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

PROFESSIONAL READING

Clotfelter, James. *The Military in American Politics.* New York: Harper & Row, 1973. 244p.

Today one must carry Diogenes' lamp with considerably greater patience than the old man if one earnestly seeks an honest (objective, balanced, fair) contemporary book on the American Military Establishment. The available works, even those demonstrating a degree of insight (Ward Just--*Military Men*) can be reduced to expressions of personal bias, with or without research. Now the lamp may be extinguished—James Clotfelter has produced a serious, low-key, scholarly analysis of the American military's relationships with the major sectors of its society that should be applauded by academicians and military professionals alike.

The author's stated objective is to "describe and analyze behavioral patterns which involve the military and civilian groups." He has succeeded admirably in his effort to provide a nonpolemic and balanced look at the Military Establishment in America and its interaction with Congress, industry, the media, academia, and the public at large.

The book covers a wide range of subtopics for examination, including the "military-industrial-administrative complex." He asks such questions as: "Has the military spiraled out of control?"; "Have ties to the military corrupted the scientific and academic communities?"; and "Has pervasive militarism of American culture affected the mass media, schools, and public attitude?"

Mr. Clotfelter answers these questions by examining the background of each subtopic, bringing into focus the major encompassing issues. Balance is the most apparent characteristic of the book. Each viewpoint is represented by reputable and articulate spokesmen preceded by a well documented backgrounder.

The book opens with a concise, interesting history of the American Military Establishment's problems with its society. The "Military-Industrial Complex" is analyzed in terms of identifiable group behavior, but the actual influence on defense contracts is later shown to originate in the Congress, with the real power in the House. Mr. Clotfelter points out early, and reemphasizes throughout the book, that the one major charge that can be substantiated against the Defense Establishment is its size—"The production and distribution system managed by the Pentagon is the largest planned economy outside of the Soviet Union." His treatment of the military and media is interesting but not as extensive as that provided to other topics, and he concludes in this part that, "The military may have come to perceive the mass media generally as its major institutional enemy." Public opinion in response to the military and national security is shown to be fickle and possessed of a short attention span—"The public reacts to [foreign threats] with irrational aggression or demands withdrawal if this is not possible." Some public responses are surprising as well as expectedly contra-

dictory. For example, the Gallup Poll found in 1969 that 79 percent of the population favored Universal Military Service, while during the same period 52 percent said that too much money was being spent on the military.

The chapters on Defense Department control of the military and DOD involvement in foreign policy concentrate again on the behavioral patterns of the groups involved and include two excellent chronological tables of major defense issues and their outcomes from 1945 to 1970. There also is a readable, concise history of military influence on major foreign policy decisions concerning Korea, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Vietnam.

The book is very quotable (by either side) and is thoroughly documented. The principal criticism of this excellent work is the disconnected format. The chapters indeed provide answers to the hard questions posed in the introduction, but one must work patiently to organize the main points into some meaningful pattern of thought. The book lacks an underlying theme, although the individual chapters approach each issue with essentially the same balanced structure—which is undoubtedly advantageous to the researcher. The concluding chapter does little more than to highlight what Mr. Clotfelter considers to have been his principal conclusions stated in earlier parts of the book. Notwithstanding these minor criticisms, *The Military in American Politics* is a serious, scholarly, and balanced analysis of the American military profession in the 1970's and is highly recommended for every professional military bookshelf.

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Farwell, Byron. *Queen Victoria's Little Wars.* New York: Harper & Row, 1972. 394p.

Throughout Queen Victoria's long reign from 1837 to 1901, her soldiers were engaged every year somewhere in the world defending or extending her empire. Asia, Africa, America, and particularly India were the scenes of some remembered, many unreported, but mostly ignored, small imperial wars. In an easy and a readable style, Byron Farwell has chronicled some of the better known and some of the unknown little wars of this remarkable era.

If many of the military achievements are now forgotten, they are nonetheless impressive. For example, Maj. Gen. Sir George Pollock and his army in 1842 were the first to force the Khyber Pass. Even Tamberlaine had to bribe the Afridis, who controlled the pass, to let him through. Following rioting in Alexandria in 1882, the British mounted an expedition to bring order to Egypt (really to make her subservient to British wishes). At Tel-el kebir, General Wolseley conducted a night march, involving more than 17,000 men and 61 guns, through the desert with the aid of Royal Navy Navigators. This flanking movement was successful in routing the Egyptian and Sudanese forces. The expedition was completed within 2 months from the time the decision was made in London to conduct it.

The use of the British Armies in the 19th century was a reflection of an exceptionally vigorous, dynamic, and self-confident society. Aside from understandable reasons such as the protection of British citizens or the maintenance of British prestige, however perceived or defined, much of the motivation behind the extension of British authority was the firm belief that British rule, or at least influence, would bring the benefits and blessings of British civilization to the natives who, at times, were perversely ungrateful. Also, the extension of the Queen's empire was necessary in many cases to prevent the Tsar from extending his empire. Add to these reasons the general lack of interest in most instances of the British public and politicians and slowness of com-

munications, the resultant absence of meddling from Whitehall, and the resourcefulness and the initiative of the local commanders and the number and the frequency of these small wars become understandable.

After Waterloo the British Army engaged in only two wars that could be considered extensive by the standards of the time: The Crimean War and the Boer War. In both wars the performance of the commanders in the field and of the civilian managers at home left much to be desired. But most of the wars fought in the 19th century were small. Usually they involved no more than 10,000 men and frequently less. In these small encounters the army and its leaders showed their mettle and demonstrated an enviable degree of professional competence.

The key to the success of British arms lay in the quality of the leaders, most of whom joined one regiment or another in their late teens and remained there. As a rule Victorian officers had a fierce desire for glory and held the conviction that all English gentlemen were born courageous. With pluck, determination, raw courage, stamina, and self-confidence, the British officers trained and led European, Indian, and African troops in countless numbers of small but difficult engagements, wars, and expeditions to places with strange names, many of which are all but forgotten, save among antiquarians and regimental historians.

This attitude of the British officer was typified many years later by Sir Garnet Wolseley (then a field marshal and a viscount), who admitted that before battle he was sometimes nervous, because he feared that he would die "without having made the name for myself which I always hoped a kind and merciful God might permit me to win." Mr. Farwell notes that this must have been the only fear of the typical young 19th century British officer.

These wars were not all cowboys-and-Indians fights between the civilizing British and unruly tribesmen. The Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 was a desperate, grim series of events, which could have spelled the end of British rule in India had it been better led. As it was, the mutiny was a ghastly affair with shocking atrocities committed on both sides. At Cawnpore, near Delhi, 350 British soldiers held off over 3,000 mutineers. The rebel leader gave to the garrison and to the women and children inside a written safe conduct by river boat to Allahabad. When the Europeans reached the riverbank and were embarked in boats, cannon loaded with grapeshot were fired pointblank at them. One hundred twenty-five women and children survived and were taken prisoner. The day before the relief expedition arrived, they were murdered. The relief force discovered their shoes in neat rows with the feet still in them. The mangled corpses had been tossed into a well.

It is difficult in this day, inured as we are to atrocities, to imagine the sensation of horror the Cawnpore massacre created in Europe. The fierce cry for revenge was answered by ruthless suppression of the mutiny, which was visited upon even suspected mutineers as a precaution, if for no other reason.

The Crimean War demonstrated that the British Army was not organized to fight even a moderate-sized war, to say nothing of a major war. However, the army organization was admirably suited to the small, imperial wars that were a constant factor of Queen Victoria's reign. The basic unit or organization was the regiment, which was a self-contained unit. Young officers would join a regiment before they were 20 and frequently remained with it for life. The same with the private soldiers, to whom the regiment was "mother, sister, and mistress." With their own uniforms, promotions, traditions, and close contact among usually very capable men, it is not surprising that the various regi-

ments developed an *esprit* which made them highly effective but relatively small fighting units.

If the Crimean War saw the last active service of the old Waterloo veterans, the tactics and techniques used by Wellington and his predecessors were long in dying. The Duke of Cambridge, a grandson of King George III and first cousin to Queen Victoria, resisted the Cardwell Army Reforms instituted in the 1860's. Interestingly enough, he was a major general at 26 and was Commander-in-Chief of the Army from 1856 until 1895.

Contemporary military officers will be struck by two distinct differences in modern military life from that of the 19th century. The first is the extraordinary active duty longevity of many of the officers. Receiving a commission while still in their teens, many officers would remain on active duty until they either died or resigned. Sir Bindon Blood must have set a record; he died in 1940, just short of his 98th birthday, having been on the army list for over 80 years. Field Marshals Roberts, Wood, and Wolseley all lived beyond 80. There were no retirements for physical disability, and many of the senior officers had an interesting assortment of physical infirmities which did not, as a rule, unduly hamper them in the discharge of their duties.

The other difference is the role of women. Marriage *was* ruinous to the prospects of a young officer. Most delayed until they had reached the grade of major, although some married as captains. Women were expected to understand the role of honor, which necessitated extensive separations punctuated by home leaves and convalescent leaves. Women who accompanied their husbands seldom failed to display exceptional courage and fortitude, as they did during the siege of Lucknow.

Perhaps the most interesting exception to the general role of Victorian women was Mrs. Frances Duberly, wife of Capt. Henry Duberly, paymaster of the 8th Royal Irish Hussars. She not only accompanied her husband to the battlefield in the Crimea, but she remained there. She stayed on navy ships until she was finally put ashore. She even rode Lord Cardigan's horse and witnessed the charge of the Light Brigade. Although she was feted in the field, presumably without objection by Captain Duberly, she was unpopular at home and was snubbed by Queen Victoria when she wanted to dedicate a book describing her experiences to Her Majesty.

Mr. Farwell has written good military history and entertaining reading as well.

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Klare, Michael T. *War Without End: American Planning For the Next Vietnams*. New York: Knopf, 1972. 464p.

War Without End is a compendious military research book which considers in depth "the development of new strategies and techniques for counter-insurgency—while contributing to the broader assault on the assumptions of American foreign policy." Michael Klare, a 29-year-old member of the North American Congress on Latin America, includes also a brief guide to research on the U.S. Defense Establishment.

One often hears it said that the introduction is the most significant, or at least the most widely read, part of a book. If this is true, then Klare has done himself a disservice with his poorly organized opening chapter. Yet several basic points do come across in this introduction. For instance, Klare expresses distaste for American expansionism, which he views as "*the way of life in this society.*" The author furthermore states that the only way to check American expansionism is to completely

dismantle the capability of the Pentagon (and its related police and military assistance) to intervene in other countries. Klare appears convinced that the United States has imperialist designs on all but the largest powers, and he denounces these intentions with much fervor throughout (the book is marred by the author's repeated use of italics and underlinings).

War Without End is not free from errors in its documentation. For example, in referring to the effectiveness of OPS agents during the Dominican Republic crisis of 1965, Klare cites an article published in *The Los Angeles Times* on 10 February 1963.

These negative observations notwithstanding, one finds many worthwhile points in this book. Klare is especially strong in discussing McNamara-inspired military developments of the sixties and seventies, in outlining the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean area, and in dealing with the counterinsurgency laboratories. The chapter on "The Latin American Military," furthermore shows evidence of a great deal of research, intelligently compressed.

Almost all of the "Notes" are drawn from published, unclassified documents available to the public (in his recent *Men of Intelligence*, General Strong, an intelligence professional who held a key allied position during World War II, affirms that most worthwhile intelligence is garnered from just such sources). Of the five appendixes, most are of marginal interest. But the appendix dealing with "U.S. Military Assistance Program Expenditures by Country, Fiscal Years 1950-1969" seems quite valuable.

If consulted selectively, then, *War Without End* can be read with profit by anyone interested in the future of American military strategy.

JAMES J. KIRSCHKE
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Mahon, John K. *The War of 1812.* Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1972. 476p.

In a very traditional sense, Dr. John Mahon has written a history book. *The War of 1812* is a well-documented, thoroughly researched, and, in fact, a definitive study of one of the most misunderstood conflicts in our history. The author neither grinds an interpretive ax nor exercises poetic license but reports, accurately and faithfully, the often complex and geographically fragmented events of the war. The style is more than a little terse, and it is doubtful that anyone would pick up this volume for light reading in the evening, but it should serve as the starting point for any serious student of the period for it is one of the best factual accounts of the "second war for independence" ever written.

There has been a proliferation recently of what have become known as "popular histories." Writing in a vein that has proved both popular and profitable, authors have selected dramatic themes and have attempted to fill their volumes with "meaningful" social analogies. This has, on the whole, been a valuable and beneficial development, but there is still an important place for the traditional historian: the man who patiently treads through the original sources and presents to us the facts as they occurred with a minimum of fanfare. John Mahon is that kind of historian. He has produced a volume that is exactly what it purports to be: a detailed factual study of the events of the War of 1812.

Not the least of the attractions of the book is the copius documentation. It includes an exhaustive (one is tempted to say definitive) bibliography, and it is well indexed. It will no doubt become an invaluable research tool and, in fact, the author himself states that it is his hope that the book "will serve in part as a reference work."

Two other laudable aspects of this

volume deserve mention here. Unlike many of his predecessors, Mahon pays considerable attention to the "minor" frontier skirmishes in upper Canada as well as the more famous and well-documented battles on land and at sea. Secondly, the author has performed a great service to lay readers by explaining thoroughly, almost painfully, every technical term used in the text. Hence one finds simple and clear definitions of such terms as "weather gage," "tacking," and "abaft the beam" in the narrative of the naval battles.

Though destined, I fear, for the dusty bookshelves, this is a fine work and a significant contribution to historical knowledge.

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Sapolsky, Harvey M. *The Polaris System Development.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972. 261p.

As the Navy prepares to embark upon its controversial $15 billion Trident fleet ballistic submarine (FBM) program, it might be well to look at the development of the Polaris FBM system in order to see what lessons might be gleaned. For Polaris is not only the forerunner of Trident, but it is also the most successful weapon system development program in the history of the Department of Defense. Fortunately, the first exhaustive analysis of the Polaris program has recently been written by Harvey M. Sapolsky, a political scientist from MIT.

Relying not only on official Navy records but also conducting some 400 interviews with participants in the program, Sapolsky has produced an insightful and detailed case study of a spectacularly successful governmental program. So thorough is the author's study that its completion took almost as long as the Polaris program itself. Sapolsky began his initial research in May 1967, but the book was not published until late 1972.

Sapolsky finds four causes for the success of the Polaris program. First, it was started at the right time, i.e., when technological opportunity and national needs were converging. Second, the program was managed by a group of brilliant, hard-driving men who were able to impart a sense of messianic zeal to their coworkers and subordinates. Third, the program's sponsors were skilled in the strategies of bureaucratic politics. Fourth, the program's managers used sound techniques.

The most valuable parts of *The Polaris System Development* are the discussions of two of the four reasons for the program's success, i.e., the bureaucratic political strategies and management techniques used by the program directors. During the decade of development and production of Polaris submarines and missiles, the directors employed four strategies: differentiation—developed a unique mission for Polaris and separated the program from the mainstream of naval activities; cooperation—brought potential critics into the program and implicated them in its activities; moderation—worked in unpretentious spaces and did not identify or compensate FBM crews in any way that would mark them as an elite corps; and managerial innovation—introduced techniques that appeared to indicate unique managerial competence, e.g., Program Evaluation and Review Technique, or PERT.

Although the PERT system was developed by the men who directed the Polaris program and although in some quarters PERT has become more famous than Polaris, they did not really use it to manage the Polaris program. Rather, the program directors used what might be described as simple, old-fashioned, straightforward, carrot and stick management techniques. PERT was a "lot of pizzaz" used as a protective veneer to impress outsiders, particularly in the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Congress, and to keep

these people from challenging the program's goals and methods.

In many ways this book is replete with irony. Although it is the definitive work on the successful production and development of a $10 billion weapon system, it has been written not by a management expert or a systems analyst, but by a political scientist. Although the directions of this program became renowned for their managerial techniques, their success was due to their political acumen. If Sapolsky's work has any lesson for the Trident program, it would seem to be that just as war is too important to be left to the generals, weapon system development is too important to be left to the managers or technicians.

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Weigley, Russell F. *The American Way of War: a History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*. New York: Macmillan, 1973. 584p.

The subtitle of Russell Weigley's book may surprise many students of American military history for it has been generally believed that, at least prior to the onset of the cold war, no such thing as *American* strategy could be said to exist. Only three Americans are mentioned in Edward Mead Earle's classic *Makers of Modern Strategy*, and only one of them, Alfred T. Mahan, produced a systematic treatise on the subject. As Professor Weigley himself observes "throughout American history . . . the United States usually possessed no national strategy for the employment of the use of force or the threat of force to attain political ends. . . . The United States was not involved in international politics continuously enough or with enough consistency of purpose to permit the development of a coherent national strategy . . . "

Nevertheless, the author believes that he has found a consistent pattern running through most of American history which suggests a distinctive American approach to warfare: an "American Way of War." Professor Weigley has found this pattern not in the writings of theorists, of which there are few, but in the actions of American military leaders from George Washington and Winfield Scott to MacArthur and Marshall.

According to Professor Weigley the American Way of War has been to seek the complete destruction of the enemy's armed forces and his means of waging war. "Most American strategists," the author observes have been "strategists of annihilation." From Napoleon and his interpreters who, the author claims dominated the imagination of American military men in the 19th century, they derived the concept of the climactic battle resulting in the complete physical destruction of the enemy's army.

During the Civil War, Grant abandoned the practice of trying to win the war in a single decisive battle which commanders on both sides had repeatedly attempted, for a massive campaign of attrition designed to destroy the Confederate Armies. Nevertheless, the aim remained the same: the annihilation of the enemy. Having learned their lesson in annihilation well, American soldiers, Professor Weigley suggests, then proceeded to practice it with frightening literalness in their campaigns against the Indians.

Alfred Thayer Mahan, with his theories of seapower, and Gen. William Mitchell, with his ideas of airpower, both contributed in their way to the American concept of war: through annihilation. According to Mahan this would be accomplished through the destruction of the enemy's battle fleet in a great battle for "control of the seas"; according to Mitchell, through devastating bombing campaigns which would cripple the enemy's centers of production and destroy his will to resist. The American way of war reached its

apogee in World War II with the complete destruction of Germany and Japan. Since that time, Professor Weigley suggests, it has been increasingly irrelevant. Yet many military men have been unable or unwilling to abandon the old American belief that the object of war is the total destruction of the enemy.

The American Way of War is an impressive achievement. Professor Weigley has given coherence and meaning to a subject which until now had been treated only in a fragmentary and confused manner. Although few specialists will agree with all of the author's judgments of such men as Lee, Grant, Mahan, Marshall, and MacArthur, his portraits of these and other key figures of American military history are always clear and illuminating. The author has devoted most of his study to the methods and strategy of the great American war leaders and with good reason. Yet one could wish that more attention had been given to the role which such institutions as the Army General Staff, the Navy General Board, and the War Colleges played in the formation of American strategy. But perhaps this would have required another book.

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Ψ

It is with books as with men: a very small number play a great part.

Voltaire: 1764