

1973

## Codeword Barbarossa

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Barton Whaley

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survive the war in their own small part of the world. And survive they did; although for nearly a year it was a moot issue. A main force VC battalion did finally succeed in wiping out nearly all the marine squad and their PF's in one night-long battle. That the surviving marines refused to leave Binh Nghia and stayed to reform their CAP may well have been the deciding factor in the continuing existence of the village under Government control. The next attempt to overrun Binh Nghia was repulsed almost before it got under way. From then on, combat operations diminished steadily as the VC avoided contacts. Binh Nghia slowly began to look like a village removed from the war. Inevitably, it was declared to be "secure," and the marine element of the CAP was redeployed to start over again in another village.

Binh Nghia was a microcosm of village life in Vietnam during a period of constant war, but it was not a microcosm of the war itself. Bing West has fortunately avoided the pitfall of generalizing from this one experience. Both the experimental nature of the operation and the proximity of marine forces and a major headquarters made it something of a showcase. The CAP concept soon spread, however, to become a significant operational effort in the III MAF area, with more than 100 villages hosting the marine squads. A specialized school was started in Danang for prospective CAP marines, and operations were hierarchically organized with higher headquarters located at district and province towns. Continued success in the hamlets, however, did not necessarily follow the precedent set at Binh Nghia.

*The Village* is strongly recommended not only for the professional military reader but for anyone who enjoys a well written combat narrative and a glimpse into the grassroots life of the Vietnamese themselves as they struggle for

survival. One caution to the reader: start the book early in the evening.

L.W. JACKLEY  
Colonel, U.S. Army

Whaley, Barton. *Codeword Barbarossa*.

Cambridge: MIT Press, 1973. 376p.


"Modern historiography," we are told by Russian activist R.G. Colodny, "has tended to overlook the role of police and intelligence sources in the great social movements of history." Not so in this remarkable primer on intelligence and cover and deception operations. The war is a familiar one—World War II—the invasion of the Soviet Union by Nazi Germany. This impressive re-counting of intelligence and counter-intelligence maneuvers across the chancellories and high commands of Europe (and the United States) reads like a mystery story, as, at one level, it is. For here codified in English for the first time is the documented case study of strategic surprise, one practiced by Hitler upon Stalin culminating in the fateful attack of 22 June 1941. The research, analysis, and painstaking intelligence work exhibited in this work should warm the hearts of intelligence officers the world over. What Professor Whaley discovers is a massive failure in Allied intelligence analysis despite 84 warnings of the coming invasion coupled with clever German deception operations and an unbelievable, cumbersome Soviet military and political bureaucracy which, despite early warnings (consistently misread) and later acceptance of the imminence of war, did nothing to counter the initial "surprise" assault. It would be difficult to underestimate the value of the research put into this book. His building of a critique of "strategic surprise" challenges Roberta Wohlstetter's brilliant model of surprise based on the Pearl Harbor Japanese operation. It deals with the famous five options open to Hitler

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in his dealings with Stalin: Offensive War, Ultimatums, Bluff, Contingency or Defensive War, Preventive War. Whaley takes the reader through this puzzling maze in the most sprightly fashion, suggesting that Stalin relied on an ultimatum before war, while the United States surprisingly early in 1941 reached a tentative conclusion that unilateral

war would be Hitler's instrument. And so it went—an analyst's nightmare brilliantly reconstructed and documented. Rarely has a professional text reached the level of a John de Carre novel.

Robert F. Delaney  
Forrest Sherman Chair of Public  
Diplomacy



Many a man lives a burden to the earth; but a good book is the precious lifeblood of a master spirit, imbalmed and treasured up on purpose to a life beyond life.

*John Milton: Areopagitica*