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Europe at Risk

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ground of experience and knowledge to his relations with the three armed forces. But it was not altogether a harmonious relationship. "He had difficulties with the War Office which dated back to the nineteenth century, and four decades of experience in the twentieth century had done little to mellow his belief that it was hidebound, devoid of imagination, extravagant of manpower, and tenaciously engaged in fighting the previous war."

On a personal level, Churchill had to work most directly with the three service chiefs. These men had to bear the brunt of his frequent temper storms and translate his desires into plans and orders. Of all the members of the COS, those who suffered most from these storms were the holders of the office of CIGS (Chief of the Imperial General Staff). That office was held for a brief period by Gen. Edmund Ironside, but after the evacuation at Dunkirk he was succeeded by Gen. Sir John Dill, a talented, honest, and thoroughly professional officer. Unfortunately, he could not stand up to Churchill's brusqueness of manner. As Schoenfeld writes, "Churchill in debate could use harsh language that he never intended in spirit, and it must have been difficult for Dill to bear accusations of being 'the dead hand of inaction.'"

In November of 1941, during the most bitter days of the war, Churchill replaced Dill with Sir Alan Brooke. This relationship too had its time of trial and stress, but it survived and eventually led Britain to victory. Many of those periods of stress are related by Schoenfeld, and it is a fascinating account. Brooke himself remarked of the experience: "He is the most difficult man I have ever served, but thank God for having given me the opportunity of trying to serve such a man. . . ."

Like many another chief of state in wartime, Churchill was often tempted to involve himself in the military direction of the war effort. It is Schoenfeld's

judgment that "Churchill was rather quick to become involved in dictating tactical operations to a responsible commander on the scene." Because he had been First Lord during the first war and perhaps too because he had a sailor's love of ships, Churchill found it most tempting of all to meddle in the affairs of the Royal Navy. He met with failure as often as success in his attempts, but his rationale for doing so was clear. Standing at the center of the war effort, Churchill believed that viewing it in its fullness was important. And he, of course, was the one man who could do so. But Schoenfeld is quick to remind us that although the mistakes he made playing this role should not be exaggerated, "neither should they be ignored or excused."

Mr. Schoenfeld's work does not "debunk" Churchill nor does it even tarnish the image of the hero. What it does is to make that hero more real, more vital, and more believable as one of the most significant *dramatis personae* of recent world history.

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Watson, Alan. *Europe at Risk*. London: George G. Harrap & Co., Ltd., 1972. 224p.

Can Europe leave behind the outmoded concepts of narrowly based nationalism which have characterized the politics of her constituent peoples since the rise of the nation-state and transform herself into a model of economic and political interdependence? Alan Watson in his recent book *Europe at Risk* would seem to answer yes, but perhaps while his work is both highly readable and informative, the reader comes away feeling more that the Western European nations should move toward some form of federalized union rather than being convinced that, in fact, they will.

The case for a united Western Europe

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is clearly stated, and the entire book serves as an effective advocacy for the supranational European ideal of Monnet and Schuman as opposed to the more conservative Gaullist notion of a Europe of the Fatherlands. Watson, an Englishman writing during Britain's "Great Debate" over entry into the Common Market, posits that Europe today is in a "race against failure." While the bulk of today's discussion on the Common Market is economic and commercial, the long-term concerns of a growing and maturing EEC must be political. Europeans must move beyond viewing the issues simply in terms of immediate cost and short-run economic benefit and recognize that the future world role and sovereignty of Europe is at stake. The challenges posed by Western Europe's economic and technological disorganization, the loss of political sovereignty by individual European states in a world dominated by the superpowers, and the dangers inherent in West Germany's anomalous position between East and West can only be adequately addressed by Europeans within the context of a united Europe.

Europe at Risk is concerned with the proper long-term approach to problems facing Europe; it is not a blueprint for a United States of Europe. Rather it argues for an approach to problems which looks beyond the provincialism of the past.

While Watson artfully makes his point that a united Europe could yield many advantages for Europeans and non-Europeans alike, his analysis of the pitfalls which hampered earlier efforts to foster greater political and economic integration in postwar Europe leave the reader uncertain whether any more will be accomplished in the 1970's. Parliamentary democracies operating in nine different political environments and subject to a host of diverse domestic pressure groups and public opinion mobilized by sophisticated mass media are not likely to rightly cast aside old

inbred national points of view. Nevertheless, Alan Watson's *Europe at Risk* provides valuable insights into the politics of Europe since 1945 and, as such, contributes to our understanding of the forces at work in Europe today.

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Yarmolinsky, Adam, ed. *The Military and American Society, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. Philadelphia, Pa.: 1973. v. 406.

The books and articles that have recently been written on the role of the military in American society are highly political and even polemical in most cases. The authors of these diverse pieces of literature have often constructed elaborate theoretical treatises upon subjective foundations. For instance, an author such as Richard Barnett in his book *The Economy of Death* bases his entire analysis upon the assumption that American foreign policy is decided by the decisionmaking elite of "the military-industrial complex." An entirely different view of the world emerges from groups such as the conservative American Security Council which bases its analyses upon the assumption that the Soviet Union is attempting to take over the world. The news media confound the picture by presenting snatches of such diverse opinions as the above in documentaries such as the recent two-part series "The American Military in the Seventies." In short, the American public is literally inundated by books, articles, and news specials concerning the future role of the American military but is only rarely presented with a broad, coherent picture of the present status and probable future uses of American military power.

A book that very effectively analyzes the twofold question of what the role of the American military should be within American society and within the international system has just been published