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## Professional Reading

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
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## PROFESSIONAL READING

Fabian, Larry L. *Soldiers Without Enemies*. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1971. 315p.

A standing, internationally recruited and controlled peacekeeping force, able to be dispatched on the United Nations own authority to trouble spots around the world, is light years away. The holders of the power, responsibility, and influence needed to bring such a permanent force into being unreservedly do not want one; these include the U.N. and all of its important members—so says Larry L. Fabian of the Brookings Institution. How then, one might ask, has the U.N. achieved the success it has in averting major power confrontations over the Suez, Lebanon, and the Congo? How were the U.N. peacekeeping missions in Greece, Palestine, Indonesia, Kashmir, and West Iran fielded? A likely response might be, not very well!! However, Mr. Fabian is kinder than that and not only shows how the crises were averted and the forces marshaled, but describes in fascinating detail what it takes to create “soldiers without enemies.”

The maintenance of international peace and security requires not only soldiers, but a means to insure their preparedness. *Soldiers Without Enemies*, deals with this issue. The author explores the political history of readiness from before the League of Nations to the present and isolates the factors most instrumental in shaping institutions and diplomacy for the development of peacekeeping forces. A further detailed examination of the success and failure

of the national programs inaugurated by the Nordic countries in support of the U.N. illustrates vividly the problems and choices faced by the peacekeepers. It additionally illuminates a path for future force planning.

In contrasting the expertise of these middle powers with the stagnation of the powerless U.N. Military Staff Committee, the author brings the issue to a head. He proposes a “medium-range strategy” which calls for more involvement by qualified and interested peacekeepers like the Nordic bloc, while stressing the need for superpower detachment from the preparedness system. The requirement for political consensus in limiting force development to peacekeeping forces is an essential ingredient of his strategy. “To reach higher would endanger even this uncertain prospect.” The implementation of these and the remaining points of the author’s plan would require the establishment of a new forum, which he calls “The Special United Nations Preparedness Review Group.” It would consist of components from the Security Council, the Secretariat, and the General Assembly. Its charge would be to consider, at the outset, the status of current and future national force readiness, to structure agreements under which these troops may be deployed, and to give the Military Staff Committee the function of planning and coordinating this peacekeeping activity.

While it is questionable whether or not these proposals are any better than others now collecting dust on the

shelves at the U.N., it is clear that Mr. Fabian, in his scholarly fashion, focused on the problem and offered a plausible solution. Hopefully, the U.N. can do the same.

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Kuzmack, Arnold M. *Naval Force Levels and Modernization: an Analysis of Shipbuilding Requirements*. Washington, Brookings Institution, 1971. 47p.

Writing under the auspices of the Brookings Institution, Arnold Kuzmack addresses the problem of "block obsolescence" in the construction of naval ships. The problem is seen to lie in the area of the size of the funds involved and the implications for the future size and shape [form] of the Navy. The author's thesis is that

decisions about naval shipbuilding programs should be geared to decisions about the levels of naval forces to be maintained in the 1970's. Unless this is done, a continuing inconsistency between naval force levels and shipbuilding programs may create . . . growing problems of obsolescence . . . [and] structural imbalances within the navy since obsolescence is apt to fall with special impact on fleet support.

The paper does not recommend any given level of shipbuilding, nor does it evaluate political strategic and technical considerations inherent in a choice between alternative force structures and levels. The author bases his report on an analysis carried out before the President's 1972 budget proposals to Congress were announced, although it does consider the pattern of ship construction programs outlined in the series of posture papers presented annually to Congress by the Secretary of Defense.

By following a planned program of ship construction based upon projections of necessary force levels, Mr. Kuzmack suggests the Navy should be able to overcome the serious problems it now faces created by "block obsolescence." The author argues that planners should calculate the projected date of obsolescence of existing forces and balance this reduction in strength with carefully programed new construction. While this does not require replacement on a ship-to-ship basis, it will insure the continual existence of operational forces sufficient to achieve the Navy's mission. Since the determination of the rate of obsolescence of existing forces is more complex than the assignment of a programed age limit to weapons systems, technological change can drastically alter such rates. Breakthroughs which might make new units obsolete overnight are highly unlikely. Modular construction in the new generation of ships, too, will have drastic effects upon the operational life of future construction. As new weapons systems and propulsion plants are designed, they will be able to be installed in the already existing hulls, replacing less effective equipment. This "built-in FRAM capability" will give longer life and greater capabilities to ship systems which are now under construction.

The basic model underlying this monograph is one in which required naval force levels are explicitly determined by a precise definition of a navy's mission and in which programs of new ship construction are planned according to the necessity of achieving desired force levels at a given point in time. This can be schematized as:

mission → force levels → new construction

The explication and illustration of this three-step relationship in the determination of the proper rates and patterns of naval ship construction is the core of Mr. Kuzmack's argument.

The author illustrates the application