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The War of 1812

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88 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

dismantle the capability of the Pentagon (and its related police and military assistance) to intervene in other countries. Klare appears convinced that the United States has imperialist designs on all but the largest powers, and he denounces these intentions with much fervor throughout (the book is marred by the author's repeated use of italics and underlinings).

War Without End is not free from errors in its documentation. For example, in referring to the effectiveness of OPS agents during the Dominican Republic crisis of 1965, Klare cites an article published in *The Los Angeles Times* on 10 February 1963.

These negative observations notwithstanding, one finds many worthwhile points in this book. Klare is especially strong in discussing McNamara-inspired military developments of the sixties and seventies, in outlining the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean area, and in dealing with the counterinsurgency laboratories. The chapter on "The Latin American Military," furthermore shows evidence of a great deal of research, intelligently compressed.

Almost all of the "Notes" are drawn from published, unclassified documents available to the public (in his recent *Men of Intelligence*, General Strong, an intelligence professional who held a key allied position during World War II, affirms that most worthwhile intelligence is garnered from just such sources). Of the five appendixes, most are of marginal interest. But the appendix dealing with "U.S. Military Assistance Program Expenditures by Country, Fiscal Years 1950-1969" seems quite valuable.

If consulted selectively, then, *War Without End* can be read with profit by anyone interested in the future of American military strategy.

Mahon, John K. *The War of 1812*. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1972. 476p.

In a very traditional sense, Dr. John Mahon has written a history book. *The War of 1812* is a well-documented, thoroughly researched, and, in fact, a definitive study of one of the most misunderstood conflicts in our history. The author neither grinds an interpretive ax nor exercises poetic license but reports, accurately and faithfully, the often complex and geographically fragmented events of the war. The style is more than a little terse, and it is doubtful that anyone would pick up this volume for light reading in the evening, but it should serve as the starting point for any serious student of the period for it is one of the best factual accounts of the "second war for independence" ever written.

There has been a proliferation recently of what have become known as "popular histories." Writing in a vein that has proved both popular and profitable, authors have selected dramatic themes and have attempted to fill their volumes with "meaningful" social analogies. This has, on the whole, been a valuable and beneficial development, but there is still an important place for the traditional historian: the man who patiently treads through the original sources and presents to us the facts as they occurred with a minimum of fanfare. John Mahon is that kind of historian. He has produced a volume that is exactly what it purports to be: a detailed factual study of the events of the War of 1812.

Not the least of the attractions of the book is the copious documentation. It includes an exhaustive (one is tempted to say definitive) bibliography, and it is well indexed. It will no doubt become an invaluable research tool and, in fact, the author himself states that it is his hope that the book "will serve in part as a reference work."

Two other laudable aspects of this

PROFESSIONAL READING 89

volume deserve mention here. Unlike many of his predecessors, Mahon pays considerable attention to the "minor" frontier skirmishes in upper Canada as well as the more famous and well-documented battles on land and at sea. Secondly, the author has performed a great service to lay readers by explaining thoroughly, almost painfully, every technical term used in the text. Hence one finds simple and clear definitions of such terms as "weather gage," "tacking," and "abaft the beam" in the narrative of the naval battles.

Though destined, I fear, for the dusty bookshelves, this is a fine work and a significant contribution to historical knowledge.

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Sapolsky, Harvey M. *The Polaris System Development*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972. 261p.

As the Navy prepares to embark upon its controversial \$15 billion Trident fleet ballistic submarine (FBM) program, it might be well to look at the development of the Polaris FBM system in order to see what lessons might be gleaned. For Polaris is not only the forerunner of Trident, but it is also the most successful weapon system development program in the history of the Department of Defense. Fortunately, the first exhaustive analysis of the Polaris program has recently been written by Harvey M. Sapolsky, a political scientist from MIT.

Relying not only on official Navy records but also conducting some 400 interviews with participants in the program, Sapolsky has produced an insightful and detailed case study of a spectacularly successful governmental program. So thorough is the author's study that its completion took almost as long as the Polaris program itself. Sapolsky began his initial research in May 1967, but the book was not published until late 1972.

Sapolsky finds four causes for the success of the Polaris program. First, it was started at the right time, i.e., when technological opportunity and national needs were converging. Second, the program was managed by a group of brilliant, hard-driving men who were able to impart a sense of messianic zeal to their coworkers and subordinates. Third, the program's sponsors were skilled in the strategies of bureaucratic politics. Fourth, the program's managers used sound techniques.

The most valuable parts of *The Polaris System Development* are the discussions of two of the four reasons for the program's success, i.e., the bureaucratic political strategies and management techniques used by the program directors. During the decade of development and production of Polaris submarines and missiles, the directors employed four strategies: differentiation—developed a unique mission for Polaris and separated the program from the mainstream of naval activities; cooperation—brought potential critics into the program and implicated them in its activities; moderation—worked in unpretentious spaces and did not identify or compensate FBM crews in any way that would mark them as an elite corps; and managerial innovation—introduced techniques that appeared to indicate unique managerial competence, e.g., Program Evaluation and Review Technique, or PERT.

Although the PERT system was developed by the men who directed the Polaris program and although in some quarters PERT has become more famous than Polaris, they did not really use it to manage the Polaris program. Rather, the program directors used what might be described as simple, old-fashioned, straightforward, carrot and stick management techniques. PERT was a "lot of pizzaz" used as a protective veneer to impress outsiders, particularly in the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Congress, and to keep