military intervention abroad and expanding military expenditures. In large part, the Nixon Doctrine was developed in response to this attitude. Public opinion polls conducted from 1945 to 1960 reported consistent majorities of at least 60 percent who favored either maintaining or increasing the defense budget, but by 1968, 53 percent thought the defense budget was too large. Analyzing these statistics for an article on "Domestic Change and National Security Policy," Leslie Gelb concluded that "to the extent . . . these changed attitudes on defense spending reflect or shape attitudes on foreign policy and the use of force generally, a new dimension has been added to politics."[32]

The President's third annual foreign policy report articulated the acute implications of the military budget and presents a stark warning for the 1970's:

> Personnel costs now absorb over half of the defense budget; by the middle of the decade these costs may rise to well over 60 percent. At the same time, the costs of new weapons systems have generally been two to three times the costs of those they replace, largely due to increasing complexity. The combination of these two effects may by the mid-1970's seriously limit our ability to meet our anticipated security requirements.[33]

Fortune magazine reported that 56 percent of the 1972 military budget went to pay and related costs, whereas 42 percent was so allocated in 1961. The *Fortune* article concluded: "The result is that while the forces are being paid better and on a standard that is the envy of the world's armies, they have less capital for investment in the military

technologies that alone can make their diminished numbers count for more."[34] It is patently obvious that the dramatic increase in personnel costs is attributable to All-Volunteer Force incentives. Yet recruit quotas are still not being met, particularly by the Army, and further monetary incentives are being considered. Comparing the defense budget in current billions, the 1974 budget totaled $79 billion and the 1954 budget only $43.6 billion. Yet, when measured in constant (1958) billions, the 1974 budget is less than 80 percent of the 1954 budget.[35] An excellent summary of recent defense budget history was provided in the same *Fortune* article cited above:

> In current dollars, total U.S. military spending has increased by half since 1964, and has been steady in the $75-billion to $79-billion range for the past five years. However, military spending has been a diminishing force in the national economy (1968=6.8% GNP and in 1973=6.4% GNP)... What is more significant, by reason of its long-term effects, is the continuous decline, both in current and in constant dollars..., of the funds for military investment... In constant 1958 dollars, the $22.9 billion currently budgeted for these activities comes down to $16.6 billion, and provides $5 billion less in purchasing power than Congress authorized ten years ago. Plainly, increases in personnel costs have caused much of the rise in military spending.[36]

It is within this increasingly severe fiscal environment that the Defense Department is obliged to produce forces in support of the Nixon Doctrine. The difficult solution may not rest in simply more forces of every type but rather in a new style of forces—usable, mobile, economically manned, and decisively armed.

THE HARD CHOICE

> ... it would be unwise to make further unilateral cuts in deployments or significant reductions in overall force levels in the foreseeable future... The limitations of our current force levels were illustrated by the strain placed on our forces as a whole by our effort last year to help counter the invasion of South Vietnam by a small nation with practically no navy or air force.[37]

Force Planning Alternatives. A grave concern over the lack of a relevant strategic doctrine and a coherent military policy is evidenced in Henry Kissinger's writings. In 1969 he stated:

> No foreseeable force level—not even fullscale ballistic missile defenses—can prevent levels of damage eclipsing those of the two world wars. In these conditions, the major problem is to discipline power so that it bears a rational relationship to the objectives likely to be in dispute. The paradox of contemporary military strength is that a gargantuan increase in power has eroded its relationship to policy.[38]

This concern is unmistakenly reflected by the revitalized NSC system. The newly established Defense Program Review Committee, mentioned earlier in this paper, is attempting to assist the NSC balance policy and defense. In a significant departure from past procedures, the President now issues strategic and fiscal guidance, based on the corporate advice of the NSC, to the Secretary of Defense in sufficient time for it to be used as the basis of the annual force planning and budgeting exercise.

Secretary Laird, in presenting the Nixon administration's first comprehensive 5-Year Defense Program to the Congress, introduced the strategy of

realistic deterrence to meet the objectives of the Nixon Doctrine:

> The Strategy of Realistic Deterrence is new. Those who would dismiss it as a mere continuation of past policies in new packaging would be quite mistaken. Past policy was responsive and reactive. Our new Strategy is positive and active. Past policy focused on containment and accommodation. The new Strategy emphasizes measured, meaningful involvement and vigorous negotiation from a position of strength.[39]

In the same report a careful guideline for defense planning was presented:

> I believe that in terms of force levels and expenditures, we can make the transition from war to lasting peace and expanding freedom with an efficient and modernized U.S. military force that, in peacetime, would require no more than seven percent of Gross National Product or less and be made up of no more than 2.5 million men and women who are volunteers. Combined with adequate strength, true partnership and constructive negotiations, such a force is designed to deter war.[40]

The heavy reliance on the language of deterrence is unsettling to many national security analysts. This, coupled with the actual observed decline of general purpose forces, rekindles memories of the Eisenhower defense policy which relied on deterrence rather than conventional combat capability and resulted in the doctrine of massive retaliation, so poignantly criticized by Kissinger in his statement above. This is precisely the root of the danger perceived by Earl Ravenal—a situation where a weak conventional force placed in combat could prompt the premature release of tactical nuclear weapons. Jerome Kahan, commenting on future U.S. security objectives, made the following judgment:

> The safest course for the United States in the seventies would thus be to avoid increasing—and, if possible, to reduce—its reliance on strategic nuclear forces and to keep them as far as possible in the background, as the ultimate deterrent to nuclear attack. This approach should be reflected in U.S. declaratory policy, strategic doctrine, and overall defense posture. This clearly implies a need for complementing strategic nuclear forces with adequate conventional forces, which will set some limits to the cuts that can be made in our non nuclear capabilities.[41]

No doubt, some analysts would argue that conditions are propitious for a return to the Kennedy administration's strategy of flexible and controlled response.[42]

However, beyond the complexities of paradox, austerity, and strategy discussed briefly in the preceding paragraphs, defense planners are confronted by yet another constraint: interservice competition. Wholly unlike the traditional gridiron rivalries or evening boastings in the officer clubs, this is serious competition among professionals for favorable decisions on proposed weapons systems, strategies, political-military alternatives, and missions. Each military service carefully develops what it considers the optimum budget to ensure the national security and support American foreign policy. Earl Ravenal, in his critical essay on the political-military gap of the Nixon Doctrine, made a concise observation of this phenomenon:

> Quite naturally, the reaction of the services to a new national security policy is to accommodate to it by gravitating to where the "action" is—as they all adapted to the unconventional warfare vogue of the 1960's (even the Navy was

operating in commando units far behind enemy lines). The services are again competing innovatively, this time to adapt their traditional arms to the aseptic connotations of the Nixon Doctrine. The Navy –so far the principal beneficiary –promotes its normal "over-the-horizon" posture (the presumably non-provocative, stand-off readiness to deliver overwhelming force) and its comprehensive "blue-water" strategy (the quiet world-wide reach). The Air Force insists, characteristically, on the centrality of strategic attack (the attempted destruction of the enemy's will). The Army abstracts a new mythology of remote engagement (the automated electronic battlefield and the prompt, precise, lethal reaction).[43]

A goal of the Program Planning and Budgeting System (PPBS) introduced by former Secretary of Defense McNamara was to control this phenomenon of service competition. Alain Enthoven and Wayne Smith, biographers of the PPBS, reported the condition of the Defense Department in 1961 when the McNamara regime assumed office: "Arbitrary budget ceilings and the extrapolation of existing Service fractions year after year led the services to develop an extensive arsenal of tactics for attempts to increase their share of the total defense budget."[44] Burton Sapin, another watchman of the Pentagon machinery, has concluded:

> The point is that the inability of the three services to reach clear-cut agreement on the allocation of roles and missions, the control of particular weapons systems, the division of military budgets, and the shape of a national military strategy not only accelerated the centralizing trend in the making of major military decisions, but also put that decisionmaking power increasingly into the hands of the Secretary of Defense.[45]

By wielding the very facile, new technique of systems analysis, the McNamara regime was able to come to grips with the behemothian defense budget and its complex of issues. At first the services were overwhelmed by the revolutionary management technique that threatened their previously unchallenged rationales, but the services have reacted by developing their own system analysis capabilities which now equal, if not surpass, those of the Secretary's office. Hence, the bureaucratic tug and pull of the budget season persists. Few would argue that such an exercise is not salutary. On the contrary, the innovative proposals from each service on how best to adapt strategies to foreign policies, though they may be contradictory and competitive, are an essential input to policy formation. In his excellent summary of SALT I negotiations, John Newhouse identified a serious risk in the alternative, a Joint Chiefs of Staff approach to problem solving:

> The Joint Chiefs of Staff operate both as military heads of their services and as an institution. In the latter role, they normally speak with one voice, an achievement that requires a good deal of internal compromise. The process of compromise often denies the President a clear impression of the real position of each service on an issue.[46]

Similarly, Enthoven and Smith concluded:

> Of course, the JCS is supposed to integrate these interdependent Service parts. But history has repeatedly shown that a committee like the JCS does not act this way. If not forced to make hard choices between Service interests, the JCS staples together Service requests. If forced to make hard choices, the JCS tries to negotiate a compromise–one that often

> bears little relationship to the best mix of forces from a national or a military point of view. If the joint Chiefs fail to agree, they hand the problem back to the Secretary of Defense. [47]

The Secretary, therefore, must maintain a clear understanding of the paradox of the doctrine, balance all programs against the established strategy, and control service bias without submerging it in consensus. Ideally, the size of the budget will be a Presidential decision made on the advice of the National Security Council in which the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are included. As discussed earlier, it seems unlikely that the size of the budget will enjoy any significant growth. This was clearly stated in Secretary Laird's guideline for defense planning which set the budget threshold at 7 percent of GNP, and, in large part, the Nixon Doctrine itself flowed from the public's unwillingness to support a growing defense budget. The President's second foreign policy report confirmed the doctrine's objective to stabilize military spending: "Our current level of security expenditures is adequate to provide the forces necessary to protect our vital interests. It must be kept that way." [48]

Determining the shape of a fiscally constrained budget to support the Nixon Doctrine's commitment to allies and promise of vigorous diplomatic initiatives will require perhaps harder choices than during wartime when missions are most clearly understood and resources most plentifully available. The Secretary of Defense must first understand the central paradox of the Nixon Doctrine, that a larger role has been demanded of defense. The automatic reaction of many defense planners would be to understand a larger role only in terms of larger forces. The Secretary must diminish that tendency and encourage his analysts to concentrate less on optimizing the separate budget submissions of the services and more on optimizing the whole, as Enthoven and Smith concluded above but which has never been attained. Defense analysts, concentrating on individual service submissions, effect budget reductions and efficiencies by making incremental choices rather than the hard choice; that is, they delay procurement programs and reduce total numbers of units to be purchased or retained within a class rather than eliminate programs entirely. The individual services have already performed the analysis to optimize their programs in the context of their perceived requirements. It is for the Secretary to take the maximum management view and balance all programs of all services against the established strategy in support of the operative foreign policy and within the economic constraints of the budget. Service bias must not be invulnerable nor should it be submerged in consensus.

Hard choice analysis may open a crack for an eventual breakthrough toward the development of new military strategies which are not only sufficient, but best suited to the support of a fluid foreign policy as expressed by the Nixon Doctrine. Broad alternatives which might present themselves would be strategies which:

- Stress a qualitative adjustment of force levels rather than quantitative, i.e., more of one type of weapons system of capability and none of another rather than more of both.
- Support the creative development of regional armies, air forces, and navies, heavily endowed with U.S. equipment and training.
- Exercise the "total force" (regulars, reserves, allies) regularly.
- Emphasize a central strategy supported by lesser capable, low-cost strategies, i.e., strong navy, weaker air force and army.

The above list does not purport to be either exhaustive or novel, and for reasons of simplicity it avoids directly addressing the problem of strategic forces.

Conclusions. The world political environment has changed since 1948, and after years of stagnation American policy has decided to accept these changes. In fact, perhaps the greatest contribution that the Nixon Doctrine has as yet made is that it recognizes reality. The wornout assumption that the United States operated in a bipolar world faced with monolithic communism has been discarded in favor of a fluid policy based on multilateralism. Likewise, the doctrine has taken stock of the diminished public support for overseas commitment, accepted the accompanying demand for fiscal reduction, and has rejected the myth that American military force can or should protect anticommunism everywhere.

A new era has most certainly dawned on the foreign policy of the United States, but the exact nature and direction of that era is yet to be seen. The Nixon Doctrine presents opportunities for future policymakers, not a clear-cut outline of steps to follow. Success or failure is not intrinsic to its structure but depends wholly on the wisdom of future decisionmakers and their ability to understand the changing paradoxical world system on which it is based.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Lt. Comdr. John G. Kost, U.S. Navy, did his undergraduate work at the University of Notre Dame and is a graduate of the Destroyer School at Newport, R.I. He has served as Operations Officer of U.S.S. *Harwood* (DD-861) and Commanding Officer of U.S.S. *Defiance* (PG-95)—the first patrol gunboat to operate in the Mediterranean. Lieutenant Commander Kost has had duty in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-09C), and from 1972 to 1973 was the Administrative Assistant and Aide to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations; he is currently a student at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.

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41. Jerome H. Kahan, "Strategic Armaments," Henry Owen, ed., *The Next Phase in Foreign Policy* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1973), p. 237.
42. Leslie H. Gelb and Arnold M. Kuzmack, "General Purpose Forces," Henry Owen, ed., *The Next Phase in Foreign Policy* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1973), p. 213. "As of this writing, the Nixon administration has neither explicitly reaffirmed nor replaced this policy. In response to pressures to reduce the defense budget it has . . . taken moves that affect overall conventional combat readiness." Secretary of Defense Schlesinger's defense budget for 1975, however, indicates an intention to deliberately pursue a more flexible strategic doctrine.
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One of the ironies of military and naval history is that the men who are effective in building and providing for fleet readiness in peacetime are doomed to obscurity, while wartime leaders are acknowledged as heroes and assured of a niche in history. While Winston Churchill is well recognized for his part in World War II, the general naval community has little appreciation for the profound impact he had in initiating change in the Royal Navy prior to World War I.

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL'S LEGACY TO THE ROYAL NAVY, 1911-1915

A research paper prepared

by

Commander Maria S. Higgins, U.S. Navy

The Agadir crisis of 1911 alarmed all of Europe and brought home the possibility that war might soon break out. Germany's sudden and menacing gesture of sending a gunboat to Morocco to protect German interests was a sign to British leaders that Germany was bent on war when she could safely begin one. The tension surrounding this incident soon spurred the Prime Minister and the British Committee of Imperial Defence to review existing national war plans. In the process a serious disagreement arose between the Admiralty and War Office over the aims and methods of these vital plans. The vagueness of the Admiralty's thinking, in contrast to the clearly developed plans of the War Office, and the lack of coordination between the Admiralty and War Office led the Prime Minister to conclude that reforms and new leadership were needed at the Admiralty.

Winston Spencer Churchill eagerly accepted the Prime Minister's call to become First Lord of the Admiralty, even though he was serving in a more prestigious Cabinet position, Home Secretary. The Admiralty was an action post, and he recognized the fact that immediate reform was essential if Britain were to be prepared for war with Germany.

Churchill, who had always supported the idea of a strong navy, was interested in and already generally well informed about defense matters. Although Churchill had no previous formal contact with the navy, his association with Adm. Sir John Fisher (a former First Sea Lord) had not only stimulated his interest in the navy but also had given him ideas for further reforms. His collaboration with Fisher produced some of his most notable reforms: converting the Royal Navy from burning coal to

oil, government joint ownership of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, and instituting the naval air service.

He took every opportunity to become more knowledgeable about the navy. In his first 3 years at the Admiralty, he spent more than 8 months afloat, using the official yacht as a mobile office. He visited every naval installation, dockyard, and every important ship. He was fascinated by the work, and it absorbed all his time and energies. The navy's magic overpowered him, but he retained his sense of proportion and insured that his reforms were not blocked by traditional criticisms and resistance to change.

He concentrated his vast energies and prolific imagination on the reforms needed to bring the Royal Navy to the level of instant readiness and wartime strength. Churchill identified areas that required new treatment: the war plans needed reorientation; the fleets required reorganization to increase their readiness; measures had to be devised to guard against surprise attack; a naval war staff had to be formed; close coordination of army and navy war plans was required; designs had to be developed to increase gunpower of all classes of new ships; and changes were needed in the high command of the fleet and the Admiralty Board.[1]

While Churchill's accomplishments at the Admiralty from 1911 to 1915 were legion, only those of lasting significance to the Royal Navy will be discussed in detail: the formation of a naval war staff, the creation of a fast division of battleships featuring 15-inch guns and propulsion fueled by oil, and the initiation of meaningful pay and personnel reforms and the foundation of the Royal Naval Air Service. Winston Churchill's legacy as First Sea Lord was monumental, inasmuch as he played a key role in shaping the Royal Navy into the type of force Britain was to need in facing the challenges she was to encounter during the first half of the 20th century.

The First Task: Creation of a Naval War Staff. The urgent requirement for a naval war staff and Churchill's ability to create and implement this concept, despite the opposition of the First Sea Lord and his colleagues were the primary reasons for Churchill's appointment to the Admiralty.

Churchill gave this task the highest priority because he realized he could not improve the organization and planning departments ashore and afloat without first forming a war staff at the Admiralty. The urgent requirement for a naval war staff was finally recognized at the Committee of Imperial Defence meeting of 23 August 1911 when it became evident that there was no coordinated national war plan. The War Office believed in and had planned on a continental strategy with the army bringing maximum aid to the French at the outbreak of a war with Germany. The Admiralty supported its traditional maritime strategy and did not consider the help the British Army could bring in France worth sending. The admirals thought of the army more as an amphibious force to be used on targets behind or on the flank of the enemy. Unfortunately, there was no agreement among the admirals on the designated targets; the Admiralty plan existed only in the mind of the First Sea Lord, and consequently it changed as often as the officeholder did.

The contrast between the army and navy strategies was startling. General Wilson, speaking from carefully prepared notes, described detailed plans for transporting the British Army to France and deploying it there in support of the French. Admiral Wilson spoke extemporaneously as he had no war staff to prepare his briefing. His proposals for naval action in war were obscure and unconvincing. All his plans were based on blockade and the need to seize forward bases off the German coast, but he chose to ignore the dangers present in the new improved German mines and

submarines. He also suggested that the navy might find it necessary to enter the Baltic, but he was never explicit as to why or how it should be done. The War Office tried in vain to get Admiralty to guarantee that six divisions could be transported to France if the need arose, but the Admiralty steadfastly refused to give any assurance on this matter.

Under heavy cross-examination, Admiral Wilson failed to convince the Committee of Imperial Defence of the worth of his plan, and the meeting broke up in confusion. The army's plan was accepted and the navy's rejected, but concern continued to grow over the state of the navy's and nation's war plans.[2] The Admiralty's unwillingness to prepare a precise plan for guidance and action or to coordinate plans with the army alarmed the Prime Minister and resulted in Churchill's appointment to the Admiralty to establish a naval war staff.

Naval War Staff Organization. Soon after Churchill assumed office, Viscount Haldane, who had created the general staff for the army, was invited and came to help the First Sea Lord, Adm. Louis Battenberg, and Adm. David Beatty complete plans for the staff. A draft plan was produced based primarily on Admiral Battenberg's proposals. The naval war staff was to be headed by a chief of staff who would report directly to the First Sea Lord and be his assistant. He would guide and coordinate the work of the staff and be advised by three branches: Intelligence (war information), Operations (war plans), and Mobilization (war arrangements). The Intelligence Branch would acquire information on which action might be taken; the Operations Branch would deliberate on the facts obtained in relation to national policy and report thereon; and the Mobilization Branch would put into effect the final decision of superior authority. The main functions of the staff were to prepare strategic plans and integrate them with War Office plans. These functions were to be purely advisory.[3]

A long memorandum on the war staff, in Churchill's language and style, was circulated to the Admiralty Board for comments on 28 October 1911. In an effort to win Admiralty support for the concept, Churchill explained why a war staff was needed in modern war and pointed out that all major combat services in the world, with the exception of the Royal Navy, had such a staff. He discussed the consequences of the absence of this organization: the lack of systematic training in the principles of strategy, foreign policy, treaty agreements, and rights of neutrals; the chaotic state of war planning; and the absence of continuity in Admiralty policy with resulting financial waste.[4]

The board had been opposed to creation of the war staff because they did not believe it was needed to help them do the thinking and planning. As a whole, they were responsible for strategy and tactics, but each member was fully occupied administering his own department.[5] The First Sea Lord, Admiral Wilson, submitted comments indicating he was opposed to any kind of naval staff, and the remaining sea lords shared his view. He did not favor the creation of any position such as chief of staff, and the preparation of war plans he regarded as a matter to be dealt with by the First Sea Lord himself. Wilson preferred to trust men rather than organizations. Faced with this determined opposition, Churchill asked for the sea lords' resignations and replaced the entire Admiralty Board, except for the Comptroller.[6]

Part of the Admiralty's resistance to creating a staff arose from the fear that it would lead to the growth of an elite body of officers withdrawn from the practical day-to-day work of the navy and dwelling, brooding, planning in some sort of irrational hothouse of their own. It was feared they would be

intellectual, land-bound sailors who would inevitably find themselves in conflict with the commanders at sea.[7]

As soon as the new board was established in January 1911, Churchill circulated to the public a paper on the naval war staff that defined the functions of the war staff and was written to ease the fears of doubting naval officers. This short extract illustrates:

> The art of handling a great fleet on important occasions with deft and sure judgment is the supreme gift of the Admiral, and practical seamanship must never be displaced from its position as the first qualification of every sailor. The formation of a War Staff does not mean the setting up of new standards of professional merit or the opening of a road to advancement to a different class of officers. It is to be the means of preparing and training of those officers who arrive or are likely to arrive, by the excellence of their sea service at stations of high responsibility. . . .[8]

On the whole he was successful in allaying the worst fears of the skeptics, and the transition was a relatively smooth one, but, as Churchill wrote, "it takes a generation to form a General Staff. No wave of the wand can create those habits of mind in seniors on which the efficiency and even the reality of a staff depends."[9] Opposition to Churchill's new staff continued in various forms, but most particularly many senior commanders did all they could to discourage their subordinates from undertaking staff training.

Training the War Staff. There were no naval officers trained for a war staff, so Churchill moved to establish a staff course to train young officers in the broad principles of war by sea and land. He envisioned a 12-month course with selections to be made by examination to test the power of reasoning rather than memory. In January 1912 the War College at Portsmouth was ordered to train staff officers. But while the War College had been given a historic opportunity to reshape the education of the Royal Navy's future leadership, it lacked the intellectual capital in the form of faculty and staff to meet the challenge.[10]

Few navy officers favored the special training of staff officers. The conduct of war was an admiral's job, and lieutenants should not be initiated into the mysteries of their craft. The Royal Navy's problem, however, was that the admirals did not know their work either because they had not studied it when their minds were fresh and susceptible to self-education.[11]

Not surprisingly, the staff course was unsuccessful at first. The initial class was filled with officers who were not wanted in their commands. Some selected for the training seemed to be below the average ability, most probably because a senior officer who was opposed to the idea of a staff recommended unsuitable candidates. Also, many deserving officers were advised not to apply for the War College course because its graduates were looked on with suspicion. The course closed at the beginning of the war and did not reopen until 1919.[12]

Churchill never ceased working at the formation of a general staff. In every way he encouraged officers to read, to study history, and to think about strategy and tactics and other nontechnical problems.[13] He was a strong supporter of the project of starting the *Naval Review*, a privately circulated professional journal designed to provoke independent thought by officers of all rank. The fledgling journal might well have been smothered at birth by the objections of the senior officers except for Churchill's determination.

Evaluation of the War Staff Concept. The naval war staff had been at work

barely 2 years when war broke out, and it is not surprising that this primitive organization proved unable to cope with its tremendous wartime task.[14] In 1917 the staff was reorganized to merge the office of the Chief of the Naval Staff with that of the First Sea Lord, and a deputy was created to handle the details. Except for this change, the original naval war staff remains essentially the same today as when Churchill first created it.[15]

The First Lord of the Admiralty fully recognized that the creation of a war staff would take many years, as his writings testify:

> But it takes a generation to form a General Staff. No wave of the wand can create those habits of mind in seniors on which the efficiency and even the reality of a Staff depends. Young officers can be trained, but thereafter they have to rise step by step in the passage of time to positions of authority in the Service. . . . At least fifteen years of consistent policy were required to give the Royal Navy that widely extended outlook upon war problems and of war situations without which seamanship, gunnery, instrumentalisms of every kind, devotion of the highest order, could not achieve their due reward.[16]

More than a generation had to pass before suspicion of staff officers disappeared. In the twenties, orders to the Naval Staff College were a mixed blessing; the officer who received them ran the risk that his career might have reached a dead end. By the thirties, however, attitudes had changed, and World War II established the trained staff officer in his rightful position.[17] It was only after the war staff was allowed to get seriously down to work that the Admiralty began to recognize that the complexities of modern war could indeed be best handled by a professional naval general staff.[18]

The smoothness of naval planning and operations in the Second World War in comparison with the First World War provides ample testimony to Churchill's wisdom.

A New Class of Battleships. Churchill, however, recognized that simply organizing the Royal Navy's planning and staff procedures would not be sufficient to strengthen the navy to meet the German menace. He chose to create a fast division of ships designed to operate at higher speeds while armed with heavier guns. Through his collaboration with and reliance on Lord Fisher's technical advice, his efforts resulted in significant naval progress during his tenure as First Lord of the Admiralty.

One of Churchill's aims when he took the helm at the Admiralty was to improve the gunpower of the Royal Navy's ships. Realizing the dramatic increase in firepower produced by the new 13.5-inch gun, Churchill decided to go one size better to a 15-inch gun with a 1,920-pound projectile and 3,500 yard range for the five dreadnoughts of the 1912 program.[19]

This decision had broad ramifications, for it meant not only enlarging the gun, but it also necessitated redesigning and enlarging the ship. Larger ships would cost more and might be disapproved by Parliament. No 15-inch gun existed, and there was no time to make a trial 15-inch gun before the new ships were to be launched. Thus Churchill faced a dilemma, for if the 15-inch gun failed, the five ships would be useless; if, on the other hand, the 15-inch gun were tested first, a year would be lost and five ships would have inferior weapons.[20]

Churchill consulted several authorities who recommended he test the gun and lose a year. Nevertheless, he took the advice of Lord Fisher who was steadfast in his recommendation that the 15-inch guns be ordered. Churchill

had misgivings about this decision and fully realized the seriousness of its implications for his future political career.

> Fancy if they [the 15-inch guns] failed. What a disaster. . . . No excuse would be accepted. It would be brought home to me—"rash, inexperienced," "before he had been there a month," "altering all the plans of his predecessors" and producing "this ghastly fiasco," "the mutilation of all the ships of the year."[21]

Churchill made the decision to order the 15-inch guns for the 1912 capital ships program, because: "To achieve the supply of this gun was the equivalent of a great victory at sea; to shrink from the endeavour was treason to the Empire."[22] The program was highly successful, and, after a year of suspense, Churchill felt as if he had been delivered from a great peril. When he saw the gun fired, he knew all was well.

The dream of the Admiralty battle plans was a division of ships fast enough to seize the advantageous position and yet as strong in gunpower and armor as any battleship afloat. This desire, adopted by Churchill, led to the decision to create a new fast division of battleships.[23]

The War College was tasked to study the German Fleet of 1914-1915 and determine the superiority in speed needed in a fast division to outmaneuver the German Fleet. The study concluded that an increase of 4 or 5 knots over the speed attained by the most modern ships of that day would be required.[24] The only way to acquire the additional horsepower was to power the ships by use of fuel oil. These three material decisions are linked, as one led to the other: the increased gunpower led to the fast division and, thus, to the decision to power capital ships by fuel oil.

The most vital decision that Churchill made at the Admiralty was to change the foundations of the Royal Navy from coal to oil power. Although 56 destroyers and 74 submarines were oil powered when he came to the Admiralty, the navy as a whole did not depend upon oil as a major source of power. A considerable resistance to using fuel oil existed in naval circles at the time, however, for if large numbers of additional oil-powered ships were constructed, Britain's naval supremacy would be based on oil, not coal. This decision had serious strategic implications: crude petroleum was not available in the British Isles and had to be imported in peace or war, whereas the best steam coal in the world was available and mined in Britain. Additionally, any conversion to oil required heavy initial expense: oil reserves had to be created in Britain; oil tanks needed to be protected and installed near ports; fleets of tankers had to be built; and oil supplies had to be purchased from the market. All these expenditures required parliamentary approval.

The advantages of fuel oil, however, were incalculable: greater speed could be reached by using oil, and that speed could be attained more rapidly; oil contains 40 percent more energy than the same weight of coal; the fleet could be refueled at sea more efficiently; and oil could be stored more easily. The use of oil made it possible in every type of ship to have more gunpower and more speed for less size and less cost.

The advantages of oil in terms of power and efficiency made converting the Royal Navy to this energy form worth all the difficulties, risks, and costs. For the first time the capital ships could only be fed by oil, and the decision to use fuel oil in smaller ships followed logically from this. The importance of this decision is expressed by Churchill: "A decision like this involved our national safety as much as a battle at sea. It was as anxious and as harassing as any hazard in war."[25]

Once the decision was made, it was

necessary to solve a number of technical and procurement problems. Churchill sought to do this by appointing a Royal Commission on Fuel Oil in 1912 with Lord Fisher as the chairman. The committee was tasked to study all aspects of the problem, including the search for oil deposits, building adequate storage facilities and protecting them, securing means of regular procurement both in peace and war, conversion of existing ships to fuel oil, designing new powerplants for future ships, and exploring the use of the internal combustion engine on British ships.[26]

Churchill announced Britain's naval oil policy in July 1913 based on recommendations of the Fisher Commission. These recommendations put the British Government in the petroleum business: storage facilities were to be constructed; refineries capable of processing crude oil were to be erected; and oilfields were to be acquired.[27] Following this policy, the British Government bought controlling shares in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company for £2 million. By 1928 this investment supplied a large part of Great Britain's peacetime oil requirements for the navy while earning £60 million profit.[28]

While Britain's decision to enter the oil business for reasons of defense turned out to be a popular choice, this was not always the case. The major credit for the decision must go to Mr. Churchill because of his statesmanlike handling of the contracts and money bills in the House of Commons. He had to fight for several months to get the naval estimates approved by the Cabinet and Parliament. He did battle with economists who opposed increased navy expenditures, representatives with coalmining constituents, and the amateur strategists who thought the oilfields and tankers vulnerable to air and sea attack in wartime.[29] The naval estimates for 1912, 1913, and 1914 were momentous steps for the Royal Navy. Winning approval of the navy programs in those years, despite a powerful and determined opposition, was an impressive accomplishment. These important decisions on the 15-inch gun and oil propulsion had a long-range impact on the vital capabilities of the British Fleet for the next 50 years. The vast technological advances represented by the increased gunpower and speed and the immense strategic advantages gained by the fast division of ships insured Churchill's fame as a superior naval administrator and First Lord of the Admiralty.

Personnel Reforms. The creation of a naval general staff and the impetus he gave to technological change in the Royal Navy were not the only significant contributions made by Winston Churchill during his tenure at the Admiralty. Churchill believed strongly, as did Adm. Sir John Fisher, that improvements in the fields of pay, promotion, awards, recruitment, and naval justice were sorely needed.[30]

Pay was first and most important, as it had not been raised for almost 60 years and was at a disgracefully low level. In a memorandum to the Cabinet, Churchill more than justified the requested pay increase. He cited increased living costs, the strenuous nature of naval service, the average seaman's capability to earn more as a civilian. He further noted the sense of injustice and discontent which was then spreading through the ranks and ratings and becoming more acute with every successful industrial strike ashore. Previously, navy men had been restrained by discipline and loyalty, but it was wrong to refuse "to redress this so obvious and so harsh a grievance."[31]

A compromise on pay was reached with the Treasury after a long and bitter fight. Able seamen and stokers first class received a threepence a day increase instead of the requested fourpence increase; petty officers and chief petty officers received a fourpence instead of the requested sixpence raise; no mar-

riage allowance or separation pay was granted; and the officers' pay increase, which improved the scale of officers on one-half pay, was approved as requested. This small increase was a bitter disappointment to Churchill, but it was well received by the fleet and the public.

Churchill initiated two reforms in the promotion system. The first opened the officer ranks to the best men of the lower deck. The navy was short of officers, thus he established a program to select and train young warrant officers for commissioned officer rank. This program would annually select 25 or 30 seamen of age 25 for promotion to the rank of mate, an equivalent rank to sublieutenant, with subsequent promotion to higher rank to be based solely on merit. As these men were starting their officer careers later, it was envisioned that most would not rise above the rank of commander.[32]

Those warrant officers not selected for the mate program would be promoted to commissioned rank after 15 years instead of the 20 previously required. This new program was enthusiastically received by the lower deck, and was an invaluable source of officers for World War I.[33]

A second promotion reform was designed to improve the quality of the flag and captain lists and accelerate promotion to those ranks. It was noted with growing concern that the age and seniority of officers promoted to higher ranks were steadily rising and would apparently continue to do so. To prevent stagnation in the ranks and to accelerate promotions and insure that only the best men remained on flag and captain lists, officers not employed as captains or rear admirals at sea were retired on promotion to next rank. This reform, instituted in 1914, preserved promotion by seniority and insured only the best men were retained on the active lists.[34]

Churchill used every opportunity to improve personnel procedures. The King's request that two naval officers' names be included on his 1912 Birthday's Honours List gave Churchill the opportunity to address the Sovereign on the injustice of existing arrangements for the Honours List. "So that the favor of the Crown can be given to those who have rendered distinguished service, naval officers should be able to obtain, on the average, the same proportion of decorations as their military comrades." Obviously, since 21 army officers were being honored and only 2 naval officers, there was an injustice. Through a series of letter exchanges, Churchill persuaded the King to make the necessary changes in the Statutes of the Order of the Bath to give naval officers an equal opportunity for inclusion on the Honours List.[35]

Personnel problems in the Royal Navy at that time were further exacerbated by the rapid expansion of the fleet to keep abreast of the growing German threat. This rapid expansion complicated an already worrisome shortage of trained officers in the fleet. A special entry system was initiated to alleviate the problem and to provide a means of regulating the number of officers for the future. This system allowed men between the ages of 17½ and 18½ to enter officers training directly from public school in contrast to the then prevailing method of taking boys at age 12 from preparatory school and training them in the fleet for several years before they were commissioned. The special entry system would train the men ashore on a cruiser for 18 months before sending them to sea as sublieutenants. The new system took 3½ years less time and allowed the Admiralty to vary the input more directly with its projected needs. It provided several hundred officers for World War I by making it possible for any suitably educated boy to study to become a naval officer.[36]

Part of the discontent in the fleet in

1911 was related to discipline and punishments. Churchill established an investigatory committee to study the navy's system of summary punishments with the goal of improving discipline and better regulating the position of petty officers.[37] The Admiralty accepted the committee's subsequent report which recommended that the ship organizational system and the operating routine in the fleet be revised. The recommendations on punishment reforms were also adopted with scales of punishment being standardized, humiliating punishments being eliminated, and productive punishment prescribed. The right to appeal unjust or severe sentences was upheld; a standardized method of initiating complaints was established; and petty officers were allowed to request trial by court-martial for offenses which might lead to disrating. This privilege was seldom used, but it raised the navy petty officer's status to that of noncommissioned officers of comparable rank in the army and Royal Marines.[38]

These personnel reforms not only raised the morale of navy personnel, but they also insured the increased numbers needed to man the navy during World War I.

Churchill's emphasis on personnel reforms was warmly praised by the *The Navy League Annual* in 1916:

> But the important element of British sea power is not ships, essential as they are, but the officers and men. Whatever mistakes in naval policy Mr. Churchill may or may not have committed, the nation owes him a debt of gratitude for the persistence with which during his period of office at the Admiralty he demanded from Parliament repeated increases of personnel while at the same time making more adequate provision in respect of pay and laying on a surer foundation the system of promotion from the Lower Deck to commissioned rank.[39]

Founding the Royal Naval Air Service. Another major accomplishment of Churchill's was the creation and establishment of the Royal Naval Air Service. When he assumed office as First Lord, the navy had only four aircraft, but by 1914 when war broke out, the navy had 39 airplanes, 52 seaplanes, a few airships, and 120 pilots. Thus, in less than 4 years, Churchill had added another indispensable weapon system to the fleet's arsenal.

Churchill's membership on the Committee of Imperial Defence's Aviation Subcommittee and his acquaintance with Lord Fisher had piqued his interest in aviation, warned him of Germany's capabilities and potential threat in this area, and acquainted him with the possible uses of aviation in warfare.

The War Office had complete and sole responsibility for the air defense of Britain, but all their planes were earmarked for the expeditionary force, and, in any case, they had no money to buy planes for home defense. Churchill recognized this dangerous gap in Britain's air defense capability and reprogrammed Admiralty funds in 1912 and 1913 to purchase airplanes and seaplanes to defend naval harbors, oil tanks, and other vulnerable chokepoints in the nation's economy and war machine. The War Office viewed the growing naval air arm with alarm because they alone were responsible for home defense, and they clung to this principle though they did not have the men, money, or machines to carry it out. When the war began, all the army airplanes went to France with the expeditionary force, and none were left to guard Britain from aerial attack. Lord Kitchener of the War Office recognized the vulnerability of his position and asked in Cabinet session if the Admiralty would assume responsibility for the aerial defense of Great Britain. Fortunately, the naval air service had

the air force to protect the most vulnerable points, including the dockyards and the coast.[40]

To defend the coast, the Admiralty developed a complete system of flying stations along the east coast of Britain. To some extent these replaced the Coast Guard Service system of destroyer and submarine control.

Churchill's dynamic interest, support, and intellect were lavished on the Royal Naval Air Service, and it flourished under his guidance. He gave his attention to the smallest technical detail, as well as to the matters of planning, organization, and procurement. Under his leadership, the navy experimented with every aspect of sea and air warfare. In 1912 the first bomb was dropped from an aircraft; the first aircraft was launched from a ship; the first submarine was detected by aircraft; and the first planes were fitted with machineguns. In 1913 the first torpedo was dropped from an airplane; the first night flight was flown; and the first attack on aircraft from aircraft, using machineguns, grenades, and bombs, was made. The navy devoted more attention to the development of the plane as a fighting machine and was more advanced in this area than the army when the war began. Thus, while the army had developed airplanes suitable for scouting, the navy possessed planes to protect the coast and destroy the enemy.[41]

Churchill's real interest and understanding of navy personnel management is manifest in the extensive correspondence and other efforts he devoted to creating a stable and viable personnel system for the Royal Naval Air Service. He established workable career patterns for aviators, insured equal promotional opportunities, created a distinctive uniform identifying device, set up a succession to command, defined aviators' status, and identified entry points and methods.

The Royal Naval Air Service was of invaluable service during the war and stood as a towering monument to Churchill's vision, energy, and perseverance.

Conclusion. Sir Winston Churchill's record of accomplishments as First Lord of the Admiralty from 1911 to 1915 is spectacular. It is truly amazing that one man could have accomplished so much in such a short period of time. He combined his political ability to sell navy programs with his vast intellect, courage, technical foresight, strength of character, and unbounded confidence to produce monumental reforms which were still visible a half century later. He introduced modern concepts of staff work, discipline, social work, and technological changes that modernized the British fleet. His innovations and reforms molded the modern Royal Navy.

Churchill not only accomplished all the aims he set for himself in 1911, but he also established the Royal Naval Air Service, created a fast division of battleships which featured increased gunpower and speed, changed the navy's propulsion from coal to oil, and initi-

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

Comdr. Maria S. Higgins, U.S. Navy, did her undergraduate work at Wesleyan College and has earned an M.A. degree from George Washington University in personnel administration and an M.S. degree from the Naval Postgraduate School in business administration. She has served as Officer in Charge of the U.S. Communication Center, AF South, Naples, Italy; in Plans and Programs and in Officer Personnel Control in the Bureau of Naval Personnel; and with Headquarters, U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe, at Stuttgart, Germany. A recent graduate of the College of Naval Warfare, Commander Higgins is currently serving in the Bureau of Naval Personnel.

ated imaginative pay and personnel reforms that dramatically improved fleet morale.

The Royal Navy was at the height of its preparation under Churchill, and no more fitting tribute can be paid to his success at the Admiralty than "When war came—the fleet was ready."[42]

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35. Randolph Churchill, *Churchill Companion*, pp. 1557-1564.
36. Walker, pp. 73-74.
37. Summary punishments are those awarded by the captain of the ship.
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40. Winston Churchill, p. 337.
41. Randolph Churchill, *Young Statesman*, pp. 680-681.
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

THE BAROMETER

(Lt. Comdr. B.D. Cole, USN, comments on Lt. N. Clark Williams' article, "Decision Analysis: Toward Better Naval Management Decisions," July-August 1974.)

The near-coincident rise of computer technology and the development of game theory encouraged and has continued to emphasize a tendency toward quantification and numerical delineation by researchers in all fields of study. Those studying areas of social interaction—where determinant results depend on all-too fallible and, in the final analysis, unpredictable human beings—attempt to quantify the unquantifiable.

Lieutenant Williams' interesting article is of this genre. The article discusses "decisionmaking," a term defined as "the actual embarkation on a course of action." Counterarguments to the precepts offered by the author are presented below.

The basic weakness in his argument is expressed early by the author. Decision analysis, Lieutenant Williams states, is a "normative, rather than a descriptive, approach." Yet, the entire article is concerned with reducing to descriptive standards this admittedly normative process.

The article differentiates between a "good decision"—one consistent with the decisionmaking context—and a "good outcome" which may or may not result from an apparently "good" decision. This is sophistry. Differentiating "good decisions" and "good outcomes" renders the decision-analysis process irrelevant; in effect, analysis for the sake of analysis. This conclusion is hinted at by the author when he states that "the world in which naval officers operate is one that rewards individuals according to outcomes." Lieutenant Williams then discards this fact: "We deliberately sidestep this interesting issue." A giant "sidestep," indeed.

A particular weakness of this article is one common to management "specialists." This is the construction of balanced, sonorous phrases utilizing several multisyllabled words in rapid succession. What are we to make of the author's statement that "the subjective interpretation of probability is fundamental to the decision analysis philosophy . . ."? Once again, a supposedly objective methodology is qualified with subjective interstices.

The author follows the common "management" norm of utilizing formal model construction, a notably limiting method of research in a normative field of study. The almost irresistible temptation to fit the situation to the model, rather than vice versa, is exacerbated by Lieutenant Williams' specifying that "values [be] assigned to possible outcomes." He does not specify whose values are to be assigned.

After establishing his model for decisionmaking analysis, the author seemingly advocates disregarding it in calling for "sparks of creativity" and citing the "need for creativity." The block diagram cannot account for human changeability. Model building as a process in decisionmaking analysis

apparently is a puzzle to the author. He admits the difficulty, and hints at the impossibility, of constructing a model which "accurately captures the essential interdependencies of the problem."

The author does not; however, let this critical weakness of model building prevent him from further utilization of model analysis results as determinants. The suggested process is further limited by Lieutenant Williams' admission that value models depend on the "judgment of the individual" decisionmaker. Hence, we are back to the individual human—the objective model notwithstanding.

Another weakness in the decision-analysis process described in this article is the author's continual use of ill-defined terms. What, for instance, is "perfect information"? Surely, definition of this term rests on subjective estimates of what constitutes "information" in a given situation, not to mention the socio-economic and even theological implications of defining "perfect."

Toward the end of his article, Lieutenant Williams states that should post-decision information reveal questionable results, "changes to the basic structure of the model" may be instituted. This vitiates the process—why correct a model after the fact? This is simply "preparing to fight the last war."

The author concludes by listing some of the advantages of decision analysis. The first is "recognition of uncertainty and values." But if this context were not already recognized as being in effect, a decisionmaking situation would not exist. The second proffered value of decision analysis is its "ability to place a dollar value on the gathering of additional information." This ability is demonstrated in a case study included by the author, but one that is of limited value to the naval and Defense Department decisionmaker operating in a non-financial context of tactical/political human costs.

Lieutenant Williams' article is valuable for its discussion of probability and methods of problem delineation. Where the decision analysis concept he describes breaks down is in its attempts to apply a method dependent on numeric quantification to a human process. As "management experts" so often do, Lieutenant Williams mistakes method for substance.

Ψ

(Lt. Comdr. Peter H. Cressy amplifies on his article, "Developing an Alternative Approach to Race Relations Education: Identifying Military Middle Management Resistance," July-August 1974.)

In the editorial lead to the article entitled "Developing an Alternative Approach to Race Relations Education" of the July-August issue of the *Naval War College Review*, an unfortunate impression was created which the authors would like to alter. In reference to past Navy efforts to change racial attitudes, the editorial abstract used the statement "has not achieved its primary goal." The authors, as the original article states, believed at the time the article was written that it had not yet been shown that the UPWARD and Executive seminar had accomplished their two major objectives—to increase awareness of individual and institutional racism and to increase commitment to deal with racism through affirmative action. The article did not say that these programs had failed or that they had not achieved some important steps toward program goals. The authors, in fact, believe that the UPWARD and Executive seminars were a very useful first step and worthy of considerable admiration. As one personally associated with many of those who created and ran these programs, I am convinced that their efforts were not wasted.

The research upon which the article was based was done with the hope of discovering why past programs had not yet attained their objectives to a fuller

degree. In short, the authors hoped to add some practical contribution to the creative efforts of others in the continued drive to solve the problem of racism in the military.

It is the understanding of the authors that Phase II of the Navy's assault on racism has moved in several of the directions considered by the article based on other research. At the Naval War College, a Human Goals Program is underway which is based, in fact, on the research of the authors. To date, several groups have participated in the 35-hour program developed by the Human Resources Management (HRM) staff. The program is composed of both experienced and cognitive learning experiences. It attempts to tie such management concerns as change, conflict, communication, and objective setting to the race relations problem as well as the drug and alcohol concern.

Evaluation of any program is extremely difficult, particularly if an effort is made to evaluate behavior. Basing an evaluation of an educational program on a participant's questionnaire is hardly sure evidence of program success or failure. Nonetheless, the responses of participants thus far has been most heartening. The program appears to have circumvented resistances while still allowing considerable education to take place. A followup article discussing the program in detail is planned for a future issue of the *Naval War College Review*.

The authors have had considerable response to their articles. Most of it, frankly, has been of a very positive nature. Several criticisms, however, have been directed at the format of the survey used. This officer feels those criticisms are justified and wishes, in retrospect, that he had taken a somewhat more standard approach. The composits of the survey presented in the *Naval War College Review* may have also been somewhat misleading, and this author accepts full responsibility and hastens to inform the interested reader that the full computerized breakdown of the survey is available by writing the HRM staff at the War College.

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(Comdr. Warren H. Winchester, USN, comments on Lt. Comdr. Peter H. Cressy's and Dr. Louis R. Desfosses' article "Developing an Alternative Approach to Race Relations Education," July-August 1974.)

In their recently published article on the Navy's Race Relations Program, Lieutenant Commander Cressy and Professor Desfosses are right on target when they argue that a *new* program is needed for Navy middle managers, but experience both as an aviation squadron commanding officer and as a student at the Naval War College, where I participated in numerous discussions of leadership issues with my contemporaries, makes me highly skeptical of their reasons. In my opinion, the statistical data used to support the researchers' conclusions does not reflect the actions or the thinking of the majority of our 0-5/6's; much of the data cited is valid but extremely dated . . ..

Lieutenant Commander Cressy cites survey data which indicates officers in the 0-4/6 levels have misgivings regarding the conduct of the Race Relations Seminars. No doubt, in some cases these criticisms are valid. It must be noted, however, that the participation of all rank/rate groups in one seminar and the use of sensitivity training methods has never been sanctioned by the program sponsor. Historically any discussion of racism, whether in the Navy or in our civilian society, has been emotional rather than intellectual, . . . and despite the numerous anti-discriminatory laws that have been passed, discriminatory practices still exist both in and outside the Navy. Consequently, any program that is to be effective in the long range must at once address the legal, moral, emotional, and

institutional actions necessary to counter racism.

The allegation that detailers are reluctant to order line officers to Human Resource Management (HRM) billets is, at best, misleading. A review of officers presently assigned to HRM billets reveals that 14 captains (100 percent), most of whom are flag contenders, have had one or more commands ranging from destroyers to major combatants and air stations. Additionally, 60 percent of the commanders currently serving in HRM billets have had command at sea experience ranging from patrol craft to destroyers and aviation squadrons. Promotion experience to date shows that, like all other Navy assignments, those officers who have been top performers in all jobs held get promoted; those who haven't will pay the price. Admittedly, during the implementation and development period of the HRM programs there were a number of officers who applied and were accepted whose advancement potential was already in jeopardy because they had not followed what is often called the "traditional career patterns." The fact that a number of these officers subsequently failed selection should not be an indictment of the programs or the people concerned any more than those officers who were caught in the switch from diesel to nuclear submarines. The officers assigned were dedicated, highly motivated, and in most cases had the educational background or expertise necessary in the early stages of program development.

While Cressy and Desfosses criticize Phase I of the Navy's Race Relations Program, minimal research would have disclosed that it was designed to increase awareness and understanding of racism. An independent survey of Navy personnel shows that this short-range goal was achieved.

Cressy and Desfosses arrive at the conclusion that a "new" approach to race relations based on behavioral actions should be instituted. Had not documentation for this need already been available and had not this program already been in the detailed design stages with clearly stated objectives and milestones, this would indeed have been a revelation.

The second phase of the Navy's race relations program is scheduled for implementation in November of this year. Its stated goals are to develop behavior which counters the effects of racism. This will be accomplished through a series of workshops tailored to command needs and will be structured primarily for groups at the upper and middle management levels. Subjects covered will include equal opportunity, actions to counter racism, and affirmative action planning. Source data for these workshops will be based on personal interviews and equal opportunity quality indicators which will show the application of military justice, upward and lateral mobility, and retention to minority personnel. Race relations program personnel will be trained to consult with and assist commanding officers in the development and implementation of command equal opportunity programs. At the E-1/4 level, command resources will be utilized to conduct workshops on military rights and responsibilities and cultural expression in the Navy.

I gather from the article that the Cressy/Desfosses thesis is that "only a rational solution can be utilized to stop an irrational act," and further, if something is not "liked" then it must be wrong. If we had "liked" the idea of eliminating racism from our society, we would not have had to endure the turmoil of the sixties nor would it have been necessary to enact numerous Federal laws prohibiting discrimination.

The new program is designed to create a command climate that permits the Navy to capitalize on the potential of all individuals. It is self-evident that the maximum utilization of all re-

sources, human and material, is in the Navy's interest. Maximum mission readiness can only be attained when the full potential of our human resources without regard to race, color, creed, or sex is realized.

That is the responsibility of leadership.

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

PROFESSIONAL READING

Blechman, B.M., *et al. Setting National Priorities: the 1975 Budget.* Washington: Brookings Institution, 1974. 269p.

In this book, the fifth of a series, the authors set out to evaluate the President's budget submitted to the Congress for the fiscal year ending in June 1975. The product is a highly readable and thought-provoking examination of the economic and, to a lesser extent, the political environment that confronted the former administration as it prepared the 1975 budget - the critical budgetary alternatives that were considered and are still relevant, as are the long-term fiscal implications of the budget as proposed as well as certain alternatives. The first and last chapters stand together as an excellent overview, background, and summary of the major budgetary issues and options on the national agenda for the foreseeable future. In providing the reader with this, as well as the intervening topical chapters, the authors have succeeded in making the very complex world of economics, institutional relationships, and budgetary mechanics both understandable and relevant to the layman.

Of course, not all the issues are analyzed or even addressed. Rather, the book settles on major representative issues and seeks to balance the necessary details of the issues chosen with the "big picture," namely, the tradeoffs and priorities that must be made in order to reconcile competing objectives and claims with limited and constrained resources. The several budget areas analyzed are: national security policy, energy policy, income support programs, and national health insurance. (Additional chapters assess specific decisions underlying the 1975 budget and the various economic implications of the budget.) To those who are acquainted with these issues, the analyses do not uncover new facts or develop novel alternatives, concentrating, instead, on the presentation of as balanced an appraisal as can be expected on these issues. No particular ideological orientation is consciously pursued.

Such an unbiased stance, however, has its shortcomings. In the nondefense area, discussion of overall tradeoffs and priorities is so bland and noncontroversial that it does a disservice to the heated atmosphere common to the political climate of the seventies. Budget strategies that logically flow from basic, alternative assumptions about the role of government are not packaged as such. No contrast is made between an economic conservative approach to national priorities, favoring greater individual choice relative to government dictation, and the so-called liberal approach, advocating the need and desirability for active government in specific areas. In this sense the book is too restricted to the issues of the day to be of lasting value, for it fails to wrestle with the fundamental ideological problems of who gets what, when, and how—basic values that really *mold* national priorities over time.

Likewise, the two chapters on defense are at one and the same time very

useful overviews but relatively disappointing analyses. There is a serious lack of new insight as to how a given defense budget should be parceled out: among the respective services, between investment and operations, and among the forces designed and configured for particular scenarios and regions of the world. Nor is there any substantive discussion of alternative strategies together with their overall budget levels and associated risks. These chapters, however, do an excellent job of outlining the former administration's perspective and rationale as reflected in the defense program proposed for 1975. This alone is very useful inasmuch as 1975 represents a significant turning point, given "the administration's concern that long-term (downward) trends in the U.S. defense posture were conveying the wrong signals to the Soviet Union and the U.S. allies alike."

Perhaps one of the most important points made by the authors is the significant improvement in near-term fiscal flexibility. For the past several years, the margin between revenues and outlays, excluding any new initiatives, projected 2 or 3 years ahead posed severe constraints on what actions could be taken in any given budget year. For example, in drawing up the previous 1974 budget, the administration was confronted with unacceptable full employment budget deficits of $21 billion and $19 billion in 1975 and 1976, respectively. Little, if any, unclaimed revenue was believed to be available until 1977-78, and then only after making drastic cutbacks in ongoing programs and previously planned initiatives in the 1973-74 budget. In preparing the 1975 budget just a year later, however, the administration faced full employment budget surpluses of $15 billion and $26 billion in 1976 and 1977, respectively. Ironically, this dramatic turnaround stems largely from greater-than-anticipated inflation, "because revenues respond more sensitively to inflation than expenditures." Long-term program initiatives now appear possible, with defense being a possible beneficiary. Many of these initiatives are reflected in budget authority increases requested in 1975. However, the authors conclude with an appropriate note of caution that potential claims and contingencies exceed projected unclaimed revenues, so the perennial problem of allocating limited resources remains. And whatever choices are made should not be made in isolation and should take long-term implications into account.

It is unfortunate that this book, written this past spring, has been overtaken by events to the extent that it fails to put the budget into the context of the economic malaise now confounding the public only a half-year later. For example, if sizable full employment budget surpluses are "just around the corner," are the cutbacks in excess of $5 billion sought by the Ford administration prudent or necessary, and what criteria should be applied to evaluate where the cuts should be made? Some relevant data and interpretations are to be found in the book; yet, such questions baffle the experts, much less the laymen. Thus, the answers to these knotty problems are far from apparent, even after reading this book.

As the fifth in a series, it is inevitable that comparisons be made between this volume and its predecessors. Most noticeably absent is the creator of this series, the chief author and editor of previous editions, Charles L. Schultze. He and his former collaborators were consulted during the preparation of this book, but they have left "big shoes" which the current authors, to their credit, have done an admirable job of filling.

Together, the five volumes of *Setting National Priorities* provide highly useful insight into that portion of our national drama which is played out on the budgetary stage. The changing problems

and issues, objectives and values, stakes and risks, and opportunities and expectations all are there. Only the personalities of the major players are left to be filled in. If you want to get a better understanding of how we got to where we are in terms of national priorities in 1975, reviewing the 1974 edition alone, or these five volumes together, is well worthwhile—for the expert as well as the layman. After all, money is policy.

CHARLES P. SHIRKEY
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Naval War College

Ψ

Davidson, Eugene. *The Nuremberg Fallacy*. New York: Macmillan, 1973. 331p.

In a well researched and eminently readable book, Eugene Davidson examines the significance of the Nuremberg doctrines in the context of four regions. The Sinai, Indochina, Eastern Europe, and once French Algeria provide separate case studies where the durability and value of the Nuremberg principles are observed in dynamic situations.

Davidson advances the theory that a world conflagration has been avoided not because of, but in spite of, the doctrines and purpose of Nuremberg. Indeed, the dissections of the subject regional conflicts appear supportive of the maxim that powerful states will exert their strength whenever they so desire, once potential gains and risks are weighed. In essence, the argument of Davidson centers on the classic confrontation between situational ethics in world politics and an attempt to find a traditional statement of an absolute and recognized morality. At issue is whether a judicial body can project its influence and control in the arena of international affairs.

The initial goal of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the subsequent convention was to articulate a universal morality agreed upon by all the nations of the world society. The variety of past prohibitions which stigmatized war crimes in general were supplemented by new canons denouncing crimes against humanity and the waging of aggressive war. The criticism of the effort, however, was twofold in nature. Not only were the rules of Nuremberg too broad to possess functional merit, but the drafters condemned various acts in an atmosphere of idealism alien to the current theories of Realpolitik.

Perhaps the most unique and impressive aspect of Davidson's work is the effort to remove the Nuremberg thesis from the grasp of the political and legal theorists. Once observed in the context of actual political and armed conflicts in any of the four focal areas, one can better grasp not only the theory of public international law but its applicability and relevancy to the world order. It cannot be stated that cruelty in war has proportionately appreciated from the Mideast hostilities of 1948 to the mire of Indochina in 1974. Yet, as ideologies and weapons become increasingly depersonalized, there developed a certain ability to ignore the traditional rules of warfare. Where combatants once generally agreed upon certain common attitudes toward noncombatants and recognized standards of conduct during war, emerging ideologies which employed war as a political expedient have negated the value of the individual. Warfare abandoned the isolated field of battle to intrude among civilian population centers, and the destruction of nationalities, or even races, by weapons which killed without selectivity resulted in the "enemy" as being a collective term rather than a concept involving individual soldiers or leaders. Thus, from recent conflicts there has emerged a standard and tactic entirely alien to anything contemplated at Nuremberg and previous conventions—a perverse concept where all members of a society share the same risks with terrible results.

The realities may dictate that global

tranquility will be maintained by balanced weaponry rather than pronouncements of collective security and universal order. If this is true, armed involvement could be managed more effectively in terms more germane to the specific conditions of a region than general statements offered at international forums. Clearly, any path to a restoration of an ethic of warfare will result only from the input of self-interest for a particular nation rather than subscription to an idealized goal. And naturally, the question which remains is whether an appropriate forum does exist to assemble and project a realistic code of conduct universally acceptable in war.

In view of the involvement in Vietnam and current efforts to remodel the rules of land warfare, *The Nuremberg Fallacy* assumes a degree of relevancy to military professionals once reserved for studies of tactics and armaments. It provides an excellent and fascinating premise, not only to rebut rudimentary concepts in another environment, but also to establish a perspective for modernized and simplified rules of conduct in war. If the only value of the book is to raise the consciousness of the reader to reply and argue, it has served its purpose in an area currently in revision.

DAVID W. ELBAOR
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Ψ

MccGwire, Michael, ed. *Soviet Naval Developments Capability and Context.* New York: Praeger, 1973. 467p.

In 2 years Dalhousie University at Halifax has earned an enviable reputation for sponsoring what has developed into an annual seminar on Soviet naval developments. This collection of essays is the product of the first such seminar in 1972. The impressive caliber of the participants is matched by the caliber of their contributions.

The seminar sought first to identify current trends in Soviet naval developments and then to establish a reasonably solid frame of reference in which to evaluate them. Even though the contributors disagreed in many respects, there was a fair measure of consensus on the nature of Soviet foreign policy and on Soviet attitudes toward war, peace, deterrence, and the uses of military power and force.

MccGwire succinctly points out that the body of opinion can be divided into two distinct schools. The first school focuses on theater level planning. For this reason it must be primarily concerned with the capabilities of the Soviet maritime forces and on Western vulnerabilities. For contingency planning, this school must deal with the most dangerous rather than the most likely course of action.

The second school MccGwire describes concentrates on the politico-strategic level. It is concerned with the main currents of Soviet naval policy and seeks to assess Soviet capacity to meet a maritime threat to the Soviet Union. It highlights Soviet vulnerabilities. For this reason, it seeks to identify the nature of Soviet intentions and the most likely course of Soviet action. Obviously, the two schools operate on significantly different planes, and in making any analysis or assessment, it is crucially important to keep in mind the distinction between them.

The individual essays in this volume are conveniently and logically arranged under general headings dealing with the background of Soviet maritime interests, specific data, Soviet naval developments, and deployments to the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, and the Caribbean. This arrangement will be of great help to the general reader as well as to the specialist who seeks more detailed information and analysis.

Among the many themes running through this collection, perhaps the most important is that which

emphasizes the highly political nature in the use of Soviet maritime forces. This emphasis on politics has its origin in the ideological perceptions of Marxism-Leninism and in many respects is very different from the Western perceptions, articulated by Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett.

Even though *Soviet Naval Developments* raises more questions than it answers, MccGwire states the question that must be addressed in the immediate future: "Having been drawn forward in strategic defense, the Soviet Union is now in a position to use her warships to the West's discomfiture, and to promote her own interests in these distant areas. But, except where the security of the homeland is threatened, Soviet maritime policy continues to be more concerned with the political advantages that can be gained from the *use* of the sea than from the use of force at sea."

This thesis can and should be debated.

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Ψ

Venter, Al J. *Portugal's Guerrilla War: the Campaign for Africa*. Capetown: John Malherbe, 1973. 220p.

For those whose interests span both the political and military, Al Venter has written a book both challenging and absorbing, reminiscent of the late Dr. Bernard Fall's *Street Without Joy* for its richness of detail and description. A well-known South African journalist with ties to both NBC news and the *International Defense Review*, Mr. Venter's knowledge of military and paramilitary skills is clearly evident in a book dealing specifically with insurgency and counterinsurgency in Guinea (Bissau). There are also occasional and insightful comparisons to campaigns in Mozambique and Angola, with fleeting references to irregular warfare in Rhodesia and South-West Africa (Namibia).

Deftly establishing the sense of excitement, fear, and ennui experienced by the Portuguese Armed Forces, Venter describes not only the basic operations of the army, air force, and marines (riverine patrols), but the troublesome issue of the use of NATO weapons by the Portuguese as well. The weaponry used in the campaign is a topic that interests the author, and he provides a lucid account of armaments used by both combatants. He notes that the utilization of medium-range artillery by the FARP (the acronym for the People's Revolutionary Armed Forces) from bases in Guinea (Conakry) and Senegal suggests a level of operations advancing toward the "setpiece battle" scenario found in guerrilla manuals.

Mr. Venter was granted an interview with the then commander of the Portuguese defense forces in Guinea (Bissau), Gen. Antonio de Spinola, who later was the energizing force behind the 1974 coup in Lisbon. The interview, however, published in an appendix along with written answers to the author's supplementary written questions, is plagued by language and translation problems and detracts from, rather than adds to, the quality of the book. It would have been more useful if the Portuguese had supplied Mr. Venter with articles about the theory and practice of guerrilla warfare in Guinea (Bissau) published in Portuguese military and political journals. Such an approach would have allowed the author to trace the evolution of Portuguese counterinsurgency doctrine in the 1960's and 1970's and perhaps to have compared it with trends in official French military circles with respect to the conflicts in Indochina and Algeria. Indeed, the overall comparative utility of the book is marred by the absence of an index, a paucity of footnotes, and a bibliography satisfactory only for the general public and beginning students of guerrilla warfare and African affairs.

The author has included an insightful

chapter on the history, organizational and military capabilities of Portugal's foes, the African Independence Party of Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands (PAIGC). Data on the leadership of the party was greatly enhanced by an interview with the since assassinated leader of that organization, Dr. Amilcar Cabral. Venter had the party's manifesto reprinted in the appendix, but unfortunately he did not provide any date of publication for the manifesto. Hence, one is unable to ascertain whether the PAIGC has changed any of its doctrines and, if so, to what extent.

Overall, Mr. Venter has written a lively, compelling, and fresh account of contemporary insurgency and counter-insurgency in a part of the world which has ramifications far beyond those on the various belligerents, an account valuable to anyone who wants to establish what the Germans call a "fingertip feeling" about the war. This volume is principally a work of description and only secondarily one of analysis. As such it should be read with care by those in the academic and military communities who are concerned with the human, psychological, political, and economic costs and burdens borne by both combatants in the decade-long war.

RICHARD DALE
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CORRESPONDENCE COURSE INFORMATION

Professional growth is the hallmark of a professional, and for the naval officer the Naval War College represents the apex in formal career development. Although not every naval officer has the opportunity to attend the Naval War College's resident program, all have the opportunity to become involved in the resident curriculum through correspondence courses—courses that have been designed to assist in the development of the naval leaders of the coming decade. This program will provide professional enrichment and a new perspective that will serve both the student and the naval service.

Correspondence courses are recognized as enhancing a naval officer's career as evidenced by the following quotation from the March 1974 Officer Personnel Newsletter (NAVPERS 15892):

> Reporting seniors are encouraged to document, in the comments section of fitness reports, individual efforts at self-improvement. Such documentation should include correspondence courses from various service colleges; . . . This information is important to Navy Department personnel managers and is often an item of consideration by selection boards.

ELIGIBILITY AND APPLICATIONS. Naval War College correspondence courses are available to all commissioned officers of the U.S. military services in active service or in the inactive Reserve. Selected Government employees of the grade GS-10 (or equivalent) and above may also enroll. Waivers may be granted for qualified individuals in lower grades. Applications from active and inactive commissioned officers may be by the application card provided in the *Naval War College Review* and in brochures, or by letter. Applications from personnel requiring waivers should be by letter via commanding officer or command maintaining service record.

LEVEL OF STUDY. Courses are graduate level and require creative work. Students should plan to spend at least 5 hours a week in study and to press forward consistently to sustain the benefit of each study lesson.

Letters of completion are issued for each course; copies are sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel or other appropriate authority for the student's selection jacket. Certificates are issued upon successful completion of all courses in a subject area, and the Naval War College Correspondence Course Diploma is awarded when the entire course is completed.

CURRENT PROGRAM. The resident curricula for the Colleges of Naval Warfare and Naval Command and Staff are oriented to place maximum emphasis upon the three core subjects of strategy, management, and tactics. In order to accomplish the Naval War College mission, "to enhance the professional capabilities of its students to make sound decisions in both command and management positions" each of these core subjects is aimed toward expanding the student's logical reasoning capability and ability to analyze the elements of choice rather than in familiarization with straight factual material.

COURSE DESCRIPTIONS. The Center for Continuing Education parallels resident courses by offering a one-diploma Naval War College correspondence curriculum of approximately 1,000 hours of study. This program is organized as follows:

(1) 300 Hours Strategy and Policy
(2) 300 Hours Defense Economics and Decisionmaking (Management)
(3) 300 Hours Naval Tactics
(4) 100 Hours Discretionary—to be creditable from International Law courses, previous NWC correspondence course work completed, or as chosen from other NWC correspondence courses that may be available in the future.

Although students are not obligated to pursue this entire diploma program through to completion, they are encouraged to give the matter serious consideration. The purpose of both the resident curricula and this program is to enhance the professional capabilities of students to make sound decisions in both command and management positions. Therefore, even for those officers who may eventually be selected for Naval War College resident instruction, this complete diploma program provides an outstanding opportunity for further career and professional development. Completion of the correspondence course does not preclude assignment to the NWC resident course. Students may enroll in only one course at a time.

STRATEGY AND POLICY[1]

The overall objective of these seven courses is to provide students with the opportunity to probe into strategic problems in sufficient depth to understand the complexities of the issues and factors relevant to decisions. Estimated hours of study and retirement point credits for those Reserve officers not on active duty are also shown. A total of 300 hours and 100 Reserve points is involved.

Course S 11 The Sovereign State: Early Strategy and Policy Considerations (36 hours/12 points)

This course deals with the Peloponnesian War between Greek city-states in the fifth century B.C. The basic text is by Thucydides, one of the most noted of all historians. The book is important in that it contains many of the great issues with which mankind has been grappling since its beginning—the nature of man, the nature of power, what is right, what is wrong, what is justice, and what are the causes of war. This particular historical period serves as the first of six such case studies that will be dealt with in the subject area of Strategy and Policy. The reader will undoubtedly associate the issues and problems faced to situations confronting various 20th-century leaders—whether they be presidents, prime ministers, diplomats, admirals, generals, or others possessing significant governmental authority.

Course S 12 The Strategy of Total War: Napoleon and Clausewitz (42 hours/14 points)

This course principally concerns the impact of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars on the evolution of modern warfare and strategic thought—particularly as reflected in the writings of Gen. Karl von Clausewitz.

[1] All courses are prerequisites to those that follow, except that only Course S 11 is a prerequisite for S 17.

Course S 13 The Strategy of Limited War and Alliance Politics: Otto von Bismarck (42 hours/14 points)

This course takes up the relationship between strategy and foreign policy. Using Bismarck's remarkable successes as an illustration, the course probes the use of war as an instrument of national policy and the use of alliance politics to preserve the peace and maintain stability.

Course S 14 The Origins of World War I (42 hours/14 points)

This course will use an investigation of the long-range and immediate origins of World War I to focus on the modern phenomena of armed peace, accidental war, and the escalation of local war. The role of such factors as imperialism, revolutionary nationalism, technological developments and armaments races, and increasingly rigid alliance systems, will all be examined.

Course S 15 The Origins and Strategy of World War II (54 hours/18 points)

This course seeks first to show how Great Britain and France sought security after World War I, especially in the face of the growing military threat of Nazi Germany. In this study, the relationship between the development of new weapons and strategic doctrine on the one hand, and the formulation of defense and foreign policy on the other, is especially important. The course then deals with the principal issues confronting the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union in hammering out a coalition strategy and in agreeing upon the allocation of national resources for the global war against Germany and Japan.

Course S 16 Containment and the Cold War (42 hours/14 points)

This course examines the difficulty in reordering the international political structure after a total war fought with unlimited means for unconditional ends. The collapse of the wartime Grand Alliance and the confrontation of the United States and the Soviet Union as postwar superpowers combined to produce a situation in some respects unprecedented in international politics.

Course S 17 The Military Profession (42 hours/14 points)

This course examines the role of the military profession in modern American society. Special attention is directed toward the military's relationship with civil authority, the military response to technological and social change, and to the tensions that may develop between traditional military values and the changing role and requirements placed upon the professional officer today.

DEFENSE ECONOMICS AND DECISIONMAKING[2]

The Defense Economics and Decisionmaking area emphasizes the problems associated with translating national strategic goals into force levels and the required specific weapons systems. Estimated hours of study and retirement point credits for Reserve officers not on active duty are also shown. A total of 300 hours and 100 reserve points is involved in this subject.

[2]All courses are prerequisites to those that follow except that M 22 and M 23 may be reversed in order.

Course M 21 National Resource Allocation (60 hours/20 points)

This course addresses the environment within which priorities—and ultimately, national strategies—are made and resources allocated at the national and Department of Defense levels. The focus of this course is on those interests and constraints which have the greatest impact on the range of options and particularly on national defense strategies and budgets.

Course M 22 Decisionmaking in Organizations (60 hours/20 points)

This course focuses on relationships among people in organizations and on the nature of decisionmaking, especially as related to defense matters. The course covers human values and perceptions, group and individual interaction, and the interrelationships of organizational systems and subsystems. Organizational models for decisionmaking are introduced, and their explanatory and predictive values analyzed.

Course M 23 Quantitative Factors in Defense Decisions (60 hours/20 points)

The course focuses upon the disciplines of microeconomics and decisionmaking under uncertainty to develop the theoretical bases for analysis and examines various tools (e.g., optimization and estimation) useful in the implementations of this theory. These topics are examined on both a theoretical and applications basis. Theoretical developments are included to provide general knowledge of the techniques and to examine the philosophic insights into decisionmaking that they provide, as well as to develop a basis for evaluating any specific application of the technique. Applications are examined in order to further study the usefulness of the theoretical technique, to examine the problems that arise when an analyst attempts to develop an analytic model of a large problem, and to develop the manager's ability to extract from an analytic report useful decisionmaking information.

Course M 24 Analysis of Defense Decisions—I (60 hours/20 points)

This course will focus on systems analysis as a process (i.e., an organized, rational approach that helps the manager to relate all the important factors in a situation requiring a decision) that may be applied to a varied number of decisionmaking situations. The structure of systems analysis, as discussed in the Quade and Boucher textbook, aids the decisionmaker in structuring his investigation of the factors relating to the decisionmaking situation.

Course M 25 Analysis of Defense Decisions—II (60 hours/20 points)

This course focuses on the DOD Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS) and the use of analysis in management problem-solving situations. The course covers the PPBS structure and a review of the use of systems analysis by the Department of Defense as a management tool in the decisionmaking process.

NAVAL TACTICS[3]

The Naval Tactics subject area is designed to expand the student's understanding of how tactics are developed and implemented in support of naval missions. It teaches the use of fundamental principles for the employment of weapon systems which have applicability to present as well as future naval operations. Estimated

[3]All courses are prerequisites for those that follow with the exception that T 32 and T 35 may be taken at any time.

hours of study and retirement point credits for Reserve officers not on active duty are also shown. A total of 300 hours and 100 points is included in this subject.

Course T 31 Fundamentals and Engagement Analysis (60 hours/20 points)

Through the use of selected readings, written work, and problem solving, the student examines the fundamental parameters of sensors, weapons, and sea and aerospace platforms. The impact these fundamentals have on tactics is analyzed through simplified tactical engagements.

Course T 32 Military Planning Process (60 hours/20 points)

Through the use of selected readings, a programed text, and written work, the student will examine problem-solving techniques as applied to military planning. Emphasis is placed on the "Commander's Estimate of the Situation." The student will use the military planning process format to solve a hypothetical military problem.

Course T 33 Sea Control (60 hours/20 points)

Through the use of essays and a practical scenario, this course examines the Navy's mission area of Sea Control. The problems of the sortie, rendezvous and ocean transit of a carrier task force, and the employment of weapon platforms and sensors are studied along with the tactical decisions required to protect this force at sea in a multithreat environment.

Course T 34 Projection (60 hours/20 points)

Through the use of essays and a practical scenario, this course examines the Navy's mission of projection of naval power ashore through the use of amphibious operations and employment of naval air, the relationship between Sea Control and Power Projection, the effectiveness of tactical air strikes as a conventional deterrent, and the legal and moral implications of civilian casualties resulting from the use of airpower.

Course T 35 Presence and Nuclear Deterrence (60 hours/20 points)

Through the use of essays the presence section of this course identifies the operative factors in a politico-military diplomatic operation, compares and contrasts various tactics employed in naval presence, and evaluates the use of naval forces in a presence role in international crisis situations. The nuclear deterrence section utilizes essays to identify past and present U.S. nuclear deterrent policies, the contribution of the elements of the TRIAD toward deterrence, and the progress of the Strategic Arms Limitations negotiations.

INTERNATIONAL LAW[4]

The International Law subject area aims at enhancing the military officer's capability to make sound decisions involving the application of international legal principles. They may also be credited toward completion of the 100-hour discretionary portion of the 1,000-hour diploma program or may be pursued separately without regard to attainment of the diploma. Estimated hours of study and retirement point credits for Reserve officers not on active duty are also shown. A total of 144 hours and 48 retirement points is represented in this subject.

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[4]All courses are prerequisites to those that follow.

Course L 51 Fundamental Concepts in International Law (60 hours/20 points)

An introduction to basic international legal principles, the role of the United Nations Charter in controlling the use of force, and selected instances of recent resorts to force.

Course L 52 Jurisdictional Concepts of International Law (42 hours/14 points)

The course focuses on selected areas where states may claim competing rights with respect to use of the high seas, airspace and outer space, and visits by forces of one state in the territory of another.

Course L 53 The Laws of War (42 hours/14 points)

An introduction to the basic principles controlling the conduct of force in wartime, with emphasis on the application of the principles to selected factual instances involving land, sea, and air warfare.

Course	Title	Hours	Points
S 11	The Sovereign State	36	12
S 12	The Strategy of Total War	42	14
S 13	The Strategy of Limited War and Alliance Politics	42	14
S 14	The Origins of World War I	42	14
S 15	The Origins and Strategy of World War II	54	18
S 16	Containment and the Cold War	42	14
S 17	The Military Profession	42	14
	Totals	300	100
M 21	National Resource Allocation	60	20
M 22	Decisionmaking in Organizations	60	20
M 23	Quantitative Factors	60	20
M 24	Analysis of Defense Decisions–I	60	20
M 25	Analysis of Defense Decisions–II	60	20
	Totals	300	100
T 31	Fundamentals and Engagement Analysis	60	20
T 32	Military Planning Process	60	20
T 33	Sea Control	60	20
T 34	Projection	60	20
T 35	Presence and Nuclear Deterrence	60	20
	Totals	300	100
L 51	Fundamental Concepts in International Law	60	20
L 52	Jurisdictional Concepts in International Law	42	14
L 53	Laws of War	42	14

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