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Without End: American Planning For the Next Vietnams

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ments developed an *esprit* which made them highly effective but relatively small fighting units.

If the Crimean War saw the last active service of the old Waterloo veterans, the tactics and techniques used by Wellington and his predecessors were long in dying. The Duke of Cambridge, a grandson of King George III and first cousin to Queen Victoria, resisted the Cardwell Army Reforms instituted in the 1860's. Interestingly enough, he was a major general at 26 and was Commander-in-Chief of the Army from 1856 until 1895.

Contemporary military officers will be struck by two distinct differences in modern military life from that of the 19th century. The first is the extraordinary active duty longevity of many of the officers. Receiving a commission while still in their teens, many officers would remain on active duty until they either died or resigned. Sir Bindon Blood must have set a record; he died in 1940, just short of his 98th birthday, having been on the army list for over 80 years. Field Marshals Roberts, Wood, and Wolseley all lived beyond 80. There were no retirements for physical disability, and many of the senior officers had an interesting assortment of physical infirmities which did not, as a rule, unduly hamper them in the discharge of their duties.

The other difference is the role of women. Marriage was ruinous to the prospects of a young officer. Most delayed until they had reached the grade of major, although some married as captains. Women were expected to understand the role of honor, which necessitated extensive separations punctuated by home leaves and convalescent leaves. Women who accompanied their husbands seldom failed to display exceptional courage and fortitude, as they did during the siege of Lucknow.

Perhaps the most interesting exception to the general role of Victorian women was Mrs. Frances Duberly, wife

of Capt. Henry Duberly, paymaster of the 8th Royal Irish Hussars. She not only accompanied her husband to the battlefield in the Crimea, but she remained there. She stayed on navy ships until she was finally put ashore. She even rode Lord Cardigan's horse and witnessed the charge of the Light Brigade. Although she was feted in the field, presumably without objection by Captain Duberly, she was unpopular at home and was snubbed by Queen Victoria when she wanted to dedicate a book describing her experiences to Her Majesty.

Mr. Farwell has written good military history and entertaining reading as well.

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Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Klare, Michael T. *War Without End: American Planning For the Next Vietnams*. New York: Knopf, 1972. 464p.

War Without End is a compendious military research book which considers in depth "the development of new strategies and techniques for counter-insurgency—while contributing to the broader assault on the assumptions of American foreign policy." Michael Klare, a 29-year-old member of the North American Congress on Latin America, includes also a brief guide to research on the U.S. Defense Establishment.

One often hears it said that the introduction is the most significant, or at least the most widely read, part of a book. If this is true, then Klare has done himself a disservice with his poorly organized opening chapter. Yet several basic points do come across in this introduction. For instance, Klare expresses distaste for American expansionism, which he views as "the way of life in this society." The author furthermore states that the only way to check American expansionism is to completely

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dismantle the capability of the Pentagon (and its related police and military assistance) to intervene in other countries. Klare appears convinced that the United States has imperialist designs on all but the largest powers, and he denounces these intentions with much fervor throughout (the book is marred by the author's repeated use of italics and underlinings).

War Without End is not free from errors in its documentation. For example, in referring to the effectiveness of OPS agents during the Dominican Republic crisis of 1965, Klare cites an article published in *The Los Angeles Times* on 10 February 1963.

These negative observations notwithstanding, one finds many worthwhile points in this book. Klare is especially strong in discussing McNamara-inspired military developments of the sixties and seventies, in outlining the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean area, and in dealing with the counterinsurgency laboratories. The chapter on "The Latin American Military," furthermore shows evidence of a great deal of research, intelligently compressed.

Almost all of the "Notes" are drawn from published, unclassified documents available to the public (in his recent *Men of Intelligence*, General Strong, an intelligence professional who held a key allied position during World War II, affirms that most worthwhile intelligence is garnered from just such sources). Of the five appendixes, most are of marginal interest. But the appendix dealing with "U.S. Military Assistance Program Expenditures by Country, Fiscal Years 1950-1969" seems quite valuable.

If consulted selectively, then, *War Without End* can be read with profit by anyone interested in the future of American military strategy.

Mahon, John K. *The War of 1812*. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1972. 476p.

In a very traditional sense, Dr. John Mahon has written a history book. *The War of 1812* is a well-documented, thoroughly researched, and, in fact, a definitive study of one of the most misunderstood conflicts in our history. The author neither grinds an interpretive ax nor exercises poetic license but reports, accurately and faithfully, the often complex and geographically fragmented events of the war. The style is more than a little terse, and it is doubtful that anyone would pick up this volume for light reading in the evening, but it should serve as the starting point for any serious student of the period for it is one of the best factual accounts of the "second war for independence" ever written.

There has been a proliferation recently of what have become known as "popular histories." Writing in a vein that has proved both popular and profitable, authors have selected dramatic themes and have attempted to fill their volumes with "meaningful" social analogies. This has, on the whole, been a valuable and beneficial development, but there is still an important place for the traditional historian: the man who patiently treads through the original sources and presents to us the facts as they occurred with a minimum of fanfare. John Mahon is that kind of historian. He has produced a volume that is exactly what it purports to be: a detailed factual study of the events of the War of 1812.

Not the least of the attractions of the book is the copious documentation. It includes an exhaustive (one is tempted to say definitive) bibliography, and it is well indexed. It will no doubt become an invaluable research tool and, in fact, the author himself states that it is his hope that the book "will serve in part as a reference work."

Two other laudable aspects of this