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The much debated subjects of zero draft and the all-volunteer force have become reality for America's Military Establishment in the 1970's. Despite the undeniable public support voiced for an end to the draft, the long-term cultural, political, and strategic implications of this course have largely been overlooked. Historical experience, both in the United States and in Western Europe, suggests that an all-volunteer force may not only lack the popular support needed if it is to be truly effective in the field but also indicates the possibility that it might become an alienated, isolated force threatening to upset America's tradition of a people-based, apolitical military controlled by civilians.

HISTORY AND CULTURE: SOME THOUGHTS ON THE UNITED STATES ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

A research paper

prepared by

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On Saturday, 27 January 1973, U.S. Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird announced the end of the military draft. His announcement came 5 months ahead of President Nixon's goal of switching to an all-volunteer armed force in the United States. With this act it seems that the "mass army" has come to an end in America. Secretary Laird stated in the announcement, which received relatively little attention in the midst of the clamor of the Vietnam peace agreement: "With the signing of the peace agreement in Paris today, and after receiving a report from the Secretary of the Army that he foresees no need for further inductions, I wish to inform you that the [U.S.] armed forces henceforth will depend exclusively on volunteer soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines. The use of the draft has ended."

Although the draft law is due to expire in July 1973, the Nixon administration has plans to ask Congress to keep the draft legislation on a standby basis for possible national emergencies. At the same time, the Pentagon has set a policy which calls for using the National Guard and Reserves first in future emergencies.¹ It might be well to remember that the last time the United States was without a military draft was in the late 1940's when President Truman allowed selective service to lapse in 1947 and most of 1948. At the time it was soon found that the military services, though sharply reduced after World War II, could not get enough volunteers. Once again the United States has reached the point where neither public opinion nor budgetary constraints allow the Nation to maintain a drafted mass army. Is it, this time, really the end of an American

armed force that traditionally, through the draft, evolved over the decades into a truly heterogeneous force representing the broadest cultural, social, and psychological spectrum of American society? The issue confronting us in a sociocultural context is relatively simple: Must an armed force today be reasonably in tune with the values, world view, and ethos of the society it represents and for whose protection and defense it is said to exist? Can a modern nation-state with the complexity, the size, and international commitments like the United States exist without a mass army and rely primarily on an all-volunteer force (AVF)?

The Past. Clausewitz in *On War* described what he understood to be the revolution in warfare which had taken place in his own lifetime. While earlier wars had always been primarily wars of kings and not clashes of peoples or nations, the politics of the Napoleonic era had changed all that. National existence was not at stake in the wars of the early 18th century. War was for the conquest of a city or a province or two, but it did not generally involve threats to the existence of a kingdom or empire. The issues underlying wars in the 18th century for the most part were separated from the interests, values, and culture of the middle and lower classes. These wars of the past were what we now call "limited wars," inasmuch as they were limited in objectives and ethos. After 1789 the ideology of war changed. With Napoleon and the French Revolution, ideologies and values of the people who fought in wars changed. The change was not as sudden as the event of the Revolution itself, but the Revolution and the new ideas it embodied accelerated change in European thought in the field of warfare too. The rationale for war, its objectives, and values all came to be seen in a different light, and while the first steps in this process of change began somewhat earlier, by the

end of the 18th century a new form of warfare had emerged on the scene. Clausewitz perceived correctly that although the armies of his day were very much alike in training, discipline, and equipment, an infusion of a national spirit came to mean that henceforth kings were no longer fighting other kings but rather nationals of one state were fighting nationals of another state for survival.² In this new era of mass armies, the objectives and the strategy, as well as the tactics, were to become increasingly influenced by the values and the "Volksgeist" of a whole nation.

Clausewitz when speaking of "The Chief Moral Powers in War" stated that they consisted of the talents of the commander, the military virtue of the army; its national feeling.³ He even remarked that "hence it cannot be denied that, as matters now stand, greater scope is afforded for the influence of National spirit and habituation of any Army to War. A long peace may again alter all this."⁴

"The national spirit of an Army [enthusiasm, fanatical zeal, faith, opinion] displays itself most in mountain warfare, where every one down to the common soldier is left to himself."⁵

Perhaps Clausewitz, the Prussian, did not know all there is about mountain warfare, but his point about the importance of national spirit is well taken. What was revolutionary in the wars of that time was not so much change in weaponry and tactics as a change in values and conception about war and warfare. Now emerged "nations in arms"—armies grew in size, and new national objectives provided the *raison d'être* for conflicts.

In emphasizing these changes in values, we should hasten to add that patriotism and mass conscription of such "patriots" into armies had not been unknown before 1789. Far from it. Guibert, the French military reformer had argued earlier in favor of universal military service and training

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based on "national characteristics."⁶ Rousseau had claimed that only a national militia in which every citizen would serve as a soldier would provide a force equal to the task of defending a free nation. Then, as now, intellectuals argued over what forces should or could best defend "free societies."

The French Revolution not only provided slogans for many political reformers, but it also proved that political revolution could make military revolution possible. New armies motivated to fight by new values and ideals were to come. In 1789 "les cahiers de doléances" called for the abolition of provincial militias since political reforms would render these forces unnecessary.⁷ The Royal Army of France was gradually dismantled, and for a time no other force took its place. Under the monarchy before the Revolution, France, like the other European nations, relied principally on noblemen to officer the Royal Army. In essence until then European armies usually represented two classes with the officers coming from the nobility and the enlisted men from the lower classes. The middle class and emerging middle-class values were almost never part of any military establishments before 1789. Now suddenly, two-thirds of the Royal French officers were lost with the fall of the Bastille. The organization of the National Guards and the new military constitution of 1790, which made all citizens eligible for every military rank, signaled that a new era had begun in warfare. Loyalty was no longer sworn to a monarch, but loyalty to a state and a constitution became the cornerstone values for a "new" French soldier. In 1789 Dubois-Crancé had pleaded for a short-term universal service combined with a small regular army. But the French Constituent Assembly then, as the U.S. Congress in 1791, opted for voluntary enlistments for pay. However, soon after 1789, when the national objectives

of getting an "all-volunteer force." Departments and districts were allocated quotas, and when these quotas could not be filled on a voluntary basis, a lottery system for unmarried males between the ages of 18 and 40 was introduced. Recruiting-Commissioners were sent out into the provinces to emphasize to Frenchmen that the "Army wanted to join them."⁸ The all-volunteer—or in this case simply a volunteer-system, even at the height of revolutionary fervor and zeal, had largely failed. Even under one of the most effective revolutionary systems, in which many citizens identified their own values with those of the revolutionary state, a voluntary system failed when the need for any sizable force became necessary. A glance at Mao's system of recruitment to the 8th Route Army in China in the 1930's provides one with a similar example. There, as in revolutionary 1790 France, an "all-volunteer force" was not realized, greatly desired as it was by both the people and the leader(s). By August 1793, when France needed some 543 new battalions, it became necessary to raise them by conscription: "All Frenchmen are called by their country to defend liberty." So were all Chinese called upon "to repel the invader—Japan" by Mao and Chiang after Sian, in December 1937. By 1793 the *levée en masse*, which was to dominate recruitment practices until the 1960's throughout the world, became a reality. The proclamation of a modern nation in arms became a fact. Identification with the values of the French Revolutionary, joined with conscription, did swell the ranks of the French forces so that by the spring of 1794 France had about 750,000 men under arms.

By 1802, under Napoleon, local draft boards were established, but only 3 years later they were found to be swayed too much by local values and local conditions and were deprived of all responsibilities. A lottery system was

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introduced to select those from lists who would serve their country.⁹ Nevertheless, even when *égalité* still embodied a considerable romantic revolutionary value in many a Frenchman, this revolutionary principle soon became abused in terms of military service. No matter how impartial this original selection was, it soon worked against the poor and operated in favor of the rich and powerful. Even in revolutionary France of the 1790's and early 1800's, it appears that revolutionary values were essentially defended by the poor who acted for and under the command of a revolutionary elite. Not even Napoleon at the height of his control over revolutionary France was successful in controlling or eliminating corruption.¹⁰ The American all-volunteer force today proclaims, as did Napoleon's army then, "la carrière on veste aux talents." Napoleon was initially successful in shaping a truly remarkable armed forces because it was indeed possible for a Frenchman of the time—possessing the brains, physical stamina, and the motivation by revolutionary values—to rise from the lowest to the highest rank. Napoleon's armies were essentially fighting armies; prowess in battle rather than birth or intellectual qualities led to promotion; fighting qualities most often determined the choice between those who succeeded and those who failed. As Napoleon's conflicts grew in complexity and in force requirements, so did the difficulties in finding suitable volunteers or draftees to bring to all of Europe the blessings of the French Revolution. As force requirements climbed, the values which had so passionately and effectively supported the Revolution in its early stages, and made truly spectacular military achievements possible, declined. By 1813, in a desperate attempt to offset the losses suffered in Russia, the class of 1815, although legally too young for service, was called to serve. Many of Napoleon's strongest supporters tried to dissuade the Emperor

as did the French public which had lost much of its revolutionary fervor by then, from reintroducing conscription during the critical days of 1815. Twenty-six years after the Revolution the values of those who were to fight for it all over Europe had obviously changed. When the values of a society no longer support its armed forces, the armed forces seem to become soon isolated, unpopular, and ineffective.

The missionary revolutionary zeal that had made the French Army the single most powerful force on the Continent was gone. So it went in France, and so it was to happen in Prussia where in this period the process of social emancipation was accompanied by military conscription of national manpower. Liberation of Prussia demanded a national "people's army." As in France, political emancipation and military conscription were to become the twin pillars of a modern nation in arms.

Not then, and not now, were all concerned convinced of the fundamental strength of a military force based on conscription, but such a force perhaps best embodies the values and ideals of all social classes of a modern nation-state. Frederick William III of Prussia saw in a conscript army or in a militia a threat to the efficiency of a professional force and also (and rightly so) a potential threat to royal authority.

In 1807 under Scharnhorst, the sons of commoners could become officers and not only in the despised technical and light troops but in the artillery, engineers, Hussars, and Chasseurs—the barriers of distrust had begun to break down.¹¹ Since commissioned rank no longer depended upon birth but upon the abilities of the individual concerned, it might well have been thought that the old caste feeling would in time give place to a more egalitarian spirit. To generations of middle-class Germans, a commission in the reserve became a symbol of social elevation, and they prized the social status thus conferred

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more highly than any equality of political rights or political power. Indeed, this new bourgeois element introduced new values into the army. Expansionistic ideas, such as the latter-day Pan Germanism, affected the officer corps far less than many foreigners supposed, but insofar as they did so, it was from bourgeois origins that they derived.

By 1813 the *levée en masse* truly had come to Prussia as it had earlier come to revolutionary France; 300,000 men were under arms, a force nearly twice as large as the standing army of Frederick the Great.¹² No longer were Prussia's warriors limited to a special social class.¹³ The time of people's wars had dawned, and the era of "total war" was to appear. Never again, it seemed, would wars be fought by a courageous few for God, King, and country.¹⁴

The generals from Marlborough onward had fought their battles with armies of 50,000-75,000 men. Frederick the Great's battlefield numbers were indeed far smaller than many North Vietnamese Army units in South Vietnam, about 42,000 at Leuthen and Kumersdorf. Napoleon had 50,000 men at Marengo, but for Ulm and Jena in 1806, he maneuvered forces of about 190,000. By 1815 Russia, Prussia, Austria, and England agreed to produce a total of nearly 600,000 men converging on Paris. Mass armies had become the order of the day. True, we do not know all we should about the basic value systems which motivated soldiers to fight for or against Napoleon or for or against Prussia. Nevertheless, it is, reasonable to assume that with the changes after 1789 in the political culture of France and Prussia came a change in value orientation which made the *levée en masse* not only a necessity but which essentially made the modern mass armed forces possible. Without a value system that reinforced and nurtured the national goals of France, Napoleon's early spectacular victories would have been improbable, if not impossible. Un-

popular as universal service might have been even then in France and as it appears currently in the United States, it was the revolutionary value system permeating a whole society that brought about and tolerated mass armies based on a combination of volunteers and draftees. The mass armed force which had its origins in both technological and sociopolitical factors in the 1790's has seemingly come to end by the 1970's.¹⁵

The Present. The value systems of the French and the American Revolutions focusing on a "nation" have been replaced today by a value orientation encompassing the world where mass armies—at least among a majority of "Western" powers—are rendered apparently obsolete by technology and the new "Kissinger balance" of power diplomacy. Is this a fact in the United States or simply an illusion brought about by the muting of nationalism and a certain emphasis of transnationalism? Is it that mass armies and weapon systems employed by them have simply become too costly, or could it be that the values motivating a great many young middle and upper class males all over the globe no longer accept the idea that military service is an essential element of citizenship in a modern world? Does ideology (again, primarily in the West) no longer provide a cause and certain sufficient justification for which one would fight or even die?

The draft in the United States probably never achieved true egalitarianism in distributing the obligation of military service among all social classes and races within the Nation. In the past—and in keeping, at least overtly, with the American liberal ethic—soldiers did not engage in politics or affairs of state. American soldiers, in the past, often saw their role in war as crusaders against wrongs usually brought about by evil foreign and perverted domestic politicians. American soldiers, in the past, had almost always believed that

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they would be asked to fight and to die for causes which were in the society's and thus their own, best interests. Civilian politicians and the public-at-large believed in the past (at least up to World War II) that soldiers should be provided with the best available means to pursue a war with relatively limited civilian meddling in military affairs after appropriations to the military were made. The U.S. soldier, in the past, being drafted from the society-at-large went on his crusades, especially during two World Wars, holding values, or believing that he held such values, similar to those of his Commander in Chief, the President, and the population as a whole. The values of the individual American were then somehow geared to those of the Nation. Middle-class values identified for the G.I. of World Wars I and II the enemy to democracy—their commonly held way of life.

The crusade in France in World War I was a war for most Americans since it was to make the world safe for democracy. Almost all Americans could in fact, "hate" Hitler in Europe and Tojo in the Pacific, and World War II again was a crusade for the Nation. Apparently there existed a considerable homogeneity in the public cultural and political values accepted by a majority of Americans.

Today, however, this homogeneity, if it ever existed to the extent that World War II could be seen by most Americans as "their" war in which they were supported by a commonly held value system, has disappeared. An era of cultural pluralism has seemingly replaced *The American* way of the past. In the past, lower class Americans aspired to middle-class values. Lower class Americans served in the U.S. Armed Forces and achieved a certain success through serving in the military. In times of war, from the Civil War to the Korean conflict, the military became one of the great equalizing forces in American society. By serving in the

military, new immigrants and immigrant sons became not only citizens of a state, but they became Americans. The mid-westerner served with the scion of the "Eastern establishment." The southerner became aware that the Yankee of the North was indeed nearly as "American" as himself. Wars and the military cut across classes and cultural heterogeneity. Today, however, we assume that the individuals in the AVF, particularly the enlisted men and women, will come primarily from the economically less viable classes in society. Before 1940 the Volunteer Army was mostly poor whites and immigrants who enlisted out of lack of opportunity or to learn the language and adjust to "civilian" America. It was the "From Here to Eternity" Army so well represented in James Jones' novel.

The reality of the lower class other America is represented by the homogeneity of the culture of poverty. Degrees of poverty in the lower classes will impose limits on educational achievement and correspondingly limits the psycho-social-educational profile of potential AFV members. A preponderance of individuals, it is assumed, will be coming from a population stratum in the United States where the culture of poverty prevails and thus may establish a number of perimeters on individual achievement, aspirations, and opportunities.

In 1939 the United States had no military alliances and no troops stationed in any foreign country. Except on the high seas and within North America, the country had really no offensive capability at all. The overwhelming sentiment within the country was isolationist. The insignificance of the military was reflected in American foreign policy. Or perhaps, the military was a reflection of U.S. foreign policy. In 1939 the U.S. Army had 185,000 officers and men and an annual budget of less than \$500 million. Troops were scattered, mostly out of sight, from

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society-at-large. Except in Washington, D.C., (where members of the U.S. Armed Forces were mufti to even further reduce the visibility of the military) the American public seldom saw active duty soldiers, sailors, and marines. Officers then were isolated from the mainstream of American life, partly by personal choice, partly because the public wanted nothing to do with them; they were physically, socially, and soon culturally, separated from the society-at-large. The enlisted men of those pre-World War II days were often unmarried, long-serving Regulars who had even less contact with the American public than the officers. America, then, was largely oblivious to conscription as it had been in the 19th century. Young American males knew that only in the event of a true national emergency would they be called to serve with most of their neighbors. The impact of the military on American life was minimal. At the time a very definite theme was incorporated into the value system; namely, Americans on the whole felt little or no need to become involved in foreign wars.

Only one generation later, the armed services were, by any measurement, among the most important of all U.S. national institutions. Mass conscription by the 1960's had been a permanent feature of American life for two decades. Many a young American male had to plan his life around the draft, and a large percentage of young adults had to spend two or more of their productive years in the armed services.

Within two generations the American military had become deeply involved in and had an incalculable impact on every aspect of American life—the economy, the allocation of resources, college and university programs and funding, the black revolution, the environment, basic education, and foreign policy. In but one generation America had incorporated into its value system a very definite military component; however,

this military component did represent primarily majority-held values. Ideologies were to be defended because they had become American ideologies. The Crusade in Europe in World War II was truly a crusade for most Americans. Hitler was such a perfect enemy because he could be hated by almost all Americans. Japan did not just threaten Hawaii, Guam, and Midway, but the Japanese came to be viewed by the majority of Americans as a threat to their way of life, their democracy, and their national independence. When post-World War II Americans wanted to bring the blessings of democracy, capitalism, and stability to the world, it meant that the world would become a reflection of the United States—its values, its democracy, and its technology. Truly, from 1945 through the early 1960's most Americans felt that "their" values were more often than not being represented by Americans in the Armed Forces spread all over the globe.

Although the language, the legal system, and social values of America today are still essentially the offshoots of a belief in personal freedom and Anglo-Saxon culture, American core values have increasingly come to be tempered by other values that are not as Euro-centered as in the past. These other values are American cultural themes that emphasize an international rather than national point of view. Today these are most likely found in the society among the middle and upper classes. An internationalist will most likely come from a university environment more often than he will come from an ethnic ghetto. Yet in the AFV these individuals from the ghetto may have most to gain in an armed force where pay and other incentives rather than the ideology of service have become a major motivation to voluntary enlistment. He or she will come from a lower stratum of society that is today far more urban, far more alienated from the WASP (Catholic) middle-class

American lifestyle, politics, and government. Many of these individuals may well be urbanized, southern, and of various ethnic subcultures. These enlisted men and women will, in the future, most likely be neither farm boys nor immigrants. The values held by the officers of the AVF as well will be different. In a country where values and lifestyles of everyone are no longer based on a strong majority middle-class bias, some individuals in the AVF officer corps may increasingly come to see the Armed Forces as the standard and the preserver of the "true values and ideals" of the whole Nation. And since these "true" values may no longer exclusively represent the values held by a majority of the American society-at-large, an alienated AVF officer corps may well also become a possibility in the near future. We should not overlook that nearly every scenario of a coup d'etat has included such an alienated officer corps, and the attempt invariably comes in the wake of a particularly unsuccessful or frustrating war. As a matter of fact, a military coup from the right as well as a revolution from the left may be seen as kinds of revitalization movements whereby the military as well as a leftist movement attempt to purify a society from "moral and political evils" of the past. Military coup leaders may think of themselves as embodying the "true" traditional values of the past.

The officers of an American AVF may come to feel that since no other institution appears able to effectively deal with threats to the American way of life from within the country, it is up to them to reaffirm the values that have made the United States the greatest Nation on earth. Various subcultures in the United States in this new-found state of cultural-heterogeneity acceptance, on the other hand, may equally come to feel that middle-class American values, used and manipulated by an opportunistic establishment, no longer

represented their own aspirations and thus were neither worth fighting for nor dying for.

In an era of cultural plurality where various ethnic groups see their strength in fighting the establishment, it is hard to imagine that an all-volunteer force composed of enlisted personnel of these subcultures and officered by still primarily middle-class individuals could be a truly effective instrument to defend U.S. global commitments. In an age where the white American power elite is seen by some strata of the society as exploitive, aggressive, and imperialist at the expense of nonwhites at home and abroad, it is difficult to believe that such an all-volunteer force will fight well for pay alone.

One could ask if in a society where competition, achievement, and profit go together in business and industry, could an all-volunteer force ever be expected to compete on an equal basis in terms of financial rewards alone? Business and industry in the United States have in the past attracted young men and women for whom making money, lots of money, meant success. Supply and demand of suitable individuals depended often on the well-being of certain industries; will the same process hold true for recruiting the best and the brightest into the all-volunteer force where achievement, promotion, and financial reward are determined by the frequently slow legislative process of the U.S. Congress? In fact, under the present sociocultural conditions prevailing in the United States, no all-volunteer force can probably ever compete with the private industrial sector.

It was Senator Goldwater, a longtime advocate of a strong U.S. military posture, who suggested in 1964 to end the draft in favor of a AVF. It was a Republican U.S. President, who repeatedly had emphasized his commitment to military strength and one who has frequently used this same military strength, that apparently achieved an

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American AVF objective by January 1973. The end of the draft in the United States has motivated other NATO nations, if they have not already done so, to rely heavily, if not exclusively, on AVF's. Thus we seemingly have begun to enter a historical phase with no mass armed forces (with the exception of France) among the major Western powers. Yet there persists a malaise, an ambiguous feeling among many Americans, Asians, and Europeans, that perhaps the AVF in the United States will not be capable of defending U.S. global commitments and/or interests. Some basic arguments have been advanced against a U.S. AVF, namely: (1) there will not be enough volunteers to fill authorized strength levels; (2) an AVF in trying to compete with the civilian U.S. business sector will make such a force too expensive; (3) an AVF in the United States will mean that the U.S. military will become increasingly culturally, socially, and politically separated from the Nation as a whole; (4) the AVF force level and the composition of this force will eventually dictate, determine, or, at best, limit the strategic U.S. objectives on a global scale; (5) since inertia, rather than movement, probably characterizes most legislative bodies, an AVF will have difficulty in gaining drastic funding increases once such a force has been established; (6) as technology progresses and weapon systems continue to escalate in costs, we may find that an AVF will have allocated to it fewer and fewer of these prohibitively expensive new systems; (7) a U.S. AVF would not have a broad political base nor would its members be in relatively frequent contacts with the Congress; and (8) without the broad base of the former (U.S.) mass army, Congressional committees will in the future most likely find their relations to the Armed Forces changed.

These are among some of the most cogent arguments against a U.S. AVF.

While most governments tend to ignore

the value underpinnings of an armed force, perhaps the projected costs for this force may cause at least some American Government leaders to contemplate in a serious and critical manner the broader implications of altering the nature of the Military Establishment. An all-volunteer military in any society, but especially in the United States of the 1970's, is a very expensive proposition, since raising pay at the bottom requires increases in higher ranks and in retirement pay. The 1974 budget outlays projected for the U.S. AVF are about four times the original estimate for a military force of comparable size. Whereas in 1968 the U.S. Armed Forces consisted of about 3,547,000 men and women and the costs for manpower amounted to \$32.6 billion, in 1974, 2,233,000 individuals are to cost \$43.9 billion. An AVF, with 1,314,000 fewer men and women, 37 percent smaller than a combined volunteer and draft force, will cost over 30 percent more.

Thus, even with inflation, the United States will be spending some \$6 billion more in fiscal 1974 for only two-thirds of the number of men and women in uniform than had been the case in 1968. For 1,314,000 less personnel we will have to pay \$12.3 billion more.¹⁶ Most important, perhaps, is the fact that this increase in expenditure represents an overrun of approximately 300 percent over the estimated 1971 costs predicted by the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Force.¹⁷

It has been suggested, and probably rightly so, that the President and the U.S. Congress have written into law the concept—hitherto alien to Americans—of one man's money for another man's blood.

Conclusion. It may have always been true that wealth, position, family, and education could relieve some Americans from military service. However, it was equally true that under the draft the Armed Forces could count on officers

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that came from almost all walks of life. If there ever was a "military mentality," there now exists a strong possibility that such a mentality will become more pronounced in the AVF. The AVF officer corps may well almost exclusively consist of professional career-oriented individuals who will come to see their values, mostly middle class, southern, or midwestern, as those leading to the salvation of the Nation's foreign and domestic ills. The attitudes of AVF officers in the future, when compared to the values of the society as a whole, may have some resemblance to the officers recently returned from captivity in Vietnam. No longer will a broader, more inclusive, American world view be equally part of an officer's perceived perimeters to Duty, Honor, and Country.

Some will argue that this is exactly the type of men desirable for a U.S. military force of the future. Yet, some of the immense strength of America lies in the heterogeneity of its culture patterns and social structure; no socially isolated group as the AVF may well become can be expected to defend the multiplicity of ideals held by an increasingly pluralistic American population.

There has taken place in the last few years in the United States a growth in class distinction. Not surprising, then, is the fact that during the Vietnam conflict most draft dodgers came from the upper middle class. Most Americans killed in Vietnam—except for officers and special volunteers—on the other hand, came from the lower middle and lower classes.

In recent politics, as well, a similar case could perhaps be made; the upper middle class and the intellectual northeastern State of Massachusetts tended to vote for Senator McGovern in the last (1972) U.S. presidential election. The rest of the country voted for "patriotism and morality." A pronounced difference then has appeared between the traditional American and the cosmopolitan, upper middle class American.

Although class distinctions are still much weaker in the United States than in Europe, the AVF may well come to represent an officer corps that holds values quite different from the enlisted ranks. Racial strife may come to mean class conflict rather than only racial confrontation. Quality in such an AVF consisting of poorer, less educated volunteers may well become an insurmountable problem in a technologically sophisticated era where one aircraft carrier alone will cost in excess of \$1 billion.

It may come to pass that the AVF in the 1970's may become as isolated from the rest of the country as such elitist institutions as Harvard. And it may also come to pass that an AVF and its leadership may become more reluctant to defend the intellectual constructs of men seen as no longer representing "our American ideals."

Finally, it may well be asked if in the future the fiscal and social restraints of the AVF will force the United States to abdicate from its role as a great Nation.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY



Professor Felix Moos did his undergraduate work at the University of Cincinnati and earned both a master's degree and a doctorate in anthropology from the University of Washington. He has done considerable field work in applied anthropology in Japan, Korea, and Micronesia and has held a Fulbright Scholarship for study in Japan from 1958 to 1960, a General Research Grant from the University of Kansas, a Ford Foundation Fellowship, and was codirector of Themis Project, University of Kansas, 1969-72. Before occupying the Claude V. Ricketts Chair of Comparative Cultures at the Naval War College, Professor Moos was Director, Center for East Asian Studies at the University of Kansas.

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FOOTNOTES

1. Although the services are no longer inducting any draftees, the Selective Service will continue to list the names of the Nation's 18-year-olds subject to the draft. Selective Service law still requires that all 18-year-old American males must register with a state Selective Service board.

At this time, March 1973, it is expected that the induction provision of the current draft law will expire 30 June. Congress, however, can renew inductions whenever a national emergency warrants such action.

2. Karl von Clausewitz, *On War*, O.J. Matthijs Jolles, trans. (Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1950), p. 577-583; Clausewitz in describing this change in the nature of war states:

Since the time of Bonaparte, war, through being first on one side, then on the other, again an affair of the whole nation, has assumed quite a new nature, or rather it has approached much nearer to its real nature, to its absolute perfection. The means then called forth had no visible limit, the limit lost itself in the energy and enthusiasm of the governments and their subjects. By the extent of the means and the wide field of possible results, as well as by the powerful excitement of feeling, energy in the conduct of war was immensely increased, the object of its action was the overthrow of the foe; and not until the enemy lay powerless on the ground was it supposed to be possible to stop and to come to any understanding with respect to the mutual objects of the contest.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 127.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 127.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 127. In discussing "The Chief Moral Powers" Clausewitz cautions a commander never to undervalue the talents of the commander, the military virtue of the army, and its national feeling. He reminds his readers that, "It is better to adduce sufficient evidence from history of the undeniable efficacy of these three things."

6. Comte J.A.H. de Guibert, *Essai General de Tactique* (London, 1772), p. 33.

7. When the cahiers de doléances of 1789 in France called for the abolition of the then existing provincial militias, it was implied that the political reforms which followed the Revolution would make armed forces less and not more necessary. As a consequence the Royal Army was broken up.

8. Already, in December 1789, Dubois-Crancé had pleaded for universal short service and a small regular army. He argued that citizenship and the obligations of military service should go together. By the end of 1792 when it was estimated that 300,000 new recruits were needed, it became clear that no such goal would be forthcoming from volunteers alone and that, thus, the voluntary system had completely failed.

The slogan the "Army wants to join You" is one of the U.S. Army's current recruiting slogans.

9. Military service was legally due from all Frenchmen between the ages of 20 and 25. But there were limits upon universality even within these ages. First, the laws expressly exempted many groups from military service: married men; those, whether married or not, with dependents; and later, priests. Next—for financial and economic reasons—it was normal, until the last critical years of the Empire, to call up only a proportion of those named on the lists. Finally, it was possible for those chosen to find a substitute or replacement, a privilege already established and made legal in May 1802.

10. One revolutionary principle quite clearly infringed by this whole process was that of equality. However fairly the original selection was made by lot, the subsequent privilege of providing a replacement worked all too obviously in favor of the rich. In the Côte d'Or, for example, during the middle years of the Empire, the cost of a substitute varied from about 2,000 to 3,500 francs, and only a very small percentage of the population could afford that price.

11. Under Scharnhorst's control from 1809, the Ministry of War helped to break down the divorce between the army and the nation which had contributed so much to the collapse of Prussia in 1806.

12. When the time of crisis arrived in 1813, the idea of mobilizing national manpower had been sufficiently debated and planned to make it possible to act within a minimum of time. In February 1813 universal conscription was applied to Prussia as a whole.

13. A royal order of August 1808 declared that

a claim to the position of officer shall from now on be warranted, in peace-time by knowledge and education, in time of war by exceptional bravery and quickness of perception . . . All social preference which has hitherto existed is herewith terminated in the military establishment, and everyone, without regard for his background has the same duties and the same rights.

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14. By 1813 all Prussians between the ages of 17 and 40, if not already in the army or its volunteer Jaeger detachments, were formed into a *Landwehr* or into forces for home defense and guerrilla operations. These moves were inspired by the same spirit as the *levée en masse* had been in revolutionary France. By the end of 1813 Prussia had about 6 percent of the population, nearly 300,000 men, under arms, a force nearly twice as large as the standing army of Frederick the Great.

15. It is perhaps interesting to note that if war, looked at from the point of view of manpower, had changed its character, this was much less true of the weapons those men used. While the political revolution had released moral forces of incalculable significance, the early industrial revolution did nothing comparable for the material and technical aspects of war. Today the reverse may well be true.

16. The Defense Department wants to spend \$79 billion in the fiscal year starting July 1973 for its shrinking "peacetime" forces. Seventy-nine billion is more than the Pentagon was spending annually in the late 1960's, when the Vietnam war was at its peak and when 3.5 million men were in uniform. By mid-1974, personnel levels are expected to bottom at the lowest mark since 1950 just before the Korean war. The Defense Department's budget for 1950 totaled some \$12 billions.

17. The proposal for the year starting 1 July 1973 exceeds the military's current spending estimates—\$74.8 billion—by 4.2 billion. The extra money is needed, according to the Pentagon, because of skyrocketing salaries and inflation.



An army raised without proper regard to the choice of its recruits was never yet made good by length of time.

Vegetius: De Re Militari, i, 378